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Sample records for safeguards neutron counter

  1. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  2. Monte Carlo simulation of neutron counters for safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Looman, Marc; Peerani, Paolo; Tagziria, Hamid

    2009-01-01

    MCNP-PTA is a new Monte Carlo code for the simulation of neutron counters for nuclear safeguards applications developed at the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra (Italy). After some preliminary considerations outlining the general aspects involved in the computational modelling of neutron counters, this paper describes the specific details and approximations which make up the basis of the model implemented in the code. One of the major improvements allowed by the use of Monte Carlo simulation is a considerable reduction in both the experimental work and in the reference materials required for the calibration of the instruments. This new approach to the calibration of counters using Monte Carlo simulation techniques is also discussed.

  3. Preliminary calibration of the ACP safeguards neutron counter

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, T. H.; Kim, H. D.; Yoon, J. S.; Lee, S. Y.; Swinhoe, M.; Menlove, H. O.

    2007-10-01

    The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP), a kind of pyroprocess, has been developed at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Since there is no IAEA safeguards criteria for this process, KAERI has developed a neutron coincidence counter to make it possible to perform a material control and accounting (MC&A) for its ACP materials for the purpose of a transparency in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials at KAERI. The test results of the ACP Safeguards Neutron Counter (ASNC) show a satisfactory performance for the Doubles count measurement with a low measurement error for its cylindrical sample cavity. The neutron detection efficiency is about 21% with an error of ±1.32% along the axial direction of the cavity. Using two 252Cf neutron sources, we obtained various parameters for the Singles and Doubles rates for the ASNC. The Singles, Doubles, and Triples rates for a 252Cf point source were obtained by using the MCNPX code and the results for the ft8 cap multiplicity tally option with the values of ɛ, fd, and ft measured with a strong source most closely match the measurement results to within a 1% error. A preliminary calibration curve for the ASNC was generated by using the point model equation relationship between 244Cm and 252Cf and the calibration coefficient for the non-multiplying sample is 2.78×10 5 (Doubles counts/s/g 244Cm). The preliminary calibration curves for the ACP samples were also obtained by using an MCNPX simulation. A neutron multiplication influence on an increase of the Doubles rate for a metal ingot and UO2 powder is clearly observed. These calibration curves will be modified and complemented, when hot calibration samples become available. To verify the validity of this calibration curve, a measurement of spent fuel standards for a known 244Cm mass will be performed in the near future.

  4. Neutron techniques in Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zucker, M.S.

    1982-01-01

    An essential part of Safeguards is the ability to quantitatively and nondestructively assay those materials with special neutron-interactive properties involved in nuclear industrial or military technology. Neutron techniques have furnished most of the important ways of assaying such materials, which is no surprise since the neutronic properties are what characterizes them. The techniques employed rely on a wide selection of the many methods of neutron generation, detection, and data analysis that have been developed for neutron physics and nuclear science in general

  5. A Neutron Rem Counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, I Oe; Braun, J

    1964-01-15

    A neutron detector is described which measures the neutron dose rate in rem/h independently of the energy of the neutrons from thermal to 15 MeV. The detector consists of a BF{sub 3} proportional counter surrounded by a shield made of polyethylene and boron plastic that gives the appropriate amount of moderation and absorption to the impinging neutrons to obtain rem response. Two different versions have been developed. One model can utilize standard BF{sub 3} counters and is suitable for use in installed monitors around reactors and accelerators and the other model is specially designed for use in a portable survey instrument. The neutron rem counter for portable instruments has a sensitivity of 2.4 cps/mrem/h and is essentially nondirectional in response. With correct bias setting the counter is insensitive to gamma exposure up to 200 r/h from Co-60.

  6. A portable neutron coincidence counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Peurrung, A.J.; Bowyer, S.M.; Craig, R.A.; Dudder, G.B.; Knopf, M.A.; Panisko, M.E.; Reeder, P.L.; Stromswold, D.C.; Sunberg, D.S.

    1996-11-01

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has designed and constructed a prototype portable neutron coincidence counter intended for use in a variety of applications, such as the verification and inspection of weapons components, safety measurements for novel and challenging situations, portable portal deployment to prevent the transportation of fissile materials, uranium enrichment measurements in hard-to-reach locations, waste assays for objects that cannot be measured by existing measurement systems, and decontamination and decommissioning. The counting system weighs less than 40 kg and is composed of parts each weighing no more than 5 kg. In addition, the counter`s design is sufficiently flexible to allow rapid, reliable assembly around containers of nearly arbitrary size and shape. The counter is able to discern the presence of 1 kg of weapons-grade plutonium within an ALR-8 (30-gal drum) in roughly 100 seconds and 10 g in roughly 1000 seconds. The counter`s electronics are also designed for maximum adaptability, allowing operation under a wide variety of circumstances, including exposure to gamma-ray fields of 1 R/h. This report provides a detailed review of the design and construction process. Finally, preliminary experimental measurements that confirm the performance capabilities of this counter are discussed. 6 refs., 18 figs., 3 tabs.

  7. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. The authors compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and they examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well

  8. Prototype fast neutron counter for the assay of impure plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wachter, J.R.; Adams, E.L.; Ensslin, N.

    1987-01-01

    A fast coincident neutron counter using liquid scintillators and gamma-ray/neutron pulse-shape discrimination has been constructed for the analysis of plutonium samples with unknown self-multiplication and (α,n) production. The counter was used to measure plutonium-bearing materials that cover a range of masses and (α,n) reaction rates of importance to the safeguards community. Measured values of the 240 Pu effective mass differed, on average, from their declared values by 0.4% for plutonium oxides and by -2.2% for metal and MgO-loaded samples. Poorer results were obtained for materials with large (α,n) reaction rates and low self-multiplication such as plutonium ash and plutonium fluoride

  9. A new neutron counter for fission research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laurent, B., E-mail: benoit.laurent@cea.fr [CEA, DAM, DIF, F-91297 Arpajon (France); Granier, T.; Bélier, G.; Chatillon, A.; Martin, J.-F.; Taieb, J. [CEA, DAM, DIF, F-91297 Arpajon (France); Hambsch, F.-J. [EC-JRC Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM), Retieseweg, 2440 Geel (Belgium); Tovesson, F.; Laptev, A.B.; Haight, R.C.; Nelson, R.O.; O' Donnell, J.M. [Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2014-05-01

    A new neutron counter for research experiments on nuclear fission has been developed. This instrument is designed for the detection of prompt fission neutrons within relatively high levels of gamma and neutron background. It is composed of a set of {sup 3}He proportional counters arranged within a block of polyethylene which serves as moderator. The detection properties have been studied by means of Monte Carlo simulations and experiments with radioactive sources. These properties are confirmed by an experiment on neutron-induced fission of {sup 238}U at the WNR facility of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center during which the mean prompt fission neutron multiplicity, or ν{sup ¯} has been measured from 1 to 20 MeV of incident neutron energy.

  10. A programme for Euratom safeguards inspectors, used in the assay of plutonium bearing materials by passive neutron interrogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vocino, V.; Farese, N.; Maucq, T.; Nebuloni, M.

    1991-01-01

    The programme PECC (Passive Euratom Coincidence Counters) has been developed at the Joint Research Center, Ispra by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg and the Safety Technology Institute, Ispra for the acquisition, evaluation, management and storage of measurements data originating from passive neutron assay of plutonium bearing materials. The software accommodates the implementation of the NDA (Non Destructive Assay) procedures for all types of passive neutron coincidence deployed by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg

  11. An extended range neutron rem counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birattari, C.; Nuccetelli, C.; Pelliccioni, M.; Silari, M.

    1990-01-01

    Extensive Monte Carlo calculations have been carried out to assess the possibility of extending the sensitivity of a neutron rem counter of the Andersson-Braun type up to several hundred MeV. The validity of the model adopted has first been checked by comparing with experimental data the calculated response curve and the angular dependence of the sensitivity for a well known commercial rem counter. Next, a number of modifications to the configuration of the moderator-attenuator have been investigated. The response functions and angular distributions produced by two simple solutions yielding an instrument with a sensitivity extended up to 400 MeV are presented. The response of the original rem counter and of its two modified versions to nine test spectra has also been calculated. The resulting instrument is transportable rather than portable, but the availability of an extended range neutron survey meter would be of great advantage at medium and high energy particle accelerator facilities. (orig.)

  12. A programme for Euratom safeguards inspectors, used in the assay of high enriched (H.E.U.) and low enriched (L.E.U.) uranium fuel materials by active neutron interrogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vocino, V.; Farese, N.; Maucq, T.; Nebuloni, M.

    1991-01-01

    The programme AECC (Active Euratom Coincidence Counters) has been developed at the Joint Research Center, Ispra by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg and the Safety Technology Institute, Ispra for the acquisition, evaluation, management and storage of measurement data originating from active neutron interrogation of HEU and LEU fuel materials. The software accommodates the implementation of the NDA (Non Destructive Assay) procedures for the Active Well Coincidence Counters and Active Neutron Coincidence Counters deployed by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg

  13. MCNP modelling of a combined neutron/gamma counter

    CERN Document Server

    Bourva, L C A; Ottmar, H; Weaver, D R

    1999-01-01

    A series of Monte Carlo neutron calculations for a combined gamma/passive neutron coincidence counter has been performed. This type of device, part of a suite of non-destructive assay instruments utilised for the enforcement of the Euratom nuclear safeguards within the European Union, is to be used for high accuracy measurements of the plutonium content of small samples of nuclear materials. The multi-purpose Monte Carlo N-particle (MCNP) code version 4B has been used to model in detail the neutron coincidence detector and to investigate the leakage self-multiplication of PuO sub 2 and mixed U-Pu oxide (MOX) reference samples used to calibrate the instrument. The MCNP calculations have been used together with a neutron coincidence counting interpretative model to determine characteristic parameters of the detector. A comparative study to both experimental and previous numerical results has been performed. Sensitivity curves of the variation of the detector's efficiency, epsilon, to, alpha, the ratio of (alpha...

  14. Efficiency simulation of long neutron counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hu Qingyuan; Li Bojun; Zhang De; Guo Hongsheng; Wang Dong; Yang Gaozhao; Si Fenni; Liu Jian

    2008-01-01

    In order to achieve the high efficiency and uniform sensitivity for neutrons with widely different energies, the efficiency of long boron trifluoride proportional counter imbedded in polyethylene moderator was simulated by MCNP code. The result shows that detective efficiency would increase with increasing moderator radius and response curve at higher energy would be ameliorated through adjusting the thickness of front moderator. Also we calculated the relative efficiencies for different energy of a detector whose efficiencies were calibrated on an accelerator. The simulated efficiency for D-D neutrons (2.4 MeV) is 75% of the efficiency for D-T neutrons (14.1 MeV), which is approximately agreed with experimental data, 61%. The validity of the simulated model was proved by the consistent results between calculation and experiment data. (authors)

  15. Calibration of the neutron scintillation counter threshold

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noga, V.I.; Ranyuk, Yu.N.; Telegin, Yu.N.

    1978-01-01

    A method for calibrating the threshold of a neutron counter in the form of a 10x10x40 cm plastic scintillator is described. The method is based on the evaluation of the Compton boundary of γ-spectrum from the discrimination curve of counter loading. The results of calibration using 60 Co and 24 Na γ-sources are given. In order to eValuate the Compton edge rapidly, linear extrapolation of the linear part of the discrimination curve towards its intersection with the X axis is recommended. Special measurements have shown that the calibration results do not practically depend on the distance between the cathode of a photomultiplier and the place where collimated γ-radiation of the calibration source reaches the scintillator

  16. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Neutron Dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vanhavere, F.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of SCK-CEN's R and D programme on neutron dosimetry is to improve the determination of neutron doses by studying neutron spectra, neutron dosemeters and shielding adaptations as well as to investigate the charcteristics of bubble detectors in order to be able to use them as direct-readiong neutron dosemeters

  17. Neutron dosimetry using proportional counters with tissue equivalent walls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerviller, H. de

    1965-01-01

    The author reminds the calculation method of the neutron absorbed dose in a material and deduce of it the conditions what this material have to fill to be equivalent to biological tissues. Various proportional counters are mode with walls in new tissue equivalent material and filled with various gases. The multiplication factor and neutron energy response of these counters are investigated and compared with those obtained with ethylene lined polyethylene counters. The conditions of working of such proportional counters for neutron dosimetry in energy range 10 -2 to 15 MeV are specified. (author) [fr

  18. Fast-neutron coincidence-counter manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ensslin, N.; Atwell, T.L.; Lee, D.M.; Erkkila, B.; Marshall, R.S.; Morgan, A.; Shonrock, C.; Tippens, B.; Van Lyssel, T.

    1982-03-01

    The fast neutron counter (FNC) described in this report is a computer-based assay system employing fast-pulse counting instrumentation. It is installed below a glove box in the metal electrorefining area of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Processing Facility. The instrument was designed to assay plutonium salts and residues from this process and to verify the mass of electrorefined metal. Los Alamos National Laboratory Groups Q-1, Q-3, and CMB-11 carried out a joint test and evaluation plan of this instrument between May 1978 and May 1979. The results of that evaluation, a description of the FNC, and operating instructions for further use are given in this report

  19. Neutron resonance analysis for nuclear safeguards and security applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Paradela, Carlos; Heyse, Jan; Kopecky, Stefan; Schillebeeckx, Peter; Harada, Hideo; Kitatani, Fumito; Koizumi, Mitsuo; Tsuchiya, Harufumi

    2017-09-01

    Neutron-induced reactions can be used to study the properties of nuclear materials of interest in the fields of nuclear safeguards and security. The elemental and isotopic composition of these materials can be determined by using the presence of resonance structures. This idea is the basis of two non-destructive analysis techniques which have been developed at the GELINA neutron time-of-flight facility at JRC-Geel: Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA) and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA). A combination of NRTA and NRCA has been proposed for the characterisation of particle-like debris of melted fuel formed in severe nuclear accidents. In this work, we present a quantitative validation of the NRTA technique which was used to determine the areal densities of Pu enriched reference samples used for safeguards applications. Less than 2% bias has been obtained for the fissile isotopes, with well-known total cross sections.

  20. Real‑time, fast neutron detection for stimulated safeguards assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joyce, Malcolm J.; Adamczyk, Justyna; Plenteda, Romano; Aspinall, Michael D.; Cave, Francis D.

    2015-01-01

    The advent of low‑hazard organic liquid scintillation detectors and real‑time pulse‑shape discrimination (PSD) processing has suggested a variety of modalities by which fast neutrons, as opposed to neutrons moderated prior to detection, can be used directly to benefit safeguards needs. In this paper we describe a development of a fast‑neutron based safeguards assay system designed for the assessment of 235 U content in fresh fuel. The system benefits from real‑time pulse‑shape discrimination processing and auto‑calibration of the detector system parameters to ensure a rapid and effective set‑up protocol. These requirements are essential in optimising the speed and limit of detection of the fast neutron technique, whilst minimising the intervention needed to perform the assay.

  1. Simulations of Lithium-Based Neutron Coincidence Counter for Gd-Loaded Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowles, Christian C. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kouzes, Richard T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Siciliano, Edward R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-10-01

    The Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security (NA-241) is supporting the project Lithium-Based Alternative Neutron Detection Technology Coincidence Counting for Gd-loaded Fuels at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the development of a lithium-based neutron coincidence counter for nondestructively assaying Gd loaded nuclear fuel. This report provides results from MCNP simulations of a lithium-based coincidence counter for the possible measurement of Gd-loaded nuclear fuel. A comparison of lithium-based simulations and UNCL-II simulations with and without Gd loaded fuel is provided. A lithium-based model, referred to as PLNS3A-R1, showed strong promise for assaying Gd loaded fuel.

  2. Recoil-proton fast-neutron counter telescope

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pavan, P.; Toniolo, D.; Zago, G.; Zannoni, R. (Padua Univ. (Italy). Ist. di Fisica); Galeazzi, G.; Bressanini, G.

    1981-12-01

    A recoil-proton neutron counter telescope is described composed of a solid-state silicon transmission detector and a NE 102 A plastic scintillator, measuring the energy loss, the energy of the recoil protons and the time of flight between the two detectors. The counter exposed to monoenergetic neutron beams of energy from 6 to 20 MeV presents a low background and a moderate energy resolution. Its absolute efficiency is calculated up to 50 MeV.

  3. Recoil-proton fast-neutron-counter telescope

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Galeazzi, G.; Pavan, P.; Toniolo, D.; Zago, G.; Zannoni, R.; Bressanini, G.

    1981-01-01

    A proton-recoil neutron counter telescope is described composed of a solid state silicon transmission detector and a NE 102 A plastic scintillator, measuring the energy loss, the energy of the recoil protons and the time-of-flight between the two detectors. The counter exposed to monoenergetic neutron beams of energy from 6 to 20 MeV, presents a low background and a moderate energy resolution. Its absolute efficiency is calculated up to 50 MeV.

  4. A recoil-proton fast-neutron counter telescope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pavan, P.; Toniolo, D.; Zago, G.; Zannoni, R.; Galeazzi, G.; Bressanini, G.

    1981-01-01

    A recoil-proton neutron counter telescope is described composed of a solid-state silicon transmission detector and a NE 102 A plastic scintillator, measuring the energy loss, the energy of the recoil protons and the time of flight between the two detectors. The counter exposed to monoenergetic neutron beams of energy from 6 to 20 MeV presents a low background and a moderate energy resolution. Its absolute efficiency is calculated up to 50 MeV. (author)

  5. {sup 3}He Replacement for Nuclear Safeguards Applications- an integrated test program to compare alternative neutron detectors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menlove, H. O.; Henzlova, D.; Evans, L. G.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Marlow, J. B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Safeguards Science and Technology Group, Los Alamos, (United States)

    2011-12-15

    During the past several years, the demand for {sup 3}He gas has far exceeded the gas supply. This shortage of {sup 3}He gas is projected to continue into the foreseeable future. There is a need for alternative neutron detectors that do not require {sup 3}He gas. For more than four decades, neutron detection has played a fundamental role in the safeguarding and control of nuclear materials at production facilities, fabrication plants and storage sites worldwide. Neutron measurements for safeguards applications have requirements that are unique to the quantitative assay of special nuclear materials. These neutron systems measure the neutron multiplicity distributions from each spontaneous fission and/or induced fission event. The neutron time correlation counting requires that two or more neutrons from a single fission event be detected. The doubles and triples neutron counting rate depends on the detector efficiency to the 2nd and 3rd power, respectively, so low efficiency systems will not work for the coincidence measurements, and any detector instabilities are greatly amplified. In the current test program, we will measure the alternative detector properties including efficiency, die-away time, multiplicity precision, gamma sensitivity, dead-time, and we will also consider the detector properties that would allow commercial production to safeguards scale assay systems. This last step needs to be accomplished before the proposed technologies can reduce the demand on {sup 3}He gas in the safeguards world. This paper will present the methodology that includes MCNPX simulations for comparing divergent detector types such as {sup 10}B lined proportional counters with {sup 3}He gas based systems where the performance metrics focus on safeguards applications.

  6. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

  7. The application of safeguards design principles to the spent fuel bundle counter for 600 MW

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stirling, A.J.; Allen, V.H.

    1978-10-01

    The irradiated fuel bundle counters for CANDU 600 MW reactors provide the IAEA with a secure and independent means of estimating the inventory of the spent fuel storage bay at each inspection. Their function is straightforward: to count the bundles entering the storage area through the normal transfer ports. However, location, reliability, security and operating requirements make them highly ΣintelligentΣ instruments which have required a major development program. Moreover, the bundle counters incorporate principles which apply to many unattended safeguards instruments. For example, concealing the operating status from potential diverters eases reliability specifications, continuous self-checking gives the inspector confidence in the readout, independence from continuous station services improves tamper resistance, and the detailed data display provides tamper indication and a high level of credibility. Each irradiated fuel bundle counter uses four Geiger counters to detect the passage of fuel bundles as they pass sequentially through the field-of-view. A Microprocessor analyzes the sequence of the Geiger counter signals and determines the number and direction of bundles transferred. The readout for IAEA inspectors includes both a tally and a printed log. The printer is also used to alert the inspector to abnomal fuel movements, tampering, Geiger counter failures and contamination of the fuel transfer mechanism. (author)

  8. Calibration and Monte Carlo modelling of neutron long counters

    CERN Document Server

    Tagziria, H

    2000-01-01

    The Monte Carlo technique has become a very powerful tool in radiation transport as full advantage is taken of enhanced cross-section data, more powerful computers and statistical techniques, together with better characterisation of neutron and photon source spectra. At the National Physical Laboratory, calculations using the Monte Carlo radiation transport code MCNP-4B have been combined with accurate measurements to characterise two long counters routinely used to standardise monoenergetic neutron fields. New and more accurate response function curves have been produced for both long counters. A novel approach using Monte Carlo methods has been developed, validated and used to model the response function of the counters and determine more accurately their effective centres, which have always been difficult to establish experimentally. Calculations and measurements agree well, especially for the De Pangher long counter for which details of the design and constructional material are well known. The sensitivit...

