WorldWideScience

Sample records for biological weapons threat

  1. Weapons of mass destruction - current security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durdiak, J.; Gafrik, A.; Pulis, P.; Susko, M.

    2005-01-01

    This publication brings a complex and comprehensive view of the weapons of mass destruction phenomenon in the context of present military and political situation. It emphasizes the threat posed by proliferation of these destructive devices and their carriers as well as the threat present in their possession by unpredictable totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups. The publication is structured into four basic parts: Introduction Into The Topic, Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons. The Introduction reflects the latest developments on the field of military technologies, which lead to the development of new destructive devices with characteristics comparable to basic types of WMDs - nuclear, chemical and biological. Based on the definition of WMD as 'weapon systems with enormous impact causing mass destruction, population, equipment and material losses', the modern mass destruction devices are assorted here, such as ecological, radiological and beam weapons, aerosol and container intelligent ammunition, the outburst of dangerous chemical substances from infrastructure, non-conventional weapons and military devices. The Nuclear Weapons part depicts the most destructive device of mass destruction mankind ever invented in close detail. It maps the history of most significant discoveries in nuclear physics, development and construction of the first nuclear weapons, accumulation of nuclear warheads and their carriers in the Cold war era, attempts of nuclear disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in possession of superpowers and their proliferation in the world's crisis regions including North Korea and Iran. The chapters devoted to theoretical grounds and physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons' functioning, the main categories and types, as well as destructive effects and consequences of use contain an adequate mathematical apparatus. This chapter's conclusion brings the overview of nuclear armament of states that

  2. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-01-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  3. The bioscience revolution & the biological weapons threat: levers & interventions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martin Greg

    2009-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract In December 2008, the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, released a report, World At Risk. The Report points to the fact that, not only is the use of a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist attack before the end of 2013, more likely than not, but also to the fact that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use biological weapons than nuclear. This paper examines the recommendations of the report in the context of the historic and geopolitical changes, in particular globalization. The authors highlight the "dual-use" dilemma, as described in the report, as the paradoxical use of technology developed for the benefit of mankind being used for sinister purposes. The mitigation of such a threat lies in broad stakeholder involvement and cooperation, including non-state actors, governments and the bio-tech industry itself. The importance of vigilance measures within the life science community is emphasized and, the authors propose, could include a web-based didactic course in bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction identification. The site could outline safety protocols, have detailed disaster management tutorials, and could be specifically tailored for different subsets of industry and health professionals. The paper concludes with an endorsement of a multi-pronged approach including strong international guidelines and intelligence cooperation and preparatory measures such as the wide-spread use of detection systems as well as diagnostic decision support systems for bioterrorism detection at the local level.

  4. Turkey's response to threats of weapons of mass destruction

    OpenAIRE

    Al, Guray.

    2001-01-01

    Unlike most of its NATO allies, Turkey did not emerge from the Cold War with enhanced security. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles by its neighbors in the Middle Eastâ Iran, Iraq and Syriaâ creates a serious security concern for Turkey. This thesis analyzes the numerous threats posed to Turkey by its neighborsα nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and their ballistic missiles. It evaluates Turkeyαs defense options to counter these thre...

  5. Turkey’s Response to Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2001-12-01

    categories of unconventional weapons and was prepared to invest enormous financial and human resources to achieve this goal. 5 Iraqi attempts to seek...Ministry of Defense White Paper of 2001 defines “Religious Fundementalism ” among the internal threats directed against Turkey’s security in the post...Therefore, Syria will likely continue to develop an extensive chemical and biological weapons arsenal and will also invest in upgrading the accuracy of

  6. Chemical and biological weapons: new questions, new answers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hood, E

    1999-01-01

    The words "chemical and biological weapons" (CBW) send a shiver down most spines these days. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a massive nuclear confrontation appears remote, so today many popular doomsday scenarios center on the aggressive use of chemical or biological warfare by rogue nations or terrorist groups. As exaggerated as some of the accounts are, with CBW cast as the latest unseen, unstoppable enemy, the threat posed by these weapons is all too real, and growing. Images p931-a PMID:10585899

  7. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons; Armes de terreur. Debarrasser le monde des armes nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques - Commission sur les armes de destruction massive

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-07-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  8. The nuclear terrorist, radiological, biological, chemical threat. Medical approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gourmelon, P.; Vidal, D.; Renaudeau, C.

    2005-01-01

    This book illustrates the cooperation of the civil and the military experts in the domain of the NBRC (nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical threat). The different aspects bond to the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, are discussed. Al topics of each domains (NRBC) are presented: historical and fundamental aspects, diagnostic, therapeutic and prevention. (A.L.B.)

  9. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang Yenchiang

    2009-01-01

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  10. From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Koblentz, Gregory D

    2012-01-01

    The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, was held in Geneva in December 2011. On 7 December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became the highest-ranking US government official to address a BWC meeting. Secretary Clinton told the assembled delegation that ‘we view the risk of bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority’. At the same time, she warned that a large-scale disease outbreak ‘could cripple an already fragile global economy’. Secretary Clinton's speech reflected a new understanding that the range of biological threats to international security has expanded from state-sponsored biological warfare programmes to include biological terrorism, dual-use research and naturally occurring infectious diseases such as pandemics. Recognizing these changes, President Barack Obama released a new national strategy for countering biological threats in 2009. This strategy represents a shift in thinking away from the George W. Bush administration's focus on biodefence, which emphasized preparing for and responding to biological weapon attacks, to the concept of biosecurity, which includes measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. The Obama administration's biosecurity strategy seeks to reduce the global risk of naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks through prevention, international cooperation, and maximizing synergies between health and security. The biosecurity strategy is closely aligned with the Obama administration's broader approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes the pragmatic use of smart power, multilateralism and engagement to further the national interest. This article describes the Obama administration's biosecurity strategy; highlights elements of continuity and change from the policies of the Bush administration; discusses

  11. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do.

  12. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do

  13. Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    ... stands within the context of a ground based air defence system (GBADS) at the turn of the twenty first century. However, much of the contents of the paper maye generalized to military environments other than a GBADS one. Keywords: Threat evaluation, weapon assignment, decision support. ORiON Vol. 23 (2) 2007: pp.

  14. Bugs and gas: Agreements banning chemical and biological weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mikulak, Robert P.

    2017-11-01

    The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.

  15. Nuclear weapons: new threats, new challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durand, D.

    2005-01-01

    After a brief history of the Iranian nuclear crisis since 2003, the author discusses the four aspects of this crisis which make it a textbook case: a country which wants to control the whole nuclear process and therefore may reach the capacity to produce military-grade uranium (this raises the question of the relationship between nuclear energy and disarmament), the validity and efficiency of international controls is at stake, divergence may appear on the ways to have international treaties respected (different approaches between Europe and the USA), a country which is looking for nuclear weapon for matters of regional security and power (this raises the issue of a new approach to security). Then, the author describes the new nuclear threats: proliferating states, terrorist groups, and states with nuclear weapons (attitude of the USA, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, perspective of a nuclear disarmament of Europe). He gives an overview of the current status of disarmament and of treaties (START, NPT), and discusses the opportunities to save the non proliferation treaty from collapsing in 2005

  16. The chemical and biological weapon terrorism by the Aum Shnirikyo

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furukawa, K.

    2009-01-01

    The Aum Shinrikyo, an obscure cult religious group, attacked the Tokyo subways employing sarin gas in March 1995, which was viewed as a mark of a new era in terrorism. The Aum Shinrikyo remains the one empirical example of a religiously motivated cult with an affluent amount of financial and human resources and motivations to use unconventional weapons. The Aum Shinrikyo's leaders included the scientific elite of a young generation as well as former Yakuza members who had close ties with organized crime networks. Aum succeeded in establishing an extensive network to procure weapons, material, and drug, primarily in Russia but also other countries including the United States and even North Korea. Despite the fact that the law enforcement authority had already obtained various pieces of information that reasonably indicated that Aum was producing sarin by late 1994, the law enforcement authority became too cautious to advance its investigation to arrest Aum members until it was too late. Japan's experience with the Aum Shinrikyo's threats provides valuable insights for democratic governments seeking to thwart the deadly plans of religiously motivated non-state actors. It reveals the tremendous difficulties for a democratic society to confront the terrorists who were willing to pursue their deadly 'divine' objectives, especially when the society had no experience to encounter such a threat. This presentation will explain the chemical and biological weapon programs of the Aum Shinrikyo, especially focusing on the following elements: Intention and capability of the Aum Shinrikyo; Weapon systems and mode of attacks, including their target selections; The lessons learned from this case for the prevention and crisis/consequence management n the event of CBW terrorism. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the Research Institute for Science and Technology for Society or its research sponsors.(author)

  17. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) as asymmetric weapons: the design basis threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skinner, L.

    2009-01-01

    Asymmetric warfare concepts relate well to the use of improvised chemical weapons against urban targets. Sources of information on toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and lists of high threat chemicals are available that point to likely choices for an attack. Accident investigations can be used as a template for attacks, and to judge the possible effectiveness of an attack using TICs. The results of a chlorine rail car accident in South Carolina, USA and the Russian military assault on a Moscow theater provide many illustrative points for similar incidents that mighty be carried out deliberately. Computer modeling of outdoor releases shows how an attack might take into consideration issues of stand-off distance and dilution. Finally, the preceding may be used to estimate with some accuracy the design basis threat posed by the used of TICs as weapons.(author)

  18. Simulated ICJ Judgment : Revisiting the Lawfulness of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Winston P. Nagan

    2012-04-01

    Full Text Available The author prepared this simulated judgment at the request of Cadmus editors to demonstrate that there is ample ground for revisiting and revising the landmark 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons. The ICJ failed to anticipate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which expands the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, the potential cataclysmic impact of nuclear war on climate change, the multiplication of nuclear-weapon-free zones as evidence of a widespread rejection, mounting evidence regarding the physical and psychological harm, and unwillingness of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under the NPT. This article challenges the notion that a few sovereign states should be the sole arbiters of international law and affirms the legitimate claim of the global community of protection from the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. The use or threat of use undermines foundational values of the international legal system and the specific rules of self-defense and humanitarian law. The contribution seeks to give an accentuated role for the explicit use of the fundamental values of international legal order, in crafting an innovative methodology for the formulation of the judgment. The very existence of these weapons undermines the rights of all of humanity. The ICJ should be moved to categorically declare the use and possession of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity.

  19. Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2006-01-01

    DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies inconsistently address and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability...

  20. Coding ethical behaviour: the challenges of biological weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rappert, Brian

    2003-10-01

    Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.

  1. Radiation, chemical and biological protection. Mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janasek, D.; Svetlik, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this text-book mass destruction weapons and radiation, chemical and biological protection are reviewed. The text-book contains the following chapter: (1) Mass destruction weapons; (2) Matter and material; (3) Radioactive materials; (4) Toxic materials; (5) Biological resources; (6) Nuclear energetic equipment; Appendices; References.

  2. Chemical and biological weapons in the 'new wars'.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ilchmann, Kai; Revill, James

    2014-09-01

    The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

  3. Responding to the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction After September 11, 2001

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Lewy, Donald

    2002-01-01

    This paper addresses the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction as it is understood following the events of 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks directed at congressional and media offices...

  4. Health and environmental threats associated with the destruction of chemical weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matousek, Jirí

    2006-09-01

    Still existing arsenals of chemical weapons (CW) pose not only security threats for possible use in hostilities by state actors or misuse by terrorists but also safety threats to humans and biota due to leakages and possible accidents. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) commits the States Parties (SPs) to destroy CW using technologies taking into consideration human health and environmental protection. It does not allow methods, routinely used up to the 1970s, such as earth burial, open-pit burning, and sea dumping. Long-term health and environmental threats and some accidents that have already occurred in the known localities of the sea-dumped and earth-buried arsenals of Nazi-German armed forces in the Baltic Region and of Imperial Japanese forces in the Far East Region are analyzed according to the impact of major CW and ammunition types (i.e., sulfur mustard--HD, tabun--GA, arsenicals--DA, DC, DM, arsine oil, and chloroacetophenone--CN). Any possible operations and handling with CW envisaged by the CWC as well as their verification are summarized taking into account the health threat they pose. CW and toxic armament waste to be destroyed and applied technologies (both developed and under current use in operational CW destruction facilities [CWDF]) are reviewed as are systems of health safety and environmental protection of the destruction/demilitarization stems from the extraordinary high toxicity of supertoxic lethal agents in man and biota. Problems of currently used Russian and U.S. standards for maximum allowable workplace concentrations and general population limits and possibilities of their determination by available analytical instrumentation are discussed.

  5. Chemical and biological warfare. Should defenses be researched and deployed?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Orient, J M

    1989-08-04

    The threat of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction has intensified because of improved delivery systems and advances in chemistry, genetics, and other sciences. Possible US responses to this threat include deterrence, defenses, and/or disarmament, including a reaffirmation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which is now in jeopardy. This article discusses the history of chemical and biological warfare, existing and potential weapons, the proliferation of weapons and delivery systems, ways to prevent the use of these weapons, and ways to protect populations from their effects.

  6. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyson, Rhianna

    2005-01-01

    'Some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral, and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation. The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon States continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately, the reverse is true.' - United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 'Something is wrong with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Although seemingly well-equipped with an arsenal of legal and political mechanisms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), decades' worth of General Assembly (GA) resolutions and even a recent slew of ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the regime created to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war remains inadequate. This insufficiency is even starker when viewed in relation to the regimes controlling other weapons of mass destruction. Despite its own challenges, the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons remains relatively well-funded and well-situated to facilitate the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), while still lacking the necessary verification mechanisms, has managed to effectively criminalize not just the use and threat of use of biological weapons, but also their production, development and stockpiling. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear regime seems to be faltering. Progress made in

  7. Analytical technique to address terrorist threats by chemical weapons of mass destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dempsey, Patrick M.

    1997-01-01

    Terrorism is no longer an issue without effect on the American mind. We now live with the same concerns and fears that have been commonplace in other developed and third world countries for a long time. Citizens of other countries have long lived with the specter of terrorism and now the U.S. needs to be concerned and prepared for terrorist activities.T he terrorist has the ability to cause great destructive effects by focusing their effort on unaware and unprepared civilian populations. Attacks can range from simple explosives to sophisticated nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Intentional chemical releases of hazardous chemicals or chemical warfare agents pose a great threat because of their ready availability and/or ease of production, and their ability to cause widespread damage. As this battlefront changes from defined conflicts and enemies to unnamed terrorists, we must implement the proper analytical tools to provide a fast and efficient response. Each chemical uses in a terrorists weapon leaves behind a chemical signature that can be used to identify the materials involved and possibly lead investigators to the source and to those responsible. New tools to provide fast and accurate detection for battlefield chemical and biological agent attack are emerging. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is one of these tools that has found increasing use by the military to respond to chemical agent attacks. As the technology becomes smaller and more portable, it can be used by law enforcement personnel to identify suspected terrorist releases and to help prepare the response; define contaminated areas for evacuation and safety concerns, identify the proper treatment of exposed or affected civilians, and suggest decontamination and cleanup procedures.

  8. The nuclear threat and the Nuclear Threat Initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curtis, Charles

    2001-01-01

    Full text: President and chief operating officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), was invited by the IAEA Director General to speak about NTI and its mission at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium. Established by CNN founder Ted Turner and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, NTI is a charitable organization working to strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The foundation is global, concentrating not just on the United States, Russia, and other nations of the former Soviet Union, but also on those regions of greatest proliferation concern in Asia and the Middle East. NTI is working to close what it perceives as an increasingly dangerous gap between the threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the global response. NTI is supported by a pledge from Mr. Turner of at least $250 million over five years, among the largest sums any private individual has ever invested in these security issues. NTI's Board of Directors, an international team of experienced and knowledgeable experts, determines the overall direction of the foundation. (author)

  9. Biological and Chemical Weapons: Criminal Sanctions and Federal Regulations

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Garcia, Michael J

    2004-01-01

    The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, both of which have been signed and ratified by the United States, obligate signatory parties to enact legislation or otherwise...

  10. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  11. Biological effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frischauf, H.

    1983-01-01

    Prompt and delayed biological effects of nuclear weapons are discussed. The response to excess pressure on man is estimated, the acute radiation syndrome caused by different radiation doses and cancerogenous and genetic effects are described. Medical care after a nuclear explosion would be difficult and imperfect. (M.J.)

  12. Sources and basic threats of biological safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nazarova, O.D.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Biological safety of any state is connected with development of its public protection against biological weapons and opportunity to prevent bio terrorist attacks. That's why in modern social-economic and geo-political conditions, the problem of biological safety strengthening become significant, which is connected with migration process globalization, development of bio-technology and dramatically increased risk of pathogenic germ infections proliferation, which can be used as biological weapon. Despite of undertaken efforts by world community on full prohibition of biological weapon, its proliferation in the world still takes place. Biology revolution during second and third millennium lead to development not only biotechnology but new achievements in medicine, agriculture and other fields of economy, but also created scientific and research preconditions for development of advanced biological means of mass destruction, that make it more attractive for achieving superiority and assigned targets: low developments costs, opportunity to create it by one small laboratory with two-three high qualified specialists bio technologists; tremendous impact effect: one substance gram can contain from one till one hundreds quintillions (10"1"8 - 10"2"0) active pathogen molecules and in case if they belong to amplificated RNA and DNA, each molecule getting to organism, will multiply and contaminate environment (the last one is its principal difference from chemical weapon); bypass of organism immunological barriers and specific vaccinations; unusual clinic finding, hard diagnosis; weakness of traditional medications and treatment methods; lack of material destruction; opportunity of tight-lipped developments; opportunity of tight-lipped application; opportunity of delayed effect; opportunity of selective influence on specific population (by use of genetic, climatic and cultural specifications of race, nations and nationalities). Above mentioned specifications create

  13. Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mariella Jr., Raymond P.

    2004-09-07

    A system for detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens uses a detector system, an electrostatic precipitator or scrubber, a circulation system, and a control. The precipitator or scrubber is activated in response to a signal from the detector upon the detection of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens.

  14. Prerequisites for a nuclear weapons convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    1999-01-01

    A Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) would prohibit the research, development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and would serve their total elimination.' In this fashion it follows the model laid out by the biological and chemical weapons conventions. The NWC would encompass a few other treaties and while replacing them should learn from their experiences. The Nuclear Weapons Convention should at some given point in the future replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and so resolve its contradictions and shortcomings. The main objectives of an NWC Would be: reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the 'five' nuclear weapons powers down to zero within a set of fixed periods of time; elimination of stockpiles of weapons-usable materials and, where existent, nuclear warheads in de-facto nuclear weapon and threshold states; providing assurance that all states will retain their non-nuclear status forever

  15. Detecting Chemical Weapons: Threats, Requirements, Solutions, and Future Challenges

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boso, Brian

    2011-03-01

    Although chemicals have been reportedly used as weapons for thousands of years, it was not until 1915 at Ypres, France that an industrial chemical, chlorine, was used in World War I as an offensive weapon in significant quantity, causing mass casualties. From that point until today the development, detection, production and protection from chemical weapons has be an organized endeavor of many of the world's armed forces and in more recent times, non-governmental terrorist organizations. The number of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) has steadily increased as research into more toxic substances continued for most of the 20 th century. Today there are over 70 substances including harassing agents like tear gas, incapacitating agents, and lethal agents like blister, blood, chocking, and nerve agents. The requirements for detecting chemical weapons vary depending on the context in which they are encountered and the concept of operation of the organization deploying the detection equipment. The US DoD, for example, has as a requirement, that US forces be able to continue their mission, even in the event of a chemical attack. This places stringent requirements on detection equipment. It must be lightweight (developed for this application, including, but not limited to: mass spectroscopy, IR spectroscopy, RAMAN spectroscopy, MEMs micro-cantilever sensors, surface acoustic wave sensors, differential mobility spectrometry, and amplifying fluorescence polymers. In the future the requirements for detection equipment will continue to become even more stringent. The continuing increase in the sheer number of threats that will need to be detected, the development of binary agents requiring that even the precursor chemicals be detected, the development of new types of agents unlike any of the current chemistries, and the expansion of the list of toxic industrial chemical will require new techniques with higher specificity and more sensitivity.

  16. The Tipping Point: Biological Terrorism

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Scott Cary

    2009-01-01

    Full Text Available This article presents a strategic, operational, and tactical analysis of information currently available on the state of bio-weapons development by non-state actors, primarily Islamist jihadists. It discusses the evidence supporting a practical assessment that non-state actors have begun to acquire, and in the near-term intend to employ, bio-weapons. A pathogen and method of attack specifically designed to achieve the strategic goals of jihadists are presented as functional examples of the problem of the emerging global bio-weapons threat.Is a terrorist attack utilizing biological weapons a real threat? If so, is there a way to predict the circumstances under which it might happen or how it might be conducted? This article explores what is known and cannot be known about these questions, and will examine the threat of biological terrorism in the context of the strategic goals, operational methods, and tactical intentions of Islamist terrorists.

  17. A Conceptual Model to Identify Intent to Use Chemical-Biological Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mary Zalesny

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available This paper describes a conceptual model to identify and interrelate indicators of intent of non-state actors to use chemical or biological weapons. The model expands on earlier efforts to understand intent to use weapons of mass destruction by building upon well-researched theories of intent and behavior and focusing on a sub-set of weapons of mass destruction (WMD to account for the distinct challenges of employing different types of WMD in violent acts. The conceptual model is presented as a first, critical step in developing a computational model for assessing the potential for groups to use chemical or biological weapons.

  18. Advances in Neuroscience and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dando, Malcolm

    2011-01-01

    This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse. PMID:21350673

  19. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

  20. An integrated approach to risk assessment and mitigating the CBRN threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bokan, S.

    2009-01-01

    CBRN mass casualty events threat mitigation remains today the highest international priority. Although significant progress has been made, the national security requirements for efforts to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons of Mass Disruption will be of the highest national priority in the near future. An integration of a number of approaches is essential in the risk assessment and mitigating the CBRN treat. Preparedness measures and procedures, engineering, science and technology, policy, medical, and emergency response are essential to reduce the threat from the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Improved coordination between international, public and private security entities is also essential task to hopefully prevent the terrorist attacks. In this lecture, it will be presented very important scientific approach to risk assessment of potential use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical weapons in terrorist actions. An integrated approach for mitigating the CBRN threat, crisis management and preparedness measures for prevention and reduction of potential consequences, will be presented.(author)

  1. 75 FR 30002 - Federal Advisory Committee; Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-28

    ... management; c. Nuclear deterrence transformation; d. Weapons effects; and e. Other Office of the Under... Reduction Agency on the following: a. Reducing the threat posed by nuclear, biological, chemical...

  2. Proliferation of massive destruction weapons: fantasy or reality?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duval, M.

    2001-01-01

    This article evaluates the threat of massive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological) for Europe and recalls the existing safeguards against the different forms of nuclear proliferation: legal (non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) etc..), technical (fabrication of fissile materials, delays). However, all these safeguards can be overcome as proven by the activities of some countries. The situation of proliferation for the other type of massive destruction weapons is presented too. (J.S.)

  3. Aum Shinrikyo's Chemical and Biological Weapons: More Than Sarin.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tu, A T

    2014-07-01

    The radical religious group Aum Shinrikyo was founded in Japan in the 1980s and grew rapidly in the 1990s. Aum members perpetrated a mass murder in Matsumoto City in 1994, where they used sarin as a chemical weapon to poison approximately 500 civilians. On March 20, 1995, Aum deployed sarin in an even larger terrorist attack on the Tokyo Subway System, which poisoned some 6,000 people. After the Tokyo Subway attack, the Japanese Police arrested the sect's senior members. From 2005 through 2011, 13 of these senior members were sentenced to death. In this article, aspects of Aum's chemical and biological terrorism are reviewed. Sarin production efforts by the sect are described, including how the degradation product of sarin in soil, methylphosphonic acid, enabled the detection of sarin production sites. Also, Aum's chemical-warfare agents other than sarin are described, as are its biological weapons. The author was permitted by the Japanese government to interview Dr. Tomomasa Nakagawa, one of the senior members of Aum Shinrikyo. From Dr. Nakagawa the author obtained valuable inside information about Aum's chemical and biological weapons programs. Copyright © 2014 Central Police University.

  4. Biological and Chemical Weapons: Criminal Sanctions and Federal Regulations

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Garcia, Michael J

    2004-01-01

    .... In accordance with these obligations, the United States has enacted various federal requirements and criminal sanctions applying to biological and chemical weapons, Re cent anti4errorisrn legislation...

  5. 78 FR 55326 - Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-10

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8460] Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 AGENCY: Bureau of... Government has determined on August 2, pursuant to Section 306(a) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons...

  6. War and Medicine in a Culture of Peace. 2. Synopsis of Biological Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Pierard, Gérald

    2001-01-01

    Biological warfare has a long history. Despite the 1972 international convention and several attempts at biological weapon eradication, some countries and non governmental groups still retain some of these agents. According to their potential use, they belong to bioterrorism or to massive destruction weapons. Any biological warfare put the civilian medical and paramedical assets at the frontline and at high risk for being rapidly contaminated. The prompt recognition of a bioterrorist attack a...

  7. The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alexander, Archibald S.; And Others

    This book is composed of four papers prepared to illuminate the problem areas which might arise if the policies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other measures to limit chemical and biological weapons are ratified by the United States Senate. The papers included are: Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; The Use of Herbicides in War: A…

  8. Chemical and biological weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, E.D.

    1991-01-01

    This paper discusses the prospects of the multilateral negotiations aimed at achieving a complete and total ban on chemical weapons the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC). The control of the proliferation of chemical weapons is no longer just on East-West issue; it is also an issue of concern in Third World Countries, and in some of the wealthier middle eastern nations, such as Kuwait

  9. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luke, S.J.

    2011-01-01

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

  10. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Luke, S J

    2011-12-20

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

  11. Finding the Demons in Our Midst: Utilizing DOD ISR Assets to Combat Terrorist Use of CBRNE Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Liedman, Sean

    2002-01-01

    ... (NCA). A key tenet of the new strategic setting is the grave threat to national security posed by terrorism, potentially using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Enhanced High Explosive (CBRNE) weapons...

  12. [Biological weapons--an old menace in new circumstances].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bartůnĕk, P

    2001-12-06

    Biological weapons were conceived for years by the world community only as a potential evil. A fundamental change of opinions regarding their real menace occurred only after the premeditated criminal attack on the USA on September 11, 2001. It was logical that publicists for mall types of media demanded from representatives of the state administration of the Czech Republic information how out country is prepared for this type of danger. Their reactions were hesitant and in a way reflect a certain chaos associated with the reorganization of the army and at the same time unpreparedness of civil defence. To a certain extent all this can be conceived as the consequence of the fundamental transformation of our society and thus it may be excused to a certain extent. Nevertheless it is obvious that not even the most advanced countries are quite clear as regards defence against the horror of biological weapons. Evidence to this effect is the following document, devoted to the problem in the USA, major parts of which we reproduce from the prestigious periodical The England Journal of Medicine.

  13. History of chemical and biological warfare agents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szinicz, L.

    2005-01-01

    Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents

  14. History of chemical and biological warfare agents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szinicz, L

    2005-10-30

    Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents.

  15. Open-area concealed-weapon detection system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pati, P.; Mather, P.

    2011-06-01

    Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) has become a significant challenge to present day security needs; individuals carrying weapons into airplanes, schools, and secured establishments are threat to public security. Although controlled screening, of people for concealed weapons, has been employed in many establishments, procedures and equipment are designed to work in restricted environments like airport passport control, military checkpoints, hospitals, school and university entrance. Furthermore, screening systems do not effectively decipher between threat and non-threat metal objects, thus leading to high rate of false alarms which can become a liability to daily operational needs of establishments. Therefore, the design and development of a new CWD system to operate in a large open area environment with large numbers of people reduced incidences of false alarms and increased location accuracy is essential.

  16. Bioterrorism and Biological Warfare, from Past to the Present: A classic review

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Majid Zare Bidaki

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available Bioterrorism is defined as any terrorist action of intentional release or dissemination of highly pathogenic biological agents, including a variety of microorganisms or biological toxins. With the growing threat of terrorism, is necessary that the potential danger of various microorganisms – as a powerful tool of aggression and threat- to be taken seriously. This review tries to explain the concept of biological weapons and their historical development process with an emphasis on efforts to control the proliferation of these types of weapons over the last century. Potential impact of infectious diseases on people and armed forces was known from since 600 BC. Using the victims of the plague as a weapon in medieval warfare and spread of smallpox as a weapon during the war against the Indians when initially America was discovered, the development of biological weapons during the World War I, World War II and the Cold War, and even since the beginning of the third millennium, all show the strategic importance of pathogenic microorganisms as a deterrent power for the superiority of some governments and cults. Historical attempts to use infectious diseases as biological weapons reveal that the distinction between a natural outbreak of an infectious disease and that of a deliberate biological attack is very difficult. Abusing this characteristic of infectious diseases has made it possible for the purposes of superiority. International agreements to control the development of biological weapons, such as “the 1925 Geneva Protocol” and “the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxic Weapons” have not been able to control the development and using of biological warfare.  The current paper is a classic review (Overview article aiming at increasing the knowledge and awareness of people especially of health authorities and government officials.

  17. South America and the proliferation of biological weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Tatiana Coutto

    2013-01-01

    This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting t...

  18. Animal Botulism Outcomes in the AniBioThreat Project

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Woudstra, Cédric; Tevell Åberg, Annica; Skarin, Hanna

    2013-01-01

    and botulinum neurotoxins are considered potential weapons for bioterrorism and have been included in the Australia Group List of Biological Agents. In 2010 the European Commission (DG Justice, Freedom and Security) funded a 3-year project named AniBioThreat to improve the EU's capacity to counter animal...... new genetic information to better understand the diversity of these Clostridia and develop detection methods targeting both highly specific genetic markers of these Clostridia and the neurotoxins they are able to produce. Several European institutes participating in the AniBioThreat project...

  19. Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-01

    Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands , Mongolia, Panama, and St. Vin- cent and the Grenadines, according to a State Department summary available...1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. As such, NBC weapons represent a group of weapons that the...Development, Produc- tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains two references to WMD

  20. Escalation of terrorism? On the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nass, Jens

    2010-01-01

    The report on the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials covers the following topics: the variety of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, politically motivated, social revolutionary, political extremism, religious fanaticism, governmental terrorism; CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons and materials: their availability and effectiveness in case of use; potential actor groups; prevention and counter measures, emergency and mitigating measures.

  1. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

  2. Evaluation of Potential Biological Threats in Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pozdnyakova, L.; Slavina, N.; Pozdnyakov, S.

    2007-01-01

    Dilating of biological threats spectrum, EDI diffusion opportunities and routes, unpredictability of outbreaks connected with connatural, technogenic, terrorist factors determines constant monitoring and readiness for operative BPA indication and identification. Scientific analytical approach of existing and probable regional bio-threats evaluation is necessary for adequate readiness system creation and maintenance of medical counteraction tactics to probable biological threats. Basing on the international experience, we carry out analysis of a situation present in Ukraine and routes for the decisions. The basic directions are: - Evaluation of a reality for EDI penetration from abroad and presence of conditions for their further diffusion inside the country. - Revealing of presence and definition of connatural EDI foci biocenoses features and BPAs. - Appropriate level of biological safety and physical protection of bio-laboratories and pathogens collections maintenance. - Gene/molecular and phenotypical definition of EDI circulating strains. - Creation of the circulating EDI gene/ phenotypic characteristics regional data bank. - Ranging of EDI actual for area. - Introduction of GPT, mathematical modeling and forecasting for tactics development in case of technogenic accidents and connatural outbreaks. - Methodical basis and equipment improvement for BPA system indication for well-timed identification of natural, or modified agent. - Education and training The international cooperation in maintenance of biosafety and bioprotection within the framework of scientific programs, grants, exchange of experience, introduction of international standards and rules are among basic factors in the decision for creating system national biosafety for countries not included in EU and the NATO. (author)

  3. A review of research on common biological agents and their impact on environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mashiatullah, A.; Qureshi, R.M.

    2009-01-01

    Biological agents are unique class of microorganisms which can be used to produce the disease in large populations of humans, animals and plants. If used for hostile purposes, any disease-causing microorganism could be considered a weapon. The use of biological agents is not a new concept and history is replete with examples of biological weapon use. Before the twenty century, biological warfare took on three main forms by deliberate poisoning of food and water with infectious material, use of microorganisms or toxins in some form of weapon system, and use of biologically inoculated fabrics. Four kinds of biological warfare agents are bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi. These are distinguished by being living organisms, that reproduce within their host victims, who then become contagious with a deadly multiplier effect, bacteria, viruses, or fungi or toxin found in nature can be used to kill or injure people. Biological agents may be used for an isolated assassination, as well as to cause incapacitation or death to thousands. These biological agents represent a dangerous military threat because they are alive, and are therefore unpredictable and uncontrollable once released. The act of bioterrorism can range from a simple hoax to the actual use of biological weapons. Biological agents have the potential to make an environment more dangerous over time. If the environment is contaminated, a long-term threat to the population could be created. This paper discusses common biological agents, their mode of action in living organisms and possible impact on the environment. (author)

  4. Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jasjit Singh

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

  5. Indonesian perceptions on the implementation of the chemical weapons convention in relation with biosecurity and biosafety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Isroil, S.

    2009-01-01

    April 29, 2007 was marked the 10 year anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entry into force and the creation of the OPCW. Many nations throughout the last year were celebrated its commemoration. Compared to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which is now entering the 33rd year of its entry into force, the progress of CWC is running far beyond that convention because CWC is considered the most complete convention which is equipped with a comprehensive verification system. In contrast, up till now there is no formal verification regime to monitor compliance of the BWC. So the national legislation as well as biosafety and biosecurity procedures will be the best regime to prohibit the misuse of biological agents. To some extent, the strategy and method on implementing the provision of CWC are coincident with biosecurity and biosafety procedure due to their dual use characteristics. Concerning CWC, Indonesia which was ratified it in 30 September 1998 has always active in any multilateral meeting and as well as national activities on prohibiting the misuse of chemical weapons. Several courses have also been done in cooperation with OPCW such as Development of Response System Against Chemical Weapons, Basic Training Course for Response Team, National Industry Awareness Workshop, Advance Training for Response Team, National Emergency Response Workshop, as well as setting up 20 sets of individual protective equipment. There have already 7 inspections done by OPCW in Indonesia during 2004-2007 which proved that there were no indications of misuse of chemical processes and its facilities for hostile purposes. However, it does not mean that there is no threat from the possible misuse of chemical and biological agents due to its dual use characteristics. Learnt from Indonesian experiences, there are several constraints on implementing the CWC as well as biosafety and biosecurity. First is the different perception on the biological and chemical threats. For

  6. Evaluation of DoD Biological Safety and Security Implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-04-27

    advanced development, efficient production, and timely distribution. Critical Reagent Program products include antibodies, inactivated antigens , genomic...effects to the economy, communicability, low infectious dose, and a history of or current interest in weaponization based on threat reporting. The...unwarranted by the threat. Recommendation #3. Biological Personnel Reliability Program [BPRP] Maintain use of the BPRP tailored to bio -defense work; balance

  7. Prospects for improved detection of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wuest, Craig R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Hart, Brad [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Slezak, Thomas R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2012-07-31

    Acquisition and use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons continue to be a major focus of concern form the security apparatus of nation states because of their potential for mass casualties when used by a determined adversary.

  8. Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their Impact

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Shea, Dana A

    2004-01-01

    The domestic approach to potential terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, or toxin weapons attempts to balance a "post-event" consequence management approach with a "pre-event," preventative approach...

  9. Application of a Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Weapon Target Assignment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-01

    evaluation and weapon assignment in maritime combat scenarios. Lloyd also acts as a liaison for the Weapons and Combat Systems Division with the ANZAC...positively identified a number of targets as threats, whether they are an enemy ship (i.e., specifically, its weapon launcher systems) or a directed

  10. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

  11. Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-09-01

    The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera

  12. An overview of non-traditional nuclear threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geelhood, B.D.; Wogman, N.A.

    2005-01-01

    In view of the terrorist threats to the United States, the country needs to consider new vectors and weapons related to nuclear and radiological threats against our homeland. The traditional threat vectors, missiles and bombers, have expanded to include threats arriving through the flow of commerce. The new commerce-related vectors include: sea cargo, truck cargo, rail cargo, air cargo, and passenger transport. The types of weapons have also expanded beyond nuclear warheads to include radiation dispersal devices (RDD) or 'dirty' bombs. The consequences of these nuclear and radiological threats are both economic and life threatening. The defense against undesirable materials entering our borders involves extensive radiation monitoring at ports of entry. The radiation and other signatures of potential nuclear and radiological threats are examined along with potential sensors to discover undesirable items in the flow of commerce. Techniques to improve radiation detection are considered. A strategy of primary and secondary screening is proposed to rapidly clear most cargo and carefully examine suspect cargo. (author)

  13. Terrorist threat, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear medical approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Revel, Th. de; Gourmelon, P.; Vidal, D.; Renaudeau, C.

    2005-01-01

    The different aspects linked to the use of nuclear, radiological, biological and or chemical weapons are gathered in this work. They concern history, fundamental aspect, diagnosis, therapy and prevention. The part devoted to the nuclear aspect concern the accidents in relation with ionizing radiations, the radiation syndrome, the contribution and limits of dosimetry, the treatment of medullary aplasia, the evaluation and treatment of an internal contamination, new perspectives on the use of cytokine for the treatment of accidental irradiated persons, alternative to the blood transfusion. (N.C.)

  14. Biomaterials for mediation of chemical and biological warfare agents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Russell, Alan J; Berberich, Jason A; Drevon, Geraldine F; Koepsel, Richard R

    2003-01-01

    Recent events have emphasized the threat from chemical and biological warfare agents. Within the efforts to counter this threat, the biocatalytic destruction and sensing of chemical and biological weapons has become an important area of focus. The specificity and high catalytic rates of biological catalysts make them appropriate for decommissioning nerve agent stockpiles, counteracting nerve agent attacks, and remediation of organophosphate spills. A number of materials have been prepared containing enzymes for the destruction of and protection against organophosphate nerve agents and biological warfare agents. This review discusses the major chemical and biological warfare agents, decontamination methods, and biomaterials that have potential for the preparation of decontamination wipes, gas filters, column packings, protective wear, and self-decontaminating paints and coatings.

  15. Decisions to Shoot in a Weapon Identification Task: The Influence of Cultural Stereotypes and Perceived Threat on False Positive Errors

    OpenAIRE

    Fleming, Kevin K.; Bandy, Carole L.; Kimble, Matthew O.

    2009-01-01

    The decision to shoot engages executive control processes that can be biased by cultural stereotypes and perceived threat. The neural locus of the decision to shoot is likely to be found in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) where cognition and affect converge. Male military cadets at Norwich University (N=37) performed a weapon identification task in which they made rapid decisions to shoot when images of guns appeared briefly on a computer screen. Reaction times, error rates, and EEG activ...

  16. On the implementation of the Biological Threat Reduction Program in the Republic of Uzbekistan

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tuychiev, Laziz; Madaminov, Marifjon

    2013-01-01

    Objective To review the implementation of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Republic of Uzbekistan since 2004. Introduction The Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) has been being implemented in the Republic of Uzbekistan since 2004 within the framework of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation in the Area of the Promotion of Defense Relations and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 06.05.2001. Threat agent detection and response activities that target a list of especially dangerous pathogens are being carried out under the BTRP within the health care system of Uzbekistan. This presentation reviews some of the achievements of the program to date. Results BTRP, in partnership with the Government of Uzbekistan, has funded the establishment of five Regional Diagnostic Laboratories (RDL) and ten Epidemiological Support Units (ESU), operated by the Ministry of Health of Uzbekistan, which are intended to improve the diagnosis of quarantine and especially dangerous infections, and to ensure timely preventive and anti-epidemic measures. RDLs provide a high level of biosafety and biosecurity to conduct rapid laboratory diagnostics (PCR, ELISA) of especially dangerous infections. RDLs are equipped with up-to-date diagnostic laboratory equipment that conforms to internationals standards, as well as with all necessary consumables. Personnel of RDLs have been appropriately trained in epidemiology, clinical and diagnostic techniques for especially dangerous infections, including such state-of-the-art techniques as rapid PCR and ELISA diagnostics, as well as in work and equipment operation safety regulations. Epidemiological Support Units (ESU) have been established on the basis of the Especially Dangerous Infections Divisions of Oblast, city and Rayon Centers for State Sanitary

  17. applying reinforcement learning to the weapon assignment problem

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    ismith

    In his 2007 book, The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern. World, General Rupert Smith ..... WA is a resource-management process during which weapons are allocated to engage threats in the ... strategy (the policy). If the threat was ...

