The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Spain and the United States of America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1967-01-01

The text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, Spain and the United States of America relating to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Spain and the United States of America. Protocol of Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-02-01

The text of the Protocol suspending the application of safeguards pursuant to the Safeguards Transfer Agreement of 9 December 1966, as amended, between the Agency, Spain and the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

The Text of a Safeguards Transfer Agreement Relating to the Bilateral Agreement Between Sweden and the United States of America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of a Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, Sweden and the United States of America relating to the agreement of 28 July 1966, as amended, between the two Governments for co-operation in the civil uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to The Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1965-12-14

The text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, the Philippines and the United States of America relating to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to The Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1965-01-01

The text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, the Philippines and the United States of America relating to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1966-12-15

The text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America relating to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1966-01-01

The text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America relating to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Thailand and the United States of America. Protocol of Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Protocol suspending the Safeguards Transfer Agreement of 30 September 1964 between the Agency, Thailand and the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of a Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to a Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of China and the United States of America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of a Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, the Republic of China and the United States of America relating to the agreement of 18 July 1955 between the two Governments for co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of a Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to a Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of China and the United States of America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-03-08

The text of a Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, the Republic of China and the United States of America relating to the agreement of 18 July 1955 between the two Governments for co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Sweden and the United States of America. Protocol of Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Protocol of 14 April 1975 suspending the Safeguards Transfer Agreement of 1 March 1972 between the Agency, Sweden and the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement Relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Iran and the United States of America. Protocol of Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Protocol suspending the Safeguards Transfer Agreement of 4 March 1969 between the Agency, Iran and the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Protocol entered into force, pursuant to Section 3 thereof, on 15 May 1974.

Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

1977-01-01

The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States of America. Protocol of Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the protocol suspending the Safeguards Transfer Agreement of 26 September 1966 between the Agency, Australia and the United States of America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

A Comparative Study on Safeguards Implementation under Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeon, Jihye; Kim, Ki-Hyun; Lee, Young Wook [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

A Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) requires several conditions, so-called obligations, on the items under the agreement such as: 1) peaceful use, 2) retransfer consent, 3) consent prior to reprocessing or enrichment and 4) safeguards and security. These obligations of the NCAs are imposed by the supplier country. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its member states require similar activities. However, there is a significant gap in nuclear material accountancy between safeguards implementation under the NCA and CSA. The difference of those two frameworks is compared herein, focusing on the unique features of the NCA safeguards and its implications are presented. In this study, the NCAs between the ROK and Canada, Australia and US were analyzed since each of them is one of the ROK’s major nuclear trading partners. The safeguards implementation under the NCA is usually specified in an Administrative Arrangement (AA) under the Agreement. The ROK has two AAs in force with Canada and Australia among 29 countries with NCA. Recently, the AA with Canada was revised in December 2015, with those concepts mentioned above. The AA with the US is currently under discussion. Cooperation in nuclear energy between two countries could be further enhanced through reliable implementation of the NCA undertakings. Taking into account the unique features of the NCA, we need to establish effective strategy for fulfilling the obligation under the Agreement.

The Text of the Safeguards agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Switzerland and the United States of America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-04-20

The text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency. Switzerland and the United States of America relating to the agreement of 30 December 1965 between the two Governments for co-operation in the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for 'the information of all Members.

Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

20 years of the implementation of the safeguards agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramirez Quijada, Renan

2001-01-01

Peru has signed an INFIRC/153 type safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1979. The paper describes the nuclear material under control and outlines the organization and the activities related to the implementation of the safeguards agreements

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-06-01

This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-04-01

This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

Nuclear safeguards policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1982-01-01

Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

The Text of the Safeguards Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between India and the United States of America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America providing for the Agency to apply safeguards in relation to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the civil uses of atomic energy, is reproduced in part I of this document for the information of all Members. The text of the co-operation agreement is reproduced in part II. The Safeguards Agreement entered into force on 27 January 1971

The Text of the Safeguards Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between India and the United States of America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-09-03

The text of the Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America providing for the Agency to apply safeguards in relation to the agreement between those Governments concerning co-operation in the civil uses of atomic energy, is reproduced in part I of this document for the information of all Members. The text of the co-operation agreement is reproduced in part II. The Safeguards Agreement entered into force on 27 January 1971.

The Text of the Safeguards Transfer Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Colombia and the United States of America. Protocol Prolonging the Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Protocol of 28 March 1977 prolonging the Agreement of 9 December 1970 between the Agency, Colombia and the United States of America for the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Protocol entered into force, pursuant to section 2, on 28 March 1977.

The Text of a Safeguards Agreement relating to the Bilateral Agreement between Japan and Australia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-01-26

The text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Japan and Australia relating to the agreement of 21 February 1972 between the two Governments for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities. Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards Under the Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

In accordance with Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (hereinafter “the Agreement”), India shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer any facility identified by India for Agency safeguards under the Agreement. Any facility so notified by India becomes subject to the Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India, and is to be included in the Annex to the Agreement. On 11 March 2014, the Agency received from India written notification, pursuant to Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement, of its decision to bring one additional facility under safeguards in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Pursuant to Paragraph 14 4(a) of the Agreement, the Annex to the Agreement has been updated and is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency

Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities. Addition to the List of Facilities Subject to Safeguards Under the Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

In accordance with Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (hereinafter “the Agreement”), India shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer any facility identified by India for Agency safeguards under the Agreement. Any facility so notified by India becomes subject to the Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India, and is to be included in the Annex to the Agreement. On 11 March 2014, the Agency received from India written notification, pursuant to Paragraph 14(a) of the Agreement, of its decision to bring one additional facility under safeguards in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Pursuant to Paragraph 14 4(a) of the Agreement, the Annex to the Agreement has been updated and is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency [es

Safeguards agreement and additional protocol - IAEA instruments for control of nuclear materials distribution and their application in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nasrulloev, Kh.; Mirsaidov, U.

2010-01-01

Full text: It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. During 5 years Republic of Tajikistan submits information on its nuclear activity as declarations, foreseen in article 2.3 of Additional protocol to Safeguards agreement. Currently 66 declarations are submitted. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; the more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. IAEA inspection mission consisting of Messrs. N.Lazarev and F. Coillou visited Dushanbe in 2008 for verification of republic’s declarations on account for and control of nuclear materials under Additional protocol and Small quantity protocol, as well as consultations were provided on correct declaration completing and providing information on all nuclear materials. Besides, in 2006, the training course was conducted in Chkalovsk with participation of Commonwealth of Independent States countries on Safeguards agreement and Additional protocol. These visits and events will facilitate to strengthening of weapons of mass destruction non

The text of the agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 23 October 1973 between Argentina and the IAEA relating to the application of safeguards has been suspended

Towards more efficient safeguards approach of transfer campaign in Wolsong CANDU reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, S. K.; Na, W. W.; Park, W. S.; Jung, S. T.; Park, S. J.

2002-01-01

Due to the unique character of the CANDU reactor, a transfer campaign has been carried out every year for 2 months or so in Wolsong unit 1. It is expected to require performance of the transfer campaign for 4 units of Wolsong site in 2006 and more than 50% of the ROK safeguards inspection efforts. The IAEA and TCNC have gained several years of experience in safeguards approach during transfer campaign. Occasionally the deterrence and interference of operator transfer work have been occurred in order to attain safeguards inspection goal. These could be minimized using optimum C/S applications, NDA and RDT techniques. This paper shows the interrelationship and combinations of these resources and proposes new safeguards approach to maintain the continuity of knowledge from fuel loading in the spent fuel pond to the point of canister loading and closure during transfer campaign

Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-09-01

This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-12-01

This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

This document is a model Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives

The Text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Canada and India

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between the Agency, the Government of Canada and the Government of India providing for the Agency to apply safeguards in connection with the Agreement of 16 December 1963 between those Governments relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station is reproduced in Part I below for the information of all Members. The texts of the latter Agreement and of a supplementary agreement amending it are reproduced in Parts II and III respectively

The Text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Canada and India

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-11-06

The text of the agreement between the Agency, the Government of Canada and the Government of India providing for the Agency to apply safeguards in connection with the Agreement of 16 December 1963 between those Governments relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station is reproduced in Part I below for the information of all Members. The texts of the latter Agreement and of a supplementary agreement amending it are reproduced in Parts II and III respectively.

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

2012-06-15

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, Renaud; )

2012-01-01

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

Technology transfer - insider protection workshop (Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strait, R.S.; Renis, T.A.

