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Sample records for sarp halfpact sarp

  1. Incisiones verticales en SARPE Vertical incisions in SARPE

    OpenAIRE

    J. Gonzalez Lagunas; J.A. Hueto Madrid; G. Raspall Martín

    2005-01-01

    La expansión rápida de paladar asistida quirúrgicamente (SARPE) es una de las opciones terapeuticas de los transtornos transversales del maxilar superior. Presentamos nuestra experiencia inicial con una variante técnica consistente en una corticotomía de la pared lateral del maxilar combinada con una osteotomía palatina media transincisal, y efectuadas a través de tres pequeñas incisiones verticales.Surgically assisted rapid palatal expansion (SARPE) is one of the therapeutic options for the ...

  2. Incisiones verticales en SARPE Vertical incisions in SARPE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    J. Gonzalez Lagunas

    2005-06-01

    Full Text Available La expansión rápida de paladar asistida quirúrgicamente (SARPE es una de las opciones terapeuticas de los transtornos transversales del maxilar superior. Presentamos nuestra experiencia inicial con una variante técnica consistente en una corticotomía de la pared lateral del maxilar combinada con una osteotomía palatina media transincisal, y efectuadas a través de tres pequeñas incisiones verticales.Surgically assisted rapid palatal expansion (SARPE is one of the therapeutic options for the correction of transverse maxillary collapse. We present our initial experience with a technique consisting in a lateral corticotomy of the maxilla plus a transincisal midpalatal osteotomy, both performed through minimal vertical incisions.

  3. SARP: a value-based approach to hospice admissions triage.

    Science.gov (United States)

    MacDonald, D

    1995-01-01

    As hospices become established and case referrals increase, many programs are faced with the necessity of instituting waiting lists. Prioritizing cases for order of admission requires a triage method that is rational, fair, and consistent. This article describes the SARP method of hospice admissions triage, which evaluates prospective cases according to seniority, acuity, risk, and political significance. SARP's essential features, operative assumptions, advantages, and limitations are discussed, as well as the core hospice values which underlie its use. The article concludes with a call for trial and evaluation of SARP in other hospice settings.

  4. Forecasts of recruitment in South African anchovy from sarp field ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Forecasts of recruitment in South African anchovy from sarp field data using a simple deterministic expert system. ... A rule-based deterministic model is used to forecast recruitment of anchovy Engraulis ... AJOL African Journals Online.

  5. SAR Agriculture Rice Production Estimation (SARPE)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Raimadoya, M.

    2013-12-01

    The study of SAR Agriculture Rice Production Estimation (SARPE) was held in Indonesia on 2012, as part of Asia-Rice Crop Estimation & Monitoring (Asia-RiCE), which is a component for the GEO Global Agricultural Monitoring (GEOGLAM) initiative. The study was expected to give a breakthrough result, by using radar technology and paradigm shift of the standard production estimation system from list frame to area frame approach. This initial product estimation system is expected to be refined (fine tuning) in 2013, by participating as part of Technical Demonstration Site (Phase -1A) of Asia-RICE. The implementation period of this initial study was from the date of March 12 to December 10, 2012. The implementation of the study was done by following the approach of the BIMAS-21 framework, which has been developed since 2008. The results of this study can be briefly divided into two major components, namely: Rice-field Baseline Mapping (PESBAK - Peta Sawah Baku) and Crop Growth Monitoring. Rice-fields were derived from the mapping results of the Ministry of Agriculture (Kemtan), and validated through Student Extension Campaign of the Faculty of Agriculture, Bogor Agricultural University (IPB). While for the crop growth, it was derived from the results of image analysis process. The analysis was done, either on radar/Radarsat-2 (medium resolution) or optical/ MODIS (low resolution), based on the Planting Calendar (KATAM) of Kemtan. In this case, the planting season II/2012-2013 of rice production centers in West Java Province (Karawang, Subang and Indramayu counties). The selection of crop season and county were entirely dependent on the quality of the available PESBAK and procurement process of radar imagery. The PESBAK is still in the form of block instead of fields, so it can not be directly utilized in this study. Efforts to improve the PESBAK can not be optimal because the provided satellite image (ECW format) is not the original one. While the procurement process of

  6. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-01-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

  7. NASA's Student Airborne Research Program (SARP) 2009-2017

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schaller, E. L.

    2017-12-01

    The NASA Student Airborne Research Program (SARP) is a unique summer internship program for rising senior undergraduates majoring in any of the STEM disciplines. SARP participants acquire hands-on research experience in all aspects of a NASA airborne campaign, including flying onboard NASA research aircraft while studying Earth system processes. Approximately thirty-two students are competitively selected each summer from colleges and universities across the United States. Students work in four interdisciplinary teams to study surface, atmospheric, and oceanographic processes. Participants assist in the operation of instruments onboard NASA aircraft where they sample and measure atmospheric gases and image land and water surfaces in multiple spectral bands. Along with airborne data collection, students participate in taking measurements at field sites. Mission faculty and research mentors help to guide participants through instrument operation, sample analysis, and data reduction. Over the eight-week program, each student develops an individual research project from the data collected and delivers a conference-style final presentation on their results. Each year, several students present the results of their SARP research projects in scientific sessions at this meeting. We discuss the results and effectiveness of the program over the past nine summers and plans for the future.

  8. Equivalence relations for the 9972-9975 SARP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemer, K.A.; Frost, R.L.

    1994-10-01

    Equivalence relations required to determine mass limits for mixtures of nuclides for the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Savannah River Site 9972, 9973, 9974, and 9975 shipping casks were calculated. The systems analyzed included aqueous spheres, homogeneous metal spheres, and metal ball-and-shell configurations, all surrounded by an effectively infinite stainless steel or water reflector. Comparison of the equivalence calculations with the rule-of-fractions showed conservative agreement for aqueous solutions, both conservative and non-conservative agreement for the metal homogeneous sphere systems, and non-conservative agreement for the majority of metal ball-and-shell systems. Equivalence factors for the aqueous solutions and homogeneous metal spheres were calculated. The equivalence factors for the non-conservative metal homogeneous sphere systems were adjusted so that they were conservative. No equivalence factors were calculated for the ball-and-shell systems since the -SARP assumes that only homogeneous or uniformly distributed material will be shipped in the 9972-9975 shipping casks, and an unnecessarily conservative critical mass may result if the ball-and-shell configurations are included

  9. Analysis of mosses along Sarp-Samsun highway in Turkey

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koz, B. [Giresun University, Department of Biology, 28049 Giresun (Turkey); Cevik, U. [Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Physics, 61080 Trabzon (Turkey)], E-mail: ugurc@ktu.edu.tr; Ozdemir, T. [Giresun University, Department of Biology, 28049 Giresun (Turkey); Duran, C. [Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Chemistry, 61080 Trabzon (Turkey); Kaya, S. [Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Physics, 61080 Trabzon (Turkey); Gundogdu, A. [Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Chemistry, 61080 Trabzon (Turkey); Celik, N. [Karadeniz Technical University, Department of Physics, 61080 Trabzon (Turkey)

    2008-05-01

    The elemental analysis of mosses along Sarp-Samsun highway in Turkey was determined using energy dispersive X-ray fluorescence method. A radioisotope excited X-ray fluorescence analysis using the method of multiple standard additions is applied for the elemental analysis of mosses. An annular 50 mCi {sup 241}Am radioactive source and annular 50 mCi {sup 55}Fe radioactive source were used for excitation of characteristic K X-rays. An Si(Li) detector which has a 147 eV full width at half maximum for 5.9 keV photons was used for intensity measurements. A qualitative analysis of spectral peaks showed that the samples contained phosphates, potassium, calcium, titanium, iron, strontium, tin and barium. Since this study is the elemental analysis along the highway, one can expect to detect Pb. Due to the detection limit of EDXRF, elements were analyzed with Atomic Absorption Spectroscopy (AAS) for Pb. Evaluation of these elements with their potential hazards for ecology and human is briefly discusse000.

  10. Analysis of mosses along Sarp-Samsun highway in Turkey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koz, B.; Cevik, U.; Ozdemir, T.; Duran, C.; Kaya, S.; Gundogdu, A.; Celik, N.

    2008-01-01

    The elemental analysis of mosses along Sarp-Samsun highway in Turkey was determined using energy dispersive X-ray fluorescence method. A radioisotope excited X-ray fluorescence analysis using the method of multiple standard additions is applied for the elemental analysis of mosses. An annular 50 mCi 241 Am radioactive source and annular 50 mCi 55 Fe radioactive source were used for excitation of characteristic K X-rays. An Si(Li) detector which has a 147 eV full width at half maximum for 5.9 keV photons was used for intensity measurements. A qualitative analysis of spectral peaks showed that the samples contained phosphates, potassium, calcium, titanium, iron, strontium, tin and barium. Since this study is the elemental analysis along the highway, one can expect to detect Pb. Due to the detection limit of EDXRF, elements were analyzed with Atomic Absorption Spectroscopy (AAS) for Pb. Evaluation of these elements with their potential hazards for ecology and human is briefly discussed

  11. K Basins Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) approval plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This document delineates the plan for preparation, review, and approval of the K Basins Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Design Criteria (PDC) document and the on-site Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). The packaging addressed in these documents is used to transport SNF in a Multi- canister Overpack (MCO) configuration

  12. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP): ATMX-500 Railcar nuclear packaging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Griffin, J.F.; Peterson, J.B.; Edling, D.A.; Blauvelt, R.K.

    1977-01-01

    A Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) is described that makes available to all potential users the technical specifications and limits pertinent to the modification and use of the ATMX Railcars for which the Department of Transportation has issued Special Permit No. 5948. The SARP includes discussions of structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding and radiological safety, nuclear criticality safety, and quality control. Much of the information was previously published in a similar report. A complte physical and technical description of the package is presented. The packaging cnsists of a specially modified ATMX Series 500 Railcar loaded with DOT Specification steel drums or fiberglass coated plywood boxes. The results of the nuclear criticality safety analysis provide the maximum quantities of each fissile isotope which may be shipped as Fissile Class I in 30- and 55-gal drums. A limit of 5 g/ft 3 was established for wooden boxes. Design and development considerations regarding the packaging concept and modification of the ATMX-500 Railcar are presented. Tables, dimensional sketches, sequential photographs of the structural modifications, technical references, loading and shipping guidelines, and results of Mound Laboratory's experience in using this container are included. An internal review of this SARP was performed in compliance with the requirements of ERDA Manual Chapter 5201-Part V

  13. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) for USA/5790/BLF (DOE-AL) and USA/5791/BLF (DOE-AL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roome, L.G.; Watkins, R.A.; Bertram, R.E.; Kreider, H.B.

    1980-01-01

    This revised Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) includes discussions of structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding and radiological safety, nuclear criticality safety, and quality control of shipping containers. Much of the information was previously submitted to AEC/OSD/ALO and the Department of Transportation (DOT) and provided the basis for obtaining special permits DOT-SP-5790 and DOT-SP-5791 as well as the Interim Certificates of Compliance until the original SARP could be prepared and Certificates of Compliance issued by ERDA. This SARP revision incorporates information on certain design changes, the most significant of which relate to the inner container for the type 5790 package. Complete physical and technical descriptions of the packages are presented. Each package consists of a cylindrical steel inner container centered within an insulating steel drum assembly. The contents may be any radioactive materials which satisfy the requirements established in this SARP. A shipment of plutonium-238 in the form of a solid oxide is evaluated in this SARP as an example. The results of the nuclear criticality safety analysis show how much of the fissile isotopes may be shipped as Fissile Class I, II, or III for each container. Design and development considerations, the tests and evaluations required to prove the ability of the containers to withstand normal transportation conditions, and the sequence of four hypothetical accident conditions (free drop, puncture, thermal, and water immersion) are discussed. Tables, graphs, dimensional sketches, photographs, technical references, loading and shipping procedures, Mound Facility experience in using the containers, and copies of the DOE Certificates of Compliance are included. Internal reviews of the original and revised SARP's have been performed in compliance with the requirement of DOEM 5201-Part V

  14. Documentation for fiscal year 1995 annual BUSS cask SARP testing and inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saueressig, P.T.

    1994-11-08

    The purpose of this report is to compile the data generated during the Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 annual tests and inspections performed on the Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) cask. The BUSS Cask Model R-1 is a type B shipping container used for shipment of radioactive cesium-137 and strontium-90 capsules to Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF). The primary purpose of the BUSS Cask is to provide shielding and confinement as well as impact, puncture, and thermal protection for the capsules under both normal and accident conditions. Section 8.2 ``Maintenance and Periodic Inspection Program`` of the BUSS Cask SARP requires that the following tests and inspections be performed on an annual basis: hydrostatic pressure test; helium leak test; dye penetrant test on the trunnions and life lugs; torque test on all permanent bolts; and impact limiter inspection and weight test. In addition to compiling the generated data, this report will verify that the testing criteria identified in section 8.2 of the BUSS Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was met.

  15. Documentation for fiscal year 1995 annual BUSS cask SARP testing and inspections

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saueressig, P.T.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to compile the data generated during the Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 annual tests and inspections performed on the Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) cask. The BUSS Cask Model R-1 is a type B shipping container used for shipment of radioactive cesium-137 and strontium-90 capsules to Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF). The primary purpose of the BUSS Cask is to provide shielding and confinement as well as impact, puncture, and thermal protection for the capsules under both normal and accident conditions. Section 8.2 ''Maintenance and Periodic Inspection Program'' of the BUSS Cask SARP requires that the following tests and inspections be performed on an annual basis: hydrostatic pressure test; helium leak test; dye penetrant test on the trunnions and life lugs; torque test on all permanent bolts; and impact limiter inspection and weight test. In addition to compiling the generated data, this report will verify that the testing criteria identified in section 8.2 of the BUSS Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was met

  16. The U.S. Department of Energy SARP review training program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mauck, C.J.

    1988-01-01

    In support of its radioactive material packaging certification program, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has established a special training workshop. The purpose of the two-week workshop is to develop skills in reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs) and performing confirmatory analyses. The workshop, conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for DOE, is divided into two parts: methods of review and methods of analysis. The sessions covering methods of review are based on the DOE document, ''Packaging Review Guide for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings'' (PRG). The sessions cover relevant DOE Orders and all areas of review in the applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guides. The technical areas addressed include structural and thermal behavior, materials, shielding, criticality, and containment. The course sessions on methods of analysis provide hands-on experience in the use of calculational methods and codes for reviewing SARPs. Analytical techniques and computer codes are discussed and sample problems are worked. Homework is assigned each night and over the included weekend; at the conclusion, a comprehensive take-home examination is given requiring six to ten hours to complete

  17. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP): USA/5790/BLF (ERDA-AL) and USA/5791/BLF (ERDA-AL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Griffin, J.F.; Bertram, R.E.; Blauvelt, R.K.; Edling, D.A.; Flanagan, T.M.; Peterson, J.B.; Prosser, D.L.

    1976-01-01

    The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) satisfies the request of the U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration for a formal safety analysis of the two insulated drum shipping containers identified as USA/5790/BLF ERDA-AL and USA/5791/BLF ERDA-AL. Discussions of structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding and radiological safety, nuclear criticality safety, and quality control are included. Much of the information was previously submitted to ERDA/OSD/ALO and the Department of Transportation (DOT) and provided the basis for obtaining special permits DOT-SP-5790 and DOT-SP-5791 as well as the Interim Certificates of Compliance until the SARP could be prepared. Complete physical and technical descriptions of the packages are presented. Each package consists of a modified DOT Specification 2R cylindrical steel inner container centered within an insulated steel drum. The contents may be any radioactive materials which satisfy the requirements established in this SARP. A shipment of Plutonium-238 in the form of a solid oxide is evaluated in this SARP as an example. The results of the nuclear criticality safety analysis show how much of the fissile isotopes may be shipped as Fissile Class I, II, or III for each container. Design and development considerations, the test and evaluations required to prove the ability of the containers to withstand normal transportation conditions, and the sequence of four hypothetical accident conditions (free drop, puncture, thermal, and water immersion) are discussed

  18. Safety-analysis report for packaging (SARP) general-purpose heat-source module 750-Watt shipping container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitney, M.A.; Burgan, C.E.; Blauvelt, R.K.; Zocher, R.W.; Bronisz, S.E.

    1981-01-01

    The SARP includes discussions of structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding and radiological safety, nuclear criticality safety, and quality control. Extensive tests and evaluations were performed to show that the container will function effectively with respect to all required standards and when subjected to normal transportation conditions and the sequence of four hypothetical accident conditions (free drop, puncture, thermal, and water immersion). In addition, a steady state temperature profile and radiation profile were measured using two heat sources that very closely resemble the GPHS. This gave an excellent representation of the GPHS temperature and radiation profile. A nuclear criticality safety analysis determined that all safety requirements are met

  19. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP): USA/9507/BLF (ERDA--AL), Model AL-M1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watkins, R.A.; Bertram, R.E.; Blauvelt, R.K.; Edling, D.A.; Flanagan, T.M.; Griffin, J.F.; Rhinehammer, T.B.

    1977-01-01

    The SARP includes structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding and radiological safety, nuclear criticality safety, and quality control of three insulated drum shipping containers identified as USA/9507/BLF (ERDA-AL), also called AL-M1, configurations 1, 3, and 5. Complete physical and technical descriptions of the packages are presented. Each package consists of an inner container centered within an insulated steel drum. The contents are plutonium-239 and uranium-235 in configurations-1 and -3. The configuration-5 package is intended for shipment of up to 100,000 Ci of tritiated water immobilized on a sorbent such as molecular sieve

  20. Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A). Engineering Test Report: Radiated Emissions and SARR, SARP, DCS Receivers, Link Frequencies EMI Sensitive Band Test Results, AMSU-A1, S/N 108 2

    Science.gov (United States)

    Valdez, A.

    2000-01-01

    This is the Engineering Test Report, Radiated Emissions and SARR, SARP, DCS Receivers, Link Frequencies EMI Sensitive Band Test Results, AMSU-A1 SIN 108, for the Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A).

  1. Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A). Engineering Test Report: Radiated Emissions and SARR, SARP, DCS Receivers, Link Frequencies EMI Sensitive Band Test Results, AMSU-A1, S/N 109

    Science.gov (United States)

    Valdez, A.

    2000-01-01

    This is the Engineering Test Report, Radiated Emissions and SARR, SARP, DCS Receivers, Link Frequencies EMI Sensitive Band Test Results, AMSU-A1, S/N 109, for the Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A).

  2. Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A). Engineering Test Report: Radiated Emissions and SARR, SARP, DCS Receivers, Link Frequencies EMI Sensitive Band Test Results, AMSU-A2, S/N 108, 08

    Science.gov (United States)

    Valdez, A.

    2000-01-01

    This is the Engineering Test Report, Radiated Emissions and SARR, SARP, DCS Receivers, Link Frequencies EMI Sensitive Band Test Results, AMSU-A2, S/N 108, for the Integrated Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A).

  3. Technical Review Report for the Model 9975-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00003, Revision 0, January 2008)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    West, M.

    2009-01-01

    This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), on the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Model 9975, Revision 0, dated January 2008 (S-SARP-G-00003, the SARP). The review includes an evaluation of the SARP, with respect to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 71, and in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9975-96 Package is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. Earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, the Model 9966, the Model 9967, and the Model 9968 Packagings, were originally designed and certified in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with the then newer safety requirements were proposed. The updated package designs at the time were the Model 9972, the Model 9973, the Model 9974, and the Model 9975 Packagings, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under the Office of Safety Management and Operations. The safety analysis of the Model 9975-85 Packaging is documented in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Model 9975, B(M)F-85, Revision 0, dated December 2003. The Model 9975-85 Package is certified by DOE Certificate of Compliance (CoC) package identification number, USA/9975/B(M)F-85, for the transportation of Type B quantities of uranium metal/oxide, 238 Pu heat sources, plutonium/uranium metals, plutonium/uranium oxides, plutonium composites, plutonium/tantalum composites, 238 Pu oxide/beryllium metal.