  9. A semiconductor counter telescope for neutron reaction studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lalovic, B I; Ajdacic, V S [Institute of nuclear sciences Boris Kidric, Vinca, Beograd (Yugoslavia)

    1963-12-15

    A counter telescope consisting of two or three semiconductor counters for {delta}E/{delta}x vs. E analysis was made for studying nuclear reactions induced by 14.4 MeV neutrons. Various factors important for the telescope performance are discussed in details and some solutions for getting an optimum resolution and a low background are given. Protons, deuterons and alpha particles resulting from scattering and reactions of 14.4 MeV neutrons on deuterium, tritium, praseodymium and niobium were detected, and pulses from the counters recorded on a two-dimensional analyzer. These experiments have shown that the telescope compares favorably with other types of telescopes with regards to the upper limit of neutron flux which can be used, (DELTADELTA)x and E resolution, versatility and compactness (author)

  10. DEVELOPMENT OF HETEROGENEOUS PROPORTIONAL COUNTERS FOR NEUTRON DOSIMETRY.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forouzan, Faezeh; Waker, Anthony J

    2018-01-10

    The use of a custom-made cylindrical graphite proportional counter (Cy-GPC) along with a cylindrical tissue equivalent proportional counter (TEPC) for neutron-gamma mixed-field dosimetry has been studied in the following steps: first, the consistency of the gamma dose measurement between the Cy-TEPC and the Cy-GPC was investigated over a range of 20 keV (X-ray) to 0.661 MeV (Cs-137 gamma ray). Then, with both the counters used simultaneously, the neutron and gamma ray doses produced by a P385 Neutron Generator (Thermo Fisher Scientific) together with a Cs-137 gamma source were determined. © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  11. High-level neutron coincidence counter (HLNCC): users' manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krick, M.S.; Menlove, H.O.

    1979-06-01

    This manual describes the portable High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC) developed at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) for the assay of plutonium, particularly by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The counter is designed for the measurement of the effective 240 Pu mass in plutonium samples which may have a high plutonium content. The following topics are discussed: principle of operation, description of the system, operating procedures, and applications

  12. Introduction to Neutron Coincidence Counter Design Based on Boron-10

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kouzes, Richard T.; Ely, James H.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

    2012-01-22

    The Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Policy (NA-241) is supporting the project 'Coincidence Counting With Boron-Based Alternative Neutron Detection Technology' at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for development of an alternative neutron coincidence counter. The goal of this project is ultimately to design, build and demonstrate a boron-lined proportional tube based alternative system in the configuration of a coincidence counter. This report, providing background information for this project, is the deliverable under Task 1 of the project.

  13. Simulation and preliminary experimental results for an active neutron counter using a neutron generator for a fissile material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, Seong-Kyu; Lee, Tae-Hoon; Shin, Hee-Sung; Kim, Ho-Dong

    2009-01-01

    An active neutron coincidence counter using a neutron generator as an interrogation source has been suggested. Because of the high energy of the interrogation neutron source, 2.5 MeV, the induced fission rate is strongly affected by the moderator design. MCNPX simulation has been performed to evaluate the performance achieved with these moderators. The side- and bottom-moderator are significantly important to thermalize neutrons to induce fission. Based on the simulation results, the moderators are designed to be adapted to the experimental system. Their preliminary performance has been tested by using natural uranium oxide powder samples. For a sample of up to 3.5 kg, which contains 21.7 g of 235 U, 2.64 cps/g- 235 U coincidence events have been measured. Mean background error was 9.57 cps and the resultant coincidence error was 13.8 cps. The experimental result shows the current status of an active counting using a neutron generator which still has some challenges to overcome. However, the controllability of an interrogation source makes this system more applicable for a variety of combinations with other non-destructive methods like a passive coincidence counting especially under a harsh environment such as a hot cell. More precise experimental setup and tests with higher enriched samples will be followed to develop a system to apply it to an active measurement for the safeguards of a spent fuel treatment process.

  14. Advances in passive neutron instruments for safeguards use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Krick, M.S.; Langner, D.G.; Miller, M.C.; Stewart, J.E.

    1994-01-01

    Passive neutron and other nondestructive assay techniques have been used extensively by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify plutonium metal, powder, mixed oxide, pellets, rods, assemblies, scrap, and liquids. Normally, the coincidence counting rate is used to measure the 240 Pu-effective mass and gamma-ray spectrometry or mass spectrometry is used to verify the plutonium isotopic ratios. During the past few years, the passive neutron detectors have been installed in plants and operated in the unattended/continuous mode. These radiation data with time continuity have made it possible to use the totals counting rate to monitor the movement of nuclear material. Monte Carlo computer codes have been used to optimize the detector designs for specific applications. The inventory sample counter (INVS-III) has been designed to have a higher efficiency (43%) and a larger uniform counting volume than the original INVS. Data analyses techniques have been developed, including the ''known alpha'' and ''known multiplication'' methods that depend on the sample. For scrap and other impure or poorly characterized samples, we have developed multiplicity counting, initially implemented in the plutonium scrap multiplicity counter. For large waste containers such as 200-L drums, we have developed the add-a-source technique to give accurate corrections for the waste-matrix materials. This paper summarizes recent developments in the design and application of passive neutron assay systems

  15. Experimental Assessment of a New Passive Neutron Multiplication Counter for Partial Defect Verification of LWR Fuel Assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaFleur, A.; Menlove, H.; Park, S.-H.; Lee, S. K.; Oh, J.-M.; Kim, H.-D.

    2015-01-01

    The development of non-destructive assay (NDA) capabilities to improve partial defect verification of spent fuel assemblies is needed to improve the timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of fissile material. This NDA capability is important to the implementation of integrated safeguards for spent fuel verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and would improve deterrence of possible diversions by increasing the risk of early detection. A new NDA technique called Passive Neutron Multiplication Counter (PNMC) is currently being developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to improve safeguards measurements of LightWater Reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies. The PNMC uses the ratio of the fast-neutron emission rate to the thermalneutron emission rate to quantify the neutron multiplication of the item. The fast neutrons versus thermal neutrons are measured using fission chambers (FC) that have differential shielding to isolate fast and thermal energies. The fast-neutron emission rate is directly proportional to the neutron multiplication in the spent fuel assembly; whereas, the thermalneutron leakage is suppressed by the fissile material absorption in the assembly. These FCs are already implemented in the basic Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) detector package. Experimental measurements of fresh and spent PWR fuel assemblies were performed at LANL and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), respectively, using a hybrid PNMC and SINRD detector. The results from these measurements provides valuable experimental data that directly supports safeguards research and development (R&D) efforts on the viability of passive neutron NDA techniques and detector designs for partial defect verification of spent fuel assemblies. (author)

  16. Use of the helium-3 proportional counter for neutron spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vialettes, H.; Le Thanh, P.

    1967-01-01

    Up to now, two methods have been mainly used for neutron spectrometry near nuclear installations: - photographic emulsion spectrometry - the so-called, 'multisphere' technique spectrometry. The first method, which is fairly difficult to apply, has a threshold energy of about 500 keV; this is a big disadvantage for an apparatus which has to be used for spectrometry around nuclear installations where the neutron radiation is very much degraded energetically. The second method does not suffer from this disadvantage but the results which it yields are only approximate. In order to extend the energy range of the neutron spectra studied with sufficient accuracy the use of a helium-3 proportional counter has been considered. This report presents the principles of operation of the helium-3 spectrometer, and the calculation methods which make it possible to take into account the two main effects tending to deform the spectra obtained: - energy absorption by the walls of the counter, - energy loss of the incident neutrons due to elastic collisions with helium-3 nuclei. As an example of the application, the shape of the neutron spectrum emitted by a polonium-lithium source is given; the results obtained are in excellent agreement with theoretical predictions. (authors) [fr

  17. Performance Evaluation of the Neutron Coincidence Counter for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, Howard O.; Kim, H.D.; Ko, W.I.; Park, S.W.

    2005-01-01

    The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is a pyrochemical dry reprocessing technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing this technology for the purpose of spent fuel management and is planning to perform a lab-scale demonstration in 2006. With this technology, a significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected, which could decrease the burden of safety and economics. In this study, MCNPX code calculations were carried out to estimate the performance of a neutron coincidence counter designed for measruement of the process materials in the pilot-scale ACP facility. To verify the design requirement, the singles and doubles counting rates of the detectors were simulated with the latest coincidence capability of the MCNPX code. Then, the precision of the coincidence measurements were evaluated on various process materials from the ACP. It was verified that the performance of the neutron coincidence counter could meet the design criteria for all samples in the ACP, and the material accounting system for the pilot-scale ACP facility could meet the IAEA safeguards goals.

  18. A high-sensitivity neutron counter and waste-drum counting with the high-sensitivity neutron instrument

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hankins, D.E.; Thorngate, J.H.

    1993-04-01

    At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), a highly sensitive neutron counter was developed that can detect and accurately measure the neutrons from small quantities of plutonium or from other low-level neutron sources. This neutron counter was originally designed to survey waste containers leaving the Plutonium Facility. However, it has proven to be useful in other research applications requiring a high-sensitivity neutron instrument

  19. FB-line neutron multiplicity counter operation manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langner, D.G.; Sweet, M.R.; Salazar, S.D.; Kroncke, K.E.

    1998-01-01

    This manual describes the design features, performance, and operating characteristics for the FB-Line Neutron Multiplicity Counter (FBLNMC). The FBLNMC counts neutron multiplicities to quantitatively assay plutonium in many forms, including impure scrap and waste. Monte Carlo neutronic calculations were used to design the high-efficiency (57%) detector that has 113 3 H tubes in a high-density polyethylene body. The new derandomizer circuit is included in the design to reduce deadtime. The FBLNMC can be applied to plutonium masses in the range from a few tens of grams to 5 kg; both conventional coincidence counting and multiplicity counting can be used as appropriate. This manual gives the performance data and preliminary calibration parameters for the FBLNMC

  20. Neutron coincidence counter for MOX fuel pins in storage trays: users' manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowder, L.; Menlove, H.

    1982-08-01

    The neutron coincidence counter for measurement of mixed-oxide fuel pins in storage trays is described. The special detector head has been designed so that the detectors, high-voltage junction boxes, and electronics are interchangeable with those of the high-level neutron coincidence counter system. This manual describes the system components and the operation and maintenance of the counter. The counter was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for in-plant inspection applications by the International Atomic Energy Agency

  1. High-level neutron coincidence counter maintenance manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swansen, J.; Collinsworth, P.

    1983-05-01

    High-level neutron coincidence counter operational (field) calibration and usage is well known. This manual makes explicit basic (shop) check-out, calibration, and testing of new units and is a guide for repair of failed in-service units. Operational criteria for the major electronic functions are detailed, as are adjustments and calibration procedures, and recurrent mechanical/electromechanical problems are addressed. Some system tests are included for quality assurance. Data on nonstandard large-scale integrated (circuit) components and a schematic set are also included

  2. High-level neutron coincidence counter maintenance manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swansen, J.; Collinsworth, P.

    1983-05-01

    High-level neutron coincidence counter operational (field) calibration and usage is well known. This manual makes explicit basic (shop) check-out, calibration, and testing of new units and is a guide for repair of failed in-service units. Operational criteria for the major electronic functions are detailed, as are adjustments and calibration procedures, and recurrent mechanical/electromechanical problems are addressed. Some system tests are included for quality assurance. Data on nonstandard large-scale integrated (circuit) components and a schematic set are also included.

  3. Passive and Active Fast-Neutron Imaging in Support of Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative Safeguards Campaign

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blackston, Matthew A.; Hausladen, Paul

    2010-01-01

    Results from safeguards-related passive and active coded-aperture fast-neutron imaging measurements of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) material configurations performed at Idaho National Laboratory s Zero Power Physics Reactor facility are presented. The imaging measurements indicate that it is feasible to use fast neutron imaging in a variety of safeguards-related tasks, such as monitoring storage, evaluating holdup deposits in situ, or identifying individual leached hulls still containing fuel. The present work also presents the first demonstration of imaging of differential die away fast neutrons.

  4. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  5. Application of safeguards design principles to the spent-fuel bundle counters for 600-MW CANDU reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stirling, A.J.; Allen, V.H.

    1979-01-01

    The irradiated fuel bundle counters for CANDU 600-MW reactors provide the IAEA with a secure and independent means of estimating the inventory of the spent-fuel storage bay at each inspection. Their function is straightforward - to count the bundles entering the storage area through the normal transfer ports. However, location, reliability, security and operating requirements make them highly ''intelligent'' instruments which have required a major development programme. Moreover, the bundle counters incorporate principles which apply to many unattended safeguards instruments. For example, concealing the operating status from potential diverters eases reliability specifications, continuous self-checking gives the inspector confidence in the readout, independence from continuous station services improves tamper-resistance, and the detailed data display provides tamper indication and a high level of credibility. Each irradiated fuel-bundle counter uses four Geiger counters to detect the passage of fuel bundles as they pass sequentially through the field-of-view. A microprocessor analyses the sequence of the Geiger counter signals and determines the number and direction of bundles transferred. The readout for IAEA inspectors includes both a tally and a printed log. The printer is also used to alert the inspector to abnormal fuel movements, tampering, Geiger counter failures and contamination of the fuel transfer mechanism. (author)

  6. The side-on response of a standard long counter to fast neutrons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, F.A.

    1979-01-01

    The response of a standard long counter to neutrons incident into its front face relative to its response to those incident into its side was measured for a range of neutron energies, and an increasing sensitivity to high-energy neutrons incident into the side was evident. The effect of a shadow bar in contributing to an initial degradation in energy of neutrons which then scatter from the surroundings into the counter was suggested by the response of the counter in the side-on orientation as a function of the separation distance of the bar from a source. (Auth.)

  7. The D-D Neutron Generator as an Alternative to Am(Li) Isotopic Neutron Source in the Active Well Coincidence Counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McElroy, Robert Dennis [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Cleveland, Steven L. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2017-03-01

    The 235U mass assay of bulk uranium items, such as oxide canisters, fuel pellets, and fuel assemblies, is not achievable by traditional gamma-ray assay techniques due to the limited penetration of the item by the characteristic 235U gamma rays. Instead, fast neutron interrogation methods such as active neutron coincidence counting must be used. For international safeguards applications, the most commonly used active neutron systems, the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC), Uranium Neutron Collar (UNCL) and 252Cf Shuffler, rely on fast neutron interrogation using an isotopic neutron source [i.e., 252Cf or Am(Li)] to achieve better measurement accuracies than are possible using gamma-ray techniques for high-mass, high-density items. However, the Am(Li) sources required for the AWCC and UNCL systems are no longer manufactured, and newly produced systems rely on limited supplies of sources salvaged from disused instruments. The 252Cf shuffler systems rely on the use of high-output 252Cf sources, which while still available have become extremely costly for use in routine operations and require replacement every five to seven years. Lack of a suitable alternative neutron interrogation source would leave a potentially significant gap in the safeguarding of uranium processing facilities. In this work, we made use of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Large Volume Active Well Coincidence Counter (LV-AWCC) and a commercially available deuterium-deuterium (D-D) neutron generator to examine the potential of the D-D neutron generator as an alternative to the isotopic sources. We present the performance of the LV-AWCC with D-D generator for the assay of 235U based on the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations and measurements of depleted uranium (DU), low enriched uranium (LEU), and highly enriched uranium (HEU) items.

  8. Evaluation of in-plant neutron coincidence counters for the measurement of molten salt extraction residues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langner, D.G.; Russo, P.A.; Wachter, J.R.

    1993-01-01

    Americium is extracted from plutonium by a molten salt extraction (MSE) process. The residual americium-laden salts are a significant waste stream in this pyrochemical purification process. Rapid assay of MSE residues is desirable to minimize the exposure of personnel to these often high-level emissions. However, the quantitative assay of plutonium in MSE residues is difficult. Variable, unknown (a,n) rates and variable emitted-neutron energy spectra preclude the use of standard neutron coincidence counting techniques with old-generation neutron coincidence counters. Gamma-ray assay methods have not been successful with some residues because of random lumps of plutonium metal. In this paper, we present measurements of MSE residues with two state-of-the-art neutron coincidence counters at the Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility: an in-line counter built for the assay of bulk waste material and the pyrochemical multiplicity counter that underwent test and evaluation at that facility. Both of these counters were designed to minimize the effects on measurements of variations in the sample geometry and variable energy spectra of emitted neutrons. These results are compared to measurements made with an HLNCII and with a 20-yr-old in-line well counter. The latter two counters are not optimized in ft sense. We conclude that the newer counters provide significantly improved assay results. The pyrochemical multiplicity counter operated in the conventional coincidence mode provided the best assays overall

  9. Ideal response function of a 3He proportional counter to thermal neutrons determined by different length counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takeda, Naoto; Kudo, Katsuhisa; Kobayashi, Katsuhei; Yoshimoto, Takaaki

    2000-01-01

    The relative gas multiplication along the cylindrical axis of three 3 He proportional counters with different length were measured by using a thermal neutron beam at the Kyoto University Reactor and an ideal response function by taking into account the difference of pulse height spectra were measured by different length counters. The three 3 He proportional counters (model type of P4-0806, P4-0806 and P4-0808 manufactured by Reuter-Stokes) prepared for relative gas multiplication measurements had identical structure having cylindrical outer shells of 304 stainless steel except for different sensitive lengths of 10 cm, 15 cm and 20 cm, respectively. All counters were filled with 400 kPa of 3 He gas and 200 kPa of Ar gas. The pulse height distributions were measured by moving the counter in the direction of it's cylindrical axis perpendicular to the thermal neutron beam. The measured pulse heights corresponding to the full energy peaks at various entrance points were normalized to that of the whole counter irradiation. The results as a function of the distance from the bottom edge of the stainless steel cylinder are shown. The total transition region of gas gain corresponded to about 23 %, 15 % and 10 % of each nominal sensitive region corresponding to shot, middle and long counters. The ideal pulse height spectrum (dots) obtained by using proportional counters of 10 cm and 20 cm in nominal sensitive length to thermal neutron beam is shown in the paper in comparison to simulated one which was calculated assuming the constant gain within the sensitive region and zero gas gain outside the sensitive regions. The simulation realized the ideal response function fairly well. (S.Y.)

  10. Calibration methodology for proportional counters applied to yield measurements of a neutron burst

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarifeño-Saldivia, Ariel, E-mail: atarifeno@cchen.cl, E-mail: atarisal@gmail.com; Pavez, Cristian; Soto, Leopoldo [Comisión Chilena de Energía Nuclear, Casilla 188-D, Santiago (Chile); Center for Research and Applications in Plasma Physics and Pulsed Power, P4, Santiago (Chile); Departamento de Ciencias Fisicas, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas, Universidad Andres Bello, Republica 220, Santiago (Chile); Mayer, Roberto E. [Instituto Balseiro and Centro Atómico Bariloche, Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica and Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, San Carlos de Bariloche R8402AGP (Argentina)

    2014-01-15

    This paper introduces a methodology for the yield measurement of a neutron burst using neutron proportional counters. This methodology is to be applied when single neutron events cannot be resolved in time by nuclear standard electronics, or when a continuous current cannot be measured at the output of the counter. The methodology is based on the calibration of the counter in pulse mode, and the use of a statistical model to estimate the number of detected events from the accumulated charge resulting from the detection of the burst of neutrons. The model is developed and presented in full detail. For the measurement of fast neutron yields generated from plasma focus experiments using a moderated proportional counter, the implementation of the methodology is herein discussed. An experimental verification of the accuracy of the methodology is presented. An improvement of more than one order of magnitude in the accuracy of the detection system is obtained by using this methodology with respect to previous calibration methods.

  11. Calibration methodology for proportional counters applied to yield measurements of a neutron burst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarifeño-Saldivia, Ariel; Pavez, Cristian; Soto, Leopoldo; Mayer, Roberto E.

    2014-01-01

    This paper introduces a methodology for the yield measurement of a neutron burst using neutron proportional counters. This methodology is to be applied when single neutron events cannot be resolved in time by nuclear standard electronics, or when a continuous current cannot be measured at the output of the counter. The methodology is based on the calibration of the counter in pulse mode, and the use of a statistical model to estimate the number of detected events from the accumulated charge resulting from the detection of the burst of neutrons. The model is developed and presented in full detail. For the measurement of fast neutron yields generated from plasma focus experiments using a moderated proportional counter, the implementation of the methodology is herein discussed. An experimental verification of the accuracy of the methodology is presented. An improvement of more than one order of magnitude in the accuracy of the detection system is obtained by using this methodology with respect to previous calibration methods

  12. Some aspects of the use of proton recoil proportional counters for fast neutron personnel dosimeters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yule, T.J.; Bennett, E.F.

    1984-01-01

    Gas-filled proton recoil proportional counters have been used extensively for the measurement of neutron spectra in degraded fission-spectrum environments. Some considerations relating to the use of these counters for personnel dosimetry are here described. High sensitivity and good accuracy in the determination of dose-equivalent can be obtained if relatively high pressure hydrogen-filled proportional counters are used as the active element in a dosimeter system

  13. Proceedings of the symposium on measurements of neutron energy spectra using recoil proton proportional counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Urabe, Itsumasa

    1986-01-01

    This is a report of the symposium on measurements of neutron energy spectra using recoil proton proportional counters held at the Research Reactor Institute of Kyoto University on January 27 in 1986. An energy resolution, wall effects of response functions, n · γ discrimination methods and other fundamental properties of recoil proton counters are discussed for a new development of an application of this counter. (author)

  14. Novel concept for neutron detection: proportional counter filled with 10B nanoparticle aerosol

    Science.gov (United States)

    Amaro, F. D.; Monteiro, C. M. B.; dos Santos, J. M. F.; Antognini, A.