  18. Maintaining non-nuclear weapon status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muller, H.

    1991-01-01

    Among the some 170 sovereign states in the world, five are legally recognized as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the terms of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Six countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa) are counted as threshold states: they possess sizeable unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or have passed the brink of a nuclear test or of clandestine weapon production. Six other countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Taiwan, and North and South Korea) have been suspected periodically of either considering the nuclear weapon option or of working secretly on the development of weapons. Thus, about 150 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain which neither possess nuclear weapons nor strive to acquire them. These states are distributed throughout the globe and encompass highly industrialized as well as underdeveloped countries, liberal democracies, socialist states, sheikdoms and dictatorships. Some NNWS face acute military threats; other are far removed from the quarrels of the world, as in the case of some remote fortunate islands. Furthermore, NNWS may be members of nuclear-umbrella alliances or may have opted for a policy of neutrality or non-alignment

  19. The return of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calvez, Jean-Yves

    2005-01-01

    Written after the 2005 NPT review conference, this article first recalls the early stages of nuclear proliferation: acquisition of nuclear weapons by Great-Britain, USSR, France and China, and creation of the NPT in 1970. The author briefly evokes some weaknesses and violations of this treaty: emergence of new nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel) and of nuclear weapon programmes (Iran, North Korea). He outlines the lack of true rules to impede countries to develop nuclear weapons, and then states that the only solution seems to be a simple abolition of these weapons. This option is notably supported by the Catholic Church as outlined and recalled here. The author discusses the situation of this abolition option, and notices that, even though NPT members committed themselves on this way, some also decided to develop new and smaller weapons. Then, it becomes always more difficult to persuade countries not to possess these weapons. The author finally discusses the issues of terrorism threat in relationship to the miniaturisation process, and regrets the lack of commitment in an abolition process

  20. Deconstructing the 'energy weapon': Russia's threat to Europe as case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith Stegen, Karen

    2011-01-01

    As the likelihood increases that Russia will dominate the European Union's (EU) energy supply, questions have emerged as to whether Russia would use the energy weapon to influence EU member policies and extract political concessions. Countervailing voices argue that Russia would be restricted by interdependence and market forces. As of yet, no one has analyzed the assumptions underlying the energy weapon thesis. Moreover, many scholars examining EU-Russian energy relations rely on non-Russian data. This article seeks to fill several informational and theoretical gaps by including Russian sources and first-hand data and by systematically analyzing the conditions that must obtain before an energy supplier can successfully convert its energy resources into political power. The resulting model can be utilized to analyze the capacity of a supplier to use the energy weapon-whether it be Russia, Iran, Venezuela or any other energy heavyweight-and to assess whether the deployment was successful. Five purported cases of Russian manipulation are analyzed in this article and the findings indicate that, more often than not, Russia failed to achieve political concessions. Looking to the future, the plausibility of Russia using the energy weapon to exploit Europe's dependence, particularly on gas, is also examined. - Highlights: → Energy producers may manipulate supply and prices to coerce political concessions. → Energy weapon model: four conditions must obtain for successful deployment. → Western policy-makers worry about EU dependence on and vulnerability to Russia. → Analysis of five Russian cases reveals tenuous link between weapon use and success. → In medium term, EU can likely avoid yielding political autonomy for supply security.

  1. On the implementation of the Biological Threat Reduction Program in the Republic of Uzbekistan

    OpenAIRE

    Tuychiev, Laziz; Madaminov, Marifjon

    2013-01-01

    Objective To review the implementation of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Republic of Uzbekistan since 2004. Introduction The Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) has been being implemented in the Republic of Uzbekistan since 2004 within the framework of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation in the Area of the Promotion ...

  2. Chemical or Biological Terrorist Attacks: An Analysis of the Preparedness of Hospitals for Managing Victims Affected by Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bennett, Russell L.

    2006-01-01

    The possibility of a terrorist attack employing the use of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on American soil is no longer an empty threat, it has become a reality. A WMD is defined as any weapon with the capacity to inflict death and destruction on such a massive scale that its very presence in the hands of hostile forces is a grievous threat. Events of the past few years including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the use of planes as guided missiles directed into the Pentagon and New York’s Twin Towers in 2001 (9/11) and the tragic incidents involving twenty-three people who were infected and five who died as a result of contact with anthrax-laced mail in the Fall of 2001, have well established that the United States can be attacked by both domestic and international terrorists without warning or provocation. In light of these actions, hospitals have been working vigorously to ensure that they would be “ready” in the event of another terrorist attack to provide appropriate medical care to victims. However, according to a recent United States General Accounting Office (GAO) nationwide survey, our nation’s hospitals still are not prepared to manage mass causalities resulting from chemical or biological WMD. Therefore, there is a clear need for information about current hospital preparedness in order to provide a foundation for systematic planning and broader discussions about relative cost, probable effectiveness, environmental impact and overall societal priorities. Hence, the aim of this research was to examine the current preparedness of hospitals in the State of Mississippi to manage victims of terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological WMD. All acute care hospitals in the State were selected for inclusion in this study. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were utilized for data collection and analysis. Six hypotheses were tested. Using a

  3. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

  4. South America and the proliferation of biological weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tatiana Coutto

    2013-04-01

    Full Text Available This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC. Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting the exchange of information among different groups of states, most notably during the 2006 BTWC review conference. This paper also sheds light on the identification of specific features that allow for increasing visibility and actorness of regional powers in promoting universality of multilateral security regimes (MSR, as well as the limitations faced by these players.

  5. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nonproliferation of Chemical and...—Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of.... Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on...

  6. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  7. The threat of nuclear terrorism: Nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maerli, Morten Bremer

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Conventional weaponry and tactics are likely to remain the primary terrorist means for a definitive majority of sub-national groups. No non-state actors have ever deployed or used a nuclear device. However, recent developments in international terrorism may point in the direction of future terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices. Some terrorist groups with a high international profile have showed disturbing interests in acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. As the 'terrorist nuclear weapon standards' are likely to be lower than the strict requirements for traditional state nuclear weapons, technical barriers should not be considered sufficient to avoid future nuclear terrorist violence. Preventing any extremist group from achieving their goals of large-scale nuclear killing is likely best done by preventing the access to fissile materials through state compliances to rigorous standards of Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC and A). (author)

  8. Beyond the Dirty Dozen: A Proposed Methodology for Assessing Future Bioweapon Threats.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cieslak, Theodore J; Kortepeter, Mark G; Wojtyk, Ronald J; Jansen, Hugo-Jan; Reyes, Ricardo A; Smith, James O

    2018-01-01

    Countermeasure Availability, and Ease of Detection. Reproducibility of scoring data was assessed by examining the standard deviations (SD) of mean scores. Our results were unexpected. Several familiar biothreat diseases such as anthrax and tularemia were judged, by our experts, to be less threatening than many others owing to a number of factors including ease of detection, lack of communicability, and the ready availability of countermeasures. Conversely, several toxins were judged by experts to have very high potential as threat agents owing, in part, to their reliability, virulence, and a lack of available countermeasures. Agreement among experts, as determined by lower SD about a mean score, was greater for more familiar threats. Our study was designed to provide a concise and east-to-apply set of criteria that could be used by NATO nations to evaluate emerging infectious disease threats with respect to their weaponization potential. Our results were unexpected. We believe that a lack of appropriate weighting factors may explain these results and suggest that future studies weigh each of the 12 proposed criteria based on the intended use of the assessment data and other situational factors. We believe that the greatest value of our study lies in a codification of the attributes of a biological weapon. © Association of Military Surgeons of the United States 2017. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

  9. Preparing for and implementing the UN secretary-general's mechanism on alleged use investigation for biological weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kraatz-Wadsack, G.

    2009-01-01

    The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2006. Preventing and responding to attacks using WMD were identified amongst the key areas of activities covered by the strategy. The Secretary-General's mechanism to carry out prompt investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons was developed in the late 1980s. Triggered by a request from any member State, the Secretary-General is authorized to launch an investigation including dispatching a fact-finding team to the site of the alleged incident(s) and to report to all UN Member States. This is to ascertain in an objective and scientific manner facts of alleged violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons. Member States encouraged the Secretary-General in September 2006 to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures, available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use. The roster of experts and laboratories and the guidelines and procedures constitute the key elements of the special mechanism available to the Secretary-General for investigation of reports by Member States of alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been working with Member States since March 2007 to update the roster of experts and laboratories and the technical appendices of the guidelines and procedures so that they fully correspond with the rapid and substantial developments that have occurred in the biological area since the 1980s and also to take into account the fact that an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has since been established. Currently, the roster of experts and laboratories has been updated and includes experts from more than 50 countries. The information available in

  10. Preparing for and implementing the UN secretary-general's mechanism on alleged use investigation for biological weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kraatz-Wadsack, G [Department for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), New York (United States)

    2009-07-01

    The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2006. Preventing and responding to attacks using WMD were identified amongst the key areas of activities covered by the strategy. The Secretary-General's mechanism to carry out prompt investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons was developed in the late 1980s. Triggered by a request from any member State, the Secretary-General is authorized to launch an investigation including dispatching a fact-finding team to the site of the alleged incident(s) and to report to all UN Member States. This is to ascertain in an objective and scientific manner facts of alleged violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons. Member States encouraged the Secretary-General in September 2006 to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures, available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use. The roster of experts and laboratories and the guidelines and procedures constitute the key elements of the special mechanism available to the Secretary-General for investigation of reports by Member States of alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been working with Member States since March 2007 to update the roster of experts and laboratories and the technical appendices of the guidelines and procedures so that they fully correspond with the rapid and substantial developments that have occurred in the biological area since the 1980s and also to take into account the fact that an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has since been established. Currently, the roster of experts and laboratories has been updated and includes experts from more than 50 countries. The information available in

  11. Prevent, Counter, and Respond - A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016-FY2020)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2015-03-01

    NNSA’s second core mission is reducing global nuclear dangers by preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, countering efforts to acquire such weapons or materials, and responding to nuclear or radiological incidents. In 2015, NNSA reorganized its nonproliferation activities based on core competencies and realigned its counterterrorism and counterproliferation functions to more efficiently address both current and emerging threats and challenges. The reorganization accompanied the March 2015 release of the first ever Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This report, which NNSA will update annually, highlights key nuclear threat trends and describes NNSA’s integrated threat reduction strategy.

  12. Biological agents with potential for misuse: a historical perspective and defensive measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bhalla, Deepak K.; Warheit, David B.

    2004-01-01

    Biological and chemical agents capable of producing serious illness or mortality have been used in biowarfare from ancient times. Use of these agents has progressed from crude forms in early and middle ages, when snakes and infected cadavers were used as weapons in battles, to sophisticated preparations for use during and after the second World War. Cults and terrorist organizations have attempted the use of biological agents with an aim to immobilize populations or cause serious harm. The reasons for interest in these agents by individuals and organizations include relative ease of acquisition, potential for causing mass casualty or panic, modest financing requirement, availability of technology, and relative ease of delivery. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has classified Critical Biological Agents into three major categories. This classification was based on several criteria, which include severity of impact on human health, potential for delivery in a weapon, capacity to cause panic and special needs for development, and stockpiling of medication. Agents that could cause the greatest harm following deliberate use were placed in category A. Category B included agents capable of producing serious harm and significant mortality but of lower magnitude than category A agents. Category C included emerging pathogens that could be developed for mass dispersion in future and their potential as a major health threat. A brief description of the category A bioagents is included and the pathophysiology of two particularly prominent agents, namely anthrax and smallpox, is discussed in detail. The potential danger from biological agents and their ever increasing threat to human populations have created a need for developing technologies for their early detection, for developing treatment strategies, and for refinement of procedures to ensure survival of affected individuals so as to attain the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from intentional use of

  13. Biological agents with potential for misuse: a historical perspective and defensive measures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bhalla, Deepak K; Warheit, David B

    2004-08-15

    Biological and chemical agents capable of producing serious illness or mortality have been used in biowarfare from ancient times. Use of these agents has progressed from crude forms in early and middle ages, when snakes and infected cadavers were used as weapons in battles, to sophisticated preparations for use during and after the second World War. Cults and terrorist organizations have attempted the use of biological agents with an aim to immobilize populations or cause serious harm. The reasons for interest in these agents by individuals and organizations include relative ease of acquisition, potential for causing mass casualty or panic, modest financing requirement, availability of technology, and relative ease of delivery. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has classified Critical Biological Agents into three major categories. This classification was based on several criteria, which include severity of impact on human health, potential for delivery in a weapon, capacity to cause panic and special needs for development, and stockpiling of medication. Agents that could cause the greatest harm following deliberate use were placed in category A. Category B included agents capable of producing serious harm and significant mortality but of lower magnitude than category A agents. Category C included emerging pathogens that could be developed for mass dispersion in future and their potential as a major health threat. A brief description of the category A bioagents is included and the pathophysiology of two particularly prominent agents, namely anthrax and smallpox, is discussed in detail. The potential danger from biological agents and their ever increasing threat to human populations have created a need for developing technologies for their early detection, for developing treatment strategies, and for refinement of procedures to ensure survival of affected individuals so as to attain the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from intentional use of

  14. The threat of nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maerli, M.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: There have always been enormous gaps between the potential of a weapon and the abilities and/or the will to employ it by terrorists. New means and methods of violence with unknown outcomes could be less appealing for sub-national groups. Conventional 'off the shelf' weaponry is thus likely to remain the major tools for traditional terrorists. However, the analysis show that while the risk of nuclear terrorism may be remote, it should not and cannot be excluded. Rigorous standards and means the protection, control and accounting of fissile materials are thus needed. 'Nuclear terrorism' can be defined as acts of violence and destruction where the means applied are nuclear devices, or threats of use of such means, to create a condition of fear, to get attention, or to blackmail to have wider effect on others than the directly targeted victim(s). Nuclear terrorism is a subset of radiological terrorism, were the means (or threats) applied are radioactive substances. While being distinctly dissimilar in terms of technical approaches and damage potentials, many of the features with regards to public threat perception are likely to be similar. No non-state actors have ever deployed or used a nuclear device, and the number of (publicly known) nuclear bomb treats has been limited. However, there is a disturbing interest among some terrorist organizations in acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities, probably for tactical purposes. The biological and chemical programs of the Japanese 'Aum Shinrikyo' cult that culminated in the Tokyo metro attack is highly publicized. Less well-known is the nuclear weapon program of the group. Nuclear material was acquired from the sect's properties in Australia and markets were explored to purchase nuclear technology via straw trading companies. Another highly profiled terrorist group with obvious nuclear intentions is the 'Al- Qa'ida', the group of bin Laden. The recent trail for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya

  15. The terrorist threat nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical - a medical approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Revel, M.C. de; Gourmelon, M.C.S.; Vidal, P.C.; Renaudeau, P.C.S.

    2005-01-01

    Since September 11, 2001, the fear of a large scale nuclear, biological and/or chemical terrorism is taken again into consideration at the highest level of national policies of risk prevention. The advent of international terrorism implies a cooperation between the military defense and the civil defense. The nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC) experts of the health service of army and of civil defense will have to work together in case of major terror attack. This book presents this cooperation between civil and military experts in the NRBC domain: risk analysis, national defense plans, crisis management, syndromes and treatments. The different aspects linked with the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are analyzed by the best experts from French medical and research institutes. All topics of each NRBC domain are approached: historical, basic, diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive. (J.S.)

  16. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  17. Quantitative stem cell biology: the threat and the glory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pollard, Steven M

    2016-11-15

    Major technological innovations over the past decade have transformed our ability to extract quantitative data from biological systems at an unprecedented scale and resolution. These quantitative methods and associated large datasets should lead to an exciting new phase of discovery across many areas of biology. However, there is a clear threat: will we drown in these rivers of data? On 18th July 2016, stem cell biologists gathered in Cambridge for the 5th annual Cambridge Stem Cell Symposium to discuss 'Quantitative stem cell biology: from molecules to models'. This Meeting Review provides a summary of the data presented by each speaker, with a focus on quantitative techniques and the new biological insights that are emerging. © 2016. Published by The Company of Biologists Ltd.

  18. Real-time threat evaluation in a ground based air defence environment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    JN Roux

    2008-06-01

    Full Text Available In a military environment a ground based air defence operator is required to evaluate the tactical situation in real-time and protect Defended Assets (DAs on the ground against aerial threats by assigning available Weapon Systems (WSs to engage enemy aircraft. Since this aerial environment requires rapid operational planning and decision making in stress situations, the associated responsibilities are typically divided between a number of operators and computerized systems that aid these operators during the decision making processes. One such a Decision Support System (DSS, a threat evaluation and weapon assignment system, assigns threat values to aircraft (with respect to DAs in real-time and uses these values to propose possible engagements of observed enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft WSs. In this paper a design of the threat evaluation part of such a DSS is put forward. The design follows the structured approach suggested in [Roux JN & van Vuuren JH, 2007, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, ORiON, 23(2, pp. 151-187], phasing in a suite of increasingly complex qualitative and quantitative model components as more (reliable data become available.

  19. Consequences of a changing CBRN threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Medema, J.

    2009-01-01

    The OPCW now counts 186 member States. Member States that possessed chemical weapons (CW) are destroying those weapons, albeit at a slow pace. In the coming decade most, if not all, of the 100.000 + tons of CW from the previous century will have been destroyed. Of the 12± States, not part of the OPCW, four of them potentially have CW but their quantities are restricted to less than 1000 tons. About one kg of the more potent nerve agent or Mustard gas is required to produce on average one casualty amongst unprotected troops, 1000 tons potentially can produce 1 million casualties. Protection, passive chemical defense, is therefore mandatory. However, once a detection and protection system is in place, with a protection factor of say one thousand, the amount required to produce one casualty amongst troops in a military scenario becomes prohibitive. Furthermore, available CW quantities will have been reduced by pre-emptive airstrikes and the aggressor will have little chance to fully deploy his CW capability. The threat from massive CW with units facing several attacks per week has changed to incidental attacks on a smaller scale and with far lower frequency. This should have consequences for the chemical defense posture of the forces, Detection and protection are still required but the protection can have a lower capacity, less spares per individual. Because the number of incidents will be far lower it might be more cost effective to abandon contaminated equipment than to decontaminate it. As the number of CW casualties entering the military medical system will be small it might be better to find cures for diseases from biological weapons than to spent money on improved therapies for nerve agent or mustard. Although research in CW medical over the last 50 years was great, it has not produced a therapy for mustard or a significant improvement over the old therapy for nerve agent poisoning. With a declining CW threat the BW threat is on the rise, making a passive

  20. Precursor of other nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roman-Morey, E.

    1997-01-01

    Based on the analysis of the long process of negotiations for implementing the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its history during the last three decades, especially its influence on other regions of the world for stimulating the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the following conclusions were drawn: nuclear danger still persists; the end of Cold War implies the end of a nuclear threat; the nuclear fear should not become nuclear complacency and be accepted by international community; common security as the goal of international community should be recognised and definitive abolition of nuclear weapons should be sought; the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents the cornerstone for creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones; Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should be examples to be followed by other regions and groups of countries for creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones which should be recognised as very important phase in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and means for attaining an international regime of non-proliferation of weapons for mass destruction

  1. Weapons of mass destruction, WMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: Since the invasion into Iraq in 2003, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have come to general notice; they include today chemical, biological, and atomic/nuclear weapons, (CW, BW, and AW). Radiological findings shall be described. Material and methods: X-ray findings of victims of WMD are described. From CW, own observations are reported. Examples of (possible) X-ray findings of victims of BW are described. AW may induce radiation disease. Results: Exposure to sulfur-lost induces severe bronchitis; if the radiograph shows pulmonary infiltrations, the prognosis is bad; a late consequence maybe bronchiectasis. BW can be based on bacteria, virus or toxins. An approach of the X-ray findings for BW victims is based on the assumption that the disease induced by BW has the same (or a similar) clinic and radiology as that induced by the original microorganism or by the unchanged toxism. This approximation may have its limits, if the germ or toxin has been modified. In survivors of AW, the radiology is probably that of victims of thermal radiation and blast. Conclusion: WMD seem to be a real or a possible threat. They can be used in war, in terrorist attacks, in crime, and in action of secret services. In case that WMD are employed, X-ray diagnostic will be used to evaluate the prognosis (triage) and the risk of infection

  2. Weapons of mass destruction, WMD

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, D-20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: Since the invasion into Iraq in 2003, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have come to general notice; they include today chemical, biological, and atomic/nuclear weapons, (CW, BW, and AW). Radiological findings shall be described. Material and methods: X-ray findings of victims of WMD are described. From CW, own observations are reported. Examples of (possible) X-ray findings of victims of BW are described. AW may induce radiation disease. Results: Exposure to sulfur-lost induces severe bronchitis; if the radiograph shows pulmonary infiltrations, the prognosis is bad; a late consequence maybe bronchiectasis. BW can be based on bacteria, virus or toxins. An approach of the X-ray findings for BW victims is based on the assumption that the disease induced by BW has the same (or a similar) clinic and radiology as that induced by the original microorganism or by the unchanged toxism. This approximation may have its limits, if the germ or toxin has been modified. In survivors of AW, the radiology is probably that of victims of thermal radiation and blast. Conclusion: WMD seem to be a real or a possible threat. They can be used in war, in terrorist attacks, in crime, and in action of secret services. In case that WMD are employed, X-ray diagnostic will be used to evaluate the prognosis (triage) and the risk of infection.

  3. The threat of proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palme, Olof.

    1986-01-01

    The paper on the threat of proliferation, is a keynote speech delivered to the Colloquium on Nuclear War, Nuclear Proliferation and their Consequences, Geneva, 1985. Topics discussed in the address include: nuclear weapons, nuclear war, terrorists, Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear disarmament, and leadership in world affairs. (UK)

  4. Strategy for responding to nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical threats in Switzerland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Storch, Daniel; Kenzelmann, Marc; Cadisch, Marc; Baggenstos, Martin

    2008-01-01

    ABC- Protection in Switzerland was originally set up primarily for protection against military weapons of mass destruction, such as atomic/nuclear or chemical weapons. Protection against biological weapons - at first within the domain of the medical service - was later integrated into AC-Protection, thus leading to ABC-Protection in Switzerland. In some cases the objectives of ABC-Protection with regard to prevention and intervention were defined differently in the military and civil fields. In order to put ABC-Protection in Switzerland on a uniform basis, the Federal Council has instructed the KomABC (Commission for ABC-Protection) to develop a general strategy for 'ABC-Protection in Switzerland'. The following paper describes the objectives as well as the key elements of this general strategy, which should guarantee that all Federal and Cantonal organizations take decisions related to prevention and intervention based on the same principles. The strategy covers the following topics: 1) Reference scenarios for ABC-Protection; 2) Demands related to prevention; 3) Demands related to intervention; 4) Allocation of tasks at the Federal and Cantonal levels. Protective measures for improving ABC-Protection in Switzerland are presented. (author)

  5. Why we must abolish nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohnishi, Hitoshi

    1997-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has offered a great opportunity to reduce or even abolish nuclear weapons, but the international community seemed to lose interest in nuclear weapons issues. Today, however, there are a lot of other major menaces to the survival of the mankind: pollution, hunger, poverty, ethnic conflicts. So the nuclear weapons issue is merely one of the most pressing threats to survival

  6. Military and diplomatic roles and options for managing and responding to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Final report: Program on Stability and the Offense/Defense Relationship

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hallenbeck, R.A.; Gill, J.M.; Murray, B.L.

    1993-05-26

    The March seminar, ``Military and Diplomatic Roles and Options`` for managing and responding to proliferation, featured three presentations: the military and diplomatic implications of preemptive force as a counterproliferation option; an in-depth assessment of the threat posed by biological weapons; and, a new proposed US counterproliferation policy.

  7. applying reinforcement learning to the weapon assignment problem

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    ismith

    Carlo (MC) control algorithm with exploring starts (MCES), and an off-policy ..... closest to the threat should fire (that weapon also had the highest probability to ... Monte Carlo ..... “Reinforcement learning: Theory, methods and application to.

  8. Combating the terrorist use of mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barakat, M.

    2008-01-01

    The risks of mass destruction weapons vary and also forms of damages resulting therefrom. While the effects of nuclear weapons are focused, sudden and comprehensive, the chemical weapons have limited impacts relatively unless used intensively severe prejudice to the element of surprise, and thus impaired the efficacy of their influences,especially that they affect exceptionally the individuals in the area of injury and biological weapons do not announce themselves except through their effect that appears later than the time of use as they affect exceptionally the organisms in the area of injury.The mass destruction weapons have turned from being a purely military means in the early twentieth century and have now become the means of violence against governments and countries that they should prepare themselves for and respond in ways of successful and effective countermeasures. Despite the fact that the acquisition of mass destruction weapons can be considered as a priority objective, which terrorist groups and organizations steadily seek but their accessibility is flanked by a lot of difficulties. Addressing the risk of further spread of nuclear weapons, and especially after doubling the power of those high-risk weapons, the international community has an approach to take a number of arrangements that complement each other to control and resist nuclear proliferation, either for the states or for terrorist groups.

  9. Operationalising UN security council resolution 1540: an overview of select practical activities in the chemical and biological weapon-related areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hart, J.

    2009-01-01

    The UN member states are continuing to take measures to inter alia establish and effectively implement controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts, including by working through the 1540 Committee. Most analyses on the implementation of the resolution have focused on nuclear issues. This presentation provides an overview of select practical activities in the chemical and biological weapon-related areas, including chemical product classification and identification, biosafety and biosecurity practices and criminal prosecutions for unauthorised chemical transfers.(author)

  10. Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What's at Stake?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hersman, Rebecca K

    2004-01-01

    .... Unfortunately, the current preoccupation with intelligence might mask other issues and shortcomings in the American ability to eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of its enemies...

  11. Considerations for the Distribution of Antiarmor Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1985-05-20

    German tank, used in mass formations, had been the decisive factor weapon.- The German Threat - "Blitzkrieg" The first German Tiger tank was not...also needed flank or rear shots to penetrate the armor of Panther and Tiger tanks at all but the closest ranges. A third self propelled antitank gun...Armored Threat In June 1944, the German Western Connand had 99 obsolete Pz III, 587 Pz IV, 290 Pz V (Panther) and only 63 Pz VI ( Tiger ) tanks available.20

  12. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  13. Medical experimentation concerning chemical and biological weapons for mass destruction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deutsch, Erwin

    2003-04-01

    This article is the text of a speech originally presented at the Second World Conference on Medical Ethics at Gijon, Spain, on 2 October 2002 under the title "Medical Experimentation Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons for Mass Destruction: Clinical Design for New Smallpox Vaccines: Ethical and Legal Aspects." Experimentation on vaccines such as smallpox is subject to the usual ethical rules such as the need for informed consent. However, the participants will not often be at risk of catching the disease but expose themselves by taking part in the experimentation. Professor Deutsch explores the implications of this, including the position of vulnerable groups such as children, those with mental handicaps, and those acting under orders such as the miliary, the policy and fire officers.

  14. Decisions to shoot in a weapon identification task: The influence of cultural stereotypes and perceived threat on false positive errors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fleming, Kevin K; Bandy, Carole L; Kimble, Matthew O

    2010-01-01

    The decision to shoot a gun engages executive control processes that can be biased by cultural stereotypes and perceived threat. The neural locus of the decision to shoot is likely to be found in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), where cognition and affect converge. Male military cadets at Norwich University (N=37) performed a weapon identification task in which they made rapid decisions to shoot when images of guns appeared briefly on a computer screen. Reaction times, error rates, and electroencephalogram (EEG) activity were recorded. Cadets reacted more quickly and accurately when guns were primed by images of Middle-Eastern males wearing traditional clothing. However, cadets also made more false positive errors when tools were primed by these images. Error-related negativity (ERN) was measured for each response. Deeper ERNs were found in the medial-frontal cortex following false positive responses. Cadets who made fewer errors also produced deeper ERNs, indicating stronger executive control. Pupil size was used to measure autonomic arousal related to perceived threat. Images of Middle-Eastern males in traditional clothing produced larger pupil sizes. An image of Osama bin Laden induced the largest pupil size, as would be predicted for the exemplar of Middle East terrorism. Cadets who showed greater increases in pupil size also made more false positive errors. Regression analyses were performed to evaluate predictions based on current models of perceived threat, stereotype activation, and cognitive control. Measures of pupil size (perceived threat) and ERN (cognitive control) explained significant proportions of the variance in false positive errors to Middle-Eastern males in traditional clothing, while measures of reaction time, signal detection response bias, and stimulus discriminability explained most of the remaining variance.

  15. Assessing the impact of Melendez-Diaz on the investigation and prosecution of biological weapons incidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bahr, Elizabeth L; Katz, Rebecca

    2009-12-01

    In June 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted in Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts that the admission of a laboratory analyst's certificate to validate forensic evidence against a defendant violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The Court stated that if a prosecution wished to use forensic science evidence against a defendant, the plaintiff must ensure that an actual lab analyst could testify live before the court as to the nature of the laboratory certificate being presented against the defendant, in order to uphold a defendant's constitutional right to confront the adverse witnesses against him or her. The opinion itself, as well as dicta in both the majority and the dissenting opinions, has potential implications for the success of any future prosecutions of alleged biological weapons use involving microbial forensics. Not only does the Melendez-Diaz opinion create an added burden on laboratory investigators, but the case called into question the reliability of the use of forensic science in the courtroom. Analysts and policymakers should be aware of this ruling and any potential impact the Court may have on the ability to successfully prosecute a biological weapons use event.

  16. Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-06-04

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  17. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  18. Reducing the threat of nuclear theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, Matthew; Bunn, George

    2001-01-01

    The appalling events of September II, 2001 make clear that the threat of well-organized global terrorist groups bent on causing mass destruction is not hypothetical but real. There is evidence that Osama bin Laden's Al Quaida organization is seeking weapons of mass destruction, and has attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material from the former Soviet Union for use in nuclear explosives. Ensuring that the technologies and materials of weapons of mass destruction - especially weapons-usable nuclear materials, do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups or hostile states must therefore be a central element of the coming global battle to prevent mass-destruction terrorism. At the same time, nuclear facilities and radioactive materials - along with a wide range of other especially hazardous facilities and materials - must be protected from mass-consequence sabotage. Limited access to fissile materials, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, is the principal technical barrier to nuclear proliferation in the world today. The international community has an overwhelming interest in seeing that all such material is secure and accounted for. These events highlight the urgent need to: Dramatically expand international cooperation to upgrade security and accounting for weapons- usable nuclear material, in the former Soviet Union and worldwide, with the goal of ensuring that all such material is protected to stringent standards within a few years; Ensure that all nuclear facilities and materials (and other particularly hazardous facilities) are secure from mass-consequence sabotage; Strengthen national and international standards for security of nuclear materials and facilities; Greatly expand international efforts to interdict nuclear smuggling, including the difficult but essential task of strengthening efforts to share intelligence in this critical area; Reduce the number of sites where significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material exist, and the size

  19. 2007 Joint Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Conference and Exhibition - Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-06-27

    Selected CB Defense Systems SHAPESENSE Joint Warning and Reporting Network JSLIST CB Protected Shelter Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program Joint Effects...military can operate in any environment, unconstrained by chemical or biological weapons. 21 SHIELD SUSTAIN Selected CB Defense Systems SHAPESENSE Joint...28070625_JCBRN_Conference_Reeves UNCLASSIFIED Decontamination Vision Strippable Barriers Self-Decontaminating Fabrics/Coatings Reduce Logistics Burden

  20. Limitations of Guns as a Defence against Manoeuvring Air Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Washsberger, Christian

    2004-01-01

    In the near future, strategic and other critical assets will be subject to attack from a new range of air threats, including highly accurate aircraft-launched weapons that offer long stand-off ranges...

  1. Economic impact profiling of CBRN events: focusing on biological incidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cavallini, Simona; Bisogni, Fabio; Mastroianni, Marco

    2014-12-01

    Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, both caused accidentally by human error or natural/technological events and determined intentionally as criminal/malicious/terroristic acts, have consequences that could be differently characterized. In the last years many efforts to analyze the economic impact of terrorist threat have been carried out, while researches specifically concerning CBRN events have not been extensively undertaken. This paper in particular aims at proposing a methodological approach for studying macro-level economic impact profiles of biological incidents caused by weaponized and non-weaponized materials. The suggested approach investigates the economic consequences of biological incidents according to two main dimensions: type of large-scale effect and persistence of effect. Biological incident economic impacts are analyzed taking into account the persistence of effect during time as short-term impact (i.e. immediately after the incident), medium-term impact (i.e. by a month) and long-term impact (i.e. by years). The costs due to preventive countermeasure against biological threats (e.g. prevention, protection and preparedness expenses) are not taken into account. To this purpose, information on the key features of past biological incidents can be used as case studies to try to build impact profiles taking into account the proposed two main dimensions. Consequence management and effect mitigation of CBRN emergencies and disasters may benefit from an ex ante definition of the impact profiling related to this kind of incidents. The final goal of this paper is to define an approach to organize information on possible biological events according to their impact profile for supporting more effective and efficient first responders' prompt actions and policy makers' strategic decisions after the event occurrence.

  2. Worldwide governmental efforts to locate and destroy chemical weapons and weapons materials: minimizing risk in transport and destruction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trapp, Ralf

    2006-09-01

    The article gives an overview on worldwide efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the context of the implementation of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It highlights the objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency set up in The Hague to implement the CWC, and provides an overview of the present status of implementation of the CWC requirements with respect to chemical weapons (CW) destruction under strict international verification. It addresses new requirements that result from an increased threat that terrorists might attempt to acquire or manufacture CW or related materials. The article provides an overview of risks associated with CW and their elimination, from storage or recovery to destruction. It differentiates between CW in stockpile and old/abandoned CW, and gives an overview on the factors and key processes that risk assessment, management, and communication need to address. This discussion is set in the overall context of the CWC that requires the completion of the destruction of all declared CW stockpiles by 2012 at the latest.

  3. The role of genomics in the identification, prediction, and prevention of biological threats.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    W Florian Fricke

    2009-10-01

    Full Text Available In all likelihood, it is only a matter of time before our public health system will face a major biological threat, whether intentionally dispersed or originating from a known or newly emerging infectious disease. It is necessary not only to increase our reactive "biodefense," but also to be proactive and increase our preparedness. To achieve this goal, it is essential that the scientific and public health communities fully embrace the genomic revolution, and that novel bioinformatic and computing tools necessary to make great strides in our understanding of these novel and emerging threats be developed. Genomics has graduated from a specialized field of science to a research tool that soon will be routine in research laboratories and clinical settings. Because the technology is becoming more affordable, genomics can and should be used proactively to build our preparedness and responsiveness to biological threats. All pieces, including major continued funding, advances in next-generation sequencing technologies, bioinformatics infrastructures, and open access to data and metadata, are being set in place for genomics to play a central role in our public health system.

  4. Functionalized gold nanoparticle supported sensory mechanisms applied in detection of chemical and biological threat agents: A review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Upadhyayula, Venkata K.K.

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► Smart sensors are needed for detection of chemical and biological threat agents. ► Smart sensors detect analytes with rapid speed, high sensitivity and selectivity. ► Functionalized gold nanoparticles (GNPs) can potentially smart sense threat agents. ► Functionalized GNPs support multiple analytical methods for sensing threat agents. ► Threat agents of all types can be detected using functionalized GNPs. - Abstract: There is a great necessity for development of novel sensory concepts supportive of smart sensing capabilities in defense and homeland security applications for detection of chemical and biological threat agents. A smart sensor is a detection device that can exhibit important features such as speed, sensitivity, selectivity, portability, and more importantly, simplicity in identifying a target analyte. Emerging nanomaterial based sensors, particularly those developed by utilizing functionalized gold nanoparticles (GNPs) as a sensing component potentially offer many desirable features needed for threat agent detection. The sensitiveness of physical properties expressed by GNPs, e.g. color, surface plasmon resonance, electrical conductivity and binding affinity are significantly enhanced when they are subjected to functionalization with an appropriate metal, organic or biomolecular functional groups. This sensitive nature of functionalized GNPs can be potentially exploited in the design of threat agent detection devices with smart sensing capabilities. In the presence of a target analyte (i.e., a chemical or biological threat agent) a change proportional to concentration of the analyte is observed, which can be measured either by colorimetric, fluorimetric, electrochemical or spectroscopic means. This article provides a review of how functionally modified gold colloids are applied in the detection of a broad range of threat agents, including radioactive substances, explosive compounds, chemical warfare agents, biotoxins, and

  5. Functionalized gold nanoparticle supported sensory mechanisms applied in detection of chemical and biological threat agents: A review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Upadhyayula, Venkata K.K., E-mail: Upadhyayula.Venkata@epa.gov [Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education (ORISE), MC-100-44, PO Box 117, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States)

    2012-02-17

    Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Smart sensors are needed for detection of chemical and biological threat agents. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Smart sensors detect analytes with rapid speed, high sensitivity and selectivity. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Functionalized gold nanoparticles (GNPs) can potentially smart sense threat agents. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Functionalized GNPs support multiple analytical methods for sensing threat agents. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Threat agents of all types can be detected using functionalized GNPs. - Abstract: There is a great necessity for development of novel sensory concepts supportive of smart sensing capabilities in defense and homeland security applications for detection of chemical and biological threat agents. A smart sensor is a detection device that can exhibit important features such as speed, sensitivity, selectivity, portability, and more importantly, simplicity in identifying a target analyte. Emerging nanomaterial based sensors, particularly those developed by utilizing functionalized gold nanoparticles (GNPs) as a sensing component potentially offer many desirable features needed for threat agent detection. The sensitiveness of physical properties expressed by GNPs, e.g. color, surface plasmon resonance, electrical conductivity and binding affinity are significantly enhanced when they are subjected to functionalization with an appropriate metal, organic or biomolecular functional groups. This sensitive nature of functionalized GNPs can be potentially exploited in the design of threat agent detection devices with smart sensing capabilities. In the presence of a target analyte (i.e., a chemical or biological threat agent) a change proportional to concentration of the analyte is observed, which can be measured either by colorimetric, fluorimetric, electrochemical or spectroscopic means. This article provides a review of how functionally modified gold colloids are applied in the detection of a broad

  6. Shipborne Laser Beam Weapon System for Defence against Cruise Missiles

    OpenAIRE

    J.P. Dudeja; G.S. Kalsey

    2000-01-01

    Sea-skim~ing cruise missiles pose the greatest threat to a surface ship in the present-day war scenario. The convenitional close-in-weapon-systems (CIWSs) are becoming less reliable against these new challenges requiring extremely fast reaction time. Naval Forces see a high energy laser as a feasible andjeffective directed energy weapon against sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles becauseof its .ability to deliver destructive energy at the speed of light on to a distant target. The paper com...

  7. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Matoušek, J

    2010-02-01

    Full Text Available Chemical weapons, like all military technology, are associated with activities of scientists and engineers. However, chemical weapons differ from any other military technology because they were invented, and their first mass use directly developed by famous chemists. The active contribution of engineers and scientists and their organisations in the negotiations on chemical disarmament, including drafting the Chemical Weapons Convention, is described. Their present and future role in implementing the Convention is analysed, taking into consideration the threats and benefits of advances in science and technology, and stressing the independent expertise of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board.

  8. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  9. An assessment of the Canadian Forces' capability to manage the consequences of the domestic use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pickering, W.L.

    2003-01-01

    In view of the threat to Canadian domestic targets presented by the asymmetric use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this thesis examines whether the Canadian Forces (CF) has capability deficiencies in managing the consequences of such an attack. Research included an examination of the post Cold War strategic environment, the state of the art in CBRN technology, current concepts and experience in managing the consequences of major disasters and responsibilities at the municipal, provincial and federal levels of government. The methodology used included scenario based planning to develop circumstances where WMD might be used domestically, and decomposition to break down the scenarios into events and potential CF roles and tasks. The current CF structure was used to determine the probable CF response, which included the ability of CF units to perform the required tasks, the CF response time and the ability of the CF to sustain the operation. (author)

  10. A multiobjective approach towards weapon assignment in a ground ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    A typical ground-based air defence (GBAD) environment comprises defended assets on the ground which require protection from enemy aircraft entering the defended airspace. ... of computerised threat evaluation and weapon assignment (TEWA) decision support systems (DSSs) within the context of a GBAD system.

  11. Classifying threats with a 14-MeV neutron interrogation system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Strellis, Dan; Gozani, Tsahi

    2005-01-01

    SeaPODDS (Sea Portable Drug Detection System) is a non-intrusive tool for detecting concealed threats in hidden compartments of maritime vessels. This system consists of an electronic neutron generator, a gamma-ray detector, a data acquisition computer, and a laptop computer user-interface. Although initially developed to detect narcotics, recent algorithm developments have shown that the system is capable of correctly classifying a threat into one of four distinct categories: narcotic, explosive, chemical weapon, or radiological dispersion device (RDD). Detection of narcotics, explosives, and chemical weapons is based on gamma-ray signatures unique to the chemical elements. Elements are identified by their characteristic prompt gamma-rays induced by fast and thermal neutrons. Detection of RDD is accomplished by detecting gamma-rays emitted by common radioisotopes and nuclear reactor fission products. The algorithm phenomenology for classifying threats into the proper categories is presented here.

  12. Elimination of ballistic missiles: An important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheffran, J.

    1997-01-01

    Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty preamble emphasises 'the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems. Delivery systems are an important and costly part of nuclear weapons which should be sophisticated, therefore the control of nuclear-capable delivery systems would be an important step to make nuclear weapons useless and reduce the threat od their use. This is especially true for ballistic missiles, which represent effective and powerful means to deploy nuclear weapons

  13. The nuclear threat; La menace nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2011-01-26

    For a long time, a small group of big powers has been the only holder of nuclear weapons (US, USSR, Great Britain, France and China). Since then, new weapons have come out on the geopolitical scene: Israel, India, Pakistan, and some others remain uncertain and generate a worrying atmosphere (North Korea, Iran..). But what is the real risk with nuclear proliferation? Should we dread about it? Is nuclear terrorism a real threat? What are the political stakes of nuclear weapons? Is disarmament a real solution? These are some of the questions that the author answers in a precise and clear manner in this book. Contents: 1 - from monopoly to proliferation: who owns nuclear weapons today, why is it so coveted, is it easy to make one?; 2 - the newcomers: what do we really know about the Iranian nuclear programme, Iran and North Korea: between negotiation and confrontation; 3 - international control and regulation: do we have reliable information, how do we know what we know, Iraq: was there a 'lie' somewhere, who are the states who have renounced nuclear weapons?; 4 - the future: is there still a nuclear warfare risk, what if Pakistani weapons fall into islamic hands, is nuclear terrorism a fantasy or a real risk?