  4. Promoter Engineering Reveals the Importance of Heptameric Direct Repeats for DNA Binding by Streptomyces Antibiotic Regulatory Protein-Large ATP-Binding Regulator of the LuxR Family (SARP-LAL) Regulators in Streptomyces natalensis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barreales, Eva G; Vicente, Cláudia M; de Pedro, Antonio; Santos-Aberturas, Javier; Aparicio, Jesús F

    2018-05-15

    The biosynthesis of small-size polyene macrolides is ultimately controlled by a couple of transcriptional regulators that act in a hierarchical way. A Streptomyces antibiotic regulatory protein-large ATP-binding regulator of the LuxR family (SARP-LAL) regulator binds the promoter of a PAS-LuxR regulator-encoding gene and activates its transcription, and in turn, the gene product of the latter activates transcription from various promoters of the polyene gene cluster directly. The primary operator of PimR, the archetype of SARP-LAL regulators, contains three heptameric direct repeats separated by four-nucleotide spacers, but the regulator can also bind a secondary operator with only two direct repeats separated by a 3-nucleotide spacer, both located in the promoter region of its unique target gene, pimM A similar arrangement of operators has been identified for PimR counterparts encoded by gene clusters for different antifungal secondary metabolites, including not only polyene macrolides but peptidyl nucleosides, phoslactomycins, or cycloheximide. Here, we used promoter engineering and quantitative transcriptional analyses to determine the contributions of the different heptameric repeats to transcriptional activation and final polyene production. Optimized promoters have thus been developed. Deletion studies and electrophoretic mobility assays were used for the definition of DNA-binding boxes formed by 22-nucleotide sequences comprising two conserved heptameric direct repeats separated by four-nucleotide less conserved spacers. The cooperative binding of PimR SARP appears to be the mechanism involved in the binding of regulator monomers to operators, and at least two protein monomers are required for efficient binding. IMPORTANCE Here, we have shown that a modulation of the production of the antifungal pimaricin in Streptomyces natalensis can be accomplished via promoter engineering of the PAS-LuxR transcriptional activator pimM The expression of this gene is

  5. ATMX-600 rail car safety analysis report for packaging (SARP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adcock, F.E.; McCarthy, J.D.

    1977-01-01

    The ATMX-600 series rail car is used by Rockwell International, Rocky Flats Plant, for shipping low-level radioactive waste under the provisions of DOT Special Permit 5948. Fissile Class I shipments are authorized with the car loaded to capacity with drums containing up to 200 grams of plutonium-239. Inner packaging may be polyethylene-lined steel drums or fiberglass-coated plywood crates. These massive double-walled steel cars provide the equivalent protection of a Type B package. Rapid loading and unloading of the 9- by 9- by 50-foot cargo space are accomplished by prepackaging the waste in standard 20-foot steel cargo containers. The ATMX-600 rail car will hold two cargo containers, each carrying seventy 55-gallon drums and up to 44,800 pounds gross weight. This report is a revision of an earlier document and describes improvements to inner packaging. It also reflects current shipping practices

  6. ATMX-600 rail car safety analysis report for packaging (SARP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adcock, F.E.; McCarthy, J.D.

    1977-01-01

    The ATMX-600 series rail car is used by Rockwell International, Rocky Flats Plant, for shipping low-level radioactive waste under the provisions of DOT Special Permit 5948. Fissile Class I shipments are authorized with the car loaded to capacity with drums containing up to 200 g of 239 Pu. Inner packaging may be polyethylene-lined steel drums or fiberglass-coated plywood crates. These massive double-walled steel cars provide the equivalent protection of a Type B package. Rapid loading and unloading of the 9- by 9- by 50-ft cargo space is accomplished by prepackaging the waste in standard 20-ft steel cargo containers. The ATMX-600 rail car will hold two cargo containers, each carrying seventy 55-gal drums and up to 44,800 lb gross weight. Improvements to inner packaging and current shipping practices are discussed

  7. K Basin sludge packaging design criteria (PDC) and safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) approval plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brisbin, S.A.

    1996-01-01

    This document delineates the plan for preparation, review, and approval of the Packaging Design Crieteria for the K Basin Sludge Transportation System and the Associated on-site Safety Analysis Report for Packaging. The transportation system addressed in the subject documents will be used to transport sludge from the K Basins using bulk packaging

  8. Safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Garden Carrier No. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klima, B.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Box, W.D.

    1978-04-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Garden Carrier No. 2 was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing off-site radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the cask complies with the applicable regulations. The package is designed to ship large quantities of fissile and radioactive materials as solids

  9. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Foamglas Shipping Container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klima, B.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Box, W.D.

    1978-05-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Foamglas Shipping Container was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing offsite radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the container complies with the applicable regulations

  10. Methodology for a radiological analysis for inclusion in an SARP packaging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldberg, H.J.

    1996-01-01

    Almost anything done in this industry entails the necessity of transporting waste or items contaminated by waste. These operations must be carried out in a manner that risks no detriment either to the workers involved in the transport operation or members of the general public

  11. Safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Foamglas Shipping Container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klima, B.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Box, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    An analytical evaluation of the ORNL Foamglas Shipping Container was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing offsite radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the container complies with the applicable regulations

  12. Safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. TRU curium shipping container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Klima, B.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Shappert, L.B.; Aramayo, G.A.

    1980-06-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Transuranium (TRU) Curium Shipping Container was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing offsite shipment of packages containing radioactive material. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the container complies with the applicable regulations

  13. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory TRU Californium Shipping Container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Shappert, L.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Klima, B.B.; Jurgensen, M.C.; Hammond, C.R.; Watson, C.D.

    1980-01-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory TRU Californium Shipping Container was made in order to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing off-site shipment of packages that contain radioactive material. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the container complies with the applicable regulations

  14. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Garden Carrier No. 2. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Klima, B.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Shappert, L.B.; Watson, C.D.; Aramayo, G.A.

    1979-08-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Garden Carrier No. 2 was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing off-site radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the cask complies with the applicable regulations

  15. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Shipping Cask D-38. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Shappert, L.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Watson, C.D.; Hammond, C.R.; Klima, B.B.

    1979-09-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Shipping Cask D-38 (solids shipments) was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing off-site radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the cask complies with the applicable regulations

  16. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Garden Carrier No. 2. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Box, W.D.; Klima, B.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Shappert, L.B.; Watson, C.D.; Aramayo, G.A.

    1979-08-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Garden Carrier No. 2 was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing off-site radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the cask complies with the applicable regulations.

  17. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Shipping Cask D-38. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Box, W.D.; Shappert, L.B.; Seagren, R.D.; Watson, C.D.; Hammond, C.R.; Klima, B.B.

    1979-09-01

    An analytical evaluation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Shipping Cask D-38 (solids shipments) was made to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations governing off-site radioactive material shipping packages. The evaluation encompassed five primary categories: structural integrity, thermal resistance, radiation shielding, nuclear criticality safety, and quality assurance. The results of the evaluation show that the cask complies with the applicable regulations.

  18. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: ''each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.'' They further state: ''each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.'' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the WIPP management and operating (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with 10 CFR 71.11. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. This document provides the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT packaging. The intent of these instructions is to standardize operations. All users will follow these instructions or equivalent instructions that assure operations are safe and meet the requirements of the SARPs

  19. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2002-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT Shipping Package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event there is a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the SARP and/or C of C shall govern. C of Cs state: ''each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.'' They further state: ''each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.'' Chapter 9.0 of the SAR P charges the WIPP Management and Operation (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with 10 CFR 71.11. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT packaging. The intent of these instructions is to standardize these operations. All users will follow these instructions or equivalent instructions that assure operations are safe and meet the requirements of the SARPs

  20. Summary of the technical review of the safety analysis reports for packaging (SARP) for the transnuclear transport/storage casks: TN-BRP and TN-REG

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-07-01

    The Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging for two spent fuel shipping casks were technically reviewed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The casks were designed by Transnuclear, Inc., for shipment of 85 Big Rock Point boiling water reactor fuel elements and 40 R.E. Ginna pressurized water reactor fuel elements from West Valley, New York, to Idaho Falls, Idaho. The intent of the review was to ensure compliance of the casks with the requirements the applicable Federal Regulations contained in 10 CFR Pt. 71 and allow issuance of Department of Energy Certificates of Compliance for transport by the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office. The review was performed by a team of Oak Ridge National Laboratory staff assembled for their expertise in criticality analysis, shielding, metallurgy, nondestructive testing, thermal analysis, structural analysis, and containment. This report describes the review processes, the findings in each technical area, and the overall conclusion that a Certificate of Compliance could be issued for the proposed single shipment under the specified conditions and constraints

  1. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: ''each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.'' They further state: ''each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.'' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) management and operating (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 71.8. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required.

  2. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: 'each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the pplication.' They further state: 'each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) management and operating (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 71.8. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21 regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations

  3. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: 'each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.' They further state: 'each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) management and operating (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 71.8. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21 regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations

  4. Beneficial uses shipping system (BUSS) cask, safety analysis report for packaging: Volumes 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrell, P.C.

    1997-01-01

    The Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was originally prepared by Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). After the certification process was completed, the ownership of the BUSS cask and associated SARP was transferred from SNL to the DOE Hanford site in Richland, Washington. During timely renewal of the BUSS cask certificate of compliance, the SARP was revised to (1) respond to the timely renewal questions, (2) consolidate the previous revision made by SNL, and (3) bring the SARP into compliance with the 1996 version of 10 CFR 71. Since the BUSS cask is now the responsibility of RL, the SARP was reissued as a Hanford document

  5. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: 'each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.' They further state: 'each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant| (WIPP) management and operating (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations(CFR) 71.8. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required.In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21 regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations

  6. CH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II), a HalfPACT shipping package, and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), HalfPACT SARP, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificates of Compliance (C of C) 9218 and 9279, respectively. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SARP or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of Cs state: 'each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.' They further state: 'each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP charges the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) management and operating (M and O) contractor with assuring packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 71.8. Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required.In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21 regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations

  7. Veolia Environment - ohtlike jäätmete käitlemise pioneer Prantsusmaal / Lauri Aasalo

    Index Scriptorium Estoniae

    Aasalo, Lauri

    2007-01-01

    Euroopa suurima ohtlike jäätmete käitlemise ettevõtte SARP Industries käitlustehasest Prantsusmaal Limays. Sarp Industries kuulub kontserni Veolia Environment, millel on kaks energeetikafirmat ka Eestis- Eraküte ja Tallinna Küte

  8. Recent trends in spin-resolved photoelectron spectroscopy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Okuda, Taichi

    2017-12-01

    Since the discovery of the Rashba effect on crystal surfaces and also the discovery of topological insulators, spin- and angle-resolved photoelectron spectroscopy (SARPES) has become more and more important, as the technique can measure directly the electronic band structure of materials with spin resolution. In the same way that the discovery of high-Tc superconductors promoted the development of high-resolution angle-resolved photoelectron spectroscopy, the discovery of this new class of materials has stimulated the development of new SARPES apparatus with new functions and higher resolution, such as spin vector analysis, ten times higher energy and angular resolution than conventional SARPES, multichannel spin detection, and so on. In addition, the utilization of vacuum ultra violet lasers also opens a pathway to the realization of novel SARPES measurements. In this review, such recent trends in SARPES techniques and measurements will be overviewed.

  9. Hanford Site Transuranic (TRU) Waste Certification Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GREAGER, T.M.

    1999-01-01

    The Hanford Site Transuranic Waste Certification Plan establishes the programmatic framework and criteria with in which the Hanford Site ensures that contract-handled TRU wastes can be certified as compliant with the WIPP WAC and TRUPACT-II SARP

  10. Hanford Site Transuranic (TRU) Waste Certification Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    GREAGER, T.M.

    1999-09-09

    The Hanford Site Transuranic Waste Certification Plan establishes the programmatic framework and criteria within which the Hanford Site ensures that contract-handled TRU wastes can be certified as compliant with the WIPP WAC and TRUPACT-II SARP.

  11. DOES INTRAVENOUS TRANEXAMIC ACID REDUCE BLOOD LOSS DURING SURGICALLY ASSISTED RAPID PALATAL EXPANSION?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Emine AKBAŞ

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available Purpose: The purpose of this study was to evaluate the efficacy of tranexamic acid (TXA in reducing blood loss during surgically assisted rapid palatal expansion (SARPE procedure. Subjects and Methods: A total of 34 patients (12 male, 22 female who had been treated surgically under general anesthesia with SARPE including pterygoid disjunction for transverse maxillary deficiency (TMD were included in this study. The study group (n=17 received intravenous (IV TXA 10 mg/kg as a preoperative bolus; the control group (n=17 received normal saline solution. Preoperative and postoperative haemoglobin and haematocrit values, intraoperative blood loss, and any blood product transfusion were recorded. Results: Blood loss during SARPE was statistically significantly less in the study group than the control group (p=0.0001. Conclusion: Preoperative IV administration of TXA can effectively control blood loss during when SARPE with pterygoid disjunction is performed.

  12. The procedures used to review safety analysis reports for packagings submitted to the US Department of Energy for certification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popper, G.F.; Raske, D.T.; Turula, P.

    1988-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the procedures used at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) to review Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs) submitted to the US Department of Energy (DOE) for issuance of a Certificate of Compliance. Prior to certification and shipment of a packaging for the transport of radioactive materials, a SARP must be prepared describing the design, contents, analyses, testing, and safety features of the packaging. The SARP must be reviewed to ensure that the specific packaging meets all DOE orders and federal regulations for safe transport. The ANL SARP review group provides an independent review and evaluation function for the DOE to ensure that the packaging meets all the prescribed requirements. This review involves many disciplines and includes evaluating the general information, drawings, construction details, operating procedures, maintenance and test programs, and the quality assurance plan for compliance with requirements. 14 refs., 6 figs

  13. Radioisotope thermoelectric generator transportation system safety analysis report for packaging. Volumes 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferrell, P.C.

    1996-04-18

    This SARP describes the RTG Transportation System Package, a Type B(U) packaging system that is used to transport an RTG or similar payload. The payload, which is included in this SARP, is a generic, enveloping payload that specifically encompasses the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) RTG payload. The package consists of two independent containment systems mounted on a shock isolation transport skid and transported within an exclusive-use trailer.

  14. Radioisotope thermoelectric generator transportation system safety analysis report for packaging. Volumes 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrell, P.C.

    1996-01-01

    This SARP describes the RTG Transportation System Package, a Type B(U) packaging system that is used to transport an RTG or similar payload. The payload, which is included in this SARP, is a generic, enveloping payload that specifically encompasses the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) RTG payload. The package consists of two independent containment systems mounted on a shock isolation transport skid and transported within an exclusive-use trailer

  15. Translations on Eastern Europe, Scientific Affairs, Number 592.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1978-07-13

    Personnel (NAUKA POLSKA, Mar-Apr 78) 6 ROMANIA New Herbicide To Protect Trifolium Crops (N. Sarpe; AGRICULTURA SOCIALISTA, 13 May 78) 17...Developments in Chemical Fertilizer Production (Oliviu Popa Interview; AGRICULTURA . SOCIALISTA, 13 May 78) 19 -a - [III - EE - 65] HUNGARY...2602 16 ROMANIA NEW HERBICIDE TO PROTECT TRIPOLIUM CROPS Bucharest AGRICULTURA SOCIALISTA in Romanian 13 May ?8 p k /Article by Dr Engr N. Sarpe

  16. Application of the asthma phenotype algorithm from the Severe Asthma Research Program to an urban population.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Paru Patrawalla

    Full Text Available Identification and characterization of asthma phenotypes are challenging due to disease complexity and heterogeneity. The Severe Asthma Research Program (SARP used unsupervised cluster analysis to define 5 phenotypically distinct asthma clusters that they replicated using 3 variables in a simplified algorithm. We evaluated whether this simplified SARP algorithm could be used in a separate and diverse urban asthma population to recreate these 5 phenotypic clusters.The SARP simplified algorithm was applied to adults with asthma recruited to the New York University/Bellevue Asthma Registry (NYUBAR to classify patients into five groups. The clinical phenotypes were summarized and compared.Asthma subjects in NYUBAR (n = 471 were predominantly women (70% and Hispanic (57%, which were demographically different from the SARP population. The clinical phenotypes of the five groups generated by the simplified SARP algorithm were distinct across groups and distributed similarly to those described for the SARP population. Groups 1 and 2 (6 and 63%, respectively had predominantly childhood onset atopic asthma. Groups 4 and 5 (20% were older, with the longest duration of asthma, increased symptoms and exacerbations. Group 4 subjects were the most atopic and had the highest peripheral eosinophils. Group 3 (10% had the least atopy, but included older obese women with adult-onset asthma, and increased exacerbations.Application of the simplified SARP algorithm to the NYUBAR yielded groups that were phenotypically distinct and useful to characterize disease heterogeneity. Differences across NYUBAR groups support phenotypic variation and support the use of the simplified SARP algorithm for classification of asthma phenotypes in future prospective studies to investigate treatment and outcome differences between these distinct groups.Clinicaltrials.gov NCT00212537.

  17. "Without this program, women can lose their lives": migrant women's experiences with the Safe Abortion Referral Programme in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tousaw, Ellen; La, Ra Khin; Arnott, Grady; Chinthakanan, Orawee; Foster, Angel M

    2017-11-01

    For displaced and migrant women in northern Thailand, access to health care is often limited, unwanted pregnancy is common, and unsafe abortion is a major contributor to maternal death and disability. Based on a pilot project and situational analysis research, in 2015 a multinational team introduced the Safe Abortion Referral Programme (SARP) in Chiang Mai, Thailand, to reduce the socio-linguistic, economic, documentation, and transportation barriers women from Burma face in accessing safe and legal abortion care in Thailand. Our qualitative study documented the experiences of women with unwanted pregnancies who accessed the SARP in order to inform programme improvement and expansion. We conducted 22 in-depth, in-person interviews and analysed them for content and themes using deductive and inductive techniques. Women were overwhelmingly positive about their experiences using the SARP. They reported lack of costs, friendly programme staff, accompaniment to and interpretation at the providing facility, and safety of services as key features. Financial and legal circumstances shaped access to the programme and women learned about the SARP through word-of-mouth and community workshops. After accessing the SARP and receiving support, women became community advocates for reproductive health. Efforts to expand the programme and raise awareness in migrant communities appear warranted. Our findings suggest that referral programmes for safe and legal abortion can be successful in settings with large displaced and migrant populations. Identifying ways to work within legal constraints to expand access to safe services has the potential to reduce harm from unsafe abortion even in humanitarian settings.

  18. Documentation for first annual testing and inspections of Benificial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) Cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lundeen, J.E.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to compile date generated during the first annual tests and inspections of the Benificiai Uses Shipping System (BUSS) Cask. In addition, this report will verify that the testing criteria identified in chapter 8 of the BUSS Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was met. Section 8.2 ''Maintenance and Periodic Inspection Program'' of the BUSS Cask SARP requires that the following tests and inspections be performed on an annual basis: Hydrostatic pressure test; helium leak test; dye penetrant test on the trunnions and lifting lugs; and torque test on all bolts; impact limiter inspection and weight test. The first annual inspections and testing of the BUSS Cask were completed on May 5, 1994, and met the SARP criteria

  19. Safety Analysis Report - Packages, 9965, 9968, 9972-9975 Packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanton, P.