1986-01-01

The Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat, developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is a field-applicable tool to evaluate facility safeguards against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by nonviolent insiders. To ensure successful transfer of this technology from the laboratory to DOE field offices and contractors, LLNL developed a three-part package. The package includes a workbook, user-friendly microcomputer software, and a three-day training program. The workbook guides an evaluation team through the Safeguards Evaluation Method and provides forms for gathering data. The microcomputer software assists in the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness. The software is designed for safeguards analysts with no previous computer experience. It runs on an IBM Personal Computer or any compatible machine. The three-day training program is called the Insider Protection Workshop. The workshop students learn how to use the workbook and the computer software to assess insider vulnerabilities and to evaluate the benefits and costs of potential improvements. These activities increase the students' appreciation of the insider threat. The workshop format is informal and interactive, employing four different instruction modes: classroom presentations, small-group sessions, a practical exercise, and ''hands-on'' analysis using microcomputers. This approach to technology transfer has been successful: over 100 safeguards planners and analysts have been trained in the method, and it is being used at facilities through the DOE complex

The text of the agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with a co-operation agreement between Argentina and Canada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with a co-operation agreement between Argentina and Canada has been suspended

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

The text of the agreement between the Agency and Argentina for the application of safeguards to Embalse Power Reactor Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 6 December 1974 between the Agency and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Embalse Power Reactor Facility has been suspended

The text of the agreement between the Agency and Argentina for the application of safeguards to the Atucha power reactor facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 3 October 1972 between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to the Atucha Power Reactor Facility has been suspended

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, Robert; Truong, Q.S. Bob; Keeffe, Richard; Whiting, Neville; Green, Brian

2001-01-01

Full text: To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to dry storage facilities, which are built on site. Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to the dry storage facilities. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Point Lepreau and Gentilly and Pickering CANDU reactor stations. When the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the Pickering site and how that approach might be applied to the Bruce site. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using Global Positioning System (GPS), Geospatial Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity and remote surveillance and monitoring. (author)

Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system (Programme 93+2)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tani, Hiroshi

1999-01-01

Present safeguards systems against nuclear proliferation as well as their improvement activities for more effective results are reviewed. First, the mechanism of the NPT Safeguards System is explained, which is the grasp of inventories of nuclear materials through change and transfer booking starting with actual investigation. Then, other various safeguards systems are described, including TLATELOCO (Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America), VO (Voluntary Offer), OCA (Other Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement), PA (Project Agreement), US (Unilateral Submission), and OSA (Other Safeguards Agreement). Thirdly, the present status and problems of the nuclear proliferation prevention in the world are described, including competitive nuclear weapon development in India and Pakistan, and Iraq and North Korea problems. Lastly, the 93 + 2 plan to improve the present system is explained. (M.M.)

Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vaclav, J.

2010-01-01

The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina Relating to the Application of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 23 October 1973 pursuant to Section 10.

The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina Relating to the Application of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-18

The text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 23 October 1973 pursuant to Section 10.

Overview of IAEA guidelines for state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: objectives, diversion of nuclear material, and the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buechler, C.

1984-01-01

Topics discussed include IAEA safeguards statutes, project and transfer agreements, agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementation of IAEA safeguards, diversion strategies, accountancy and surveillance systems, and verification

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

1976-01-01

Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 22 September 1975 between the Agency, France and the Republic of Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 22 September 1975 between the Agency, France and the Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards with respect to nuclear material and related items supplied by France to the Republic of Korea, and with respect to added items made or used on the basis of information supplied by France to the Republic, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force pursuant to Section 28 on 22 September 1975. The application of safeguards under it in the Republic of Korea was, however, suspended pursuant to Section 27 on 14 November 1975, the date on which a safeguards agreement between the Republic and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force.

The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

1983-01-01

A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

To Russia with love: how the Australian Government's much vaunted safeguards policy has been watered down, step by step

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Milliken, R.

1981-01-01

Australia's uranium safeguards policy was announced in May 1977. The following conditions were included: no contracts could be signed until safeguards agreements had been concluded; uranium sold must remain Australian owned until it had been processed into a form attracting IAEA safeguards inspection; and prior Australian consent was required before a customer could reprocess Australian uranium, transfer it to a third country, or enrich it to a grade higher than that needed for normal power plants. Australia has signed 9 safeguards agreements and two more are due to be finalised soon. The author discusses changes in policy since the first agreement was signed. One problem has been conflict between commercial and safeguards issues

International safeguards 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1979-01-01

First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

The Text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Republic of China

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1969-10-30

The text of the agreement between the Agency and the Republic of China for the application of safeguards to the Taiwan research reactor facility, which entered into force on 13 October 1969, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Exchange of notes constituting an implementing arrangement, concerning international obligation exchanges, to the agreement between the Government of Australia and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) concerning transfers of nuclear material of 21 September 1981

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The implementing arrangement which entered into force on 8 September 1993, concerns the safeguard obligations attaching to nuclear material transferred or re transferred pursuant to the Agreement on Nuclear Transfers between Australia and the European Atomic Energy Community

Protocol to suspend the application of safeguards pursuant to the Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol of 16 October 1998 suspending the application of safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/237) of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA. The Protocol entered into force on 21 October 1999

Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

2015-01-01

Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

Agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

These columns summarize the different bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded recently between the different OECD countries and concerning the nuclear energy domain: Argentina - Australia: Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2001). Argentina - Brazil: Joint Declaration regarding the Creation of the Argentinean-Brazilian Agency for Nuclear Energy Applications (2001). Australia - Czech Republic / Australia - Hungary: Agreements on Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear Material (2001). Australia - Indonesia: Arrangement Concerning Co-operation on Nuclear Safeguards and Related Matters (2001). Austria - Switzerland: Agreement on the Early Exchange of Information in the Field of Nuclear Safety and Radiation. Brazil - United States: Extension of the Agreement concerning Research and Development in Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy, Verification, Physical Protection, and Advanced Containment and Surveillance Technologies for International Safeguards Applications (2001). Czech Republic - Republic of Korea: Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2001). European Union- Russian Federation: Agreements on Nuclear Safety and Controlled Nuclear Fusion (2001). France - United States: Agreement for Co-operation in Advanced Nuclear Reactor Science and Technology (2001). Japan - United Kingdom: Co-operation Agreement on Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Fast Breeder Reactor and Other Related Technologies (2001). Republic OF Korea - United States: Annex IV Joint Project on Cintichem Technology (2000). Morocco - United States: Protocol amending the Co-operation Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2001). Multilateral Agreements: Agreement for Information Exchange on Radiological Surveillance in Northern Europe (2001). Status of Conventions in the Field of Nuclear Energy. (author)

Agreement of 20 September 1988 between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-10-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of China to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in peaceful nuclear facilities to be designated by China within its territory with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from those facilities while such material is subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 10 February 1977 between the Agency, Canada and Spain

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-05-05

The text of the Agreement of 10 February 1977 between the Agency, Canada and Spain for the application of safeguards in relation to the Agreement of 7 July 1975 between the two Governments for the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Section 34, on 10 February 1977.

Information required from States, including 'small quantities protocol' status, under the Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tuley, N.

1999-01-01

The Model, or Additional, Protocol to the Model Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/153, contains, inter alia, provisions for expanded declarations from Member States to the IAEA. These provisions include earlier design information declarations and information on fuel cycles activities, such a mining and milling, that were not previously part of safeguards. The session discusses the extent of the expanded declarations and provides examples of the forms that will be used to provide the information to the Agency. (author)

Nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estrampres, J.

2010-01-01

Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

1995-01-01

In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The continuing role of item-specific agreements in the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeFrancia, Cristian

2012-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 'safeguards system' serves as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, under which the IAEA acts as an auditor, monitor and inspector of state-administered nuclear energy programmes. The system consists of agreements and practices that enable the IAEA to gain a clear picture of a state's nuclear activities in order to provide credible assurances that nuclear energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes

Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Morocco to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Estimated incremental costs for NRC licensees to implement the US/IAEA safeguards agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, R.G.; Brouns, R.J.; Chockie, A.D.; Davenport, L.C.; Merrill, J.A.

1979-01-01

A study was recently completed for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commision (NRC) by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to identify the incremental cost of implementing the US/IAEA safeguards treaty agreement to eligible NRC licensees. Sources for the study were cost estimates from several licensees who will be affected by the agreement and cost analyses by PNL staff. The initial cost to all eligible licensees to implement the agreement is estimated by PNL to range from $1.9 to $7.2 million. The annual cost to these same licensees for the required accounting and reporting activities is estimated at $0.5 to $1.5 million. Annual inspection costs to the industry for the limited IAEA inspection being assumed is estimated at $80,000 to $160,000

Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rames, J.