    2017-01-01

    The high neutron detection efficiency, good gamma-ray discrimination and non-toxicity of 3He made of proportional counters filled with this gas the obvious choice for neutron detection, particularly in radiation portal monitors (RPM), used to control the illicit transport of nuclear material, of which neutron detectors are key components. 3He is very rare and during the last decade this gas has become increasingly difficult to acquire. With the exception of BF3, which is toxic, no other gas can be used for neutron detection in proportional counters. We present an alternative where the 3He atoms are replaced by nanoparticles made of another neutron sensitive material, 10B. The particles are dispersed in a gaseous volume, forming an aerosol with neutron sensitive properties. A proportional counter filled with such aerosol was exposed to a thermal neutron beam and the recorded response indicates that the neutrons have interacted with the particles in the aerosol. This original technique, which transforms a standard proportional gas mixture into a neutron sensitive aerosol, is a breakthrough in the field of radiation detection and has the potential to become an alternative to the use of 3He in proportional counters. PMID:28181520

  15. Manual for the Portable Handheld Neutron Counter (PHNC) for Neutron Survey and the Measurement of Plutonium Samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.

    2005-01-01

    We have designed a portable neutron detector for passive neutron scanning measurement and coincidence counting of bulk samples of plutonium. The counter will be used for neutron survey applications as well as the measurement of plutonium samples for portable applications. The detector uses advanced design 3 He tubes to increase the efficiency and battery operated shift register electronics. This report describes the hardware, performance, and calibration for the system

  16. The neutron long counter NERO for studies of β-delayed neutron emission in the r-process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pereira, J.; Hosmer, P.; Lorusso, G.; Santi, P.; Couture, A.; Daly, J.; Del Santo, M.; Elliot, T.

    2010-01-01

    The neutron long counter NERO was built at the National Superconducting Cyclotron Laboratory (NSCL), Michigan State University, for measuring β-delayed neutron-emission probabilities. The detector was designed to work in conjunction with a β-delay implantation station, so that β decays and β-delayed neutrons emitted from implanted nuclei can be measured simultaneously. The high efficiency of about 40%, for the range of energies of interest, along with the small background, are crucial for measuring β-delayed neutron emission branchings for neutron-rich r-process nuclei produced as low intensity fragmentation beams in in-flight separator facilities.

  17. Development of a lithium fluoride zinc sulfide based neutron multiplicity counter

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cowles, Christian; Behling, Spencer; Baldez, Phoenix; Folsom, Micah; Kouzes, Richard; Kukharev, Vladislav; Lintereur, Azaree; Robinson, Sean; Siciliano, Edward; Stave, Sean; Valdez, Patrick

    2018-04-01

    The feasibility of a full-scale lithium fluoride zinc sulfide (LiF/ZnS) based neutron multiplicity counter has been demonstrated. The counter was constructed of modular neutron detecting stacks that each contain five sheets of LiF/ZnS interleaved between six sheets of wavelength shifting plastic with a photomultiplier tube on each end. Twelve such detector stacks were placed around a sample chamber in a square arrangement with lithiated high-density polyethylene blocks in the corners to reflect high-energy neutrons and capture low-energy neutrons. The final system design was optimized via modeling and small-scale test. Measuring neutrons from a 252Cf source, the counter achieved a 36% neutron detection efficiency (ɛ) and an 11 . 7 μs neutron die-away time (τ) for a doubles figure-of-merit (ɛ2 / τ) of 109. This is the highest doubles figure-of-merit measured to-date for a 3He-free neutron multiplicity counter.

  18. Measurement of fast neutron spectra inside reactors with a Li{sup 6} semiconductor counter spectrometer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ajdacic, V S; Lalovic, B I; Petrovic, B P [Institute of nuclear sciences Boris Kidric, Vinca, Beograd (Yugoslavia)

    1963-12-15

    The possibility of using the Li{sup 6} semiconductor counter spectrometer for measuring fast neutron spectra inside reactors has been investigated in details and some solutions of the difficulties associated with the high interference of thermal neutrons in well-moderated reactors are suggested and checked experimentally (author)

  19. Safeguards Considerations for the Design of a Future Fast Neutron Sodium Cooled Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cazalet, J.; Raymond, P.; Masson, M.; Saturnin, A.

    2015-01-01

    Incorporating safeguards at an early stage of a reactor design is a way to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards measures minimizing the possibilities of misuse of the plant or nuclear material diversion. It also reduces the impact on the construction and operation cost. At the preliminary phase, the design will integrate: confinement, containment, surveillance features and non-destructive assay equipment. Taking into account these requirements will help the operator in the approval of the plant at the design phase by national and international authorities in charge of Nuclear Material accounting and safeguards. A large amount of work has been made by the GEN IV International Forum to assess the proliferation resistance of nuclear systems. The IAEA has developed guidelines on ''Safeguards by design'' describing reference requirements for future nuclear facilities. Based on these studies, this communication details implementation of safeguards in the design of a sodium cooled fast neutron reactor (SFR) currently studied in France. Specificities are the use of MOX fuel with high concentration of plutonium and the potential capacity of breeding. A great attention should be paid to avoid diversion of nuclear material contained in fresh or irradiated fuel. Scenarios of reactor misuse are analyzed. The identification of diversion pathways and requirements for nuclear material accountancy, leads to an approach of safeguards, specific to SFR: Material Balance Areas (MBA) and some key measurement points (KMP) are characterized. Specific instrumentation assay helping in the identification and/or characterization of fuel elements and the inventory of nuclear material is described. As concerns the fuel cycle, the safeguards of the reprocessing unit will be progressively increased through the development of materials monitoring and the implementation of these measures at strategic locations of buildings, thus providing real-time information

  20. Study on the neutron dosimetric characteristics of Tissue Equivalent Proportional Counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nunomiya, T.; Kim, E.; Kurosawa, T.; Taniguchi, S.; Nakamura, T. [Tohoku Univ., Sendai (Japan). Cyclotron and Radioisotope Center; Tsujimura, N.; Momose, T.; Shinohara, K. [Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Inst., Environment and Safety Division, Tokai Works, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    1999-03-01

    The neutron dosimetric characteristics of TEPC (Tissue Equivalent Proportional Counter) has been investigated under a cooperative study between Tohoku University and JNC since 1997. This TEPC is a spherical, large volume, single-wire proportional counter (the model LETSW-5, manufactured by Far West Technology, Inc.) and filled with a tissue equivalent gas in a spherical detector of the A-150 tissue equivalent plastic. The TEPC can measure the spectra of absorbed dose in LET and easily estimate the tissue equivalent dose to neutron. This report summarizes the dosimetric characteristics of TEPC to the monoenergetic neutrons with energy from 8 keV to 15 MeV. It is found that TEPC can estimate the ambient dose equivalent, H*(10), with an accuracy from 0.9 to 2 to the neutron above 0.25 MeV and TEPC has a good counting efficiency enough to measure neutron doses with low dose rate at the stray neutron fields. (author)

  1. Calibration methodology for proportional counters applied to yield measurements of a neutron burst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarifeño-Saldivia, Ariel; Pavez, Cristian; Soto, Leopoldo; Mayer, Roberto E

    2015-01-01

    This work introduces a methodology for the yield measurement of a neutron burst using neutron proportional counters. The methodology is based on the calibration of the counter in pulse mode, and the use of a statistical model to estimate the number of detected events from the accumulated charge resulting from detection of the burst of neutrons. An improvement of more than one order of magnitude in the accuracy of a paraffin wax moderated 3 He-filled tube is obtained by using this methodology with respect to previous calibration methods. (paper)

  2. Savannah River Site delayed neutron instruments for safeguards measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Studley, R.V.

    1992-01-01

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) includes a variety of nuclear production facilities that, since 1953, have processed special nuclear materials (SNM) including highly-enriched uranium (>90% 235 U), recycled enriched uranium (∼50% 235 U + 40% 236 U), low burnup plutonium (> 90% 239 Pu + 240 Pu ) and several other nuclear materials such as heat source plutonium ( 238 Pu). DOE Orders, primarily 5633.3, require all nuclear materials to be safeguarded through accountability and material control. Accountability measurements determine the total amount of material in a facility, balancing inventory changes against receipts and shipments, to provide assurance (delayed) that all material was present. Material control immediately detects or deters theft or diversion by assuring materials remain in assigned locations or by impeding unplanned movement of materials within or from a material access area. Goals for accountability or material control, and, therefore, the design of measurement systems, are distinctly different. Accountability measurements are optimized for maximum precision and accuracy, usually for large amounts of special nuclear material. Material control measurements are oriented more toward security features and often must be optimized for sensitivity, to detect small amounts of materials where none should be

  3. Novel fast-neutron activation counter for high repetition rate measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mahmood, S.; Springham, S. V.; Zhang, T.; Rawat, R. S.; Tan, T. L.; Krishnan, M.; Beg, F. N.; Lee, S.; Schmidt, H.; Lee, P.

    2006-01-01

    A fast-neutron beryllium activation counter has been constructed for neutron measurements on a high repetition rate deuterium plasma focus. Beryllium activation is especially suitable for measurements of DD neutron yields. The cross section for the relevant reaction, 9 Be(n,α) 6 He, results in a maximum sensitivity at the characteristic energy of the DD neutrons (∼2.5 MeV) and practically no sensitivity to neutrons with energies 6 He enabled the shot-to-shot neutron yield from the plasma focus to be measured for repetition rates from 0.2 to 3 Hz (and for a range of deuterium gas pressures). With careful analysis, the shot-to-shot yield can be measured up to a maximum repetition rate of 3 Hz, beyond which the pileup of counts from the previous shots reduces the accuracy of the measurements to an unacceptable level. This new beryllium activation counter has been cross-checked against an indium activation counter to obtain absolute neutron yields. At a charging voltage of 12.5 kV (bank energy of 2.2 kJ), the average neutron yield was found to be (7.9±0.7)x10 7 per shot (standard deviation of 4x10 7 ). It was found that activation of the plasma focus construction materials (especially aluminum) must be taken into account

  4. Variable dead time counters. 1 - theoretical responses and the effects of neutron multiplication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lees, E.W.; Hooton, B.W.

    1978-10-01

    A theoretical expression is derived for calculating the response of any variable dead time counter (VDC) used in the passive assay of plutonium by neutron counting of the natural spontaneous fission activity. The effects of neutron multiplication in the sample arising from interactions of the original spontaneous fission neutrons is shown to modify the linear relationship between VDC signal and Pu mass. Numerical examples are shown for the Euratom VDC and a systematic investigation of the various factors affecting neutron multiplication is reported. Limited comparisons between the calculations and experimental data indicate provisional validity of the calculations. (author)

  5. A high-efficiency neutron coincidence counter for small samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Menlove, H.O.; Russo, P.A.

    1991-01-01

    The inventory sample coincidence counter (INVS) has been modified to enhance its performance. The new design is suitable for use with a glove box sample-well (in-line application) as well as for use in the standard at-line mode. The counter has been redesigned to count more efficiently and be less sensitive to variations in sample position. These factors lead to a higher degree of precision and accuracy in a given counting period and allow for the practical use of the INVS counter with gamma-ray isotopics to obtain a plutonium assay independent of operator declarations and time-consuming chemicals analysis. A calculation study was performed using the Los Alamos transport code MCNP to optimize the design parameters. 5 refs., 7 figs., 8 tabs

  6. A gaseous scintillation counter filled with He3 for neutron spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldin, S.A.; Matveev, V.V.

    1962-01-01

    The paper describes a gas plant and gaseous scintillation counter, and gives the results of experiments on the recording and spectrometry of neutron beams using a gaseous scintillation counter filled with a mixture of 10% xenene and 90% helium-3 at an overall pressure of 20 ata. Data are given on the design of the gas plant, which makes it possible to operate the counter continuously over long periods of time, as well as providing the required gas mixtures at overall pressures of up to 60 atm and ensuring constant freedom of the gas from contamination. In addition, the paper presents the results of research on the counter's energy resolution and linearity at different energy levels and indicates its efficiency in gamma fields of intensity up to 3 r/h; the possibility of extending the working energy-range of gaseous scintillation counters filled with helium-3 is also considered. (author) [fr

  7. Methods of calculus for neutron spectrometry in proportional counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Butragueno, J.L.; Blazquez, J.B.; Barrado, J.M.

    1976-01-01

    Response functions for cylindrical proportional counters with hidrogenated gases have been determined, taking in account only wall effect, by means of two independent calculus methods. One of them is a Montecarlo application and the other one analytical at all. Results of both methods have been compared. (author) [es

  8. Methods of calculus for neutron spectrometry in proportional counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Butragueno Casado, J.L.; Blazquez Martinez, J.B.; Barrado Menendez, J.M.

    1976-01-01

    Response functions for cylindrical proportional counters with hydrogenated gases have been determined, taking in account only wall effect, by means of two independent calculus methods. One of them is a Monte Carlo application and the other one analytica at all. Results of both methods have been compared. (Author)

  9. Application of Whole Body Counter to Neutron Dose Assessment in Criticality Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kurihara, O.; Tsujimura, N.; Takasaki, K.; Momose, T.; Maruo, Y. [Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, Tokai (Japan)

    2001-09-15

    Neutron dose assessment in criticality accidents using Whole Body Counter (WBC) was proved to be an effective method as rapid neutron dose estimation at the JCO criticality accident in Tokai-mura. The 1.36MeV gamma-ray of {sup 24}Na in a body can be detected easily by a germanium detector. The Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) of {sup 24}Na is approximately 50Bq for 10minute measurement by the germanium-type whole body counter at JNC Tokai Works. Neutron energy spectra at the typical shielding conditions in criticality accidents were calculated and the conversion factor, whole body activity-to-organ mass weighted neutron absorbed dose, corresponding to each condition were determined. The conversion factor for uncollied fission spectrum is 7.7 [(Bq{sup 24}Na/g{sup 23}Na)/mGy].

  10. Neutron dose equivalent next to the target shield of a neutron therapy facility using an LET counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stinchcomb, T.G.; Kuchnir, F.T.

    1981-01-01

    The use of a spherical tissue-equivalent proportional counter for measurements of the lineal energy (y) and derivations of the linear energy transfer (LET) for fast neutrons has the advantage of giving distributions of dose and dose equivalent as functions of either LET or y. A measurement next to the target shielding of the neutron therapy facility at the University of Chicago Hospitals and Clinics (UCHC) is described, and the data processing is outlined. The distributions are presented and compared to those from measurements in the neutron beam. The average quality factors are presented

  11. The Neutron Spectrometry System Using 3He Counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dang Lanh; Pham Ngoc Tuan; Tuong Thi Thu Huong; Nguyen Nhi Dien; Nguyen Van Hung

    2011-01-01

    A spectrometry system was designed for neutron counting at the horizontal channels of Dalat nuclear reactor. The system is able to interface to PC via EZ-USB with full speed. The designed system can be installed for operation not only at the channel No. 4 of the reactor, but also operated with the neutron Howitzer system installed at the Training Center of Nuclear Research Institute for training purposes. Almost results can be achieved effectively while choosing the shaping time of 2 μs of amplifier unit; and an appropriate preamplifier is used to measure neutron spectra. In this work, the multi-channel spectrometer for measuring neutron was designed and tested. (author)

  12. Measurement of plutonium oxalate in thermal neutron coincidence counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, R.S.; Erkkila, B.H.

    1979-01-01

    A coincidence neutron counting method has been developed for assaying batches of plutonium oxalate. Using counting data from two concentric rings of 3 He detectors, corrections are made for the effects that water has on the coincidence neutron count rate. Batches of plutonium oxalate varying from 750 to 1000 g of plutonium and from 34 to 54% water are assayed with an average accuracy of +-3%

  13. Development of a lithium fluoride zinc sulfide based neutron multiplicity counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowles, Christian; Behling, Spencer; Baldez, Phoenix; Folsom, Micah; Kouzes, Richard; Kukharev, Vladislav; Lintereur, Azaree; Robinson, Sean; Siciliano, Edward; Stave, Sean; Valdez, Patrick

    2018-04-01

    Past 3He shortages led to investigations into replacement options for neutron detectors in systems that previously used 3He-based technologies. The goal of this research was to investigate the feasibility of a full-scale lithium fluoride with silver activated zinc sulfide (LiF/ZnS) based neutron multiplicity counter. The LiF/ZnS based neutron multiplicity counter (LiNMC) was developed based on an iterative process between modeling and experimental measurements. Each active region of the LiNMC contains five sheets of LiF/ZnS sandwiched between six sheets of wavelength shifting plastic to form neutron detection stacks. The wavelength shifted scintillation light was collected by photomultiplier tubes located on each end of the stacks. Twelve such detector stacks were placed around a sample chamber in a square arrangement with lithiated high density polyethylene blocks in the corners to reflect high energy neutrons and capture low energy neutrons. Preliminary calibration with a 252Cf neutron source showed that the LiNMC was able to achieve 36% neutron detection efficiency (ε) and an 11.7 μs neutron die-away time (τ) for a doubles Figure-of-merit (ε2/ τ) of 109. This is the highest doubles Figure-of-merit performance measured to-date for a 3He-free neutron multiplicity counter system. By the end of this project, the LiNMC’s basic components were integrated into a single laboratory scale system capable of proof-of-concept measurements.

  14. The Statistics of Emission and Detection of Neutrons and Photons from Fissile Samples for Safeguard Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Enqvist, Andreas

    2008-03-01

    One particular purpose of nuclear safeguards, in addition to accounting for known materials, is the detection, identifying and quantifying unknown material, to prevent accidental and clandestine transports and uses of nuclear materials. This can be achieved in a non-destructive way through the various physical and statistical properties of particle emission and detection from such materials. This thesis addresses some fundamental aspects of nuclear materials and the way they can be detected and quantified by such methods. Factorial moments or multiplicities have long been used within the safeguard area. These are low order moments of the underlying number distributions of emission and detection. One objective of the present work was to determine the full probability distribution and its dependence on the sample mass and the detection process. Derivation and analysis of the full probability distribution and its dependence on the above factors constitutes the first part of the thesis. Another possibility of identifying unknown samples lies in the information in the 'fingerprints' (pulse shape distribution) left by a detected neutron or photon. A study of the statistical properties of the interaction of the incoming radiation (neutrons and photons) with the detectors constitutes the second part of the thesis. The interaction between fast neutrons and organic scintillation detectors is derived, and compared to Monte Carlo simulations. An experimental approach is also addressed in which cross correlation measurements were made using liquid scintillation detectors. First the dependence of the pulse height distribution on the energy and collision number of an incoming neutron was derived analytically and compared to numerical simulations. Then an algorithm was elaborated which can discriminate neutron pulses from photon pulses. The resulting cross correlation graphs are analyzed and discussed whether they can be used in applications to distinguish possible sample

  15. The Statistics of Emission and Detection of Neutrons and Photons from Fissile Samples for Safeguard Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Enqvist, Andreas

    2008-03-15

    One particular purpose of nuclear safeguards, in addition to accounting for known materials, is the detection, identifying and quantifying unknown material, to prevent accidental and clandestine transports and uses of nuclear materials. This can be achieved in a non-destructive way through the various physical and statistical properties of particle emission and detection from such materials. This thesis addresses some fundamental aspects of nuclear materials and the way they can be detected and quantified by such methods. Factorial moments or multiplicities have long been used within the safeguard area. These are low order moments of the underlying number distributions of emission and detection. One objective of the present work was to determine the full probability distribution and its dependence on the sample mass and the detection process. Derivation and analysis of the full probability distribution and its dependence on the above factors constitutes the first part of the thesis. Another possibility of identifying unknown samples lies in the information in the 'fingerprints' (pulse shape distribution) left by a detected neutron or photon. A study of the statistical properties of the interaction of the incoming radiation (neutrons and photons) with the detectors constitutes the second part of the thesis. The interaction between fast neutrons and organic scintillation detectors is derived, and compared to Monte Carlo simulations. An experimental approach is also addressed in which cross correlation measurements were made using liquid scintillation detectors. First the dependence of the pulse height distribution on the energy and collision number of an incoming neutron was derived analytically and compared to numerical simulations. Then an algorithm was elaborated which can discriminate neutron pulses from photon pulses. The resulting cross correlation graphs are analyzed and discussed whether they can be used in applications to distinguish possible

  16. Calibration of a large multi-element neutron counter in the energy range 85-430 MeV

    CERN Document Server

    Strong, J A; Esterling, R J; Garvey, J; Green, M G; Harnew, N; Jane, M R; Jobes, M; Mawson, J; McMahon, T; Robertson, A W; Thomas, D H

    1978-01-01

    Describes the calibration of a large 60 element neutron counter with a threshold of 2.7 MeV equivalent electron energy. The performance of the counter has been measured in the neutron kinetic energy range 8.5-430 MeV using a neutron beam at the CERN Synchrocyclotron. The results obtained for the efficiency as a function of energy are in reasonable agreement with a Monte Carlo calculation. (7 refs).