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the analysis and testing performed on four type B Packages: the 9972, 9973, 9974, and 9975 packages. Because all four packages have similar designs with very similar performance characteristics, all of them are presented in a single SARP. The performance evaluation presented in this SARP documents the compliance of the 9975 package with the regulatory safety requirements. Evaluations of the 9972, 9973, and 9974 packages support that of the 9975. To avoid confusion arising from the inclusion of four packages in a single document, the text segregates the data for each package in such a way that the reader interested in only one package can progress from Chapter 1 through Chapter 9. The directory at the beginning of each chapter identifies each section that should be read for a given package. Sections marked ''all'' are generic to all packages

  20. Childhood asthma clusters and response to therapy in clinical trials.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chang, Timothy S; Lemanske, Robert F; Mauger, David T; Fitzpatrick, Anne M; Sorkness, Christine A; Szefler, Stanley J; Gangnon, Ronald E; Page, C David; Jackson, Daniel J

    2014-02-01

    Childhood asthma clusters, or subclasses, have been developed by computational methods without evaluation of clinical utility. To replicate and determine whether childhood asthma clusters previously identified computationally in the Severe Asthma Research Program (SARP) are associated with treatment responses in Childhood Asthma Research and Education (CARE) Network clinical trials. A cluster assignment model was determined by using SARP participant data. A total of 611 participants 6 to 18 years old from 3 CARE trials were assigned to SARP pediatric clusters. Primary and secondary outcomes were analyzed by cluster in each trial. CARE participants were assigned to SARP clusters with high accuracy. Baseline characteristics were similar between SARP and CARE children of the same cluster. Treatment response in CARE trials was generally similar across clusters. However, with the caveat of a smaller sample size, children in the early-onset/severe-lung function cluster had best response with fluticasone/salmeterol (64% vs 23% 2.5× fluticasone and 13% fluticasone/montelukast in the Best ADd-on Therapy Giving Effective Responses trial; P = .011) and children in the early-onset/comorbidity cluster had the least clinical efficacy to treatments (eg, -0.076% change in FEV1 in the Characterizing Response to Leukotriene Receptor Antagonist and Inhaled Corticosteroid trial). In this study, we replicated SARP pediatric asthma clusters by using a separate, large clinical trials network. Early-onset/severe-lung function and early-onset/comorbidity clusters were associated with differential and limited response to therapy, respectively. Further prospective study of therapeutic response by cluster could provide new insights into childhood asthma treatment. Copyright © 2013 American Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology. Published by Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

  1. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) multicanister overpack cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edwards, W.S.

    1997-01-01

    This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) documents the safety of shipments of irradiated fuel elements in the MUlticanister Overpack (MCO) and MCO Cask for a highway route controlled quantity, Type B fissile package. This SARP evaluates the package during transfers of (1) water-filled MCOs from the K Basins to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and (2) sealed and cold vacuum dried MCOs from the CVDF in the 100 K Area to the Canister Storage Building in the 200 East Area

  2. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) L3-181 N basin cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adkins, H.E. Jr.

    1996-01-01

    Purpose of this Safety Analysis Report (SARP) is to authorize the onsite transfer of a Type B, Fissile Excepted, non-highway route controlled quantity in the L3-181 packaging from the N Basin to a storage/disposal facility within 200 West Area. This SARP provides the evaluation necessary to demonstrate that the L3-181 meets the requirements of the 'Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping', WHC- CM-2-14, by meeting the applicable performance requirements for normal conditions of transport

  3. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) multicanister overpack cask

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Edwards, W.S.

    1997-07-14

    This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) documents the safety of shipments of irradiated fuel elements in the MUlticanister Overpack (MCO) and MCO Cask for a highway route controlled quantity, Type B fissile package. This SARP evaluates the package during transfers of (1) water-filled MCOs from the K Basins to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and (2) sealed and cold vacuum dried MCOs from the CVDF in the 100 K Area to the Canister Storage Building in the 200 East Area.

  4. Approaches to construction of systems of safety management in airlines

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available The article presents three approaches of building a safety management system (SMS in airlines in the framework of implementation of ICAO SARPs that apply methods of risk assessment based on use of operational activity of airline taking into account existing and implementing "protections" or "safety barriers".

  5. A review of the safety features of 6M packagings for DOE programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-12-01

    This report, prepared by a US Department of Energy (DOE) Task Force and organized for clarity into two-page modules, argues that the US Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification-6M packagings (hereafter referred to as 6M packaging, or simply 6M) merit continued DOE use and, if necessary, DOE certification. This report is designed to address the specific requirements of a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). While not a SARP, this report constitutes a compilation of all available documentation on 6M packagings. The authors individually, and the Task Force collectively, believe their investigation provides justification for the continued use of 6M packagings because they meet criteria for quality assurance and for safety under normal and accident conditions as defined by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. This report may be used by DOE managers to assist in deliberations on future requirements for 6M packagings as they are required to support DOE programs. For the purpose of ready evaluation, this report includes categorical topics found in Nuclear Regulatory Guide 7.9, the topical guideline for SARPs. The format, however, will (it is hoped) pleasantly surprise customary reader expectations. For, while maintaining categorical headings and subheadings found in SARPs as a skeleton, the Task Force chose to adopt the document design principles developed by Hughes Aircraft in the 1960s, ''Sequential Thematic Organization of Publications'' (STOP). 37 figs

  6. Functional characterization of tobacco transcription factor TGA2.1

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kegler, C.; Lenk, I.; Krawczyk, S.

    2004-01-01

    Activation sequence-1 (as-1)-like regulatory cis elements mediate transcriptional activation in response to increased levels of plant signalling molecules auxin and salicylic acid (SA). Our earlier work has shown that tobacco cellular as-1-binding complex SARP (salicylic acid responsive protein...

  7. LLNL Compliance Plan for TRUPACT-2 Authorized Methods for Payload Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This document describes payload control at LLNL to ensure that all shipments of CH-TRU waste in the TRUPACT-II (Transuranic Package Transporter-II) meet the requirements of the TRUPACT-II SARP (safety report for packaging). This document also provides specific instructions for the selection of authorized payloads once individual payload containers are qualified for transport. The physical assembly of the qualified payload and operating procedures for the use of the TRUPACT-II, including loading and unloading operations, are described in HWM Procedure No. 204, based on the information in the TRUPACT-II SARP. The LLNL TRAMPAC, along with the TRUPACT-II operating procedures contained in HWM Procedure No. 204, meet the documentation needs for the use of the TRUPACT-II at LLNL. Table 14-1 provides a summary of the LLNL waste generation and certification procedures as they relate to TRUPACT-II payload compliance

  8. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) doorstop samplecarrier system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Obrien, J.H.

    1997-02-24

    The Doorstop Sample Carrier System consists of a Type B certified N-55 overpack, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification or performance-oriented 208-L (55-gal) drum (DOT 208-L drum), and Doorstop containers. The purpose of the Doorstop Sample Carrier System is to transport samples onsite for characterization. This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluation necessary to demonstrate that the Doorstop Sample Carrier System meets the requirements and acceptance criteria for both Hanford Site normal transport conditions and accident condition events for a Type B package. This SARP also establishes operational, acceptance, maintenance, and quality assurance (QA) guidelines to ensure that the method of transport for the Doorstop Sample Carrier System is performed safely in accordance with WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping.

  9. Safety Analysis Report - Packages, 9965, 9968, 9972-9975 Packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Alstine, M.N.

    1999-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the performance of the 9965 B, 9968 B, 9972 B(U), 9973 B(U), 9974 B(U), and 9975 B(U) packages in satisfying the regulatory safety requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 711 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Series No. 6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1985 edition2. Results of the analysis and testing performed on the 9965 B, 9968 B, 9972 B(U), 9973 B(U), 9974 B(U), and 9975 B(U) packages are presented in this SARP, which was prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of energy (DOE) Order 5480.33 and in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guides 7.94 and 7.10.5

  10. Safety analysis report - packages 9965, 9968, 9972-9975 packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Alstine, M.N.

    1997-10-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the performance of the 9965 B( ), 9968 B( ), 9972 B(U), 9973 B(U), 9974 B(U), and 9975 B(U) packages in satisfying the regulatory safety requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR 71 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Series No. 6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 1985 edition. Results of the analysis and testing performed on the 9965 B(), 9968 B(), 9972 B(U), 9973 B(U), and 9975 B(U) packages are presented in this SARP, which was prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.3 and in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guides 7.9 and 7.10

  11. Optical preparation of H2 rovibrational levels with almost complete population transfer

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dong, Wenrui; Mukherjee, Nandini; Zare, Richard N.

    2013-08-01

    Using stimulated Raman adiabatic passage (SARP), it is possible, in principle, to transfer all the population in a rovibrational level of an isolated diatomic molecule to an excited rovibrational level. We use an overlapping sequence of pump (532 nm) and dump (683 nm) single-mode laser pulses of unequal fluence to prepare isolated H2 molecules in a molecular beam. In a first series of experiments we were able to transfer more than half the population to an excited rovibrational level [N. Mukherjee, W. R. Dong, J. A. Harrison, and R. N. Zare, J. Chem. Phys. 138(5), 051101-1051101-4 (2013)], 10.1063/1.4790402. Since then, we have achieved almost complete transfer (97% ± 7%) of population from the H2 (v = 0, J = 0) ground rovibrational level to the H2 (v = 1, J = 0) excited rovibrational level. An explanation is presented of the SARP process and how these results are obtained.

  12. A revision of the cask designers guide for the '90s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shappert, L.B.; Green, V.M.

    1993-01-01

    DOE has requested that ORNL initiate a revision to NSIC-68, A Guide for the Design, Fabrication, and Operation of Shipping Casks for Nuclear Applications, commonly called the Cask Designers Guide. This revision, called the Cask Handbook, has two goals: (1) to improve the quality of SARPs that are submitted to DOE, and (2) to provide up-to-date information on the design of spent fuel shipping casks, including information on fabrication, quality assurance, SARP preparation, certification, use, maintenance, and other general topics. The revision provides guidance that will help engineers through the cask licensing process, in part, by providing as much regulator-approved data and 'lessons-learned' information as possible. The effort is sponsored by DOE-Environmental, Safety and Health (EH), guided by Transportation Technology staff members at ORNL, and the information is being generated by experts in the various technical fields. (J.P.N.)

  13. The development of a packaging handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shappert, L.B.

    1994-01-01

    The Packaging Handbook, dealing with the development of packagings designed to carry radioactive material, is being written for DOE's Transportation and Packaging Safety Division. The primary goal of the Handbook is to provide sufficient technical information and guidance to improve the quality of Safety Analysis Reports on Type B Packagings (SARPs) that are submitted to DOE for certification. This paper provides an update on the status of the Handbook

  14. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) steel drum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCormick, W.A.

    1998-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the steel drum packaging system meets the transportation safety requirements of HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments, for an onsite packaging containing Type B quantities of solid and liquid radioactive materials. The basic component of the steel drum packaging system is the 208 L (55-gal) steel drum

  15. Documentation associated with the shipping of Hot-Cell Waste from WESF 225-B to the 200W (218-W-3AE) burial grounds under shipment number RSR-37338

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PAWLAK, M.W.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to compile the records generated during the Packaging and Shipping of WESF Hot-Cell Waste from the 225-B Facility to 200W (218-W-3AE) burial grounds. A total of six 55-gallon drums were packaged and shipped using the Chem-Nuc Cask in accordance with WHC-SD-TP-SARP-025, Rev.0 ''Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (Onsite) for Type B Material in the CNS-14-215H Cask''

  16. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) sample pig transport system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MCCOY, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides a technical evaluation of the Sample Pig Transport System as compared to the requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Order 5480.1, Change 1, Chapter III. The evaluation concludes that the package is acceptable for the onsite transport of Type B, fissile excepted radioactive materials when used in accordance with this document

  17. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) sample pig transport system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MCCOY, J.C.

    1999-03-16

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides a technical evaluation of the Sample Pig Transport System as compared to the requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Order 5480.1, Change 1, Chapter III. The evaluation concludes that the package is acceptable for the onsite transport of Type B, fissile excepted radioactive materials when used in accordance with this document.

  18. A New Spin on Photoemission Spectroscopy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jozwiak, Chris [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2008-12-01

    The electronic spin degree of freedom is of general fundamental importance to all matter. Understanding its complex roles and behavior in the solid state, particularly in highly correlated and magnetic materials, has grown increasingly desirable as technology demands advanced devices and materials based on ever stricter comprehension and control of the electron spin. However, direct and efficient spin dependent probes of electronic structure are currently lacking. Angle Resolved Photoemission Spectroscopy (ARPES) has become one of the most successful experimental tools for elucidating solid state electronic structures, bolstered by-continual breakthroughs in efficient instrumentation. In contrast, spin-resolved photoemission spectroscopy has lagged behind due to a lack of similar instrumental advances. The power of photoemission spectroscopy and the pertinence of electronic spin in the current research climate combine to make breakthroughs in Spin and Angle Resolved Photoemission Spectroscopy (SARPES) a high priority . This thesis details the development of a unique instrument for efficient SARPES and represents a radical departure from conventional methods. A custom designed spin polarimeter based on low energy exchange scattering is developed, with projected efficiency gains of two orders of magnitude over current state-of-the-art polarimeters. For energy analysis, the popular hemispherical analyzer is eschewed for a custom Time-of-Flight (TOF) analyzer offering an additional order of magnitude gain in efficiency. The combined instrument signifies the breakthrough needed to perform the high resolution SARPES experiments necessary for untangling the complex spin-dependent electronic structures central to today's condensed matter physics.

  19. TRUPACT-II procedures and maintenance instructions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for operation, inspection and maintenance of a TRUPACT-II Shipping Package and directly related components. This document shall supply the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9218. In the event there is a conflict between this document and the TRUPACT-II SARP (NRC Certificate of Compliance No. 9218), the TRUPACT-II SARP shall govern. This document details the operations, maintenance, repair, replacement of components, as well as the documentation required and the procedures to be followed to maintain the integrity of the TRUPACT-II container. These procedures may be modified for site use, but as a minimum all parameters and format listed herein must be included in any site modified version. For convenience and where applicable steps may be performed out of sequence. Packaging and payload handling equipment and transport trailers have been specifically designed for use with the TRUPACT-II Packaging. This document discusses the minimum required procedures for use of the adjustable center of gravity lift fixture and the TRUPACT-II transport trailer in conjunction with the TRUPACT-II Packaging

  20. MODEL 9977 B(M)F-96 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Abramczyk, G; Paul Blanton, P; Kurt Eberl, K

    2006-05-18

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the analysis and testing performed on and for the 9977 Shipping Package, referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Package (GPFP). The performance evaluation presented in this SARP documents the compliance of the 9977 package with the regulatory safety requirements for Type B packages. Per 10 CFR 71.59, for the 9977 packages evaluated in this SARP, the value of ''N'' is 50, and the Transport Index based on nuclear criticality control is 1.0. The 9977 package is designed with a high degree of single containment. The 9977 complies with 10 CFR 71 (2002), Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1B, DOE Order 460.2, and 10 CFR 20 (2003) for As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principles. The 9977 also satisfies the requirements of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material--1996 Edition (Revised)--Requirements. IAEA Safety Standards, Safety Series No. TS-R-1 (ST-1, Rev.), International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria (2000). The 9977 package is designed, analyzed and fabricated in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, 1992 edition.

  1. Comparison of the effects of sedation and general anesthesia in surgically assisted rapid palatal expansion.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Satilmis, Tulin; Ugurlu, Faysal; Garip, Hasan; Sener, Bedrettin C; Goker, Kamil

    2011-06-01

    To compare the effects of sedation and general anesthesia for surgically assisted rapid palatal expansion (SARPE). This randomized prospective study included 30 patients who were scheduled for SARPE, and was performed between January 2008 to February 2010 in the Department of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, Faculty of Dentistry, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey. Patients were allocated into Group S - midazolam + fentanyl sedation (n=15), and Group G - general anesthesia (n=15). Hemodynamic parameters, duration of anesthesia, surgery, recovery time, time to discharge, visual analogue scale (VAS) pain scores at 30 minutes (min), one hour (hr), 4 hours, 12 hours, and 24 hours, first consumption of analgesic time, total amount of consumption of analgesics, patient and surgeon satisfaction, nausea, and vomiting were recorded. Analgesic time was significantly longer in Group S (p=0.008), and total analgesic consumption was significantly lower in Group S than in Group G (p=0.031). Patient satisfaction was statistically higher in Group S (p=0.035). At 30 min, one hr, and 12 hrs, VAS satisfaction scores in Group S were statistically lower than those in Group G, and at 4 hrs and 24 hrs there was no statistical difference in VAS scores for both groups. The use of sedation for outpatient SARPE resulted in lower pain scores at discharge, lower analgesic consumption, and greater patient satisfaction.

  2. Adapted recreational and sports programs for children with disabilities: A decade of experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Moberg-Wolff, Elizabeth; Kiesling, Sarah

    2008-01-01

    To identify and describe community based adapted sports and recreational programs (SARPs) for children with physically disabilities, documenting program types, benefits, challenges, growth and/or decline, and lessons they have learned over a 10-year period. In 1996, a total of 277 children's hospitals and freestanding rehabilitation hospitals stating that they provided pediatric rehabilitation services were contacted and asked to provide information regarding adapted recreational and sports programs in their region. Seventy-nine SARPs were identified, contacted, and survyed about programming, benefits and challenges they faced. They were then re-surveyed in 2006 for comparison data. Ten years ago, the average SARP served 25 or fewer clients and was led by a therapeutic recreation specialist with assistance from volunteers. Most programs had been in place for 5 years or more, met weekly for 2-3 hours, and were recreational in orientation. Activities varied, with basketball, aquatics, horseback riding and snow skiing being most common. Fund-raisers and grants supported most programs, and securing funding was their greatest challenge. Participant benefits noted by programs included improved socialization, enhanced physical fitness, increased self esteem, improved therapeutic skills (ADL's, transfers, etc.), enhanced cognition, expanded client independence, improved community relations, and enhanced leisure skills. Ten years later, the majority of SARPs noted similar benefits, and reported an increase in number of participants despite continued challenges with funding and staffing. Leadership and mentorship by those with disabilities was still very low, but community awareness of the abilities of those with disabilities had increased. Adapted sports and recreation programs surveyed in 1996 and again in 2006, report overall that their health is good, and many have retained the same programming, financial support mechanisms, leadership and participant mix over the years

  3. Severe Accident Research Program plan update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    In August 1989, the staff published NUREG-1365, ''Revised Severe Accident Research Program Plan.'' Since 1989, significant progress has been made in severe accident research to warrant an update to NUREG-1365. The staff has prepared this SARP Plan Update to: (1) Identify those issues that have been closed or are near completion, (2) Describe the progress in our understanding of important severe accident phenomena, (3) Define the long-term research that is directed at improving our understanding of severe accident phenomena and developing improved methods for assessing core melt progression, direct containment heating, and fuel-coolant interactions, and (4) Reflect the growing emphasis in two additional areas--advanced light water reactors, and support for the assessment of criteria for containment performance during severe accidents. The report describes recent major accomplishments in understanding the underlying phenomena that can occur during a severe accident. These include Mark I liner failure, severe accident scaling methodology, source term issues, core-concrete interactions, hydrogen transport and combustion, TMI-2 Vessel Investigation Project, and direct containment heating. The report also describes the major planned activities under the SARP over the next several years. These activities will focus on two phenomenological issues (core melt progression, and fuel-coolant interactions and debris coolability) that have significant uncertainties that impact our understanding and ability to predict severe accident phenomena and their effect on containment performance SARP will also focus on severe accident code development, assessment and validation. As the staff completes the research on severe accident issues that relate to current generation reactors, continued research will focus on efforts to independently evaluate the capability of new advanced light water reactor designs to withstand severe accidents

  4. IL6R Variation Asp358Ala Is a Potential Modifier of Lung Function in Asthma

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hawkins, Gregory A; Robinson, Mac B; Hastie, Annette T; Li, Xingnan; Li, Huashi; Moore, Wendy C; Howard, Timothy D; Busse, William W.; Erzurum, Serpil C.; Wenzel, Sally E.; Peters, Stephen P; Meyers, Deborah A; Bleecker, Eugene R

    2012-01-01

    Background The IL6R SNP rs4129267 has recently been identified as an asthma susceptibility locus in subjects of European ancestry but has not been characterized with respect to asthma severity. The SNP rs4129267 is in linkage disequilibrium (r2=1) with the IL6R coding SNP rs2228145 (Asp358Ala). This IL6R coding change increases IL6 receptor shedding and promotes IL6 transsignaling. Objectives To evaluate the IL6R SNP rs2228145 with respect to asthma severity phenotypes. Methods The IL6R SNP rs2228145 was evaluated in subjects of European ancestry with asthma from the Severe Asthma Research Program (SARP). Lung function associations were replicated in the Collaborative Study on the Genetics of Asthma (CSGA) cohort. Serum soluble IL6 receptor (sIL6R) levels were measured in subjects from SARP. Immunohistochemistry was used to qualitatively evaluate IL6R protein expression in BAL cells and endobronchial biopsies. Results The minor C allele of IL6R SNP rs2228145 was associated with lower ppFEV1 in the SARP cohort (p=0.005), the CSGA cohort (0.008), and in combined cohort analysis (p=0.003). Additional associations with ppFVC, FEV1/FVC, and PC20 were observed. The rs2228145 C allele (Ala358) was more frequent in severe asthma phenotypic clusters. Elevated serum sIL6R was associated with lower ppFEV1 (p=0.02) and lower ppFVC (p=0.008) (N=146). IL6R protein expression was observed in BAL macrophages, airway epithelium, vascular endothelium, and airway smooth muscle. Conclusions The IL6R coding SNP rs2228145 (Asp358Ala) is a potential modifier of lung function in asthma and may identify subjects at risk for more severe asthma. IL6 transsignaling may have a pathogenic role in the lung. PMID:22554704

  5. DOE-EM-45 Packaging Operations And Maintenance Course

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watkins, R.; England, J.