1999-01-01

This presentation discusses the legal framework of IAEA Safeguards which consists of a number of elements, including agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings, basic safeguards documents (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, INFCIRC/153 (Corr..), INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, GC(V)/INF/39), the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements, and finally the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Boards of Governors. Major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguard agreements are described

IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, Nikolai

2001-01-01

IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rockwood, Laura

2001-01-01

The legal framework of IAEA safeguards consists of a number of elements, not at all of which are documents. These elements include the Statute of the IAEA; treaties and supply agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings; the basic safeguards documents, the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements; and finally, the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Board of Governors. After a discussion of these elements the major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Finally the procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguards agreements are described. (author)

The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina relating to the Application of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994 [es

NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kyd, D.R.

1993-10-01

Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), combines the statutory office of Director of Safeguards with that of Director, Chemical Weapons Convention Office (CWCO). The Director General also performs the functions of the Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office (ACTBO) on an informal basis, as the relevant legislation has not yet come into effect. Throughout the year, ASNO made a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Additional Protocol enters general application, as well as the specific arrangements which will apply in Australia. In the latter context, ASNO offers the IAEA a safeguards-friendly environment, together with constructive critique, to assist in the development and testing of new techniques. This work is important in ensuring the effective implementation of strengthened safeguards elsewhere. Substantial progress were made on several new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. An agreement with the US covering transfer of the Silex laser enrichment technology came into force, and ASNO is now working with US authorities to develop the detailed administrative arrangements required to give effect to this agreement. Also concluded during the year was an agreement with New Zealand covering transfers of uranium for non-nuclear use (as a colouring agent in glass manufacture). ASNO was also working closely with ANSTO to ensure that nuclear material accountancy and control at Lucas Heights accords with best international practice, particularly having regard to the requirements of the IAEA under integrated safeguards. Excellent professional relationship were maintained with the OPCW and counterpart national authorities

The voluntary safeguards offer of the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Houck, F.S.

1985-01-01

During negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concerns were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that their acceptance of Agency safeguards would put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the nuclear-weapon States. To allay these concerns, the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1967 made voluntary offers to accept Agency safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Subsequently, France made a voluntary offer, the safeguards agreement for which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1978, with a view to encouraging acceptance of Agency safeguards by additional States. More recently, in February 1985 the Board approved the safeguards agreement for the voluntary offer of the USSR, made inter alia to encourage further acceptance of Agency safeguards. These safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon-States have two important features in common: Namely, they result from voluntary offers to accept safeguards rather than from multilateral or bilateral undertakings, and they give the Agency the right but generally not an obligation to apply its safeguards. The agreements differ in certain respects, the most noteworthy of which is the scope of the nuclear activities covered by each offer. The agreements of the United States and United Kingdom are the broadest, covering all peaceful nuclear activities in each country. The safeguards agreement for the US voluntary offer has been in force since December 1980. Now is an appropriate time to review the experience with the agreement's implementation during its first four years, as well as its history and salient features

Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

2015-01-01

Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

The Text of the Agreement of 1 April 1981 Between Spain and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards Relating to Four Nuclear Facilities. Agreement to Amend the Agreement of 1 April 1981. Corrigendum

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-07-01

The Agreement of 4 July 1985 to Amend the Agreement of 1 April 1981 between the Government of Spain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Relation to Four Nuclear Facilities entered into force on 8 November 1985, and not on 24 September 1985 as indicated in document INFCIRC/291/Mod.1 paragraph 2

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States' understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in 'Safeguards Implementation Practices' (SIPs) to be published separately.

The Text of an Agreement between the Agency and the United Kingdom for the Application of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-02-06

The text of the Agreement of 14 December 1972 between the Agency and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the application of safeguards is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Implementation of a Strengthened International Safeguards System ABBAC 15 years

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vicens, Hugo; Maceiras, Elena; Dominguez, Cristina A.

2008-01-01

The purpose of the paper is to explain how the system of a regional safeguard has been operating and developing in the framework of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and how the international recommendation of radiological protection must be taken into account in the safeguards implementation and its impact in the international context. The ABACC has been a dynamic system, which contributes worldwide in the application of the regional and international safeguard. In 2006, the ABACC celebrated its 15th anniversary. The ABBAC was created in 1991 in the framework of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, the ABBAC was created in order to apply the aforementioned system called 'Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials' (SCCC). During this time, the ABBAC has grown in its implementation and has become a model in the application of regional safeguards that is recognized internationally. The ABBAC was the pillar to signed an Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABBAC and the International Atomic Energy Agency, called 'Quadripartite Agreement', committed themselves to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all the nuclear activities performed in both countries. The ABACC and the relevant implementing and supplementary agreements, set forth the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exchange of technical staff, the transfer of knowledge and international cooperation in a strong commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This introduction provides an overview of political, legal and technical aspects implemented in the ABACC, which will be developed later in the paper. (author)

IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that is supported by detailed guidance and examples in safeguards implementation practices presented in other publications in the series. (This version is the 2016 update.)

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement Between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with New Zealand to Amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolilferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 24 February 2014, the date on which the Agency received New Zealand's affirmative reply

The text of the agreement of 1 July 1986 between Albania and the Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities of Albania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-10-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 1 July 1986 between the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities of Albania. It contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Albania to accept safeguards on all nuclear material or facilities within its territory, or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere for the purpose of verifying that such material is not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement entered into force on 25 March 1988

The text of the agreement of 14 October 1981 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of Safeguards in relation to the heavy water production plant at Arroyito

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 14 October 1981 between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in relation to the heavy water production plant at Arroyito has been suspended

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of Australia concerning the transfer of nuclear material between Finland and Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

This Agreement between two non-nuclear weapon States was signed on 20 July 1978 under the Non-proliferation Treaty. It lays down that nuclear material may only be transferred to a body duly authorised by the recipient Party's appropriate Governmental Authority; such material may not be used for nuclear weapons or diverted to military purposes and is subject to IAEA safeguards and physical protection measures. Provision is made for regular consultation between both Parties on effective implementation of the Agreement which will remain in force for 30 years. (NEA) [fr

REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

2010-01-01

Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of

IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

The Text of the Agreement for the Application of Agency Safeguards to United States Reactor Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1964-08-14

The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the United States of America for the application of Agency safeguards to United States reactor facilities, which was signed on 15 June 1964 and entered into force on 1 August 1964, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Ghana to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the agreement of 27 June 1975 between the two Governments for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which entered into force on 26 February 1976

The text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-05-26

The document reproduces the text of the Safeguards Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the agreement of 27 June 1975 between the two Governments for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which entered into force on 26 February 1976.

The text of the agreement of 14 October 1981 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of Safeguards to heavy water supplied from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 14 October 1981 between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to heavy water supplied from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been suspended

IAEA safeguard system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pontes, B.C.

1987-01-01

The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

2002-09-01

One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

Safeguarding research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Powers, J.A.

1983-03-01

The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-06-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-12-15

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan for the application of safeguards with respect to a fuel reprocessing plant and to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and relevant technological information supplied by France to Pakistan for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-06-22

The text of the Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan for the application of safeguards with respect to a fuel reprocessing plant and to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and relevant technological information supplied by France to Pakistan for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

The Text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with a Co-operation Agreement between Argentina and Canada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-11-28

The text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Agreement of 30 January 1976 between the Governments of Argentina and Canada for co-operation in the development and application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Section 31, on 22 July 1977.

The Text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with a Co-operation Agreement between Argentina and Canada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 22 July 1977 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Agreement of 30 January 1976 between the Governments of Argentina and Canada for co-operation in the development and application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Section 31, on 22 July 1977.

Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Panama to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 March 1984 between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Nuclear safeguards research and development

Science.gov (United States)

Henry, C. N.

1981-11-01

The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

The Text of an Agreement between the Agency and Spain Relating to the Application of Safeguards to a Quantity of Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-07-23

The text of an agreement between the Agency and Spain relating to the application of safeguards to a quantity of enriched uranium is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The agreement entered into force on 18 June 1975, pursuant to Section 24.

Implementation of Safeguards for Romania National LOFs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Popovici, I.

2015-01-01

The safe deployment of nuclear activities in Romania is provided by Law no. 111/1996. The Law was republished based on the provisions of Article II of Law no. 63/2006 for the amendment and addition and was modified and completed by the Law no. 378/2013. The competent national authority in the nuclear field, which has responsibilities of regulation, authorization and control as stipulated in this Law, is the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). According to art. 2c), provisions of the Nuclear Law shall apply to production, sitting and construction, supply, leasing, transfer, handling, possession, processing, treatment, use, temporary storage or final disposal, transport, transit, import and export of radiological installations, nuclear and radioactive materials, including nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and ionizing radiation generating devices. With regards to the small holders of nuclear materials, the Romanian legislation takes into account the following safeguards objectives: · Establishing provisions governing the possession, use, transfer, import and export of nuclear materials; · Ensuring the implementation of the safeguards system for accountancy and control of nuclear materials: · Ensuring that all nuclear materials are reported under the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement; · Ensuring that all nuclear activities are declared under the provisions of the Additional Protocol; · Developing and implementing nuclear material accounting and control procedures at all small holders of nuclear materials; · Ensuring training for safeguards staff at all small holders. Based on the provision of Law no. 111/1996 CNCAN has issued a Guidelines for applying of the safeguards by the small holders of nuclear materials from Romania. The guidelines provide specific regulations regarding the movement of the nuclear materials, the accountancy and control of nuclear materials, the containment and surveillance systems for small holders of nuclear

The Text of the Agreement for the Application of Agency Safeguards to Four United States Reactor Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1962-05-24

The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the United States of America for the application of Agency safeguards to four United States reactor facilities, which was signed on 30 March 1962 and will enter into force on 1 June 1962, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency.