  14. Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-12-01

    Senate testimony, Dr. Craig Venter suggested that “outbreaks and spread of avian and other fl u virus strains . . . could potentially kill hundreds of...May 23, 2005. 36. Dr. Craig Venter, Testimony to Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, “21st Century...International Studies. 241. Robert M. Cook- Deegan , “Issues in Biosecurity and Biosafety,” Science, Vol. 308, No. 5730, June 24, 2005, pp. 1867-1868

  15. 激光失能生物学原理与激光失能武器技术%Biological foundation and technical development of disabling laser weapons

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    杨在富; 王嘉睿; 钱焕文

    2014-01-01

    Disabling laser weapons are directed energy weapons , which make use of laser energy to fight against the en-emy, deprive them of the ability of to perform military tasks but will not result in death .Based on biological principles , dis-abling laser weapons can be divided into blinding , dazzling or pain-eliciting weapons .In this paper , the biological founda-tion and technical development of disabling laser weapons were reviewed .%激光失能武器是利用光能对敌人实施打击,致其丧失军事作业能力但不会直接致命的定向能武器。激光失能武器依据其生物学原理可分为激光致盲武器、激光眩目武器、激光致痛武器等不同类型。该文对上述激光失能武器的生物学原理和武器技术现状做一综述。

  16. Nuclear weapons industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertsch, K.A.; Shaw, L.S.

    1984-01-01

    This unique study was written specifically as a reference source for institutional investors concerned about the threat posed to their stock portfolios by the debate over nuclear arms production. The authors focus their analysis on the 26 leading companies in the field. The perspective is neutral and refreshing. Background information on strategic policy, arms control and disarmament, and the influence of the industry on defense policy and the economy is presented rationally. The study also discusses the economic significance of both the conversion from military to civilian production and nuclear freeze initiatives. An appendix contains a fact-filled guide to nuclear weapon systems

  17. Deconstructing the 'energy weapon': Russia's threat to Europe as case study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith Stegen, Karen, E-mail: k.smithstegen@jacobs-university.de [Jacobs University Bremen (Germany); Bremer Energie Institut (Germany)

    2011-10-15

    As the likelihood increases that Russia will dominate the European Union's (EU) energy supply, questions have emerged as to whether Russia would use the energy weapon to influence EU member policies and extract political concessions. Countervailing voices argue that Russia would be restricted by interdependence and market forces. As of yet, no one has analyzed the assumptions underlying the energy weapon thesis. Moreover, many scholars examining EU-Russian energy relations rely on non-Russian data. This article seeks to fill several informational and theoretical gaps by including Russian sources and first-hand data and by systematically analyzing the conditions that must obtain before an energy supplier can successfully convert its energy resources into political power. The resulting model can be utilized to analyze the capacity of a supplier to use the energy weapon-whether it be Russia, Iran, Venezuela or any other energy heavyweight-and to assess whether the deployment was successful. Five purported cases of Russian manipulation are analyzed in this article and the findings indicate that, more often than not, Russia failed to achieve political concessions. Looking to the future, the plausibility of Russia using the energy weapon to exploit Europe's dependence, particularly on gas, is also examined. - Highlights: > Energy producers may manipulate supply and prices to coerce political concessions. > Energy weapon model: four conditions must obtain for successful deployment. > Western policy-makers worry about EU dependence on and vulnerability to Russia. > Analysis of five Russian cases reveals tenuous link between weapon use and success. > In medium term, EU can likely avoid yielding political autonomy for supply security.

  18. Bio-Terrorism Threat and Casualty Prevention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NOEL,WILLIAM P.

    2000-01-01

    The bio-terrorism threat has become the ''poor man's'' nuclear weapon. The ease of manufacture and dissemination has allowed an organization with only rudimentary skills and equipment to pose a significant threat with high consequences. This report will analyze some of the most likely agents that would be used, the ease of manufacture, the ease of dissemination and what characteristics of the public health response that are particularly important to the successful characterization of a high consequence event to prevent excessive causalities.

  19. The tale of the shrinking weapon: seasonal changes in nutrition affect weapon size and sexual dimorphism, but not contemporary evolution.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, C W; McDonald, G C; Moore, A J

    2016-11-01

    Sexually selected traits are often highly variable in size within populations due to their close link with the physical condition of individuals. Nutrition has a large impact on physical condition, and thus, any seasonal changes in nutritional quality are predicted to alter the average size of sexually selected traits as well as the degree of sexual dimorphism in populations. However, although traits affected by mate choice are well studied, we have a surprising lack of knowledge of how natural variation in nutrition affects the expression of sexually selected weapons and sexual dimorphism. Further, few studies explicitly test for differences in the heritability and mean-scaled evolvability of sexually selected traits across conditions. We studied Narnia femorata (Hemiptera: Coreidae), an insect where males use their hind legs as weapons and the femurs are enlarged, to understand the extent to which weapon expression, sexual dimorphism and evolvability change across the actual range of nutrition available in the wild. We found that insects raised on a poor diet (cactus without fruit) are nearly monomorphic, whereas those raised on a high-quality diet (cactus with ripe fruit) are distinctly sexually dimorphic via the expression of large hind leg weapons in males. Contrary to our expectations, we found little evidence of a potential for evolutionary change for any trait measured. Thus, although we show weapons are highly condition dependent, and changes in weapon expression and dimorphism could alter evolutionary dynamics, our populations are unlikely to experience further evolutionary changes under current conditions. © 2016 European Society For Evolutionary Biology. Journal of Evolutionary Biology © 2016 European Society For Evolutionary Biology.

  20. The threat from creationism to the rational teaching of biology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    ATHEL CORNISH-BOWDEN

    2007-01-01

    Full Text Available Most biologists outside the USA and a few other countries, like Australia and Canada, are under the impression that the threat to the teaching of biology represented by creationism does not concern them directly. This is unfortunately no longer true: the recent growth of creationism, especially in its pseudo-scientific manifestation known as "intelligent design", has been obvious in several countries of Western Europe, especially the UK, Germany and Poland, and it is beginning to be noticeable in Brazil, and maybe elsewhere in Latin America. The problem is complicated by the fact that there are not just two possibilities, evolution and creationism, because creationism comes in various incompatible varieties. Turkey is now a major source of creationist propaganda outside the USA, and is especially significant in relation to its influence on Muslim populations in Europe. The time for biologists to address the creationist threat is now

  1. Nuclear power and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apold, A.

    1978-01-01

    The theme of Dr. Marshall's lecture was that it is, from the viewpoint of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons,preferable to use plutonium as a fuel in FBR reactors rather than store it in what, in effect, would be plutonium mines. The true threat of proliferation lies in uranium enrichment. The FBR reactor is misunderstood and the US policy is not against breeders as such. Safeguards against the misuse of plutonium by leaving a residue of radioactivity after reprocessing is quite feasible, despite certain practical problems and extra costs. Weapon proliferation is subject to political objectives and intentions. Definite proposals are, (a) a limited number of reprocessing centres, (b) an accelerated development of FBR reactors, (c) a new FBR fuel cycle, (d) stop storage of spent thermal reactor fuel, (e) reinforced safeguards. (JIW)

  2. Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm For A World Without Nuclear Weapons?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marc Finaud

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available If there is a loose consensus on aiming at a world free of nuclear weapons in the future, there are clear oppositions as to the timeframe as well as the means for achieving this goal. The approach to nuclear disarmament followed to date has only yielded limited success because it has been conceived in isolation from global and regional security environments and threat perceptions. A new paradigm should thus be sought in order to reconcile nuclear powers’ security doctrines with global aspirations for a safer world, and ensure that nuclear powers derive their security less from others’ insecurity but from mutually beneficial cooperative security. This should not become a pretext for preserving nuclear weapons for ever. It will on the contrary require parallel tracks addressing the initial motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD, in particular in the context of regional conflicts, as well as dealing with the current issues necessarily related to nuclear disarmament (missile defence, weaponization of space, conventional imbalances and future weapon systems. Ultimately, in a globalised nuclear-weapon free world, state security will not require nuclear weapons because it will be inserted into a broader network encompass­ing all aspects of security addressed in cooperative and multilateral approaches.

  3. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons : The law of arms control and the international non-proliferation regime

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Coppen, T.

    2016-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a severe threat to international peace, security and stability. In order to counter this threat, the international community has taken numerous measures, legal and otherwise, resulting in a global framework of treaties and political agreements known as

  4. The abolition of nuclear weapons: realistic or not? For physicians, a world without nuclear weapons is possible and above all necessary. To abolish, did you say abolish? Is the elimination of the nuclear weapon realistic?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Behar, Abraham; Gere, Francois; Lalanne, Dominique

    2010-06-01

    In a first article, a physician explains that eliminating nuclear weapons would be a way to get rid of the temptation for some persons to use this arm of massive destruction, and that it would be better for mankind to live without this threat. The author of the second article discusses the effect abolition could have, and, with a reference to President Obama's position about zero nuclear weapons, outlines that it could be at the benefit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He also discusses the perspectives of this 'global zero logics' with a new approach to arms control, and comments the relationships between abolition and non proliferation. He finally discusses the reserved attitude of France on these issues. In the next contribution, a nuclear physicist wanders whether the elimination of nuclear weapons is realistic: whereas it has always been a political objective, nuclear states refused to commit themselves in this direction in 2010 and keep on developing military-oriented tools to design new weapons

  5. Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adams, Marvin

    2011-04-01

    As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

  6. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK.

  7. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung

    2015-01-01

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK

  8. Physical security technologies for weapons complex reconfiguration facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-01-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a member of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S ampersand S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration. The physical security systems in the new and upgraded facilities being considered for the WCR had to meet DOE orders and other requirements set forth in the WCR Programmatic Design Criteria (PDC), incorporate the latest physical security technologies using proven state-of-the-art systems and meet fundamental security principles. The outcome was to avoid costly retrofits and provide effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, costs and schedule. Physical security requirements for WCR facilities include: (1) reducing S ampersand S life-cycle costs, (2) where feasible automating S ampersand S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, (3) increasing the amount of delay to outsider adversary attack, (4) compartmentalizing the facility to minimize the number of personnel requiring access to critical areas and (5) having reliable and maintainable systems. To be most effective against threats physical security must be integrated with facility operations, safety and other S ampersand S activities, such as material control and accountability, nuclear measurements and computer and information security. This paper will discuss the S ampersand S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical security technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed

  9. American security perspectives: public views on energy, environment, nuclear weapons and terrorism: 2008

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.

    2008-01-01

    We analyze and compare findings from matching national surveys of the US general public on US energy and environmental security administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2008. Key areas of investigation include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alter-native sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include evolving perspectives on global climate change and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options. We also report findings from an Internet survey of the general public conducted in mid-2008 that investigates assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support for domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism.

  10. Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction: Some reflections. Essay, published in Le Monde

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2003-01-01

    With all the changes in international relations since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have continued to have a position of prominence as the currency of ultimate power. And although a number of countries such as South Africa have given up their nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons ambitions, the nuclear umbrellas of NATO and other alliances continue to expand. More importantly, the objectives embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), developed in the early 1970s to control the spread of nuclear weapons and to move us towards nuclear disarmament, are under growing stress. Several thousands of nuclear weapons continue to exist in the five nuclear weapon States party to the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). And of the three countries that remain outside the NPT, two India and Pakistan have in the last few years demonstrated their nuclear weapons capability, while the third Israel is generally presumed to have such weapons. Most recently North Korea, a party to the NPT, has decided to walk away from the Treaty and, not unlike some other parties to the Treaty, is suspected of working to acquire nuclear weapons. Other States, on the other hand, have opted for the 'poor man's alternative' by pursuing the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons. And in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, the threat of Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation gained a new dimension: the prospect of sub-national groups seeking to acquire and use these weapons. Faced with this reality, one must conclude that it is futile to try to combat the spread of WMD through a collective, rule-based system of international security and that people have to acquiesce to living in a world plagued with the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust or other disasters? But reliance on a system of collective security to curb the proliferation of WMD will require bold thinking, a willingness to work together

  11. Heterogeneous Defensive Naval Weapon Assignment To Swarming Threats In Real Time

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-03-01

    come under fire from multiple sources simultaneously. These threats would be engaged in a numbers game , seeking to saturate the battlespace with many...optimization extension that uses the Python modeling language. B. TEST SCENARIO The following test scenario was developed to validate the models...Adaptive rapid response to swarming threats Concept Briefing. Presented at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Python [Computer Software]. (2015

  12. Conflict Without Casualties: Non-Lethal Weapons in Irregular Warfare

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-09-01

    the body,” and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, bans the use of chemical and biological weapons .11 On 8 April 1975, President Ford issued Executive...E Funding – PE 63851M) (accessed 15 December 2006). The American Journal of Bioethics . “Medical Ethics and Non-Lethal Weapons .” Bioethics.net...CASUALTIES: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE by Richard L. Scott September 2007 Thesis Advisor: Robert McNab Second Reader

  13. Escalation of terrorism? On the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials; Eskalation des Terrors? Ueber das Anschlagsrisiko mit chemischen, biologischen, radiologischen und nuklearen Waffen oder Stoffen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nass, Jens

    2010-07-01

    The report on the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials covers the following topics: the variety of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, politically motivated, social revolutionary, political extremism, religious fanaticism, governmental terrorism; CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons and materials: their availability and effectiveness in case of use; potential actor groups; prevention and counter measures, emergency and mitigating measures.

  14. Security in the Mediterranean basin: terrorism and weapons of mass destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benoit, L.

    2006-01-01

    The european union has appreciated the gravity of the threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and has adopted a strategy for keeping up its guard, particularly in the Mediterranean basin. The author reviews what is being done to meet these scourges. (author)

  15. Interfacing a biosurveillance portal and an international network of institutional analysts to detect biological threats.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Riccardo, Flavia; Shigematsu, Mika; Chow, Catherine; McKnight, C Jason; Linge, Jens; Doherty, Brian; Dente, Maria Grazia; Declich, Silvia; Barker, Mike; Barboza, Philippe; Vaillant, Laetitia; Donachie, Alastair; Mawudeku, Abla; Blench, Michael; Arthur, Ray

    2014-01-01

    The Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) project, launched in 2008, is aimed at improving global early alerting and risk assessment and evaluating the feasibility and opportunity of integrating the analysis of biological, chemical, radionuclear (CBRN), and pandemic influenza threats. At a time when no international collaborations existed in the field of event-based surveillance, EAR's innovative approach involved both epidemic intelligence experts and internet-based biosurveillance system providers in the framework of an international collaboration called the Global Health Security Initiative, which involved the ministries of health of the G7 countries and Mexico, the World Health Organization, and the European Commission. The EAR project pooled data from 7 major internet-based biosurveillance systems onto a common portal that was progressively optimized for biological threat detection under the guidance of epidemic intelligence experts from public health institutions in Canada, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The group became the first end users of the EAR portal, constituting a network of analysts working with a common standard operating procedure and risk assessment tools on a rotation basis to constantly screen and assess public information on the web for events that could suggest an intentional release of biological agents. Following the first 2-year pilot phase, the EAR project was tested in its capacity to monitor biological threats, proving that its working model was feasible and demonstrating the high commitment of the countries and international institutions involved. During the testing period, analysts using the EAR platform did not miss intentional events of a biological nature and did not issue false alarms. Through the findings of this initial assessment, this article provides insights into how the field of epidemic intelligence can advance through an

  16. A Look into Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, from the Past to Today

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Babak Shiravand

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: Biological attack a phenomenon which has seriously started in the 20th- century and is expanding every day. Plague agent is one of factors listed as a biological weapon by the disarmament convention. Therefore, the risk of biological or bioterrorism applications is probable and serious. The purpose of this study was to update health professionals' information on plague and bioterrorism aspect of this disease. Methods: This article is a literature review written based on search on articles from library and internet resources (1990- 2016. Results: More than 2,000 species of bacteria have been identified in three main groups of bacillus (rod-shaped, cocci (round and oval, and spiral. But only about 100 of them are known as pathogens and Less than 10 species are used as biological agents for military application and one of them is plague agent. Yersinia pestis is a Gram negative, rod-shaped, anaerobic, member of the enterobacteriaceae family, and if be painted by Colors Wright, Giemsa or Leeson will be seen bipolar under a microscope. Conclusion: Nowadays, in spite of the progresses made in science and technology, human knowledge is relatively incapable to anticipate the time and place of biological attacks. Therefore, being prepared and ready for its unavoidable occurrence is necessary. So, regarding the importance and necessity of readiness, officials and experts have to make an effort and plan against these hazards.

  17. The Neutrino Bomb: A New Weapon of Mass Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broda, E.

    1978-01-01

    This text was written by E. Broda in a “Supplementary” paper for Pugwash in the year 1978. It is about the neutrino and a general principle of its use as a potential weapon of mass destruction. It ends with a suggestion to convene a Pugwash workshop for dealing with the threat of the neutrino bomb. (zarka)

  18. Experimental manipulation reveals a trade-off between weapons and testes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Somjee, U; Miller, C W; Tatarnic, N J; Simmons, L W

    2018-01-01

    Theory predicts a trade-off between sexually selected weapons used to secure mates and post-copulatory traits used to maximize fertilization success. However, individuals that have a greater capacity to acquire resources from the environment may invest more in both pre- and post-copulatory traits, and trade-offs may not be readily apparent. Here, we manipulate the phenotype of developing individuals to examine allocation trade-offs between weapons and testes in Mictis profana (Hemiptera: Coreidae), a species where the hind legs are sexually selected weapons used in contests over access to females. We experimentally prevented males from developing weapons by inducing them to autotomize their hind legs before the final moult to adulthood. We compared trait expression in this group to males where autotomy was induced in the mid-legs, which are presumably not under sexual selection to the same extent. We found males without weapons invested proportionally more in testes mass than those with their mid-legs removed. Males that developed to adulthood without weapons did not differ from the mid-leg removal group in other traits potentially under precopulatory sexual selection, other post-copulatory traits or naturally selected traits. In addition, a sample of adult males from the same population in the wild revealed a positive correlation between investment in testes and weapons. Our study presents a critical contribution to a growing body of literature suggesting the allocation of resources to pre- and post-copulatory sexual traits is influenced by a resource allocation trade-off and that this trade-off may only be revealed with experimental manipulation. © 2017 European Society For Evolutionary Biology. Journal of Evolutionary Biology © 2017 European Society For Evolutionary Biology.

  19. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugie, Ei-Ichi

    1997-01-01

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  20. Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats: An Analysis of Russias New Generation Warfare and Implications for the US Army

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-10-18

    Threats 21 Laws and Cultural Norms as a Weapons System : When operating in the gray zone, aggressors try to use... Operational Phases 26 Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats 4 Abstract The gray zone is an operating environment in...Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats 6 Criminal Organizations and Networks,

  1. Concealed Threat Detection at Multiple Frames-per-second

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chang, J T

    2005-11-08

    In this LDRD project, our research purpose is to investigate the science and technology necessary to enable real-time array imaging as a rapid way to detect hidden threats through obscurants such as smoke, fog, walls, doors, and clothing. The goal of this research is to augment the capabilities of protective forces in concealed threat detection. In the current context, threats include people as well as weapons. In most cases, security personnel must make very fast assessments of a threat based upon limited amount of data. Among other attributes, UWB has been shown and quantified to penetrate and propagate through many materials (wood, some concretes, non-metallic building materials, some soils, etc.) while maintaining high range resolution. We have build collaborations with university partners and government agencies. We have considered the impact of psychometrics on target recognition and identification. Specifically we have formulated images in real-time that will engage the user's vision system in a more active way to enhance image interpretation capabilities. In this project, we are researching the use of real time (field programmable gate arrays) integrated with high resolution (cm scale), ultra wide band (UWB) electromagnetic signals for imaging personnel through smoke and walls. We evaluated the ability of real-time UWB imaging for detecting smaller objects, such as concealed weapons that are carried by the obscured personnel. We also examined the cognitive interpretation process of real time UWB electromagnetic images.

  2. Cyber terrorism and cyber-crime – threats for cyber security

    OpenAIRE

    Ackoski, Jugoslav; Dojcinovski, Metodija

    2012-01-01

    This paper has aim to give contribution in supporting efforts against cyber threats recognized as a cyber terrorism and cyber crime. Also, it has aim to show future challenges related to cyber security and their emerging threats – cyber war, cyber terrorism and cyber crime. Accelerate weapon development called ICT (Information Communication Technology) which is developed every day faster and faster, and development of human conscious on higher level about consequences of ICT enormous pene...

  3. Consequences of the Use of Neutron Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilijas, B.

    1998-01-01

    In modern conceptions of the use of nuclear weapons there is a significant role of so called enhanced radiation weapons, also known as neutron weapons. Its most important feature is that all other effects (blast, thermal) are minimized in favour of neutron radiation. Because of the great penetrative capability and biological efficiency, neutron beam is ideal weapon against people in shelters and armoured vehicles. Material goods stay saved and also there is no significant long- term radioactive contamination. After the use of this weapons, which is possible even for tactical tasks on limited area, one must count with great number of people irradiated with doses in wide range - from those enough for instantaneous incapacitation to those which cause only long-term effects. For the purpose of maximal efficiency in this situation, it is necessary to work out plans for dosimetric control, first aid, transport and medical treatment of irradiated people (soldiers and civilians) in war conditions. (author)

  4. The big shadow of the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hubert-Rodier, J.

    2006-01-01

    While civil nuclear industry shows a revival, the military side comes back to the front of the scene too. The end of the cold war has not buried the nuclear weapon. In front of the threats shown by Iran and Northern Korea and despite the quasi-universal nonproliferation treaty, the world is now again threaten by a wave of proliferation encouraged by the political tensions in the Middle-East and Asia. (J.S.)

  5. Global patterns in threats to vertebrates by biological invasions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bellard, C.; Genovesi, P.; Jeschke, J. M.

    2016-01-01

    Biological invasions as drivers of biodiversity loss have recently been challenged. Fundamentally, we must know where species that are threatened by invasive alien species (IAS) live, and the degree to which they are threatened. We report the first study linking 1372 vertebrates threatened by more than 200 IAS from the completely revised Global Invasive Species Database. New maps of the vulnerability of threatened vertebrates to IAS permit assessments of whether IAS have a major influence on biodiversity, and if so, which taxonomic groups are threatened and where they are threatened. We found that centres of IAS-threatened vertebrates are concentrated in the Americas, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. The areas in which IAS-threatened species are located do not fully match the current hotspots of invasions, or the current hotspots of threatened species. The relative importance of biological invasions as drivers of biodiversity loss clearly varies across regions and taxa, and changes over time, with mammals from India, Indonesia, Australia and Europe are increasingly being threatened by IAS. The chytrid fungus primarily threatens amphibians, whereas invasive mammals primarily threaten other vertebrates. The differences in IAS threats between regions and taxa can help efficiently target IAS, which is essential for achieving the Strategic Plan 2020 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. PMID:26817767

  6. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2001-01-01

    ... more than $3 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to help Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Georgia secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction...

  7. Hazards of chemical weapons release during war: new perspectives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reutter, S

    1999-01-01

    The two major threat classes of chemical weapons are mustard gas and the nerve agents, and this has not changed in over 50 years. Both types are commonly called gases, but they are actually liquids that are not remarkably volatile. These agents were designed specifically to harm people by any route of exposure and to be effective at low doses. Mustard gas was used in World War I, and the nerve agents were developed shortly before, during, and after World War II. Our perception of the potency of chemical weapons has changed, as well as our concern over potential effects of prolonged exposures to low doses and potential target populations that include women and children. Many of the toxicologic studies and human toxicity estimates for both mustard and nerve agents were designed for the purpose of quickly developing maximal casualties in the least sensitive male soldier. The "toxicity" of the chemical weapons has not changed, but our perception of "toxicity" has. PMID:10585902

  8. Between Allies and Rivals: Turkey, Nuclear Weapons, and BMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kibaroglu, Mustafa

    2014-01-01

    This paper discusses Turkey's attitudes vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense in the light of recent developments in the Iranian nuclear program and NATO's evolving concept of extended deterrence. On the one hand, the long-standing forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey and the country's role in the US Phased Adaptive Approach BMD architecture are still considered to be key elements of national security. On the other, security guarantees offered to Turkey by NATO and the US appear less and less credible in the face of rising regional threats. As this paper shows, there is a growing gap between official policy and public perceptions inside Turkey vis-a-vis the US, Iran, and nuclear weapons, as well as a growing Turkish aspiration to autonomy in its security and defense policy. While one should not expect Turkey to develop nuclear weapons anytime soon, an unchecked Iranian regional power could bring Ankara to hedge its bets in the long term. Turkey's controversial recent decision to buy a Chinese system for its national air and missile defense rather than European or US equipment should be seen in the light of this search for autonomy. (author)

  9. Responding to chemical weapons violations in Syria: legal, health, and humanitarian recommendations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brooks, Julia; Erickson, Timothy B; Kayden, Stephanie; Ruiz, Raul; Wilkinson, Stephen; Burkle, Frederick M

    2018-01-01

    The repeated use of prohibited chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict poses serious health, humanitarian, and security threats to civilians, healthcare personnel, and first responders. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons constitutes a clear and egregious violation of international law-likely amounting to a war crime-for which continued impunity is setting a dangerous precedent in relation to current and future conflicts. This debate article calls upon concerned states, organizations, and individuals to respond urgently and unequivocally to this serious breach of international legal and humanitarian norms. Based on health, humanitarian, and legal findings, this article calls for concrete action to: 1) reduce the risk of chemical weapons being used in current and future conflicts; 2) review and support the preparedness equipment and antidote supplies of first responders, humanitarian organizations, and military forces operating in Syria; 3) support international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the prohibition on chemical weapons, including through criminal accountability; 4) support civilian victims of chemical weapons attacks, including refugees; and 5) re-commit to the complete elimination of chemical weapons in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), a comprehensive treaty that bans chemical weapons and requires their complete destruction. All involved states and organizations should take urgent steps to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable victims of conflict, including victims of chemical weapons attacks in Syria, and to reinforce international law in the face of such serious violations.

  10. Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the Former Soviet Union

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1997-01-01

    DOD's program to convert former Soviet Union defense industries to commercial enterprises is part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which DOD has supported since 1992 to reduce the weapons...

  11. THE MYTH OF THE RUSSIAN EXISTENTIAL THREAT

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-04-01

    Putin’s intent. What we can do is learn from his actions, and what we see suggests growing Russian capabilities, significant military modernization...AU/ACSC/POWELL, N/AY16 AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY THE MYTH OF THE RUSSIAN EXISTENTIAL THREAT...The methodology focuses on Russian capability, capacity, and intention to threaten NATO members’ existence. While Russia does possess nuclear weapons

  12. Defense against nuclear weapons: a decision analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orient, J.M.

    1985-01-01

    Response to the public health threat posed by nuclear weapons is a medical imperative. The United States, in contrast to other nations, has chosen a course that assures maximal casualties in the event of a nuclear attack, on the theory that prevention of the attack is incompatible with preventive measures against its consequences, such as blast injuries and radiation sickness. A decision analysis approach clarifies the risks and benefits of a change to a strategy of preparedness

  13. Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2000-01-01

    ...) gathers intelligence and assesses the threat posed by domestic sources of terrorism. According to the U.S. intelligence community, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. The intelligence community (both foreign and domestic agencies) reports an increased possibility that terrorists may use CBRN agents in the next decade.

  14. Biological warfare, bioterrorism, and biocrime

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Jansen, H. J.; Breeveld, F. J.; Stijnis, C.; Grobusch, M. P.

    2014-01-01

    Biological weapons achieve their intended target effects through the infectivity of disease-causing infectious agents. The ability to use biological agents in warfare is prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention. Bioterrorism is defined as the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria

  15. Virus, bakterier og toksiner som biologiske kampstoffer

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, J E

    1999-01-01

    or individuals have developed biological weapons for offensive use in war or terrorism. This article reviews the publically available literature, and clinical and therapeutic possibilities are described. The possibilities for protection of military and civilian groups are discussed and the need for a national......Biological weapons are an important part of the level of international threat. Technological development has made biological weapon production relatively simple and cheap, and although a UN convention from 1972 bans biological weapons, governments as well as non-governmental organisations...

  16. A systematic screen of FDA-approved drugs for inhibitors of biological threat agents.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Peter B Madrid

    Full Text Available BACKGROUND: The rapid development of effective medical countermeasures against potential biological threat agents is vital. Repurposing existing drugs that may have unanticipated activities as potential countermeasures is one way to meet this important goal, since currently approved drugs already have well-established safety and pharmacokinetic profiles in patients, as well as manufacturing and distribution networks. Therefore, approved drugs could rapidly be made available for a new indication in an emergency. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: A large systematic effort to determine whether existing drugs can be used against high containment bacterial and viral pathogens is described. We assembled and screened 1012 FDA-approved drugs for off-label broad-spectrum efficacy against Bacillus anthracis; Francisella tularensis; Coxiella burnetii; and Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa fever viruses using in vitro cell culture assays. We found a variety of hits against two or more of these biological threat pathogens, which were validated in secondary assays. As expected, antibiotic compounds were highly active against bacterial agents, but we did not identify any non-antibiotic compounds with broad-spectrum antibacterial activity. Lomefloxacin and erythromycin were found to be the most potent compounds in vivo protecting mice against Bacillus anthracis challenge. While multiple virus-specific inhibitors were identified, the most noteworthy antiviral compound identified was chloroquine, which disrupted entry and replication of two or more viruses in vitro and protected mice against Ebola virus challenge in vivo. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: The feasibility of repurposing existing drugs to face novel threats is demonstrated and this represents the first effort to apply this approach to high containment bacteria and viruses.

  17. A Systematic Screen of FDA-Approved Drugs for Inhibitors of Biological Threat Agents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Madrid, Peter B.; Chopra, Sidharth; Manger, Ian D.; Gilfillan, Lynne; Keepers, Tiffany R.; Shurtleff, Amy C.; Green, Carol E.; Iyer, Lalitha V.; Dilks, Holli Hutcheson; Davey, Robert A.; Kolokoltsov, Andrey A.; Carrion, Ricardo; Patterson, Jean L.; Bavari, Sina; Panchal, Rekha G.; Warren, Travis K.; Wells, Jay B.; Moos, Walter H.; Burke, RaeLyn L.; Tanga, Mary J.

    2013-01-01

    Background The rapid development of effective medical countermeasures against potential biological threat agents is vital. Repurposing existing drugs that may have unanticipated activities as potential countermeasures is one way to meet this important goal, since currently approved drugs already have well-established safety and pharmacokinetic profiles in patients, as well as manufacturing and distribution networks. Therefore, approved drugs could rapidly be made available for a new indication in an emergency. Methodology/Principal Findings A large systematic effort to determine whether existing drugs can be used against high containment bacterial and viral pathogens is described. We assembled and screened 1012 FDA-approved drugs for off-label broad-spectrum efficacy against Bacillus anthracis; Francisella tularensis; Coxiella burnetii; and Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa fever viruses using in vitro cell culture assays. We found a variety of hits against two or more of these biological threat pathogens, which were validated in secondary assays. As expected, antibiotic compounds were highly active against bacterial agents, but we did not identify any non-antibiotic compounds with broad-spectrum antibacterial activity. Lomefloxacin and erythromycin were found to be the most potent compounds in vivo protecting mice against Bacillus anthracis challenge. While multiple virus-specific inhibitors were identified, the most noteworthy antiviral compound identified was chloroquine, which disrupted entry and replication of two or more viruses in vitro and protected mice against Ebola virus challenge in vivo. Conclusions/Significance The feasibility of repurposing existing drugs to face novel threats is demonstrated and this represents the first effort to apply this approach to high containment bacteria and viruses. PMID:23577127

  18. Barents Sea polar bears (Ursus maritimus: population biology and anthropogenic threats

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Magnus Andersen

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available This paper examines how anthropogenic threats, such as disturbance, pollution and climate change, are linked to polar bear (Ursus maritimus population biology in the Svalbard and Barents Sea area, with the aim to increase our understanding of how human activity may impact the population. Overharvesting drastically reduced the population of polar bears in the Barents Sea region from about 1870 to 1970. After harvesting was stopped—in 1956 in Russia and 1973 in Norway—the population grew to an estimated 2650 individuals (95% confidence interval 1900–3600 in 2004, and maternity denning in the Svalbard Archipelago became more widely distributed. During recent decades, the population has faced challenges from a variety of new anthropogenic impacts: a range of pollutants, an increasing level of human presence and activity as well as changes in ice conditions. Contaminants bioaccumulate up through the marine food web, culminating in this top predator that consumes ringed, bearded and harp seals. Females with small cubs use land-fast sea ice for hunting and are therefore vulnerable to disturbance by snowmobile drivers. Sea-ice diminution, associated with climate change, reduces polar bears’ access to denning areas and could negatively affect the survival of cubs. There are clear linkages between population biology and current anthropogenic threats, and we suggest that future research and management should focus on and take into consideration the combined effects of several stressors on polar bears.

  19. Toward a psychology of human survival: Psychological approaches to contemporary global threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walsh, R.

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear weapons, population explosion, resource and food-supply depletion, and environmental deterioration have been posing increasing threats to human survival. Moreover, for the first time in history, all these major global threats are human caused and can, therefore, be traced in large part to psychological origins. After a brief overview of the nature and extent of current threats, this paper suggests criteria for an adequate psychology of human survival. The causes and effects of the threats are examined from various psychological perspectives and the psychological principles underlying effective responses are deduced. The ways in which mental health professionals may contribute to this most crucial task are discussed. 76 references

  20. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  1. Avoiding Panic and Keeping the Ports Open in a Chemical and Biological Threat Environment. A Literature Review

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Korpi, Tanja M; Hemmer, Christopher

    2005-01-01

    ... and biological threat environment. As a starting point for such a program, this study examines the extant literature on the psychology of risk assessment, warnings, sociological studies of reactions to disasters...

  2. The prevention of geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons: Nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in the Southern hemisphere

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, E.

    1989-01-01

    It is understandable that many Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) worry about the dangers of further geographical or spatial proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the extension to their regions of rivalries that are foreign to them. In this regard, there has been since the 1950's a number of proposals and initiatives to turn specific regions into nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace in order to prevent or reduce the above mentioned threats. Although differences exits between the concepts of nuclear-weapon-free-zones and zones of peace as well as among the various NWFZ and ZP, inter se, they do share a common feature insofar as they represent a regional approach to the question of curbing the arms race, especially the nuclear one. This study will address some of these initiatives, examine their specific characteristics and assess their role in the prevention of the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Among the relevant existing initiatives, those situated in the Southern Hemisphere offer an interesting focus of attention, in view of the fact that, together, they form a sort of a contiguous geographical area encompassing virtually half of the globe. The regions covered are the Antarctic, Latin American, South Pacific, South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The first three have been established as nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the last two are in the process of being turned into zones of peace. The aim of this study is to compare similarities and differences among them and to identify the factors that condition their efficiency. By understanding their usefulness and their weaknesses, one many eventually construct useful paradigms for further regional initiatives to curb the arms race, specially the nuclear one

  3. Maintaining distinctions under threat: heterosexual men endorse the biological theory of sexuality when equality is the norm.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Falomir-Pichastor, Juan M; Hegarty, Peter

    2014-12-01

    According to social identity theory, group members sometimes react to threats to their group's distinctiveness by asserting the distinctiveness of their group. In four studies (n = 261) we tested the hypothesis that heterosexual men with a greater propensity to be threatened by homosexuality would react to egalitarian norms by endorsing biological theories of sexuality. Heterosexual men, but not women, with narrow prototypes of their gender in-group endorsed biological theories the most (Study 1). Heterosexual men with higher gender self-esteem, with heterosexist attitudes, who endorsed traditional gender roles, and with narrow prototypes of their gender in-group, endorsed the biological theories more when egalitarian norms rather than anti-egalitarian norms (Studies 2 and 3) or pro-minority ideologies that emphasized group differences (Study 4) were made salient. These findings show group-level reactive distinctiveness among members of a high-status group in a context of threat to the unique privileges that they once enjoyed. © 2013 The British Psychological Society.

  4. Biological warfare, bioterrorism, and biocrime.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jansen, H J; Breeveld, F J; Stijnis, C; Grobusch, M P

    2014-06-01

    Biological weapons achieve their intended target effects through the infectivity of disease-causing infectious agents. The ability to use biological agents in warfare is prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention. Bioterrorism is defined as the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria or other agents used to cause illness or death in people, but also in animals or plants. It is aimed at creating casualties, terror, societal disruption, or economic loss, inspired by ideological, religious or political beliefs. The success of bioterroristic attempts is defined by the measure of societal disruption and panic, and not necessarily by the sheer number of casualties. Thus, making only a few individuals ill by the use of crude methods may be sufficient, as long as it creates the impact that is aimed for. The assessment of bioterrorism threats and motives have been described before. Biocrime implies the use of a biological agent to kill or make ill a single individual or small group of individuals, motivated by revenge or the desire for monetary gain by extortion, rather than by political, ideological, religious or other beliefs. The likelihood of a successful bioterrorist attack is not very large, given the technical difficulties and constraints. However, even if the number of casualties is likely to be limited, the impact of a bioterrorist attack can still be high. Measures aimed at enhancing diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities and capacities alongside training and education will improve the ability of society to combat 'regular' infectious diseases outbreaks, as well as mitigating the effects of bioterrorist attacks. © 2014 The Authors Clinical Microbiology and Infection © 2014 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases.

  5. Public views on multiple dimensions of security: nuclear weapons, terrorism, energy, and the environment: 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.

    2008-01-01

    We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support for domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.

  6. Kidnapping and abduction minimizing the threat and lessons in survival

    CERN Document Server

    Heard, Brian John

    2014-01-01

    Terrorist groups and organized crime cartels pose an increasing threat of kidnapping throughout many regions in the word. At the same time, international travel has become more commonplace for both business and leisure purposes. Kidnapping and Abduction: Minimizing the Threat and Lessons in Survival provides a practical guide on the precautions travelers can take to avoid being kidnapped or derail a kidnapping attempt in progress. In the event this cannot be avoided, the book supplies advice on how to ensure survival during captivity. Readers will learn: The basic elements of kidnapping and abduction The motivations and mechanisms of kidnappers The hotspots where kidnapping/hostage taking is prevalent Vehicles best suited for avoidance of kidnap threat and proposals for up-armoring an existing vehicle How to recognize immediate threats and precautions to be taken in assessing threat level The types of weapons most favored by kidnappers and their threat level Available bullet-resistant materials and their use ...

  7. Proposals for chemical weapons during the American Civil War.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hasegawa, Guy R

    2008-05-01

    Proposals for chemical weapons that arose during the American Civil War are described. Most incendiary and all biological agents are excluded. The described proposals appeared primarily in periodicals or letters to government officials on both sides. The weapons were usually meant to temporarily disable enemy combatants, but some might have been lethal, and Civil War caregivers were ill-prepared to deal with the weapons' effects. Evidently, none of the proposed weapons were used. In only one instance was use against civilians mentioned. Among the agents most commonly proposed were cayenne pepper or other plant-based irritants such as black pepper, snuff, mustard, and veratria. Other suggested agents included chloroform, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic compounds, sulfur, and acids. Proponents usually suggested that the chemicals be included in explosive artillery projectiles. Less commonly proposed vehicles of delivery included fire engines, kites, and manned balloons. Some of the proposed weapons have modern counterparts.

  8. HEU core conversion of Russian production reactors: a major threat to the international RERTR regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

    1998-01-01

    This paper calls the attention for the major threat to the International Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, represented by the HEU core conversion of russian production reactors. This program aims to reduce and eventually eliminate international civilian commerce in nuclear weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium , and thereby significantly lower risks of the material being stolen or diverted by terrorist or states for producing nuclear weapons

  9. Terrorist threat, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear medical approach; Menace terroriste, approche medicale nucleaire, radiologique, biologique, chimique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Revel, Th. de [Hopital d' Instruction des Armees Percy, 92 - Clamart (France); Gourmelon, P. [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), 92 - Clamart (France); Vidal, D. [Centre de Recherche du Service de Sante des Armees, 38 - La Tronche (France); Renaudeau, C. [Ecole du Val de Grace, 92 - Clamart (France)

    2005-07-01

    The different aspects linked to the use of nuclear, radiological, biological and or chemical weapons are gathered in this work. They concern history, fundamental aspect, diagnosis, therapy and prevention. The part devoted to the nuclear aspect concern the accidents in relation with ionizing radiations, the radiation syndrome, the contribution and limits of dosimetry, the treatment of medullary aplasia, the evaluation and treatment of an internal contamination, new perspectives on the use of cytokine for the treatment of accidental irradiated persons, alternative to the blood transfusion. (N.C.)