  17. A helium-3 proportional counter technique for estimating fast and intermediate neutrons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosako, Toshiso; Nakazawa, Masaharu; Sekiguchi, Akira; Wakabayashi, Hiroaki.

    1976-11-01

    3 He proportional counter was employed to determine the fast and intermediate neutron spectra of wide energy region. The mixed gas ( 3 He, Kr) type counter response and the spectrum unfolding code were prepared and applied to some neutron fields. The counter response calculation was performed by using the Monte Carlo code, paying regards to dealing of the particle range calculation of the mixed gas. An experiment was carried out by using the van de Graaff accelerator to check the response function. The spectrum unfolding code was prepared so that it may have the function of automatic evaluation of the higher energy spectrum's effect to the pulse hight distribution of the lower energy region. The neutron spectra of the various neutron fields were measured and compared with the calculations such as the discrete ordinate Sn calculations. It became clear that the technique developed here can be applied to the practical use in the neutron energy range from about 150 KeV to 5 MeV. (auth.)

  18. Annular shape silver lined proportional counter for on-line pulsed neutron yield measurement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dighe, P.M.; Das, D.

    2015-01-01

    An annular shape silver lined proportional counter is developed to measure pulsed neutron radiation. The detector has 314 mm overall length and 235 mm overall diameter. The central cavity of 150 mm diameter and 200 mm length is used for placing the neutron source. Because of annular shape the detector covers >3π solid angle of the source. The detector has all welded construction. The detector is developed in two halves for easy mounting and demounting. Each half is an independent detector. Both the halves together give single neutron pulse calibration constant of 4.5×10 4 neutrons/shot count. The detector operates in proportional mode which gives enhanced working conditions in terms of dead time and operating range compared to Geiger Muller based neutron detectors

  19. Use of curium neutron flux from head-end pyroprocessing subsystems for the High Reliability Safeguards methodology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Borrelli, R.A., E-mail: r.angelo.borrelli@gmail.com

    2014-10-01

    The deployment of nuclear energy systems (NESs) is expanding around the world. Nations are investing in NESs as a means to establish energy independence, grow national economies, and address climate change. Transitioning to the advanced nuclear fuel cycle can meet growing energy demands and ensure resource sustainability. However, nuclear facilities in all phases of the advanced fuel cycle must be ‘safeguardable,’ where safety, safeguards, and security are integrated into a practical design strategy. To this end, the High Reliability Safeguards (HRS) approach is a continually developing safeguardability methodology that applies intrinsic design features and employs a risk-informed approach for systems assessment that is safeguards-motivated. Currently, a commercial pyroprocessing facility is used as the example system. This paper presents a modeling study that investigates the neutron flux associated with processed materials. The intent of these studies is to determine if the neutron flux will affect facility design, and subsequently, safeguardability. The results presented in this paper are for the head-end subsystems in a pyroprocessing facility. The collective results from these studies will then be used to further develop the HRS methodology.

  20. Development of a position-sensitive fission counter and measurement of neutron flux distributions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamagishi, Hideshi; Soyama, Kazuhiko; Kakuta, Tsunemi

    2001-08-01

    A position-sensitive fission counter (PSFC) that operates in high neutron flux and high gamma-ray background such as at the side of a power reactor vessel has been developed. Neutron detection using the PSFC with a solenoid electrode is based on a delay-line method. The PSFC that has the outer diameter of 25 mm and the sensitive length of 1000 mm was manufactured for investigation of the performances. The PSFC provided output current pulses that were sufficiently higher than the alpha noise, though the PSFC has a solenoid electrode and large electrode-capacitance. The S/N ratio of PSFC outputs proved to be higher than that of ordinary fission counters with 200 mm sensitive length. A performance test to measure neutron flux distributions by a neutron measuring system with the PSFC was carried out by the side of a graphite pile, W2.4 x H1.4 x L1.2 m, with neutron sources, Am-Be 370 GBq x 2. It was confirmed that the neutron flux distribution was well measured with the system. (author)

  1. {sup 10}B multi-grid proportional gas counters for large area thermal neutron detectors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersen, K. [ESS, P.O. Box 176, SE-221 00 Lund (Sweden); Bigault, T. [ILL, BP 156, 6, rue Jules Horowitz, 38042 Grenoble Cedex 9 (France); Birch, J. [Linköping University, SE-581, 83 Linköping (Sweden); Buffet, J. C.; Correa, J. [ILL, BP 156, 6, rue Jules Horowitz, 38042 Grenoble Cedex 9 (France); Hall-Wilton, R. [ESS, P.O. Box 176, SE-221 00 Lund (Sweden); Hultman, L. [Linköping University, SE-581, 83 Linköping (Sweden); Höglund, C. [ESS, P.O. Box 176, SE-221 00 Lund (Sweden); Linköping University, SE-581, 83 Linköping (Sweden); Guérard, B., E-mail: guerard@ill.fr [ILL, BP 156, 6, rue Jules Horowitz, 38042 Grenoble Cedex 9 (France); Jensen, J. [Linköping University, SE-581, 83 Linköping (Sweden); Khaplanov, A. [ILL, BP 156, 6, rue Jules Horowitz, 38042 Grenoble Cedex 9 (France); ESS, P.O. Box 176, SE-221 00 Lund (Sweden); Kirstein, O. [Linköping University, SE-581, 83 Linköping (Sweden); Piscitelli, F.; Van Esch, P. [ILL, BP 156, 6, rue Jules Horowitz, 38042 Grenoble Cedex 9 (France); Vettier, C. [ESS, P.O. Box 176, SE-221 00 Lund (Sweden)

    2013-08-21

    {sup 3}He was a popular material in neutrons detectors until its availability dropped drastically in 2008. The development of techniques based on alternative convertors is now of high priority for neutron research institutes. Thin films of {sup 10}B or {sup 10}B{sub 4}C have been used in gas proportional counters to detect neutrons, but until now, only for small or medium sensitive area. We present here the multi-grid design, introduced at the ILL and developed in collaboration with ESS for LAN (large area neutron) detectors. Typically thirty {sup 10}B{sub 4}C films of 1 μm thickness are used to convert neutrons into ionizing particles which are subsequently detected in a proportional gas counter. The principle and the fabrication of the multi-grid are described and some preliminary results obtained with a prototype of 200 cm×8 cm are reported; a detection efficiency of 48% has been measured at 2.5 Å with a monochromatic neutron beam line, showing the good potential of this new technique.

  2. Dual-chamber/dual-anode proportional counter incorporating an intervening thin-foil solid neutron converter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boatner, Lynn A.; Neal, John S.; Blackston, Matthew A.; Kolopus, James A.; Ramey, Joanne O.

    2012-01-01

    A dual-chamber/dual-anode gas proportional counter utilizing thin solid 6 LiF or 10 B neutron converters coated on a 2-micon-thick Mylar film that is positioned between the two counter chambers and anodes has been designed, fabricated, and tested using a variety of fill gases—including naturally abundant helium. In this device, neutron conversion products emitted from both sides of the coated converter foil are detected—rather than having half of the products absorbed in the wall of a conventional tube-type counter where the solid neutron converter is deposited on the tube wall. Geant4-based radiation transport calculations were used to determine the optimum neutron converter coating thickness for both isotopes. Solution methods for applying these optimized-thickness coatings on a Mylar film were developed that were carried out at room temperature without any specialized equipment and that can be adapted to standard coating methods such as silk screen or ink jet printing. The performance characteristics of the dual-chamber/dual-anode neutron detector were determined for both types of isotopically enriched converters. The experimental performance of the 6 LiF-converter-based detector was described well by modeling results from Geant4. Additional modeling studies of multiple-foil/multiple-chamber/anode configurations addressed the basic issue of the relatively longer absorption range of neutrons versus the shorter range of the conversion products for 6 LiF and 10 B. Combined with the experimental results, these simulations indicate that a high-performance neutron detector can be realized in a single device through the application of these multiple-foil/solid converter, multiple-chamber detector concepts.

  3. Response matrix of a multisphere neutron spectrometer with an 3 He proportional counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vega C, H.R.; Manzanares A, E.; Hernandez D, V.M.; Mercado S, G.A.

    2005-01-01

    The response matrix of a Bonner sphere spectrometer was calculated by use of the MCNP code. As thermal neutron counter, the spectrometer has a 3.2 cm-diameter 3 He-filled proportional counter which is located at the center of a set of polyethylene spheres. The response was calculated for 0, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 16 inches-diameter polyethylene spheres for neutrons whose energy goes from 10 -9 to 20 MeV. The response matrix was compared with a set of responses measured with several monoenergetic neutron sources. In this comparison the calculated matrix agrees with the experimental results. The matrix was also compared with the response matrix calculated for the PTB C spectrometer. Even though that calculation was carried out using a detailed model to describe the proportional counter; both matrices do agree, but small differences are observed in the bare case because of the difference in the model used during calculations. Other differences are in some spheres for 14.8 and 20 MeV neutrons, probably due to the differences in the cross sections used during both calculations. (Author) 28 refs., 1 tab., 6 figs

  4. A neutron well counter for plutonium assay in 200 l waste drums

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eyrich, W.; Kuechle, M.; Shafiee, M.

    1979-05-01

    A neutron well counter is briefly described which will be used for monitoring the plutonium content of 200 l barrels in the waste treatment plant of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe. Measurements on simulated waste were made to study the influence of matrix material and non-homogeneous plutonium distribution. The variation in detection efficiency could be reduced from 28% to 10% when the signals from inner and outer neutron detectors in the polyethylene annulus are counted separately and a correction is applied, using this information. This method is superior to the source addition technique. Coincidence counting shows a larger variation which could not be reduced to below 18%. (orig.) [de

  5. A deadtime reduction circuit for thermal neutron coincidence counters with Amptek preamplifiers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bourret, S.C.; Krick, M.S.

    1994-01-01

    We have developed a deadtime reduction circuit for thermal neutron coincidence counters using Amptek preamplifier/amplifier/discriminator circuits. The principle is to remove the overlap between the output pulses from the Amptek circuits by adding a derandomizer between the Amptek circuits and the shift-register coincidence electronics. We implemented the derandomizer as an Actel programmable logic array; the derandomizer board is small and can be mounted in the high-voltage junction box with the Amptek circuits, if desired. Up to 32 Amptek circuits can be used with one derandomizer. The derandomizer has seven outputs: four groups of eight inputs, two groups of 16 inputs, and one group of 32 inputs. We selected these groupings to facilitate detector ring-ratio measurements. The circuit was tested with the five-ring research multiplicity counter, which has five output signals-one for each ring. The counter's deadtime was reduced from 70 to 30 ns

  6. The calculated neutron response of a sphere with the multi-counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Taosheng; Yang Lianzhen; Li Dongyu

    2004-01-01

    Based on the difference of the neutron distribution in the moderator, three position sensitive proportional counters which are perpendicular to each other are inserted into the moderator. The energy responses with six spherical moderators and six incidence directions have been calculated by MCNP4A code. The calculated results for two divided region methods in the radial of the spherical moderator have been analyzed and compared. (authors)

  7. Neutron spectrometry with proton recoil proportional counters at the research and measurement reactor Braunschweig - status of the technique

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knauf, K.; Wittstock, J.

    1987-07-01

    This status report is concerned with the facilities set up for neutron spectrometry at the Research and Measurement Reactor Braunschweig, based on proton recoil proportional counters. Cylindrical counters for irradiation by a neutron beam normal to the counter wire and commercial spherical counters are employed. They can be filled with hydrogen or a hydrogeneous gas up to a pressure of 1 MPa depending on their use. The filling method and the electronic pulse processing are described. The pulse analysis system includes a pulse shape discrimination branch in order to separate γ-ray induced pulses. Finally, experimental investigations with spherical counters are discussed regarding the region of proportionality and the influence of the counter voltage on the shape of the response function. (orig./HP) [de

  8. Neutron time-of-flight counters and spectrometers for diagnostics of burning fusion plasmas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elevant, T.; Olsson, M.

    1991-02-01

    Experiment with burning fusion plasmas in tokamaks will place particular requirements on neutron measurements from radiation resistance-, physics-, burn control- and reliability considerations. The possibility to meet these needs by measurements of neutron fluxes and energy spectra by means of time-of-flight techniques are described. Reference counters and spectrometers are proposed and characterized with respect to efficiency, count-rate capabilities, energy resolution and tolerable neutron and γ-radiation background levels. The instruments can be used in a neutron camera and are capable to operate in collimated neutron fluxes up to levels corresponding to full nuclear output power in the next generation of experiments. Energy resolutions of the spectrometers enables determination of ion temperatures from 3 (keV) through analysis of the Doppler broadening. Primarily, the instruments are aimed for studies of 14 (MeV) neutrons produced in (d,t)-plasmas but can, after minor modifications, be used for analysis of 2.45 (MeV) neutrons produced in (d,d)-plasma. (au) (33 refs.)

  9. Advanced Neutron Detection Methods: new Tools for Countering Nuclear Terrorism (412th Brookhaven Lecture)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vanier, Peter

    2006-01-01

    Acts of terrorism have become almost daily occurrences in the international news. Yet one of the most feared types of terrorism - nuclear terrorism - has not yet happened. One important way of preventing nuclear terrorism is to safeguard nuclear materials, and many people worldwide work continuously to achieve that goal. A second, vital defense is being developed: greatly improved methods of detecting material that a nuclear terrorist would need so that timely discovery of the material could become more probable. Special nuclear materials can emit neutrons, either spontaneously or when excited by a source of high-energy gamma rays, such as an electron accelerator. Traditional neutron detectors can sense these neutrons, but not the direction from which the neutrons come, or their energy. The odds against finding smuggled nuclear materials using conventional detectors are great. However, innovative designs of detectors are producing images that show the locations and even the shapes of man-made neutron sources, which stand out against the uniform background produced by cosmic rays. With the new detectors, finding needles in haystacks - or smuggled nuclear materials in a huge container among thousands of others in a busy port - suddenly becomes possible.

  10. A new fast neutron collar for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low enriched uranium fuel assemblies containing burnable poison rods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Evans, Louise G., E-mail: evanslg@ornl.gov [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Schwalbach, Peter; Baere, Paul De [European Commission, Euratom Safeguards Office (Luxembourg); Browne, Michael C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2013-11-21

    Safeguards inspection measurements must be performed in a timely manner in order to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. A shorter measurement time can increase the number of items that a nuclear safeguards inspector can reliably measure during a period of access to a nuclear facility. In turn, this improves the reliability of the acquired statistical sample, which is used to inform decisions regarding compliance. Safeguards inspection measurements should also maintain independence from facility operator declarations. Existing neutron collars employ thermal neutron interrogation for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh fuel assemblies. A new fast neutron collar has been developed for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel assemblies containing gadolinia (Gd{sub 2}O{sub 3}) burnable poison rods. The Euratom Fast Collar (EFC) was designed with high neutron detection efficiency to make a fast (Cd) mode measurement viable whilst meeting the high counting precision and short assay time requirements of the Euratom safeguards inspectorate. A fast mode measurement reduces the instrument sensitivity to burnable poison rod content and therefore reduces the applied poison correction, consequently reducing the dependence on the operator declaration of the poison content within an assembly. The EFC non-destructive assay (NDA) of typical modern European pressurized water reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly designs have been simulated using Monte Carlo N-particle extended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. Simulations predict that the EFC can achieve 2% relative statistical uncertainty on the doubles neutron counting rate for a fast mode measurement in an assay time of 600 s (10 min) with the available {sup 241}AmLi (α,n) interrogation source strength of 5.7×10{sup 4} s{sup −1}. Furthermore, the calibration range of the new collar has been extended to verify {sup 235}U content in variable PWR fuel

  11. A new fast neutron collar for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low enriched uranium fuel assemblies containing burnable poison rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, Louise G.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Schwalbach, Peter; Baere, Paul De; Browne, Michael C.

    2013-01-01

    Safeguards inspection measurements must be performed in a timely manner in order to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. A shorter measurement time can increase the number of items that a nuclear safeguards inspector can reliably measure during a period of access to a nuclear facility. In turn, this improves the reliability of the acquired statistical sample, which is used to inform decisions regarding compliance. Safeguards inspection measurements should also maintain independence from facility operator declarations. Existing neutron collars employ thermal neutron interrogation for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh fuel assemblies. A new fast neutron collar has been developed for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel assemblies containing gadolinia (Gd 2 O 3 ) burnable poison rods. The Euratom Fast Collar (EFC) was designed with high neutron detection efficiency to make a fast (Cd) mode measurement viable whilst meeting the high counting precision and short assay time requirements of the Euratom safeguards inspectorate. A fast mode measurement reduces the instrument sensitivity to burnable poison rod content and therefore reduces the applied poison correction, consequently reducing the dependence on the operator declaration of the poison content within an assembly. The EFC non-destructive assay (NDA) of typical modern European pressurized water reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly designs have been simulated using Monte Carlo N-particle extended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. Simulations predict that the EFC can achieve 2% relative statistical uncertainty on the doubles neutron counting rate for a fast mode measurement in an assay time of 600 s (10 min) with the available 241 AmLi (α,n) interrogation source strength of 5.7×10 4 s −1 . Furthermore, the calibration range of the new collar has been extended to verify 235 U content in variable PWR fuel designs in the presence of up to

  12. Passive assay of plutonium metal plates using a fast-neutron multiplicity counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Di Fulvio, A., E-mail: difulvio@umich.edu [Department of Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (United States); Shin, T.H.; Jordan, T.; Sosa, C.; Ruch, M.L.; Clarke, S.D. [Department of Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (United States); Chichester, D.L. [Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 (United States); Pozzi, S.A. [Department of Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Sciences, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (United States)

    2017-05-21

    We developed a fast-neutron multiplicity counter based on organic scintillators (EJ-309 liquid and stilbene). The system detects correlated photon and neutron multiplets emitted by fission reactions, within a gate time of tens of nanoseconds. The system was used at Idaho National Laboratory to assay a variety of plutonium metal plates. A coincidence counting strategy was used to quantify the {sup 240}Pu effective mass of the samples. Coincident neutrons, detected within a 40-ns coincidence window, show a monotonic trend, increasing with the {sup 240}Pu-effective mass (in this work, we tested the 0.005–0.5 kg range). After calibration, the system estimated the {sup 240}Pu effective mass of an unknown sample ({sup 240}Pu{sub eff} >50 g) with an uncertainty lower than 1% in a 4-min assay time.

  13. Measurement of highly enriched uranium metal buttons with the high-level neutron coincidence counter operating in the active mode

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foley, J.E.

    1980-10-01

    The portable High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter is used in the active mode with the addition of AmLi neutron sources to assay the 235 U content of highly enriched metal pieces or buttons. It is concluded that the portable instrument is a practical instrument for assaying uranium metal buttons with masses in the range 1.5 to 4 kg

  14. Discrimination of the wall effect in a thin counter with micro-gap structure for neutron position sensing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sakae, Takeji; Manabe, Tohru; Kitamura, Yasunori; Nohtomi, Akihiro [Kyushu Univ., Fukuoka (Japan); Sakamoto, Sigeyasu

    1996-07-01

    Simulation by the Monte Carlo method is applied to estimate the wall effect in a thermal neutron counter having a new function for discriminating the effect. The counter is designed to have paralleled electrodes with micro-gap structure. A resistive anode is used for position sensing on the center of a set of the three electrode. The structure can be made by simple arrangement of anode and cathode wires on an insulator plane. The calculation shows discrimination of the wall effect can be achieved by coincident counting of two or three elements included in the counter. By using the coincident counting, the thickness of the neutron counter can be made into 1 mm with the information of the total energy created in the neutron detection. (author)

  15. The high-level neutron coincidence counter (HLNCC) family of detectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramalho, A.; Dahn, E.; Selleck, E.; Kupryashkin, V.; Dubreuil, A.

    1983-01-01

    A description of a group of detectors based on The High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC) concept is presented. Experience in their utilization is summarized and the procedures followed in calibration and data treatment are described. Advantages of the use of this variety of detectors in simplifying the NDA verifications, reducing the interference with facility operators, and increasing the effectiveness of the inspectors' work are stressed. Likewise, remaining problems such as the need for a vigorous programme directed at achieving the best independent calibrations are emphasized. (author)

  16. The extended range neutron rem counter LINUS: overview and latest developments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birattari, C.; Rancati, T.; Esposito, A.; Pelliccioni, M.; Ferrari, A.; Silari, M.

    1997-01-01

    The 'history' of the extended range neutron rem counter LINUS, since its first conception in 1990 is reviewed, along with the latest developments. These include the calibration of the initially cylindrical version with nearly monoenergetic neutrons in the energy range 34-66 MeV, a detailed evaluation of the anisotropy of its response function, the construction and calibration of an improved spherical version, and recent measurements in reference high energy stray radiation fields. The instrument can now be considered as being fully characterized. Similar monitors built by other laboratories following the present design have confirmed its performances. The instrument is now in semi-routine use at a number of particle accelerator facilities and is one of several devices used on-board of aircrafts for assessing the exposure to cosmic rays at commercial flight altitudes. (author)

  17. A suspended boron foil multi-wire proportional counter neutron detector

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nelson, Kyle A.; Edwards, Nathaniel S.; Hinson, Niklas J.; Wayant, Clayton D.; McGregor, Douglas S.