    2010-01-01

    Savannah River National Laboratory - Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRNL-SRPT) delivered the inaugural offering of the Packaging Operations and Maintenance Course for DOE-EM-45's Packaging Certification Program (PCP) at the University of South Carolina Aiken on September 1 and 2, 2009. Twenty-nine students registered, attended, and completed this training. The DOE-EM-45 Packaging Certification Program (PCP) sponsored the presentation of a new training course, Packaging Maintenance and Operations, on September 1-2, 2009 at the University of South Carolina Aiken (USC-Aiken) campus in Aiken, SC. The premier offering of the course was developed and presented by the Savannah River National Laboratory, and attended by twenty-nine students across the DOE, NNSA and private industry. This training informed package users of the requirements associated with handling shipping containers at a facility (user) level and provided a basic overview of the requirements typically outlined in Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Chapters 1, 7, and 8. The course taught packaging personnel about the regulatory nature of SARPs to help reduce associated and often costly packaging errors. Some of the topics covered were package contents, loading, unloading, storage, torque requirements, maintaining records, how to handle abnormal conditions, lessons learned, leakage testing (including demonstration), and replacement parts. The target audience for this course was facility operations personnel, facility maintenance personnel, and field quality assurance personnel who are directly involved in the handling of shipping containers. The training also aimed at writers of SARP Chapters 1, 7, and 8, package designers, and anyone else involved in radioactive material packaging and transportation safety. Student feedback and critiques of the training were very positive. SRNL will offer the course again at USC Aiken in September 2010.

  6. Safety analysis report for the TRUPACT-II shipping package (condensed version). Volume 1, Rev. 14

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-10-01

    The condensed version of the TRUPACT-II Contact Handled Transuranic Waste Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) contains essential material required by TRUPACT-II users, plus additional contents (payload) information previously submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All or part of the following sections, which are not required by users of the TRUPACT-II, are deleted from the condensed version: (i) structural analysis, (ii) thermal analysis, (iii) containment analysis, (iv) criticality analysis, (v) shielding analysis, and (vi) hypothetical accident test results.

  7. Quality assurance guidance for TRUPACT-II [Transuranic Package Transporter-II] payload control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-10-01

    The Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), discusses authorized methods for payload control in Appendix 1.3.7 and the Quality Assurance (QA) requirements in Section 9.3. Subsection 9.3.2.1 covers maintenance and use of the TRUPACT-II and the specific QA requirements are given in DOE/WIPP 89-012. Subsection 9.3.2.2 covers payload compliance, for which this document was written. 6 refs

  8. Guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packaging: Review of quality assurance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, D.W.

    1988-10-01

    This review section describes quality assurance requirements applying to design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of components of packaging which are important to safety. The design effort, operation's plans, and quality assurance requirements should be integrated to achieve a system in which the independent QA program is not overly stringent and the application of QA requirements is commensurate with safety significance. The reviewer must verify that the applicant's QA section in the SARP contains package-specific QA information required by DOE Orders and federal regulations that demonstrate compliance. 8 refs

  9. Safety analysis report for the TRUPACT-II shipping package (condensed version). Volume 1, Rev. 14

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    The condensed version of the TRUPACT-II Contact Handled Transuranic Waste Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) contains essential material required by TRUPACT-II users, plus additional contents (payload) information previously submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All or part of the following sections, which are not required by users of the TRUPACT-II, are deleted from the condensed version: (i) structural analysis, (ii) thermal analysis, (iii) containment analysis, (iv) criticality analysis, (v) shielding analysis, and (vi) hypothetical accident test results

  10. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging: The unirradiated fuel shipping container USA/9853/AF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The HFBR Unirradiated Fuel Shipping Container was designed and fabricated at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1978 for the transport of fuel for the High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR) for Brookhaven National Laboratory. The package has been evaluated analytically, as well as the comparison to tests on similar packages, to demonstrate compliance with the applicable regulations governing packages in which radioactive and fissile materials are transported. The contents of this Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) are based on Regulatory Guide 7.9 (proposed Revision 2 - May 1986), 10 CFR Part 71, DOE Order 1540.2, DOE Order 5480.3, and 49 CFR Part 173

  11. RH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the RH-TRU 72-B Waste Shipping Package and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states: 'each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.' It further states: 'each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M and O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1.8, 'Deliberate Misconduct.' Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, 'Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material,' certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, 'Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,' regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these

  12. RH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the RH-TRU 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the 'RH-TRU 72-B cask') and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states: 'each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.' It further states: 'each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M and O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 71.8, 'Deliberate Misconduct.' Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required.In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, 'Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material,' certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, 'Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,' regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous

  13. Approach for implementing burnup credit in high-capacity truck casks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boshoven, J.; Hopf, J.; Su, S.

    1991-01-01

    General Atomics (GA) will be submitting an application for certification to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the GA-4 and GA-9 Casks in 1992. To maintain a capacity of four pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies, the GA-4 Cask uses burnup credit as part of the criticality control for the higher enrichments. Using the US Department of Energy (DOE) Burnup Credit Program as a basis, GA presents here an approach to burnup credit analysis to be included in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). 6 refs., 2 figs., 5 tabs

  14. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) Castor GSF cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clements, E.P.

    1997-01-01

    The CASTOR GSF packaging was designed and fabricated to be a certified Type B(U) packaging and comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for transport of up to five sealed canisters of vitrified radioactive materials. This onsite Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides the analysis and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the casks, with the canister payload, meet the intent of the Type B packaging regulations set forth in 10 CFR 71 and therefore meet the onsite transportation safety requirements of WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping

  15. Recent insights from severe accident research and implications for containment criteria for advanced LWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Speis, T.P.; King, T.L.; Eltawila, F.

    1992-01-01

    The Severe Accident Research Program (SARP) was begun after the TMI-2 accident in March, 1979. The rule for dealing with the generation of large quantity of hydrogen in BWRs and Ice Condenser PWRs was promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC issued severe Accident Policy Statement in 1985, and the revised SARP in 1989. In this paper, the current understanding of the more important phenomena and the associated mechanical and thermal loads to the containment is described, and the on-going works are summarized. The containment loadings in severe accidents are listed, and direct containment heating and the liner failure in BWR Mark I are added. A great deal of informations obtained on the early phase of melt progression are shown. The current understanding of the severe accident phenomena related to the containment and the on-going related research efforts are discussed more in detail. Fuel-coolant interaction including alpha-mode containment failure, direct containment heating, hydrogen deflagration and detonation, core-concrete interaction and debris coolability are described. (K.I.)

  16. Following Surgically Assisted Rapid Palatal Expansion, Do Tooth-Borne or Bone-Borne Appliances Provide More Skeletal Expansion and Dental Expansion?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamedi-Sangsari, Adrien; Chinipardaz, Zahra; Carrasco, Lee

    2017-10-01

    The aim of this study was to compare outcome measurements of skeletal and dental expansion with bone-borne (BB) versus tooth-borne (TB) appliances after surgically assisted rapid palatal expansion (SARPE). This study was performed to provide quantitative measurements that will help the oral surgeon and orthodontist in selecting the appliance with, on average, the greatest amount of skeletal expansion and the least amount of dental expansion. A computerized database search was performed using PubMed, EBSCO, Cochrane, Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar on publications in reputable oral surgery and orthodontic journals. A systematic review and meta-analysis was completed with the predictor variable of expansion appliance (TB vs BB) and outcome measurement of expansion (in millimeters). Of 487 articles retrieved from the 6 databases, 5 articles were included, 4 with cone-beam computed tomographic (CBCT) data and 1 with non-CBCT 3-dimensional cast data. There was a significant difference in skeletal expansion (standardized mean difference [SMD], 0.92; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.54-1.30; P appliances. However, there was no significant difference in dental expansion (SMD, 0.05; 95% CI, -0.24 to 0.34; P = .03). According to the literature, to achieve more effective skeletal expansion and minimize dental expansion after SARPE, a BB appliance should be favored. Copyright © 2017 American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  17. Revised Severe Accident Research Program plan, FY 1990--1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    For the past 10 years, since the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC has sponsored an active research program on light-water-reactor severe accidents as part of a multi-faceted approach to reactor safety. This report describes the revised Severe Accident Research Program (SARP) and how the revisions are designed to provide confirmatory information and technical support to the NRC staff in implementing the staff's Integration Plan for Closure of Severe Accident Issues as described in SECY-88-147. The revised SARP addresses both the near-term research directed at providing a technical basis upon which decisions on important containment performance issues can be made and the long-term research needed to confirm and refine our understanding of severe accidents. In developing this plan, the staff recognized that the overall goal is to reduce the uncertainties in the source term sufficiently to enable the staff to make regulatory decisions on severe accident issues. However, the staff also recognized that for some issues it may not be practical to attempt to further reduce uncertainties, and some regulatory decisions or conclusions will have to be made with full awareness of existing uncertainties. 2 figs., 1 tab

  18. Documentation for initial testing and inspections of Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) Cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lundeen, J.E.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to compile data generated during the initial tests and inspections of the Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) Cask. In addition, this report will verify that the testing criteria identified in section 8.1 of the BUSS Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was met. The BUSS Cask Model R-1 is a type B shipping container used for shipment of radioactive cesium-137 and strontium-90 capsules to Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF). The BUSS Cask body and lid are each one-piece forgings fabricated from ASTM A473, Type 304 stainless steel. The primary purpose of the BUSS Cask is to provide shielding and confinement as well as impact, puncture, and thermal protection for the capsules under both normal and accident conditions. Chapter 8 of the BUSS Cask SARP requires several acceptance tests and inspections, each intended to evaluate the performance of different components of the BUSS Cask system, to be performed before its first use. The results of the tests and inspections required are included in this document

  19. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anderson, James [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Goins, Monty [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Paul, Pran [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wilkinson, Alan [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wilson, David [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-09-03

    This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of adioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

  20. TRU waste transportation -- The flammable gas generation problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connolly, M.J.; Kosiewicz, S.T.

    1997-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has imposed a flammable gas (i.e., hydrogen) concentration limit of 5% by volume on transuranic (TRU) waste containers to be shipped using the TRUPACT-II transporter. This concentration is the lower explosive limit (LEL) in air. This was done to minimize the potential for loss of containment during a hypothetical 60 day period. The amount of transuranic radionuclide that is permissible for shipment in TRU waste containers has been tabulated in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP, 1) to conservatively prevent accumulation of hydrogen above this 5% limit. Based on the SARP limitations, approximately 35% of the TRU waste stored at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab (INEEL), Los Alamos National Lab (LANL), and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) cannot be shipped in the TRUPACT-II. An even larger percentage of the TRU waste drums at the Savannah River Site (SRS) cannot be shipped because of the much higher wattage loadings of TRU waste drums in that site's inventory. This paper presents an overview of an integrated, experimental program that has been initiated to increase the shippable portion of the Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste inventory. In addition, the authors will estimate the anticipated expansion of the shippable portion of the inventory and associated cost savings. Such projection should provide the TRU waste generating sites a basis for developing their TRU waste workoff strategies within their Ten Year Plan budget horizons

  1. Equivalency relations for mixtures of nuclides in shipping casks 9972-9975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemer, K.A.; Frost, R.L.; Williamson, T.G.

    1994-01-01

    Equivalence relations required to determine mass limits for mixtures of nuclides for the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) of the Savannah River Site 9972, 9973, 9974, and 9975 shipping casks were calculated. The systems analyzed included aqueous spheres, homogeneous metal spheres, and metal ball-and-shell configurations, all surrounded by an effectively infinite stainless steel or water reflector. Comparison of the equivalence calculations with the rule-of-fractions showed conservative agreement for aqueous solutions, both conservative and non-conservative agreement for the metal homogenous sphere systems, and non-conservative agreement for the majority of metal ball-and-shell systems. Equivalence factors for the aqueous solutions and homogeneous metal spheres were calculated. The equivalence factors for the non-conservative metal homogeneous sphere systems were adjusted so that they were conservative. No equivalence factors were calculated for the ball-and-shell systems since the SARP assumes that only homogeneous or uniformly distributed material will be shipped in the 9972-9975 shipping casks, and an unnecessarily conservative critical mass may result if the ball-and-shell configurations are included

  2. Nuclear power plant Severe Accident Research Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larkins, J.T.; Cunningham, M.A.

    1983-01-01

    The Severe Accident Research Plan (SARP) will provide technical information necessary to support regulatory decisions in the severe accident area for existing or planned nuclear power plants, and covers research for the time period of January 1982 through January 1986. SARP will develop generic bases to determine how safe the plants are and where and how their level of safety ought to be improved. The analysis to address these issues will be performed using improved probabilistic risk assessment methodology, as benchmarked to more exact data and analysis. There are thirteen program elements in the plan and the work is phased in two parts, with the first phase being completed in early 1984, at which time an assessment will be made whether or not any major changes will be recommended to the Commission for operating plants to handle severe accidents. Additionally at this time, all of the thirteen program elements in Chapter 5 will be reviewed and assessed in terms of how much additional work is necessary and where major impacts in probabilistic risk assessment might be achieved. Confirmatory research will be carried out in phase II to provide additional assurance on the appropriateness of phase I decisions. Most of this work will be concluded by early 1986

  3. Examining Dimethyl Sulfide Emissions in California's San Joaquin Valley

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huber, D.; Hughes, S.; Blake, D. R.

    2017-12-01

    Dimethyl Sulfide (DMS) is a sulfur-containing compound that leads to the formation of aerosols which can lead to the formation of haze and fog. Whole air samples were collected on board the NASA C-23 Sherpa aircraft during the 2017 Student Airborne Research Program (SARP) over dairies and agricultural fields in the San Joaquin Valley. Analysis of the samples indicate average DMS concentrations of 23 ± 9 pptv, with a maximum concentration of 49 pptv. When compared with DMS concentrations from previous SARP missions (2009-2016), 2017 by far had the highest frequency of elevated DMS in this region. For this study, agricultural productivity of this region was analyzed to determine whether land use could be contributing to the elevated DMS. Top down and bottom up analysis of agriculture and dairies were used to determine emission rates of DMS in the San Joaquin Valley. Correlations to methane and ethanol were used to determine that DMS emissions were strongly linked to dairies, and resulted in R2 values of 0.61 and 0.43, respectively. These values indicate a strong correlation between dairies and DMS emissions. Combined with NOAA HySPLIT back trajectory data and analysis of ground air samples, results suggest that the contribution of dairies to annual DMS emissions in the San Joaquin Valley exceeds those from corn and alfalfa production.

  4. Overview of the DOE packaging certification process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu, Y.Y.; Carlson, R.D. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Carlson, R.W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Kapoor, A. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)

    1995-12-31

    This paper gives an overview of the DOE packaging certification process, which is implemented by the Office of Facility Safety Analysis, under the Assistance Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, for packagings that are not used for weapons and weapons components, nor for naval nuclear propulsion. The overview will emphasize Type B packagings and the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) review that parallels the NRC packaging review. Other important elements in the DOE packaging certification program, such as training, methods development, data bases, and technical assistance, are also emphasized, because they have contributed significantly to the improvement of the certification process since DOE consolidated its packaging certification function in 1985. The paper finishes with a discussion of the roles and functions of the DOE Packaging Safety Review Steering Committee, which is chartered to address issues and concerns of interest to the DOE packaging and transportation safety community. Two articles related to DOE packaging certification were published earlier on the SARP review procedures and the DOE Packaging Review Guide. These articles may be consulted for additional information.

  5. Expanding the Allowable TRUPACT-II Payload

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    St Michel, W.; Lott, S.

    2002-01-01

    The partnership between the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and the TRU and Mixed Waste Focus Area (TMFA) was rewarded when several long-term projects came to fruition. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) removed some of the conservatism in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) with their approval of Revision 19. The SARP strictly limits the payload constituents to ensure that hydrogen gas and other flammable volatile organic compounds (VOCs) don't build up to flammable/explosive levels while the transuranic (TRU) waste is sealed in the container during shipment. The CBFO/TMFA development program was based on laboratory experiments with surrogate waste materials, real waste experiments, and theoretical modeling that were used to justify payload expansion. Future work to expand the shipping envelope of the TRUPACT-II focuses on increasing the throughput through the waste certification process and reducing the waste operations costs by removing the need for a repack aging and/or treatment capability or reducing the size of the needed repackaging/treatment capability

  6. Packaging design criteria modified fuel spacer burial box. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, P.F.

    1994-01-01

    Various Hanford facilities must transfer large radioactively contaminated items to burial/storage. Presently, there are eighteen Fuel Spacer Burial Boxes (FSBBs) available on the Hanford Site for transport of such items. Previously, the FSBBS were transported from a rail car to the burial trench via a drag-off operation. To allow for the lifting of the boxes into the burial trench, it will be necessary to improve the packagings lifting attachments and provide structural reinforcement. Additional safety improvements to the packaging system will be provided by the addition of a positive closure system and package ventilation. FSBBs that are modified in such a manner are referred to as Modified Fuel Spacer Burial Boxes (MFSBs). The criteria provided by this PDC will be used to demonstrate that the transfer of the MFSB will provide an equivalent degree of safety as would be provided by a package meeting offsite transportation requirements. This fulfills the onsite transportation safety requirements implemented in WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping. A Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) will be prepared to evaluate the safety of the transfer operation. Approval of the SARP is required to authorize transfer. Criteria are also established to ensure burial requirements are met

  7. Magnetism, Spin Texture, and In-Gap States: Atomic Specialization at the Surface of Oxygen-Deficient SrTiO_{3}.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Altmeyer, Michaela; Jeschke, Harald O; Hijano-Cubelos, Oliver; Martins, Cyril; Lechermann, Frank; Koepernik, Klaus; Santander-Syro, Andrés F; Rozenberg, Marcelo J; Valentí, Roser; Gabay, Marc

    2016-04-15

    Motivated by recent spin- and angular-resolved photoemission (SARPES) measurements of the two-dimensional electronic states confined near the (001) surface of oxygen-deficient SrTiO_{3}, we explore their spin structure by means of ab initio density functional theory (DFT) calculations of slabs. Relativistic nonmagnetic DFT calculations display Rashba-like spin winding with a splitting of a few meV and when surface magnetism on the Ti ions is included, bands become spin-split with an energy difference ∼100  meV at the Γ point, consistent with SARPES findings. While magnetism tends to suppress the effects of the relativistic Rashba interaction, signatures of it are still clearly visible in terms of complex spin textures. Furthermore, we observe an atomic specialization phenomenon, namely, two types of electronic contributions: one is from Ti atoms neighboring the oxygen vacancies that acquire rather large magnetic moments and mostly create in-gap states; another comes from the partly polarized t_{2g} itinerant electrons of Ti atoms lying further away from the oxygen vacancy, which form the two-dimensional electron system and are responsible for the Rashba spin winding and the spin splitting at the Fermi surface.