The Text of an Agreement between the Agency and Spain Relating to the Application of Safeguards to a Quantity of Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of an agreement between the Agency and Spain relating to the application of safeguards to approximately 4. 5 kilograms of enriched uranium is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The agreement entered into force on 19 November 1974, pursuant to Section 10.

The Text of an Agreement between the Agency and Spain Relating to the Application of Safeguards to a Quantity of Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-01-20

The text of an agreement between the Agency and Spain relating to the application of safeguards to approximately 4. 5 kilograms of enriched uranium is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The agreement entered into force on 19 November 1974, pursuant to Section 10.

Agreement of 1 July 1986 between Albania and the Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities of Albania. An agreement by exchange of letters of 31 October and 28 November 2002 with the Republic of Albania in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: - the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 1 that entered into force on 25 March 1988, concluded between the Republic of Albania and the IAEA, satisfies the obligation of Albania under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); - the safeguards set forth in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Albania, in connection with the NPT; - notwithstanding Article 25 of the SGA, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement shall remain in force as long as Albania is party to the NPT. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002 and, pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

The Texts of the Agreements for the Application of Agency Safeguards to the Bradwell Reactor Facility in the United Kingdom

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1966-09-23

The texts of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the application of safeguards with regard to the Bradwell Nuclear Power Station, and of the Supplementary Agreement thereto, which were signed on 20 June 1966 and entered into force on 1 September 1966, are reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Safeguarding arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Flanagan, S.J.

1988-01-01

This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

Recent developments in the implementation of Euratom safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.; Bommelle, P.; Sharpe, B.W.; Love, B.

1983-01-01

The EURATOM safeguards system is based legally on the 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the original Community of six (now 10) countries. Under this safeguards system, the Commission has, inter alia, ''to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with'' (art. 77b). The practical implementation of safeguards within the Community is significantly influenced by the requirements of: (a) the three different agreements between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA, concerning the application of IAEA safeguards to some or all of the civil nuclear materials in the Community, and (b) the various agreements between the Community and certain third countries, concerning inter alia the application of safeguards within the Community to nuclear materials supplied, directly or indirectly, by these third countries. Within the past four years significant developments have occurred in both groups of agreements. The EURATOM safeguards organisation is the only multinational safeguards organisation in the world, and currently has a staff of some 120 inspectors, with appropriate administrative support, and can draw for research and development work on the resources of the Community's Joint Research Centre. The recent changes in inspection techniques, particularly in relation to non-destructive assay techniques, and the implementation of containment and surveillance measures, are discussed. A description is given of the experience gained in recent years in the operation of ''Joint Teams'' of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors in certain plants as well as the continuing experience gained under the normal regime, using the observation principle, as foreseen in the respective Agreement

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in ‘Safeguards Implementation Practices’ (SIPs) to be published separately

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Arabic Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in ‘Safeguards Implementation Practices’ (SIPs) to be published separately.

Experience in safeguarding nuclear material at the Rheinsberg nuclear power station

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Winkler, R.

1976-01-01

The three years' experience that has been gained in application of the Safeguards Agreement shows that the carrying out of inspections at the nuclear power plant has virtually no effect on operating conditions. In future it will be possible to reduce this effect even further and still maintain the operational reliability of the station. Verification of the transfer of nuclear material and detection of possible violations have proved relatively simple. The labour requirement of each unit at the station for the performance of inspections is not more that thirty man-days. Constructive collaboration between power station staff and inspectors is of great importance in improving the safeguards procedures. (author)

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

77 FR 38033 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

Science.gov (United States)

2012-06-26

... DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Foreign Agricultural Service WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels... and trigger levels for safeguard measures provided for in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement... measures under the safeguard provisions of the WTO [[Page 38034

The text of the agreement of 8 July 1982 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of Safeguards in connection with the supply of nuclear material from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 8 July 1982 between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of nuclear material from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been suspended

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement Between the Agency and Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Embalse Power Reactor Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Embalse Power Reactor Facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between the Agency and Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Atucha Power Reactor Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-01-25

The text of the Agreement between the Agency and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Application of Safeguards to the Atucha Power Reactor Facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets for...

Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1983-01-01

The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Almeida, S.G. de

1986-01-01

The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 1 August 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 2 February 2009. Pursuant to paragraph 108 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 11 May 2009, the date on which the Agency received from India written notification that India's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) | FNLCR Staging

Science.gov (United States)

Material Transfer Agreements are appropriate for exchange of materials into or out of the Frederick National Labfor research or testing purposes, with no collaborative research by parties involving the materials.

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement and is furthered through a common understanding of the respective rights and obligations of States and the IAEA. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published IAEA Services Series No. 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding and improving cooperation in safeguards implementation. To meet their safeguards obligations, States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up their infrastructure to meet their specific needs. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to differences in the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes, their regulatory framework and other factors. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. This SIP Guide addresses the important topic of the provision of information by States to the IAEA. Declarations by States form the basis for IAEA verification activities, and the quality and timeliness of such declarations impact significantly the efficiency of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and their use is voluntary. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. An agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 17 November 2003 with the Republic of Panama in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. This Exchange of Letters constitutes an agreement confirming that: the Safeguards Agreement of 23 March 1984, concluded between the Republic of Panama and the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty), also satisfies the obligation of Panama under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; the safeguards set forth in the Safeguards Agreement shall also apply, as regards Panama, in connection with the NPT; the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply as long as Panama is party to the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty or both. The agreement reflected in the Exchange of Letters was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 November 2003, and pursuant to its terms, entered into force on that date

Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Honduras to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between the Republic of Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

1976-01-01

The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

The text of the agreement of 29 February 1988 between Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-10-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 29 February 1988 and of the Protocol thereto, between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Nigeria to accept safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement and the Protocol entered into force on 29 February 1988

Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Mauritius in connection with the amendment of Article 15 of the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Through the attached Exchange of Letters, Article 15 of the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been amended to read as follows: 'The Government of Mauritius and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Government of Mauritius or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.'

Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Mauritius in connection with the amendment of Article 15 of the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Through the attached Exchange of Letters, Article 15 of the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been amended to read as follows: 'The Government of Mauritius and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Government of Mauritius or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request.' [es

Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

2010-01-01

IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

A view to the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsuboi, Hiroshi

2000-01-01

The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wagner, W.

2000-01-01

A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Croatia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency. The amendments agreed upon in the Exchange of Letters entered into force on 26 May 2008, the date on which the Agency received from Croatia written notification that Croatia's internal requirements for entry into force had been fulfilled

Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-03-01

The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one.

Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-03-01

The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Ukraine to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1995, signed in Vienna on 21 September 1995, and entered into force on 22 January 1998

Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

2010-01-01

After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

Development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Doo; Song, Dae Yong; So, Dong Sup; Kwack, Eun Ho [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

2000-04-01

Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described. 3 tabs. (Author)

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The international safeguards profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1986-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

Strengthening regional safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

1996-01-01

Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

Entry into Force of the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prieto, N.; Recio, M.

2004-01-01

The development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy has always been linked to verification of the truthfulness of such peaceful application. such checks must necessarily be undertaken by people or organisations possessing technical competence and a status of independence recognised by the international community. this is the case of the safeguards inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The history of safeguards dates back to the speech Atoms for Peace, given by the US President Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8th December 1953. In his speech, Eisenhower underlined the serious threat of the incipient atomic weapons race and the advisability of achieving a collective commitment to the peaceful use of atomic energy. the speech anticipated the setting up of an international agency that would cooperate in the technological development of nuclear energy and at the same time safeguard a material that should not be used for the clandestine manufacturing of weapons. This agency, the IAEA, was created three years later within the framework of the United Nations and is today the leading actor in the application of safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials and facilities

Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Australian nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kerin, J.C.