    2014-12-11

    Three natural boron foils, approximately 1.0 cm in diameter and 1.0 µm thick, were obtained from The Lebow Company and suspended in a multi-wire proportional counter. Suspending the B foils allowed the alpha particle and Li ion reaction products to escape simultaneously, one on each side of the foil, and be measured concurrently in the gas volume. The thermal neutron response pulse-height spectrum was obtained and two obvious peaks appear from the 94% and 6% branches of the {sup 10}B(n,α){sup 7}Li neutron reaction. Scanning electron microscope images were collected to obtain the exact B foil thicknesses and MCNP6 simulations were completed for those same B thicknesses. Pulse-height spectra obtained from the simulations were compared to experimental data and matched well. The theoretical intrinsic thermal–neutron detection efficiency for enriched {sup 10}B foils was calculated and is presented. Additionally, the intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of the three natural B foils was calculated to be 3.2±0.2%.

  18. A suspended boron foil multi-wire proportional counter neutron detector

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, Kyle A.; Edwards, Nathaniel S.; Hinson, Niklas J.; Wayant, Clayton D.; McGregor, Douglas S.

    2014-12-01

    Three natural boron foils, approximately 1.0 cm in diameter and 1.0 μm thick, were obtained from The Lebow Company and suspended in a multi-wire proportional counter. Suspending the B foils allowed the alpha particle and Li ion reaction products to escape simultaneously, one on each side of the foil, and be measured concurrently in the gas volume. The thermal neutron response pulse-height spectrum was obtained and two obvious peaks appear from the 94% and 6% branches of the 10B(n,α)7Li neutron reaction. Scanning electron microscope images were collected to obtain the exact B foil thicknesses and MCNP6 simulations were completed for those same B thicknesses. Pulse-height spectra obtained from the simulations were compared to experimental data and matched well. The theoretical intrinsic thermal-neutron detection efficiency for enriched 10B foils was calculated and is presented. Additionally, the intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of the three natural B foils was calculated to be 3.2±0.2%.

  19. Proton-recoil proportional-counter array for neutron-image construction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fink, C.L.; Eichholz, J.J.; DeVolpi, A.

    1984-01-01

    The fuel-motion measurement capability of the fast-neutron hodoscope has been upgraded by the addition of a 360-detector proton-recoil proportional-counter array, which detects high-energy fission neutrons. The current sensitive amplifier/discriminator module for each detector fits into a 12.7 by 12.7 by 102 mm package and cost less than $100 per module. It has a 50 ns rise time, a noise level of 100 nA, and a deadtime per event of 200 ns. Provision has been provided for the independent adjustment of the input current versus discriminator voltage for each module. The new proportional-counters cost approximately $400 each. Each detector has been tested to have the same gain versus voltage response. A space-charge model relating count-rate changes to space-charge effects has also been developed. The new detector array has been operational for approximately two years and has become the main detector system in fuel-motion analysis. It has significantly improved the linearity, stability, count-rate capability, and setup ease of the hodoscope

  20. Proposal for Analysis of the Safeguarded Nuclear Materials 235U and 239Pu by Delayed Neutrons Technique

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    El-Mongy, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    This paper introduces, describes and initiates a very sensitive and rapid non-destructive technique to be used for analysis of the safeguarded nuclear materials 235 U and 239 Pu. The technique is based on fission of the nuclear material by neutrons and then measuring the delayed neutrons produced from the neutron rich fission products. By this technique, fissile isotope content ( 235 U) can be determined in the presence of the other fissile (e.g. 239 Pu) or fertile isotopes (e.g. 238 U) in fresh and spent fuel. The time consumed for analysis of bulk materials by this technique is only 4 minutes. The method is also used for analysis of uranium in rock, sediment, soil, meteorites, lunar, biological, urine, archaeological, zircon sand and seawater samples. The method enables uranium in a sample to be measured without respect to its oxidation state, organic and inorganic elements

  1. Development of a Neutron Long Counter Detector for (α, n) Cross Section Measurements at Ohio University

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brandenburg, Kristyn; Meisel, Zach; Brune, Carl R.; Massey, Thomas; Soltesz, Doug; Subedi, Shiv

    2017-01-01

    The origin of the elements from roughly zinc-to-tin (30 determined. The neutron-rich neutrino driven wind of core collapse supernova (CCSN) is a proposed site for the nucleosynthesis of these elements. However, a significant source of uncertainty exists in elemental abundance yields from astrophysics model calculations due to the uncertainty for (α , n) reaction rates, as most of the relevant cross sections have yet to be measured. We are developing a neutron long counter tailored to measure neutrons for (α , n) reaction measurements performed at The Ohio University Edwards Accelerator Laboratory. The detector design will be optimized using the Monte-Carlo N-Particle transport code (MCNP6). Details of the optimization process, as well as the present status of the detector design will be provided. The plans for first (α , n) cross section measurements will also be briefly discussed. This work was supported in part by the US Department of Energy under Grant Number DE-FG02-88ER40387.

  2. Broad Energy Range Neutron Spectroscopy using a Liquid Scintillator and a Proportional Counter: Application to a Neutron Spectrum Similar to that from an Improvised Nuclear Device.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Yanping; Randers-Pehrson, Gerhard; Marino, Stephen A; Garty, Guy; Harken, Andrew; Brenner, David J

    2015-09-11

    A novel neutron irradiation facility at the Radiological Research Accelerator Facility (RARAF) has been developed to mimic the neutron radiation from an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) at relevant distances (e.g. 1.5 km) from the epicenter. The neutron spectrum of this IND-like neutron irradiator was designed according to estimations of the Hiroshima neutron spectrum at 1.5 km. It is significantly different from a standard reactor fission spectrum, because the spectrum changes as the neutrons are transported through air, and it is dominated by neutron energies from 100 keV up to 9 MeV. To verify such wide energy range neutron spectrum, detailed here is the development of a combined spectroscopy system. Both a liquid scintillator detector and a gas proportional counter were used for the recoil spectra measurements, with the individual response functions estimated from a series of Monte Carlo simulations. These normalized individual response functions were formed into a single response matrix for the unfolding process. Several accelerator-based quasi-monoenergetic neutron source spectra were measured and unfolded to test this spectroscopy system. These reference neutrons were produced from two reactions: T(p,n) 3 He and D(d,n) 3 He, generating neutron energies in the range between 0.2 and 8 MeV. The unfolded quasi-monoenergetic neutron spectra indicated that the detection system can provide good neutron spectroscopy results in this energy range. A broad-energy neutron spectrum from the 9 Be(d,n) reaction using a 5 MeV deuteron beam, measured at 60 degrees to the incident beam was measured and unfolded with the evaluated response matrix. The unfolded broad neutron spectrum is comparable with published time-of-flight results. Finally, the pair of detectors were used to measure the neutron spectrum generated at the RARAF IND-like neutron facility and a comparison is made to the neutron spectrum of Hiroshima.

  3. Neutron measurements inside reactors with semiconductor counters; Apsolutno merenje neutronskih flukseva u jezgru reaktora RA visokim snagama

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ajdacic, V; Lalovic, B; Barucija, M; Petrovic, B [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Laboratorija za fiziku i dinamiku reaktora, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1964-06-15

    A method of absolute in-core measurement of high neutron fluxes inside reactors operating in the megawatt region is described. In this method a semiconductor counter observes particles coming from neutron induced reactions in a target placed inside the reactor core through a long evacuated aluminum tube. The paper deals with factors which influence the accuracy of the method. Possible use of the long- tube method for neutron flux measurements in advanced reactors with neutron flux of 10{sup 15}-10{sup 16} n/cm{sup 2} sec is also discussed. The possibility of using the Li{sup 6} semiconductor counter spectrometer for measuring fast neutron spectra inside the zero power reactor at Vinca has been investigated. Great difficulties associated with the high interference of thermal neutrons have been encountered. The thermal neutron interference is almost completely suppressed by a new detector-target arrangement, in which only those products of the Li{sup 6} (n,alpha)T reactions whose mutual angle of emission is different from 180 deg are detected in coincidence. Resolution of the spectrometer as a function of the reactor power and correction factors of the spectrometer efficiency for various neutron energies are presented (author)

  4. Response of a carbon-walled proportional counter to 14 MeV neutrons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, K.D.

    1982-01-01

    The response of a carbon-walled spherical proportional counter filled with a methane-based tissue-equivalent gas mixture at low pressure and irradiated with 14 MeV neutrons is first measured experimentally and is then calculated theoretically by using an analytical model. The model, called the CISS model, is derived from a consideration of four basic modes of interaction of charged particles generated in neutron-nucleus reactions with the spherical cavity of the detector. Since several quantities which have application in neutron dosimetry, radiation protection, and radiation biology make direct use of such spectra, it is desirable to have the ability to theoretically predict what is expected experimentally. Thus, a comparison between the two response curves is made. The discrepancy between them is investigated by considering several physical phenomena occurring within the detector wall which tend to distort the experimental response curve. In particular, the C(n,n',3α) reaction occurring in the detector wall gives rise to multiple events, originating from a single neutron interaction in the wall simultaneously strike the detector cavity, and are recorded as a single larger event in an experimental spectra. In the analytic model, the simultaneous entry of two charged particles into the cavity is scored as two separate smaller events, uncorrelated in their production. In this work, an effort is made to modify the analytic model prediction of the response curve by correcting for the multiple events which occur. Finally, the CISS model is used to compute mass stopping power corrections for this inhomogeneous detector

  5. Universal Fast Breeder Reactor Subassembly Counter manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Eccleston, G.W.; Swansen, J.E.; Goris, P.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Ramalho, A.

    1984-08-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of fast breeder reactor fuel assemblies. This assay system can accommodate the full range of geometries and masses found in fast breeder subassemblies under IAEA safeguards. The system's high-performance capability accommodates high plutonium loadings of up to 16 kg. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications

  6. Universal Fast Breeder Reactor Subassembly Counter manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menlove, H.O.; Eccleston, G.W.; Swansen, J.E.; Goris, P.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Ramalho, A.

    1984-08-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of fast breeder reactor fuel assemblies. This assay system can accommodate the full range of geometries and masses found in fast breeder subassemblies under IAEA safeguards. The system's high-performance capability accommodates high plutonium loadings of up to 16 kg. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications.

  7. Detection of neutrons of intermediate energy using 10B, enclosed in a coaxial Ge(Li) counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huck, A.; Klotz, G.; Walter, G.

    1976-01-01

    A neutron detector operating in the energy range 1keV to roughly 1MeV with a time response that is fast enough to be used in time-of-flight experiments, has been designed and built. The neutron is absorbed in boron-10, placed inside a coaxial Ge(Li) counter. Efficient detection of the 478keV line from 7 Li, resulting from 10 B(n,α) 7 Li*, is realized. At the same time, the measurement of accompanying γ radiations, emitted by the neutron source, can be performed. Examples of results, obtained using (p,nγ) reactions, are given [fr

  8. Errors in estimating neutron quality factor using lineal energy distributions measured in tissue-equivalent proportional counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borak, T.B.; Stinchcomb, T.G.

    1982-01-01

    Neutron dose equivalent is obtained from quality factors which are defined in terms of LET. It is possible to estimate the dose averaged quality factor, antiQ, directly from distributions in lineal energy, y, that are measured in tissue-equivalent proportional counters. This eliminates a mathematical transformation of the absorbed dose from D(y) to D(L). We evaluate the inherent error in computing Q from D(y) rather than D(L) for neutron spectra below 4 MeV. The effects of neutron energy and simulated tissue diameters within a gas cavity are examined in detail. (author)

  9. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): A Nondestructive Assay Technique for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Plutonium Assay Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. W. Sterbentz; D. L. Chichester

    2010-12-01

    This is an end-of-year report for a project funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The goal of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) to assay plutonium in commercial light-water-reactor spent fuel. This project is part of a larger research effort within the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to evaluate methods for assaying plutonium in spent fuel, the Plutonium Assay Challenge. The first-year goals for this project were modest and included: 1) developing a zero-order MCNP model for the NRTA technique, simulating data results presented in the literature, 2) completing a preliminary set of studies investigating important design and performance characteristics for the NRTA measurement technique, and 3) documentation of this work in an end of the year report (this report). Research teams at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and at several universities are also working to investigate plutonium assay methods for spent-fuel safeguards. While the NRTA technique is well proven in the scientific literature for assaying individual spent fuel pins, it is a newcomer to the current NGSI efforts studying Pu assay method techniques having just started in March 2010; several analytical techniques have been under investigation within this program for two to three years or more. This report summarizes a nine month period of work.

  10. Photon and neutron dose discrimination using low pressure proportional counters with graphite and A150 walls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kylloenen, J.; Lindborg, L.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The determination of both the low- and high-LET components of ambient dose equivalent in mixed fields is possible with microdosimetric methods. With the multiple-event microdosimetric variance covariance method the sum of those components are directly obtained also in pulsed beams. However, if the value of each dose component is needed a more extended analysis is required. The use of a graphite walled proportional detector in combination with a tissue-equivalent proportional counter in combination with the variance covariance method was here investigated. MCNP simulations were carried out for relevant energies to investigate the photon and neutron responses of the two detectors. The combined graphite and TEPC system, the Sievert instrument, was used for measurements at IRSN, Cadarache, in the workplace calibration fields of CANEL+, SIGMA, a Cf-252 and a moderated Cf(D 2 O,Cd) radiation field. The response of the instrument in various monoenergetic neutron fields is also known from measurements at PTB. The instrument took part in the measurement campaigns in workplace fields in the nuclear industry organized within the EVIDOS contract. The results are analyzed and the method of using a graphite detector compared with alternative methods of analysis is discussed. (author)

  11. Study of the response of a lithium yttrium borate scintillator based neutron rem counter by Monte Carlo radiation transport simulations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sunil, C.; Tyagi, Mohit; Biju, K.; Shanbhag, A. A.; Bandyopadhyay, T.

    2015-12-01

    The scarcity and the high cost of 3He has spurred the use of various detectors for neutron monitoring. A new lithium yttrium borate scintillator developed in BARC has been studied for its use in a neutron rem counter. The scintillator is made of natural lithium and boron, and the yield of reaction products that will generate a signal in a real time detector has been studied by FLUKA Monte Carlo radiation transport code. A 2 cm lead introduced to enhance the gamma rejection shows no appreciable change in the shape of the fluence response or in the yield of reaction products. The fluence response when normalized at the average energy of an Am-Be neutron source shows promise of being used as rem counter.

  12. Study of the response of a lithium yttrium borate scintillator based neutron rem counter by Monte Carlo radiation transport simulations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sunil, C., E-mail: csunil11@gmail.com [Accelerator Radiation Safety Section, Health Physics Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai 400085 (India); Tyagi, Mohit [Technical Physics Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai 400085 (India); Biju, K.; Shanbhag, A.A.; Bandyopadhyay, T. [Accelerator Radiation Safety Section, Health Physics Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai 400085 (India)

    2015-12-11

    The scarcity and the high cost of {sup 3}He has spurred the use of various detectors for neutron monitoring. A new lithium yttrium borate scintillator developed in BARC has been studied for its use in a neutron rem counter. The scintillator is made of natural lithium and boron, and the yield of reaction products that will generate a signal in a real time detector has been studied by FLUKA Monte Carlo radiation transport code. A 2 cm lead introduced to enhance the gamma rejection shows no appreciable change in the shape of the fluence response or in the yield of reaction products. The fluence response when normalized at the average energy of an Am–Be neutron source shows promise of being used as rem counter.

  13. Detection of pulsed fast neutrons by a proportional counter boron-convered and enveloped in paraffin moderators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goncalez, O.L.; Yanagihara, L.S.; Veissid, V.L.C.P.; Herdade, S.B.

    1983-01-01

    The response to pulsed fast neutrons by a parafin moderated boron-lined proportional counter is investigated theoretically and experimentally. The neutrons pulses are generated by 60 MeV electrons from a linear accelerator. The calculation of the counting loss based on the detector dead time and on the exponential decresse of the thermal neutron population in the moderator is presented in detail. An analytical relation between the true counting rate and the reduced one, indicated by the detector, is found. In this formula three parameters appear: the decay constant of the thermal neutron population, the detector dead time and the pulse frequency of the neutron source. The decay constant is calculated by diffusion theory. The experimental results for six values of moderator thickness (between 2.5 to 12.5 cm) agree with our theoretical calculation within 20 per cent. (Author) [pt

  14. The design of a high-efficiency neutron counter for waste drums to provide optimized sensitivity for plutonium assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menlove, H.O.; Beddingfield, D.H.; Pickrell, M.M. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)] [and others

    1997-11-01

    An advanced passive neutron counter has been designed to improve the accuracy and sensitivity for the nondestructive assay of plutonium in scrap and waste containers. The High-Efficiency Neutron Counter (HENC) was developed under a Cooperative Research Development Agreement between the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Canberra Industries. The primary goal of the development was to produce a passive assay system for 200-L drums that has detectability limits and multiplicity counting features that are superior to previous systems. A detectability limit figure of merit (FOM) was defined that included the detector efficiency, the neutron die-away time, and the detector`s active volume and density that determine the cosmic-ray background. Monte Carlo neutron calculations were performed to determine the parameters to provide an optimum FOM. The system includes the {sup 252}Cf {open_quotes}add-a-source{close_quotes} feature to improve the accuracy as well as statistical filters to reduce the cosmic-ray spallation neutron background. The final decision gave an efficiency of 32% for plutonium with a detector {sup 3}He tube volume that is significantly smaller than for previous high-efficiency systems for 200-L drums. Because of the high efficiency of the HENC, we have incorporated neutron multiplicity counting for matrix corrections for those cases where the plutonium is localized in nonuniform hydrogenous materials. The paper describes the design and performance testing of the advanced system. 5 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs.

  15. The design of a high-efficiency neutron counter for waste drums to provide optimized sensitivity for plutonium assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Beddingfield, D.H.; Pickrell, M.M.

    1997-01-01

    An advanced passive neutron counter has been designed to improve the accuracy and sensitivity for the nondestructive assay of plutonium in scrap and waste containers. The High-Efficiency Neutron Counter (HENC) was developed under a Cooperative Research Development Agreement between the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Canberra Industries. The primary goal of the development was to produce a passive assay system for 200-L drums that has detectability limits and multiplicity counting features that are superior to previous systems. A detectability limit figure of merit (FOM) was defined that included the detector efficiency, the neutron die-away time, and the detector's active volume and density that determine the cosmic-ray background. Monte Carlo neutron calculations were performed to determine the parameters to provide an optimum FOM. The system includes the 252 Cf open-quotes add-a-sourceclose quotes feature to improve the accuracy as well as statistical filters to reduce the cosmic-ray spallation neutron background. The final decision gave an efficiency of 32% for plutonium with a detector 3 He tube volume that is significantly smaller than for previous high-efficiency systems for 200-L drums. Because of the high efficiency of the HENC, we have incorporated neutron multiplicity counting for matrix corrections for those cases where the plutonium is localized in nonuniform hydrogenous materials. The paper describes the design and performance testing of the advanced system. 5 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs

  16. Nondestructive Neutron And Gamma-Ray Technologies Applied To GNEP And Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dougan, A D; Snyderman, N; Ham, Y; Nakae, L; Dietrich, D; Kerr, P; Wang, T; Stoeffl, W; Choi, J S

    2007-01-01

    In recent years, LLNL has developed methods for diagnosing significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Homeland security problems have recently focused our attention on detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is a weak signal problem. Current and advanced safeguards applications will require working in the opposite extreme of strong but buried signals. We will review some of the technologies that have been developed at LLNL for homeland security applications and discuss how they might be used in support of international safeguards

  17. A New Neutron Multiplicity Counter for the Measurement of Impure Plutonium Metal at Westinghouse Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baker, L.B.; Faison, D.M.; Langner, D.G.; Sweet, M.R.; Salazar, S.D.; Kroncke, K.E.

    1998-07-01

    A new neutron multiplicity counter has been designed, fabricated, characterized, and installed for use in the assay of impure plutonium metal buttons from the FB-Line at the Westinghouse Savannah River Site (WSRS). This instrument incorporates the performance characteristics of the Pyrochemical or In-plant Multiplicity Counter with the package size of the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter. In addition, state-of-the art features such as the de-randomizer circuit and separate ring outputs have been added. The counter consists of 113, 71 cm active length 3He tubes in a polyethylene moderator. Its efficiency for 252Cf is 57.8 percent, the highest of any multiplicity counter to date. Its die-away time is 50.4 ms and its deadtime is 50 ns. In this paper we will present the characterization data for the counter and the results of preliminary metal measurements at WSRS. We will also discuss the new challenges the impure metal buttons from FB-Line are presenting to the multiplicity counting technique

  18. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Neutron Activation Analysis with k0-standardisation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomme, S.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on Neutron Activation Analysis with k 0 -standardisation concentrates on the improvement of the standardisation method and the characterisation of the neutron field as well as on the improvement of the statistical control on neutron activation analysis. Main achievements in 2000 are reported

  19. Mathematical model and computer programme for theoretical calculation of calibration curves of neutron soil moisture probes with highly effective counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kolev, N.A.