  10. Countering the Nuclear Terrorist Threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vantine, H C

    2002-01-01

    The nuclear/radioactive threat to homeland security posed by terrorists can be broken into four categories. Of highest concern is the use of an improvised nuclear device (IND). An IND, as its name implies, is a nuclear explosive device. It produces nuclear yield, and this nuclear yield has catastrophic effects. An IND is the ultimate terrorist weapon, and terrorist groups are actively attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Detonation of an IND could dwarf the devastation of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. Dealing with the aftermath of an IND would be horrific. Rescue efforts and cleanup would be hazardous and difficult. Workers would have to wear full protection suits and self-contained breathing apparatus. Because of the residual radioactivity, in certain locations they could only work short times before acquiring their ''lifetime'' dose. As with the Chernobyl event, some rescue workers might well expose themselves to lethal doses of radiation, adding to the casualty toll. Enormous volumes of contaminated debris would have to be removed and disposed. If a terrorist group decides not to pursue an actual nuclear device, it might well turn to Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) or ''dirty bombs'' as they are often called. RDDs spread radioactivity but they do not generate nuclear yield. The fabrication of an RDD requires radioactive material and a dispersal mechanism. Radioactive materials are used all over the world for medical, industrial, and research applications. Standards for safe handling and accountability of radioactive material vary around the world. Stories in the press suggest inadequate controls on radiological materials in parts of the world. The effects of an RDD vary widely, and are measured in terms of contamination area, health effects to the exposed population, and economic consequences. Even a negligible, but measurable, exposure would exploit the general public's fear of things radioactive and would have significant

  11. [Smallpox virus as biological weapon].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kondrusik, Maciej; Hermanowska-Szpakowicz, Teresa

    2003-02-01

    Smallpox, because of its high case-fatality rate, easy transmission from human to human, lack of specific treatment represents nowadays one of the main threats in bioterrorist attacks. Over the centuries, naturally occurring smallpox with its case-fatality over 30 percent and its ability to spread in any climate and season has been treated as the most dangerous infectious disease. But it is now, 25 years after the last documented case of smallpox and cessation of routine vaccination in present mobile and susceptible population, smallpox virus spread might be rapid and devastating.

  12. Bill related to the struggle against proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This bill indicates the modifications brought to different French laws and codes (penal code, defence code, custom code) and defines provisions and penalties within the frame of struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons, biological weapons and toxin-based weapons, chemical weapons), and against the proliferation of their vectors. These modifications, provisions and penalties also concern double-use products. The bill also defines the modifications brought to the French penal procedure code. It finally addresses offenses related to these proliferations which can be considered as an act of terrorism

  13. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is w here it all began . The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  14. Insular threat associations within taxa worldwide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leclerc, Camille; Courchamp, Franck; Bellard, Céline

    2018-04-23

    The global loss of biodiversity can be attributed to numerous threats. While pioneer studies have investigated their relative importance, the majority of those studies are restricted to specific geographic regions and/or taxonomic groups and only consider a small subset of threats, generally in isolation despite their frequent interaction. Here, we investigated 11 major threats responsible for species decline on islands worldwide. We applied an innovative method of network analyses to disentangle the associations of multiple threats on vertebrates, invertebrates, and plants in 15 insular regions. Biological invasions, wildlife exploitation, and cultivation, either alone or in association, were found to be the three most important drivers of species extinction and decline on islands. Specifically, wildlife exploitation and cultivation are largely associated with the decline of threatened plants and terrestrial vertebrates, whereas biological invasions mostly threaten invertebrates and freshwater fish. Furthermore, biodiversity in the Indian Ocean and near the Asian coasts is mostly affected by wildlife exploitation and cultivation compared to biological invasions in the Pacific and Atlantic insular regions. We highlighted specific associations of threats at different scales, showing that the analysis of each threat in isolation might be inadequate for developing effective conservation policies and managements.

  15. Nuclear theft and sabotage. Priorities for reducing new threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, Matthew; Bunn, George

    2001-01-01

    The appalling attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States make clear that the threat of large, well-organized global terrorist groups bent on causing mass destruction is not hypothetical but real. The attackers achieved horrifying destruction with box-cutters. The results could have been even more horrific if the attackers would have had access to, and used, weapons of mass destruction. Ensuring that technologies and materials for weapons of mass destruction - especially weapons-usable nuclear materials, whose acquisition is the most difficult part of making a nuclear bomb - do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups or hostile States must be a central element of the coming global effort to prevent catastrophic terrorism. At the same time, nuclear facilities and materials - along with a wide range of other especially hazardous facilities and materials must be protected from mass-consequence sabotage. Securing these materials and facilities must be a top priority on the international agenda - pursued at every opportunity, at every level of authority, until the job is done. At the same time, the threats against which we must defend have to be fundamentally reconsidered. On 11 September, the threat revealed itself to be bigger, smarter, better organized, and more deadly than the threats most of the world's security systems were designed to defend against. We must ensure that our defensive response is every bit as intelligent and capable as the September attackers. And we may have to rethink some of the approaches to nuclear energy that the world has been pursuing or contemplating. Every reasonable effort must be made to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities are effectively secured. In the past, many scenarios with enormously high consequences were dismissed as too unlikely to contribute much to overall risk - but now many of these probability estimates will have to be revised. A far-reaching new effort is needed to strengthen security for nuclear

  16. Cyber Conflicts as a New Global Threat

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexander Kosenkov

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available In this paper, an attempt is made to analyze the potential threats and consequences of cyber conflicts and, in particular, the risks of a global cyber conflict. The material is based on a comprehensive analysis of the nature of cyber conflict and its elements from both technical and societal points of view. The approach used in the paper considers the societal component as an essential part of cyber conflicts, allowing basics of cyber conflicts often disregarded by researchers and the public to be highlighted. Finally, the conclusion offers an opportunity to consider cyber conflict as the most advanced form of modern warfare, which imposes the most serious threat and whose effect could be comparable to weapons of mass destruction.

  17. Detecting Illicit Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kouzes, Richard T.

    2005-01-01

    The threat that weapons of mass destruction might enter the United States has led to a number of efforts for the detection and interdiction of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons at our borders. There have been multiple deployments of instrumentation to detect radiation signatures to interdict radiological material, including weapons and weapons material worldwide

  18. Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material: The 'net' security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zaitseva, L.; Steinhausler, F.

    2006-01-01

    Illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, which could be used for building a nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersal device, has been a subject of concern for more than a decade. A major obstacle to assessing the actual security threat due to nuclear trafficking is the inclusion in the analysis of incidents that do not represent a security threat, in the sense of being a possible pre-stage to a clandestine nuclear weapons programme or a terrorist operation involving a crude nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device. International transport of contaminated scrap metal, or discovery of lost or abandoned radioactive sources are examples of such incidents, which have little or no security relevance. This paper analyses the global data contained in the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSO) using special filters to discriminate between incidents that are of security relevance and those that are not. (author)

  19. Susceptibility and hardening of electronic systems to fast transient threats: new challenges ahead

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    F. Sabath

    2004-01-01

    Full Text Available The field of susceptibility and hardening of electronic systems to transient threats has experienced a significant growth during the past ten years. Driven by the development in the area of non-lethal electromagnetic weapons it has become necessary to extend the classical set of transient threats, consisting of LEMP, ESD and NEMP, by a fast transient threat with an extreme bandwidth. The investigation of the susceptibility to those UWB threats, characterized by a bandwidth of more than a quarter of the center frequency, rise times of less than 200 ps and pulse durations in the ns regime, is of special interest. This paper presents an overview of current challenges of the hardening against UWB threats. It discusses recent research trends in transient susceptibility measurements, protection concepts and methods of analysis.

  20. Non-State actors’ pursuit of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Meulenbelt, S.E.; Nieuwenhuizen, M.S.

    2016-01-01

    This paper discusses non-State actors’ motivation and capacity to develop and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) improvised weapons in attacks, as well as the possible consequences of such use. Six types of groups have been identified as potential CBRN weapons users that may

  1. The terrorist threat nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical - a medical approach; Menace terroriste nucleaire, radiologique, biologique, chimique - approche medicale

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Revel, M.C. de; Gourmelon, M.C.S.; Vidal, P.C.; Renaudeau, P.C.S

    2005-07-01

    Since September 11, 2001, the fear of a large scale nuclear, biological and/or chemical terrorism is taken again into consideration at the highest level of national policies of risk prevention. The advent of international terrorism implies a cooperation between the military defense and the civil defense. The nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC) experts of the health service of army and of civil defense will have to work together in case of major terror attack. This book presents this cooperation between civil and military experts in the NRBC domain: risk analysis, national defense plans, crisis management, syndromes and treatments. The different aspects linked with the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are analyzed by the best experts from French medical and research institutes. All topics of each NRBC domain are approached: historical, basic, diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive. (J.S.)

  2. The weapons effect.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J

    2018-02-01

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  3. High Speed Marine Craft Threat: Buoyancy and Stability Requirements for a Sub-Launched Weapon System

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Lowery, John

    1999-01-01

    ...) that would be used for coastal infiltration. The most practical scenario would utilize a torpedo stow for a weapon system that would be tube launched, thus ensuring the maximum cruise missile capability of the submarine with a minimal sacrifice...

  4. International forum on nuclear and biological decommissioning: Management of global security threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aslanian, G.; Kouzminov, V.; Martellini, M.; Santesso, R.

    1998-01-01

    The Forum on Nuclear and Biological Decommissioning: Management of Global Security Threats was organized by the Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV) with the support of the UNESCO Venice Office, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian National Board for Alternative Energy Sources (ENEA), the Lombardy Region and the Municipality of Como. Subjects dealt with at the conference included the reconversion of nuclear and biological military equipment produced in the 50 years of the Cold War period and the effects of radio contamination on the environment and on human life. This conference was the most recent of a number of initiatives on reconversion organized in collaboration with the UNESCO Venice Office. The issues dealt with at the conference will be among the subjects for discussion at the UNESCO International School Science for Peace, which will be set up at the 'A. Volta' Center for Scientific Culture

  5. The emerging threat of superwarfarins: history, detection, mechanisms, and countermeasures: The emerging threat of superwarfarins

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Feinstein, Douglas L. [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Jesse Brown VA Medical Center, Chicago Illinois; Akpa, Belinda S. [Department of Molecular Biomedical Sciences, North Carolina State University, Raleigh North Carolina; Ayee, Manuela A. [Department of Medicine, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Boullerne, Anne I. [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Jesse Brown VA Medical Center, Chicago Illinois; Braun, David [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Brodsky, Sergey V. [Department of Pathology, the Ohio State University, Columbus Ohio; Gidalevitz, David [Department of Physics and the Center for the Molecular Study of Condensed Soft Matter, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago Illinois; Hauck, Zane [Department of Medicinal Chemistry and Pharmacognosy, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Kalinin, Sergey [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Kowal, Kathy [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Kuzmenko, Ivan [X-ray Science Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont Illinois; Lis, Kinga [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Marangoni, Natalia [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Martynowycz, Michael W. [Department of Physics and the Center for the Molecular Study of Condensed Soft Matter, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago Illinois; X-ray Science Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont Illinois; Rubinstein, Israel [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Department of Medicine, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; van Breemen, Richard [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Ware, Kyle [Department of Pathology, the Ohio State University, Columbus Ohio; Weinberg, Guy [Department of Anesthesiology, University of Illinois, Chicago Illinois; Jesse Brown VA Medical Center, Chicago Illinois

    2016-05-31

    Superwarfarins were developed following the emergence of warfarin resistance in rodents. Compared to warfarin, superwarfarins have much longer half-lives and stronger affinity to vitamin K epoxide reductase and therefore can cause death in warfarin-resistant rodents. By the mid-1970s, the superwarfarins brodifacoum and difenacoum were the most widely used rodenticides throughout the world. Unfortunately, increased use was accompanied by a rise in accidental poisonings, reaching >16,000 per year in the United States. Risk of exposure has become a concern since large quantities, up to hundreds of kilograms of rodent bait, are applied by aerial dispersion over regions with rodent infestations. Reports of intentional use of superwarfarins in civilian and military scenarios raise the specter of larger incidents or mass casualties. Unlike warfarin overdose, for which 1–2 days of treatment with vitamin K is effective, treatment of superwarfarin poisoning with vitamin K is limited by extremely high cost and can require daily treatment for a year or longer. Furthermore, superwarfarins have actions that are independent of their anticoagulant effects, including both vitamin K–dependent and –independent effects,which are not mitigated by vitaminKtherapy. In this review, we summarize superwarfarin development, biology and pathophysiology, their threat as weapons, and possible therapeutic approaches.

  6. Biological consequences of nuclear war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dubinin, N.P.

    1986-01-01

    Irradiation probability due to radionuclide fallout is shown to exceed 1 Gy even for the territories which have not been affected by nuclear weapons direct explosions. If some people survive in the nuclear war, their heredity would be affected. Genetic consequences of nuclear war complete the process of Homo sapiens disappearance from the Earth. Space weapons development will deteriorate the prospects of civilization ruin as a result of biological aftereffects of nuclear war and possible application of new arms, as well as chemical and biologic weapons

  7. The threat of nuclear war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This report aims to describe the present threat of nuclear war, with particular reference to New Zealand, and the increasing concern felt by many scientists, from a scientific viewpoint but in non-technical language. It surveys what is known about nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, and attention is drawn to the importance of penetrating the language and examining the assumptions made in the propaganda about n uclear deterrence . The tasks involved in maintaining the present peace and attempting to establish an agreed disarmament is examined. The report pays particular attention to the roles of scientists in these endeavours

  8. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award Lecture: Managing Nuclear and Biological Risks: Building Resilience through International Cooperation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pregenzer, Arian

    2012-03-01

    International technical cooperation has long been an important nonproliferation strategy, especially since the 1990s when cooperative threat reduction (CTR) to prevent theft or illicit transfer of nuclear weapons, material and expertise in the former Soviet Union became a keystone of U.S. policy. The CTR approach expanded to include engagement with scientists and engineers with expertise relevant to biological and chemical weapons, and continued in the 2000s with efforts in Iraq and Libya, and cooperation with a wide range of countries on export control and nuclear and biological security. In general, the goal of such efforts has been to prevent proliferation or WMD terrorism. In most cases, the United States (or the West) defines the threat, and then funds partner countries to implement solutions. This presentation will argue that the future requires a new approach. Nuclear capabilities are more widely available than ever before, repercussions of the A.Q. Khan network continue to unfurl, and countries such as the DPRK engage in illicit cooperation. In addition, there has been a global boom in biotechnology with many nations, particularly across South and East Asia, investing in the biotech industry as a source of fuels, food, and materials for their rapidly expanding populations. Compared to the 1990s, today's threat is more diffuse, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate technical capability is no longer so clear. In addition, the West has many fewer resources to invest due to the global economic downturn. In this environment, full commitment of all countries that benefit from nuclear and biological advances will be required to assure the safety and security of all. Technical cooperation can continue to play an important role, but with some significant changes: First, challenges should be defined from a local perspective to ensure full commitment and participation. Second, the goal of cooperation should shift from preventing specific threats to building

  9. Prototyping of CBRN threat assessment system. Phase 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ina, Shinichiro; Suzuki, Tomoyuki; Maeno, Akihiro; Sakaue, Motoki

    2015-01-01

    Recently, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, that is, CBRN threats have emerged. In order to support the Japan Self Defense Forces unit coping with the CBRN threats, it is important to take measures against these invisible threats. Our CBRN threat assessment system will make invisible CBRN threats visible. This report describes a prototyping of the CBRN threat assessment system (PHASE 1) carried out from fiscal year 2012-2014. (author)

  10. Optimized Environmental Test Sequences to Ensure the Sustainability and Reliability of Marine Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jung Ho Yang

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, there has been an increase in the types of marine weapons used in response to diverse hostile threats. However, because marine weapons are only tested under a single set of environmental conditions, failures due to different environmental stresses have been difficult to detect. Hence, this study proposes an environmental test sequence for multi-environment testing. The environmental test sequences for electrical units described in the international standard IEC 60068-1, and for military supply described in the United States national standard MIL-STD-810G were investigated to propose guidelines for the appropriate test sequences. This study demonstrated the need for tests in multiple environments by investigating marine weapon accidents, and evaluated which environmental stresses and test items have the largest impacts on marine weapons using a two-phase quality function deployment (QFD analysis of operational scenarios, environmental stresses, and environmental test items. Integer programming was used to determine the most influential test items and the shortest environmental test time, allowing us to propose optimal test procedures. Based on our analysis, we developed optimal environmental test sequences that could be selected by a test designer.

  11. Flexible weapons architecture design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pyant, William C., III

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.

  12. Current nuclear threats and possible responses

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lamb, Frederick K.

    2005-04-01

    Over the last 50 years, the United States has spent more than 100 billion developing and building a variety of systems intended to defend its territory against intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Most of these systems never became operational and ultimately all were judged ineffective. The United States is currently spending about 10 billion per year developing technologies and systems intended to defend against missiles that might be acquired in the future by North Korea or Iran. This presentation will discuss these efforts ad whether they are likely to be more effective than those of the past. It will also discuss the proper role of anti-ballistic programs at a time when the threat of a nuclear attack on the U.S. by terrorists armed with nuclear weapons is thought to be much higher than the threat of an attack by nuclear-armed ballistic missles.

  13. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  14. Flexible weapons architecture design

    OpenAIRE

    Pyant, William C.

    2015-01-01

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilia...

  15. Nuclear Threats and Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Garry Jacobs

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available This article presents highlights and insights from the International Conference on “Nuclear Threats and Security” organized by the World Academy of Art and Science in association with the European Leadership Network and the Dag Hammarskjöld University College of International Relations and Diplomacy and sponsored by NATO at the Inter-University Centre, Dubrovnik on September 14-16, 2012. The conference examined important issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the legality of nuclear weapons and their use, illicit trade in nuclear materials, the dangers of nuclear terrorism, nuclear- and cyber-security. Papers and video recordings of the major presentations and session summaries can be found here.

  16. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eaton, M.A.

    2007-01-01

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  17. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eaton, M.A

    2007-07-01

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians

  18. Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glauser, H

    2011-03-03

    Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

  19. Application of the MASH v1.0 Code System to radiological warfare radiation threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, J.O.; Santoro, R.T.; Smith, M.S.

    1994-01-01

    Nuclear hardening capabilities of US and foreign ground force systems is a primary concern of the Department of Defense (DoD) and US Army. The Monte Carlo Adjoint Shielding Code System -- MASH v1.0 was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to analyze these capabilities, i.e. the shielding effectiveness, for prompt radiation from a nuclear weapon detonation. Rapidly changing world events and the proliferation of nuclear weapons related technology have increased the kinds of nuclear threats to include intentionally dispersed radiation sources and fallout from tactical nuclear weapons used in the modern AirLand battlefield scenario. Consequently, a DoD area of increasing interest focuses on determining the shielding effectiveness of foreign and US armored vehicles to radiological warfare and fallout radiation threats. To demonstrate the applicability of MASH for analyzing dispersed radiation source problems, calculations have been completed for two distributed sources; a dispersed radiation environment simulated by a uniformly distributed 60 Co source, and a 235 U fission weapon fallout source. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the free-field, the inside of a steel-walled two-meter box, in a phantom standing in the free-field, and in a phantom standing in the two-meter box. The results indicate substantial radiation protection factors for the 60 Co dispersed radiation source and the fallout source compared to the prompt radiation protection factors. The dose protection factors ranged from 40 to 95 for the two-meter box and from 55 to 123 for the mid-gut position of the phantom standing in the box. The results further indicate that a 60 Co source might be a good first order approximation for a tactical fission weapon fallout protection factor analysis

  20. Soviet children and the threat of nuclear war: a preliminary study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chivian, E.; Mack, J.E.; Waletzky, J.P.; Lazaroff, C.; Doctor, R.; Goldenring, J.M.

    1985-01-01

    This study, the first undertaken by Western researchers with Soviet children on the subject of nuclear weapons, compared the questionnaire responses of 293 Soviet youngsters with those of 201 age-matched Californians. Interviews were conducted to supplement the questionnaire findings. Similarities and differences between the two samples are discussed in the context of how young people today perceive the threat of nuclear war

  1. [Consequences learned from the use of chemical weapons during the First World War for the modern military medicine].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Belskikh, A N; Basharin, V A; Chepur, S V; Khalimov, Yu Sh; Markizova, N F

    2015-08-01

    The article describes the way medical service dealed with problems resulted from the use of chemical weapons during the First World War (1914-1918). It was revealed that many of the abovementioned problems remain unsolved up to the present moment. It is stated the existence of the threat of use of chemical weapons in modem military conflicts, which expands the area of responsibility for medical chemical protection. The authors proved necessity and algorithm of the training system, considered as a part of medical protection in case of adverse factors of chemical nature.

  2. Toxins as biological weapons for terror-characteristics, challenges and medical countermeasures: a mini-review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berger, Tamar; Eisenkraft, Arik; Bar-Haim, Erez; Kassirer, Michael; Aran, Adi Avniel; Fogel, Itay

    2016-01-01

    Toxins are hazardous biochemical compounds derived from bacteria, fungi, or plants. Some have mechanisms of action and physical properties that make them amenable for use as potential warfare agents. Currently, some toxins are classified as potential biological weapons, although they have several differences from classic living bio-terror pathogens and some similarities to manmade chemical warfare agents. This review focuses on category A and B bio-terror toxins recognized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Botulinum neurotoxin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin, and ricin. Their derivation, pathogenesis, mechanism of action, associated clinical signs and symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment are discussed in detail. Given their expected covert use, the primary diagnostic challenge in toxin exposure is the early detection of morbidity clusters, apart from background morbidity, after a relatively short incubation period. For this reason, it is important that clinicians be familiar with the clinical manifestations of toxins and the appropriate methods of management and countermeasures.

  3. Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    James J.F. Forest

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available This article examines theories of practical and strategic constraints that collectively explain why so few terrorist groups in history have crossed (or attempted to cross the WMD threshold. From this analysis, it becomes clear that a terrorist group's deliberations about WMD can be influenced (positively or negatively by a variety of factors. Our projections of the future WMD terrorism threat must therefore account for changes in the kinds of practical and strategic constraints that could lead to an increased willingness and/or capability of a group to pursue these kinds of weapons. Further, there are ways in which governments can influence a terrorist group's decision-making and thus have a direct impact on the future evolution of the WMD terrorism threat.

  4. Lab-to-Lab Cooperative Threat Reduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hecker, Siegfried S.

    2017-11-01

    It is difficult to imagine today how dramatically global nuclear risks changed 25 years ago as the Soviet Union disintegrated. Instead of the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation, the world became concerned that Russia and the other 14 former Soviet states would lose control of their huge nuclear assets - tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, more than a million kilograms of fissile materials, hundreds of thousands of nuclear workers, and a huge nuclear complex. I will describe how scientists and engineers at the DOE laboratories, with a focus on Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia national laboratories, joined forces with those at the Russian nuclear weapon institutes for more than 20 years to avoid what looked like the perfect nuclear storm - a story told in the two-volume book Doomed to Cooperate1 published in 2016. Due to an internal processing error, an incorrect version of this article was published on 15 November 2017 that omitted the footnotes. AIP Publishing apologizes for this error. An updated version of this article, including the missing footnotes, was published on 21 November 2017.

  5. Advanced Research Workshop on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological Threats

    CERN Document Server

    Diamond, David; Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges

    2015-01-01

    With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the nuclear threats facing the world are constantly evolving and have grown more complex since the end of the Cold War. The diversion of complete weapon systems or nuclear material to rogue nations and terrorist organizations has increased. The events of the past years have proved the necessity to reevaluate these threats on a level never before considered.  In recognition that no single country possesses all of the answers to the critical scientific, institutional and legal questions associated with combating nuclear and radiological terrorism, the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on “Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological Threats” and this proceeding was structured to promote wide-ranging, multi-national exploration of critical technology needs and underlying scientific challenges to reducing the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism; to illustrate through country-specific presentations how resulting technologies were used in national programs; and to outli...

  6. GLOBAL WARMING: IS A NEW THREAT?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ayca Eminoglu

    2008-09-30

    In the Post Cold War era, the concepts of ''security'', ''national security'', and ''international security'' have changed with regard to their contents and meanings. Such developments made states to renew their national security policies. Security is a special form of politics as well. All security issues are political problems but not all political conflicts are security issues. In the Post Cold War era, differentiating and increasing numbers of elements that constitutes threat changed the concept of threat and widen the capacity of security. In this term, many elements lost its effect of being a threat but also new threatening elements emerged. Environmental problems, human rights, mass migration, micro nationalism, ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism, contagious diseases, international terrorism, economic instabilities, drug and weapon smuggling and human trafficking are the new problems emerged in international security agenda. Environmental problems no longer take place in security issues and can be mentioned as a ''low security'' issue. They are threats to the global commons i.e. the oceans, the seas, the ozone layer and the climate system, which are life supports for mankind as a whole. Global warming is one of the most important environmental issues of our day that effects human life in every field and can be defined as a 'serious threat to international security'. Because of global warming, environmental changes will occur and these changes will cause conflicting issues in international relations. Because of global warming dwindling freshwater supplies, food shortages, political instability and other conflicts may take place. Some IR scholars see a need for global cooperation in order to face the threat. At the background of global warming and its effects, states have to get preventive measures and normally, each state form its own measures, therefore as a

  7. Physical effects of thermonuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotblat, J.

    1984-01-01

    The detonation of nuclear weapons gives rise to the following: blast wave; thermal wave; initial radiation (neutrons and gamma-rays); local radioactive fallout; global radioactive fallout; electromagnetic pulse; atmospheric disturbances. Some of these phenomena became known only as a result of the use or testing of bombs and are not as yet fully understood. They produce physical or biological effects or both, almost all of which are directly detrimental to human health. Some are likely to damage the environment

  8. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of

  9. The weapons effect

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J.

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain

  10. Pakistan's national legislation entitled: 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, dated 4 November 2004, concerning Pakistan's national legislation entitled 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'. As requested by the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, the letter and the Export Control Act of 2004, are reproduced herein for the information of the Member States

  11. Scientific and technical development and the chemical weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqui, P.H.

    2008-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was drafted with the recognition that it is impossible to envision every way in which toxic chemicals might be used for aggressive purposes. As terrorist organizations and rogue states replace the major powers as the most likely candidates to employ chemical weapons, the agents of choice may differ from those developed for battlefield use. Twenty- first century chemical warfare may target civilians or agricultural production, and clandestine production-facilities may manufacture toxic agents from chemical precursors, not monitored under the CWC control regime. The effects (on CWC implementation) of changing industrial technologies, including ongoing developments in chemical process technology, dual-use industrial chemicals, and rapid methods for discovering biologically active chemicals, are considerable Also considered is how commercial technologies could be misused for the development of novel chemical weapons, and how such abuses might be detected and monitored. (author)

  12. National health and medical services response to incidents of chemical and biological terrorism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tucker, J B

    1997-08-06

    In response to the growing threat of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons, the US government has developed a national concept of operations for emergency health and medical services response. This capability was developed and tested for the first time during the Atlanta Olympic Games in the summer of 1996. In the event of a chemical or biological terrorist incident that exceeded local and state-level response capabilities, federal agencies would provide specialized teams and equipment to help manage the consequences of the attack and treat, decontaminate, and evacuate casualties. The US Congress has also established a Domestic Preparedness Program that provides for enhanced training of local first-responders and the formation of metropolitan medical strike teams in major cities around the country. While these national response capabilities are promising, their implementation to date has been problematic and their ultimate effectiveness is uncertain.

  13. E-War : an early warning and response methodology for buildings at risk to chemical and biological threats

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rastan, S.; Kozinski, J. [McGill Univ., Montreal, PQ (Canada); Foo, S.; Morofsky, E. [Public Works and Government Services, Ottawa, ON (Canada). Indoor Environments and Healthy Buildings

    2004-07-01

    Several government departments, academic institutions and private firms have collaborated on a research project to develop an Early Warning and Response (e-WAR) method to protect occupants in high-risk public buildings from chemical and biological threats. The project involves a heat, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) based monitoring system equipped with photo ionization and laser particle counter technologies to characterize baseline airborne concentrations. E-WAR recognizes out-of-norm events and instantly triggers a set of just-in-case (JIC) filtration, in-duct neutralization and decontamination responses to reduce the dispersion of toxic airborne materials within the building. The proposed system reduced the severity of any potential threat, as well as the cost of remediation. A scale model of the proposed system has been designed and developed. 45 refs., 1 tab., 1 fig.

  14. If it bleeds, it leads: separating threat from mere negativity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kveraga, Kestutis; Boshyan, Jasmine; Adams, Reginald B; Mote, Jasmine; Betz, Nicole; Ward, Noreen; Hadjikhani, Nouchine; Bar, Moshe; Barrett, Lisa F

    2015-01-01

    Most theories of emotion hold that negative stimuli are threatening and aversive. Yet in everyday experiences some negative sights (e.g. car wrecks) attract curiosity, whereas others repel (e.g. a weapon pointed in our face). To examine the diversity in negative stimuli, we employed four classes of visual images (Direct Threat, Indirect Threat, Merely Negative and Neutral) in a set of behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies. Participants reliably discriminated between the images, evaluating Direct Threat stimuli most quickly, and Merely Negative images most slowly. Threat images evoked greater and earlier blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activations in the amygdala and periaqueductal gray, structures implicated in representing and responding to the motivational salience of stimuli. Conversely, the Merely Negative images evoked larger BOLD signal in the parahippocampal, retrosplenial, and medial prefrontal cortices, regions which have been implicated in contextual association processing. Ventrolateral as well as medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortices were activated by both threatening and Merely Negative images. In conclusion, negative visual stimuli can repel or attract scrutiny depending on their current threat potential, which is assessed by dynamic shifts in large-scale brain network activity. © The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  15. Nuclear weapons policy at the crossroads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howlett, D.; Ogilvie-White, T.; Simpson, J.; Taylor, E.

    2000-01-01

    This study on nuclear futures is a product of work undertaken by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) of the University of Southampton. The study has pursued three goals: to attempt to understand the dynamics of the nuclear present; to elucidate a range of possible nuclear futures that may emerge; and to assess different strategies that could be pursued in response to these futures, including proposals for promoting nuclear disarmament. The aim was to draw on research, meetings and outreach to achieve these goals, and to use the knowledge gained to help inform the international policy-making community. The work underlying this study was divided into two stages. During the first stage, the apparent threat perceptions of the five acknowledged NWS (China, France, Russia, the UK and the United States) and the three de facto NWS (India, Israel and Pakistan) were explored . The purpose of this research was to identify the main factors (or shapers) that seem to have influenced nuclear weapons policy in all these states, and to assess their relative importance. The second stage of the work drew on the conclusions reached on the eight countries. The shapers were divided into categories on the basis of their apparent impact on nuclear weapons policy. This study summarizes the main conclusions reached in the course of this work

  16. A Statistical Model for Generating a Population of Unclassified Objects and Radiation Signatures Spanning Nuclear Threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, K.; Sokkappa, P.

    2008-01-01

    This report describes an approach for generating a simulated population of plausible nuclear threat radiation signatures spanning a range of variability that could be encountered by radiation detection systems. In this approach, we develop a statistical model for generating random instances of smuggled nuclear material. The model is based on physics principles and bounding cases rather than on intelligence information or actual threat device designs. For this initial stage of work, we focus on random models using fissile material and do not address scenarios using non-fissile materials. The model has several uses. It may be used as a component in a radiation detection system performance simulation to generate threat samples for injection studies. It may also be used to generate a threat population to be used for training classification algorithms. In addition, we intend to use this model to generate an unclassified 'benchmark' threat population that can be openly shared with other organizations, including vendors, for use in radiation detection systems performance studies and algorithm development and evaluation activities. We assume that a quantity of fissile material is being smuggled into the country for final assembly and that shielding may have been placed around the fissile material. In terms of radiation signature, a nuclear weapon is basically a quantity of fissile material surrounded by various layers of shielding. Thus, our model of smuggled material is expected to span the space of potential nuclear weapon signatures as well. For computational efficiency, we use a generic 1-dimensional spherical model consisting of a fissile material core surrounded by various layers of shielding. The shielding layers and their configuration are defined such that the model can represent the potential range of attenuation and scattering that might occur. The materials in each layer and the associated parameters are selected from probability distributions that span the

  17. The Assessment of Knowledge of Organisational - Administrative Procedures in the Case of a Bioterrorist Threat in Selected Environmental Populations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Henrykowska Gabriela

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available In the past we have seen numerous cases of the purposeful utilisation of micro-organisms and toxins. This situation forced us to undertake actions aimed at a limitation of the production and storage of biological weapons. Unfortunately, despite the signing of the Convention on Biological and Chemical Weapons, many countries are still involved in research into the use of biological agents as a military resource.

  18. Importance of the radioactive or nuclear component and its conjunction with conventional risks in social phenomena resulting from terrorist acts; Importancia da componente radioactiva e ou nuclear e sua conjuncao com riscos convencionais, em fenomenos sociais decorrentes de accoes terroristas

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pereira, Francisco Miguel da Rocha Grave [Coronel, Portuguese Army, Ministerio da Defesa Nacional (Portugal)

    2009-05-15

    The current strategic environment has attenuated the traditional threats of military nature. However, several instability factors result on new risks and potential threats. A review is made on the current threats and risk scenarios and the capacities for intervention of the Portuguese Army in scenarios involving the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

  19. Importance of the radioactive or nuclear component and its conjunction with conventional risks in social phenomena resulting from terrorist acts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pereira, Francisco Miguel da Rocha Grave

    2009-01-01

    The current strategic environment has attenuated the traditional threats of military nature. However, several instability factors result on new risks and potential threats. A review is made on the current threats and risk scenarios and the capacities for intervention of the Portuguese Army in scenarios involving the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

  20. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

  1. The threat of a dirty bomb and possible verification measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meer, Klaas van der; Hardeman, Frank; Meier, Oliver

    2003-01-01

    The paper discusses technical aspects of the dirty (radiological dispersion) bomb and the threat that this type of bomb poses to societies and international security. Based on the technology and materials needed to construct a dirty bomb, the relevance of the safeguards system for nuclear material accountancy and chemical and biological control systems is discussed. A dirty bomb consists of a conventional explosive charge combined with radioactive material. Its purpose is to contaminate a large area with radioactive material. The main consequences would be loss of life through direct impact and contamination. In comparison with use of nuclear fission devices, the number of direct casualties due to the impact of the explosion are likely to be small. In the long run, there may be casualties due to radioactive contamination, however, probably fewer than is mentioned in public discussions. Other consequences of the use of a radiological device include widespread panic, fear and uncertainty among the public, high decontamination costs, loss of real estate value and disruption of economic activity in the area concerned. If a terrorist is intent on causing maximum havoc and disruption, the radioactive material of choice should have a reasonably long half life. Access should be easy and such material should be available in sufficient quantities. The most obvious candidates from this perspective are 60 Co and 137 Cs and to a lesser extent 90 Sr. Also some more 'exotic' radionuclides or mixtures cannot absolutely be excluded. 60 Co and 137 Cs are frequently used in medical and industrial equipment. There is currently no international material accountancy system for these materials and thousands of sources have been produced in many countries. One or several of these sources contain sufficient material for the construction of an effective 'dirty bomb'. Approximative dispersion calculations will be performed to determine the spread of radioactive material. Dependent on the

  2. Biological Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-09-01

    program for pro- jects that advance BEP objectives. Global Cooperation to develop bio- safety and pathogen security stan- dards that are consistent with...security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) has recently developed voluntary biosecurity guidelines for implementation...Abbreviations AG Australia Group BEP Biosecurity Engagement Program BSL Biosafety level BWC Biological Weapons Convention BWC-ISU Biological Weapons

  3. International conference 'Addressing the issues of potential terrorism and guarding against weapons of mass destruction in Central Asia' Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction (W D M) arouse serious concern in world community. Geneva's protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the W D M proliferation becomes the subject of high concern. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show their interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution

  4. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  5. The Nature of the Bioterrorism Threat

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Regens, J. L.

    2003-02-25

    This analysis provides an overview of the nature of the bioterrorism threat. It identifies potential CDC Class A biological agents that are likely candidates for use in a terrorist incident and describes the known sources of vulnerability. The paper also summarizes S&T resources/needs and assesses response options for achieving effective biodefense against terrorist threats.

  6. Perceived popularity of adolescents who use weapons in violence and adolescents who only carry weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wallace, Lacey N

    2017-01-01

    Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed.

  7. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-21

    of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminate many of them. These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in July 1991...of these weapons. The abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over nuclear weapons...assure other allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, but these assurances do not necessarily include legally binding commitments to retaliate

  8. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  9. End the nuclear threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Douglas, Michael

    2005-01-01

    's promises and commitments. Fulfilling our promises in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, now with 189 member States, must be a primary aim. This Treaty, essential to our security, will be reviewed formally in 2005 at the UN. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) performs a vital role under the Treaty - it's the world's nuclear inspectorate to check that countries are not pursuing nuclear weapons. I've had the chance to visit the UN and IAEA at their headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and know how tough the job can be. We need to back the IAEA and make sure it stays strong in our fight against nuclear weapons. At the 2000 Review of the Treaty, the US along with all other parties to the Treaty made a pledge. Let me remind you of what was promised, and I quote: 'an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. leading to nuclear disarmament.' There are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the world, over 90% are possessed by Russia and the US. Most are many times more devastating than those used on Hiroshima. The arsenals of Russia and the US are armed, targeted and poised, waiting for three short computer signals to fire. These hair trigger devices represent the devastation of approximately 100,000 Hiroshimas and pose a horrific threat to life. The use of a nuclear weapon could take place by accident or design by States, or even terrorists. These weapons pose an unacceptable risk to the planet. We must demonstrate our unambiguous commitment to fulfill our promises. Other-wise, the prospect of more nuclear weapons States, and the construction of new nuclear weapons, will only increase human peril. The world needs a more effective non-proliferation and disarmament regime and is looking to us for leadership

  10. Sovereignty and Nuclear Weapons: The Need for Real Sovereign Authority Rooted in the People’s Global Expectations about Survival, Peace and Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Winston P. Nagan

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The current international security framework is based on an incomplete, anachronistic conception of sovereignty shaped largely by historical circumstance rather than principles of universal justice. Evolution of the global community over the past half century necessitates a reformulation of the concept to justly represent the rights of individual citizens and the global community as a whole. The reconceptualization of sovereignty is an essential condition for the elimination of major threats to global security, most especially those arising from the continued existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

  11. Identification of nuclear weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  12. Security with nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karp, R.C.

    1991-01-01

    Recent improvements in East-West relations and the process of dramatic political change in Europe may result in unprecedented opportunities to reduce the global arsenal of nuclear weapons. Despite these welcome developments, the prospects for effectively controlling the spread of nuclear capability in the Third World have remained much less encouraging. The possibility of large reductions in nuclear weapons poses fundamental questions about their purpose. Why have some states chosen to acquire nuclear weapons? How and why have these decisions been maintained over time? Why have some states elected to approach, but not cross, the nuclear threshold? This book examines the commonalities and differences in political approaches to nuclear weapons both within and between three groups of states: nuclear, non-nuclear and threshold. The chapters explore the evolution of thinking about nuclear weapons and the role these weapons play in national security planning, and question the official security rationales offered by the nuclear weapon states for the maintenance of nuclear capabilities. For the non-nuclear weapon states, the book presents an analysis of alternative ways of assuring security and foreign policy effectiveness. For the threshold states, it examines the regional contexts within which these states maintain their threshold status. This book transcends traditional East-West approaches to analysis of nuclear issues by giving equal prominence to the issues of nuclear proliferation and non-nuclearism. The book also provides a comprehensive analysis of how current approaches to nuclear weapons have evolved both within and among the groups of countries under study

  13. Nuclear weapons free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahl, K.

    1990-01-01

    The article analyses the concept and problems of the two nuclear weapons free zones in Latin America and in the South Pacific established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. So far the nuclear weapons states except China have refused to sign the additional protocols of the Treaties or have signed them only with considerable provisos. Therefore they don't fully recognize the nuclear weapons free status of those zones, or they don't recognize it at all. Both Treaties contain no provisions to regulate the transit of nuclear weapons through the zones. This allows de facto the stationing of nuclear weapons in the military bases of the US which are located within the nuclear weapons free zone of Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains also the right of the states, party to the Treaty, to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Since peaceful and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished technically, this right could also undermine the nuclear weapons free status of the region. Important nuclear threshold countries like Argentina and Brazil have furthermore refrained from putting the Treaty into force. (orig.) [de

  14. Chemical Weapons Convention

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1997-01-01

    On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  15. Biological Threats Detection Technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartoszcze, M.

    2007-01-01

    Among many decisive factors, which can have the influence on the possibility of decreases the results of use biological agents should be mentioned obligatory: rapid detection and identification of biological factor used, the proper preventive treatment and the medical management. The aims of identification: to identify the factor used, to estimate the area of contamination, to evaluate the possible countermeasure efforts (antibiotics, disinfectants) and to assess the effectiveness of the decontamination efforts (decontamination of the persons, equipment, buildings, environment etc.). The objects of identification are: bacteria and bacteria's spores, viruses, toxins and genetically modified factors. The present technologies are divided into: based on PCR techniques (ABI PRISM, APSIS, BIOVERIS, RAPID), immuno (BADD, RAMP, SMART) PCR and immuno techniques (APDS, LUMINEX) and others (BDS2, LUNASCAN, MALDI). The selected technologies assigned to field conditions, mobile and stationary laboratories will be presented.(author)

  16. Dynamics of attentional bias to threat in anxious adults: bias towards and/or away?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zvielli, Ariel; Bernstein, Amit; Koster, Ernst H W

    2014-01-01

    The aim of the present study was to question untested assumptions about the nature of the expression of Attentional Bias (AB) towards and away from threat stimuli. We tested the idea that high trait anxious individuals (N = 106; M(SD)age = 23.9(3.2) years; 68% women) show a stable AB towards multiple categories of threatening information using the emotional visual dot probe task. AB with respect to five categories of threat stimuli (i.e., angry faces, attacking dogs, attacking snakes, pointed weapons, violent scenes) was evaluated. In contrast with current theories, we found that 34% of participants expressed AB towards threat stimuli, 20.8% AB away from threat stimuli, and 34% AB towards some categories of threat stimuli and away from others. The multiple observed expressions of AB were not an artifact of a specific criterion AB score cut-off; not specific to certain categories of threat stimuli; not an artifact of differences in within-subject variability in reaction time; nor accounted for by individual differences in anxiety-related variables. Findings are conceptualized as reflecting the understudied dynamics of AB expression, with implications for AB measurement and quantification, etiology, relations, and intervention research.