1988-01-01

The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

International safeguards: experience and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

1982-01-01

IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of Ukraine

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-02-01

The text of the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to all Nuclear Material in all Peaceful Nuclear Activities of Ukraine is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 28 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 13 January 1995

Safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2000-01-01

Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1991-01-01

This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear Material between Australia and the Arab Republic of Egypt and Agreed Minutes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-02-01

The Agreement aims to establish conditions consistent with the NPT obligations of the two countries under which nuclear material can be transferred between them. It specifies that nuclear material transferred is not to be used for any military purpose. Compliance with this requirement is to be ensured by the IAEA safeguards system. In addition, each Party must take measures to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material within its jurisdiction [fr

Safeguards as an evolutionary system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1998-01-01

NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

Coordination of Croatian National Legislative with EU Commission Regulation on the Application of Euratom Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ilijas, B.; Medakovic, S.

2012-01-01

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in the view of increasing quantities of nuclear materials produced, used, carried and recycled in the Community, and also development of trade in these materials, especially in the scope of the successive enlargements of the EU, it is essential to ensure effectiveness of safeguards. Commission Regulation on the application of Euratom safeguards of 8 February 2005 is a comprehensive regulation dealing with basic technical characteristics and particular safeguard provisions of installations for the production, separation, reprocessing, storage or other use of source material or special fissile material, as well as nuclear material accountancy, transfer between states and some specific provisions. Croatia signed the 'Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)' and a few years later 'Protocol Additional' to this Agreement that stipulates strict obligations of the Republic of Croatia under Safeguards in connection with NPT. Also, in Croatia is on power 'Act on Radiological and Nuclear Safety' which, beside others, establishes measures for ensuring the safe performance of practices involving ionising radiation sources, nuclear activities, radioactive waste disposal and the physical protection of ionising radiation sources and nuclear facilities. But on power is also 'Ordinance on control of the nuclear materials and special equipment' which refers to an old 'Act on nuclear safety', and also takes into account provisions of the NPT and 'Protocol Additional' regarding safeguards. A new ordinance should be promulgated in accordance with new act. As a new act also should be corrected before Croatia joins EU, an extensive job must be done in adjusting Croatian national legislative to Euratom safeguards.(author).

The international framework for safeguarding peaceful nuclear energy programs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mazer, B.M.

1980-01-01

International law, in response to the need for safeguard assurances, has provided a framework which can be utilized by supplier and recipient states. Multilateral treaties have created the International Atomic Energy Agency which can serve a vital role in the establishment and supervision of safeguard agreements for nuclear energy programs. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has created definite obligations on nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to alleviate some possibilities of proliferation and has rejuvenated the function of the IAEA in providing safeguards, especially to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation treaty. States which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty may receive nuclear energy co-operation subject to IAEA safeguards. States like Canada, have insisted through the bilateral nuclear energy co-operation agreements that either individual or joint agreement be reached with the IAEA for the application of safeguards. Trilateral treaties among Canada, the recipient state and the IAEA have been employed and can provide the necessary assurances against the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy programs to military or non-peaceful uses. The advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its guidlines has definitely advanced the cause of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective should be the creation of an international structure incorporating the application of the most comprehensive safeguards which will be applied universally to all nuclear energy programs

Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of Ukraine

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-02-01

The text of the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to all Nuclear Material in all Peaceful Nuclear Activities of Ukraine is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 28 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 13 January 1995.

ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palacios, E.

1998-01-01

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-06-10

The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

2001-05-01

We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

2001-05-01

We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

The Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1977 between the Agency and Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Uranium Concentrate

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-07-07

The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1977 between the Agency and Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of uranium concentrate from Niger is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force pursuant to Article 24, on 2 March 1977.

14 CFR 1260.73 - Transfers, novations, and change of name agreements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Transfers, novations, and change of name agreements. 1260.73 Section 1260.73 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS General Post-Award Requirements § 1260.73 Transfers, novations, and...

Implementation of integrated safeguards at Nuclear Fuel Plant Pitesti, Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olaru, Vasilica; Ivana, Tiberiu; Epure, Gheorghe

2010-01-01

The nuclear activity in ROMANIA was for many years under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions this type of nuclear safeguards. Now, the opportunity exists to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and increase the accountancy and control of nuclear material by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS). The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA related to safeguards as part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol content published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between Nuclear Fuel Plant (NFP) representatives and IAEA inspectors was in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited NFP and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storages, technological flow, and was reviewed the disposal times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, measuring methods, weighting method and elaborating procedure of the documents and lists. At that time the IAEA and NFP representatives established the main points for starting the IS at NFP: performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI); communication of the days established for SNRI for each year; communication of the estimated deliveries and shipments for first quarter and then for the rest of the year: daily mail box declaration (DD) with respect to the deposit time for several nuclear materials i.e. advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), others. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and NFP (WRMD) has taken all measures to implement this objective. (authors)

Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

1977-06-01

The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sapir, J.L.

1977-06-01

The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer

Agreement between the Republic of Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Republic of Namibia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 17 March 1998, signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998, and entered into force on 15 April 1998

A Legal Analysis of Safeguard Measures in the European Community

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Guang Ma

2006-12-01

Full Text Available In 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in thIn 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the "Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China" and the "Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in the European Community comply with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In conclusion, based on the analysis of safeguard measures in the European Community's legal system and their practice in actual cases, it apparent that the European Community is making a serious effort to comply with the standards of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. In certain respects, the European Community has a comparatively higher level of standards than the WTO. Nevertheless, there continue to be challenges to WTO

Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-12-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997

Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-12-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Czech Republic to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 9 September 1996, signed in Vienna on 18 September 1996 and entered into force on 11 September 1997.

Study on the development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, B. D.; Song, D. Y.; So, D. S.; Kwak, E. H. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2000-05-01

Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this paper, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described.

Development of safeguards information treatment system at facility level in Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

So, D.S.; Lee, B.D.; Song, D.Y.

2001-01-01

Safeguards Information Treatment System (SITS) at Facility level was developed to implement efficiently the obligations under IAEA comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, bilateral nuclear cooperation Agreements with other countries and domestic law, and to manage efficiently the information related to safeguards implementation at facility level in Korea. Nuclear facilities in Korea are categorized into 8 types based on its accounting characteristics as follows: (1) Item counting facility or bulk handling facility; (2) Batch follow-up facility or not; (3) MUF (Material Unaccounted For) occurrence or not; (4) Nuclear production facility or not; (5) Operation status of facility; (6) Information management of nuclear material transfer status between KMPs or not; (7) Indication of inventory KMP on the inventory change of nuclear material is required or not. Hardware and Software for SITS can be loaded on a personal computer under operation system of Window 2000 or Window NT. MS SQL server 7 and MS Internet Information Server were adopted for database management system and Web server, respectively. Network environment of SITS was designed to include nuclear research institute, nuclear power plants of PWR and CANDU, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities and other facilities. SITS can be operated standalone or under the client-server system if intranet exists. More detailed contents of SITS are described elsewhere. Each module of SITS will be tested during incorporation of existing data into SITS and SITS will be distributed to nuclear facilities in Korea

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

Safeguards implementation at US facilities during 1986 and 1987

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wredberg, L.

1987-01-01

Safeguards procedures were implemented at three nuclear facilities in the United States during 1986 and 1987, namely, the Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina; the Salem No. 1 light water reactor (LWR) in New Jersey; and the Turkey Point No. 4 LWR in Florida. These three facilities have been under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since early 1986 in accordance with the voluntary offer agreement between the IAEA and the United States, which went into force in 1980. Because of limited manpower and budget resources allocated to safeguards in nuclear weapon states, only a limited number of facilities can be under IAEA safeguards inspections at a time. Facilities are, therefore, subject to inspection only during a 2-yr period in the case of the United States. After that period other facilities are selected for another 2-yr period from the list of facilities subject to safeguards under the agreement. The facilities have been selected so that they form a fuel cycle, i.e., the inspected reactors are fueled with fuel assemblies manufactured by the inspected fabrication plant. The IAEA applies full scope safeguards at the selected facilities based upon established implementation practice for the facility types

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. The 44 participants represented eight national laboratories, four universities, three government organizations, two international organizations, two professional organizations, and three small companies. The goal of the ERIS workshop was to improve efforts to engage U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. At the workshop's conclusion, participants presented their findings to the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). The report's major findings are summarized.

Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

2006-01-01

Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-02-01

The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

The text of the Agreement between Bangladesh and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-01-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Bangladesh to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

The text of the Agreement between Egypt and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-07-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Egypt to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-17

The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-13

The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-01-24

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-12-31

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of China and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 31 December 1998. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from China written notification that China's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 28 March 2002

The present status of safeguards in Turkey

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yilmazer, A.; Yuecel, A.