    1981-07-01

    A mathematical model based on the three group theory for theoretical calculation by means of computer of the calibration curves of neutron soil moisture probes with highly effective counters, is described. Methods for experimental correction of the mathematical model are discussed and proposed. The computer programme described allows the calibration of neutron probes with high or low effective counters, and central or end geometry, with or without linearizing of the calibration curve. The use of two calculation variants and printing of output data gives the possibility not only for calibration, but also for other researches. The separate data inputs for soil and probe temperature allow the temperature influence analysis. The computer programme and calculation examples are given. (author)

  20. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  1. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  2. Use of the helium-3 proportional counter for neutron spectrometry; Utilisation du compteur proportionnel a helium 3 pour la spectrometrie des neutrons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vialettes, H; Le Thanh, P [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1967-07-01

    Up to now, two methods have been mainly used for neutron spectrometry near nuclear installations: - photographic emulsion spectrometry - the so-called, 'multisphere' technique spectrometry. The first method, which is fairly difficult to apply, has a threshold energy of about 500 keV; this is a big disadvantage for an apparatus which has to be used for spectrometry around nuclear installations where the neutron radiation is very much degraded energetically. The second method does not suffer from this disadvantage but the results which it yields are only approximate. In order to extend the energy range of the neutron spectra studied with sufficient accuracy the use of a helium-3 proportional counter has been considered. This report presents the principles of operation of the helium-3 spectrometer, and the calculation methods which make it possible to take into account the two main effects tending to deform the spectra obtained: - energy absorption by the walls of the counter, - energy loss of the incident neutrons due to elastic collisions with helium-3 nuclei. As an example of the application, the shape of the neutron spectrum emitted by a polonium-lithium source is given; the results obtained are in excellent agreement with theoretical predictions. (authors) [French] Jusqu'ici deux methodes ont ete utilisees principalement pour la spectrometrie des neutrons autour des installations nucleaires: - la spectrometrie par emulsions photographiques - la spectrometrie par la technique dite des multispheres. La premiere methode, d'un emploi assez delicat presente un seuil en energie d'environ 500 keV qui est un obstacle serieux a la spectrometrie autour des installations nucleaires ou le rayonnement neutronique est tres degrade en energie. La deuxieme methode ne presente pas cet inconvenient mais les resultats qu'elle permet d'obtenir ne sont qu'approches. Pour etendre la gamme d'energie des spectres de neutrons etudies avec une precision suffisante, l'utilisation du

  3. Measurement and analysis of neutron flux distribution of STACY heterogeneous core by position sensitive proportional counter. Contract research

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Murazaki, Minoru; Uno, Yuichi; Miyoshi, Yoshinori [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

    2003-03-01

    We have measured neutron flux distribution around the core tank of STACY heterogeneous core by position sensitive proportional counter (PSPC) to develop the method to measure reactivity for subcritical systems. The neutron flux distribution data in the position accuracy of {+-}13 mm have been obtained in the range of uranium concentration of 50g/L to 210g/L both in critical and in subcritical state. The prompt neutron decay constant, {alpha}, was evaluated from the measurement data of pulsed neutron source experiments. We also calculated distribution of neutron flux and {sup 3}He reaction rates at the location of PSPC by using continuous energy Monte Carlo code MCNP. The measurement data was compared with the calculation results. As results of comparison, calculated values agreed generally with measurement data of PSPC with Cd cover in the region above half of solution height, but the difference between calculated value and measurement data was large in the region below half of solution height. On the other hand, calculated value agreed well with measurement data of PSPC without Cd cover. (author)

  4. Measurement and analysis of neutron flux distribution of STACY heterogeneous core by position sensitive proportional counter. Contract research

    CERN Document Server

    Murazaki, M; Uno, Y

    2003-01-01

    We have measured neutron flux distribution around the core tank of STACY heterogeneous core by position sensitive proportional counter (PSPC) to develop the method to measure reactivity for subcritical systems. The neutron flux distribution data in the position accuracy of +-13 mm have been obtained in the range of uranium concentration of 50g/L to 210g/L both in critical and in subcritical state. The prompt neutron decay constant, alpha, was evaluated from the measurement data of pulsed neutron source experiments. We also calculated distribution of neutron flux and sup 3 He reaction rates at the location of PSPC by using continuous energy Monte Carlo code MCNP. The measurement data was compared with the calculation results. As results of comparison, calculated values agreed generally with measurement data of PSPC with Cd cover in the region above half of solution height, but the difference between calculated value and measurement data was large in the region below half of solution height. On the other hand, ...

  5. Test of the rem-counter WENDI-II from Eberline in different energy-dispersed neutron fields

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutermuth, F.; Radon, T.; Fehrenbacher, G.; Siekmann, R.

    2004-03-01

    The neutron rem-counter WENDI-II from Eberline was tested in high-energy particle accelerator produced neutron fields. A radioactive 241 Am-Be(αn) source was used as a reference. The experimentally determined responses are compared to Monte-Carlo simulations of the response function done by R. H. Olsher et al. (2000). The energy spectra of the accelerator produced neutron fields were determined employing Monte-Carlo simulations, too. According to the simulations done by C. Birattari et al. (1998) and in this work these neutron fields exhibit large contributions to the ambient dose equivalent resulting from neutrons with kinetic energy of more than 20 MeV up to a few 100 MeV. The WENDI-II detector proved to show a response of approximately 3.10 9 pulses per Sievert ambient dose equivalent. Considering the experimental and statistical uncertainties the results are consistent with the assumption that the dose response of the WENDI-II reproduces quite accurately the function for the ambient dose equivalent of the ICRP 74

  6. Dual-Particle Imaging System with Neutron Spectroscopy for Safeguard Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hamel, Michael C. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Weber, Thomas M. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2017-11-01

    A dual-particle imager (DPI) has been designed that is capable of detecting gamma-ray and neutron signatures from shielded SNM. The system combines liquid organic and NaI(Tl) scintillators to form a combined Compton and neutron scatter camera. Effective image reconstruction of detected particles is a crucial component for maximizing the performance of the system; however, a key deficiency exists in the widely used iterative list-mode maximum-likelihood estimation-maximization (MLEM) image reconstruction technique. For MLEM a stopping condition is required to achieve a good quality solution but these conditions fail to achieve maximum image quality. Stochastic origin ensembles (SOE) imaging is a good candidate to address this problem as it uses Markov chain Monte Carlo to reach a stochastic steady-state solution. The application of SOE to the DPI is presented in this work.

  7. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  8. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  9. Development Of A Method For Measurement Of Total Neutron Cross Sections Based On The Neutron Transmission Method Using A He-3 Counter On Filtered Neutron Beams At Dalat Research Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tran Tuan Anh; Dang Lanh; Nguyen Canh Hai; Nguyen Xuan Hai; Pham Kien; Nguyen Thuy Nham; Pham Ngoc Son; Ho Huu Thang

    2007-01-01

    Determination of total neutron cross sections and average resonance parameters in the energy range from tens keV to hundreds keV is important for fast reactors calculations and designs because this energy range gives the most output of all neutron induced reactions in the spectrum of fast reactors. Besides, the total neutron cross section measurement is also one of the methods for determination of s, p and d-wave neutron strength functions. The purpose of this project is to develop a method for measurement of total neutron cross sections based on the neutron transmission technique using a He-3 counter. The average total neutron cross sections of 238 U were obtained from neutron transmission measurements on filtered neutron beams of 55 keV and 144 keV at the horizontal channel No.4 of the Dalat research reactor. The present results have been compared with the previous measurements, and the evaluated data from ENDF/B-6.8 library. (author)

  10. Methods of calculus for neutron spectrometry in proportional counters; Metodos de calculo para espectrometria de neutrones en contadores proporcionales

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Butragueno, J L; Blazquez, J B; Barrado, J M

    1976-07-01

    Response functions for cylindrical proportional counters with hydrogenated gases have been determined, taking in account only wall effect, by means of two independent calculus methods. One of them is a Monte Carlo application and the other one analytica at all. Results of both methods have been compared. (Author)

  11. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  12. A NRESPG Monte Carlo code for the calculation of neutron response functions for gas counters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kudo, K; Takeda, N; Fukuda, A [Electrotechnical Lab., Tsukuba, Ibaraki (Japan); Torii, T; Hashimoto, M; Sugita, T; Yang, X; Dietze, G

    1996-07-01

    In this paper, we show the outline of the NRESPG and some typical results of the response functions and efficiencies of several kinds of gas counters. The cross section data for the several kinds of filled gases and the wall material of stainless steel or aluminum are taken mainly from ENDF/B-IV. The ENDF/B-V for stainless steel is also used to investigate the influence on pulse height spectra of gas counters due to the difference of nuclear data files. (J.P.N.)

  13. Realisation and qualification of a tissue equivalent proportional counter with a multi-cellular geometry for the individual neutron dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoflack, Ch.

    1999-01-01

    The present day dosimetry means for radiations with a strong ionization density cannot fulfill the future radioprotection regulations which will require an individual dosimetry with active dosemeters. The aim of this work is the study and development of an individual dosemeter based on a tissue equivalent proportional counter and with a multi-cellular geometry allowing to reach a sensibility equivalent to environmental dosemeters. A pressure regulation bench has been added to the detector in order to reduce the degassing of the detector parts and to reach a sufficient service life for the implementation of the characterization tests. The hole counter system has been adopted for the first prototypes in order to reduce the sensibility of the wires multiplication system with respect to mechanical vibrations. Tests performed with an internal alpha source have shown that a better electrical efficiency can be reached when more severe mechanical limits are adopted during the construction. The dose equivalent response of the prototype for mono-energy neutrons of 144 keV to 2.5 MeV is analyzed experimentally and by simulation. During experiments with normal incidence neutrons, the prototype fulfills the requirements of the CEI N O 1323 standard for energies comprised between 400 keV and 2.5 MeV, while the simulation indicates a satisfactory response up to 200 keV. A preliminary study of the behaviour of the detector with respect to the neutrons incidence indicates that the multi-cellular geometry is efficient for large angles (the sensibility of the prototype is increased by a factor 3). Finally, simulation studies have to be made to optimize the electrical operation and the geometry of the next prototype. (J.S.)

  14. Performance of a Boron-Coated-Straw-Based HLNCC for International Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simone, Angela T. [ORNL; Croft, Stephen [ORNL; McElroy, Robert Dennis [ORNL; Sun, Liang [Proportional Technologies Inc.; Hayward, Jason P. [ORNL

    2017-08-01

    3He gas has been used in various scientific and security applications for decades, but it is now in short supply. Alternatives to 3He detectors are currently being integrated and tested in neutron coincidence counter designs, of a type which are widely used in nuclear safeguards for nuclear materials assay. A boron-coated-straw-based design, similar to the High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter-II, was built by Proportional Technologies Inc., and has been tested by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at both the JRC in Ispra and ORNL. Characterization measurements, along with nondestructive assays of various plutonium samples, have been conducted to determine the performance of this coincidence counter replacement in comparison with other similar counters. This paper presents results of these measurements.

  15. Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company californium multiplier/delayed neutron counter safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zimmer, W.H.

    1976-08-01

    The Californium Multiplier (CFX) is a subcritical assembly of uranium surrounding 252 Cf spontaneously fissioning neutron sources; its function is to multiply the neutron flux to a level useful for activation analysis. This document summarizes the safety analysis aspects of the CFX, DNC, pneumatic transfer system, and instrumentation and to detail all the aspects of the total facility as a starting point for the ARHCO Safety Analysis Review. Recognized hazards and steps already taken to neutralize them are itemized

  16. Variable dead time counters: 2. A computer simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hooton, B.W.; Lees, E.W.

    1980-09-01

    A computer model has been developed to give a pulse train which simulates that generated by a variable dead time counter (VDC) used in safeguards determination of Pu mass. The model is applied to two algorithms generally used for VDC analysis. It is used to determine their limitations at high counting rates and to investigate the effects of random neutrons from (α,n) reactions. Both algorithms are found to be deficient for use with masses of 240 Pu greater than 100g and one commonly used algorithm is shown, by use of the model and also by theory, to yield a result which is dependent on the random neutron intensity. (author)

  17. Application of thin-film breakdown counters for characterization of neutron field of the VESUVIO instrument at the ISIS spallation source

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smirnov, A.N. [V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute, St. Petersburg (Russian Federation); Pietropaolo, A., E-mail: antonino.pietropaolo@roma2.infn.it [CNISM UdR Tor Vergata, and Centro NAST Roma, Italy Scientifica 1 I-00133 Roma Italy (Italy); Prokofiev, A.V. [The Svedberg Laboratory, Uppsala University, Uppsala (Sweden); Rodionova, E.E. [V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute, St. Petersburg (Russian Federation); Frost, C.D.; Ansell, S.; Schooneveld, E.M. [ISIS Facility, Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, Chilton (United Kingdom); Gorini, G. [Dipartimento di Fisica ' G. Occhialini,' Universita degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Milano (Italy)

    2012-09-21

    The high-energy neutron field of the VESUVIO instrument at the ISIS facility has been characterized using the technique of thin-film breakdown counters (TFBC). The technique utilizes neutron-induced fission reactions of {sup nat}U and {sup 209}Bi with detection of fission fragments by TFBCs. Experimentally determined count rates of the fragments are Almost-Equal-To 50% higher than those calculated using spectral neutron flux simulated with the MCNPX code. This work is a part of the project to develop ChipIr, a new dedicated facility for the accelerated testing of electronic components and systems for neutron-induced single event effects in the new Target Station 2 at ISIS. The TFBC technique has shown to be applicable for on-line monitoring of the neutron flux in the neutron energy range 1-800 MeV at the position of the device under test (DUT).

  18. Application of thin-film breakdown counters for characterization of neutron field of the VESUVIO instrument at the ISIS spallation source

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smirnov, A. N.; Pietropaolo, A.; Prokofiev, A. V.; Rodionova, E. E.; Frost, C. D.; Ansell, S.; Schooneveld, E. M.; Gorini, G.

    2012-09-01

    The high-energy neutron field of the VESUVIO instrument at the ISIS facility has been characterized using the technique of thin-film breakdown counters (TFBC). The technique utilizes neutron-induced fission reactions of natU and 209Bi with detection of fission fragments by TFBCs. Experimentally determined count rates of the fragments are ≈50% higher than those calculated using spectral neutron flux simulated with the MCNPX code. This work is a part of the project to develop ChipIr, a new dedicated facility for the accelerated testing of electronic components and systems for neutron-induced single event effects in the new Target Station 2 at ISIS. The TFBC technique has shown to be applicable for on-line monitoring of the neutron flux in the neutron energy range 1-800 MeV at the position of the device under test (DUT).

  19. Application of thin-film breakdown counters for characterization of neutron field of the VESUVIO instrument at the ISIS spallation source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smirnov, A.N.; Pietropaolo, A.; Prokofiev, A.V.; Rodionova, E.E.; Frost, C.D.; Ansell, S.; Schooneveld, E.M.; Gorini, G.

    2012-01-01

    The high-energy neutron field of the VESUVIO instrument at the ISIS facility has been characterized using the technique of thin-film breakdown counters (TFBC). The technique utilizes neutron-induced fission reactions of nat U and 209 Bi with detection of fission fragments by TFBCs. Experimentally determined count rates of the fragments are ≈50% higher than those calculated using spectral neutron flux simulated with the MCNPX code. This work is a part of the project to develop ChipIr, a new dedicated facility for the accelerated testing of electronic components and systems for neutron-induced single event effects in the new Target Station 2 at ISIS. The TFBC technique has shown to be applicable for on-line monitoring of the neutron flux in the neutron energy range 1–800 MeV at the position of the device under test (DUT).

  20. Characteristics of the NE-213 large-volume neutron counters for muon catalyzed fusion investigation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bystritsky, V.M.; Wozniak, J.; Zinov, V.G.

    1984-01-01

    The Monte-Carlo method was used to establish the properties and feasibility of a large-volume NE-213 scin illator as an efficient neutron detector. The recoil proton spectra, calculated efficiencies for different detection thresholds and scintillator sizes are presented for the neutron energy up to 15 MeV. The time characteristics, e. g., time resolution, are discussed. It is also shown that no strong influence of light attenuation by the scintilla or itself on calculated efficiencies is observed, when gamma-calibration technique is used. The detector vol me of approximately 100 l is suggested for application in investigations of μ-atom and μ-molecular processes

  1. Response functions of the Andersson-Braun and extended range rem counters for neutron energies from thermal to 10 GeV

    CERN Document Server

    Mares, V; Schraube, H

    2002-01-01

    This work is devoted to the calculation of responses as functions of neutron energy for a paired set of Andersson-Braun rem counters, which is commercially available. Different Monte Carlo codes such as MCNP, LAHET, HADRON and MCNPX were applied in the calculations. The study extended to frontal, lateral and isotropic neutron incidence. For an estimation of the contribution of charged high-energy particles to the reading, the responses to protons and pions were also determined. The results obtained give good bases for the practical use of the new instrument in high-energy neutron fields.

  2. A compact neutron counter telescope with thick radiator (COTETRA) for fusion experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osakabe, M.; Itoh, S.; Gotoh, Y.; Sasao, M.; Fujita, J.

    1993-01-01

    A new type of neutron spectrometer, based on recoil proton measurement, has been developed for diagnosing a DT fusion plasma. This spectrometer has such advantages as: 1. direct measurement of the neutron energy without the unfolding procedure, 2. relatively high detection efficiency for 14 MeV neutrons, 3. a wide dynamic range of counting rate, and 4. perfect n-γ discrimination. To examine the performance of this spectrometer, we developed a Monte Carlo simulation code. It predicts that we may achieve energy resolution up to 3 % with a detection efficiency of 10 -5 [count cm 2 /n] if we could successfully adjust the condition of the spectrometer. A prototype spectrometer was constructed and was compared with the Monte Carlo prediction. The energy resolution of 5.3 ± 0.7 % for 14 MeV neutron was obtained for the prototype spectrometer and the calculation agrees with the experimental results within its margin of error if we take into account the intrinsic energy resolution of the detector that is used in the prototype. (author)

  3. Geiger-Mueller counter for mixed neutron-gamma beam dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonald, J.C.; Ma, I.-C.

    1978-01-01

    A Geiger-Mueller (G-M) dosimeter has been constructed and employed to measure the gamma-ray component of absorbed dose in a cyclotron produced fast neutron field. This instrument is waterproof for measurements in a liquid medium, and read-out is accompanied with any standard scaler. (Auth.)

  4. Field test and calibration of neutron coincidence counters for high-mass plutonium samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Dickinson, R.J.; Douglas, I.

    1987-02-01

    Five different neutron coincidence systems were evaluated and calibrated for high-mass PuO 2 samples. The samples were from 2 to 7.2 kg of PuO 2 in mass, with a large range of burnup. This report compares the equipment and the results, with an evaluation of deadtime and multiplication corrections

  5. Numerical modeling of working of a multicellular proportional counter aimed to individual dosimetry of neutrons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bordy, J.M.; Barthe, J.; Boutruche, B.

    1993-01-01

    The use of a personal dosimeter imposes severe constraints, particularly for tension of polarization and tolerable dimensions. That why a numerical modeling of this detector working is an appreciable help for conception. It allows to determine quickly the influence of modification of different parameters (nature and pressure of gas, dimension of electrodes, dimension of channels, tension of polarization,...) without having to make new prototypes. The aim of this report is to give some numerical results got with a multicellular counter with a cylindrical geometry. 6 figs

  6. Performance of an active well coincidence counter for HEU samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrari, Francesca; Peerani, Paolo

    2010-01-01

    Neutron coincidence counting is the reference NDA technique used in nuclear safeguards to measure the mass of nuclear material in samples. For high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples active neutron interrogation is generally performed and the most common device used by nuclear inspectors is the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC). Within her master thesis at the Polytechnic of Milan, the first author performed an intensive study on the characteristics and performances of the AWCC in order to assess the 235 U mass in HEU oxide samples at the PERLA laboratory of JRC. The work has been summarised in this paper that starts with the optimisation of the use of AWCC for nuclear safeguards, describing the calibration procedure, reporting results of a series of verification measurements, summarising the performances that can be obtained with this instruments during inspections at fuel production plants and concluding with the discussion of uncertainties related to these measurements.

  7. Effects of the inversion layer thickness and 10B distribution in it on the characteristics of ion-doped semiconductor neutron counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diasamidze, Eh.M.; Solov'ev, Yu.A.; Shmakov, A.N.

    1984-01-01

    The technique for calculating the dependence of energy spectrum of the 10 B(n, α) 7 Li reaction products in the thickness of the inversion layer in a semiconductor counter fabricated using the diffusion method is proposed. The inversion layer is formed as a result of the 10 B ion implantation into n-type silicon. The cases of uniform and Gaussian distributions of 10 B impurity are considered. Corrections for neutron fluence calculation by α-peak, taking into account α-particle absorption in the inversion layer are obtained. It is concluded that the suggested calculational technique can be used for semiconductor counters fabricated by the diffusion method

  8. Near Real-Time Nondestructive Active Inspection Technologies Utilizing Delayed γ-Rays and Neutrons for Advanced Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, Alan; Tobin, S. J.