  17. Antisatellite weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garwin, R.L.; Gottfried, K.; Hafner, D.L.

    1984-01-01

    The authors take issue with the assessment that the advent of antisatellite weapons implies that the beneficial role of satellites in arms control, confidence building, and conflict resolution has been judged less important than their ability to support actual military operations. They argue that there is still an opportunity to negotiate a militarily significant and verifiable constraint on the growth of antisatellite technology that would be in the security interest of the US and the world as a whole. They base their opinion on an assessment of the roles of the existing military satellites and their vulnerability to antisatellite weapons and the probable impact of antisatellite weapons on various kinds of crisis and conflict. 10 figures, 1 table

  18. Is the nuclear weapon taboo? The nuclear weapon is useless and expensive. Let us not leave the nuclear weapon as an inheritance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauchet, Nathalie; Norlain, Bernard; Beach, Hugh; Beckett, Margaret; Quiles, Paul; Rocard, Michel; Ramsbotham, David

    2012-03-01

    Starting with the definition of the word taboo as stated in a dictionary (a topic it would be unbecoming to evoke, under social and moral proprieties), the author of the first article discusses the status of the nuclear weapon, outlining that it is expensive, useless and monstrous. She notices that conventions on chemical weapons seem to be more efficient than the NPT, that, even if the reasons for abolition are known as well as ways to reach it, it seems difficult to actually address this issue. She evokes different voices coming from different countries or international bodies calling for this abolition. She also states that the nuclear weapon is not a deterrent weapon but a weapon of domination, and calls for the mobilisation of the civil society throughout the world. A second article states that the nuclear weapon is useless and expensive, and that we have to get rid of this hazard for the sake of the planet. Former ministers, Prime ministers, and generals consider that we can and must give up nuclear weapons, notably because the strategic context has completely changed since the fall of the Berlin wall, and support the action of Global Zero

  19. Concept and Technology Exploration for Transparent Hearing

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Chapin, William L; Zurek, Patrick M; Shinn-Cunningham, Barbara; Durlach, Nathaniel; Bolas, Mark

    2003-01-01

    Modern militaries are challenged to physically protect open-field personnel from a great variety of life and effectiveness threats, including chemical, biological, laser, ballistic, and percussive weapons...

  20. Monitoring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Can regional CBMs play a role?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sood, R.

    1994-01-01

    The experience of regional Confidence Building Measures (CBM), has only limited applicability for tackling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where the international norm has developed as in the case of biological and chemical weapons, through international disarmament treaties, regional initiatives can strengthen this norm. Where a norm is less well-founded, regional initiatives are not likely to succeed. Specifically, with regard to nuclear weapons, consensus on negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a convention for prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and explosive devices is a positive development. Successful conclusion of these universal and verifiable treaties will go a long way to strengthening the international norm against proliferation. Two other measures are critical - a development of a non-use assurance and commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear weapon States. If the international community witnesses improvement in these areas, regional negotiations will be stimulated. Therefore, the primary focus should be on developing an international norm to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Regional efforts will take their cue from these international norms and would result in CBMs that are consistent with the international norm

  1. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S; Dolan, P J

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  2. The Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    2002-05-01

    HIT” The threat of biological weapons arises in part from a decades-old megatrend in the life sciences. New advances in molecular biology, genetics...99 The Technology Landscape Today.................................... 101 Biological Warfare Defense...planning and programming, today’s environment comprises a broader, more diffuse set of concerns: terrorism, biological warfare, regional tensions

  3. The evolution of legal approaches to controlling nuclear and radiological weapons and combating the threat of nuclear terrorism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Herbach, J.

    2015-01-01

    This chapter traces the evolution of international law related to the weaponization of nuclear and other radioactive materials, focusing in particular on the law pertaining to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism. International efforts to control atomic energy have evolved substantially since the

  4. Information Discovery from Complementary Literatures: Categorizing Viruses as Potential Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swanson, Don R.; Smalheiser, Neil R.; Bookstein, A.

    2001-01-01

    This project demonstrates how techniques of analyzing complementary literatures might be applied to problems of defense against biological weapons. The article is based solely on the open-source scientific literature, and is oriented on informatics techniques. Findings are intended as a guide to the virus literature to support further studies that…

  5. Interoperability In Multi-Layered Active Defense:The Need For Commonality And Robustness Between Active Defense Weapon Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-16

    into areas where there is no access to maritime platforms. Sea-based interceptor platforms have the ability to intercept targets at each stage of the...argues that the most efficient concept for integrating active defense weapon systems is a multi- layered architecture with redundant intercept ...faster data transfer and will prevent data loss. The need for almost 100% interception successes is increasing as the threat becomes more

  6. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1992-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  7. The acquisition of dangerous biological materials: Technical facts sheets to assist risk assessments of 46 potential BW agents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aceto, Donato Gonzalo [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Astuto-Gribble, Lisa M. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Gaudioso, Jennifer M. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2007-11-01

    Numerous terrorist organizations have openly expressed interest in producing and deploying biological weapons. However, a limiting factor for many terrorists has been the acquisition of dangerous biological agents, as evidenced by the very few successful instances of biological weapons use compared to the number of documented hoaxes. Biological agents vary greatly in their ability to cause loss of life and economic damage. Some agents, if released properly, can kill many people and cause an extensive number of secondary infections; other agents will sicken only a small number of people for a short period of time. Consequently, several biological agents can potentially be used to perpetrate a bioterrorism attack but few are likely capable of causing a high consequence event. It is crucial, from a US national security perspective, to more deeply understand the likelihood that terrorist organizations can acquire the range of these agents. Few studies have attempted to comprehensively compile the technical information directly relevant to the acquisition of dangerous bacteria, viruses and toxins. In this report, technical fact sheets were assembled for 46 potentially dangerous biological agents. Much of the information was taken from various research sources which could ultimately and significantly expedite and improve bioterrorism threat assessments. By systematically examining a number of specific agent characteristics included in these fact sheets, it may be possible to detect, target, and implement measures to thwart future terrorist acquisition attempts. In addition, the information in these fact sheets may be used as a tool to help laboratories gain a rudimentary understanding of how attractive a method laboratory theft is relative to other potential acquisition modes.

  8. Does Britain need nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, C.R.; Pease, R.S.; Peierls, R.E.; Rotblat, J.

    1995-01-01

    This report from the British Pugwash Group follows up a detailed international study of the desirability and feasibility of a world free from nuclear weapons with an analysis of issues particular to British nuclear weapons and the associated defense policies. United Kingdom nuclear weapons are reviewed historically, as are the nuclear weapons policies of other countries. A critique of present government policy is presented, with alternative uses for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold war world. The document concludes with a summary of the text and suggests how a British government could move towards global nuclear disarmament. (UK)

  9. Ose evaluation of delay systems in a high threat environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rich, B.L.; Cook, B.G.

    1988-01-01

    The Office of Security Evaluations (OSE) has in place an Evaluation Program to assist the Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters and operations office managers by assessing specific elements of protection programs and informing the managers of common strengths and weaknesses of these elements. This information is provided so that sufficient and cost effective protection programs are maintained or enhanced. The subject of this paper is the evaluation of delay systems in the high-threat environment defined for sensitive DOE security interests such as special nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and related classified devices and information

  10. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezendes, V.S.

    1992-04-01

    In addition to long-standing safety and environmental problems plaguing the nuclear weapons complex, this paper reports that the Department of Energy (DOE) faces a major new challenge-how to reconfigure the weapons complex to meet the nation's defense needs in the 21st century. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex; where, if necessary, to relocate various operations; what technologies to use for new tritium production; and what to do with excess weapons-grade material. The choices confronting DOE and Congress are difficult given the conflicting demands for limited resources

  11. Achieving competitive excellence in nuclear energy: The threat of proliferation; the challenge of inertial confinement fusion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuckolls, J.H.

    1994-06-01

    Nuclear energy will have an expanding role in meeting the twenty-first-century challenges of population and economic growth, energy demand, and global warming. These great challenges are non-linearly coupled and incompletely understood. In the complex global system, achieving competitive excellence for nuclear energy is a multi-dimensional challenge. The growth of nuclear energy will be driven by its margin of economic advantage, as well as by threats to energy security and by growing evidence of global warming. At the same time, the deployment of nuclear energy will be inhibited by concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear waste and nuclear reactor safety. These drivers and inhibitors are coupled: for example, in the foreseeable future, proliferation in the Middle East may undermine energy security and increase demand for nuclear energy. The Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories are addressing many of these challenges, including nuclear weapons builddown and nonproliferation, nuclear waste storage and burnup, reactor safety and fuel enrichment, global warming, and the long-range development of fusion energy. Today I will focus on two major program areas at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL): the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of inertial confinement fusion (ICF) energy

  12. The indoor as a scene for biological threats

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Storgaard, Kresten; Gunnarsen, Lars; Bräuner, Elvira

    2014-01-01

    The paper presents the result of involving users in developing a user-friendly device for easy and fast detection of bio-threats in indoor settings. Bio-protect is a project supported by the European Commission, with the concept of developing a fast-alert, mobile, easy-to-use device to detect and...

  13. Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    We performed the audit in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning conflicts of interest among members of the Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program...

  14. Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

    1998-05-01

    The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

  15. 'NRBC' threat: is this concept still valid?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lacronique, J.F.

    2006-01-01

    About 10 years ago, after the Sarin attack in Tokyo, the world discover that terrorists could use again radio-nuclear, chemical or biological agents to launch attacks, just to cause terror and disruption of western economies. This has forged the acronym 'NRBC'. In terms of likelihood, nuclear and radiological attacks could be considered among the most easy to prepare, and some possible acts are listed in this paper. A considerable amount of work has been prepared for the preparedness against radio-nuclear attacks, during the last 3 years, by World Health Organization (WHO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Atomic Energy Agency (AEN) as well as by the International Commission of Radio Protection (ICRP). A series of documents have been issued from international cooperation. These documents shows specificities to the R/N threat in terms of health consequences, that make this threat less prone to international cooperative efforts than biological threats. In addition, the Ministers of Health of the G7 countries have created an 'Global Health Security Initiative' (GHSI) in 2002 to anticipate crisis such as the anthrax problem, or other possible NRBC threats

  16. Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Part I: Medical aspects of nuclear warfare.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kasthuri, A S; Pradhan, A B; Dham, S K; Bhalla, I P; Paul, J S

    1990-04-01

    Casualties in earlier wars were due much more to diseases than to weapons. Mention has been made in history of the use of biological agents in warfare, to deny the enemy food and water and to cause disease. In the first world war chemical agents were used to cause mass casualties. Nuclear weapons were introduced in the second world war. Several countries are now involved in developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems, for the mass annihilation of human beings, animals and plants, and to destroy the economy of their enemies. Recently, natural calamities and accidents in nuclear, chemical and biological laboratories and industries have caused mass instantaneous deaths in civilian population. The effects of future wars will not be restricted to uniformed persons. It is time that physicians become aware of the destructive potential of these weapons. Awareness, immediate protective measures and first aid will save a large number of persons. This series of articles will outline the medical aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems in three parts. Part I will deal with the biological effects of a nuclear explosion. The short and long term effects due to blast, heat and associated radiation are highlighted. In Part II, the role of biological agents which cause commoner or new disease patterns is mentioned. Some of the accidents from biological warfare laboratories are a testimony to its potential deleterious effects. Part III deals with medical aspects of chemical warfare agents, which in view of their mass effects can overwhelm the existing medical resources, both civilian and military.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

  17. The morality of weapons research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forge, John

    2004-07-01

    I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as 'defensive' weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.

  18. A low cost maritime control aircraft-ship-weapons system. [antiship missile defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fluk, H.

    1981-01-01

    It is pointed out that the long-range antiship standoff missile is emerging as the foremost threat on the seas. Delivered by high speed bombers, surface ships, and submarines, a missile attack can be mounted against selected targets from any point on the compass. An investigation is conducted regarding the configuration of a system which could most efficiently identify and destroy standoff threats before they launch their weapons. It is found that by using ships for carrying and launching missiles, and employing aircraft with a powerful radar only for search and missile directing operations, aircraft cost and weight can be greatly reduced. The employment of V/STOL aircraft in preference to other types of aircraft makes it possible to use ships of smaller size for carrying the aircraft. However, in order to obtain an all-weather operational capability for the system, ships are selected which are still big enough to display the required stability in heavy seas.

  19. Biological Weapons Attribution: A Primer

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-06-01

    environment rich in amino acids , nucleosides, and glucose—such as that found in the blood or tissue of an animal or human host. 33 Anthrax can be found...The Grapes of Wrath and the Speckled Monster, Part III: Epidemics, Natural Disasters and Biological Terrorism-The Federal Response,” Michigan State...Control. Accessed at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/pdf/cdcresponseguide.pdf on March 5, 2007. Sciarrino, Alfred J. “The Grapes of Wrath and the

  20. Making weapons, talking peace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, H.F.

    1987-01-01

    The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961, the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle

  1. Do Weapons Facilitate Adolescent Delinquency? An Examination of Weapon Carrying and Delinquency Among Adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Emmert, Amanda D; Hall, Gina Penly; Lizotte, Alan J

    2018-03-01

    This article examines whether weapon carrying influences the frequency and variety of violent, property, and drug delinquency adolescents commit through fixed-effects analyses of data from the Rochester Youth Development Study (RYDS). We conclude that weapon carrying contributes to violent, substance, and property delinquency, and delinquent behaviors learned during weapon carrying continue to affect substance and property delinquency long after carrying has ceased.

  2. Weapons and hope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyson, F.

    1984-01-01

    The British-born physicist presents a full-blown critique of US weapons policy. His careful evaluation of opposing views leads him to endorse a live-and-let-live concept of arms control, which would reject both assured destruction and first use of nuclear weapons in favor of abolishing them. Dyson's faith in the humane progress of military technology and his tolerance of dangerous conventional weapons will not please dovish readers, while his denunciation of military idolatry and his support of a nuclear freeze will disappoint some hawks. Along with moving personal memories of war and pacifism, the most original sections of the book are the author's insightful comments about the Soviet Union and the issue of verification

  3. Handshake with the Dragon: Engaging China in the Biological Weapons Convention

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Lewis, James

    1998-01-01

    ...). Efforts to strengthen the BWC with an inspection protocol have been hampered by disagreement over intrusive inspection and the threat it poses to national security and industrial competitiveness...

  4. Influenza type A virus: an outstandingly protean pathogen and a potent modular weapon.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shoham, Dany

    2013-05-01

    A remarkable debate recently arose on a global scale, about bioethics, biohazard, bioweaponry and bioterrorism issues related to scientific research concerning the induced transition of the highly lethal H5N1 avian flu virus from a non-pandemic to a tentatively pandemic strain, which might fall into malevolent hands. Appreciable ecogenetic complexity marks the main attributes of influenza type A viruses, namely infectivity, virulence, antigenicity, transmissibility, host range, endemicity, and epidemicity. They all shape, conjunctively, the outstanding protean nature of this pathogen, hence the modularity of the latter as a potent weapon. The present analysis inquires into those attributes, so as to profile and gauge threat, usability, impact and coping, particularly that the dimension of genetic engineering of this virus largely amplifies its potential. Within that context, various human interventions and misuses, including human experimental infections, undesirable vaccinations, as well as unauthorized and unskillful operations, led to bad corollaries and are also discussed in the present study. Altogether, a variety of interrelated properties underlying the complicatedness of and menaces posed by influenza A virus as a grave medical challenge, a dually explorable pathogen, and a modular biological warfare agent, are thereby illuminated, alongside with their scientific, strategic and practical implications.

  5. Wounds and weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de; Dootz, B. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

  6. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.; Dootz, B.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  7. Return of the Viking: Restoring a Proven Asset to Combat an Advanced Threat

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-05-12

    ability to project power.32F33 Among the threats are the land based DF-21D and DF-26 Anti -Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs). These systems have an...strikers. Analysis of potential future conflicts projects the use of advanced Anti -Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) systems and the requirement for the carrier... Anti -Access/Area Denial Challenges”.29F30 Specifically, in response to the development of sophisticated weapons systems by China and Iran “the U.S

  8. Stereotype threat affects financial decision making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carr, Priyanka B; Steele, Claude M

    2010-10-01

    The research presented in this article provides the first evidence that one's decision making can be influenced by concerns about stereotypes and the devaluation of one's identity. Many studies document gender differences in decision making, and often attribute these differences to innate and stable factors, such as biological and hormonal differences. In three studies, we found that stereotype threat affected decision making and led to gender differences in loss-aversion and risk-aversion behaviors. In Study 1, women subjected to stereotype threat in academic and business settings were more loss averse than both men and women who were not facing the threat of being viewed in light of negative stereotypes. We found no gender differences in loss-aversion behavior in the absence of stereotype threat. In Studies 2a and 2b, we found the same pattern of effects for risk-aversion behavior that we had observed for loss-aversion behavior. In addition, in Study 2b, ego depletion mediated the effects of stereotype threat on women's decision making. These results suggest that individuals' decision making can be influenced by stereotype concerns.

  9. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    will sketch this history, discuss the approach of the Bush Administration in more detail and assess its successes and failures, and suggest the lines of a new approach to U.S. nuclear weapons policy for the coming decades. This approach will follow that outlined in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba (eds.), ``U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Threats'' (Brookings, 2006, 340 pp.).

  10. Effects of threat management interactions on conservation priorities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Auerbach, Nancy A; Wilson, Kerrie A; Tulloch, Ayesha I T; Rhodes, Jonathan R; Hanson, Jeffrey O; Possingham, Hugh P

    2015-12-01

    Decisions need to be made about which biodiversity management actions are undertaken to mitigate threats and about where these actions are implemented. However, management actions can interact; that is, the cost, benefit, and feasibility of one action can change when another action is undertaken. There is little guidance on how to explicitly and efficiently prioritize management for multiple threats, including deciding where to act. Integrated management could focus on one management action to abate a dominant threat or on a strategy comprising multiple actions to abate multiple threats. Furthermore management could be undertaken at sites that are in close proximity to reduce costs. We used cost-effectiveness analysis to prioritize investments in fire management, controlling invasive predators, and reducing grazing pressure in a bio-diverse region of southeastern Queensland, Australia. We compared outcomes of 5 management approaches based on different assumptions about interactions and quantified how investment needed, benefits expected, and the locations prioritized for implementation differed when interactions were taken into account. Managing for interactions altered decisions about where to invest and in which actions to invest and had the potential to deliver increased investment efficiency. Differences in high priority locations and actions were greatest between the approaches when we made different assumptions about how management actions deliver benefits through threat abatement: either all threats must be managed to conserve species or only one management action may be required. Threatened species management that does not consider interactions between actions may result in misplaced investments or misguided expectations of the effort required to mitigate threats to species. © 2015 The Authors. Conservation Biology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., on behalf of Society for Conservation Biology.

  11. Political accountability and autonomous weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    James Igoe Walsh

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Autonomous weapons would have the capacity to select and attack targets without direct human input. One important objection to the introduction of such weapons is that they will make it more difficult to identify and hold accountable those responsible for undesirable outcomes such as mission failures and civilian casualties. I hypothesize that individuals can modify their attribution of responsibility in predicable ways to accommodate this new technology. The results of a survey experiment are consistent with this; subjects continue to find responsible and hold accountable political and military leaders when autonomous weapons are used, but also attribute responsibility to the designers and programmers of such weapons.

  12. Airborne Particulate Threat Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patrick Treado; Oksana Klueva; Jeffrey Beckstead

    2008-12-31

    Aerosol threat detection requires the ability to discern between threat agents and ambient background particulate matter (PM) encountered in the environment. To date, Raman imaging technology has been demonstrated as an effective strategy for the assessment of threat agents in the presence of specific, complex backgrounds. Expanding our understanding of the composition of ambient particulate matter background will improve the overall performance of Raman Chemical Imaging (RCI) detection strategies for the autonomous detection of airborne chemical and biological hazards. Improving RCI detection performance is strategic due to its potential to become a widely exploited detection approach by several U.S. government agencies. To improve the understanding of the ambient PM background with subsequent improvement in Raman threat detection capability, ChemImage undertook the Airborne Particulate Threat Assessment (APTA) Project in 2005-2008 through a collaborative effort with the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), under cooperative agreement number DE-FC26-05NT42594. During Phase 1 of the program, a novel PM classification based on molecular composition was developed based on a comprehensive review of the scientific literature. In addition, testing protocols were developed for ambient PM characterization. A signature database was developed based on a variety of microanalytical techniques, including scanning electron microscopy, FT-IR microspectroscopy, optical microscopy, fluorescence and Raman chemical imaging techniques. An automated particle integrated collector and detector (APICD) prototype was developed for automated collection, deposition and detection of biothreat agents in background PM. During Phase 2 of the program, ChemImage continued to refine the understanding of ambient background composition. Additionally, ChemImage enhanced the APICD to provide improved autonomy, sensitivity and specificity. Deliverables included a Final Report detailing our

  13. Can an attribution assessment be made for Yellow Rain? Systematic reanalysis in a chemical-and-biological-weapons use investigation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Katz, Rebecca; Singer, Burton

    2007-03-01

    In intelligence investigations, such as those into reports of chemical- or biological-weapons (CBW) use, evidence may be difficult to assemble and, once assembled, to weigh. We propose a methodology for such investigations and then apply it to a large body of recently declassified evidence to determine the extent to which an attribution can now be made in the Yellow Rain case. Our analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that CBW were used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although a definitive judgment cannot be made. The proposed methodology, while resource-intensive, allows evidence to be assembled and analyzed in a transparent manner so that assumptions and rationale for decisions can be challenged by external critics. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions, emphasizing the use of evolving information-extraction (IE) technologies, a sub-field of artificial intelligence (AI).

  14. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities

  15. Habitat preferences and conservation threats to Black-necked Cranes wintering in Bhutan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Namgay, Rinchen; Wangchuk, Sangay

    2016-01-01

    Black-necked Crane (Grus nigricollis) is a vulnerable Red list species whose populations are declining. However, little is known about Black-necked Cranes' habitat requirements or the causes of their population decline. We identified Black-necked Cranes' winter roost and foraging preferences of Black-necked Cranes in Bhutan during the winter of 2013-2014. Black-necked Cranes' roosts were recorded using Garmin GPSmap 60CSx, while foraging preferences and threats to the birds were identified based on a survey of household heads (n = 107) residing within a 3 km radius of roost sites. We grouped the threats identified by the communities into four major categories, viz. biological, social, political and natural threats based on the relevance. Of the four major threats, communities residing within the roosting and foraging habitat of the Black-necked Crane reported biological threat as major. Biological threats as reported by communities include loss of habitat, food shortage and competition from other animals. We recommend the present roosting areas be designated as part of the conservation areas for Black-necked Crane wintering in Bumthang district. In addition to preserving these areas, government should also encourage farming in foraging habitats of Black-necked Crane, because they mainly feed on barley, wheat, paddy, potatoes and buckwheat, besides roots, tubers and insects in the wetlands.

  16. Autonomous bio-chemical decontaminator (ABCD) against weapons of mass destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hyacinthe, Berg P.

    2006-05-01

    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the use of such elements pose an eminent asymmetric threat with disastrous consequences to the national security of any nation. In particular, the use of biochemical warfare agents against civilians and unprotected troops in international conflicts or by terrorists against civilians is considered as a very peculiar threat. Accordingly, taking a quarantine-before-inhalation approach to biochemical warfare, the author introduces the notion of autonomous biochemical decontamination against WMD. In the unfortunate event of a biochemical attack, the apparatus proposed herein is intended to automatically detect, identify, and more importantly neutralize a biochemical threat. Along with warnings concerning a cyber-WMD nexus, various sections cover discussions on human senses and computer sensors, corroborating evidence related to detection and neutralization of chemical toxins, and cyber-assisted olfaction in stand alone, peer-to-peer, and network settings. In essence, the apparatus can be used in aviation and mass transit security to initiate mass decontamination by dispersing a decontaminant aerosol or to protect the public water supply against a potential bioterrorist attack. Future effort may involve a system-on-chip (SoC) embodiment of this apparatus that allows a safer environment for the emerging phenomenon of cyber-assisted olfaction and morph cell phones into ubiquitous sensors/decontaminators. Although this paper covers mechanisms and protocols to avail a neutralizing substance, further research will need to explore the substance's various pharmacological profiles and potential side effects.

  17. Sea-dumped chemical weapons: environmental risk, occupational hazard.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Greenberg, M I; Sexton, K J; Vearrier, D

    2016-01-01

    for decades. Rates of solubility and hydrolysis and levels of innate toxicity of a chemical agent are used to predict the risk to the marine environments. The organoarsenicals eventually breakdown into arsenic, and thus present an indefinite timeline for contamination. Generally, studies assaying sediment and water levels of parent chemical agents and breakdown products at dumpsites have found minimal amounts of relevant chemicals, although arsenic levels are typically higher in dumpsites than reference areas. Studies of marine organisms have not shown concerning amounts of chemical agents or breakdown products in tissue, but have shown evidence of chronic toxicity. There is believed to be minimal risk posed by seafood consumption. Microbiota assays of dumpsites are significantly altered in species composition compared to reference sites, which may imply unseen but significant changes to ecosystems of dumpsites. Human health concerns: The major human health risk at this time appears to arise from acute exposure to an agent by either accidental recovery of a chemical weapon on a fishing vessel, or by munitions washed ashore onto beaches. Improving technology continues to make the deep sea more accessible, thus increasing the risk of disturbing munitions lying on or buried in the seabed. Pipe laying, cable burying, drilling, scuba diving, trawling, and undersea scientific research are the activities posing the most risk. The long-term threat to the benthic habitat via increased arsenic concentrations, shifts in microbiota speciation, and chronic toxicity to vertebrates and invertebrates is not currently understood. The risk to the environment of massive release via disturbance remains a distinct possibility. Terrorist recovery and re-weaponization of chemical agents is a remote possibility.

  18. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.

    2010-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  19. Russia and the 'Gas-Opec'. Real or perceived threat?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, D.

    2007-01-01

    he threat of a gas-OPEC, waved around by certain big producers, has given rise to much fear in consuming countries. The behavior of Russia, a key exporter, has made it seem as though gas sales could be used as a political weapon. In truth, the creation of an entente between exporting countries is not technically feasible. What is more, Russia remains reticent to join any association in order not to limit its room for maneuver. Seeking to dominate the world market, it has singed a certain number of agreements with other big producers. Nevertheless, the capitalistic constraints of the gas market jeopardize the chances of long-term coordination, which is incompatible with short-term political interests. (author)

  20. Assessing the Biological Threat Posed by Suicide Bombers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-01

    the test by about 350’, it is clear some aerosol particles “ surfed ” the shockwave from the blast and were carried a distance upwind. Had the sampling...projectiles implantation in victims of suicide bombings and implications for health and emergency care provideres: the 7/7 experience, Ann R Coll Surg Engl...Ebola in East Africa and Implications for Global Health and Security, Global Policy 2013. (8) Ustun, C.; Ozgurler, O., Ebola: A Significant Threat as

  1. Global strike hypersonic weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, Mark J.

    2017-11-01

    Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.

  2. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-03-01

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  3. Quarantine after an international biological weapons attack: medical and public health requirements for containment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oren, Meir

    2004-11-01

    The world now faces the dreadful possibility of biological weapons attacks by terrorists. Healthcare systems would have to cope with such emergencies should all preemptive measures fail. Information gained from the Global Mercury exercise and the SARS outbreak has shown that containing an outbreak at the start is more effective than reacting to it once it has spread and that containment should be treated both nationally and internationally. On the national level this entails developing rapid and effective methods to detect and identify infected cases, and implementing isolation and control measures to lower the risk of further transmission of the disease while assuring the safety of medical teams and laboratory workers. Strategic contingency plans should incorporate well-defined procedures for hospitalization and isolation of patients, providing regional backup of medical personnel and equipment and maintaining close cooperation between the various bodies in the healthcare system. Quarantine is an effective containment measure, especially if voluntarily imposed. Modern communication systems can help by sending professional teams timely instructions and providing the public with information to reduce panic and stress during quarantine procedures. Informing the public poses a dilemma: finding a balance between giving advance warning of an imminent epidemic outbreak and ascertaining the likelihood of its occurrence. Containment of international bioterrorist attacks depends entirely on close international cooperation to implement national and international strategic contingency plans with free exchange of information and recognition of procedures.

  4. Nuclear power and weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwood, T.; Rathjens, C.W.; Ruina, J.

    1977-01-01

    The relationship between nuclear weapons development and nuclear electric power is examined. A brief description of nuclear weapons design is first given. This is then followed by a discussion of various aspects of nuclear power technology and of how they affect a nuclear weapon programme. These include fuel cycles, chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment, and the control of dissemination of nuclear technology. In conclusion there is a discussion of possible political and institutional controls for limiting nuclear proliferation. (U.K.)

  5. Pulsed Electric Fields for Biological Weapons Defense

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Gundersen, Martin A

    2008-01-01

    Pulsed power for biological investigations newly developed at USC include a fast diode-based systems designed to drive cell suspensions in a microscope slide electrode microchamber for observations...

  6. A Lesson Not to Be Learned? Understanding Stereotype Threat Does Not Protect Women from Stereotype Threat

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tomasetto, Carlo; Appoloni, Sara

    2013-01-01

    This research examines whether reading a text presenting scientific evidence concerning the phenomenon of stereotype threat improves or disrupts women's performance in a subsequent math task. In two experimental conditions participants (N=118 ) read a text summarizing an experiment in which stereotypes, and not biological differences, were shown…

  7. The threat from without

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lassi Saressalo

    1987-01-01

    him with his own weapon come close to the myth of the beginning of time when a Lapp managed to secure his existence and defend his community against an outside threat. Without the proto-Lapp battle against evil, the community would not have had a chance to exist, the right to live in its area, as the community does nowadays.

  8. Effects of the use of ABC weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karl-Rueckert, E.

    1980-01-01

    The effects of ABC-weapons are presented. The various classes of chemical weapons and their effects are discussed. It is pointed out that there is hardly a means of protection against these weapons. (MG) [de

  9. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  10. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaughen, V.C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  11. North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pollack, J.D.

    2010-01-01

    This essay assesses North Korea's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons; alternative strategies for inhibiting Pyongyang's weapons development; and the potential implications for regional security and nonproliferation should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) retain and enhance its weapons programs. North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has long provoked heated debate among policy makers and research analysts about the purposes of engagement with the North, reflecting the repeated frustrations in efforts to negotiate Korean denuclearization. These debates reflect widely divergent views of the North Korean regime; its sustainability as an autonomous political, economic, and military system; and the potential consequences of continued nuclear development in this isolated, highly idiosyncratic state. These questions assume additional salience as North Korea approaches a leadership succession for only the second time in its six-decade history. The effort to inhibit North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is among the longest running and least successful sagas in international security and non-proliferation policy of the past quarter century. In early 2010, Pyongyang claims a rudimentary nuclear capability by possession of weaponized plutonium, the conduct of two nuclear tests, and advances in the production of enriched uranium as an alternative means of fissile material production, though the latter step is nominally justified as a source for reactor fuel. North Korea defends its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent to counter what Pyongyang deems existential threats posed by the United States.Despite the resumption of high-level diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang in late 2009, realization of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula remains a very remote prospect. The DPRK insists that a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea and hence the cessation of 'hostile DPRK-U.S. relations' are necessary before any consideration of

  12. President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-10-01

    outreach efforts, the WMD Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and experts from the government and private sectors ...fever and the virus that causes Venezuelan equine encephalitis); and two types of anticrop weapons (the fungi that cause wheat rust and rice blast...Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus; liquid suspensions of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus and Q-fever rickettsia; and tens of thousands of

  13. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  14. North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-04-01

    work.42 The NDC membership also is unique in that its membership does not appear to be linked to ceremony, but the members of this commission are...class reportedly continues. The majority of the KPN’s fleet is comprised of tor- pedo boat-size hulls which are from 60 to 200 tons. 203 Other...ingenuity and self-reliance. Hence it is sometimes dubbed the “Juche fiber.” Defectors also have linked Lee’s name with Pyongyang’s chemical weapons

  15. Explosive developments in biotechnology and the role of BTWC in strengthening a global biosecurity - biosafety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bokan, S.

    2009-01-01

    The international community is confronted by a unique challenge in dealing with the threat posed by the potential use of biology and the life sciences in hostile purposes. As we know, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) entered into force thirty four years ago. It is a simple instrument, only a few pages long, but its prohibitions are clear, succinct, categorical and definitive, but it is an instrument of principle rather than procedure. Relevant resources of biological and toxin agents, technologies and knowledge are more numerous and more widely distributed than their equivalents in other disarmament fields (chemical, radiological or nuclear). In the 1990s, negotiations were begun on a protocol to strengthen and verify the BWC, which would have added to the Convention the verification elements present in other regimes. After many years of work, this effort collapsed in disagreement and recrimination in 2001. After the Fifth Review Conference in 2002, BWC States Parties succeeded to establish a work program for 2003 to 2005, at which they would work on several specific topics related to better implementation of the Convention. With that approach of the work, the necessary network of collaboration and coordination were developed into a flexible oversight and prevention of the biological and toxin weapons. Experts from all around the world gathered to share experiences and ideas on how to deal with the threat posed by biological weapons. Officials from health, science and agriculture ministries made connections with their counterparts in defense, justice, foreign affairs and security agencies. The explosive developments in biotechnology represent today serious threat and no government or international organization could hope to monitor effectively the tens of thousands of small biotechnology facilities in operation worldwide. Intelligible, this is a problem that needs a collective, multifaceted and multidimensional approach. However, after the Sixth Review

  16. Information report on Proliferation geo-strategic stakes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-11-01

    This large report, notably based on interviews of many representatives of international institutions and politicians, ambassadors and researchers of different countries, all involved or specialized in nuclear and defence issues, starts with a description of the evolution of the international and geo-strategic context from the Cold War to a period of a new nuclear proliferation, with, in between, a period of stabilisation between the USA and the USSR. It also questions the various forms of proliferation which could be ballistic, biological, chemical, and cybernetic. Then, it analyses the role which mass destruction weapons have in international relationships, making a distinction between countries possessing such weapons (USA, Russia, China, France, Great-Britain), Israel which has been a newcomer for thirty years, the new actors (India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea) with their own and different motivations, and the possible new actors (Libya, Syria). It comments the meaning of the ballistic threat and of the anti-missile defence. The third part of this report deals with the dissemination of proliferating technologies, describing the proliferation networks and the failure of actions against state-based proliferations, questioning the reality of the associated risks (discussion about the impact of September 11 attacks, about a chemical and biological terrorist threat which is realistic as well as difficult to be implemented, and about cybernetic attacks). The fourth part comments the impact of the international community on proliferation, outlining the different efficiencies of the international agreements and institutions (Chemical Weapons Convention, IAEA, Non Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, The Hague Code of Conduct), commenting the opportunities associated with other texts (those about nuclear free areas, or those produced by exporter groups), and discussing the attitude of the international community with respect to proliferation, and the

  17. Information report on Proliferation geo-strategic stakes; Rapport d'information depose en application de l'article 145 du Reglement par la Commission des Affaires Etrangeres sur Les enjeux geostrategiques des proliferations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2009-11-15

    This large report, notably based on interviews of many representatives of international institutions and politicians, ambassadors and researchers of different countries, all involved or specialized in nuclear and defence issues, starts with a description of the evolution of the international and geo-strategic context from the Cold War to a period of a new nuclear proliferation, with, in between, a period of stabilisation between the USA and the USSR. It also questions the various forms of proliferation which could be ballistic, biological, chemical, and cybernetic. Then, it analyses the role which mass destruction weapons have in international relationships, making a distinction between countries possessing such weapons (USA, Russia, China, France, Great-Britain), Israel which has been a newcomer for thirty years, the new actors (India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea) with their own and different motivations, and the possible new actors (Libya, Syria). It comments the meaning of the ballistic threat and of the anti-missile defence. The third part of this report deals with the dissemination of proliferating technologies, describing the proliferation networks and the failure of actions against state-based proliferations, questioning the reality of the associated risks (discussion about the impact of September 11 attacks, about a chemical and biological terrorist threat which is realistic as well as difficult to be implemented, and about cybernetic attacks). The fourth part comments the impact of the international community on proliferation, outlining the different efficiencies of the international agreements and institutions (Chemical Weapons Convention, IAEA, Non Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention, The Hague Code of Conduct), commenting the opportunities associated with other texts (those about nuclear free areas, or those produced by exporter groups), and discussing the attitude of the international community with respect to proliferation, and the

  18. Statement to Conference for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World, 12 October 2011, Astana, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and underscores the principles of the NPT. By constraining further development of nuclear weapons, these measures to bring nuclear tests to a halt and to bring the test sites to closure are important steps towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Recently, Kazakhstan has offered to provide a location for an IAEA low enriched uranium bank. I am grateful to the Government of Kazakhstan for its offer. Ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used exclusively for peaceful purposes is the basic pillar upon which the IAEA was established more than five decades ago. A central Agency function is to verify that States are fully complying with their non-proliferation obligations and to confirm that nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. This is our main contribution to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Non-Nuclear-Weapon States party to the NPT are required to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, under which we conduct regular inspections of their nuclear material and activities. The additional protocol to these safeguards agreements, greatly enhances the IAEA's verification capability by giving us expanded access to information and to relevant locations. It enables us to provide credible assurance not only about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material - that is, material about which a country has notified us - but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Such credible assurances are highly effective tools of international and regional confidence building. They can contribute decisively to forestalling the spread of threat perceptions and thus to reducing the risk of the further spread of nuclear weapons. So far, 110 countries have brought additional protocols into force. Last year, at the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony marking the 65 anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, I made my own Nagasaki Commitment to work for a world free of

  19. Different groups, different threats: a multi-threat approach to the experience of stereotype threats.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shapiro, Jenessa R

    2011-04-01

    Two studies demonstrated that different negatively stereotyped groups are at risk for distinct forms of stereotype threats. The Multi-Threat Framework articulates six distinct stereotype threats and the unique constellations of variables (e.g., group identification, stereotype endorsement) that elicit each stereotype threat. Previous research suggests that different negatively stereotyped groups systematically vary across these stereotype threat elicitors; a pilot study confirms these differences. Across two studies, groups that tend to elicit low stereotype endorsement (religion, race/ethnicity, congenital blindness) were less likely to report experiencing self-as-source stereotype threats (stereotype threats requiring stereotype endorsement) and groups that tend to elicit low group identification (mental illness, obesity, blindness later in life) were less likely to report experiencing group-as-target stereotype threats (stereotype threats requiring group identification). This research suggests that traditional models may overlook the experiences of stereotype threats within some groups and that interventions tailored to address differences between stereotype threats will be most effective.

  20. Nuclear experts and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1979-01-01

    In Germany the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation has attracted scant attention. Most potential nuclear weapon states are important trade partners of the FRG and, since further proliferation of nuclear weapons could worsen conflicts involving these, it should be in the FRG's interest to limit proliferation. The security of the FRG is also dependent on the common interest of the great powers to avoid nuclear war. The contradictory positions of Usa and the USSR on nuclear weapons policy regarding themselves and non-nuclear weapon states encourages less developed countries to see nuclear weaponry as useful. The NPT and IAEA safeguards have only limited inhibiting effect. The nuclear export policy of the FRG has been dominated by short term economic advantage, neglecting the negative long term effects of decreased political stability. The FRG should formulate a policy based on self-restraint, positive stimuli and extension of controls, using its economic strength to deter proliferation. (JIW)

  1. Influence of a carbohydrate drink on performance of military personnel in NBC protective clothing

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dokkum, W. van; Boxtel, L.B.J. van; Dijk, M.J. van; Boer, L.C.; Beek, E.J. van der

    1996-01-01

    Background: The increased threat of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons underlines the need of protective clothing and gas masks, but this may impair performance. Thus, attention should be focused on the nutritional requirements. Hypothesis: Optimal performance is guaranteed if the supply

  2. Radiological threat, public and media: a psychosociological view

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arciszewski, T. [University Rene Descartes - Paris 5, 92 - Boulogne (France)

    2006-07-01

    Nuclear risk has become a major social communication along the 20. century because of its critical socio-political impact. That communication is not limited to expert speeches and simple acceptation. The way people understand that kind of threat is based on beliefs and on imaginary pictures. Consequently, and because it shapes people attitude, expectations and behaviours, their analysis is a key for policy and prevention. We will present, in the light of the research on risk perception and social psychology theoretical background, how people can manage with the nuclear fear. Some particular points will be studied: the nature of nuclear threat and fear, the cultural and media coverage and the consequences of this threat on behaviour. We will first focus on what a societal threat is and of which nature is the nuclear threat. We will rely on statistical data on risk perception. We have to consider the two main fields of information: first the nuclear threat as a mass destruction weapon and second, the radiological risk as a consequence of civil use of radiological material. Those two aspects, deeply related for most people, make the roots for the described fears. Then, the perception of the risks relative to nuclear is necessarily influenced by this representation. The representation of the nuclear power is and will be for next years, related to the nuclear mushroom as experimentally pointed o ut by Fiske, both with the abnormal children of Chernobyl. How can we change that vision? Not to be a liar, it will be hard work because it a old story, a long construction of what will be the future of mankind, something deeply influenced by media, movie, geopolitical facts like the cold war or technological accident like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. It has to deal with the problem of media transmission of fears, which is a problem in itself, but due to the scientific base of our problem, particularly relevant. Moreover, there is a strong cultural background that maintains

  3. Radiological threat, public and media: a psychosociological view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arciszewski, T.