2001-01-01

Republic of Turkey signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Vienna, Austria on January 28, 1969 and the Treaty was ratified by Turkish Parliament on March 29, 1979. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Republic of Turkey signed the Safeguards Agreement on June 30, 1981. Turkey accepted the international safeguards administered by IAEA and at the same time its subsidiary arrangements and Facility attachments were enforced for all nuclear facilities as an Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party to NPT. Regulation on Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control, which was prepared in accordance with Agreement Between the Government of Turkey and IAEA for the application of Safeguard in Connection with the Treaty on NPT, has been put into force since it was published in Official Gazette on September 10, 1997. This study presents the essential futures of national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Turkey

IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

2014-07-01

The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

The Text of the Agreement of 5 January 1977 between the Agency, France and South Africa for the Application of Safeguards in Respect of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-02-23

The text of the Agreement of 5 January 1977 between the Agency, France and South Africa for the application of safeguards in respect of the Koeberg nuclear power station is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 27, on 5 January 1977.

The Text of the Agreement of 5 January 1977 between the Agency, France and South Africa for the Application of Safeguards in Respect of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 5 January 1977 between the Agency, France and South Africa for the application of safeguards in respect of the Koeberg nuclear power station is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 27, on 5 January 1977.

The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, P.

1999-01-01

For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-09

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-11

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Brazil and the strengthening of safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency: from the four-part agreement to the additional protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moura, Carmen Lidia Richter Ribeiro

2001-01-01

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the evolution of IAEA verification system, that constitutes one of the main fundaments of the Non-proliferation nuclear weapons regimen, and to point out elements that contribute to inform the Brazilian position related to the Model Protocol additional to agreements for safeguard application: instrument that comprehend the most recent multilateral efforts of the nuclear verification

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-19

The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-02-22

The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

2015-07-12

The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-04-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (French Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-07-15

The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-11-17

The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-11-19

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-12

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-10

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-19

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-15

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Lesotho and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 12 June 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-10-27

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

The text of the Agreement between Colombia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-07-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Colombia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-08-01

The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters with the Commonwealth of Dominica in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which constitutes an agreement confirming that the Safeguards Agreement of 3 May 1996 (IAEA-INFCIRC-513) concluded between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) and the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) satisfies the obligation of Dominica under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

2010-04-01

For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-05-18

The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-03

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-29

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-22

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-10

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

Safeguards at Kozloduy NPP - Experience and expectations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elenkov, Todor

2001-01-01

Bulgaria is a party of Non Proliferation Treaty since 5 September 1969. The agreement between IAEA and Bulgaria - INFCIRC 178 - has been in force since 29 February 1972. At that time Bulgaria had one research reactor IRT-2000 in Sofia and two power reactors of WWER-440 type under construction. Now at Kozloduy NPP site there are 4 facilities, which consist of 4 WWER-440 and 2 WWER-1000 type power reactors, producing almost 50% of the electricity in Bulgaria and 1 wet away from reactor spent fuel storage. In 1991 under the green movements and social pressure, the research reactor in Sofia was closed and the construction of the second NPP in Belene with 2 WWER-1000 type reactors was halted. After the transfer in 1994 of the fresh fuel from the research reactor to Kozloduy due to security reasons practically NPP Kozloduy remains the only significant (from safeguards point of view) nuclear site in Bulgaria. In 1972 a 'Nuclear Fuel' group was formed at the Physicists Department in NPP Kozloduy with responsibilities to carry out for safeguards records and reports, fresh and spent fuel transport and control. In 1990 this group was transferred to the Safety Section and since 1992 it exists as 'Control and Accounting for of the Nuclear Materials' - a section in the Safety Department. Currently the section serves all four facilities in NPP Kozloduy and has four people: section head, chief inspector and two inspectors. The main activities of the section include: a) Control of the nuclear fuel location as well as meeting the storage and transport conditions regulations; b) Control of the conditions for normal operations of the installed IAEA surveillance systems; c) Preparation of documents for licensing of fresh and spent nuclear fuel transport; d) Preparation of the official information on nuclear materials location and quantity; e) Preparation of accounting records and the reports for IAEA (ICR, PIL, MBR); f) Co-ordination of the IAEA safeguards inspection activities at NPP

The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-01

The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-08-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... channels of trade and other outlets for other than the specific purposes authorized therefor, and the...

7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... from entering channels of trade for other than the specific purpose authorized therefor, and rules...

7 CFR 958.56 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 958.56 Section 958.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... dehydrators into dehydrated onion products, from entering channels of trade for other than the purpose...

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1999-01-01

'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

Communication dated 1 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of Egypt

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 1 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt, concerning implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of Egypt, attaching the text of a Press Statement dated 25 January 2005. The Note Verbale and, as requested therein, the Press Statement, are reproduced herewith for the information of Member States

Implementation of integrated safeguards in Nuclear Fuel Plant at Pitesti, Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olaru, V.; Ivana, T.; Epure, Gh.

2009-01-01

The nuclear activity was conducted for many years in Romania under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions the specific nuclear safeguards. Now there is a good opportunity to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and at the same time to increase the accountancy and control of nuclear materials by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS) implementation. The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional completion to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA relating to safeguards. It is part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between the Nuclear Fuel Plant (FCN) representatives and IAEA inspectors has taken place in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited FCN and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storage and the technological flow and it was reviewed the residence times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, metrological methods, weighting method and procedures of elaborating the implied documents and lists. At the same time the IAEA and FCN representatives established the main points for implementing the IS at FCN i.e. performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), communicating the eligible days for SNRI for each year, communicating the estimated deliveries and shipments for the first quarter and then for the rest of the year, mail box daily declaration (DD) with respect to the residence time for several nuclear materials, advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), etc. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and FCN (RO

Technology transfer: A cooperative agreement and success story

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reno, H.W.; McNeel, K.; Armstrong, A.T.; Vance, J.K.

1996-01-01

This paper describes the cooperative agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy and Envirocare of Utah, Inc., wherein the former transferred macroencapsulative technology to the latter for purposes of demonstrating commercialization of treatment and disposal of 225, 000 Kg of radioactive lead stored at departmental installations

Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henry, C.N.

1981-11-01

This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security

Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Henry, C.N. (comp.)

1981-11-01

This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997

The Text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Respect of a Research Reactor Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-11-14

The text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in respect of a research reactor facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 23, on 20 July 1977.

The Text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Respect of a Research Reactor Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 20 July 1977 between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in respect of a research reactor facility is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 23, on 20 July 1977

The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-11-01

The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-03-24

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

An analytical laboratory to facilitate international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, B.E.; Muellner, P.; Deron, S.

1976-01-01

Member States which have concluded safeguards agreements accept safeguards on part or all of their nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. The Agreements enable the Agency to make inspections in order to verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material. The independent analysis of samples of safeguards material is an essential part of the verification process. A new analytical laboratory has been made available to the Agency by the Austrian Government. This facility is staffed by the Agency with scientists and technicians from five Member States. Design criteria for the laboratory were defined by the Agency. Construction was carried out under the project management of the Oesterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie Ges.m.b.H. Scientific equipment was procured by the Agency. Samples of feed and product material from the nuclear fuel cycle will constitute the main work load. Irradiated and unirradiated samples of uranium, plutonium and mixtures of both will be analysed for concentration and isotopic composition. Since highly diluted solutions of spent fuel will be the most active beta-gamma samples, shielded and remote manipulation facilities are not necessary. Ptentiometry, mass spectrometry and coulometry are the main techniques to be employed. Gravimetry, alpha and gamma spectrometry and emission spectroscopy will also be utilized as required. It is not intended that this laboratory, should carry the whole burden of the Agency's safeguards analytical work, but that it should function as a member of a network of international laboratories which has been set up by the Agency for this purpose. (author)

7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... entering trade channels other than those authorized by regulations and by such rules as may be necessary...

7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... prevent shipments pursuant to § 945.53 from entering channels of trade and other outlets for other than...

The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-08

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The text of the Agreement of 5 May 1980 between the Agency and Cuba relating to the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a nuclear power plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-06-01

The full text of the agreement between Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency relating to the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a nuclear power plant from the USSR is presented

The Text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-11-19

The text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25 thereof.

Special Agricultural Safeguards; Virtual Benefits and Real Costs—Lessons for the Doha Round

OpenAIRE

Jean-Jacques Hallaert

2005-01-01

In the Doha Round, negotiators are discussing the elimination or continuation of the special agricultural safeguards introduced by the Uruguay Round as well as the creation of special safeguard mechanism for use by developing countries. This paper argues that, in violation of the spirit of the WTO Agreement in Agriculture, the special agricultural safeguards have often been used as a prolonged protectionist device. It then draws lessons for the design of the special safeguard mechanism.