    2015-01-01

    In this two year project, the research team investigated how delayed γ-rays from short-lived fission fragments detected in the short interval between irradiating pulses can be exploited for advanced safeguards technologies. This program contained experimental and modeling efforts. The experimental effort measured the emitted spectra, time histories and correlations of the delayed γ-rays from aqueous solutions and solid targets containing fissionable isotopes. The modeling effort first developed and benchmarked a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation technique based on these experiments. The benchmarked simulations were then extended to other safeguards scenarios, allowing comparisons to other advanced safeguards technologies and to investigate combined techniques. Ultimately, the experiments demonstrated the possible utility of actively induced delayed γ-ray spectroscopy for fissionable material assay.

  9. Near Real-Time Nondestructive Active Inspection Technologies Utilizing Delayed γ-Rays and Neutrons for Advanced Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunt, Alan [Idaho State Univ., Pocatello, ID (United States). Idaho Accelerator Center, Dept. of Physics; Reedy, E. T.E. [Idaho State Univ., Pocatello, ID (United States). Dept. of Phyics, Idaho Accelerator Center; Mozin, V. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Nonproliferation

    2015-02-12

    In this two year project, the research team investigated how delayed γ-rays from short-lived fission fragments detected in the short interval between irradiating pulses can be exploited for advanced safeguards technologies. This program contained experimental and modeling efforts. The experimental effort measured the emitted spectra, time histories and correlations of the delayed γ-rays from aqueous solutions and solid targets containing fissionable isotopes. The modeling effort first developed and benchmarked a hybrid Monte Carlo simulation technique based on these experiments. The benchmarked simulations were then extended to other safeguards scenarios, allowing comparisons to other advanced safeguards technologies and to investigate combined techniques. Ultimately, the experiments demonstrated the possible utility of actively induced delayed γ-ray spectroscopy for fissionable material assay.

  10. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  11. Development of NRESP98 Monte Carlo codes for the calculation of neutron response functions of neutron detectors. Calculation of the response function of spherical BF{sub 3} proportional counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hashimoto, M.; Saito, K.; Ando, H. [Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., Oarai, Ibaraki (Japan). Oarai Engineering Center

    1998-05-01

    The method to calculate the response function of spherical BF{sub 3} proportional counter, which is commonly used as neutron dose rate meter and neutron spectrometer with multi moderator system, is developed. As the calculation code for evaluating the response function, the existing code series NRESP, the Monte Carlo code for the calculation of response function of neutron detectors, is selected. However, the application scope of the existing NRESP is restricted, the NRESP98 is tuned as generally applicable code, with expansion of the geometrical condition, the applicable element, etc. The NRESP98 is tested with the response function of the spherical BF{sub 3} proportional counter. Including the effect of the distribution of amplification factor, the detailed evaluation of the charged particle transportation and the effect of the statistical distribution, the result of NRESP98 calculation fit the experience within {+-}10%. (author)

  12. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Experience Using 30-Gallon Drum Neutron Multiplicity Counter for Measuring Plutonium-Bearing Salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dearborn, D M; Keeton, S C

    2004-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been performing accountability measurements of plutonium (Pu) -bearing items with the 30-gallon drum neutron multiplicity counter (NMC) since August 1998. A previous paper focused on the LLNL experience with Pu-bearing oxide and metal items. This paper expands on the LLNL experience with Pu-bearing salts containing low masses of Pu. All Pu-bearing salts used in this study were measured using calorimetry and gamma isotopic analyses (Cal/Iso) as well as the 30-gallon drum NMC. The Cal/Iso values were treated as being the true measure of Pu content because of the inherent high accuracy of the Cal/Iso technique, even at low masses of Pu, when measured over a sufficient period of time. Unfortunately, the long time period required to achieve high accuracy from Cal/Iso can impact other required accountability measurements. The 30-gallon drum NMC is a much quicker system for making accountability measurements of a Pu-bearing salt and might be a desirable tradeoff. The accuracy of 30-gallon drum NMC measurements of Pu-bearing salts, relative to that of Cal/Iso, is presented in relation to the mass range and alpha associated with each item. Conclusions drawn from the use of the 30-gallon drum NMC for accountability measurements of salts are also included

  13. Irradiated fuel bundle counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, J.W.; Todd, J.L.

    1975-01-01

    The design of a prototype safeguards instrument for determining the number of irradiated fuel assemblies leaving an on-power refueled reactor is described. Design details include radiation detection techniques, data processing and display, unattended operation capabilities and data security methods. Development and operating history of the bundle counter is reported. (U.S.)

  14. Irradiated fuel bundle counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, J.W.; Todd, J.L.

    1975-01-01

    The design of a prototype safeguards instrument for determining the number of irradiated fuel assemblies leaving an on-power refueled reactor is described. Design details include radiation detection techniques, data processing and display, unattended operation capabilities and data security methods. Development and operating history of the bundle counter is reported

  15. Data acquisition systems for uses of multi-counter time analyzer and one-dimensional PSD pulse height analyzer to neutron scattering measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ono, Masayoshi; Tasaki, Seiji; Okamoto, Sunao

    1989-01-01

    A data acquisition system having the various modern electronic devices was designed and tested for practical use of neutron time-of-flight (TOF) measurements with multiple counters. The system is principally composed of TOF logic units (load-able up to 128 units) with a control unit and a conventional micro-computer. The TOF logic unit (main memory, 2048 ch, 24 bits/ch) demonstrates about 1.7 times higher efficiency for neutron counting rate per channel than the one by a conventional TOF logic unit. Meanwhile, some data-access functions of the TOF logic unit were applied to position sensitive analyzer of one-dimensional neutron PSD for small angle scattering. The analyzer was tested with use of pulse generator. The result shows good linearity. (author)

  16. Body counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koeppe, P.

    1975-01-01

    The paper gives a survey on some applications of the whole body counter in clinical practice and a critical study of its application as a routine testing method. Remarks on the necessary precautions are followed by a more detailed discussion of the determination of the natural potassium content, the iron metabolism, the vitamin B12 test, investigations of the metabolism of the bone using 47 Ca and 85 Sr, investigations with iodine and iodine-labelled substances, clearance investigations (in particular the 51 Cr EDTA clearance test), as well as the possibilities of neutron activation in vivo. (ORU/AK) [de

  17. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A.-L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-01-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3 He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3 He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3 He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3 He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3 He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3 He-alternative technologies.

  18. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henzlova, Daniela [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kouzes, R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); McElroy, R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Peerani, P. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Aspinall, M. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Baird, K. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Bakel, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Borella, M. [SCK.CEN, Mol (Belgium); Bourne, M. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Bourva, L. [Canberra Ltd., Oxford (United Kingdom); Cave, F. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Chandra, R. [Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Zurich (Sweden); Chernikova, D. [Chalmers Univ. of Technology (Sweden); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dermody, G. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Dougan, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Ely, J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Fanchini, E. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Finocchiaro, P. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Gavron, Victor [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kureta, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ishiyama, K. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Lee, T. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Martin, Ch. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); McKinny, K. [GE Reuter-Stokes, Twinsburg, OH (United States); Menlove, Howard Olsen [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Orton, Ch. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Pappalardo, A. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Pedersen, B. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Peranteau, D. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Plenteda, R. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Pozzi, S. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Schear, M. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Seya, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Siciliano, E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Stave, S. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sun, L. [Proportional Technologies Inc., Houston, TX (United States); Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Tagziria, H. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Vaccaro, S. [DG Energy (Luxembourg); Takamine, J. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Weber, A. -L. [Inst. for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Yamaguchi, T. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Zhu, H. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States)

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  19. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  20. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  1. Non-periodic multi-slit masking for a single counter rotating 2-disc chopper and channeling guides for high resolution and high intensity neutron TOF spectroscopy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bartkowiak, M.; Hofmann, T.; Stüßer, N.

    2017-02-01

    Energy resolution is an important design goal for time-of-flight instruments and neutron spectroscopy. For high-resolution applications, it is required that the burst times of choppers be short, going down to the µs-range. To produce short pulses while maintaining high neutron flux, we propose beam masks with more than two slits on a counter-rotating 2-disc chopper, behind specially adapted focusing multi-channel guides. A novel non-regular arrangement of the slits ensures that the beam opens only once per chopper cycle, when the masks are congruently aligned. Additionally, beam splitting and intensity focusing by guides before and after the chopper position provide high intensities even for small samples. Phase-space analysis and Monte Carlo simulations on examples of four-slit masks with adapted guide geometries show the potential of the proposed setup.

  2. Design and characterisation of a pulsed neutron interrogation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Favalli, A.; Pedersen, B.

    2007-01-01

    The Joint Research Centre recently obtained a license to operate a new experimental device intended for research in the field of nuclear safeguards. The research projects currently being planned for the new device includes mass determination of fissile materials in matrices and detection of contraband non-nuclear materials. The device incorporates a commercial pulsed neutron generator and a large graphite mantle surrounding the sample cavity. In this configuration, a relatively high thermal neutron flux with a long lifetime is achieved inside the sample cavity. By pulsing the neutron generator, a sample may be interrogated by a pure thermal neutron flux during repeated time periods. The paper reports on the design of the new device and the pulsed fast and thermal neutron source. The thermal neutron flux caused by the neutron generator and the graphite structure has been characterised by foil activation, fission chamber and 3 He proportional counter measurements. (authors)

  3. Channel coincidence counter: version 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krick, M.S.; Menlove, H.O.

    1980-06-01

    A thermal neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the assay of fast critical assembly fuel drawers and plutonium-bearing fuel rods. The principal feature of the detector is a 7-cm by 7-cm by 97-cm detector channel, which provides a uniform neutron detection efficiency of 16% along the central 40 cm of the channel. The electronics system is identical to that used for the High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter

  4. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  5. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  6. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  7. Advanced safeguards research and development plan with an emphasis on its impact on nuclear power-plant design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobin, S.J.; Demuth, S.F.; Miller, M.C.; Swinhoe, M.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    2007-01-01

    One tool for reducing the concern of nuclear proliferation is enhanced safeguards. Present safeguards have evolved over the past 40 years, and future safeguards will grow from this strong base to implement new technologies for improving our ability to quantify nuclear material. This paper will give an overview of the advanced technology research and development plan for safeguarding. One of the research facilities planned by the Department of Energy is the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), to develop a novel nuclear fuel recycling program. Since the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility will receive and reprocess spent fuel and will fabricate fast-reactor fuel, a wide breadth of safeguards technologies is involved. A fundamental concept in safeguards is material control and accounting (MCA). 4 topics concerning MCA and requiring further research have been identified: 1) measuring spent fuel, 2) measuring the plutonium content in the electro-refiner with pyro-processing, 3) measuring plutonium in the presence of other actinides, and 4) measuring neptunium and americium in the presence of other actinides. As for the long-term research and development plan for the AFCF, it will include improving MCA techniques as well as introducing new techniques that are not related to MCA, for example, enhanced containment and surveillance, or enhanced process monitoring. The top priority will stay quantifying the plutonium as accurately as possible and to reach this purpose 4 relevant technologies have been identified: 1) the microcalorimeter, 2) the passive neutron-albedo reactivity, 3) list-mode data acquisition, and 4) a liquid-scintillator multiplicity counter. Incorporating safeguards into the initial design of AFCF (safeguards by design) is a central concept. As the technology research and development plan for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility is examined, particular attention will be given to safeguards technologies that may affect the physical design of nuclear power plants

  8. Handbook of nuclear data for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lammer, M.; Schwerer, O.

    1991-06-01

    This handbook contains nuclear data needed by safeguards users for their work. It was initiated by an IAEA working group, and the contents were defined by the relies to a questionnaire sent to safeguards specialists. This is a preliminary edition of the handbook for distribution to safeguards and nuclear data experts for review. The present edition of the handbook contains the following basic nuclear data: actinides: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron cross sections and resonance integrals, prompt neutron data, delayed neutron data; fission products: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron capture cross sections and resonance integrals; fission product yields. Also included are appendices that summarize the data requested by safeguards users, and that present a number of questions to them and to data experts on the data contained in this preliminary issue and about additional data for possible inclusion in future editions and updates of the handbook

  9. Monte Carlo calculations of the neutron coincidence gate utilisation factor for passive neutron coincidence counting

    CERN Document Server

    Bourva, L C A

    1999-01-01

    The general purpose neutron-photon-electron Monte Carlo N-Particle code, MCNP sup T sup M , has been used to simulate the neutronic characteristics of the on-site laboratory passive neutron coincidence counter to be installed, under Euratom Safeguards Directorate supervision, at the Sellafield reprocessing plant in Cumbria, UK. This detector is part of a series of nondestructive assay instruments to be installed for the accurate determination of the plutonium content of nuclear materials. The present work focuses on one aspect of this task, namely, the accurate calculation of the coincidence gate utilisation factor. This parameter is an important term in the interpretative model used to analyse the passive neutron coincidence count data acquired using pulse train deconvolution electronics based on the shift register technique. It accounts for the limited proportion of neutrons detected within the time interval for which the electronics gate is open. The Monte Carlo code MCF, presented in this work, represents...

  10. Nuclear safeguards research with the LASL 3. 75-MV Van de Graaff accelerator

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Krick, M.S.; Evans, A.E.

    1976-01-01

    The continued use of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) 3.75-MV Van de Graaff accelerator for the nondestructive assay of nuclear material in support of nuclear safeguards is reviewed. A brief description of the accelerator facility and the small-sample assay station (SSAS) is provided. Factors affecting high-accuracy assay of small samples are outlined. Examples are provided for the assay of uranium--thorium mixtures, low-level uranium samples, and high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) fuel rods. Research on delayed-neutron energy spectra, radiation damage to /sup 3/He proportional counters, and /sup 4/He gas scintillators is summarized.

  11. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  12. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

    2001-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  13. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  14. The n,{gamma} discrimination in recoil-proton proportional counters. Application to the measurement of fast neutron spectra; Discrimination n,{gamma} dans les compteurs proportionnels a protons de recul. Application a la mesure des spectres de neutrons rapides

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeandidier, C [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1969-07-01

    A description is given of a spectrometry chain working in the energy range of a few keV to 1 MeV, and designed for measurement of fast neutron spectra. It consists of detectors, recoil proton proportional counters built especially for this work by R. COMTE (DEG/SER) and which make it possible to cover the energy range and also associated electronic equipment. A brief description is first given of the physical processes involved: (n,p) collisions in the gas, influence of {gamma} radiation; the method of discrimination is then presented. It is based on the difference in the rise-times of the pulses. In the experiments described here the use of a bi-parametric system made it possible to employ the most simple discrimination device, based on the fact that the high frequency gamma pulse components are, at a given energy, weaker than those of the neutron pulses. Results are given of measurements carried out on the Van der Graaff (mono-energetic neutrons for testing the linearity of the chain and the resolving power of the counters), and of those made in a sub-critical system Hug at Cadarache. (author) [French] On decrit une chaine de spectrometrie travaillant dans le domaine d'energie de quelques keV a 1 MeV destinee a la mesure des spectres de neutrons rapides. Elle comprend les detecteurs, compteurs proportionnels a protons de recul, realises specialement pour cette etude par M. R. COMTE (DEG/SER), permettant de couvrir la gamme d'energie et l'electronique associee. Apres un rappel des processus physiques mis en jeu: chocs (n,p) dans les gaz, influence des rayonnements {gamma}, on expose la methode de discrimination utilisee. Celle-ci est basee sur la difference des temps de montee des impulsions. Au cours des experiences rapportees ici, la mise en oeuvre d'un ensemble bi-parametrique a permis d'utiliser le dispositif de discrimination le plus simple, base sur la remarque que les composantes a haute frequence des impulsions {gamma} sont, a energie egale, plus faibles

  15. The n,{gamma} discrimination in recoil-proton proportional counters. Application to the measurement of fast neutron spectra; Discrimination n,{gamma} dans les compteurs proportionnels a protons de recul. Application a la mesure des spectres de neutrons rapides

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeandidier, C. [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1969-07-01

    A description is given of a spectrometry chain working in the energy range of a few keV to 1 MeV, and designed for measurement of fast neutron spectra. It consists of detectors, recoil proton proportional counters built especially for this work by R. COMTE (DEG/SER) and which make it possible to cover the energy range and also associated electronic equipment. A brief description is first given of the physical processes involved: (n,p) collisions in the gas, influence of {gamma} radiation; the method of discrimination is then presented. It is based on the difference in the rise-times of the pulses. In the experiments described here the use of a bi-parametric system made it possible to employ the most simple discrimination device, based on the fact that the high frequency gamma pulse components are, at a given energy, weaker than those of the neutron pulses. Results are given of measurements carried out on the Van der Graaff (mono-energetic neutrons for testing the linearity of the chain and the resolving power of the counters), and of those made in a sub-critical system Hug at Cadarache. (author) [French] On decrit une chaine de spectrometrie travaillant dans le domaine d'energie de quelques keV a 1 MeV destinee a la mesure des spectres de neutrons rapides. Elle comprend les detecteurs, compteurs proportionnels a protons de recul, realises specialement pour cette etude par M. R. COMTE (DEG/SER), permettant de couvrir la gamme d'energie et l'electronique associee. Apres un rappel des processus physiques mis en jeu: chocs (n,p) dans les gaz, influence des rayonnements {gamma}, on expose la methode de discrimination utilisee. Celle-ci est basee sur la difference des temps de montee des impulsions. Au cours des experiences rapportees ici, la mise en oeuvre d'un ensemble bi-parametrique a permis d'utiliser le dispositif de discrimination le plus simple, base sur la remarque que les composantes a haute frequence des impulsions {gamma} sont, a

  16. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  17. Crate counter for normal operating loss

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harlan, R.A.

    A lithium-loaded zinc sulfide scintillation counter to closely assay plutonium in waste packaged in 1.3 by 1.3 by 2.13m crates was built. In addition to assays for normal operating loss accounting, the counter will allow safeguards verification immediately before shipment of the crates for burial. The counter should detect approximately 10 g of plutonium in 1000 kg of waste

  18. A measurement of the efficiency for the detection of neutrons in the momentum range 200 to 3200 MeV/c, in large volume liquid scintillation counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, R.M.; Clark, A.G.; Duke, P.J.

    1976-04-01

    A description is given of a system of 194 large volume liquid scintillation counters designed to detect neutrons in an experiment on the reaction π - p → π 0 n in the resonance region. The detection efficiency of the system has been determined, as a function of neutron momentum, in three separate measurements, covering the range 200 to 3200 MeV/c. Below 400 MeV/c the efficiency shows the expected momentum dependence near threshold, rising to a maximum of 50% near 300 MeV/c and then falling to 43% near 400 MeV/c. In the region 400 to 700 MeV/c the efficiency rises to 47% near 600 MeV/c and falls again to 43%, an effect not seen before; the efficiency was expected to be almost momentum independent in this region. Above the threshold for inelastic processes in nucleon-nucleon collision (approximately 800 MeV/c) the efficiency rises significantly reaching a maximum value of 65% above 1700 MeV/c. (author)

  19. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  20. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

  1. Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    During the past decade, IAEA inspectors, national inspectors, and facility operators have used neutron coincidence counters and gamma-ray isotopics measurements extensively to measure the plutonium content of various forms of nuclear materials in the fuel cycle. Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector''s oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector''s workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained form unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA. The standardized containers and robot-controlled fuel movements in automated facilities enable more accurate nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements than are possible in conventional nonautomated facilities. The NDA instrumentation can be custom designed and optimized for the particular measurement goal in the automated facility

  2. Needle counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, Yuzo

    1977-01-01

    Needle counter had been devised by Geiger about 60 years ago before the present GM counter appeared. It is suitable for the detection of weak radiation because it is limited in effective volume, if the background due to mainly cosmic ray is proportional to the effective volume of the counter. Recently the very low β detector having a needle counter as the main detector has been developed. It showed highly excellent performance in the measurements of small area samples, about ten times sensitive as compared with other detectors. The counter is installed in the very low radiation measuring well at Nokogiriyama, Chiba Prefecture, using a NaI scintillator as its guard counter. D. H. Wilkinson first treated a gas amplification counter theoretically and quantitatively. The authors have obtained good results in the comparison with the experiments of the counter using a generalized form of Wilkinson theory. The findings obtained through this study seem to be applicable to the electrode arrangement which is important for the counter design. It was found that the excellent rise time of induced pulses in a gas amplification counter was achieved in larger amplification factor and smaller convolution effect. In the detection of charged particles with small obstructing capability such as γ ray, faster rise time and higher pulses can be obtained with needle counters than wire counters. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

  3. A single-supply, high rate, small size and cheap electronic chain for 3He neutron counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boffa, A.; Fazzi, A.; Pirovano, C.; Varoli, V.