  8. Flammability Assessment Methodology Program Phase I: Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    C. A. Loehr; S. M. Djordjevic; K. J. Liekhus; M. J. Connolly

    1997-09-01

    The Flammability Assessment Methodology Program (FAMP) was established to investigate the flammability of gas mixtures found in transuranic (TRU) waste containers. The FAMP results provide a basis for increasing the permissible concentrations of flammable volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in TRU waste containers. The FAMP results will be used to modify the ''Safety Analysis Report for the TRUPACT-II Shipping Package'' (TRUPACT-II SARP) upon acceptance of the methodology by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Implementation of the methodology would substantially increase the number of drums that can be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) without repackaging or treatment. Central to the program was experimental testing and modeling to predict the gas mixture lower explosive limit (MLEL) of gases observed in TRU waste containers. The experimental data supported selection of an MLEL model that was used in constructing screening limits for flammable VOC and flammable gas concentrations. The MLEL values predicted by the model for individual drums will be utilized to assess flammability for drums that do not meet the screening criteria. Finally, the predicted MLEL values will be used to derive acceptable gas generation rates, decay heat limits, and aspiration time requirements for drums that do not pass the screening limits. The results of the program demonstrate that an increased number of waste containers can be shipped to WIPP within the flammability safety envelope established in the TRUPACT-II SARP.

  9. RH Packaging Program Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Washington TRU Solutions, LLC

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the RH-TRU 72-B Waste Shipping Package and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the SARP and/or C of C shall govern. The C of C states: ''...each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, ''Operating Procedures,'' of the application.'' It further states: ''...each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, ''Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application.'' Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M and O) contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with 10 CFR (section) 71.11, ''Deliberate Misconduct.'' Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations are safe and meet the requirements of the SARP. This document is available on the Internet at: ttp://www.ws/library/t2omi/t2omi.htm. Users are responsible for ensuring they are using the current revision and change notices. Sites may prepare their own document using the word

  10. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) decontaminated equipment self-container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boehnke, W.M.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) is to demonstrate that specific decontaminated equipment can be safely used as its own self-container. As a Decontaminated Equipment Self-Container (also referred to as a self-container), no other packaging, such as a burial box, would be required to transport the equipment onsite. The self-container will consist of a piece of equipment or apparatus which has all readily removable interior contamination removed, all of its external openings sealed, and all external surfaces decontaminated to less than 2000 dpm/100 cm for gamma-emitting radionuclides and less than 220 dpm/100 CM2 for alpha-emitting radionuclides

  11. Drop testing of the Westinghouse fresh nuclear fuel package

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shappert, L.B.; Sanders, C.F.

    1993-01-01

    The Westinghouse Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility has decided to develop and certify a new fresh fuel package design (type A, fissile) that has the capability to transport more highly enriched fuel than was previously possible. A prototype package was tested in support of the Safety Analysis Report of the Packaging (SARP). This paper provides detailed information on the tests and test results. A first prototype test was carried out at the STF, and the design did not give the safety margin that Westinghouse wanted for their containers. The data from the test were used to redesign the connection between the clamping frame and the pressure pad, and the tests were reinitiated. Three packages were then tested at the STF. All packages met the acceptance criteria and acceleration information was obtained that provided an indication of the behavior of the cradle and strongback which holds the fuel assemblies and nuclear poison in place. (J.P.N.)

  12. Design and criticality considerations for 9977 and 9978 shipping packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, R.; Biswas, D.; Abramczyk, G.

    2009-01-01

    Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed two new, Type B, state-of-the-art, general purpose, fissile material Shipping Packages, designated as 9977 and 9978, as replacements for the U.S. Dept. of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container. The packages accommodate plutonium, uranium, and other special nuclear materials in bulk quantities and in many forms with capabilities exceeding those of the 6M. A nuclear criticality safety evaluation demonstrates the safe configurations of the new shipping container for plutonium and uranium metal/oxide loading under various conditions for the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). The evaluation is in compliance with the performance requirements of 10CFR 71, specifically 10CFR71.55 and 71.59. The criticality safety index (CSI) is 1.0 for most of the contents (Max. Pu Loading -4.4 kg). (authors)

  13. Burnup credit applications in a high-capacity truck cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boshoven, J.K.

    1992-09-01

    General Atomics (GA) has designed two legal weight truck (LWT) casks, the GA-4 and GA-9, to carry four pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) and nine boiling-water-reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies, respectively. GA plans to submit applications for certification to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the two casks in mid-1993. GA will include burnup credit analysis in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) for the GA-4 Cask. By including burnup credit in the criticality safety analysis for PWR fuels with initial enrichments above 3% U-235, public and occupation risks are reduced and cost savings are realized. The GA approach to burnup credit analysis incorporates the information produced in the US Department of Energy Burnup Credit Program. This paper describes the application of burnup credit to the criticality control design of the GA-4 Cask

  14. Analysis of Strain Dependent Damping in Materials via Modeling of Material Point Hysteresis

    Science.gov (United States)

    1991-07-01

    Read input quantities fromi input files. C RBAD(9:5STIi’LE RM(q.A)-)’)SY READ (9, -’(X)’-) RP.AD(9,’jA) ’)SN RFPD(9, ’(A)’ ) SALP 5 FOR.%MT(A) REA" (9...IBSN,IESK) CALL ShLRLN( SALP , IBSAL?, IESALP?) CALL SThLEN( BA, ThSA, IESA) CALL STRLEN(SYT,ZBSFT,J:ESFT) CA*LL STRLEN (Sa~l, IBSARI, IMSAM~) CALL STRI2N...CHAP.ACTER-󈨊 TITLE,SYS,SG,SN, SALP ,SGO,SGP,SA,SI’T CU1RXCT2R- ( ) SARI, SAýR2 ,SAR3, SAR4, SARS, SARI, SAR7,SARP PARAMETER (SARl-’g0-’) PARAMETPR (SAR2""Ys

  15. TRUPACT-II container maintenance program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-11-01

    This document details the maintenance/repair and replacement of components, as well as the documentation required and the procedures to be followed to maintain the integrity of the TRUPACT-II container, in accordance with requirements of the TRUPACT-II Container Operations and Maintenance Manual, OM-134, the TRUPACT-II Container Safety Analysis Report (SARP), and the TRUPACT-II Container Certificate of Compliance (Number 9218). The routine shipping and receiving inspections required by the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other regulations are not addressed in this document. This document applies to all DOE shipping and receiving sites that use the TRUPACT-II containers

  16. Using Airborne In-Situ Profiles to Evaluate TCCON Data from Armstrong Flight Research Center

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iraci, L. T.; Hillyard, P. W.; Podolske, J. R.; Roehl, C. M.; Wunch, D.; Wennberg, P. O.; Albertson, R.

    2016-12-01

    A Fourier Transform Spectrometer (FTS) was deployed to the Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) in Edwards, CA as a member of the Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON) and has now been in operation for over 3 years. The data record from AFRC will be presented as well as airborne validation profiles obtained during the NASA SEAC4RS, SARP, KORUS-AQ, and ATom missions utilizing various NASA aircraft. One of the reasons that the AFRC location was selected is due to its proximity to a highly reflective lakebed, which has proven to be difficult for accurate satellite retrievals. As such, the data from AFRC has been used for OCO-2 calibration. In order for accurate calibration of OCO-2, the validity of the TCCON measurements must be established. To this end, integrated airborne in-situ vertical profiles will be presented and compared with the TCCON FTS measurements, where good agreement has been found.

  17. Y-12 defense programs. Nuclear Packaging Systems testing capabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The Nuclear Packaging Systems (NPS) Department can manage/accomplish any packaging task. The NPS organization is responsible for managing the design, testing, certification, procurement, operation, refurbishment, maintenance, and disposal of packaging used to transport radioactive materials, other hazardous materials, and general cargoes on public roads and within the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Additionally, the NPS Department has developed a Quality Assurance plan for all packaging, design and procurement of nonweapon shipping containers for radioactive materials, and design and procurement of performance-oriented packaging for hazardous materials. Further, the NPS Department is responsible for preparation and submittal of Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARP). The NPS Department coordinates shipping container procurement and safety certification activities that have lead-times of up to two years. A Packaging Testing Capabilities Table at the Oak Ridge complex is included as a table

  18. Safety analysis report for packaging (Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Model DT-14A package for enriched uranium), Y/DD-326 Supplement No. 1 (Rev. 0)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadelli, G.; Kennedy, W.R. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    This Supplement to the Safety Analysis Report Y/DD-326 [1.4.1] was prepared in accordance with US NRC Regulatory Guide 7.9 to address the Naval Fuel contents to be shipped in the DT-14A packaging. New chapters were written for Shielding, Critcality and Quality Assurance. Independent reviews were obtained for each of these chapters and for a product leakage analysis referenced in Chapter 7.0 of this document. Other chapters invoke the Y/DD-326 SARP with minor changes or additions as indicated in the Supplement. All references to form or composition of the fuel are classified Confidential NNPI in the interest of national security

  19. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) transuranic performance demonstration program sample packaging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mccoy, J.C.

    1997-01-01

    The Transuranic Performance Demonstration Program (TPDP) sample packaging is used to transport highway route controlled quantities of weapons grade (WG) plutonium samples from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) to the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) facility and back. The purpose of these shipments is to test the nondestructive assay equipment in the WRAP facility as part of the Nondestructive Waste Assay PDP. The PDP is part of the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) National TRU Program managed by the U. S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, Carlsbad, New Mexico. Details of this program are found in CAO-94-1045, Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay for the TRU Waste Characterization Program (CAO 1994); INEL-96/0129, Design of Benign Matrix Drums for the Non-Destructive Assay Performance Demonstration Program for the National TRU Program (INEL 1996a); and INEL-96/0245, Design of Phase 1 Radioactive Working Reference Materials for the Nondestructive Assay Performance Demonstration Program for the National TRU Program (INEL 1996b). Other program documentation is maintained by the national TRU program and each DOE site participating in the program. This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the TRU PDP sample packaging meets the onsite transportation safety requirements of WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping, for an onsite Transportation Hazard Indicator (THI) 2 packaging. This SARP, however, does not include evaluation of any operations within the PFP or WRAP facilities, including handling, maintenance, storage, or operating requirements, except as they apply directly to transportation between the gate of PFP and the gate of the WRAP facility. All other activities are subject to the requirements of the facility safety analysis reports (FSAR) of the PFP or WRAP facility and requirements of the PDP

  20. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Transporation System licensed hardware second certification test series and package shock mount system test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrell, P.C.; Moody, D.A.

    1995-10-01

    This paper presents a summary of two separate drop test a e performed in support of the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) Transportation System (RTGTS). The first portion of this paper presents the second series of drop testing required to demonstrate that the RTG package design meets the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, ''Part 71'' (10 CFR 71). Results of the first test series, performed in July 1994, demonstrated that some design changes were necessary. The package design was modified to improve test performance and the design changes were incorporated into the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). The second full-size certification test article (CTA-2) incorporated the modified design and was tested at the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site near Richland, Washington. With the successful completion of the test series, and pending DOE Office of Facility Safety Analysis approval of the SARP, a certificate of compliance will be issued for the RTG package allowing its use. The second portion of this paper presents the design and testing of the RTG Package Mount System. The RTG package mount was designed to protect the RTG from excessive vibration during transport, provide shock protection during on/off loading, and provide a mechanism for moving the RTG package with a forklift. Military Standard (MIL-STD) 810E, Transit Drop Procedure (DOE 1989), was used to verify that the shock limiting system limited accelerations in excess of 15 G's at frequencies below 150 Hz. Results of the package mount drop tests indicate that an impact force of 15 G's was not exceeded in any test from a free drop height of 457 mm (18 in.)

  1. Overproduction of lactimidomycin by cross-overexpression of genes encoding Streptomyces antibiotic regulatory proteins.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Bo; Yang, Dong; Yan, Yijun; Pan, Guohui; Xiang, Wensheng; Shen, Ben

    2016-03-01

    The glutarimide-containing polyketides represent a fascinating class of natural products that exhibit a multitude of biological activities. We have recently cloned and sequenced the biosynthetic gene clusters for three members of the glutarimide-containing polyketides-iso-migrastatin (iso-MGS) from Streptomyces platensis NRRL 18993, lactimidomycin (LTM) from Streptomyces amphibiosporus ATCC 53964, and cycloheximide (CHX) from Streptomyces sp. YIM56141. Comparative analysis of the three clusters identified mgsA and chxA, from the mgs and chx gene clusters, respectively, that were predicted to encode the PimR-like Streptomyces antibiotic regulatory proteins (SARPs) but failed to reveal any regulatory gene from the ltm gene cluster. Overexpression of mgsA or chxA in S. platensis NRRL 18993, Streptomyces sp. YIM56141 or SB11024, and a recombinant strain of Streptomyces coelicolor M145 carrying the intact mgs gene cluster has no significant effect on iso-MGS or CHX production, suggesting that MgsA or ChxA regulation may not be rate-limiting for iso-MGS and CHX production in these producers. In contrast, overexpression of mgsA or chxA in S. amphibiosporus ATCC 53964 resulted in a significant increase in LTM production, with LTM titer reaching 106 mg/L, which is five-fold higher than that of the wild-type strain. These results support MgsA and ChxA as members of the SARP family of positive regulators for the iso-MGS and CHX biosynthetic machinery and demonstrate the feasibility to improve glutarimide-containing polyketide production in Streptomyces strains by exploiting common regulators.

  2. Completion of the radioactive materials packaging handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shappert, L.B.

    1998-01-01

    'The Radioactive Materials Packaging Handbook: Design, Operation and Maintenance', which will serve as a replacement for the 'Cask Designers Guide'(1970), has now been completed and submitted to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) electronics publishing group for layout and printing; it is scheduled to be printed in late spring 1998. The Handbook, written by experts in their particular fields, is a compilation of technical chapters that address the design aspects of a package intended for transporting radioactive material in normal commerce; it was prepared under the direction of M. E. Wangler of the US DOE and is intended to provide a wealth of technical guidance that will give designers a better understanding of the regulatory approval process, preferences of regulators on specific aspects of package design, and the types of analyses that should be considered when designing a package to carry radioactive materials. Even though the Handbook is concerned with both small and large packagings, most of the emphasis is placed on large packagings that are capable of transporting fissile, radioactive sources (e.g. spent fuels). The safety analysis reports for packagings (SARPs) must address the widest range of technical topics in order to meet United States and/or international regulations, all of which are covered in the Handbook. One of the primary goals of the Handbook is to provide information which would guide designers of radioactive materials packages to make decisions that would most likely be acceptable to regulatory agencies during the approval process of the packaging. It was therefore important to find those authors who not only were experts in one or more of the areas that are addressed in a SARP, but who also had been exposed to the regulatory process or had operational experience dealing with a wide variety of package types. Twenty-five such people have contributed their time and talents to the development of this document, mostly on a volunteer basis

  3. Hanford Site Transuranic (TRU) Waste Certification Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GREAGER, T.M.

    2000-01-01

    As a generator of transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed waste destined for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the Hanford Site must ensure that its TRU waste meets the requirements of US. Department of Energy (DOE) 0 435.1, ''Radioactive Waste Management,'' and the Contact-Handled (CH) Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP-WAC). WIPP-WAC requirements are derived from the WIPP Technical Safety Requirements, WIPP Safety Analysis Report, TRUPACT-II SARP, WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 191/194 Compliance Certification Decision. The WIPP-WAC establishes the specific physical, chemical, radiological, and packaging criteria for acceptance of defense TRU waste shipments at WIPP. The WPP-WAC also requires that participating DOE TRU waste generator/treatment/storage sites produce site-specific documents, including a certification plan, that describe their program for managing TRU waste and TRU waste shipments before transferring waste to WIPP. Waste characterization activities provide much of the data upon which certification decisions are based. Waste characterization requirements for TRU waste and TRU mixed waste that contains constituents regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) are established in the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Waste Analysis Plan (WAP). The Hanford Site Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPjP) (HNF-2599) implements the applicable requirements in the WAP and includes the qualitative and quantitative criteria for making hazardous waste determinations. The Hanford Site must also ensure that its TRU waste destined for disposal at WPP meets requirements for transport in the Transuranic Package Transporter-11 (TRUPACT-11). The US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) establishes the TRUPACT-11 requirements in the Safety Analysis Report for the TRUPACT-II Shipping Package (TRUPACT-11 SARP). In

  4. Satellite Communications for ATM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shamma, Mohammed A.

    2003-01-01

    This presentation is an overview on Satellite Communication for the Aeronautical Telecommunication Management (ATM) research. Satellite Communications are being considered by the FAA and NASA as a possible alternative to the present and future ground systems supporting Air Traffic Communications. The international Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have in place Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) for the Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Services (AMSS) which is mainly derived from the pre-existing Inmarsat service that has been in service since the 1980s. The Working Group A of the Aeronautical Mobile Communication Panel of ICAO has also been investigating SARPS for what is called the Next Generation Satellite Service (NGSS) which conforms less to the Inmarsat based architecture and explores wider options in terms of satellite architectures. Several designs are being proposed by Firms such as Boeing, ESA, NASA that are geared toward full or secondary usage of satellite communications for ATM. Satellite communications for ATM can serve several purposes ranging from primary usage where ground services would play a minimal backup role, to an integrated solution where it will be used to cover services, or areas that are less likely to be supported by the proposed and existing ground infrastructure. Such Integrated roles can include usage of satellite communications for oceanic and remote land areas for example. It also can include relieving the capacity of the ground network by providing broadcast based services of Traffic Information Services messages (TIS-B), or Flight Information Services (FIS-B) which can take a significant portion of the ground system capacity. Additionally, satellite communication can play a backup role to support any needs for ground replacement, or additional needed capacity even after the new digital systems are in place. The additional bandwidth that can be provided via satellite communications can also open the door for many new

  5. Packaging Review Guide for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DiSabatino, A; Biswas, D; DeMicco, M; Fisher, L E; Hafner, R; Haslam, J; Mok, G; Patel, C; Russell, E

    2007-04-12

    This Packaging Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for Department of Energy (DOE) review and approval of packagings to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE Order 460.1B for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs). This PRG is intended for use by the Headquarters Certifying Official and his or her review staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for DOE packaging approval. This PRG is generally organized at the section level in a format similar to that recommended in Regulatory Guide 7.9 (RG 7.9). One notable exception is the addition of Section 9 (Quality Assurance), which is not included as a separate chapter in RG 7.9. Within each section, this PRG addresses the technical and regulatory bases for the review, the manner in which the review is accomplished, and findings that are generally applicable for a package that meets the approval standards. This Packaging Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for DOE review and approval of packagings to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE O 460.1B for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs). This PRG is intended for use by the Headquarters Certifying Official and his review staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for DOE packaging approval. The primary objectives of this PRG are to: (1) Summarize the regulatory requirements for package approval; (2) Describe the technical review procedures by which DOE determines that these requirements have been satisfied; (3) Establish and maintain the quality and uniformity of reviews; (4) Define the base from which to evaluate proposed changes in scope

  6. Transpalatal distraction--state of the art for the individual management of transverse maxillary deficiency--a review of 50 consecutive cases.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adolphs, Nicolai; Ernst, Nicole; Menneking, Horst; Hoffmeister, Bodo

    2014-12-01

    Transpalatal distraction has been established as a technique for surgical assisted rapid palatal/maxillary expansion (SARPE/SARME) in order to correct transverse maxillary deficiency. From 2007 until 2013 bone borne transpalatal distraction devices have been inserted in 50 patients affected by transverse maxillary deficiency and transpalatal distraction has been performed by the same surgical team. Patient records were retrospectively evaluated after ending of the active distraction phase with respect to indication, achieved expansion, additional procedures and side effects. In all cases the existing transverse maxillary deficiency was corrected by means of transpalatal distraction according to the individual needs. No complications were observed that interfered with that therapeutic aim. Evaluation of the records showed a wide variance of parameters which impedes evidence based statements. According to that series transpalatal distraction is a safe, powerful and reliable procedure and can be recommended as a state of the art procedure for the individually adapted correction of transverse maxillary deficiency if well known parameters of distraction are respected. Copyright © 2014 European Association for Cranio-Maxillo-Facial Surgery. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  7. Packaging review guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packagings: Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fisher, L.E.; Chou, C.K.; Lloyd, W.R.; Mount, M.E.; Nelson, T.A.; Schwartz, M.W.; Witte, M.C.