    2006-01-01

    Nuclear risk has become a major social communication along the 20. century because of its critical socio-political impact. That communication is not limited to expert speeches and simple acceptation. The way people understand that kind of threat is based on beliefs and on imaginary pictures. Consequently, and because it shapes people attitude, expectations and behaviours, their analysis is a key for policy and prevention. We will present, in the light of the research on risk perception and social psychology theoretical background, how people can manage with the nuclear fear. Some particular points will be studied: the nature of nuclear threat and fear, the cultural and media coverage and the consequences of this threat on behaviour. We will first focus on what a societal threat is and of which nature is the nuclear threat. We will rely on statistical data on risk perception. We have to consider the two main fields of information: first the nuclear threat as a mass destruction weapon and second, the radiological risk as a consequence of civil use of radiological material. Those two aspects, deeply related for most people, make the roots for the described fears. Then, the perception of the risks relative to nuclear is necessarily influenced by this representation. The representation of the nuclear power is and will be for next years, related to the nuclear mushroom as experimentally pointed o ut by Fiske, both with the abnormal children of Chernobyl. How can we change that vision? Not to be a liar, it will be hard work because it a old story, a long construction of what will be the future of mankind, something deeply influenced by media, movie, geopolitical facts like the cold war or technological accident like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. It has to deal with the problem of media transmission of fears, which is a problem in itself, but due to the scientific base of our problem, particularly relevant. Moreover, there is a strong cultural background that maintains

  4. Weapons material and the commercial fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steyn, J.J.

    1993-01-01

    In 1991, the United States and the former USSR had arsenals of ∼18,000 and 27,200 nuclear weapons, respectively. Approximately 10,000 of the US and 13,000 of the former USSR weapons were in the strategic category, and the remainder were tactical weapons. The dramatic changes in the political climate between the United States and the republics of the former USSR have resulted in the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II), agreements to substantially reduce nuclear weapons arsenals. Tactical weapons have already been collected in Russia, and strategic weapons are to be collected by the end of 1994. The major issues in accomplishing the treaty reductions appear to be funding, transport safety, storage capacity, and political issues between Russia and Ukraine because the latter seems to be using its weapons for political leverage on other matters. Collectively, the US and former USSR warhead stockpiles contain tremendous inventories of high-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium which if converted to light water reactor fuel would equate to an enormous economic supply of natural uranium, conversion services, and enrichment separative work. The potential for this material entering the light water reactor fuel marketplace was enhanced in July 1992, when the two US industrial companies, Nuclear Fuel Services and Allied-Signal, announced that they had reached a preliminary agreement with the Russian ministry, Minatom, and the Russian Academay of Sciences to convert Russian high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium

  5. An integrated approach to adapt physical protection to the new terrorism threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhaeusler, F.; Braun, C.; Bunn, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: New terrorism (NT) differs significantly from the traditional form of terrorism insofar as it has the capability to: train and deploy suicide commandos; use sophisticated logistics; implement transnational terrorist operations; infiltrate security and diplomatic communities; and commit acts of mass disturbance and mass killings. NT does not engage in negotiations: it does not discriminate in its attacks between children, adult civilians or military personnel; and it is willing to deploy weapons of mass destruction. These characteristics require that the conventional approach to physical protection of installations dealing with nuclear and other radioactive materials (e.g., Design Basis Threat (DBT)) be adapted accordingly. This integrated approach should encompass: at the international level: revised legally binding conventions and recommendations which are more specific than current versions, providing practically applicable advice reflecting the new threat scenarios; at the national level: introducing an element of transparency for validating the national threat perception and supra-national review of the effectiveness of the counteractions taken such as regulatory approaches implementing these international agreements; at the operational level: enhancing security-related co-operation at the command and control level between the on-site security forces at nuclear installations, the response force, police and the military, as well as upgrading of the force-on-force training; and at the research level: R and D in physical protection technology and practices to keep abreast of the threats posed by the NT. (author)

  6. Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Thoughts, Angry Feelings, Hostile Appraisals, and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapons Effect Literature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benjamin, Arlin J; Kepes, Sven; Bushman, Brad J

    2017-09-01

    Guns are associated with aggression. A landmark 1967 study showed that simply seeing a gun can increase aggression-called the "weapons effect." This meta-analysis integrates the findings of weapons effect studies conducted from 1967 to 2017. It includes 162 effect-size estimates from 78 independent studies involving 7,668 participants. The theoretical framework used to explain the weapons effect was the General Aggression Model (GAM), which proposes three routes to aggression-cognitive, affective, and arousal. The GAM also proposes that hostile appraisals can facilitate aggression. As predicted by the GAM, the mere presence of weapons increased aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals, and aggression, suggesting a cognitive route from weapons to aggression. Weapons did not significantly increase angry feelings. Only one study tested the effects of weapons on arousal. These findings also contribute to the debate about social priming by showing that incidental exposure to a stimulus (weapon) can affect subsequent related behavior (aggression).

  7. Characterising the online weapons trafficking on cryptomarkets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhumorbarbe, Damien; Werner, Denis; Gilliéron, Quentin; Staehli, Ludovic; Broséus, Julian; Rossy, Quentin

    2018-02-01

    Weapons related webpages from nine cryptomarkets were manually duplicated in February 2016. Information about the listings (i.e. sales proposals) and vendors' profiles were extracted to draw an overview of the actual online trafficking of weapons. Relationships between vendors were also inferred through the analysis of online digital traces and content similarities. Weapons trafficking is mainly concentrated on two major cryptomarkets. Besides, it accounts for a very small proportion of the illicit trafficking on cryptomarkets compared to the illicit drugs trafficking. Among all weapon related listings (n=386), firearms only account for approximately 25% of sales proposal since the proportion of non-lethal and melee weapons is important (around 46%). Based on the recorded pseudonyms, a total of 96 vendor profiles were highlighted. Some pseudonyms were encountered on several cryptomarkets, suggesting that some vendors may manage accounts on different markets. This hypothesis was strengthened by comparing pseudonyms to online traces such as PGP keys, images and profiles descriptions. Such a method allowed to estimate more accurately the number of vendors offering weapons across cryptomarkets. Finally, according to the gathered data, the extent of the weapons trafficking on the cryptomarkets appear to be limited compared to other illicit goods. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  8. A parametric design of ceramic faced composite armor subject to air weapon threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo, Y N; Sun, Q

    2015-01-01

    By taking into consideration the two categories of military projectile threats to aircraft structures, an optimal layer configuration of ceramic faced composite armor was designed in this paper. Using numerical simulations and the same layer arrangement of ceramic, UHMWPE, and carbon fiber laminates, a parametric finite element model using LS-DYNA code was built. Several thickness combinations were analyzed in order to determine the final lightest configuration that is capable of supporting a high-speed impact load and HEI blast wave load, which implements a high anti-penetration design for aircraft armor. This configuration can be used to improve the anti-impact ability of aircraft structures as well as achieve a structure/function integration design that considers a lighter weight. (paper)

  9. Status and threats analysis for the Florida manatee (Trichechus manatus latirostris), 2012

    Science.gov (United States)

    Runge, Michael C.; Langtimm, Catherine A.; Martin, Julien; Fonnesbeck, Christopher J.

    2015-01-01

    The endangered West Indian manatee (Trichechus manatus), especially the Florida subspecies (T. m. latirostris), has been the focus of conservation efforts and extensive research since its listing under the Endangered Species Act. On the basis of the best information available as of December 2012, the threats facing the Florida manatee were determined to be less severe than previously thought, either because the conservation efforts have been successful, or because our knowledge of the demographic effects of those threats is increased, or both. Using the manatee Core Biological Model, we estimated the probability of the Florida manatee population on either the Atlantic or Gulf coast falling below 500 adults in the next 150 years to be 0.92 percent. The primary threats remain watercraft-related mortality and long-term loss of warm-water habitat. Since 2009, however, there have been a number of unusual events that have not yet been incorporated into this analysis, including several severely cold winters, a severe red-tide die off, and substantial loss of seagrass habitat in Brevard County, Fla. Further, the version of the Core Biological Model used in 2012 makes a number of assumptions that are under investigation. A revision of the Core Biological Model and an update of this quantitative threats analysis are underway as of 2015.

  10. Effects produced by nuclear weapons from the medical viewpoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Messerschmidt, O.

    1982-01-01

    Recommendations are given for the protection commission of the Minister of the Interior on diagnostics and therapy of the acute radiation syndrome. In summary form, findings from the medical viewpoint are given on the biological effects of nuclear explosions - irrespective of their being produced in peace times by reactor accidents or by use of nuclear weapons in warfare. The statements on the therapy of radiation injuries are a practical aid to the experienced catastrophe physician and suggest to the still unexperienced physician to extend his training for mastering radiation injuries in catastrophes. (orig./HP) [de

  11. The global partnership: its achievements, missed opportunities and potential to address future threats from the spread of CBRN materials and expertise - 59335

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heyes, Alan; Bowen, Wyn; Chalmers, Hugh

    2012-01-01

    Document available in abstract form only. Full text of publication follows: In 2002, the G8 launched the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The partnerships budget was placed at $20 billion over 10 years, and it was supported by some 23 countries and the European Union (EU).Though it has had little public recognition, the partnership has been one of the G8's most successful initiatives and has led to many benefits, including improved international security and addressing a sizeable proportion of the Cold War nuclear and chemical weapons arsenal in the Former Soviet Union. Its future, however, remains undecided, as its funding is set to expire in less than two years. In 2009 and 2010 Kings College London with generous funding support from the US John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, carried out a detailed evaluation of the achievements and benefits of the GP to date, its failings and lost opportunities, and potential future direction. Our findings indicate that the partnership has aided security in the Former Soviet Union and had a significant number of wider benefits with the potential to continue to do the same on a broader geographic level in future. As such, it is a valuable tool to assist the international community to work together to address global threats relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials and related expertise and the G8 should take steps to renew its funding. (authors)

  12. Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

    2010-01-01

    adoption the Law On export control, Republic of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated its adherence to WMD nonproliferation and means of its delivery and Republic's entrance to world system of export control. Kyrgyzstan is a member of Nuclear-weapon nonproliferation treaty from 5 July 1994. Also, on 8 October 1996, Kyrgyzstan signed Treaty on comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. Kyrgyz Republic considers this document as one of the key instruments in the field of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, ensuring strategic stability and safety. On 16 September 2003, the IAEA General Conference adopted resolution on accepting Kyrgyz Republic as member. Thus, Kyrgyzstan officially became 137 member of IAEA. Then Kyrgyz Republic in the field of prevention nuclear weapon and materials spread, which can be used at creation of WMD, as well as ensuring safe application and use of nuclear materials ratified Agreement with IAEA on Application of Safeguards in connection with Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty. Kyrgyzstan considers Convention on prohibition of development, manufacture and accumulation of chemical weapons and its elimination as effective instrument of strengthening international peace and safety. Kyrgyz Republic is member of Convention on prohibition of chemical weapon and member of Organization of chemical weapon prohibition from April 2003. Confirmation to Kyrgyz Republic adherence to WMD nonproliferation policy is Kyrgyz Republic joining to Convention on prohibition, development, manufacturing and accumulation of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons stock and their elimination. Kyrgyzstan is member of this convention from august 2004. Currently, the Government of Kyrgyz Republic defined National bodies on cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency and Organization on prohibition of chemical weapon. As it is known one of the important factors, really ensuring the effectiveness of export control is necessity to strengthen physical protection of our

  13. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fieldhouse, R.

    1991-01-01

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  14. Small Arms - Hand and Shoulder Weapons and Machine Guns

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-06-24

    weapon barrels between firing trials is permitted. A locally fabricated rack can be used for barrels that are detached from the weapon; the air should...Lubricating oil, weapons MIL-L-14107 (LAW) 19. Hydraulic fluid, petroleum base MIL-H-5606 20. Hydraulic fluid, fire - resistant MIL-H-46170...weapon from the test environment to perform maintenance. 4.20.8 Smoke . a. Background. The smoke cloud accumulated during weapon firing can

  15. A new threat to bees? Entomopathogenic nematodes used in biological pest control cause rapid mortality in Bombus terrestris

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexandrea Dutka

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available There is currently a great deal of concern about population declines in pollinating insects. Many potential threats have been identified which may adversely affect the behaviour and health of both honey bees and bumble bees: these include pesticide exposure, and parasites and pathogens. Whether biological pest control agents adversely affect bees has been much less well studied: it is generally assumed that biological agents are safer for wildlife than chemical pesticides. The aim of this study was to test whether entomopathogenic nematodes sold as biological pest control products could potentially have adverse effects on the bumble bee Bombus terrestris. One product was a broad spectrum pest control agent containing both Heterorhabditis sp. and Steinernema sp., the other product was specifically for weevil control and contained only Steinernema kraussei. Both nematode products caused ≥80% mortality within the 96 h test period when bees were exposed to soil containing entomopathogenic nematodes at the recommended field concentration of 50 nematodes per cm2 soil. Of particular concern is the fact that nematodes from the broad spectrum product could proliferate in the carcasses of dead bees, and therefore potentially infect a whole bee colony or spread to the wider environment.

  16. The Regulation of the Possession of Weapons at Gatherings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pieter du Toit

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 provides for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the possession of a dangerous weapon and it repeals the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 as well as the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the erstwhile TBVC States. The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. The Dangerous Weapons Act provides for a uniform system of law governing the use of dangerous weapons for the whole of South Africa and it furthermore no longer places the onus on the individual charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon to show that he or she did not have any intention of using the firearm for an unlawful purpose. The Act also defines the meaning of a dangerous weapon. According to our court’s interpretation of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 a dangerous weapon was regarded as an object used or intended to be used as a weapon even if it had not been designed for use as a weapon. The Act, however, requires the object to be capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose. The possession of a dangerous weapon, in circumstances which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use it for an unlawful purpose, attracts criminal liability. The Act also provides a useful set of guidelines to assist courts to determine if a person charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon had indeed intended to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose. It seems, however, that the Act prohibits the possession of a dangerous weapon at gatherings, even if the person carrying the weapon does not intend to use it for an unlawful purpose. The state will, however, have to prove that the accused had the necessary control over the object and the intention to exercise such control, as well as that the object is capable of

  17. New Weapons and the Arms Race

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tsipis, Kosta

    1983-10-01

    In speaking about technologies that could further animate the weapons competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., it would be useful to distinguish between technologies that have already been incorporated into specific weapons systems, and new technologies that are of a generic nature, can be used in a variety of applications, adn can best be described by the tasks that they can perform rather than any specific weapons application. Let me begin with the latter class.

  18. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carasales, J.

    1998-01-01

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  19. Spatial Pattern Determination of Biodiversity Threats at Landscape Level (Case Study: Golestan Province)

    OpenAIRE

    R. Mirzaei; A. Esmaili-Sari; M. R. Hemami; H. R. Rezaei

    2015-01-01

    Mapping spatial patterns of potential biodiversity threats is one of the important steps for effective conservation planning and activities. To determine the spatial patterns of threats in Golestan province, 12 criteria in four main groups including structural (fractal coefficient of perimeter, circularity ratio of area, average slope), compositional aspects of biodiversity (presence of species at risk), non-biological threats (distance to city, distance to village, distance to road, distance...

  20. Nuclear Weapons in Russia's approach to conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Dave

    2016-11-01

    President Putin has moved nuclear weapons to the foreground of the European security landscape. New risks and dangers arise from the apparent coupling of nuclear weapons capabilities with Moscow's revanchist and irredentist foreign and defence policies toward its neighbours. Nuclear weapons are the central feature and capstone capability in Russia's evolving concept of strategic deterrence and are important tools for achieving Russia's geopolitical aims. Russian thinking on the role and place of nuclear weapons in upholding national security and in achieving strategic aims is reflected in military policy, force structure and posture, and exercises and operations. Russia's political and military leaders are not only re-conceptualising the role of nuclear weapons. They are also building the military capabilities that can credibly threaten the calibrated employment of nuclear weapons for deterrence, de-escalation and war-fighting from the regional to large-scale and global levels of conflict. New and still developing concepts for the employment of conventional long-range precision weapons in tandem with nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and containment of local and regional conflicts add volatility to the regional tensions and uncertainties created by recent Russian aggression. Russia's reliance upon integrated conventional and nuclear capabilities in reasserting its influence in its perceived sphere of special interest, intended to contain conflicts at a manageable level, could actually increase the risk of the potential employment of nuclear weapons. NATO nations collectively, and the three NATO nuclear powers (Great Britain, France, and the United States) individually, have recognized this new reality and have begun to adapt to it. In that context, the aim of this paper is to elaborate a clearer understanding of the place and role of nuclear weapons in Russia's approach to conflict, based on nuclear-related policy statements and military-theoretical writing

  1. From the nuclear stalemate to a nuclear-weapon free world. In memory of Klaus Fuchs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flach, Guenter; Fuchs-Kittowski, Klaus

    2012-01-01

    The following topics were dealt with: The first soviet atomic bomb and Klaus Fuchs, in illusory worlds of Andrei Sakharov, Edward Teller, and Klaus Fuchs, Klaus Fuchs as grandfather of the hydrogen bomb, memories of and thinking about Klaus Fuchs, the Scottish years of Klaus Fuchs 1937-1941, Klaus Fuchs in the mirror of the Venona documents, Gernot Zippe and the ultracentrifuge or east-west technology transfer in the cold war, secret impulses for the soviet nuclear project, responsibility of knowledge with anti-facism, philosophy, and science as well as peace as the first human right in the work of Klaus Fuchs, the request of Klaus Fuchs for a lasting peace, Klaus Fuchs in Daniel Granin's roman ''Escape to Russia'', ways to a nuclear-weapon free world, Otto Hahn and the declarations of Mainau and Goettingen, nuclear winter, initiatives of the GDR for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons in negative entropy, militarism and antimilitarism of the nuclear age, contributions of the young Klaus Fuchs to statistical physics, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the responsibility of the scientists for a socially effective and efficient energy change, Berlin-Bucher contributions to a world free of biological weapons. (HSI)

  2. Biotechnology: An Era of Hopes and Fears

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-01-01

    Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Fall 2016 23 Biotechnology An Era of Hopes and Fears LTC Douglas R. Lewis, PhD, US Army Abstract Biotechnology ......ignored. The idea of advances in biotechnology increasing the biological weapons threat is not new. In 2003 an analysis of gene sequencing and

  3. Spatial Pattern Determination of Biodiversity Threats at Landscape Level (Case Study: Golestan Province

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. Mirzaei

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available Mapping spatial patterns of potential biodiversity threats is one of the important steps for effective conservation planning and activities. To determine the spatial patterns of threats in Golestan province, 12 criteria in four main groups including structural (fractal coefficient of perimeter, circularity ratio of area, average slope, compositional aspects of biodiversity (presence of species at risk, non-biological threats (distance to city, distance to village, distance to road, distance to infrastructure, distance to agricultural land, soil pollution, risk of fire and isolation (Nearest Neighbor Index were used. These data layers were digitized in GIS environment and were weighted through Analytical Hierarchy Process. A weighted linear combination was then used to map the spatial pattern of biodiversity threats in the province. Compositional aspect (0.59, non-biological threats (0.23, isolation (0.11, and structural aspect (0.07 were relatively weighted in the order of importance. Central parts of the province and patches in the northern and southern parts were recognized to be more exposed to biodiversity threats. The central parts of the province were mostly threatened by urban, industrial, road and agricultural development, whereas the northern and southern parts were recognized as areas of conservation importance having a variety of threatened birds.

  4. Feasibility and options for purchasing nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from the former Soviet Union (FSU)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    In response to a recent tasking from the National Security Council, this report seeks to analyze the possible options open to the US for purchasing, from the former Soviet Union (FSU) substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the accelerated weapons retirements and dismantlements that will soon be taking place. The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the implications of some of the options that now appear to be open to the United States, it being recognized that several issues might have to be addressed in further detail if the US Government, on its own, or acting with others seeks to negotiate any such purchases on an early basis. As an outgrowth of the dissolution of the Soviet Union three of the C.I.S. republics now possessing nuclear weapons, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have stated that it is their goal, without undue delay, to become non-nuclear weapon states as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of overriding US concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, and the significant opportunity that the availability of such a large quantity of surplus weapons grade material might present in this regard, especially to a cash-starved FSU Republic. Additionally, the US, in its endeavor to drawdown its own arsenal, needs to assure itself that these materials are not being reconfigured into more modern weapons within the CIS in a manner which would be inconsistent with the stated intentions and publicized activities. The direct purchase of these valuable materials by the US government or by interested US private enterprises could alleviate these security concerns in a straightforward and very expeditious manner, while at the same time pumping vitally needed hard currency into the struggling CIS economy. Such a purchase would seem to be entirely consistent with the Congressional mandate indicated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991

  5. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  6. Why are sexually selected weapons almost absent in females?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anders BERGLUND

    2013-08-01

    Full Text Available In sex role reversed species, predominantly females evolve sexually selected traits, such as ornaments and/or weapons. Female ornaments are common and their function well documented in many species, whether sex role reversed or not. However, sexually selected female weapons seem totally absent except for small wing spurs in three jacana species, present in both males and females. This poor female weaponry is in sharp contrast to the situation in species with conventional sex roles: males commonly have evolved sexually selected weapons as well as ornaments. At the same time, females in many taxa have naturally selected weapons, used in competition over resources or in predator defence. Why are sexually selected weapons then so rare, almost absent, in females? Here I briefly review weaponry in females and the function of these weapons, conclude that the near absence of sexually selected weapons begs an explanation, and suggest that costs of sexually selected weapons may exceed costs of ornaments. Females are more constrained when evolving sexually selected traits compared to males, at least compared to those males that do not provide direct benefits, as trait costs reduce a female’s fecundity. I suggest that this constraining trade-off between trait and fecundity restricts females to evolve ornaments but rarely weapons. The same may apply to paternally investing males. Whether sexually selected weapons actually are more costly than sexually selected ornaments remains to be investigated [Current Zoology 59 (4: 564–568, 2013].

  7. Peaceful uses of nuclear weapon plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burtak, F.

    1996-01-01

    In 1993, the U.S.A. and the CIS signed Start 2 (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in which they committed themselves the reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals to a fraction of that of 1991. For forty-five years the antagonism between the superpowers had been a dominating factor in world history, determining large areas of social life. When Start 2 will have been completed in 2003, some 200 t of weapon grade plutonium and some 2000 t of highly enriched uranium (Heu) will arise from dismantling nuclear weapons. In the absence of the ideological ballast of the debate about Communism versus Capitalism of the past few decades there is a chance of the grave worldwide problem of safe disposal and utilization of this former nuclear weapon material being solved. Under the heading of 'swords turned into plowshares', plutonium and uranium could be used for peaceful electricity generation. (orig.) [de

  8. Weapons dismantlement issues in independent Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.

    1995-01-01

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a seminar during September 1993 in Kiev, Ukraine, titled, ''Toward a Nuclear-Free Future--Barriers and Problems.'' It brought together Ukrainians, Belarusians and Americans to discuss the legal, political, economic, technical, and safeguards and security dimensions of nuclear weapons dismantlement and destruction. US representatives initiated discussions on legal and treaty requirements and constraints, safeguards and security issues surrounding dismantlement, storage and disposition of nuclear materials, warhead transportation, and economic considerations. Ukrainians gave presentations on arguments for and against the Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian Parliament's nonapproval of START 1, alternative strategies for dismantling silos and launchers, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons removal from the Ukraine. Participants from Belarus discussed proliferation and control regime issues. This paper will highlight and detail the issues, concerns and possible impacts of the Ukraine's dismantlement of its nuclear weapons

  9. Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gsponer, A.; Sahin, S.; Jasani, B.

    1983-01-01

    Generally when considering problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussions are focused on horizontal proliferation. However, the emerging nuclear energy systems currently have an impact mainly on vertical proliferation. The paper indicates that technologies connected with emerging nuclear energy systems, such as fusion reactors and accelerators, enhance the knowledge of thermonuclear weapon physics and will enable production of military useful nuclear materials (including some rare elements). At present such technologies are enhancing the arsenal of the nuclear weapon states. But one should not forget the future implications for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as some of the techniques will in the near future be within the technological and economic capabilities of non-nuclear weapon states. Some of these systems are not under any international control. (orig.) [de

  10. Beyond the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinlan, M.

    2001-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

  11. Resolution 1540 (2004) overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kasprzyk, N.

    2013-01-01

    This series of slides presents the Resolution 1540, its features and its status of implementation. Resolution 1540 is a response to the risk that non-State actors may acquire, develop, traffic in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Resolution 1540 was adopted on 28 April 2004 by the U.N. Security Council at the unanimity of its members. Resolution 1540 deals with the 3 kinds of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) as well as 'related materials'. This resolution implies 3 sets of obligations: first no support of non-state actors concerning weapons of mass destruction, secondly to set national laws that prohibit any non-state actors to deal with weapons of mass destruction and thirdly to enforce domestic control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Four working groups operated by the 1540 Committee have been settled: - Implementation (coordinator: Germany); - Assistance (coordinator: France); - International cooperation (interim coordinator: South Africa); and - Transparency and media outreach (coordinator: USA). The status of implementation of the resolution continues to improve since 2004, much work remains to be done and the gravity of the threat remains considerable. (A.C.)

  12. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kerr, Paul; Nikitin, Mary B

    2007-01-01

    Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles...

  13. Toxicology of organophosphorus compounds in view of an increasing terrorist threat.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Worek, Franz; Wille, Timo; Koller, Marianne; Thiermann, Horst

    2016-09-01

    The implementation of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), prohibiting the development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons by 192 nations and the ban of highly toxic OP pesticides, especially class I pesticides according to the WHO classification, by many countries constitutes a great success of the international community. However, the increased interest of terrorist groups in toxic chemicals and chemical warfare agents presents new challenges to our societies. Almost seven decades of research on organophosphorus compound (OP) toxicology was mainly focused on a small number of OP nerve agents despite the fact that a huge number of OP analogues, many of these agents having comparable toxicity to classical nerve agents, were synthesized and published. Only limited physicochemical, toxicological and medical information on nerve agent analogues is available in the open literature. This implies potential gaps of our capabilities to detect, to decontaminate and to treat patients if nerve agent analogues are disseminated and may result in inadequate effectiveness of newly developed countermeasures. In summary, our societies may face new, up to now disregarded, threats by toxic OP which calls for increased awareness and appropriate preparedness of military and civilian CBRN defense, a broader approach for new physical and medical countermeasures and an integrated system of effective detection, decontamination, physical protection and treatment.

  14. Brillouin Spectroscopy Data Base for Biological Threats

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Rubel, Glenn

    2003-01-01

    .... Brillouin scattering from DNA, ovalbumen, the Bacillus spores globigii and thuringiensis were measured to determine the feasibility of biological material discrimination using Brillouin scattering...

  15. Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russett, B.

    1989-01-01

    To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

  16. A nuclear-weapon-free world and true disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salvini, G.

    1999-01-01

    This preliminary note about is important to consider when discussing hopes of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Without a serious effort to establish intelligent, powerful bodies to control and judge the behavior of the nations on Earth, whatever they future weapons may be, the objective to reach a nuclear-weapon-free world may even succeed, but it is not enough to stop wars and death. Even more than that: if taken alone, as the 'Great Way', it could prove negative, for it could slow down the general effort to achieve peace on out planet. A nuclear-weapon-free world is of course a very good idea but two points must be discussed: how to achieve the nuclear-weapon-free world; and what will happen afterwards. Some considerations on the second point are made

  17. Neutron weapons. War prevention by credible deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-11-01

    The neutron bomb has prompted fierce and controversial public discussions which are more emotional than based on facts. Unaware of the factual repercussions this weapon has, it has been described as the most inhumane weapon ever. By saying so, the public is wrongly informed and is made feel insecure. The following contributions made by competent authorities may be used for getting to the point, pointing out that the neutron bomb is primarily a defensive weapon. (orig.) [de

  18. Automated Navigation System based on Weapon-Target Assignment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mohammad Khairudin

    2011-12-01

    Full Text Available Operating of weapon on the tank is mostly by manually. It is not desired performance for a critical operation. An automatic control system is required to operate the weapon with the target while maintaining the accuracy. In this paper has designed an automatic weapon control system using object image proccessing. Various an image processing methods used to improve the weapon accuracy to obtain the intended target. The method used in digital image processing is the Camshift motion tracking method. This method is compared with the Lucas Canade motion tracking method. This comparison is conducted to found more precise results between the two methods. Results of object image processing are used to control the direction of the weapon that towards the desired goal. The results show that the implementation of the Lucas Canade motion tracking method using fire simulation tools have been successful. The performance of the Lucas Canade motion tracking methods is better than the CamShift method. Using Lucas Canade method for weapon controller is accordance with the purposes.

  19. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  20. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  1. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larsen, J.A.; Garrity, P.J.

    1991-12-01

    A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

  2. Instruments of war weapons and technologies that have changed history

    CERN Document Server

    Tucker, Spencer C

    2015-01-01

    In war, the weapons and technologies employed have direct effects on how battles are waged. When new weapons are introduced, they can dramatically alter the outcomes of warfare-and consequently change the course of history itself. This reference work provides a fascinating overview of the major weapon systems and military technologies that have had a major impact on world history. Addressing weapons as crude as the club used by primitive man to the high-tech weapons of today such as unmanned drones, Instruments of War: Weapons and Technologies That Have Changed History offers nearly 270 profusely illustrated entries that examine the key roles played by specific weapons and identify their success and failures. The book begins with an introductory essay that frames the subject matter of the work and discusses the history of weapons as a whole. The text is concise and accessible to general readers without extensive backgrounds in military history yet provides the detailed information necessary to convey the comp...

  3. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats: Diplomacy and International Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-18

    Regulations provide a framework for im- proving disease surveillance and reporting worldwide. In this regard, I continue to be concerned that Indonesia is not...State’s Biosecurity Engagement Program ( BEP ) is working to reduce the threat of bioterrorism through coop- erative activities to prevent terrorist...public and animal health worldwide. Since 2006, the BEP program has matured into a $37-million-a- year effort, focused on regions and countries where

  4. Psychological markers underlying murder weapon profile: a quantitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kamaluddin, M R; Othman, A; Ismail, K H; Mat Saat, G A

    2017-12-01

    The horrific nature of murder using different types of weapons has been an important focal point of many criminological studies. Weapons that are used in murders seem to play dominant roles in murder investigations as they may provide information leading to arrest. The established factors for weapon usage include environmental context, demography and availability of weapons. However, there is insufficient research attention on the psychological functioning of murderers for particular weapon usage. In light of this, the current study seeks to narrow this gap of information by identifying the influences of psychological traits on weapon usage among a sample of male murderers. The present cross-sectional study was conducted among 71 male murderers incarcerated in 11 prisons within Peninsular Malaysia. The selection of the sample was based on predetermined selection criteria using a purposive sampling method. A guided self-administered questionnaire comprising sociodemography variables and four Malay validated psychometric instruments: Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire-40-Cross-Culture, Self-control Scale, "How I Think" Questionnaire and Aggression Questionnaire; was used. Independent sample t-test was performed to establish the mean score differences of psychological traits between the murderers who used single and multiple weapons while Kruskal-Wallis tests were carried out to ascertain the differences between the specific types of weapons used among the murderers. Following this, one-way ANOVA was carried out to ascertain the psychological trait differences among the murderers according to the different sources of weapon. Results indicated specific psychological traits influenced the number(s), source(s) and type(s) of weapon used in committing murder. The findings have implications for the psychological profiling of unknown murderers within the Malaysian context.

  5. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  6. Categorizing threat : building and using a generic threat matrix.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woodard, Laura; Veitch, Cynthia K.; Thomas, Sherry Reede; Duggan, David Patrick

    2007-09-01

    The key piece of knowledge necessary for building defenses capable of withstanding or surviving cyber and kinetic attacks is an understanding of the capabilities posed by threats to a government, function, or system. With the number of threats continuing to increase, it is no longer feasible to enumerate the capabilities of all known threats and then build defenses based on those threats that are considered, at the time, to be the most relevant. Exacerbating the problem for critical infrastructure entities is the fact that the majority of detailed threat information for higher-level threats is held in classified status and is not available for general use, such as the design of defenses and the development of mitigation strategies. To reduce the complexity of analyzing threat, the threat space must first be reduced. This is achieved by taking the continuous nature of the threat space and creating an abstraction that allows the entire space to be grouped, based on measurable attributes, into a small number of distinctly different levels. The work documented in this report is an effort to create such an abstraction.

  7. Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Streeper, Charles Blamires

    2009-01-01

    In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the

  8. 15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or... REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY-CCL BASED CONTROLS § 742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention). States... Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  9. Filling in biodiversity threat gaps

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Joppa, L. N.; O'Connor, Brian; Visconti, Piero

    2016-01-01

    increase to 10,000 times the background rate should species threatened with extinction succumb to pressures they face (4). Reversing these trends is a focus of the Convention on Biological Diversity's 2020 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and its 20 Aichi Targets and is explicitly incorporated...... into the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We identify major gaps in data available for assessing global biodiversity threats and suggest mechanisms for closing them....

  10. Establishing a national biological laboratory safety and security monitoring program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blaine, James W

    2012-12-01

    The growing concern over the potential use of biological agents as weapons and the continuing work of the Biological Weapons Convention has promoted an interest in establishing national biological laboratory biosafety and biosecurity monitoring programs. The challenges and issues that should be considered by governments, or organizations, embarking on the creation of a biological laboratory biosafety and biosecurity monitoring program are discussed in this article. The discussion focuses on the following questions: Is there critical infrastructure support available? What should be the program focus? Who should be monitored? Who should do the monitoring? How extensive should the monitoring be? What standards and requirements should be used? What are the consequences if a laboratory does not meet the requirements or is not willing to comply? Would the program achieve the results intended? What are the program costs? The success of a monitoring program can depend on how the government, or organization, responds to these questions.

  11. Dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schulte, N.T.

    1997-01-01

    The safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons is of fundamental importance to the security of all countries represented in this volume. Expertise in the field is not confined to one country or organisation: all can benefit from each other. There is an ever present danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: approximately two dozen countries have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire such weapons, and many are also gaining the capability to build air-surface delivery systems. But much can be done to prevent proliferation by reducing leakage of materials and know-how and by solving the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, which has now come to be a key issue. In 13 sessions of the workshop attention was paid to (1) Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons; (2) Status of Implementation of Arms Control Treaties and Voluntary Commitments; (3) National Perspectives on Cooperation in Disarmament; (4) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Chemical Weapons; (5) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Nuclear Weapons; (6) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Conventional Weapons. Session; (7) Experience with Currently Employed Chemical Destruction Technologies; (8) Alternative Chemical Destruction Technologies; (9) Deactivation, Dismantlement and Destruction of Delivery Systems and Infrastructure for Nuclear Weapons; (10) Storage, Safeguarding and Disposition of Fissile Materials; (11) Technologies for Conversion and Civil Use of Demilitarized Materials; (12) International Organizations; and (13) Environmental Challenges Posed by Chemical and Nuclear Disarmament

  12. "Securing our survival (SOS": non-state actors and the campaign for a nuclear weapons convention through the prism of securitisation theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Renata H. Dalaqua

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available This article analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period through the prism of securitisation theory. By exploring Buzan and Wæver's conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations, the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb are interpreted as securitising moves, in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser. In the capacity of securitising actors, nuclear abolition activists argue that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC, would be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC shows that, despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security measure, that is, nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

  13. Nuclear weapons in Europe: Why zero is better

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daalder, I.H.

    1993-01-01

    Given the fundamental changes in the political context and NATO's perception of nuclear weapons, what role remains for US nuclear weapons in preserving security in Europe? Are US nuclear deployments on the continent still necessary? Is there a requirement for extended deterrence and, if so, does its credibility depend on the continued basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe? And what is the role of arms control in effecting any desirable restructuring in nuclear force postures? In addressing these questions, it becomes clear that US nuclear weapons can now be removed from Europe - they no longer serve the political and military functions they once did

  14. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons

  15. Models for synthetic biology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kaznessis, Yiannis N

    2007-11-06

    Synthetic biological engineering is emerging from biology as a distinct discipline based on quantification. The technologies propelling synthetic biology are not new, nor is the concept of designing novel biological molecules. What is new is the emphasis on system behavior. The objective is the design and construction of new biological devices and systems to deliver useful applications. Numerous synthetic gene circuits have been created in the past decade, including bistable switches, oscillators, and logic gates, and possible applications abound, including biofuels, detectors for biochemical and chemical weapons, disease diagnosis, and gene therapies. More than fifty years after the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, molecular biology is mature enough for real quantification that is useful for biological engineering applications, similar to the revolution in modeling in chemistry in the 1950s. With the excitement that synthetic biology is generating, the engineering and biological science communities appear remarkably willing to cross disciplinary boundaries toward a common goal.

  16. Population size, breeding biology and on-land threats of Cape Verde petrel (Pterodroma feae) in Fogo Island, Cape Verde.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Militão, Teresa; Dinis, Herculano Andrade; Zango, Laura; Calabuig, Pascual; Stefan, Laura M; González-Solís, Jacob

    2017-01-01

    Cape Verde petrel (Pterodroma feae) is currently considered near threatened, but little is known about its population size, breeding biology and on land threats, jeopardizing its management and conservation. To improve this situation, we captured, marked and recaptured (CMR) birds using mist-nets over 10 years; measured and sexed them; monitored up to 14 burrows, deployed GPS devices on breeders and analyzed activity data of geolocators retrieved from breeders in Fogo (Cape Verde). We set cat traps over the colony and investigated their domestic/feral origin by marking domestic cats from a nearby village with transponders, by deploying GPS devices on domestic cats and by performing stable isotope analyses of fur of the trapped and domestic cats. The population of Fogo was estimated to be 293 birds, including immatures (95% CI: 233-254, CMR modelling). Based on geolocator activity data and nest monitoring we determined the breeding phenology of this species and we found biometric differences between sexes. While monitoring breeding performance, we verified a still ongoing cat predation and human harvesting. Overall, data gathered from trapped cats without transponder, cats GPS trips and the distinct isotopic values between domestic and trapped cats suggest cats visiting the colony are of feral origin. GPS tracks from breeders showed birds left and returned to the colony using the sector NE of the islands, where high level of public lights should be avoided specially during the fledging period. Main threats for the Cape Verde petrel in the remaining breeding islands are currently unknown but likely to be similar to Fogo, calling for an urgent assessment of population trends and the control of main threats in all Cape Verde Islands and uplisting its conservation status.

  17. Population size, breeding biology and on-land threats of Cape Verde petrel (Pterodroma feae in Fogo Island, Cape Verde.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Teresa Militão

    Full Text Available Cape Verde petrel (Pterodroma feae is currently considered near threatened, but little is known about its population size, breeding biology and on land threats, jeopardizing its management and conservation. To improve this situation, we captured, marked and recaptured (CMR birds using mist-nets over 10 years; measured and sexed them; monitored up to 14 burrows, deployed GPS devices on breeders and analyzed activity data of geolocators retrieved from breeders in Fogo (Cape Verde. We set cat traps over the colony and investigated their domestic/feral origin by marking domestic cats from a nearby village with transponders, by deploying GPS devices on domestic cats and by performing stable isotope analyses of fur of the trapped and domestic cats. The population of Fogo was estimated to be 293 birds, including immatures (95% CI: 233-254, CMR modelling. Based on geolocator activity data and nest monitoring we determined the breeding phenology of this species and we found biometric differences between sexes. While monitoring breeding performance, we verified a still ongoing cat predation and human harvesting. Overall, data gathered from trapped cats without transponder, cats GPS trips and the distinct isotopic values between domestic and trapped cats suggest cats visiting the colony are of feral origin. GPS tracks from breeders showed birds left and returned to the colony using the sector NE of the islands, where high level of public lights should be avoided specially during the fledging period. Main threats for the Cape Verde petrel in the remaining breeding islands are currently unknown but likely to be similar to Fogo, calling for an urgent assessment of population trends and the control of main threats in all Cape Verde Islands and uplisting its conservation status.

  18. Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

  19. [Biological research and security institutes].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Darsie, G; Falczuk, A J; Bergmann, I E

    2006-04-01

    The threat of using biological material for ago-bioterrorist ends has risen in recent years, which means that research and diagnostic laboratories, biological agent banks and other institutions authorised to carry out scientific activities have had to implement biosafety and biosecurity measures to counter the threat, while carrying out activities to help prevent and monitor the accidental or intentional introduction of exotic animal diseases. This article briefly sets outthe basic components of biosafety and biosecurity, as well as recommendations on organisational strategies to consider in laboratories that support agro-bioterrorist surveillance and prevention programs.

  20. Cyber threat metrics.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frye, Jason Neal; Veitch, Cynthia K.; Mateski, Mark Elliot; Michalski, John T.; Harris, James Mark; Trevino, Cassandra M.; Maruoka, Scott

    2012-03-01

    Threats are generally much easier to list than to describe, and much easier to describe than to measure. As a result, many organizations list threats. Fewer describe them in useful terms, and still fewer measure them in meaningful ways. This is particularly true in the dynamic and nebulous domain of cyber threats - a domain that tends to resist easy measurement and, in some cases, appears to defy any measurement. We believe the problem is tractable. In this report we describe threat metrics and models for characterizing threats consistently and unambiguously. The purpose of this report is to support the Operational Threat Assessment (OTA) phase of risk and vulnerability assessment. To this end, we focus on the task of characterizing cyber threats using consistent threat metrics and models. In particular, we address threat metrics and models for describing malicious cyber threats to US FCEB agencies and systems.

  1. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  2. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierre, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    In this introduction to ''Nuclear Weapons in Europe'', the author summarized the views of two Americans and two Europeans, whose articles make up the volume. The introduction explains the different assumptions of the four authors before discussing their views on the military and political rationales for a nuclear force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the debate over battlefield nuclear weapons, conventional defense, and arms control proposals and talks. The four contributors whose views are analyzed are William G. Hyland, Lawrence D. Freeman, Paul C. Warnke, and Karstan D. Voight. The introduction notes that the agreements and differences do not fall strictly on American versus European dividing lines

  3. The medical consequences of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Humphrey, J.; Hartog, M.; Middleton, H.