Research and development of safeguards measures for the large scale reprocessing plant

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kikuchi, Masahiro; Sato, Yuji; Yokota, Yasuhiro; Masuda, Shoichiro; Kobayashi, Isao; Uchikoshi, Seiji; Tsutaki, Yasuhiro; Nidaira, Kazuo [Nuclear Material Control Center, Tokyo (Japan)

1994-12-31

The Government of Japan agreed on the safeguards concepts of commercial size reprocessing plant under the bilateral agreement for cooperation between the Japan and the United States. In addition, the LASCAR, that is the forum of large scale reprocessing plant safeguards, could obtain the fruitful results in the spring of 1992. The research and development of safeguards measures for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant should be progressed with every regard to the concepts described in both documents. Basically, the material accountancy and monitoring system should be established, based on the NRTA and other measures in order to obtain the timeliness goal for plutonium, and the un-attended mode inspection approach based on the integrated containment/surveillance system coupled with radiation monitoring in order to reduce the inspection efforts. NMCC has been studying on the following measures for a large scale reprocessing plant safeguards (1) A radiation gate monitor and integrated surveillance system (2) A near real time Shipper and Receiver Difference monitoring (3) A near real time material accountancy system operated for the bulk handling area (4) A volume measurement technique in a large scale input accountancy vessel (5) An in-process inventory estimation technique applied to the process equipment such as the pulse column and evaporator (6) Solution transfer monitoring approach applied to buffer tanks in the chemical process (7) A timely analysis technique such as a hybrid K edge densitometer operated in the on-site laboratory (J.P.N.).

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-09-14

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, D.B.

1986-01-01

From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... pursuant to § 906.41 or § 906.42 from entering channels of trade for other than the specific purpose...

7 CFR 956.66 - Safeguards.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 956.66 Section 956.66 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... Onions shipped, pursuant to §§ 956.63 and 956.64, from entering channels of trade for other than the...

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-08-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

Safeguards Implementation in Kazakhstan: Experience and Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhantikin, T.

2015-01-01

Experience of Kazakhstan joined the NPT in 1993, just after desintegration of USSR, and enforced Safeguards Agreement in 1995 can be interesting in implementation of safeguards in non-standard cases. Having weapon materials and test infrastructure legacy, the country together with IAEA and several donor countries found acceptable approaches to meet NPT provisions. One of challenges was to provide protection of sensitive information that could be accidentally disclosed in safeguards activities. With support of several weapon countries in close cooperation with the IAEA Kazakhstan liquidated test infrastructure in Semipalatinsk, implemented projects on elimination and minimization of use of HEU in civil sector, decommissioning of BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Now the IAEA LEU Bank is going to be established in Kazakhstan, and more challenges are coming in implementation of safeguards. Some technical and organizational details will be described from the experience of Kazakhstan in these projects. (author)

The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-09-01

The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-04-01

The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

The text of the agreement of 18 September 1987 between Chile and the Agency for the application of safeguards to nuclear material supplied from the People's Republic of China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-03-01

The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Agency for the application of safeguards to nuclear material in the form of UF 6 , enriched to 20% in the isotope U-235, supplied from the People's Republic of China for the fabrication of MTR-type fuel elements for Lo Aguirre research reactor, is reproduced. The agreement entered into force on 18 September 1987

Agreement of 2 February 1990 between Saint Lucia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-05-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Saint Lucia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activity within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part 1

The text of the Agreement of 13 April 1984 between Nauru and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-09-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of NAURU to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

1975-01-01

The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Transit Matching for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

2015-01-01

In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

Agreement between the government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-02-19

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Government of Republic of Estonia to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 24 February 1992, signed in Vienna on 18 November 1997 and in Tallinn on 24 November 1997, and entered into force on 24 November 1997.

Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramirez, R.

2010-01-01

Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-10-29

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

Technology transfer and the Argentina-German cooperation agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Di Primio, J.C.

1977-01-01

The transfer of technology from developed countries is usually done through industrial enterprises. The local industrialization of imported technology does not necessary imply that full benefit is extracted from its application. A pre-established scientific and technical infrastructure is needed to understand and incorporate it, and to develop methods for improvement and use at the industrial level, in the frame of national conditions. The transference of nuclear technology has shown recently new concepts for the implementation. It is becoming a rule that massive industrial nuclear technology transfer to developing nations is conditioned by the latter requirement for simulataneous assistance to create or promote that infrastructure. An example of international cooperation to meet the requirement explained above is the Argentine-German agreement for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Since 1971 it has been used to strengthen the scientific and technical programs of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, by application to fields relevant by its industrial implications. The objectives and implementation of the agreement are described: cooperative actions where initially directed to the infrastructure needed to support the nuclear fuel cycle industry. The results achieved during the period 1971-76 are critically analyzed. This analysis has influenced the selection of future cooperative projects as well as the extension of the cooperation to other nuclear fields of common interest [es

India and the nuclear safeguards controversy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poulose, T.T.

1979-01-01

A brief account of the origin and development of the safeguards system to prevent diversion of nuclear material from its peaceful uses to production of nuclear explosives is given. India is firmly opposed to the discriminatory characteristics of the system. The IAEA safeguards apply to those nations (most of them developing nations) seeking Agency aid and not to the nuclear weapons powers and other advanced nuclear powers who do not need Agency aid. Even though the Tarapur Agreement does not provide for full scope safeguards, U.S.A., particularly after 1974 Pokharan explosion, is pressurisinq India to accept them by delaying the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Power Plant. As is assumed by the Americans, India is not indifferent to the problem of proliferation. On the other hand, it has renounced nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy and is committed to non-proliferation. India has all along since independence advocated universal and non-discriminating full scope safeguards system applicable to all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear powers and to all nuclear facilities. (M.G.B.)

HARMONISASI REGULASI DAN EFEKTIVITAS KELEMBAGAAN SAFEGUARD DI INDONESIA

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Abdurrahman Alfaqiih

2012-06-01

Full Text Available The implementation of WTO agreement is not easy in accordance with the estabilished regulations, so deviations in the process of trade liberalization that press domestic indrusties will likely to take place. Therefore, it is necessary to have safety actions to actualize mutual benefits in international trade. There are many cases of safety actions conducted by many countries such as Argentine that implements safety actions to its footwear industries without adapting to WTO regulations which causes the country’s losses. The paper examines the consistency of safeguard regulations in Indonesia with safeguard regulations of WTO and its implementation reviewed from the law effectiveness. The result of the study shows that the safeguard regulations in Indonesia is in accordance with the safeguard regulations of WTO in the normative level, but in the implementation the policy is not done effectively.

Concept for fuel-cycle based safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

deMontmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

1985-01-01

Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify that the State's fuel cycle and degree of international independence are to be taken into account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. A concept whereby safeguards might more effectively and efficiently accomplish the purposes of NPT safeguards is explored. The principal features are: (1) division of the fuel cycle into three zones, each containing material having a different degree of significance for safeguards; (2) closing a verified material balance around each zone, supplementing the present MBA balances for more sensitive facilities and replacing them for others; (3) maintenance by the IAEA of a current book inventory for each facility by means of immediate, abbreviated reporting of interfacility transfers; (4) near real-time analysis of material flow patterns through the fuel cycle; and (5) a periodic statement of the findings for the entire State that takes the form that there is assurance that all nuclear materials under safeguards are accounted for to some stated degree of uncertainty

The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-06

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document informs that the Czech Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document informs that the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-05-14

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-27

The text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

2012-08-01

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

2013-01-01

The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mollah, A.S.

2010-01-01

Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) | Frederick National Laboratory for Cancer Research

Science.gov (United States)

Material Transfer Agreements are appropriate for exchange of materials into or out of the Frederick National Laboratory for research or testing purposes, with no collaborative research by parties involving the materials.

Nuclear safeguards in the European Union carried out by the European Commission or: the EURATOM treaty. The unknown nature

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kilb, Wolfgang

2016-01-01

Nuclear safeguards in the 28 Member States of the European Union are based on a complex structure of national, supranational and international legal acts: A first approach are the three ''S'' to be met: security, safety, safeguards. The EURATOM safeguards are based on two pillars: the control of nuclear material itself, as well as different types of international agreements: the first refers to ''agreements with a third State'', the second on ''agreement with an international organization''.

IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

2015-01-01

Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-10-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000.

Health preemption behind closed doors: trade agreements and fast-track authority.

Science.gov (United States)

Crosbie, Eric; Gonzalez, Mariaelena; Glantz, Stanton A

2014-09-01

Noncommunicable diseases result from consuming unhealthy products, including tobacco, which are promoted by transnational corporations. The tobacco industry uses preemption to block or reverse tobacco control policies. Preemption removes authority from jurisdictions where tobacco companies' influence is weak and transfers it to jurisdictions where they have an advantage. International trade agreements relocate decisions about tobacco control policy to venues where there is little opportunity for public scrutiny, participation, and debate. Tobacco companies are using these agreements to preempt domestic authority over tobacco policy. Other transnational corporations that profit by promoting unhealthy foods could do the same. "Fast-track authority," in which Congress cedes ongoing oversight authority to the President, further distances the public from the debate. With international agreements binding governments to prioritize trade over health, transparency and public oversight of the trade negotiation process is necessary to safeguard public health interests.