    1988-10-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has established procedures for obtaining certification of packagings used by DOE and its contractors for the transport of radioactive materials. The principal purpose of this document is to assure the quality and uniformity of PCS reviews and to present a well-defined base from which to evaluate proposed changes in the scope and requirements of reviews. The Packaging Review Guide (PRG) also sets forth solutions and approaches determined to be acceptable in the past in dealing with a specific safety issue or safety-related design area. These solutions and approaches are presented in this form so that reviewers can take consistent and well-understood positions as the same safety issues arise in future cases. An applicant submitting a SARP does not have to follow the solutions or approaches presented. It is also a purpose of the PRG to make information about DOE certification policy and procedures widely available to DOE field offices, DOE contractors, federal agencies, and interested members of the public. 77 refs., 16 figs., 15 tabs

  8. Spin polarized electronic states and spin textures at the surface of oxygen-deficient SrTiO3

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeschke, Harald O.; Altmeyer, Michaela; Rozenberg, Marcelo; Gabay, Marc; Valenti, Roser

    We investigate the electronic structure and spin texture at the (001) surface of SrTiO3 in the presence of oxygen vacancies by means of ab initio density functional theory (DFT) calculations of slabs. Relativistic non-magnetic DFT calculations exhibit Rashba-like spin winding with a characteristic energy scale ~ 10 meV. However, when surface magnetism on the Ti ions is included, bands become spin-split with an energy difference ~ 100 meV at the Γ point. This energy scale is comparable to the observations in SARPES experiments performed on the two-dimensional electronic states confined near the (001) surface of SrTiO3. We find the spin polarized state to be the ground state of the system, and while magnetism tends to suppress the effects of the relativistic Rashba interaction, signatures of it are still clearly visible in terms of complex spin textures. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through grants SFB/TR 49 and FOR 1346.

  9. FEA stress analysis for SAFKEG 2863B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puckett, A.

    1997-01-01

    This report covers the evaluation of the structural design of the two stainless steel containment vessels in CROFT SAFKEG Model Number 2863B, for conformance to the design criteria of the NRC Regulatory Guide 7.6, NRC Regulatory Guide 7.8, and the applicable requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 3, and Section 8. The two containment vessels are designated Cans 2870 and 2871. Each of these containment vessels was analyzed for the loadings specified in chapter 2, Section 2.1.2 of the SARP. Structural assessment of Cans 2870 and 2871 due to loading considerations beyond the evaluation of pressure and temperature are presented. This report is organized as follows: (1) overview of the design of each containment vessel and pressure boundary; (2) brief description of both containment vessels; (3) discussion of normal and accident conditions; (4) analysis assumptions; (5) detailed structural evaluation of each component of each containment vessel; (6) demonstration of compliance to Regulatory Guide 7.6 stress evaluations; (7) demonstration of compliance to Regulatory Guide 7.8 loading combinations; and (8) summary of the calculated stresses, comparison with design allowables, estimates of margins of safety and a summary of results and conclusions

  10. Criticality safety and shielding design issues in the development of a high-capacity cask for truck transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boshoven, J.K.

    1992-01-01

    General Atomics (GA) will be submitting an application for certification to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the GA-4 and GA-9 Casks In 1992. The GA-4 and GA-9 Casks are high-capacity legal weight truck casks designed to transport light water reactor spent fuel assemblies. To maintain a capacity of four pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies, the GA-4 Cask uses burnup credit as part of the criticality control for initial enrichments over 3.0 wt% U-235. Using the US Department of Energy (DOE) Burnup Credit Program as a basis, GA has performed burnup credit analysis which is included in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). The GA-9 Cask can meet the criticality safety requirements using the ''fresh fuel'' assumption. Our approach to shielding design is to optimize the GA-4 and GA-9 Cask shielding configurations for minimum weights and maximum payloads. This optimization involves the use of the most effective shielding material, square cross-section geometry with rounded corners and tapered neutron shielding sections in the non-fuel regions

  11. Energy Technology Division research summary -- 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    Research funded primarily by the NRC is directed toward assessing the roles of cyclic fatigue, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, and irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking on failures in light water reactor (LWR) piping systems, pressure vessels, and various core components. In support of the fast reactor program, the Division has responsibility for fuel-performance modeling and irradiation testing. The Division has major responsibilities in several design areas of the proposed International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). The Division supports the DOE in ensuring safe shipment of nuclear materials by providing extensive review of the Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARPs). Finally, in the nuclear area they are investigating the safe disposal of spent fuel and waste. In work funded by DOE's Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the high-temperature superconductivity program continues to be a major focal point for industrial interactions. Coatings and lubricants developed in the division's Tribology Section are intended for use in transportation systems of the future. Continuous fiber ceramic composites are being developed for high-performance heat engines. Nondestructive testing techniques are being developed to evaluate fiber distribution and to detect flaws. A wide variety of coatings for corrosion protection of metal alloys are being studied. These can increase lifetimes significant in a wide variety of coal combustion and gasification environments

  12. Project B-589, 300 Area transuranic waste interim storage project engineering study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenhalgh, W.O.

    1985-08-01

    The purpose of the study was to look at various alternatives of taking newly generated, remote-handled transuranic waste (caisson waste) in the 300 Area, performing necessary transloading operations and preparing the waste for storage. The prepared waste would then be retrieved when the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant becomes operational and transshipped to the repository in New Mexico with a minimum of inspection and packaging. The scope of this study consisted of evaluating options for the transloading of the TRU wastes for shipment to a 200 Area storage site. Preconceptual design information furnished as part of the engineering study is listed below: produce a design for a clean, sealed waste canister; hot cell loadout system for the waste; in-cell loading or handling equipment; determine transshipment cask options; determine assay system requirements (optional); design or specify transport equipment required; provide a SARP cost estimate; determine operator training requirements; determine waste compaction equipment needs if desirable; develop a cost estimate and approximate schedule for a workable system option; and update the results presented in WHC Document TC-2025

  13. Recommended nuclear criticality safety experiments in support of the safe transportation of fissile material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tollefson, D.A.; Elliott, E.P.; Dyer, H.R.; Thompson, S.A.

    1993-01-01

    Validation of computer codes and nuclear data (cross-section) libraries using benchmark quality critical (or certain subcritical) experiments is an essential part of a nuclear criticality safety evaluation. The validation results establish the credibility of the calculational tools for use in evaluating a particular application. Validation of the calculational tools is addressed in several American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standards, with ANSI/ANS-8.1 being the most relevant. Documentation of the validation is a required part of all safety analyses involving significant quantities of fissile materials. In the case of transportation of fissile materials, the safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) must contain a thorough discussion of benchmark experiments, detailing how the experiments relate to the significant packaging and contents materials (fissile, moderating, neutron absorbing) within the package. The experiments recommended in this paper are needed to address certain areas related to transportation of unirradiated fissile materials in drum-type containers (packagings) for which current data are inadequate or are lacking

  14. Gas Generation from Actinide Oxide Materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    George Bailey; Elizabeth Bluhm; John Lyman; Richard Mason; Mark Paffett; Gary Polansky; G. D. Roberson; Martin Sherman; Kirk Veirs; Laura Worl

    2000-12-01

    This document captures relevant work performed in support of stabilization, packaging, and long term storage of plutonium metals and oxides. It concentrates on the issue of gas generation with specific emphasis on gas pressure and composition. Even more specifically, it summarizes the basis for asserting that materials loaded into a 3013 container according to the requirements of the 3013 Standard (DOE-STD-3013-2000) cannot exceed the container design pressure within the time frames or environmental conditions of either storage or transportation. Presently, materials stabilized and packaged according to the 3013 Standard are to be transported in certified packages (the certification process for the 9975 and the SAFKEG has yet to be completed) that do not rely on the containment capabilities of the 3013 container. Even though no reliance is placed on that container, this document shows that it is highly likely that the containment function will be maintained not only in storage but also during transportation, including hypothetical accident conditions. Further, this document, by summarizing materials-related data on gas generation, can point those involved in preparing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (SARPs) to additional information needed to assess the ability of the primary containment vessel to contain the contents and any reaction products that might reasonably be produced by the contents.

  15. Benchmarking of the computer code and the thirty foot side drop analysis for the Shippingport (RPV/NST package)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bumpus, S.E.; Gerhard, M.A.; Hovingh, J.; Trummer, D.J.; Witte, M.C.

    1989-01-01

    This paper presents the benchmarking of a finite element computer code and the subsequent results from the code simulating the 30 foot side drop impact of the RPV/NST transport package from the decommissioned Shippingport Nuclear Power Station. The activated reactor pressure vessel (RPV), thermal shield, and other reactor external components were encased in concrete contained by the neutron shield tank (NST) and a lifting skirt. The Shippingport RPV/NST package, a Type B Category II package, weighs approximately 900 tons and has 17.5 ft diameter and 40.7 ft. length. For transport of the activated components from Shippingport to the burial site, the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) demonstrated that the package can withstand the hypothetical accidents of DOE Order 5480.3 including 10 CFR 71. Mathematical simulations of these accidents can substitute for actual tests if the simulated results satisfy the acceptance criteria. Any such mathematical simulation, including the modeling of the materials, must be benchmarked to experiments that duplicate the loading conditions of the tests. Additional confidence in the simulations is justified if the test specimens are configured similar to the package

  16. Hanford site transuranic waste certification plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GREAGER, T.M.

    1999-01-01

    As a generator of transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed waste destined for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the Hanford Site must ensure that its TRU waste meets the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5820.2A, ''Radioactive Waste Management, and the Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant' (DOE 1996d) (WIPP WAC). The WIPP WAC establishes the specific physical, chemical, radiological, and packaging criteria for acceptance of defense TRU waste shipments at WIPP. The WIPP WAC also requires that participating DOE TRU waste generator/treatment/storage sites produce site-specific documents, including a certification plan, that describe their management of TRU waste and TRU waste shipments before transferring waste to WIPP. The Hanford Site must also ensure that its TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP meets requirements for transport in the Transuranic Package Transporter41 (TRUPACT-11). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) establishes the TRUPACT-I1 requirements in the ''Safety Analysis Report for the TRUPACT-II Shipping Package'' (NRC 1997) (TRUPACT-I1 SARP)

  17. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) contaminated well cars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercado, J.E.

    1998-01-01

    In support of past operations, railcars were used to ship irradiated fuel from the 100 Area fuel storage basins to the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility. There are two configurations for the packaging systems that transported the fuel: the Three-Well Cask Car, which is outfitted with three casks, and the taller, single well, New Production Reactor (NPR) Cask Car. In this document, these cask cars are referred to collectively as well cars. The purpose of this document is to evaluate and authorize the onsite transportation of well cars that contain significant levels of contamination. No irradiated fuel will be transported in the well cars. Neutron detection data confirmed that the well cars do not contain fuel. The intention is to move 14 retired well cars from their current locations in the 100 Area to a suitable storage location in the 200 Area. Each well car contains Type B quantities of radioactivity; so that the hazard of the transport operation is relatively low. This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the contaminated well cars meet the transportation safety requirements of HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for Hazardous Material Shipments for an onsite packaging. The scope of this document addresses the preparation and transportation of the contaminated well cars

  18. Gas Generation from Actinide Oxide Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bailey, George; Bluhm, Elizabeth; Lyman, John; Mason, Richard; Paffett, Mark; Polansky, Gary; Roberson, G. D.; Sherman, Martin; Veirs, Kirk; Worl, Laura

    2000-01-01

    This document captures relevant work performed in support of stabilization, packaging, and long term storage of plutonium metals and oxides. It concentrates on the issue of gas generation with specific emphasis on gas pressure and composition. Even more specifically, it summarizes the basis for asserting that materials loaded into a 3013 container according to the requirements of the 3013 Standard (DOE-STD-3013-2000) cannot exceed the container design pressure within the time frames or environmental conditions of either storage or transportation. Presently, materials stabilized and packaged according to the 3013 Standard are to be transported in certified packages (the certification process for the 9975 and the SAFKEG has yet to be completed) that do not rely on the containment capabilities of the 3013 container. Even though no reliance is placed on that container, this document shows that it is highly likely that the containment function will be maintained not only in storage but also during transportation, including hypothetical accident conditions. Further, this document, by summarizing materials-related data on gas generation, can point those involved in preparing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages (SARPs) to additional information needed to assess the ability of the primary containment vessel to contain the contents and any reaction products that might reasonably be produced by the contents

  19. Calibration of a TCCON FTS at Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) Using Multiple Airborne Profiles

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hillyard, P. W.; Iraci, L. T.; Podolske, J. R.; Tanaka, T.; Yates, E. L.; Roehl, C. M.; Wunch, D.; Wennberg, P. O.; Albertson, R. T.; Blake, D. R.; Meinardi, S.; Marrero, J. E.; Yang, M. M.; Beyersdorf, A. J.; Wofsy, S. C.; Pittman, J. V.; Daube, B. C.

    2014-12-01

    Satellite missions including GOSAT, OCO-2 and ASCENDS measure column abundances of greenhouse gases. It is crucial to have calibrated ground-based measurements to which these satellite measurements can compare and refine their retrieval algorithms. To this end, a Fourier Transform Spectrometer has been deployed to the Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) in Edwards, CA as a member of the Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON). This location was selected due to its proximity to a highly reflective lakebed. Such surfaces have proven to be difficult for accurate satellite retrievals. This facility has been in operation since July 2013. The data collected to date at this site will be presented. In order to ensure the validity of the measurements made at this site, multiple vertical profiles have been performed using the Alpha jet, DC-8, and ER-2 as part of the AJAX (ongoing), SEAC4RS (August 2013), and SARP (July 2014) field campaigns. The integrated in-situ vertical profiles for CO2 and CH4 have been analyzed and compared with the TCCON FTS measurements, where good agreement between TCCON data and vertically-integrated aircraft in-situ data has been found.

  20. FUEL CASK IMPACT LIMITER VULNERABILITIES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leduc, D.; England, J.; Rothermel, R.

    2009-01-01

    Cylindrical fuel casks often have impact limiters surrounding just the ends of the cask shaft in a typical 'dumbbell' arrangement. The primary purpose of these impact limiters is to absorb energy to reduce loads on the cask structure during impacts associated with a severe accident. Impact limiters are also credited in many packages with protecting closure seals and maintaining lower peak temperatures during fire events. For this credit to be taken in safety analyses, the impact limiter attachment system must be shown to retain the impact limiter following Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) impacts. Large casks are often certified by analysis only because of the costs associated with testing. Therefore, some cask impact limiter attachment systems have not been tested in real impacts. A recent structural analysis of the T-3 Spent Fuel Containment Cask found problems with the design of the impact limiter attachment system. Assumptions in the original Safety Analysis for Packaging (SARP) concerning the loading in the attachment bolts were found to be inaccurate in certain drop orientations. This paper documents the lessons learned and their applicability to impact limiter attachment system designs

  1. TRUPACT-II Operating and Maintenance Instructions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Waste Isolation Division

    1999-12-31

    The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACT-II) Shipping Package and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-II Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9218. In the event there is a conflict between this document and the TRUPACT-II SARP, the TRUPACT-II SARP shall govern. TRUPACT-II C of C number 9218 states, ''... each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application.'' It further states, ''... each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the application.'' Chapter 9 of the TRUPACT-II SARP charges the Westinghouse Electric Corporation Waste Isolation Division (WID) with assuring that the TRUPACT-II is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. To meet this requirement and verify consistency of operations when loading and unloading the TRUPACT-II on the trailer, placing a payload in the packaging, unloading the payload from the packaging, or performing maintenance, the U.S. Department of Energy Carlsbad Area Office (U.S. DOE/CAO) finds it necessary to implement the changes that follow. This TRUPACT-II maintenance document represents a change to previous philosophy regarding site specific procedures for the use of the TRUPACT-II. This document details the instructions to be followed to consistently operate and maintain the TRUPACT-II. The intent of these instructions is to ensure that all users of the TRUPACT-II follow the same or equivalent instructions. Users may achieve this intent by any of the following methods: (1

  2. Preliminary data evaluation for thermal insulation characterization testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeClue, J.F.; Moses, S.D.; Tollefson, D.A.

    1991-01-01

    The purpose of Thermal Insulation Characterization Testing is to provide physical data to support certain assumptions and calculational techniques used in the criticality safety calculations in Section 6 of the Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARPs) for drum-type packaging for Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. Results of preliminary data evaluation regarding the fire-test condition reveal that realistic weight loss consideration and residual material characterization in developing calculational models for the hypothetical accident condition is necessary in order to prevent placement of unduly conservative restrictions on shipping requirements as a result of overly conservative modeling. This is particularly important for fast systems. Determination of the geometric arrangement of residual material is of secondary importance. Both the methodology used to determine the minimum thermal insulation mass remaining after the fire test and the treatment of the thermal insulation in the criticality safety calculational models requires additional evaluation. Specific testing to be conducted will provide experimental data with which to validate the mass estimates and calculational modeling techniques for extrapolation to generic drum-type containers

  3. Energy Technology Division research summary -- 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-09-01

    Research funded primarily by the NRC is directed toward assessing the roles of cyclic fatigue, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, and irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking on failures in light water reactor (LWR) piping systems, pressure vessels, and various core components. In support of the fast reactor program, the Division has responsibility for fuel-performance modeling and irradiation testing. The Division has major responsibilities in several design areas of the proposed International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). The Division supports the DOE in ensuring safe shipment of nuclear materials by providing extensive review of the Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging (SARPs). Finally, in the nuclear area they are investigating the safe disposal of spent fuel and waste. In work funded by DOE`s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, the high-temperature superconductivity program continues to be a major focal point for industrial interactions. Coatings and lubricants developed in the division`s Tribology Section are intended for use in transportation systems of the future. Continuous fiber ceramic composites are being developed for high-performance heat engines. Nondestructive testing techniques are being developed to evaluate fiber distribution and to detect flaws. A wide variety of coatings for corrosion protection of metal alloys are being studied. These can increase lifetimes significant in a wide variety of coal combustion and gasification environments.

  4. Investigating Elevated Concentrations of Hydrogen in the LAX region

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rund, P.; Hughes, S.; Blake, D. R.

    2017-12-01

    The growing interest in hydrogen (H2) fuel cell vehicles has created a need to study the atmospheric H2 budget. While there is resounding agreement that hydrogen would escape into the atmosphere due to fuel transport/storage processes, there is disagreement over the amount that would be leaked in a hydrogen fuel economy. Leakage rate estimates range from 2% to 10% for total hydrogen production and transport. A hydrogen based energy infrastructure seems a viable clean alternative to oil because, theoretically, the only waste products are H2O and heat. However, hydrogen leads to the formation of water vapor, polar stratospheric clouds, and a decrease in stratospheric temperatures, which contribute to the depletion of stratospheric ozone. Whole air samples (WAS) collected aboard the NASA Sherpa C-23 during the Student Airborne Research Program (SARP) showed elevated concentrations of hydrogen near LAX (950 ± 110 ppbv) compared to global average concentrations of 560 ± 20 ppbv. Trace gas analysis along with wind trajectories obtained with the NOAA HySPLIT models indicate that the source of elevated mixing ratios was leakage from H2 fuel stations in the surrounding areas. Correlation and ratio analyses eliminate the potential for common photochemical sources of H2 in the LAX area. This project could elucidate new and potential factors that contribute to the global atmospheric hydrogen budget.

  5. Assessment of gas flammability in transuranic waste container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connolly, M.J.; Loehr, C.A.; Djordjevic, S.M.; Spangler, L.R.

    1995-01-01

    The Safety Analysis Report for the TRUPACT-II Shipping Package [Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) SARP] set limits for gas generation rates, wattage limits, and flammable volatile organic compound (VOC) concentrations in transuranic (TRU) waste containers that would be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Based on existing headspace gas data for drums stored at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS), over 30 percent of the contact-handled TRU waste drums contain flammable VOC concentrations greater than the limit. Additional requirements may be imposed for emplacement of waste in the WIPP facility. The conditional no-migration determination (NMD) for the test phase of the facility required that flame tests be performed if significant levels of flammable VOCs were present in TRU waste containers. This paper describes an approach for investigating the potential flammability of TRU waste drums, which would increase the allowable concentrations of flammable VOCS. A flammability assessment methodology is presented that will allow more drums to be shipped to WIPP without treatment or repackaging and reduce the need for flame testing on drums. The approach includes experimental work to determine mixture lower explosive limits (MLEL) for the types of gas mixtures observed in TRU waste, a model for predicting the MLEL for mixtures of VOCS, hydrogen, and methane, and revised screening limits for total flammable VOCs concentrations and concentrations of hydrogen and methane using existing drum headspace gas data and the model predictions

  6. A new type-B cask design for transporting 252Cf

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simmons, C.M.