    1982-01-01

    A pamphlet has been produced by the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) and by the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW) to bring the catastrophic effects that the use of nuclear weapons would entail to the attention of the general public, politicians and members of the medical profession. It describes the medical consequences of the effects of blast, heat and ionizing radiation from nuclear weapons, including details from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. The medical consequences of a nuclear attack including consideration of the casualties, care of the injured, psychological effects and the outcome are also discussed. It is concluded that if for none other than purely medical reasons, nuclear warfare must never be allowed to happen. (UK)

  4. Space weapon technology and policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hitchens, Theresa

    2017-11-01

    The military use of space, including in support of nuclear weapons infrastructure, has greatly increased over the past 30 years. In the current era, rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia and China have led to assumptions in all three major space powers that warfighting in space now is inevitable, and possible because of rapid technological advancements. New capabilities for disrupting and destroying satellites include radio-frequency jamming, the use of lasers, maneuverable space objects and more capable direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons. This situation, however, threatens international security and stability among nuclear powers. There is a continuing and necessary role for diplomacy, especially the establishment of normative rules of behavior, to reduce risks of misperceptions and crisis escalation, including up to the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy and strategy should seek a balance between traditional military approaches to protecting its space assets and diplomatic tools to create a more secure space environment.

  5. The nuclear weapon; L'arme nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2008-07-01

    The author presents the technology, the concept of deterrence, the today means and the international control, concerning the nuclear weapon. The conclusion is pessimistic. The author sees only two issues: the substitution of a new weapon more powerful, or its use. (A.L.B.)

  6. Towards the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xie Zhiqiong

    1998-01-01

    For 40 years, the Pugwash Conference on Science and world affairs has been making unremitting efforts to achieve it main objectives the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, the elimination of wars and maintenance of world peace. The end of the Cold War vigorously encouraged world efforts in arms control and disarmament. On the day of exploding her first nuclear bomb in October 1964, China declared solemnly that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time under any circumstances. China has also committed unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. China is the sole nuclear weapon state that has made this commitment, and she has kept her word. China is in favour of comprehensive nuclear test ban in the move towards complete nuclear disarmament, taking an active part in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva and contributing to the conclusion of a fair, reasonable, verifiable treaty of universal adherence and unlimited duration within this year

  7. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.

    2003-01-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the

  8. Foreign trade legislation, war weapons control legislation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hucko, E.M.

    1993-01-01

    The volume contains, in addition to an introduction into the matter, the texts of the Foreign Trade Act (FTA), the War Weapons Control Act and all relevant ordinances. Foreign trade transactions of the Federal Republic of Germany are essentially, but not exclusively, governed by the FTA. They are strongly influenced by the legislation of the European Communities which in the form of directives are immediately effective here, and in the form of guidelines oblige the German lawgiver or ordinance giver to translate them into practice, mostly by appropriate modifications of the foreign trade ordinance, the import and export lists. It is not the war weapons which are the problem, but the so-called dual-use goods, namely articles, technologies and knowledge which, as a rule, serve civil purposes, which, however, may be used also to produce weapons, in particular ABC weapons or rockets. Nowadays we are concerned about several third-world states which are obsessed by the wish to build their own atomic bomb. (orig./HSCH) [de

  9. Oil and influence: the oil weapon examined

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maull, H

    1975-01-01

    The term ''oil weapon'' as used here signifies any manipulation of the price and/or supply of oil by exporting nations with the intention of changing the political behavior of the consumer nations. The political potential of the oil price is fairly restricted so, in effect, the supply interruptions are of prime concern. Manipulating price does, in principle, offer the possibilities of both conferring rewards and inflicting sanctions. Oil could be sold on preferential prices and terms. A precondition for using the oil weapon successfully would be the ability to cause real and serious damage to the consumer countries. Four damaging potentials for using the oil weapon could include its application by: (1) one producer against one consumer; (2) one producer against all consumers; (3) a group of producers against one consumer; and (4) by a group of producers against all consumers. It is concluded that the oil weapon will continue to be a force in the international system. (MCW)

  10. Structural adaptations to diverse fighting styles in sexually selected weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCullough, Erin L; Tobalske, Bret W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2014-10-07

    The shapes of sexually selected weapons differ widely among species, but the drivers of this diversity remain poorly understood. Existing explanations suggest weapon shapes reflect structural adaptations to different fighting styles, yet explicit tests of this hypothesis are lacking. We constructed finite element models of the horns of different rhinoceros beetle species to test whether functional specializations for increased performance under species-specific fighting styles could have contributed to the diversification of weapon form. We find that horns are both stronger and stiffer in response to species-typical fighting loads and that they perform more poorly under atypical fighting loads, which suggests weapons are structurally adapted to meet the functional demands of fighting. Our research establishes a critical link between weapon form and function, revealing one way male-male competition can drive the diversification of animal weapons.

  11. Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security: A Need for Weapons Programs?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Woolf, Amy F

    2003-01-01

    .... nuclear weapons that goes beyond the concept of deterrence from the Cold War. It also identified a new targeting strategy that would seek to threaten specific capabilities in adversary nations...

  12. Patterns and biases of climate change threats in the IUCN Red List.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trull, Nicholas; Böhm, Monika; Carr, Jamie

    2018-02-01

    International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List assessments rely on published data and expert inputs, and biases can be introduced where underlying definitions and concepts are ambiguous. Consideration of climate change threat is no exception, and recently numerous approaches to assessing the threat of climate change to species have been developed. We explored IUCN Red List assessments of amphibians and birds to determine whether species listed as threatened by climate change display distinct patterns in terms of habitat occupied and additional nonclimatic threats faced. We compared IUCN Red List data with a published data set of species' biological and ecological traits believed to infer high vulnerability to climate change and determined whether distributions of climate change-threatened species on the IUCN Red List concur with those of climate change-threatened species identified with the trait-based approach and whether species possessing these traits are more likely to have climate change listed as a threat on the IUCN Red List. Species in some ecosystems (e.g., grassland, shrubland) and subject to particular threats (e.g., invasive species) were more likely to have climate change as a listed threat. Geographical patterns of climate change-threatened amphibians and birds on the IUCN Red List were incongruent with patterns of global species richness and patterns identified using trait-based approaches. Certain traits were linked to increases or decreases in the likelihood of a species being threatened by climate change. Broad temperature tolerance of a species was consistently related to an increased likelihood of climate change threat, indicating counterintuitive relationships in IUCN assessments. To improve the robustness of species assessments of the vulnerability or extinction risk associated with climate change, we suggest IUCN adopt a more cohesive approach whereby specific traits highlighted by our results are considered in Red List

  13. High-Energy Laser Weapon Integration with Ground Vehicles

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hafften, Michael; Stratton, Robert

    2004-01-01

    .... The architecture of an electric, solid-state HEL weapon system would likely be based upon a hybrid electric vehicle that provides a common electrical power source for the propulsion and weapon subsystems...

  14. From weapons to waste: The future of the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wasserman Goodman, Sherri

    1992-01-01

    This paper examines how decision-making power has shifted within the nuclear weapons complex, from the federal government operating agency, in which power was originally vested by the Atomic Energy Act, to the states and to regulatory authorities. Additionally, when the original operating agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was abolished in the 1970s, substantial decision-making power shifted from Washington to the field sites. This paper identifies the needs for future materials and weapons production, and recommends that restart of old plants be abandoned as no longer militarily necessary. Instead, the U. S. should take advantage of what may be a unique opportunity to 'leapfrog' to new, smaller, technologically-advanced plants that will meet the needs of the nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War world. This paper then looks at the current state of DOE's environmental restoration/waste management program, and the technological, legal and political problems it faces in trying to accomplish its mission of cleaning up all nuclear weapons sites. This paper argues that the U. S. government no longer has the exclusive authority to make and carry out critical decisions affecting a cleanup program that will cost the U. S. over $200 billion over the next 20-40 years. Moreover, there are competing theories about the principles that should guide the cleanup program. Finally, the author examines alternative futures for the DOE'S environmental restoration/waste management program. (author)

  15. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  16. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  17. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  18. Asynchronous data-driven classification of weapon systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jin, Xin; Mukherjee, Kushal; Gupta, Shalabh; Ray, Asok; Phoha, Shashi; Damarla, Thyagaraju

    2009-01-01

    This communication addresses real-time weapon classification by analysis of asynchronous acoustic data, collected from microphones on a sensor network. The weapon classification algorithm consists of two parts: (i) feature extraction from time-series data using symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), and (ii) pattern classification based on the extracted features using the language measure (LM) and support vector machine (SVM). The proposed algorithm has been tested on field data, generated by firing of two types of rifles. The results of analysis demonstrate high accuracy and fast execution of the pattern classification algorithm with low memory requirements. Potential applications include simultaneous shooter localization and weapon classification with soldier-wearable networked sensors. (rapid communication)

  19. Early adolescent adversity inflates threat estimation in females and promotes alcohol use initiation in both sexes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walker, Rachel A; Andreansky, Christopher; Ray, Madelyn H; McDannald, Michael A

    2018-06-01

    Childhood adversity is associated with exaggerated threat processing and earlier alcohol use initiation. Conclusive links remain elusive, as childhood adversity typically co-occurs with detrimental socioeconomic factors, and its impact is likely moderated by biological sex. To unravel the complex relationships among childhood adversity, sex, threat estimation, and alcohol use initiation, we exposed female and male Long-Evans rats to early adolescent adversity (EAA). In adulthood, >50 days following the last adverse experience, threat estimation was assessed using a novel fear discrimination procedure in which cues predict a unique probability of footshock: danger (p = 1.00), uncertainty (p = .25), and safety (p = .00). Alcohol use initiation was assessed using voluntary access to 20% ethanol, >90 days following the last adverse experience. During development, EAA slowed body weight gain in both females and males. In adulthood, EAA selectively inflated female threat estimation, exaggerating fear to uncertainty and safety, but promoted alcohol use initiation across sexes. Meaningful relationships between threat estimation and alcohol use initiation were not observed, underscoring the independent effects of EAA. Results isolate the contribution of EAA to adult threat estimation, alcohol use initiation, and reveal moderation by biological sex. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

  20. 76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-07

    ..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

  1. ON THE OFFENSE: USING CYBER WEAPONS TO INFLUENCE COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mary Fendley

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available There is an increasing recognition that cyber warfare is an important area of development for targeting and weaponeering, with far-reaching effects in national defense and economic security. The ability to conduct effective operations in cyberspace relies on a robust situational awareness of events occurring in both the physical and information domains, with an understanding of how they affect the cognitive domain of friendly, neutral, and adversary population sets. The dynamic nature of the battlefield complicates efforts to understand shifting adversary motivations and intentions. There are very few approaches, to date, that systematically evaluate the effects of the repertoire of cyber weapons on the cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral characteristics of the adversary. In this paper, we describe a software environment called Cognitive Cyber Weapon Selection Tool (CCWST that simulates a scenario involving cyber weaponry.This tool provides the capabilities to test weapons which may induce behavioral state changes in the adversaries. CCWST provides the required situational awareness to the Cyber Information Operations (IO planner to conduct intelligent weapon selection during weapon activation in order to induce the desired behavioral change in the perception of the adversary. Weapons designed to induce the cognitive state changes of deception, distraction, distrust and confusion were then tested empirically to evaluate the capabilities and expected cognitive state changes induced by these weapons. The results demonstrated that CCWST is a powerful environment within which to test and evaluate the impact of cyber weapons on influencing cognitive behavioral states during information processing.

  2. Major issues in threat analysis and resolving such problems: an addendum to the GAP analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    T.D. Surasinghe

    2012-04-01

    Full Text Available Identification of regions that warrant conservation attention is a top priority among global environmental concerns. Conventionally, this objective was achieved via recognizing natural landscapes based on the number of IUCN Red Listed species, percentage of endemism and species diversity. A recent innovation in conservation biology is the use of GIS-based threat analysis models to identify key areas of conservation importance. Compared with GAP Analysis, which only identifies biodiversity-rich unprotected lands, threat analysis serves as a rigorous tool in conservation planning which specifically recognizes threats and habitat suitability to different taxa based on a spatially-explicit analysis. Threat analysis is a highly flexible process which involves building up a model with multiple independent (without autocorrelations variables that both positively and negatively affect distribution and population persistence of a concerned species. Parameters include rate of land-use change, population density, population growth rate, land management regimes, protection status, habitat suitability and land stewardship. Threat analysis models can be used to understand the current status of a particular species (or a community and can be used to project future trends about the species under consideration. This publication provides an overview of uses of GIS-based threat analyses in conservation biology and provides insights on the limitations of these models and the directions that should be taken in future.

  3. Nuclear weapons headed for the trash

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arkin, W.M.; Durrant, D.; Kristensen, H.

    1991-01-01

    Whether he intended it or not, Bush has taken steps that mean the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons. His proposals significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the burdens associated with deploying and controlling them. And although he retains many of the options for continuing and regenerating the nuclear arsenal, he has exposed the fact that there are no longer any grand justifications or doctrinal needs for nuclear weapons - and that the nuclear machine is choking on its economic, political, environmental, and human contradictions. The initiatives fundamentally altered the nuclear stance of both nations. Yet, as momentous as the changes were, they were set in motion in an almost businesslike manner. Neither leader truly framed the moves as an end to the nuclear age. But they didn't need to. The steps they have taken practically guarantee it

  4. Biological warfare agents

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Duraipandian Thavaselvam

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available The recent bioterrorist attacks using anthrax spores have emphasized the need to detect and decontaminate critical facilities in the shortest possible time. There has been a remarkable progress in the detection, protection and decontamination of biological warfare agents as many instrumentation platforms and detection methodologies are developed and commissioned. Even then the threat of biological warfare agents and their use in bioterrorist attacks still remain a leading cause of global concern. Furthermore in the past decade there have been threats due to the emerging new diseases and also the re-emergence of old diseases and development of antimicrobial resistance and spread to new geographical regions. The preparedness against these agents need complete knowledge about the disease, better research and training facilities, diagnostic facilities and improved public health system. This review on the biological warfare agents will provide information on the biological warfare agents, their mode of transmission and spread and also the detection systems available to detect them. In addition the current information on the availability of commercially available and developing technologies against biological warfare agents has also been discussed. The risk that arise due to the use of these agents in warfare or bioterrorism related scenario can be mitigated with the availability of improved detection technologies.

  5. Biological warfare agents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thavaselvam, Duraipandian; Vijayaraghavan, Rajagopalan

    2010-01-01

    The recent bioterrorist attacks using anthrax spores have emphasized the need to detect and decontaminate critical facilities in the shortest possible time. There has been a remarkable progress in the detection, protection and decontamination of biological warfare agents as many instrumentation platforms and detection methodologies are developed and commissioned. Even then the threat of biological warfare agents and their use in bioterrorist attacks still remain a leading cause of global concern. Furthermore in the past decade there have been threats due to the emerging new diseases and also the re-emergence of old diseases and development of antimicrobial resistance and spread to new geographical regions. The preparedness against these agents need complete knowledge about the disease, better research and training facilities, diagnostic facilities and improved public health system. This review on the biological warfare agents will provide information on the biological warfare agents, their mode of transmission and spread and also the detection systems available to detect them. In addition the current information on the availability of commercially available and developing technologies against biological warfare agents has also been discussed. The risk that arise due to the use of these agents in warfare or bioterrorism related scenario can be mitigated with the availability of improved detection technologies. PMID:21829313

  6. Responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Jun

    1994-01-01

    The responsibilities of Nuclear Weapon States are presented by a straightforward analysis together with the ways in which they could fulfill them. The complete undertaking of all the commitments by the Nuclear Weapon States may take a long time. However they do not have a single excuse to neglect such a historic opportunity to do their best to provide a genuinely secure world environment for the international community, of which they too are members

  7. Stereotype Threat.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spencer, Steven J; Logel, Christine; Davies, Paul G

    2016-01-01

    When members of a stigmatized group find themselves in a situation where negative stereotypes provide a possible framework for interpreting their behavior, the risk of being judged in light of those stereotypes can elicit a disruptive state that undermines performance and aspirations in that domain. This situational predicament, termed stereotype threat, continues to be an intensely debated and researched topic in educational, social, and organizational psychology. In this review, we explore the various sources of stereotype threat, the mechanisms underlying stereotype-threat effects (both mediators and moderators), and the consequences of this situational predicament, as well as the means through which society and stigmatized individuals can overcome the insidious effects of stereotype threat. Ultimately, we hope this review alleviates some of the confusion surrounding stereotype threat while also sparking further research and debate.

  8. Benefits of integrating complementarity into priority threat management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chadés, Iadine; Nicol, Sam; van Leeuwen, Stephen; Walters, Belinda; Firn, Jennifer; Reeson, Andrew; Martin, Tara G; Carwardine, Josie

    2015-04-01

    Conservation decision tools based on cost-effectiveness analysis are used to assess threat management strategies for improving species persistence. These approaches rank alternative strategies by their benefit to cost ratio but may fail to identify the optimal sets of strategies to implement under limited budgets because they do not account for redundancies. We devised a multiobjective optimization approach in which the complementarity principle is applied to identify the sets of threat management strategies that protect the most species for any budget. We used our approach to prioritize threat management strategies for 53 species of conservation concern in the Pilbara, Australia. We followed a structured elicitation approach to collect information on the benefits and costs of implementing 17 different conservation strategies during a 3-day workshop with 49 stakeholders and experts in the biodiversity, conservation, and management of the Pilbara. We compared the performance of our complementarity priority threat management approach with a current cost-effectiveness ranking approach. A complementary set of 3 strategies: domestic herbivore management, fire management and research, and sanctuaries provided all species with >50% chance of persistence for $4.7 million/year over 20 years. Achieving the same result cost almost twice as much ($9.71 million/year) when strategies were selected by their cost-effectiveness ranks alone. Our results show that complementarity of management benefits has the potential to double the impact of priority threat management approaches. © 2014 Society for Conservation Biology.

  9. Pollution, habitat loss, fishing, and climate change as critical threats to penguins.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trathan, Phil N; García-Borboroglu, Pablo; Boersma, Dee; Bost, Charles-André; Crawford, Robert J M; Crossin, Glenn T; Cuthbert, Richard J; Dann, Peter; Davis, Lloyd Spencer; De La Puente, Santiago; Ellenberg, Ursula; Lynch, Heather J; Mattern, Thomas; Pütz, Klemens; Seddon, Philip J; Trivelpiece, Wayne; Wienecke, Barbara

    2015-02-01

    Cumulative human impacts across the world's oceans are considerable. We therefore examined a single model taxonomic group, the penguins (Spheniscidae), to explore how marine species and communities might be at risk of decline or extinction in the southern hemisphere. We sought to determine the most important threats to penguins and to suggest means to mitigate these threats. Our review has relevance to other taxonomic groups in the southern hemisphere and in northern latitudes, where human impacts are greater. Our review was based on an expert assessment and literature review of all 18 penguin species; 49 scientists contributed to the process. For each penguin species, we considered their range and distribution, population trends, and main anthropogenic threats over the past approximately 250 years. These threats were harvesting adults for oil, skin, and feathers and as bait for crab and rock lobster fisheries; harvesting of eggs; terrestrial habitat degradation; marine pollution; fisheries bycatch and resource competition; environmental variability and climate change; and toxic algal poisoning and disease. Habitat loss, pollution, and fishing, all factors humans can readily mitigate, remain the primary threats for penguin species. Their future resilience to further climate change impacts will almost certainly depend on addressing current threats to existing habitat degradation on land and at sea. We suggest protection of breeding habitat, linked to the designation of appropriately scaled marine reserves, including in the High Seas, will be critical for the future conservation of penguins. However, large-scale conservation zones are not always practical or politically feasible and other ecosystem-based management methods that include spatial zoning, bycatch mitigation, and robust harvest control must be developed to maintain marine biodiversity and ensure that ecosystem functioning is maintained across a variety of scales. © 2014 The Authors. Conservation Biology

  10. Challenges to Leadership: Responding to Biological Threats

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-01

    45 Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between...any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for...contributions to it. Thanks also to Nicholas Rueter, a J.D./M.A. candidate at Duke University, for his able research assistance and to the Center for

  11. Prions: the danger of biochemical weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Eric Almeida Xavier

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available The knowledge of biotechnology increases the risk of using biochemical weapons for mass destruction. Prions are unprecedented infectious pathogens that cause a group of fatal neurodegenerative diseases by a novel mechanism. They are transmissible particles that are devoid of nucleic acid. Due to their singular characteristics, Prions emerge as potential danger since they can be used in the development of such weapons. Prions cause fatal infectious diseases, and to date there is no therapeutic or prophylactic approach against these diseases. Furthermore, Prions are resistant to food-preparation treatments such as high heat and can find their way from the digestive system into the nervous system; recombinant Prions are infectious either bound to soil particles or in aerosols. Therefore, lethal Prions can be developed by malicious researchers who could use it to attack political enemies since such weapons cause diseases that could be above suspicion.

  12. Hamburgian weapon delivery technology: a quantitative comparative approach

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Riede, Felix

    2010-01-01

    cran). Numerous studies have addressed the question of whether these points tipped arrows fired from bows, darts launched with the help of spear-throwers, or some other projectile delivery weapon. This paper approaches the question of Hamburgian weapon delivery technology from a quantitative...

  13. Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) Case Study

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bexfield, James

    2001-01-01

    .... This report describes the process used to conduct the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) in 1995-1997. This case study focuses on the weapons being procured by the Services and whether a joint viewpoint would result in a more effective mix...

  14. Work-related fear and the threats of fear among emergency department nursing staff and physicians in Finland.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mikkola, Riitta; Huhtala, Heini; Paavilainen, Eija

    2017-10-01

    To describe fear, the threats causing fear and the occurrence of fear among emergency department nursing staff and physicians. The emergency department is a challenging workplace where the staff is often confronted by factors that cause fear. A cross-sectional study. A survey was conducted in 16 hospitals (n = 544). Nurses, practical nurses, orderlies and physicians from those hospitals participated in the survey. The survey questionnaire was based on the analysis of interviews of 30 nurses from one university hospital and one central hospital. The results of the interviews were analysed using the inductive content analysis method. The analysis of the survey was performed using statistical methods, such as frequencies, cross-tabulation and principal component analysis. The results showed that nearly all of the emergency department personnel had experienced work-related fear. Generally, the fear had been momentary. According to the survey results, fear was most often caused by medication errors, the resuscitation of a child, a catastrophic accident, urgent or violent situations or patients armed with weapons. Threats that caused fear included insecurity, danger in the work environment, threat of loss of one's health and threat of the consequences of one's mistakes and actions. The staff of emergency departments often encountered factors or situations that caused fear. The main threats causing fear that were raised by the respondents were insecurity and danger in the work environment. The data obtained from this study can be utilised in identifying and describing work-related fear and threats of fear among emergency department nursing staff and physicians. Based on the information herein, it will be possible to develop methods to prevent situations that cause fear in emergency departments. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  15. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toepfer, A.J.; Posey, L.D.

    1978-12-01

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved

  16. Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Weilacher, Lester A

    2003-01-01

    Little more than a month after terrorists took control of four passenger aircraft in the United States and unleashed the horror of 9/11, 50 Chechen terrorists armed with automatic weapons and carrying...

  17. Controlling weapons of mass destruction through the rule of law

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.A.

    1995-08-08

    Many who speak of the end of the Cold War emphasize the improvement in international relations when they speak of the momentous consequences of this event. According to this image, the half century since Trinity has been a period of sparse international communication during which the Eastern and Western blocs hibernated in their isolated dens of security alliances. The emphasis in the phrase ``Cold War`` was on the word ``cold,`` and relations with the former Communist regimes are now ``warm`` by comparison. It is equally valid to consider what has happened to the word ``was` in this highly descriptive phrase. While meaningful international dialogue was in a state of relative lethargy during much of the last fifty years, the military establishments of the Great Powers were actively engaged in using as much force as possible in their efforts to control world affairs, short of triggering a nuclear holocaust. Out of these military postures a tense peace ironically emerged, but the terms by which decisions were made about controlling weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) were the terms of war. The thesis of this paper is that the end of the Cold War marks a shift away from reliance on military might toward an international commitment to controlling weapons,of mass destruction through the ``rule of law.`` Rawls wrote that ``legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation. The regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system.`` Inparticular, Rawls identifies as part of this system of public rules those laws that aim to prevent free riders on the economic system and those that aim to correct such externalities as environmental pollution.``

  18. Stereotype threat and executive functions: which functions mediate different threat-related outcomes?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rydell, Robert J; Van Loo, Katie J; Boucher, Kathryn L

    2014-03-01

    Stereotype threat research shows that women's math performance can be reduced by activating gender-based math stereotypes. Models of stereotype threat assert that threat reduces cognitive functioning, thereby accounting for its negative effects. This work provides a more detailed understanding of the cognitive processes through which stereotype threat leads women to underperform at math and to take risks, by examining which basic executive functions (inhibition, shifting, and updating) account for these outcomes. In Experiments 1 and 2, women under threat showed reduced inhibition, reduced updating, and reduced math performance compared with women in a control condition (or men); however, only updating accounted for women's poor math performance under threat. In Experiment 3, only updating accounted for stereotype threat's effect on women's math performance, whereas only inhibition accounted for the effect of threat on risk-taking, suggesting that distinct executive functions can account for different stereotype threat-related outcomes.

  19. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-03-01

    Figure 17: Examples of Knowledge Scorecards 61 Page vi GAO-17-333SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs...programs. Page 61 GAO-17-333SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Figure 17: Examples of Knowledge Scorecards Pursuant to a...had direct access to the USD AT&L and other senior acquisition officials, and some approval authorities were delegated to lower levels. For example

  20. Driving-forces model on individual behavior in scenarios considering moving threat agents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Shuying; Zhuang, Jun; Shen, Shifei; Wang, Jia

    2017-09-01

    The individual behavior model is a contributory factor to improve the accuracy of agent-based simulation in different scenarios. However, few studies have considered moving threat agents, which often occur in terrorist attacks caused by attackers with close-range weapons (e.g., sword, stick). At the same time, many existing behavior models lack validation from cases or experiments. This paper builds a new individual behavior model based on seven behavioral hypotheses. The driving-forces model is an extension of the classical social force model considering scenarios including moving threat agents. An experiment was conducted to validate the key components of the model. Then the model is compared with an advanced Elliptical Specification II social force model, by calculating the fitting errors between the simulated and experimental trajectories, and being applied to simulate a specific circumstance. Our results show that the driving-forces model reduced the fitting error by an average of 33.9% and the standard deviation by an average of 44.5%, which indicates the accuracy and stability of the model in the studied situation. The new driving-forces model could be used to simulate individual behavior when analyzing the risk of specific scenarios using agent-based simulation methods, such as risk analysis of close-range terrorist attacks in public places.

  1. The Principle of Integration in International Sustainable Development Law (ISDL with Reference to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marina Abdul Majid

    2016-02-01

    Full Text Available The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC does not explicitly refer to sustainable development despite the fact that other United Nations (UN disarmament documents prescribe that international environmental law principles and sustainable development be considered among arms control agreements. This study’s objective is to utilize the principle of integration’s three components of environmental, economic, and social development, as found in the International Sustainable Development Law (ISDL from the New Delhi Declaration (Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, in order to evaluate whether the BWC contains such components; thereby, making it possible for the BWC to contribute to sustainable development. The methodology of this study is necessarily qualitative, given that it is a socio-legal research that relies on international agreements such as the BWC, declarations, resolutions, plans of implementation, other non-binding documents of the UN, and secondary resources—all of which are analyzed through a document analysis. The results show that the BWC addresses the environment (Article II, prohibits transfers relating to export controls, international trade, and economic development (Article III, while at the same time, covering social development concerns, health, and diseases that make up the international social law (Article X. Since the BWC is found to be capable of contributing to sustainable development, it is concluded that ISDL cannot be restricted to international environmental, economic, and social law, but should be expanded to include international arms control law.

  2. Nuclear threat initiative - Kazakhstan project on elimination of high-enriched uranium. 8 October 2005, Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2001, NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) has made important contributions towards securing weapon-usable nuclear material and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, NTI pledged $1.15 million to the Agency?s Nuclear Security Fund, which has been used to achieve tangible nuclear security improvements: upgrades to physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear and radioactive material; urgently needed training in nuclear security for national officials; enhanced detection capabilities at border crossings; and improved national and international readiness for responding to terrorist acts. NTI has consistently sought to target its contributions to address areas of high priority. A primary point of focus has been to secure (and, where possible, eliminate) material that could be diverted for weapons purposes. In P roject Vinca , NTI committed $5 million in 2002 to help remove high enriched uranium fuel from a research reactor near Belgrade, for return to Russia. With support from Russia, the United States and NTI, seven transfers of fresh fuel back to Russia have been made since 2002 - a total of 112 kilograms of HEU. Current plans foresee further shipments of fresh HEU from another three countries in the next 15 months. The IAEA is also continuing to work on arrangements for the repatriation of spent research reactor fuel of Russian origin. In 2001, Sam Nunn and NTI president Charles Curtis approached the Kazakh Government to offer support for the safe transportation of the unused nuclear fuel from the shutdown BN-350 reactor - nearly 3000 kilograms - to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant JSC (UMP), where it could be dismantled and down-blended into LEU (NTI-Kazakhstan project). By the end of this year, 2897 kilograms of HEU - enough to produce dozens of nuclear bombs - will have been down-blended to LEU and placed in safe storage. Throughout the project, the IAEA has been implementing

  3. Can abolition of nuclear weapons be adequately verified?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotblat, J.

    1993-01-01

    Speaking on the problems of preventing proliferations of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament the author suggests the following measures to reach these goals: signing a treaty that binds all the nuclear weapon states to the no-first-use principle as a basic policy; the United Nations should put the elimination of nuclear weapons on its agenda; having the treaty safeguarded two-pronged verification regime, one would be technological verification, the second one - so called societal verification which means that not just a group of experts but everybody would be asked to take part in ensuring that the treaty would not be violated

  4. Chemical Disarmament: Current Problems in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Matoušek, J.

    2006-03-01

    Full Text Available The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC is briefly characterised by stressing its main pillars, such as verified destruction ofCWstockpiles and destruction/conversion ofCWproduction facilities (CWPFs, verified non-production of CW by the chemical industries, assistance and protection, and international cooperation. The CWC´s leading principle in defining theCW(protecting it generally against scientific and technological development, i. e. so called General Purpose Criterion is thoroughly elucidated showing its relation to the CWC´s sophisticated verification system. Status of implementation (as of August 2005 shows main data obligatory declared by the States Parties (SP, among them 6 possessors of CW stockpiles (Russia, USA, India, South Korea, Albania and Libya. From the declared 71 373 agent-tons, 12 889 have been destroyed, from the declared 8 679 M items of munitions (containers, 2 420 have been destroyed, which means that the anticipated 10 years deadline for CW destruction (after entry into force – EIF will be not managed. For Russia and USA the allowed extension by another 5 years has been already agreed. From the 64 CWPFs (operational after 1946, declared by 12 SPs, 53 have been certified as destroyed/converted. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW is briefly presented and main results of the First Review Conference (2003 analysed on the base of the adopted principal documents. Future problems of implementing the CWC are connected in the first line with its universality, because among 16 non-SPs, several countries (located mainly in the Near East and on the Korean peninsula are presumed to be CW-possessors. Special emphasis is laid on both, threats and benefits of the scientific and technological development for current implementing the CWC as well as of its implementation in future after all CW stockpiles have been destroyed.

  5. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juzaitis, R.J.

    1995-01-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a 'short-sleeve' workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE's contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects

  6. A nuclear-weapon-free Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jortner, Joshua

    1986-01-01

    The paper examines the issue of nuclear-weapon States involvement in regional conflicts, and whether such a conflict in the Middle East could trigger a nuclear war between the Super-Powers. Comments on the Middle Eastern situation are given, along with a discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Middle East, Israel and the NPT, and the nuclear potential in Arab countries. The proposal, by Israel, of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East is outlined. (UK)

  7. Improving performance of HVAC systems to reduce exposure to aerosolized infectious agents in buildings; recommendations to reduce risks posed by biological attacks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hitchcock, Penny J; Mair, Michael; Inglesby, Thomas V; Gross, Jonathan; Henderson, D A; O'Toole, Tara; Ahern-Seronde, Joa; Bahnfleth, William P; Brennan, Terry; Burroughs, H E Barney; Davidson, Cliff; Delp, William; Ensor, David S; Gomory, Ralph; Olsiewski, Paula; Samet, Jonathan M; Smith, William M; Streifel, Andrew J; White, Ronald H; Woods, James E

    2006-01-01

    The prospect of biological attacks is a growing strategic threat. Covert aerosol attacks inside a building are of particular concern. In the summer of 2005, the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center convened a Working Group to determine what steps could be taken to reduce the risk of exposure of building occupants after an aerosol release of a biological weapon. The Working Group was composed of subject matter experts in air filtration, building ventilation and pressurization, air conditioning and air distribution, biosecurity, building design and operation, building decontamination and restoration, economics, medicine, public health, and public policy. The group focused on functions of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in commercial or public buildings that could reduce the risk of exposure to deleterious aerosols following biological attacks. The Working Group's recommendations for building owners are based on the use of currently available, off-the-shelf technologies. These recommendations are modest in expense and could be implemented immediately. It is also the Working Group's judgment that the commitment and stewardship of a lead government agency is essential to secure the necessary financial and human resources and to plan and build a comprehensive, effective program to reduce exposure to aerosolized infectious agents in buildings.

  8. Managing threats from emerging technologies: can safeguards show the way?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leffer, Teri N.

    2014-01-01

    The system of international nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is primarily a means of verification of states’ commitments under various legal instruments, principally the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to utilize controlled nuclear fission for peaceful purposes only. However, the safeguards system can also be seen as a mechanism through which states acted to reduce the threat posed by a new technology that had a transformative impact on existing national security paradigms when it emerged in the twentieth century. In the twenty‑first century, new technologies with equally profound national security implications are emerging. These include biotechnology and synthetic biology, nano technology, information technology, cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence. Throughout its history, the safeguards system has evolved to accommodate new technologies, new undertakings and new threats. Because multiple emerging technologies now constitute potential national security threats, it is appropriate to consider whether and how the lessons and successes of the safeguards system, including its capacity to evolve in response to changing requirements, could be leveraged to mitigate the threat posed by these new technologies. This paper addresses the possibility of re‑imagining safeguards in a way that makes them applicable to a broader range of technology‑based threats without compromising their effectiveness for their original purpose.

  9. Does nuclear power lead to nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prawitz, J.

    1977-01-01

    It is pointed out that 'reactor grade' plutonium usually contains about 30 % Pu240 and is unsuitable for weapons. While it is possible to obtain an explosion, it is more difficult to initiate one and its effect, which will be considerably less than with bomb grade plutonium, is difficult to predict. The critical mass will be larger and more cooling required. The proliferation problem is then discussed and the four aspects, vertical, horizontal, sub-national and revolutionary, mentioned. In connection with nuclear power it is the second and third aspects which are of interest. In discussing the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining plutonium, a study by the Swedish Defence Research Institute is quoted as estimating that 10-20 qualified specialists and several years secret preparation would be necessary to make a nuclear weapon. Other authors, e.g. Ted Taylor, have maintained that it would be much easier, but examples of 'student designs' are primitive and unlikely to detonate. Even so, it is emphasised that safeguards and physical security are necessary. Horizontal proliferation is a more real problem and the NPT and IAEA safeguards are discussed in this connection. In conclusion the question of whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons via nuclear power can be prevented cannot be answered with a clear yes or no. Certain states may use nuclear weapon potential as a bargaining factor. However the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is political and while a nuclear power industry would be of help, it would not be decisively so. (JIW)

  10. The spread of nuclear weapons among nations: militarization or development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, A.Q.

    1986-01-01

    The paper reviews nuclear proliferation among nations. Nuclear weapons promotion and proliferation are discussed, including both motivation and lack of motivation to manufacture nuclear weapons. The failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is examined with respect to vertical and horizontal proliferation, and the containment of horizontal proliferation. Risks of nuclear war by accident are outlined, as well as nuclear weapon development. (UK)

  11. Weapon plutonium in accelerator driven power system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shvedov, O.V.; Murin, B.P.; Kochurov, B.P.; Shubin, Yu.M.; Volk, V.I.; Bogdanov, P.V.

    1997-01-01

    Accelerator Driven Systems are planned to be developed for the use (or destruction) of dozens of tons of weapon-grade Plutonium (W-Pu) resulted from the reducing of nuclear weapons. In the paper are compared the parameters of various types of accelerators, the physical properties of various types of targets and blankets, and the results of fuel cycle simulation. Some economical aspects are also discussed

  12. The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-04-15

    this genre is the venerable, and classified, official “bible” of nuclear weapons effects, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. Widely referred to by...weekly comic Shukan Shonen Jampu and was later made into several film versions, a television drama series, and ten books, which follow Gen’s...civilized behavior. The film , distributed internationally and shown on Soviet television, was widely discussed in the United States and both depressed

  13. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  14. Cross-sectional associations between violent video and computer game playing and weapon carrying in a national cohort of children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ybarra, Michele L; Huesmann, L Rowell; Korchmaros, Josephine D; Reisner, Sari L

    2014-01-01

    Data were collected from 9 to 18 year olds surveyed nationally in a three-wave longitudinal survey. The population-average (generalized estimating equation, GEE) odds of carrying a weapon to school in the last month were estimated as a function of past-year exposure to violent content in video, computer, and Internet games, as well as peer aggression and biological sex. The sample included youth who were at risk for both the exposure (i.e., game play) and the outcome (i.e., who attended public or private school). 3,397 observations from 1,489 youth were included in analyses. 1.4% of youth reported carrying a weapon to school in the last month and 69% reported that at least some of the games they played depicted violence. After adjusting for other potentially influential characteristics (e.g., aggressive behavior), playing at least some violent games in the past year was associated with a fourfold increase in odds of also reporting carrying a weapon to school in the last month. Although youth who reported frequent and intense peer victimization in the past year were more likely to report carrying a weapon to school in the last month, this relation was explained by other influential characteristics. Consistent with the predictions of social-cognitive, observational learning theory, this study supports the hypothesis that carrying weapons to school is associated with violent game play. As one of the first studies of its kind, findings should be interpreted cautiously and need to be replicated. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  15. Cross-Sectional Associations Between Violent Video and Computer Game Playing and Weapon Carrying in a National Cohort of Children

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ybarra, Michele L.; Huesmann, L. Rowell; Korchmaros, Josephine D.; Reisner, Sari L.

    2015-01-01

    Data were collected from 9 to 18 year olds surveyed nationally in a three-wave longitudinal survey. The population-average (generalized estimating equation, GEE) odds of carrying a weapon to school in the last month were estimated as a function of past-year exposure to violent content in video, computer, and Internet games, as well as peer aggression and biological sex. The sample included youth who were at risk for both the exposure (i.e., game play) and the outcome (i.e., who attended public or private school). 3,397 observations from 1,489 youth were included in analyses. 1.4% of youth reported carrying a weapon to school in the last month and 69% reported that at least some of the games they played depicted violence. After adjusting for other potentially influential characteristics (e.g., aggressive behavior), playing at least some violent games in the past year was associated with a fourfold increase in odds of also reporting carrying a weapon to school in the last month. Although youth who reported frequent and intense peer victimization in the past year were more likely to report carrying a weapon to school in the last month, this relation was explained by other influential characteristics. Consistent with the predictions of social-cognitive, observational learning theory, this study supports the hypothesis that carrying weapons to school is associated with violent game play. As one of the first studies of its kind, findings should be interpreted cautiously and need to be replicated. PMID:24464267

  16. Nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan context

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

    2002-01-01

    This thesis deals with the possible employment of nuclear weapons in the ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan. After reviewing the nuclear capabilities of both Indian and Pakistan and assessing their possible delivery systems, this dissertation explores the emerging picture regarding the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines. It is argued that, after exploring the current structure of the armed forces in both countries and after analyzing the theatres of operations, it is highly unlikely that either country seeks to employ nuclear weapons in a tactical, battlefield role. It is also argued that neither India or Pakistan is making an effort to evolve a nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Moreover, it is shown that nuclear weapons have simply led to a re-thinking of military tactics on the part of India so as to minimize the chance of a nuclear strike by limiting the aims and objectives of any Indian military action. In stark contrast, it is shown that South Asian cities present far more lucrative targets for nuclear strikes. As a result of this and the geographic and tactical limitations of South Asian battlefields, it is argued that both India and Pakistan have based their fledgling nuclear strategies around a 'city-busting' concept. The existing command and control systems in both countries are examined and found to be adequate if both countries adopt a strict 'second-strike' approach to the employment of nuclear weapons. It is further argued that nuclear weapons, while limiting the scale of any future India-Pakistan war, will not play a major role in preventing a conflict between the two countries. Rather, the basic operational parity that exists between the two countries in terms of their conventional forces is responsible for preventing the outbreak of war. The thesis also briefly explores the rationale behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both countries and on their basic security perceptions. The issue of confidence building measures and the

  17. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dallas Cham E

    2007-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. Results The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Conclusion Among the consequences of this

  18. 77 FR 59891 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-01

    ... Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and Report Handbook and Forms AGENCY: Bureau of Industry.... Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. II. Method of Collection Submitted...