The text of the agreement of 15 July 1981 between Argentina and the Agency for the application of Safeguards in connection with contracts concluded between the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica Argentina and the Kraftwerk Union AG (Federal Republic of Germany) for the supply of the Atucha II Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards came into force on 4 March 1994. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Argentina, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 15 July 1981 between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with contracts concluded between the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomic Argentina and the Kraftwerk Union AG (Federal Republic of Germany) for the supply of the Atucha II Nuclear Power Plant has been suspended

Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Owens, L.; Smith, C.

1996-01-01

The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu

Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

The text of the Agreement of 9 June 1982 between the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Agreement between the Governments on co-operation in the field of the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes of 5 December 1978

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1983-07-01

The full text of the agreement of 9 June 1982 between the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the agreement between the Governments in co-operation in the field of the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes of 5 December 1978 is presented

Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-10-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

Agreement of 13 June 1996 between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-10-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of the Principality of Monaco to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

Agreement of 15 March 1991 between the Republic of Tuvalu and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-05-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Tuvalu to accept safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory under his jurisdiction or carried on under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

The text of the Agreement of 13 October 1983 between Papua New Guinea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-01-01

The document contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Papua New Guinea to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

2001-01-01

For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

Fifth Supply Agreement. Agreement for the Transfer of Low Enriched Uranium for a Research Reactor in Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Fifth Supply Agreement among the Government of Romania, the Government of the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Transfer of Low Enriched Uranium for a Research Reactor in Romania is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members of the Agency. The Agency's Board of Governors approved the text of the Agreement on 20 November 2003, which was signed by the authorized representatives of Romania and the United States, and by the Director General of the IAEA, on 24 November 2003. Pursuant to Article V of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 November 2003, upon signature by the representatives of Romania, the United States and the Director General of the IAEA

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-07-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2012-07-01

The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1987-03-01

From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol in the Eurasia Region

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murakami, K.

2001-01-01

Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, wit the entry into force of the NPT. Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States. In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS) significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the SG Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols

Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

Survey of nuclear safeguards in the European Community

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.

1992-01-01

The control of the peaceful use of nuclear energy comprises activities related to nuclear safety, to the protection of persons and of the environment, to physical protection of the nuclear materials against theft or terrorism and to nuclear safeguards. Nuclear safeguards means the set of measures performed by the IAEA in the context of non-proliferation safeguards and, in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, those measures enabling the European Commission to satisfy itself that the nuclear material is not diverted from its intended and declared uses (particularly to unlawful non-peaceful applications) and that the obligations arising from International Agreements are complied with. This contribution to the International Conference on Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy at Liege briefly reviews the history of nuclear safeguards in Europe since the early 1960ies. It also notes the practical aspects for, constraints and impacts to the nuclear operators imposed on them by the European law such as inspections, accountancy, reporting and describes the trend of the future development of the safeguards operation. The paper finally addresses non-proliferation issues and, notably, the relations between the IAEA and Euratom which in an exemplary way resulted in effective international safeguards and high non-proliferation credentials of the European Community. (author)

The role of the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and its relationship with the international safeguards agreements for the set-up of peaceful nuclear programs and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mhadhbi, H.

2010-01-01

Nuclear energy plays an important role in the development of the economy and is considered as a key element with regard to the growth of the world energy demand due to the limitation of other natural energy resources, its contribution to the protection of the environment and the reduction of CO 2 emission. Several countries, including some Arab countries, are planning to consider the nuclear option in the near future. To provide an assurance to the international community of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency established legal tools, called Safeguards Agreements, to be accepted by every state willing to run nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes. The most important basis required by these agreements is the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, which plays a primary role for effective and efficient fulfilment of the state commitment with regard to the international safeguards agreements. The requirements for the set-up of a State System of Accounting for and Control , its role, its objectives and its fundamental elements are deeply presented. (author)

National viewpoints: Views on strengthened safeguards from Australia, Cuba and South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biggs, I.; Saburido, E.F.; Mxakato-Diseko, N.J.

1999-01-01

This paper presents views of Australia, Cuba and South Africa concerned with strengthened safeguards regime. Australia has been involved with the IAEA safeguards system since the first plenary meeting of the Conference on the IAEA Statute in 1956, joined the NPT in 1973 and began concluding bilateral safeguards agreements in 1977. Australia has the greatest respect for the IAEA coordinated efforts started in 1998 to strengthen and integrate the safeguards system. Cuba has always attached special importance to nuclear safeguards activities, recognizing their high priority as well as the important role they have in respect to international disarmament and security. South Africa supports the efforts in strengthening the safeguards activities and remains hopeful that the international community will address the challenges posed by the Trilateral Initiative between Russian federation, USA and IAEA in a mature and cooperative way

Agreement of 28 March 1991 between the Government of Solomon Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document contains two parts. The first one stipulates the agreement of Solomon Islands to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part two specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-11-29

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-06-10

The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975 between Swaziland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-12-18

The text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Swaziland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1975, pursuant to Article 24 thereof. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977 between Afghanistan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-04-01

The text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Afghanistan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 February 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

2009-10-01

Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

Health Preemption Behind Closed Doors: Trade Agreements and Fast-Track Authority

Science.gov (United States)

Crosbie, Eric; Gonzalez, Mariaelena

2014-01-01

Noncommunicable diseases result from consuming unhealthy products, including tobacco, which are promoted by transnational corporations. The tobacco industry uses preemption to block or reverse tobacco control policies. Preemption removes authority from jurisdictions where tobacco companies’ influence is weak and transfers it to jurisdictions where they have an advantage. International trade agreements relocate decisions about tobacco control policy to venues where there is little opportunity for public scrutiny, participation, and debate. Tobacco companies are using these agreements to preempt domestic authority over tobacco policy. Other transnational corporations that profit by promoting unhealthy foods could do the same. “Fast-track authority,” in which Congress cedes ongoing oversight authority to the President, further distances the public from the debate. With international agreements binding governments to prioritize trade over health, transparency and public oversight of the trade negotiation process is necessary to safeguard public health interests. PMID:25033124

The Text of the Agreement of 17 November 1977 between the Agency and India for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Heavy Water from the Soviet Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 17 November 1977 between the Agency and India for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of heavy water from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement of 17 November 1977 between the Agency and India for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of Heavy Water from the Soviet Union

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-07-15

The text of the Agreement of 17 November 1977 between the Agency and India for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of heavy water from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Agreement of 30 March 1996 between the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The document contains two parts. Part I stipulates the agreement of Algeria to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I

Technology transfer assessment in the nuclear agreement Brazil-Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cecchi, J.C.

1985-04-01

The three main arguments utilized in the Nuclear Brazil-Germany Agreement celebrated in 1975 were the following: a) the low Brazilian hydroelectric potential insufficient to attend the increasing of electrical energy demand; b) the low cost of nuclear energy related to hydroelectric energy: c) and finally, the nuclear technology transfer, involving inclusive the fuel cycle and that could permit to Brazil self-sufficiency in the nuclear energy field. Thus, this work intends to describe and discussing the 'technology transfer strategy' trying to understand and showing which are its main characteristics, and also which are the real actuals results. (author) [pt

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-10-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-04-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-04-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Safeguards uses of confirmatory measurements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coulter, C.A.

1985-01-01

An analysis is made of the role of shipper and receiver measurements in safeguarding special nuclear materials (SNM) transferred from one facility to another, with emphasis on the case where the receiver requires an analytical accounting measurement of the transferred SNM and does not need the material for process purposes at the time of receipt. Seven possible diversion periods are considered, ranging from the interval between the shipper's final accounting measurement on the material and the time it is placed in the shipper's vault, through the actual transport of the material between facilities, to the time the material is removed from the receiver's vault and placed in the process. The detection power of various combinations of six possible shipper/receiver measurements for these diversion opportunities is then evaluated; the measurements considered include the shipper's and receiver's accounting measurements, the latter at two possible times, and various nondestructive assay (NDA) confirmatory measurements. It is concluded that all safeguards measurement objectives can be met by a combination of a shipper's accounting measurement at the time the material is removed from the process, an appropriate shipper's NDA confirmatory measurement either immediately after canning or immediately before shipping, an equivalent receiver's NDA confirmatory measurement immediately after the material is received, and a receiver's accounting measurement when the material is placed in the process. Furthermore, it is found that a receiver's analytical accounting measurement immediately after receipt when the material is not yet required for process has dubious safeguards value

Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, D.B. (comp.)

1984-09-01

From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.