    2000-01-01

    plus the associated equipment is collectively called the NAC Californium Transport System (CTS) and consists of the cask, impact limiter, and transport skid, which is designed to mate with and provide tiedowns to a dedicated trailer. The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) was presented to DOE regulators in late March of 1999. The questions raised by the DOE regulators are currently being evaluated by NAC and ORNL. After DOE approves the SARP and issues a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the cask design, NRC will start its evaluation. Fabrication will not begin until all certifications (DOE and NRC CoCs, as well as an International Atomic Energy Agency Certificate of Competent Authority for international transport) have been obtained. This project is extremely challenging because of the complexity of the design and the certification and fabrication processes. The certification process is complicated by the necessity to obtain CoCs from two different regulatory agencies

  7. Software Engineering Research/Developer Collaborations (C104)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shell, Elaine; Shull, Forrest

    2005-01-01

    The goal of this collaboration was to produce Flight Software Branch (FSB) process standards for software inspections which could be used across three new missions within the FSB. The standard was developed by Dr. Forrest Shull (Fraunhofer Center for Experimental Software Engineering, Maryland) using the Perspective-Based Inspection approach, (PBI research has been funded by SARP) , then tested on a pilot Branch project. Because the short time scale of the collaboration ruled out a quantitative evaluation, it would be decided whether the standard was suitable for roll-out to other Branch projects based on a qualitative measure: whether the standard received high ratings from Branch personnel as to usability and overall satisfaction. The project used for piloting the Perspective-Based Inspection approach was a multi-mission framework designed for reuse. This was a good choice because key representatives from the three new missions would be involved in the inspections. The perspective-based approach was applied to produce inspection procedures tailored for the specific quality needs of the branch. The technical information to do so was largely drawn through a series of interviews with Branch personnel. The framework team used the procedures to review requirements. The inspections were useful for indicating that a restructuring of the requirements document was needed, which led to changes in the development project plan. The standard was sent out to other Branch personnel for review. Branch personnel were very positive. However, important changes were identified because the perspective of Attitude Control System (ACS) developers had not been adequately represented, a result of the specific personnel interviewed. The net result is that with some further work to incorporate the ACS perspective, and in synchrony with the roll out of independent Branch standards, the PBI approach will be implemented in the FSB. Also, the project intends to continue its collaboration with

  8. Packaging review guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packagings: Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, L.E.; Chou, C.K.; Lloyd, W.R.; Mount, M.E.; Nelson, T.A.; Schwartz, M.W.; Witte, M.C.

    1987-09-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has established procedures for obtaining certification of packagings used by DOE and its contractors for the transport of radioactive materials. These certification review policies and procedures are established to ensure that DOE packaging designs and operations meet safety criteria at least equivalent to the standards prescribed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) certification process for packaging. The Packaging Review Guide (PRG) is not a DOE order, but has been prepared as guidance for the Packaging Certification Staff (PCS) under the Certifying Official, Office of Security Evaluations, or designated representatives. The principal purpose of the PRG is to assure the quality and uniformity of PCS reviews, and to present a well-defined base from which to evaluate proposed changes in the scope and requirements of reviews. The PRG also sets forth solutions and approaches determined to be acceptable in the past by the PCS in dealing with a specific safety issue or safety-related design area. These solutions and approaches are presented in this form so that reviewers can take consistent and well-understood positions as the same safety issues arise in future cases. An applicant submitting a SARP does not have to follow the solutions or approaches presented in the PRG. However, applicants should recognize that the PCS has spent substantial time and effort in reviewing and developing their positions for the issues. A corresponding amount of time and effort will probably be required to review and accept new or different solutions and approaches. Finally, it is also a purpose of the PRG to make information about DOE certification policy and procedures widely available to DOE field offices, DOE contractors, federal agencies, and interested members of the public. 7 refs., 15 figs., 14 tabs

  9. Conclusions on severe accident research priorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klein-Heßling, W.; Sonnenkalb, M.; Jacquemain, D.; Clément, B.; Raimond, E.; Dimmelmeier, H.; Azarian, G.; Ducros, G.; Journeau, C.; Herranz Puebla, L.E.; Schumm, A.; Miassoedov, A.; Kljenak, I.; Pascal, G.; Bechta, S.; Güntay, S.; Koch, M.K.; Ivanov, I.; Auvinen, A.; Lindholm, I.

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • Estimation of research priorities related to severe accident phenomena. • Consideration of new topics, partly linked to the severe accidents at Fukushima. • Consideration of results of recent projects, e.g. SARNET, ASAMPSA2, OECD projects. - Abstract: The objectives of the SARNET network of excellence are to define and work on common research programs in the field of severe accidents in Gen. II–III nuclear power plants and to further develop common tools and methodologies for safety assessment in this area. In order to ensure that the research conducted on severe accidents is efficient and well-focused, it is necessary to periodically evaluate and rank the priorities of research. This was done at the end of 2008 by the Severe Accident Research Priority (SARP) group at the end of the SARNET project of the 6th Framework Programme of European Commission (FP6). This group has updated this work in the FP7 SARNET2 project by accounting for the recent experimental results, the remaining safety issues as e.g. highlighted by Level 2 PSA national studies and the results of the recent ASAMPSA2 FP7 project. These evaluation activities were conducted in close relation with the work performed under the auspices of international organizations like OECD or IAEA. The Fukushima-Daiichi severe accidents, which occurred while SARNET2 was running, had some effects on the prioritization and definition of new research topics. Although significant progress has been gained and simulation models (e.g. the ASTEC integral code, jointly developed by IRSN and GRS) were improved, leading to an increased confidence in the predictive capabilities for assessing the success potential of countermeasures and/or mitigation measures, most of the selected research topics in 2008 are still of high priority. But the Fukushima-Daiichi accidents underlined that research efforts had to focus still more to improve severe accident management efficiency

  10. Department of Transportation -- Exemption for using the Transuranic Package Transporter-I (TRUPACT-I) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Part 107, Subpart B -- Exemptions, 107-103 Application for Exemption)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyacke, M.J.; Macdonald, R.J.

    1992-08-01

    Exemption from specific regulations is being sought for the Transuranic Package Transporter Model I (TRUPACT-I) container. The design has successfully undergone extensive testing of a quarter-scale model and a full-scale prototype of the container. Results from the analysis and testing are in the TRUPACT-1 Safely Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), GA-Al8695/SAND 87-7104 (TTC0735), April 1987 (see Attachment 1). The container was never certified or used because of questions raised during the certification process. Two features of the container design failed to satisfy the regulations for Type B packaging. First, the design utilizes a venting system to control internal and external pressures; this venting system is not allowed by the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Parts 71(h) and 71.51(b) [10 CFR 71.(h) and 71.51(b)]. Second, the maximum quantity fissile material proposed to be hauled in TRUPACT-I exceeded the limits in 10 CFR 71.63(b) for a single-containment container. To correct these design deficiencies, the vents would be plugged during transport, and the maximum quantity of fissile material would be limited to the allowables for a single-containment container. An engineering analysis showed that the container could safely transport radioactive material within the boundaries of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) with the vent system plugged (see Attachment 2). However, some of the requirements for determining pressure on a container need to be changed (i.e., exempted) to reflect conditions unique to the INEL. The following are the requirements needing to be changed for INEL conditions, variances being sought, and justifications for the variances

  11. Major soluble proteome changes in Deinococcus deserti over the earliest stages following gamma-ray irradiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dedieu, Alain; Sahinovic, Elodie; Guerin, Philippe; Armengaud, Jean; Blanchard, Laurence; Fochesato, Sylvain; Groot, Arjan de; Meunier, Bruno

    2013-01-01

    Deinococcus deserti VCD115 has been isolated from Sahara surface sand. This radio-tolerant bacterium represents an experimental model of choice to understand adaptation to harsh conditions encountered in hot arid deserts. We analysed the soluble proteome dynamics in this environmentally relevant model after exposure to 3 kGy gamma radiation, a non-lethal dose that generates massive DNA damages. For this, cells were harvested at different time lapses after irradiation and their soluble proteome contents have been analysed by 2-DE and mass spectrometry. In the first stage of the time course we observed accumulation of DNA damage response protein DdrB (that shows the highest fold change ∼11), SSB, and two different RecA proteins (RecAP and RecAC). Induction of DNA repair protein PprA, DNA damage response protein DdrD and the two gyrase subunits (GyrA and GyrB) was also detected. A response regulator of the SarP family, a type II site-specific deoxyribonuclease and a putative N-acetyltransferase are three new proteins found to be induced. In a more delayed stage, we observed accumulation of several proteins related to central metabolism and protein turn-over, as well as helicase UvrD and novel forms of both gyrase subunits differing in terms of isoelectric point and molecular weight. Conclusions: Post-translational modifications of GyrA (N-terminal methionine removal and acetylation) have been evidenced and their significance discussed. We found that the Deide-02842 restriction enzyme, which is specifically found in D. deserti, is a new potential member of the radiation/desiccation response regulon, highlighting the specificities of D. deserti compared to the D. radiodurans model. (authors)

  12. Landsat satellite evidence of the decline of northern California bull kelp

    Science.gov (United States)

    Renshaw, A.; Houskeeper, H. F.; Kudela, R. M.

    2017-12-01

    Bull kelp (Nereocystis luetkeana), a species of canopy-forming brown macroalga dominant in the Pacific Northwest of North America, provides critical ecological services such as habitat for a diverse array of marine species, nutrient regulation, photosynthesis, and regional marine carbon cycling. Starting around 2014, annual aerial surveys of bull kelp forests along California's northern coastline conducted by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) have reported a sudden 93% reduction in bull kelp canopy area. Remote sensing using satellite imagery is a robust, highly accurate tool for detecting and quantifying the abundance of the canopy-forming giant kelp, Macrocystis pyrifera; however, it has not been successfully applied to measuring northern bull kelp forests. One of the main difficulties associated with bull kelp detection via satellite is the small surface area of bull kelp canopies. As a result, bull kelp beds often only constitute part of a satellite pixel, making it difficult to obtain a kelp reflectance signal significantly different than water's reflectance signal. As part of the NASA Student Airborne Research Program (SARP), we test a novel method for assessing bull kelp canopy using a multiple endmember spectral mixing analysis (MESMA) applied to Landsat 5 and Landsat 8 imagery from 2003-2016. Water and kelp spectral endmembers are selected along the northern California coastline from Havens Neck cape to Point Arena. MESMA results are ground truthed with the CDFW aerial multispectral imagery data. This project will present a satellite-based time series of bull kelp canopy area and evaluate canopy change in a northern California kelp ecosystem.

  13. Physiologic and psychosocial approaches to global management of the hemodialysis patient in the Southern Alberta Renal Program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cormier, Tina; Magat, Ofelia; Hager, Suzy; Ng, Fanny; Lee, Miran

    2012-01-01

    As frontline nurses, we know firsthand the many challenges of renal disease faced by our patients and the impact on their lives and their families. How can we help them cope with their illness? How can we improve their quality of life? How can we prevent the complications inherent to the disease? How do we know we are doing a good job? Where do we start? The purpose of this presentation is to showcase the global management of the hemodialysis (HD) patient. It provides a collaborative and systematic approach to assessing, implementing, evaluating and coordinating the physiologic and the psychosocial aspects of their care. It is a model of case management followed by the Southern Alberta Renal Program (SARP) in meeting the many and complex needs of our hemodialysis patients. The quality indicators, to name a few, that relate to the physiologic aspects of their care are dialysis adequacy and fluid removal, improved blood pressure (BP) control, maintenance and improved vascular access function, anemia, bone and mineral disease management, nutritional, and diabetes management. The psychosocial aspects of care encompass goals of care, residential support, transportation, and mobility programs in the community. There may be positive implications resulting from our practice that we believe would be invaluable in terms of improved patient care, increased adherence to therapeutic regimens, improved mortality and morbidity and overall enhanced quality of life. Moreover, better communication would possibly be fostered and wise and prompt use of resources may be a result. To date, we have not done studies to prove or disprove these outcomes.

  14. A status report on the development and certification of the Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshimura, H.R.; Bronowski, D.R.

    1996-01-01

    In the early 1980s, the US Department of Energy (DOE) implemented a program to encourage beneficial uses of nuclear byproduct materials, such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, created during the production of defense materials. Potential uses of the cesium-137 ( 137 CS) isotope included sterilizing medical products, maintaining the quality of certain food products, and disinfecting municipal sewage sludge. Strontium-90 ( 90 Sr) is a good heat source and has been used in thermoelectric generators and other products that require a constant supply of heat. During that same period, a proposed facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was designed to use cesium-137 to sterilize sewage sludge. To support the sewage sludge treatment facility, Sandia National Laboratories was funded by the DOE to develop a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-certified Type B shipping container to transport cesium chloride (CsCl) or strontium fluoride (SrF 2 ) capsules produced by the Hanford Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) in the State of Washington. The primary purpose of the Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) cask is to provide shielding and confinement, as well as impact, puncture, and thermal protection for certified, special form contents during transport under normal and hypothetical accident conditions. The BUSS cask was designed to meet dimensional and weight constraints of the WESF and user facilities. Attaining as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) radiation exposures in the design and operation of the transport system was a major design goal. Another goal was to obtain regulatory approval of the design by preparing a safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) (Yoshimura et al. 1993)

  15. Emissions from the Bena Landfill

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schafer, C.; Blake, D. R.; Hughes, S.

    2016-12-01

    In 2013, Americans generated 254 million tons of municipal solid waste (MSW). The gas generated from the decomposition of MSW is composed of approximately 50% methane, 50% carbon dioxide, and a small proportion of non-methane organic compounds (NMOCs). NMOCs constitute less than 1% of landfill emissions, but they can have a disproportionate environmental impact as they are highly reactive ozone precursors. During the 2016 Student Airborne Research Program (SARP), whole air samples were collected at the Bena landfill outside of Bakersfield, CA and throughout Bakersfield and analyzed using gas chromatography in order to quantify NMOC emissions. This area was determined to have elevated concentrations of benzene, trichloroethylene, and tetrachloroethylene, all of which are categorized by the EPA as hazardous to human health. Benzene was found to have a concentration of 145 ± 4 pptv, four times higher than the background levels in Bakersfield (36 ± 1 pptv). Trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene had concentrations of 18 ± 1 pptv and 31 ± 1 pptv which were 18 and 10 times greater than background concentrations, respectively. In addition, hydroxyl radical reactivity (ROH) was calculated to determine the potential for tropospheric ozone formation. The total ROH of the landfill was 7.5 ± 0.2 s-1 compared to total background ROH of 1.0 ± 0.1 s-1 . NMOCs only made up 0.6% of total emissions, but accounted for 67% of total ROH.These results can help to shape future landfill emission policies by highlighting the importance of NMOCs in addition to methane. More research is needed to investigate the ozone forming potential of these compounds at landfills across the country.

  16. Accident and Off-Normal Response and Recovery from Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Processing Events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ALDERMAN, C.A.

    2000-01-01

    In the process of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the K Basins through its subsequent packaging, drymg, transportation and storage steps, the SNF Project must be able to respond to all anticipated or foreseeable off-normal and accident events that may occur. Response procedures and recovery plans need to be in place, personnel training established and implemented to ensure the project will be capable of appropriate actions. To establish suitable project planning, these events must first be identified and analyzed for their expected impact to the project. This document assesses all off-normal and accident events for their potential cross-facility or Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) process reversal impact. Table 1 provides the methodology for establishing the event planning level and these events are provided in Table 2 along with the general response and recovery planning. Accidents and off-normal events of the SNF Project have been evaluated and are identified in the appropriate facility Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or in the transportation Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Hazards and accidents are summarized from these safety analyses and listed in separate tables for each facility and the transportation system in Appendix A, along with identified off-normal events. The tables identify the general response time required to ensure a stable state after the event, governing response documents, and the events with potential cross-facility or SNF process reversal impacts. The event closure is predicated on stable state response time, impact to operations and the mitigated annual occurrence frequency of the event as developed in the hazard analysis process

  17. Development of a sensitive Luminex xMAP-based microsphere immunoassay for specific detection of Iris yellow spot virus.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yu, Cui; Yang, Cuiyun; Song, Shaoyi; Yu, Zixiang; Zhou, Xueping; Wu, Jianxiang

    2018-04-04

    Iris yellow spot virus (IYSV) is an Orthotospovirus that infects most Allium species. Very few approaches for specific detection of IYSV from infected plants are available to date. We report the development of a high-sensitive Luminex xMAP-based microsphere immunoassay (MIA) for specific detection of IYSV. The nucleocapsid (N) gene of IYSV was cloned and expressed in Escherichia coli to produce the His-tagged recombinant N protein. A panel of monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) against IYSV was generated by immunizing the mice with recombinant N protein. Five specific MAbs (16D9, 11C6, 7F4, 12C10, and 14H12) were identified and used for developing the Luminex xMAP-based MIA systems along with a polyclonal antibody against IYSV. Comparative analyses of their sensitivity and specificity in detecting IYSV from infected tobacco leaves identified 7F4 as the best-performed MAb in MIA. We then optimized the working conditions of Luminex xMAP-based MIA in specific detection of IYSV from infected tobacco leaves by using appropriate blocking buffer and proper concentration of biotin-labeled antibodies as well as the suitable ratio between the antibodies and the streptavidin R-phycoerythrin (SA-RPE). Under the optimized conditions the Luminex xMAP-based MIA was able to specifically detect IYSV with much higher sensitivity than conventional enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Importantly, the Luminex xMAP-based MIA is time-saving and the whole procedure could be completed within 2.5 h. We generated five specific MAbs against IYSV and developed the Luminex xMAP-based MIA method for specific detection of IYSV in plants. This assay provides a sensitive, high-specific, easy to perform and likely cost-effective approach for IYSV detection from infected plants, implicating potential broad usefulness of MIA in plant virus diagnosis.