  19. Antigovernment Groups. A Growing Threat to US Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swift, Alicia L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2016-04-25

    Domestic terrorism is a growing threat in the United States, particularly from the 998 right-wing antigovernment (AG) groups in existence in 2015. In the years since the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City, right-wing anti-government acts have oc- curred more often and killed more people in the United States than Muslim extremists. Such AG group members are often in uenced by racist, anti-Semitic, or anti-Islamic views, believe conspiracy theories about the government, and often refuse to pay taxes or participate in frivolous lawsuits in order to intentionally waste the government's time. There is, however, a violent element to these groups which participates in events ranging from the armed take-over of federal land in Oregon, to an armed stand-o with federal agents in Nevada, to the bombing of the Oklahoma City building which killed 168 people. Such acts may be conducted by a few individuals, as is the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, or an entire group. Such groups have a wide range of capabilities, with typical weapons including legal and illegal rearms, with a focus on purchasing fully automatic weapons; hand grenades, with some homemade; deadly tox- ins, like ricin (in multiple cases) and sodium cyanide (in one case); transportation, such as all-terrain vehicles (ATVs); arson, with the intent of destroying federal property; and explosives, often in large numbers and including pipe bombs, truck bombs, IEDs, and other homemade explosives. The growing acceptance of these violent methods by Republican congressmen and governors, however, only increases visibility of such groups and encourages their behavior. Coupled with the removal of the Department of Homeland Security's division responsible for monitoring such groups, the result could prove disastrous for the safety of United States citizens.

  20. 50 kW laser weapon demonstrator of Rheinmetall Waffe munition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

    2013-10-01

    We will present the setup of a 50 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator (LWD) and results achieved with this system. The LWD is a ground based Air Defence system consisting of a Skyguard sensor unit for target acquisition and two laser equipped weapon turrets. The weapon turrets used are standard air defence turrets of Rheinmetall Air Defence which were equipped with several 10 kW Laser Weapon Modules (LWM). Each LWM consists of one 10 kW fiber laser and a beam forming unit (BFU). Commercial of the shelf fiber laser were modified for our defence applications. The BFU providing diffraction limited beam focusing, target imaging and fine tracking of the target was developed. The LWD was tested in a firing campaign at Rheinmetall test ground in Switzerland. All laser beams of both weapon turrets were superimposed on stationary and dynamic targets. Test results of the LWD for the scenarios Air Defence and C-RAMM (counter rockets, artillery, mortar and missiles) will be presented. An outlook for the next development stage towards a 100 kW class laser weapon on RWM will be given.

  1. N deposition as a threat to the World's protected areas under the Convention on Biological Diversity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bleeker, A.; Hicks, W.K.; Dentener, F.; Galloway, J.; Erisman, J.W.

    2011-01-01

    This paper combines the world's protected areas (PAs) under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), common classification systems of ecosystem conservation status, and current knowledge on ecosystem responses to nitrogen (N) deposition to determine areas most at risk. The results show that 40% (approx. 11% of total area) of PAs currently receive >10 kg N/ha/yr with projections for 2030 indicating that this situation is not expected to change. Furthermore, 950 PAs are projected to receive >30 kg N/ha/yr by 2030 (approx. twice the 2000 number), of which 62 (approx. 11,300 km 2 ) are also Biodiversity Hotspots and G200 ecoregions; with forest and grassland ecosystems in Asia particularly at risk. Many of these sites are known to be sensitive to N deposition effects, both in terms of biodiversity changes and ecosystem services they provide. Urgent assessment of high risk areas identified in this study is recommended to inform the conservation efforts of the CBD. - Highlights: → Significant areas of the Protected Areas Programme under the CBD will likely be under threat of high N deposition levels by the year 2030.→ Approx. 950 PAs are projected to receive N deposition levels of more than 30 kg N/ha/yr by 2030.→ 62 of these sites are also Biodiversity Hotspots and G200 ecoregions, where forest and grassland ecosystems in Asia will be particularly at risk.→ Many of these sites are known to be sensitive to N deposition effects, both in terms of biodiversity changes and ecosystem services they provide → Urgent assessment of high risk areas identified in this study is recommended to inform the conservation efforts of the CBD. - Significant areas of the UNEP Protected Areas Programme under the CBD receive high N deposition rates that are likely to increase in the future, especially in Asia, and may pose a significant threat to biodiversity.

  2. Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newman, D.F.

    1993-06-01

    As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO 2 fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle

  3. Males that drop a sexually selected weapon grow larger testes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Joseph, Paul N; Emberts, Zachary; Sasson, Daniel A; Miller, Christine W

    2018-01-01

    Costly sexually selected weapons are predicted to trade off with postcopulatory traits, such as testes. Although weapons can be important for achieving access to females, individuals of some species can permanently drop (i.e. autotomize) their weapons, without regeneration, to escape danger. We capitalized on this natural behavior to experimentally address whether the loss of a sexually selected weapon leads to increased testes investment in the leaf-footed cactus bug, Narnia femorata Stål (Hemiptera: Coreidae). In a second experiment, we measured offspring production for males that lost a weapon during development. As predicted, males that dropped a hind limb during development grew significantly larger testes than the control treatments. Hind-limb autotomy did not result in the enlargement of other nearby traits. Our results are the first to experimentally demonstrate that males compensate for natural weapon loss by investing more in testes. In a second experiment we found that females paired with males that lost a hind limb had 40% lower egg hatching success than females paired with intact males, perhaps because of lower mating receptivity to males with a lost limb. Importantly, in those cases where viable offspring were produced, males missing a hind limb produced 42% more offspring than males with intact limbs. These results suggest that the loss of a hind-limb weapon can, in some cases, lead to greater fertilization success. © 2017 The Author(s). Evolution © 2017 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

  4. The medicinal chemistry of botulinum, ricin and anthrax toxins.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hicks, Rickey P; Hartell, Mark G; Nichols, Daniel A; Bhattacharjee, Apurba K; van Hamont, John E; Skillman, Donald R

    2005-01-01

    The potential use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological or chemical) by terrorist organizations represents a major threat to world peace and safety. Only a limited number of vaccines are available to protect the general population from the medical consequences of these weapons. In addition there are major health concerns associated with a pre-exposure mass vaccination of the general population. To reduce or eliminate the impact of these terrible threats, new drugs must be developed to safely treat individuals exposed to these agents. A review of all therapeutic agents under development for the treatment of the illnesses and injuries that result from exposure to nuclear, biological or chemical warfare agents is beyond the scope of any single article. The intent here is to provide a focused review for medicinal and organic chemists of three widely discussed and easily deployed biological warfare agents, botulinum neurotoxin and ricin toxins and the bacteria Bacillus anthracis. Anthrax will be addressed because of its similarity in both structure and mechanism of catalytic activity with botulinum toxin. The common feature of these three agents is that they exhibit their biological activity via toxin enzymatic hydrolysis of a specific bond in their respective substrate molecules. A brief introduction to the history of each of the biological warfare agents is presented followed by a discussion on the mechanisms of action of each at the molecular level, and a review of current potential inhibitors under investigation.

  5. The nuclear threat, ethics and Pugwash

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.B.

    1999-01-01

    When nuclear weapon states had succeeded in guaranteeing their continued, unchallenged, monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons in the negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban, the process of achieving nuclear disarmament was slowed down. Fortunately when some 60 retired generals and admirals from all over the world called for elimination of nuclear weapons there arose some hope. The role of Pugwash movement concerning disarmament an be concisely formulated by the following oath: I will not use my scientific training for any purpose which I believe is intended to harm human beings; I shall strive for peace, justice, freedom and the betterment of the human condition

  6. Improving Visual Threat Detection: Research to Validate the Threat Detection Skills Trainer

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-01

    26 Threat Detection and Mitigation Strategies...quicker when identifying threats in relevant locations. This task utilized the Flicker paradigm (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Scholl, 2000...the meaning and implication of threats, why cues were relevant, strategies used to detect and mitigate threats, and challenges when attempting to

  7. NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Emergency Management after a Major Terror Attack : the New Challenges for First Responders and Civil Protection

    CERN Document Server

    Steinhäusler, Friedrich

    2007-01-01

    International terrorism remains a significant threat to the peace of the world. Weapons using various materials and delivery systems have been directed against cities and infrastructure, and other materials are postulated to be usable within the near future. Some of these materials are unusual or exotic, while some are modifications of materials used daily for other purposes: biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and explosive. These materials pose a safety challenge for first responders, slowing the response and potentially killing scarce trained personnel. This book provides information about how leading agencies across the NATO membership are preparing to confront and respond to terrorists deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Weapons of Mass Killing (WMK) and Weapons of Mass Disruption (WMDi). Based on contributions by experts from NATO member states, Israel and the Russian Federation, this book offers information on fourth generation warfare as a new challenge to first responders. It also pr...

  8. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oelgaard, P.L.

    1994-01-01

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235 U or 239 Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235 U and 239 Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  9. The proliferation of massive destruction weapons and ballistic missiles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, M.

    1996-01-01

    The author studies the actual situation of nuclear deterrence policies, the possibilities of use chemical weapons as massive destructions weapons for non nuclear governments. The situation of non proliferation of nuclear weapons took a new interest with the disintegration of the communism block, but it seems that only few nuclear matter disappeared towards proliferating countries. The denuclearization of Bielorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan makes progress with the START I treaty; China has signed the Non proliferation treaty in 1992, it conducts an export policy in matter of equipment and know-how, towards Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Syria. In a future of ten years, countries such, Iran, North Korea could catch up with Israel, India and Pakistan among non declared nuclear countries. For chemical weapon, Libya, Iran and Syria could catch up with Iraq. (N.C.)

  10. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nissen, Thomas Elkjer

    In today’s conflict environment, transformed by information technology and of who can communicate and how, states, non-state actors, ad hoc activist networks and individuals create effect(s) in and through social network media in support of their objectives. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia develops...... a framework for understanding how social network media shapes global politics and contemporary conflicts by examining their role as a platform for conduction intelligence collection, targeting, cyber-operations, psychological warfare and command and control activities. Through these, the weaponization...... of social media shows both the possibilities and the limitations of social network media in contemporary conflicts and makes a contribution to theorizing and studying contemporary conflicts....

  11. The Spear: An Effective Weapon Since Antiquity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert E. Dohrenwend

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available The spear is perhaps man’s oldest weapon, and may even be his oldest tool. Over the hundreds of thousands of years of the weapon’s existence, it evolved from a pointed stick into an efficient hunting missile, and then became the most effective hand-held bladed weapon humans ever devised. The spear and its use is the only martial art originally devised for use against species other than our own, and more than any other weapon, the spear emphasizes the relationship between hunting and warfare. Virtually without exception, the spear is present wherever there are humans. The spear may claim to be the senior martial art, and the weapon is still in use today. Early techniques are preserved by the small number of Japanese sojutsu schools, and modern Chinese martial artists have developed elegant and impressive gymnastic routines for the spear. The javelin throw is a modern Olympic track and field event, and there are people who have resurrected the Aztec atlatl for sporting competition. Today, the spear is still used in Europe for hunting wild boar, and the continued issue of the obsolete bayonet to modern soldiers testifies to a deep, almost instinctive respect still possessed by the military for the spear.

  12. Non-Lethal Weapons Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sheets Frequently Asked Questions Non-Lethal Weapons FAQs Active Denial System FAQs Human Electro -Muscular Incapacitation FAQs Related Links Business Opportunities Contact JNLWD Congressional Engagement , Wednesday, Sept 20, 2017. The Active Denial System, blunt-impact munitions, dazzling lasers, LRAD 100X

  13. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  14. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsch, Rainer

    2007-01-01

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  15. Colorimetric Sensor Arrays for the Detection and Identification of Chemical Weapons and Explosives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kangas, Michael J; Burks, Raychelle M; Atwater, Jordyn; Lukowicz, Rachel M; Williams, Pat; Holmes, Andrea E

    2017-03-04

    There is a significant demand for devices that can rapidly detect chemical-biological-explosive (CBE) threats on-site and allow for immediate responders to mitigate spread, risk, and loss. The key to an effective reconnaissance mission is a unified detection technology that analyzes potential threats in real time. In addition to reviewing the current state of the art in the field, this review illustrates the practicality of colorimetric arrays composed of sensors that change colors in the presence of analytes. This review also describes an outlook toward future technologies, and describes how they could possibly be used in areas such as war zones to detect and identify hazardous substances.

  16. Systems integration: an effective and innovative response to emerging biological threats.

    Science.gov (United States)

    House, Robert V

    2007-04-20

    A rapid and effective development of vaccines and other prophylactics, as well as novel therapeutics, against emerging threats requires the development and implementation of novel strategies. One such strategy is the integrator approach. This approach utilizes an integrated development team comprising expertise in program management, scientific management, clinical research, preclinical/nonclinical development, manufacturing, testing, risk management, quality assurance, and regulatory strategy and compliance. Key to the success of this approach is the successful management of subcontracted work, as well as the seamless integration of multiple systems and data inputs into a coherent development plan.

  17. Rethinking the Development of Weapons and Their Impact

    Science.gov (United States)

    Katsioloudis, Petros J.; Jones, Mildred V.

    2011-01-01

    As one reads about the history of humans, he/she sees very early on that humans are naturally "tool users." More specifically, humans used tools as a means of subsistence and survival. Even today humans use tools to extend their capabilities beyond imagination. These tools are even used as weapons. However primitive, these early weapons would soon…

  18. Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

    1993-01-01

    Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

  19. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-01-01

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  20. U.S. assistance in the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Mostoller, Eric Charles

    2000-01-01

    The thesis examines the present status of Russia's chemical weapons destruction program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, which is located at seven sites in western Russia. It also evaluates the environmental and international security concerns posed by the conditions at these sites and the disastrous implications of a failure of this che...

  1. Safeguards considerations related to the decontamination and decommissioning of former nuclear weapons facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.

    1995-01-01

    In response to the post-Cold War environment and the changes in the U. S. Department of Energy defense mission, many former nuclear operations are being permanently shut down. These operations include facilities where nuclear materials production, processing, and weapons manufacturing have occurred in support of the nation's defense industry. Since defense-related operations have ceased, many of the classification and sensitive information concerns do not exist. However, nuclear materials found at these sites are of interest to the DOE from environmental, safety and health, and materials management perspectives. Since these facilities played a role in defense activities, the nuclear materials found at these facilities are considered special nuclear materials, primarily highly enriched uranium and/or plutonium. Consequently, these materials pose significant diversion, theft, and sabotage threats, and significant nuclear security issues exist that must be addressed. This paper focuses on the nuclear materials protection issues associated with facility decommissioning and decontamination, primarily safeguards

  2. Weapon carrying and psychopathic-like features in a population-based sample of Finnish adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saukkonen, Suvi; Laajasalo, Taina; Jokela, Markus; Kivivuori, Janne; Salmi, Venla; Aronen, Eeva T

    2016-02-01

    We investigated the prevalence of juvenile weapon carrying and psychosocial and personality-related risk factors for carrying different types of weapons in a nationally representative, population-based sample of Finnish adolescents. Specifically, we aimed to investigate psychopathic-like personality features as a risk factor for weapon carrying. The participants were 15-16-year-old adolescents from the Finnish self-report delinquency study (n = 4855). Four different groups were formed based on self-reported weapon carrying: no weapon carrying, carrying knife, gun or other weapon. The associations between psychosocial factors, psychopathic-like features and weapon carrying were examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis. 9% of the participants had carried a weapon in the past 12 months. Adolescents with a history of delinquency, victimization and antisocial friends were more likely to carry weapons in general; however, delinquency and victimization were most strongly related to gun carrying, while perceived peer delinquency (antisocial friends) was most strongly related to carrying a knife. Better academic performance was associated with a reduced likelihood of carrying a gun and knife, while feeling secure correlated with a reduced likelihood of gun carrying only. Psychopathic-like features were related to a higher likelihood of weapon carrying, even after adjusting for other risk factors. The findings of the study suggest that adolescents carrying a weapon have a large cluster of problems in their lives, which may vary based on the type of weapon carried. Furthermore, psychopathic-like features strongly relate to a higher risk of carrying a weapon.

  3. Inferring the nature of anthropogenic threats from long-term abundance records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shoemaker, Kevin T; Akçakaya, H Resit

    2015-02-01

    Diagnosing the processes that threaten species persistence is critical for recovery planning and risk forecasting. Dominant threats are typically inferred by experts on the basis of a patchwork of informal methods. Transparent, quantitative diagnostic tools would contribute much-needed consistency, objectivity, and rigor to the process of diagnosing anthropogenic threats. Long-term census records, available for an increasingly large and diverse set of taxa, may exhibit characteristic signatures of specific threatening processes and thereby provide information for threat diagnosis. We developed a flexible Bayesian framework for diagnosing threats on the basis of long-term census records and diverse ancillary sources of information. We tested this framework with simulated data from artificial populations subjected to varying degrees of exploitation and habitat loss and several real-world abundance time series for which threatening processes are relatively well understood: bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii) and Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) (exploitation) and Red Grouse (Lagopus lagopus scotica) and Eurasian Skylark (Alauda arvensis) (habitat loss). Our method correctly identified the process driving population decline for over 90% of time series simulated under moderate to severe threat scenarios. Successful identification of threats approached 100% for severe exploitation and habitat loss scenarios. Our method identified threats less successfully when threatening processes were weak and when populations were simultaneously affected by multiple threats. Our method selected the presumed true threat model for all real-world case studies, although results were somewhat ambiguous in the case of the Eurasian Skylark. In the latter case, incorporation of an ancillary source of information (records of land-use change) increased the weight assigned to the presumed true model from 70% to 92%, illustrating the value of the proposed framework in bringing diverse sources of

  4. Bioethics, bioweapons and the microbiologist.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anaya-Velázquez, Fernando

    2002-01-01

    The analysis of behavior of man in the field of biology is carried out through bioethics, considered the science of the survival. In the microbiology, there are numerous discoveries related with pathogenic microorganisms, including those that can be used as weapons in a biological war or in an attack considered bioterrorism. The scientist involved in microbiology can participate with his knowledge in the development and improvement of bioweapons, however from the point of view of bioethics it is not acceptable that he works in an investigation related with these topics, because the defense research can evolve in offensive one. The war is an antisurvival activity, therefore it is not acceptable. In the same way, the biological weapons composed with virus, fungi or alive bacteria, or with toxins from them, neither they are morally accepted. After the terrorist attacks with anthrax in the United States in 2001, the world scientific community in the field of microbiology should show against the use of the microorganisms like bioweapons, at the time of promoting the idea that the responsible use for the microorganisms is a moral imperative for all microbiologists around the world, since the biological weapons are a threat for the human life.

  5. Sensors Provide Early Warning of Biological Threats

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-01-01

    Early Warning Inc. of Troy, New York, licensed powerful biosensor technology from Ames Research Center. Incorporating carbon nanotubes tipped with single strands of nucleic acid from waterborne pathogens, the sensor can detect even minute amounts of targeted, disease causing bacteria, viruses, and parasites. Early Warning features the NASA biosensor in its water analyzer, which can provide advance alert of potential biological hazards in water used for agriculture, food and beverages, showers, and at beaches and lakes -- within hours instead of the days required by conventional laboratory methods.

  6. Scaling range sizes to threats for robust predictions of risks to biodiversity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keith, David A; Akçakaya, H Resit; Murray, Nicholas J

    2018-04-01

    Assessments of risk to biodiversity often rely on spatial distributions of species and ecosystems. Range-size metrics used extensively in these assessments, such as area of occupancy (AOO), are sensitive to measurement scale, prompting proposals to measure them at finer scales or at different scales based on the shape of the distribution or ecological characteristics of the biota. Despite its dominant role in red-list assessments for decades, appropriate spatial scales of AOO for predicting risks of species' extinction or ecosystem collapse remain untested and contentious. There are no quantitative evaluations of the scale-sensitivity of AOO as a predictor of risks, the relationship between optimal AOO scale and threat scale, or the effect of grid uncertainty. We used stochastic simulation models to explore risks to ecosystems and species with clustered, dispersed, and linear distribution patterns subject to regimes of threat events with different frequency and spatial extent. Area of occupancy was an accurate predictor of risk (0.81<|r|<0.98) and performed optimally when measured with grid cells 0.1-1.0 times the largest plausible area threatened by an event. Contrary to previous assertions, estimates of AOO at these relatively coarse scales were better predictors of risk than finer-scale estimates of AOO (e.g., when measurement cells are <1% of the area of the largest threat). The optimal scale depended on the spatial scales of threats more than the shape or size of biotic distributions. Although we found appreciable potential for grid-measurement errors, current IUCN guidelines for estimating AOO neutralize geometric uncertainty and incorporate effective scaling procedures for assessing risks posed by landscape-scale threats to species and ecosystems. © 2017 The Authors. Conservation Biology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Society for Conservation Biology.

  7. Applying science and technology to combat WMD terrorism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wuest, Craig R.; Werne, Roger W.; Colston, Billy W.; Hartmann-Siantar, Christine L.

    2006-05-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This paper provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.

  8. Applying Science and Technology to Combat WMD Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wuest, C R; Werne, R W; Colston, B W; Hartmann-Siantar, C L

    2006-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This paper provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism

  9. Converging requirements and emerging challenges to public health diseases surveillance and bio surveillance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rao, V.; Abel, T.

    2009-01-01

    Disease surveillance systems are a critical component of an early warning system for public health agencies to prepare and respond to major public health catastrophes. With a growing emphasis for more robust early indicator and warning systems to track emerging and dangerous diseases of suspicious nature, considerable emphasis is now placed on deployment of more expanded electronic disease surveillance systems. The architectural considerations for bio surveillance information system are based on collection, analysis and dissemination of human, veterinary and agricultural related disease surveillance to broader regional areas likely to be affected in the event of an emerging disease, or due to bioterrorism and better coordinate plans, preparations and response by governmental agencies and multilateral forums. The diseases surveillance systems architectures by intent and design could as well support biological threat monitoring and threat reduction initiatives. As an illustrative sample set, this paper will describe the comparative informatics requirements for a disease surveillance systems developed by CSC for the US Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) currently operational nationwide, and biological weapons threat assessment developed as part of the Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) Network under the US Biological Threat Reduction Program and deployed at Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.(author)

  10. Biophysics and the Challenges of Emerging Threats

    CERN Document Server

    Puglisi, Joseph D

    2009-01-01

    This volume is a collection of articles from the proceedings of the International School of Structural Biology and Magnetic Resonance 8th Course: Biophysics and the Challenges of Emerging Threats. This NATO Advance Study Institute (ASI) was held in Erice at the Ettore Majorana Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture on 19 through 30 June 2007. The ASI brought together a diverse group of experts who bridged the fields of virology and biology, biophysics, chemistry and physics. Prominent lecturers and students from around the world representant a total of 24 countries participated in the NATO ASI organized by Professors Joseph Puglisi (Stanford University, USA) and Alexander Arseniev (Moscow, RU). The central hypothesis underlying this ASI was that interdisciplinary research, merging principles of physics, chemistry and biology, can drive new discovery in detecting and fighting bioterrorism agents, lead to cleaner environments, and help propel development in NATO partner countries. The ASI merged the relat...

  11. Australia - a nuclear weapons testing ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobbs, Michael.

    1993-01-01

    Between 1952 and 1958 Britain conducted five separate nuclear weapons trials in Australia. Australia had the uninhabited wide open spaces and the facilities which such tests need and Britain was able to use its special relationship with Australia to get agreement to conduct atomic tests in Australia and establish a permanent test site at Maralinga. Other non-nuclear tests were conducted between 1953-1963. The story of Britain's involvement in atomic weapons testing in Australia is told through its postal history. Both official and private covers are used to show how the postal communications were established and maintained throughout the test years. (UK)

  12. Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.

    1998-01-01

    Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

  13. BLDC technology and its application in weapon system launching ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    In this paper Brushless DC (BLDC) Technology and its Application in Articulation of Weapon System Launching Platform using Electromechanical Servo Drive is presented. ... Due to inherent properties of BLDC Technology BLDC Motors and Drives are profoundly used in military and strategic weapon system applications.

  14. BLDC technology and its application in weapon system launching ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Due to inherent properties of BLDC Technology BLDC Motors and Drives are profoundly used in military and strategic weapon system applications. In this paper, BLDC Motor and Electromechanical Servo Drive System, operating principle, modeling, characteristics and its application in various weapon system programs are ...

  15. Agent-based Modeling Methodology for Analyzing Weapons Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-03-26

    technique involve model structure, system representation and the degree of validity, coupled with the simplicity, of the overall model. ABM is best suited... system representation of the air combat system . We feel that a simulation model that combines ABM with equation-based representation of weapons and...AGENT-BASED MODELING METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS THESIS Casey D. Connors, Major, USA

  16. Identifying and Mitigating Insider Threats

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Probst, Christian W.

    2011-01-01

    Organisations face many threats that coarsely can be separated in inside threats and outside threats. Threats from insiders are especially hard to counter since insiders have special knowledge and privileges. Therefore, malicious insider actions are hard to distinguish from benign actions. After ...... discussing new definitions of insiders and insider threats, this article gives an overview of how to mitigate insider threats and discusses conflicting goals when dealing with insider threats....

  17. Examining perceived stereotype threat among overweight/obese adults using a multi-threat framework.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carels, Robert A; Domoff, Sarah E; Burmeister, Jacob M; Koball, Afton M; Hinman, Nova G; Davis, Alan K; Wagner Oehlhof, Marissa; Leroy, Michelle; Bannon, Erin; Hoffmann, Debra A

    2013-01-01

    The Multi-Threat Framework accounts for potentially different forms of stereotype threat that differ in target (i.e., the individual or the group) and source (i.e., the self or others). This investigation examined how these different forms of perceived stereotype threat were related to concepts, such as group identity, stereotype endorsement, stigma consciousness, etc., among overweight and obese individuals. 216 adults completed an online survey. Participants' mean age was 23.6 (SD 10.1; range 18-64) years and mean BMI was 31.6 (SD 7.5) kg/m². Participants reported a history of feeling threatened by stereotypes related to weight. When reflecting on past experiences of perceived stereotype threat, participants reported greater levels of self/own stereotype threat compared to group stereotype threat. Level of stereotype threat was related to a number of personal characteristics (i.e., sex, BMI) and individual factors (i.e., group identity, stigma consciousness, fear of fat). Individuals who are overweight report a history of being threatened by negative stereotypes. The findings support the Multi-Threat Framework for stereotype threat based on body weight. Overweight individuals' susceptibility to stereotype threat may vary systematically depending on several factors. Future research should examine weight-related stereotypes' impact on cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Copyright © 2013 S. Karger GmbH, Freiburg

  18. Examining Perceived Stereotype Threat among Overweight/Obese Adults Using a Multi-Threat Framework

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert A. Carels

    2013-05-01

    Full Text Available Objective: The Multi-Threat Framework accounts for potentially different forms of stereotype threat that differ in target (i.e., the individual or the group and source (i.e., the self or others. This investigation examined how these different forms of perceived stereotype threat were related to concepts, such as group identity, stereotype endorsement, stigma consciousness, etc., among overweight and obese individuals. Method: 216 adults completed an online survey. Participants' mean age was 23.6 (SD 10.1; range 18-64 years and mean BMI was 31.6 (SD 7.5 kg/m2. Results: Participants reported a history of feeling threatened by stereotypes related to weight. When reflecting on past experiences of perceived stereotype threat, participants reported greater levels of self/own stereotype threat compared to group stereotype threat. Level of stereotype threat was related to a number of personal characteristics (i.e., sex, BMI and individual factors (i.e., group identity, stigma consciousness, fear of fat. Conclusion: Individuals who are overweight report a history of being threatened by negative stereotypes. The findings support the Multi-Threat Framework for stereotype threat based on body weight. Overweight individuals' susceptibility to stereotype threat may vary systematically depending on several factors. Future research should examine weight-related stereotypes' impact on cognitive and behavioral outcomes.

  19. USAF Weapon System Evaluation Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1999-01-01

    During this task period, Schafer Corporation provided engineering services and analysis to the USAF at Eglin AFB, Florida in direct support of the USAF Air-to-Surface Weapon System Evaluation Program (WSEP...

  20. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kevin Larry Young

    2009-05-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testing capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.

  1. What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drell, Sidney

    2011-04-01

    Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

  2. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  3. The opportunity to limit and reduce inventories of fissionable weapon materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hebel, L.C.

    1991-01-01

    As the United States and the Soviet government agree on major reductions in nuclear weapon delivery systems, they need to address the disposal of the nuclear warheads and bombs for those systems. Such measures could be strongly reinforced if the two nations also institute restraints and reductions in the total amount of fissionable materials available for weapons. Many metric tonnes of such materials would be made surplus by the reductions in strategic nuclear weapons due to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I). Equally large reductions in short-range (theater) nuclear weapons are expected in the wake of the recent Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

  4. Are all interventions created equal? A multi-threat approach to tailoring stereotype threat interventions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shapiro, Jenessa R; Williams, Amy M; Hambarchyan, Mariam

    2013-02-01

    To date, stereotype threat interventions have been considered interchangeable. Across 4 experiments, the present research demonstrates that stereotype threat interventions need to be tailored to the specific form of experienced stereotype threat to be effective. The Multi-Threat Framework (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007) distinguishes between group-as-target stereotype threats-concerns that a stereotype-relevant performance will reflect poorly on the abilities of one's group-and self-as-target stereotype threats-concerns that a stereotype-relevant performance will reflect poorly on one's own abilities. The present experiments explored Black college students' performance on diagnostic intelligence tests (Experiments 1 and 3) and women's interest (Experiment 2) and performance (Experiment 4) in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Across the 4 experiments, participants were randomly assigned to experience either a group-as-target or self-as-target stereotype threat. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that role model interventions were successful at protecting only against group-as-target stereotype threats, and Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that self-affirmation interventions were successful at protecting only against self-as-target stereotype threats. The present research provides an experimental test of the Multi-Threat Framework across different negatively stereotyped groups (Black students, female students), different negatively stereotyped domains (general intelligence, STEM), and different outcomes (test performance, career interest). This research suggests that interventions should address the range of possible stereotype threats to effectively protect individuals against these threats. Through an appreciation of the distinct forms of stereotype threats and the ways in which interventions work to reduce them, this research aims to facilitate a more complete understanding of stereotype threat. (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.

  5. The public health impact of nuclear weapons testing in Kazakstan. Report on a WHO expert meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The Semipalatinsk Region of Kazakstan was subject to radioactive fallout from weapons testing which, it is alleged, has resulted in substantial exposure of the population and significant health effects. The Meeting, attended by experts in radiological science, reviewed the evidence from recent studies designed to establish the importance of these exposures to public health. The Meeting concluded that, in the most heavily exposed settlement, doses to individuals subject to the fallout were 1-2 orders of magnitude lower than previously claimed. While there is need to confirm this result in other exposed settlements, the Kazakstan health authorities should be advised that health problems related to past exposures are not as great as previously thought and that, with existing agricultural practices, there is at present no threat to health. Changes in agricultural practices could cause a hazard from plutonium. (author)

  6. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  7. Delayed effects of nuclear and chemical weapons in man

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dienstbier, Z.

    1984-01-01

    Delayed radiation effects are discussed of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons (defoliants and herbicides). Attention is drawn to the development of delayed malignities in exposed subjects and their pathophysiologic causes are explained. The only prevention of these effects is to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction. (author)

  8. Nuclear weapons and NATO operations: Doctrine, studies, and exercises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karber, P.A.

    1994-01-01

    A listing of papers is presented on the doctrine, studies, and exercises dealing with nuclear weapons and NATO operations for the period 1950-1983. The papers deal with studies on massive retaliation, sword and shield, and flexible response. Some of the enduring issues of nuclear weapons in NATO are listed

  9. Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Milne, T.; Wilson, H.

    1999-01-01

    The process of verifying the complete elimination of nuclear warheads in national stockpiles can be divided, conceptually, into four stages: first, comprehensive declarations of warhead and material inventories, as a base-line from which verified disarmament can proceed; second, the transfer of all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material into bonded store; third, demilitarisation measures, such as to render warheads unusable without disassembly and refabrication; fourth, dismantlement of warheads and disposition of fissile material. Many of the technologies and technologies and techniques needed for verifying the elimination of nuclear warheads have been worked out at a general level, largely in US studies. While it is essential that these techniques are refined and improved, what is most important now, if disarmament is to proceed expeditiously, is for each of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) themselves to study the central verification problems and requirements in order to identify particular techniques and approaches that meet their needs. As yet there is no system of integrated data exchange and verification that any of the NWS is willing to endorse. Each of the NWS should give detailed consideration to the logistics of dismantling the warheads in their respective stockpiles, including, for example, the practicalities of accommodating international verification at their potential dismantlement facilities. Each of the NWS might usefully review exactly which details of warhead design and construction have to remain secret in the course of the disarmament process, in the first place from one another, and second from the IAEA or any other international body that might be involved in international disarmament arrangements. Introducing transparency and verification into national nuclear weapons programmes might have a significant financial cost. Research and ingenuity might reduce this cost, however, and early investments in these fields, with sharing of

  10. From the lab to the battlefield? Nanotechnology and fourth generation nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre

    2005-01-01

    The paper addresses some major implications of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) engineering and nanotechnology for the improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons, and the development of more robust versions of these weapons, as well as for the development of fourth generations nuclear weapons in which nanotechnology will play an essential role.

  11. Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill [Money

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, A.F.; Cryer, Bob; Carlisle, Kenneth; Dean, Paul.

    1990-01-01

    The debate concerns the authorisation of payment of the money required to reorganise the atomic weapons establishment in the United Kingdom provided for in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill in progress through Parliament. In the Bill the contractorisation of the establishment is recommended and some sort of Government owned company operated scheme set up. The debate lasted about half an hour and is reported verbatim. The issues raised concerned the actual sums likely to be incurred in the formation of a Company to carry out the designated activities of the Bill. These are connected with the research, development, production or maintenance of nuclear devices and the premises needed. The government spokesman suggested the sums required to support the Bill would not be large and the resolution was agreed to without a vote. (UK)

  12. Wake up call: Sixty ways to combat WMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waengborg, M.

    2006-01-01

    Chaired by former IAEA Director General Hans Blix, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission attempts to tackle the seeming paradox that the key category of weapons of mass destruction-the roughly 27,000 nuclear weapons-in the hands of the established major powers are generally regarded as a legitimate source of military strength and political prestige and largely a stabilizing force, while in the hands of others are seen as an existential threat to the international community. The 14-member Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission advances the opposite perspective. Contrary to the currently fashionable rhetoric about rogue States, it takes the view that weapons of mass destruction are inherently dangerous, irrespective of whose hands they are in. Echoing the 1996 Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, the WMDC affirms that 'so long as any State has such weapons-especially nuclear arms-others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any State's arsenal, there is a risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic'. This is the basic credo of the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. A recent report, issued by the WMD Commission, outlines sixty proposals on how the world could be freed of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

  13. One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weaver, Jason [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-08-25

    Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there has not been a single instance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation, but there have been numerous accidents and “close calls.” As the understanding of these environments has increased, the need for a robust nuclear weapon safety philosophy has grown. This paper describes some of the methods used by the Nuclear Weapon Complex today to assure nuclear weapon safety, including testing, modeling, analysis, and design features. Lastly, it also reviews safety’s continued role in the future and examines how nuclear safety’s present maturity can play a role in strengthening security and other areas and how increased coordination can improve safety and reduce long-term cost.

  14. The research on magnetic exploring abandoned chemical weapons by Japanese

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Luoguo; Li Jingyue; Wang Zezhong

    2007-01-01

    During Word war II, a lot of chemical weapons were left by Japanese on our land. It is very difficult to explore because its complicated states underground. There is no document about the details of this. Few of the research work have been done. In order to destroy completely abandoned chemical weapons by Japanese, the paper has given a serious study on the means to explore the chemical weapons for the purpose to protect our environment and benefit our people. After plenty of research and test, we get good results. (authors)

  15. Assessing the impact of the U.S. Endangered Species Act recovery planning guidelines on managing threats for listed species.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Troyer, Caitlin M; Gerber, Leah R

    2015-10-01

    The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of the United States was enacted in 1973 to prevent the extinction of species. Recovery plans, required by 1988 amendments to the ESA, play an important role in organizing these efforts to protect and recover species. To improve the use of science in the recovery planning process, the Society for Conservation Biology (SCB) commissioned an independent review of endangered species recovery planning in 1999. From these findings, the SCB made key recommendations for how management agencies could improve the recovery planning process, after which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service redrafted their recovery planning guidelines. One important recommendation called for recovery plans to make threats a primary focus, including organizing and prioritizing recovery tasks for threat abatement. We sought to determine the extent to which results from the SCB study were incorporated into these new guidelines and whether the SCB recommendations regarding threats manifested in recovery plans written under the new guidelines. Recovery planning guidelines generally incorporated the SCB recommendations, including those for managing threats. However, although recent recovery plans have improved in their treatment of threats, many fail to adequately incorporate threat monitoring. This failure suggests that developing clear guidelines for monitoring should be an important priority in improving ESA recovery planning. © 2015 Society for Conservation Biology.

  16. Clandestine nuclear trade and the threat of nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spector, L.S.

    1987-01-01

    The nuclear netherworld may ultimately contribute to the danger of nuclear terrorism in at least three ways. First, as national governments exploit this underground market and nuclear weapons spread to additional states, the possibility that terrorists will gain access to them will grow. Such weapons in nuclear threshold countries are likely to be more vulnerable to terrorist seizure than they are in today's more advanced nuclear weapons states. Second, terrorist groups might seek to exploit the nuclear gray market themselves, using the same subterfuges that national governments use. Although in today's nuclear netherworld, subnational groups cannot obtain nuclear arms or nuclear weapons material and cannot hope to build the complex installations needed to produce the latter, they might be able to engage in a form of barter with sympathetic emerging nuclear states (for example, offering raw materials or needed nuclear hardware in return for nuclear weapons material. Finally, there is always the risk that nuclear arms or nuclear weapon materials will someday become available on the nuclear black market. There is evidence indicating that terrorist organizations might well be interested in acquiring such items. Understanding underground nuclear commerce in its current form is essential to prevent such future dangers

  17. Electromagnetic terrorism – threats in buildings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marek Kuchta

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available The paper presents the impact of electromagnetic pulses (high power and high frequency pulses — weapon E on technical infrastructure of buildings [1]. The use of modern technologies in intelligent building management i.e. human resources, control and automation systems, efficient buildings space management, requires using a large number of integrated electronic systems. From technical point of view, the intelligent building is a building in which all subsystems (e.g. technical security, air conditioning, ventilation, lighting, power, electricity, etc., interact with each other and create human-friendly environment. The use of specialized electronic systems, processors, microcontrollers in these subsystems may be a trigger of the use of weapons E as an alternative of terrorist attack— disabling automatic building management systems.[b]Keywords[/b]: electromagnetic weapons, distortion, sensitivity, susceptibility

  18. Generation and characterization of biological aerosols for laser measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cheng, Yung-Sung; Barr, E.B.

    1995-12-01

    Concerns for proliferation of biological weapons including bacteria, fungi, and viruses have prompted research and development on methods for the rapid detection of biological aerosols in the field. Real-time instruments that can distinguish biological aerosols from background dust would be especially useful. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is developing a laser-based, real-time instrument for rapid detection of biological aerosols, and ITRI is working with SNL scientists and engineers to evaluate this technology for a wide range of biological aerosols. This paper describes methods being used to generate the characterize the biological aerosols for these tests. In summary, a biosafe system has been developed for generating and characterizing biological aerosols and using those aerosols to test the SNL laser-based real-time instrument. Such tests are essential in studying methods for rapid detection of airborne biological materials.

  19. From Russian weapons grade plutonium to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braehler, G.; Kudriavtsev, E.G.; Seyve, C.

    1997-01-01

    The April 1996, G7 Moscow Summit on nuclear matters provided a political framework for one of the most current significant challenges: ensuring a consistent answer to the weapons grade fissile material disposition issue resulting from the disarmament effort engaged by both the USA and Russia. International technical assessments have showed that the transformation of Weapons grade Plutonium in MOX fuel is a very efficient, safe, non proliferant and economically effective solution. In this regard, COGEMA and SIEMENS, have set up a consistent technical program properly addressing incineration of weapons grade plutonium in MOX fuels. The leading point of this program would be the construction of a Weapons grade Plutonium dedicated MOX fabrication plant in Russia. Such a plant would be based on the COGEMA-SIEMENS industrial capabilities and experience. This facility would be operated by MINATOM which is the partner for COGEMA-SIEMENS. MINATOM is in charge of coordination of the activity of the Russian research and construction institutes. The project take in account international standards for non-proliferation, safety and waste management. France and Germany officials reasserted this position during their last bilateral summits held in Fribourg in February and in Dijon in June 1996. MINATOM and the whole Russian nuclear community have already expressed their interest to cooperate with COGEMA-SIEMENS in the MOX field. This follows governmental-level agreements signed in 1992 by French, German and Russian officials. For years, Russia has been dealing with research and development on MOX fabrication and utilization. So, the COGEMA-SIEMENS MOX proposal gives a realistic answer to the management of weapons grade plutonium with regard to the technical, industrial, cost and schedule factors. (author)

  20. Internationalization to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The recent International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) has concluded that, in a world in which an increasing number of countries are using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, no technical ways exist to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation is a political problem and must, therefore, be solved by political means. The reasons why countries want nuclear weapons - whether to meet their real or perceived security requirements or for political prestige - must be removed. Resolution of regional conflicts would diminish the stimulus for proliferation, while significant nuclear disarmament measures would de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. Meanwhile, institutional arrangements could minimize the risks of nuclear weapon proliferation. One such arrangement could be the internationalization of the sensitive, that is, the most proliferation-prone, elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This book analyses some of the political, economic, technical and legal issues involved in internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle. It consists of two parts. Part I is SIPRI's (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) evaluation of the advantages, as well as the weaknesses, of the existing proposals for internationalization. Part II contains the papers contributed to the SIPRI symposium on 'internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle', which was held in October/ November 1979. (author)