  18. Predicted versus executed surgical orthognathic treatment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Falter, B; Schepers, S; Vrielinck, L; Lambrichts, I; Politis, C

    2013-10-01

    This study aimed to analyse combined surgical-orthodontic treatment plans, compare them with the actual surgery performed, and define factors resulting in changes of the original plan during orthodontic pre-surgical preparation. The clinical files of 312 orthognathic surgery patients, operated between January 2008 and December 2010, were retrospectively reviewed. Of these 312 patients, 129 had a bimaxillary operation. One hundred sixty patients had osteotomy of the lower jaw only and 23 had osteotomy of the upper jaw only. Factors analysed in the study include Angle Class malocclusion, patient sex, and age. Lip-to-incisor relationship, overjet, overbite and midline deviations of the upper and lower jaw were recorded. Effects of surgical assisted rapid palatal expansion (SARPE) on the eventual surgery were also investigated. Reasons for changing the original treatment plan at the time of the finished pre-surgical-orthodontic alignment were analysed. The original treatment plan was changed in 42 of the 312 patients (13.5%). Changes occurred generally in case of a larger interval between set-up of the first treatment plan and the eventual operation (average 22.4 versus 16.4 months for patients with changed versus unchanged treatment plan, respectively). All Class I patients had surgery performed as planned. Class III patients had a significantly higher rate of altered treatment plan (27.3%) than Class II patients (7.6%). More men (52.4%) saw their treatment plan changed, although there were more women than men in the study population (59.6 versus 40.4%). One in seven patients (13.5%) had a different operation than was planned at the start of treatment. Class III patients with small overjet and overbite commonly have a treatment plan for a monomaxillary operation that, after decompensation, needs to be adapted to a bimaxillary operation. Copyright © 2012 European Association for Cranio-Maxillo-Facial Surgery. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

    Science.gov (United States)

    Savarino, Shirley; Fitz, Rhonda; Fesq, Lorraine; Whitman, Gerek

    2015-01-01

    The satellite systems Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and operations. This structure is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. These architecture, implementation and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (VV) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Annual Workshop titled VV of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes exposed these issues in terms of VV for a representative set of architectures. NASA's IVV is funded by NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to extend the work performed at the Workshop session. NASA IVV will extract FM architectures across the IVV portfolio and evaluate the data set for robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This work focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated VVIVV techniques provides a data set that can enable higher assurance that a satellite system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the satellite community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the

  20. Internet addiction disorder and problematic use of Google Glass™ in patient treated at a residential substance abuse treatment program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yung, Kathryn; Eickhoff, Erin; Davis, Diane L; Klam, Warren P; Doan, Andrew P

    2015-02-01

    Internet addiction disorder (IAD) is characterized by the problematic use of online video games, computer use, and mobile handheld devices. While not officially a clinical diagnosis according to the most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), individuals with IAD manifest severe emotional, social, and mental dysfunction in multiple areas of daily activities due to their problematic use of technology and the internet. We report a 31year-old man who exhibited problematic use of Google Glass™. The patient has a history of a mood disorder most consistent with a substance induced hypomania overlaying a depressive disorder, anxiety disorder with characteristics of social phobia and obsessive compulsive disorder, and severe alcohol and tobacco use disorders. During his residential treatment program at the Navy's Substance Abuse and Recovery Program (SARP) for alcohol use disorder, it was noted that the patient exhibited significant frustration and irritability related to not being able to use his Google Glass™. The patient exhibited a notable, nearly involuntary movement of the right hand up to his temple area and tapping it with his forefinger. He reported that if he had been prevented from wearing the device while at work, he would become extremely irritable and argumentative. Over the course of his 35-day residential treatment, the patient noted a reduction in irritability, reduction in motor movements to his temple to turn on the device, and improvements in his short-term memory and clarity of thought processes. He continued to intermittently experience dreams as if looking through the device. To our knowledge, this is the first reported case of IAD involving problematic use of Google Glass™. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

  1. Airborne Research Experience for Educators

    Science.gov (United States)

    Costa, V. B.; Albertson, R.; Smith, S.; Stockman, S. A.

    2009-12-01

    The Airborne Research Experience for Educators (AREE) Program, conducted by the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center Office of Education in partnership with the AERO Institute, NASA Teaching From Space Program, and California State University Fullerton, is a complete end-to-end residential research experience in airborne remote sensing and atmospheric science. The 2009 program engaged ten secondary educators who specialize in science, technology, engineering or mathematics in a 6-week Student Airborne Research Program (SARP) offered through NSERC. Educators participated in collection of in-flight remote sensor data during flights aboard the NASA DC-8 as well as in-situ research on atmospheric chemistry (bovine emissions of methane); algal blooms (remote sensing to determine location and degree of blooms for further in-situ analysis); and crop classification (exploration of how drought conditions in Central California have impacted almond and cotton crops). AREE represents a unique model of the STEM teacher-as-researcher professional development experience because it asks educators to participate in a research experience and then translate their experiences into classroom practice through the design, implementation, and evaluation of instructional materials that emphasize the scientific research process, inquiry-based investigations, and manipulation of real data. Each AREE Master Educator drafted a Curriculum Brief, Teachers Guide, and accompanying resources for a topic in their teaching assignment Currently, most professional development programs offer either a research experience OR a curriculum development experience. The dual nature of the AREE model engaged educators in both experiences. Educators’ content and pedagogical knowledge of STEM was increased through the review of pertinent research articles during the first week, attendance at lectures and workshops during the second week, and participation in the airborne and in-situ research studies, data

  2. Environmental patterns and biomass distribution of gelatinous macrozooplankton. Three study cases in the South-western Atlantic Ocean

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    H. W. Mianzan

    2000-12-01

    Full Text Available Periodic swarms or blooms of gelatinous macrozooplankton have a negative effect on many human activities such as tourism, fisheries, and industry, but for several reasons (sampling procedures, underestimation of their real abundance, etc., they have often been neglected in the local literature. The high spatial resolution exercise of the South-western Atlantic anchovy Engraulis anchoita Recruitment Project (SARP was therefore also suitable for estimating standing stocks of jelly macrozooplankton, attempting to establish particular environmental patterns exerting control on the spatial distribution of these facultative carnivorous predators in coastal frontal environments. These studies were carried out through a sampling programme on board the German R/V Meteor in three different systems, convergence and divergent, in the South-western Atlantic Ocean: Region A (42°S on the Argentine shelf, characterised by tidal mixing fronts; Region B (36°S, the freshwater outflow from Río de la Plata; and Region C (28°S, under upwelling events in subtropical waters on the Brazilian shelf. In general, a dominance of gelatinous macrozooplankton, compared with the other fraction of macrozooplankton and micronekton was observed. Mean standing stock of the gelatinous zooplankton was always greater than 50% of organic carbon (org. C in every section analysed. The lobate ctenophore Mnemiopsis leidyi dominated the zooplankton biomass in Region A, Argentina. It represented 60% of total org. C and was more abundant at the stratified zone of the front. Ctenophores were also dominant in Region B, Río de la Plata, where the related species Mnemiopsis mccradyi and the cydippid ctenophore Pleurobrachia pileus comprised 81% of total org. C. Mnemiopsis was most common in areas of vertical thermal and saline stratification, while Pleurobrachia was dominant in the less stratified areas. Gelatinous zooplankton was also the principal component of the macrozooplankton biomass

  3. Connecting Research and Practice: An Experience Report on Research Infusion with SAVE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lindvall, Mikael; Stratton, William C.; Sibol, Deane E.; Ackermann, Christopher; Reid, W. Mark; Ganesan, Dharmalingam; McComas, David; Bartholomew, Maureen; Godfrey, Sally

    2009-01-01

    succeed: 1) there must be evidence that the technology works in the practitioner's particular domain, 2) there must be a potential for great improvements and enhanced competitive edge for the practitioner, 3) the practitioner has to have strong individual curiosity and continuous interest in trying out new technologies, 4) the practitioner has to have support on multiple levels (i.e. from the researchers, from management, from sponsors etc), and 5) to remain infused, the new technology has to be integrated into the practitioner's processes so that it becomes a natural part of the daily work. NASA IV&V's Research Infusion initiative sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (OSMA) through the Software Assurance Research Program (SARP), strives to overcome some of the problems related to research infusion.

  4. Overview of the DOE-EM Packaging Certification Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feldman, M.R.; Bennett, M.E.; Shuler, J.M.

    2009-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Transportation, in 49 CFR 173.7(d) grants the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) the power to use 'packagings made by or under the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy... for the transportation of Class 7 materials when evaluated, approved and certified by the Department of Energy against packaging standards equivalent to those specified in 10 CFR part 71'. Via DOE Order 460.1B, DOE has established the DOE Packaging Certification Program (PCP) within the Department of Environmental Management for purposes including the certification of radioactive materials packages for DOE use. This paper will provide an overview of the programs and activities currently undertaken by the PCP in support of the safe transport of radioactive materials, including technical review of Safety Analysis Reports for Packaging, development of guidance documents and training courses, a quality assurance audit and field assessment program, database and docket management, and testing and test methodology development. The paper will also highlight the various organizations currently utilized by the PCP to meet the requirements of DOE O 460.1B, as well as some creative and effective methods that are being used to meet program objectives. The DOE Package Certification Program's primary function is to perform technical reviews of SARPs in support of the packaging certification process to ensure that the maximum protection is afforded to the public, all federal regulations are met, and the process is as time-effective and cost-effective as possible. Five additional specific functions are also supported by the PCP: development of guidance documents, training courses, a QA audit and field assessment program, database and docket management, and testing methods development. Each of these functions individually contributes to the overall mission of the PCP as defined in DOE O 460.1B. Taken as a whole, these functions represent a robust program to ensure the safety of workers

  5. CH Packaging Operations Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing 'Short' 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing 'Tall' 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.7, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed.

  6. Architectural Analysis of Complex Evolving Systems of Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lindvall, Mikael; Stratton, William C.; Sibol, Deane E.; Ray, Arnab; Ackemann, Chris; Yonkwa, Lyly; Ganesan, Dharma

    2009-01-01

    The goal of this collaborative project between FC-MD, APL, and GSFC and supported by NASA IV&V Software Assurance Research Program (SARP), was to develop a tool, Dynamic SAVE, or Dyn-SAVE for short, for analyzing architectures of systems of systems. The project team was comprised of the principal investigator (PI) from FC-MD and four other FC-MD scientists (part time) and several FC-MD students (full time), as well as, two APL software architects (part time), and one NASA POC (part time). The PI and FC-MD scientists together with APL architects were responsible for requirements analysis, and for applying and evaluating the Dyn-SAVE tool and method. The PI and a group of FC-MD scientists were responsible for improving the method and conducting outreach activities, while another group of FC-MD scientists were responsible for development and improvement of the tool. Oversight and reporting was conducted by the PI and NASA POC. The project team produced many results including several prototypes of the Dyn-SAVE tool and method, several case studies documenting how the tool and method was applied to APL s software systems, and several published papers in highly respected conferences and journals. Dyn-SAVE as developed and enhanced throughout this research period, is a software tool intended for software developers and architects, software integration testers, and persons who need to analyze software systems from the point of view of how it communicates with other systems. Using the tool, the user specifies the planned communication behavior of the system modeled as a sequence diagram. The user then captures and imports the actual communication behavior of the system, which is then converted and visualized as a sequence diagram by Dyn-SAVE. After mapping the planned to the actual and specifying parameter and timing constraints, Dyn-SAVE detects and highlights deviations between the planned and the actual behavior. Requirements based on the need to analyze two inter

  7. Security Vulnerability Profiles of NASA Mission Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports

    Science.gov (United States)

    Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina; Tyo, Jacob P.; Sizemore, Brian

    2017-01-01

    principle. Specifically, for all three datasets, from 86 to 88 the security related issues were located in two to four subsystems.- The severity levels of most security issues were moderate, in all three datasets.- Out of 21 primary security classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, these classes contributed from around 80 to 90 of all security issues in each dataset. This again proves the Pareto principle of uneven distribution of security issues, in this case across CWE classes, and supports the fact that addressing these dominant security classes provides the most cost efficient way to improve missions' security. The findings presented in this report uncovered the security vulnerability profiles and identified the common trends and dominant classes of security issues, which in turn can be used to select the most efficient secure design and coding best practices compiled by the part of the SARP project team associated with the NASA's Johnson Space Center. In addition, these findings provide valuable input to the NASA IVV initiative aimed at identification of the two 25 CWEs of ground and flight missions.

  8. CH Packaging Operations Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing 'Short' 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing 'Tall' 85-gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.7, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Transport trailer operations, package loading and unloading from transport trailers, hoisting and rigging activities such as ACGLF operations, equipment checkout and shutdown, and component inspection activities must be performed, but may be performed in any order and in parallel with other activities as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Steps involving OCA/ICV lid removal/installation and payload removal/loading may be performed in parallel if there are multiple operators working on the same packaging. Steps involving removal/installation of OCV/ICV upper and lower main O-rings must be performed in sequence.

  9. CH Packaging Operations Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing 'Short' 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing 'Tall' 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing Shielded Container Payload Assembly; 1.7, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.8, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Transport trailer operations, package loading and unloading from transport trailers, hoisting and rigging activities such as ACGLF operations, equipment checkout and shutdown, and component inspection activities must be performed, but may be performed in any order and in parallel with other activities as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Steps involving OCA/ICV lid removal/installation and payload removal/loading may be performed in parallel if there are multiple operators working on the same packaging. Steps involving removal/installation of OCV/ICV upper and lower main O-rings must be performed in sequence, except as noted.

  10. CH Packaging Operations Manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2009-05-27

    This document provides the user with instructions for assembling a payload. All the steps in Subsections 1.2, Preparing 55-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.3, Preparing "Short" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT); 1.4, Preparing "Tall" 85-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly (HalfPACT only); 1.5, Preparing 100-Gallon Drum Payload Assembly; 1.6, Preparing Shielded Container Payload Assembly; 1.7, Preparing SWB Payload Assembly; and 1.8, Preparing TDOP Payload Assembly, must be completed, but may be performed in any order as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Transport trailer operations, package loading and unloading from transport trailers, hoisting and rigging activities such as ACGLF operations, equipment checkout and shutdown, and component inspection activities must be performed, but may be performed in any order and in parallel with other activities as long as radiological control steps are not bypassed. Steps involving OCA/ICV lid removal/installation and payload removal/loading may be performed in parallel if there are multiple operators working on the same packaging. Steps involving removal/installation of OCV/ICV upper and lower main O-rings must be performed in sequence, except as noted.

  11. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRU WASTE TRANSPORTATION FLEET--A SUCCESS STORY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Devarakonda, Murthy; Morrison, Cindy; Brown, Mike

    2003-01-01

    Since March 1999, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO), as a repository for the permanent disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. More than 1,450 shipments of TRU waste for WIPP disposal have been completed, and the WIPP is currently receiving 12 to 16 shipments per week from five DOE sites around the nation. One of the largest fleets of Type B packagings supports the transportation of TRU waste to WIPP. This paper discusses the development of this fleet since the original Certificate of Compliance (C of C) for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) was issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1989. Evolving site programs, closure schedules of major sites, and the TRU waste inventory at the various DOE sites have directed the sizing and packaging mix of this fleet. This paper discusses the key issues that guided this fleet development, including the following: While the average weight of a 55-gallon drum packaging debris could be less than 300 pounds (lbs.), drums containing sludge waste or compacted waste could approach the maximum allowable weight of 1,000 lbs. A TRUPACT-II shipment may consist of three TRUPACT-II packages, each of which is limited to a total weight of 19,250 lbs. Payload assembly weights dictated by ''as-built'' TRUPACT-II weights limit each drum to an average weight of 312 lbs when three TRUPACT-IIs are shipped. To optimize the shipment of heavier drums, the HalfPACT packaging was designed as a shorter and lighter version of the TRUPACT-II to accommodate a heavier load. Additional packaging concepts are currently under development, including the ''TRUPACT-III'' packaging being designed to address ''oversized'' boxes that are currently not shippable in the TRUPACT-II or HalfPACT due to size constraints. Shipment optimization is applicable not only to the addition of new

  12. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes 'shipping categories' that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the 'General Case,' which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Close-Proximity Shipments' (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Controlled Shipments

  13. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes 'shipping categories' that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the 'General Case,' which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Close-Proximity Shipments' (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Controlled Shipments

  14. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes 'shipping categories' that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the 'General Case,' which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Close-Proximity Shipments' (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Controlled Shipments

  15. Mobile loading transuranic waste at small quantity sites in the Department of Energy complex-10523

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, Mitch; Howard, Bryan; Weyerman, Wade; Mctaggart, Jerri

    2009-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory, Carlsbad Office (LANL-CO), operates mobile loading operations for all of the large and small quantity transuranic (TRU) waste sites in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The mobile loading team performs loading and unloading evolutions for both contact handled (CH) and remote handled (RH) waste. For small quantity sites, many of which have yet to remove their TRU waste, the mobile loading team will load shipments that will ship to Idaho National Laboratory, a centralization site, or ship directly to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). For example, Argonne National Laboratory and General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center have certified programs for RH waste so they will ship their RH waste directly to WIPP. Many of the other sites will ship their waste to Idaho for characterization and certification. The Mobile Loading Units (MLU) contain all of the necessary equipment needed to load CH and RH waste into the appropriate shipping vessels. Sites are required to provide additional equipment, such as cranes, fork trucks, and office space. The sites are also required to provide personnel to assist in the shipping operations. Each site requires a site visit from the mobile loading team to ensure that all of the necessary site equipment, site requirements and space for shipping can be provided. The mobile loading team works diligently with site representatives to ensure that all safety and regulatory requirements are met. Once the waste is ready and shipping needs are met, the mobile loading team can be scheduled to ship the waste. The CH MLU is designed to support TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT loading activities wherever needed within the DOE complex. The team that performs the mobile loading operation has obtained national certification under DOE for TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT loading and shipment certification. The RH MLU is designed to support removable lid canister (RLC) and RH-72B cask loading activities wherever needed within the DOE

  16. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes 'shipping categories' that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the 'General Case,' which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Close-Proximity Shipments' (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Controlled Shipments

  17. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes 'shipping categories' that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the 'General Case,' which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Close-Proximity Shipments' (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Controlled Shipments

  18. CH-TRU Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes 'shipping categories' that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the 'General Case,' which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Close-Proximity Shipments' (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for 'Controlled Shipments

  19. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2006-09-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  20. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-05-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  1. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2008-01-16

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  2. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2007-02-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  3. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-06-20

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  4. CH-TRU Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-10-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  5. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2006-06-20

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  6. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-01-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codesand corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  7. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2006-12-20

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  8. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2006-08-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  9. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2006-01-18

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  10. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2004-10-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  11. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-03-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  12. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2007-09-20

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  13. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2007-08-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  14. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2004-12-01

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  15. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-11-20

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  16. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-12-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  17. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-01-30

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  18. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-08-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  19. CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2007-06-15

    The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments

  20. Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to summarize the waste acceptance criteria applicable to the transportation, storage, and disposal of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These criteria serve as the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) primary directive for ensuring that CH-TRU waste is managed and disposed of in a manner that protects human health and safety and the environment.The authorization basis of WIPP for the disposal of CH-TRU waste includes the U.S.Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear EnergyAuthorization Act of 1980 (reference 1) and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA;reference 2). Included in this document are the requirements and associated criteriaimposed by these acts and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA,reference 3), as amended, on the CH-TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP.|The DOE TRU waste sites must certify CH-TRU waste payload containers to thecontact-handled waste acceptance criteria (CH-WAC) identified in this document. Asshown in figure 1.0, the flow-down of applicable requirements to the CH-WAC istraceable to several higher-tier documents, including the WIPP operational safetyrequirements derived from the WIPP CH Documented Safety Analysis (CH-DSA;reference 4), the transportation requirements for CH-TRU wastes derived from theTransuranic Package Transporter-Model II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT Certificates ofCompliance (references 5 and 5a), the WIPP LWA (reference 2), the WIPP HazardousWaste Facility Permit (reference 6), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) Compliance Certification Decision and approval for PCB disposal (references 7,34, 35, 36, and 37). The solid arrows shown in figure 1.0 represent the flow-down of allapplicable payload container-based requirements. The two dotted arrows shown infigure 1.0 represent the flow-down of summary level requirements only; i.e., the sitesmust reference the regulatory source

  1. Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-12-29

    The purpose of this document is to summarize the waste acceptance criteria applicable to the transportation, storage, and disposal of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These criteria serve as the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) primary directive for ensuring that CH-TRU waste is managed and disposed of in a manner that protects human health and safety and the environment.The authorization basis of WIPP for the disposal of CH-TRU waste includes the U.S.Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear EnergyAuthorization Act of 1980 (reference 1) and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA;reference 2). Included in this document are the requirements and associated criteriaimposed by these acts and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA,reference 3), as amended, on the CH-TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP.|The DOE TRU waste sites must certify CH-TRU waste payload containers to thecontact-handled waste acceptance criteria (CH-WAC) identified in this document. Asshown in figure 1.0, the flow-down of applicable requirements to the CH-WAC istraceable to several higher-tier documents, including the WIPP operational safetyrequirements derived from the WIPP CH Documented Safety Analysis (CH-DSA;reference 4), the transportation requirements for CH-TRU wastes derived from theTransuranic Package Transporter-Model II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT Certificates ofCompliance (references 5 and 5a), the WIPP LWA (reference 2), the WIPP HazardousWaste Facility Permit (reference 6), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) Compliance Certification Decision and approval for PCB disposal (references 7,34, 35, 36, and 37). The solid arrows shown in figure 1.0 represent the flow-down of allapplicable payload container-based requirements. The two dotted arrows shown infigure 1.0 represent the flow-down of summary level requirements only; i.e., the sitesmust reference the regulatory source