    1996-01-01

    The paper describes a complete counting chain (charge preamplifier, shaping amplifier and threshold discriminator) devoted to 3 He neutron detectors. Since it is characterized by single supply operation, high counting rate, small size and low cost, it is well suited for high efficiency neutron well detectors where a large number (10 - 100) of counting tubes are used. Such detectors are commonly used for verification of Plutonium stocks. The preamplifier adopts an innovative circuit with the gate of the input JFET floating and a DC feedback loop that stabilizes the output voltage acting on the input cascode second transistor. Static and dynamic analysis, including the effects of the detector bias network, is reported. The shaping amplifier transfer function is a fifth order approximation of the gaussian response. All the complex pole pairs are realized with a single fourth order Voltage Controlled Voltage Source cell thus minimizing component count. Experimental signals and spectra, obtained with shaping time constants in the 1 μs - 100 ns range, are reported and discussed

  4. J. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Like many drugs, poisons, and explosives in common use in our society today, nuclear materials are dangerous. This was recognised well before the advent of nuclear power, and precautions have been taken to isolate the substances from the environment. The expected expansion of nuclear power generation, and consequent proliferation of the materials, has caused opponents of the industry to voice pessimism over the ability of the authorities to contain these substances. The author discusses the dangers associated with the illicit use of nuclear materials, and the safeguards employed to minimise the risks arising from the commercial exploitation of nuclear power

  5. Determining {sup 252}Cf source strength by absolute passive neutron correlation counting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6166 (United States); Henzlova, D., E-mail: henzlova@lanl.gov [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2013-06-21

    Physically small, lightly encapsulated, radionuclide sources containing {sup 252}Cf are widely used for a vast variety of industrial, medical, educational and research applications requiring a convenient source of neutrons. For many quantitative applications, such as detector efficiency calibrations, the absolute strength of the neutron emission is needed. In this work we show how, by using a neutron multiplicity counter the neutron emission rate can be obtained with high accuracy. This provides an independent and alternative way to create reference sources in-house for laboratories such as ours engaged in international safeguards metrology. The method makes use of the unique and well known properties of the {sup 252}Cf spontaneous fission system and applies advanced neutron correlation counting methods. We lay out the foundation of the method and demonstrate it experimentally. We show that accuracy comparable to the best methods currently used by national bodies to certify neutron source strengths is possible.

  6. filled neutron detectors

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Boron trifluoride (BF3) proportional counters are used as detectors for thermal neutrons. They are characterized by high neutron sensitivity and good gamma discriminating properties. Most practical BF3 counters are filled with pure boron trifluoride gas enriched up to 96% 10B. But BF3 is not an ideal proportional counter ...

  7. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  8. Boron-Coated Straw Collar for Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar Replacement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hu, Jianwei; Croft, Stephen; McElroy, Robert Dennis

    2017-01-01

    The objective of this project was to design and optimize, in simulation space, an active neutron coincidence counter (or collar) using boron-coated straws (BCSs) as a non- 3 He replacement to the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL). UNCL has been used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) since the 1980s to verify the 235 U content in fresh light water reactor fuel assemblies for safeguards purposes. This report documents the design and optimization of the BCS collar.

  9. Boron-Coated Straw Collar for Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar Replacement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hu, Jianwei [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Croft, Stephen [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); McElroy, Robert Dennis [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2017-01-01

    The objective of this project was to design and optimize, in simulation space, an active neutron coincidence counter (or collar) using boron-coated straws (BCSs) as a non-3He replacement to the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL). UNCL has been used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) since the 1980s to verify the 235U content in fresh light water reactor fuel assemblies for safeguards purposes. This report documents the design and optimization of the BCS collar.

  10. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  11. Multiple channel programmable coincidence counter

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arnone, Gaetano J.

    1990-01-01

    A programmable digital coincidence counter having multiple channels and featuring minimal dead time. Neutron detectors supply electrical pulses to a synchronizing circuit which in turn inputs derandomized pulses to an adding circuit. A random access memory circuit connected as a programmable length shift register receives and shifts the sum of the pulses, and outputs to a serializer. A counter is input by the adding circuit and downcounted by the seralizer, one pulse at a time. The decoded contents of the counter after each decrement is output to scalers.

  12. UK Safeguards R and D Project progress report for the period July 1983 - April 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adams, J.M.

    1984-10-01

    Progress reports are presented on the following projects: centrifuge enrichment plant safeguards; stores safeguards and general accounting techniques; generic programmes (projects underlying many instrument systems (e.g. tamper proofing and indication; neutron interrogation systems); system studies); FBR fuel cycle safeguards; service programmes (services to the IAEA); exploratory and short projects. (U.K.)

  13. Scintillation Counters for Neutron Scattering Experiments; Compteurs a scintillations pour les experiences de diffusion neutronique; Stsintillyatsionnye schetchiki dlya ehksperimentov s rasseyaniem nejtronov; Contadores de centelleo para experimentos de dispersion neutronica.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harris, D; Duffil, C [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Wraight, L A [Aere, Harwell, Didcot, Berks (United Kingdom)

    1963-01-15

    Scintillation counters discussed in this paper are of two types : (i) UP or B{sub 2}O{sub 3} fixed with zinc sulphide in varving composition, (ii) Li containing glasses of varying composition. The ideal composition of each rype for neutron scattering experiments and their relative sensitivity tae neutrons and {gamma}-rays are considered. The ZnS type can be used with a {gamma}-ray pulse shape discriminator and practical experience of its use in a multi-counter time-of-flight experiment is described. The Li glass has higher {gamma}-background but also higher neutron efficiency. Performance figures of a scintillator containing 25% by wt. Li{sub 2}O and 1 mm thick will be given. (author) [French] Les compteurs a scintillations etudies sont de deux types : i) LiF ou B{sub 2}O{sub 3} fixe par du sulfure de zinc en composition variable, ii) verres contenant du lithium en composition variable. Les auteurs examinent la composition ideale de chaque type de compteur pour les experiences de diffusion de neutrons, ainsi que leur sinsibilite rrelative aux neutrons et aux rayons gamma. On peut utiliser le compteur a ZnS avec un discriminates de forme pour rayons gamma; les auteurs decrivent l'experience qu'ils ont de son emploi dans une experience de temps de vol a plusieurs compteurs. Le compteur verre-Li a un mouvement propre plus eleve pour les rayons gamma mais une meilleure efficacite vis-a-vis des neutrons. Les auteurs donnent quelques chiffres concernant le fonctionnement d'un scintillateur contenant 25% en poids de Li{sub 2}O et ayant une epaisseur de un millimetre. (author) [Spanish] Los contadores de centelleo examinados en esta memoria son de dos tipos : a) de LiF o B{sub 2}O{sub 3} mezclado con sulfuro de cinc en proporciones variables; b) de vidrios litiados de diversas composiciones. Los autores estudian la composicion ideal de cada tipo para experimentos de dispersion neutronica, asi como su sensibilidad relativa a los neutrones y a los rayos gamma. El tio de Zn

  14. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  15. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  16. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  17. Directional epithermal neutron detector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Givens, W.W.; Mills, W.R. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    A borehole tool for epithermal neutron die-away logging of subterranean formations surrounding a borehole is described which consists of: (a) a pulsed source of fast neutrons for irradiating the formations surrounding a borehole, (b) at least one neutron counter for counting epithermal neutrons returning to the borehole from the irradiated formations, (c) a neutron moderating material, (d) an outer thermal neutron shield providing a housing for the counter and the moderating material, (e) an inner thermal neutron shield dividing the housing so as to provide a first compartment bounded by the inner thermal neutron shield and a first portion of the outer thermal neutron shield and a second compartment bounded by the inner thermal neutron shield and a second portion of the outer thermal neutron shield, the counter being positioned within the first compartment and the moderating material being positioned within the second compartment, and (f) means for positioning the borehole tool against one side of the borehole wall and azimuthally orienting the borehole tool such that the first chamber is in juxtaposition with the borehole wall, the formation epithermal neutrons penetrating into the first chamber through the first portion of the outer thermal neutron shield are detected by the neutron counter for die-away measurement, thereby maximizing the directional sensitivty of the neutron counter to formation epithermal neutrons, the borehole fluid epithermal neutrons penetrating into the second chamber through the second chamber through the second portion of the outer thermal neutron shield are largely slowed down and lowered in energy by the moderating material and absorbed by the inner thermal neutron shield before penetrating into the first chamber, thereby minimizing the directional sensitivity of the neutron counter to borehole fluid epithermal neutrons

  18. Fast Enrichment Screening for Safeguards Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, A.; McElhaney, S.

    2010-01-01

    Methods for rapid non-destructive uranium enrichment classification of large containers are of importance to safeguards and counter-terrorism agencies. There is a need to quickly categorize and segregate suspect items as 'depleted' or 'enriched' on a 'Go/No Go' basis. Recent improvements in gamma spectroscopy technologies have provided the capability to perform rapid field analysis using portable and hand-held devices such as battery-operated medium and high resolution detectors (including lanthanum halide and high purity germanium). Furthermore a new generation of portal monitors are currently under development with advanced spectroscopic capabilities. Instruments and technologies that were previously the domain of complex lab systems are now widely available as touch-screen 'off-the-shelf' units. Despite such advances, the task of enrichment analysis remains a complex exercise. This is particularly so when surveying large items such as drums and crates containing debris of unknown density and composition contaminated with uranium. The challenge is equally applicable to safeguards inspectors evaluating large items and for interdiction of illicit special nuclear materials in mass transport e.g. shipping containers at ports and borders. The variable shielding, container size, lack of matrix knowledge, wall thickness and self-shielding compound this problem. Performing an accurate assessment within the short count time window demanded of the field operative, leads to the need for a reliable method that can adapt to such conditions and is robust to a wide dynamic range of counting statistics. Several methods are evaluated with reference to the performance metrics defined in applicable standards. The primary issue is to minimize the bias that can result from attenuation effects, particularly as the gamma emissions from U235 are low energy and therefore highly susceptible to absorption in large containers with metal scrap. Use of other radiometric signatures such as

  19. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  20. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  1. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  2. High energy neutron dosimeter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rai, K.S.F.

    1994-01-01

    A device for measuring dose equivalents in neutron radiation fields is described. The device includes nested symmetrical hemispheres (forming spheres) of different neutron moderating materials that allow the measurement of dose equivalents from 0.025 eV to past 1 GeV. The layers of moderating material surround a spherical neutron counter. The neutron counter is connected by an electrical cable to an electrical sensing means which interprets the signal from the neutron counter in the center of the moderating spheres. The spherical shape of the device allows for accurate measurement of dose equivalents regardless of its positioning. 2 figures

  3. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  4. Nuclear facility safeguards systems modeling using discrete event simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.

    1977-01-01

    The threat of theft or dispersal of special nuclear material at a nuclear facility is treated by studying the temporal relationships between adversaries having authorized access to the facility (insiders) and safeguards system events by using a GASP IV discrete event simulation. The safeguards system events--detection, assessment, delay, communications, and neutralization--are modeled for the general insider adversary strategy which includes degradation of the safeguards system elements followed by an attempt to steal or disperse special nuclear material. The performance measure used in the analysis is the estimated probability of safeguards system success in countering the adversary based upon a predetermined set of adversary actions. An exemplary problem which includes generated results is presented for a hypothetical nuclear facility. The results illustrate representative information that could be utilized by safeguards decision-makers

  5. Measure of the efficiency of a long counter of Hanson's type and use of this counter for the survey of the slow neutrons coming from the reactor of Chatillon; Mesure de l'efficacite d'un long compteur du type Hanson et utilisation de ce compteur a l'etude des neutrons lents sortant de la pile de Chatillon

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barloutaud, R [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1953-07-01

    A detection device of fast neutrons of efficiency almost independent of the energy of the neutrons has been achieved. It efficiency has been measured in absolute value for groups of neutrons of different energies. This device allowed to get some indications on the energy composition of the neutrons leaving from the reactor of Chatillon. (author) [French] Un dispositif de detection de neutrons rapides d'efficacite pratiquement independante de l'energie des neutrons a ete realise. Son efficacite a ete mesuree en valeur absolue pour des groupes de neutrons de diverses energies. Ce dispositif a permis obtenir quelques indications sur la composition energetique des neutrons sortant de la pile de Chatillon. (auteur)

  6. Agreement of 10 September 1991 between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a miniature neutron source reactor from the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-10-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 10 September 1991, between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a miniature neutron source reactor from the People's Republic of China. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 20 February 1990 and entered into force upon signature on 10 September 1991

  7. The use of curium neutrons to verify plutonium in spent fuel and reprocessing wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miura, N.

    1994-05-01

    For safeguards verification of spent fuel, leached hulls, and reprocessing wastes, it is necessary to determine the plutonium content in these items. We have evaluated the use of passive neutron multiplicity counting to determine the plutonium content directly and also to measure the 240 Pu/ 244 Cm ratio for the indirect verification of the plutonium. Neutron multiplicity counting of the singles, doubles, and triples neutrons has been evaluated for measuring 240 Pu, 244 Cm, and 252 Cf. We have proposed a method to establish the plutonium to curium ratio using the hybrid k-edge densitometer x-ray fluorescence instrument plus a neutron coincidence counter for the reprocessing dissolver solution. This report presents the concepts, experimental results, and error estimates for typical spent fuel applications

  8. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  9. Sealed drift tube cosmic ray veto counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rios, R.; Tatar, E.; Bacon, J.D.; Bowles, T.J.; Hill, R.; Green, J.A.; Hogan, G.E.; Ito, T.M.; Makela, M.; Morris, C.L.; Mortenson, R.; Pasukanics, F.E.; Ramsey, J.; Saunders, A.; Seestrom, S.J.; Sondheim, W.E.; Teasdale, W.; Saltus, M.; Back, H.O.; Cottrell, C.R.

    2011-01-01

    We describe a simple drift tube counter that has been used as a cosmic ray veto for the UCNA experiment, a first-ever measurement of the neutron beta-asymmetry using ultra-cold neutrons. These detectors provide an inexpensive alternative to more conventional scintillation detectors for large area cosmic ray anticoincidence detectors.

  10. Cosmic Ray Background Analysis For A Cargo Container Counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ensslin, Norbert; Geist, W.H.; Lestone, J.P.; Mayo, D.R.; Menlove, Howard O.

    2001-01-01

    We have developed a new model for calculating the expected yield of cosmic-ray spallation neutrons in a Cargo Container Counter, and we have benchmarked the model against measurements made with several existing large neutron counters. We also developed two versions of a new measurement uncertainty prediction code based on Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. The codes calculate the minimum detectability limit for the Cargo Container Counter for either neutron singles or doubles counting, and also propagate the uncertainties associated with efficiency normalization flux monitors and cosmic ray flux monitors. This paper will describe the physics basis for this analysis, and the results obtained for several different counter designs.

  11. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  12. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  13. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  14. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  15. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  16. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  17. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

  18. A Bragg curve counter with an internal production target for the measurement of the double-differential cross-section of fragment production induced by neutrons at energies of tens of MeV

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanami, T.; Hagiwara, M.; Oishi, T.; Hosokawa, M.; Kamada, S.; Tanaka, Su.; Iwamoto, Y.; Nakashima, H.; Baba, M.

    2009-01-01

    A Bragg curve counter equipped with an internal production target was developed for the measurements of double-differential cross-sections of fragment production induced by neutrons at energies of tens of MeV. The internal target permitted a large detection solid angle and thus the registration of processes at low production rates. In this specific geometry, the detection solid angle depends on the emission angle and the range of the particle. Therefore the energy, atomic number, and angle of trajectory of the particle have to be taken into account for the determination of the solid angle. For the selection of events with tracks confined within a defined cylindrical volume around the detector axis, a segmented anode was applied. The double-differential cross-sections for neutron-induced production of lithium, beryllium, and boron fragments from a carbon target were measured at 0 deg. for 65 MeV neutrons. The results are in good agreement with theoretical calculation using PHITS code with GEM and ISOBAR model.

  19. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  20. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  1. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  2. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-01-01

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to 'breed' nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and 'burn' actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is 'fertile' or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing 'TRU'-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II 'EBR-II' at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line--a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors

  3. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  4. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  5. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  6. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  7. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  8. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  9. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  10. A Direction Sensitive Fast Neutron Monitor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Antolkovic, B; Holmqvist, B; Wiedling, T

    1964-06-15

    A direction sensitive fast neutron monitor is described and its properties are discussed in some detail. The counter is a modification of the standard long counter of the Hanson and McKibben type. Directional sensitivity is obtained by increasing the shielding of the counter and providing it with a 70 cm long collimator channel. The behaviour of this long counter monitor is compared with that of a standard long counter when both are used in neutron experiments.

  11. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  12. Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-09-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

  13. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  14. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  15. Scintillation Counters

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bell, Zane W.

    Scintillators find wide use in radiation detection as the detecting medium for gamma/X-rays, and charged and neutral particles. Since the first notice in 1895 by Roentgen of the production of light by X-rays on a barium platinocyanide screen, and Thomas Edison's work over the following 2 years resulting in the discovery of calcium tungstate as a superior fluoroscopy screen, much research and experimentation have been undertaken to discover and elucidate the properties of new scintillators. Scintillators with high density and high atomic number are prized for the detection of gamma rays above 1 MeV; lower atomic number, lower-density materials find use for detecting beta particles and heavy charged particles; hydrogenous scintillators find use in fast-neutron detection; and boron-, lithium-, and gadolinium-containing scintillators are used for slow-neutron detection. This chapter provides the practitioner with an overview of the general characteristics of scintillators, including the variation of probability of interaction with density and atomic number, the characteristics of the light pulse, a list and characteristics of commonly available scintillators and their approximate cost, and recommendations regarding the choice of material for a few specific applications. This chapter does not pretend to present an exhaustive list of scintillators and applications.

  16. Constant sensitivity circuit for solid state nuclear radiation counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kronenberg, S.; Erkkila, B.

    1985-01-01

    The utilization of solid state counters in tactical radiological instruments for measuring intensities and doses of fallout gamma rays offers advantages over Geiger-Mueller (GM) counters such as a much wider dynamic range and low operating voltages. Their very small size is suitable for use in miniaturized equipment. However, these devices have a serious problem if used in a mixed, fast neutron/gamma environment such as is encountered e.g. in a battlefield where tactical nuclear weapons are used and neutrons, prompt, initial gammas and fallout gammas are killing factors of comparable importance. Exposure to fast neutrons reduces seriously their sensitivity. This makes the solid state counters at this time unacceptable for use in Army tactical surveillance equipment and in other applications where according to requirements the performance must not be impaired by exposure to fast neutrons. It seems to be possible to reduce to some extent this neutron generated damage by improving the crystal counters

  17. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  18. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  19. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amundson, P.I.; Rusch, G.K.

    1980-01-01

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  20. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  1. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  2. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  3. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  4. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  5. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  6. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  7. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  8. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  9. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  10. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  11. Evaluation of waste crate counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wachter, J.R.; Shaw, S.W.

    1994-01-01

    A novel nondestructive measurement system has been developed to perform combined gamma-ray, passive neutron, and active neutron analyses of radioactive waste packaged in large crates. The system will be used to examine low level and transuranic waste at the Waste Receiving and Processing facility at Westinghouse-Hanford Corp. Prior to delivery of the system, an extensive evaluation of its performance characteristics will be conducted. The evaluation is to include an assessment of the mechanical properties of the system, gamma-ray attenuation correction algorithms, instrument response as a function of source positions, performance of the high resolution gamma-ray detector for ''hot spot'' and isotopic analyses, active and passive neutron counter response, instrument sensitivity, matrix effects, and packaging effects. This report will discuss the findings of the evaluation program, to date, and indicate future directions for the program

  12. Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopatin, S.

    2010-01-01

    accounting of items containing less than one gram of nuclear material (like smoke detectors, neutron detectors and sources) comparing at all nuclear activities of Ukraine. Also it is impossible to apply traditional safeguards to Chernobyl Shelter and in the terms of AP it has to be treated as a location of high-level waste containing nuclear material. Nevertheless, we believe that Ukraine is ready for application of integrated safeguards. (author)

  13. Evaluation of B10Plus+* proportional detectors for neutron coincidence counting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beddingfield, David H.; Yoon, Seokryung [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna International Centre, PO Box 100, 1400 Vienna, (Austria)

    2015-07-01

    GE-Reuter-Stokes (GERS) has developed a new line of neutron proportional counters, the B10Plus+* proportional counter. The detector design is intended to serve as a cost-effective alternative to traditional {sup 3}He proportional counters in a variety of applications. The detector is a hybrid design 10B-lined tube optimized with the addition of a small quantity of 3He gas to improve the detector performance and efficiency. As a demonstration of the B10Plus+* detector, GERS has constructed a Uranium Neutron Collar (UNCL) system consisting of B-10Plus+* proportional counters. GERS has designed and built a demonstration UNCL system intended to match the performance of a Type-I UNCL design in Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) geometry operating in thermal mode. GERS offered their system on loan to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Division of Technical and Scientific Services for an assessment of the detector technology and the demonstration system. We have characterized the demonstration UNCL system and compared its performance with a traditional Type-I UNCL design in regular use by the IAEA. This paper summarizes our findings and observations during the characterization and testing activity. (authors)

  14. Design of neutron diagnostic for MTX

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, Toshihide; Oasa, Kazumi; Hoshino, Katsumichi; Odajima, Kazuo; Maeda, Hikosuke

    1990-07-01

    A neutron diagnostic system was designed for the Microwave Tokamak Experiment being carried out at the lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. High speed measurements are important to this experiment. Plastic scintillator is used for this fast response detection of neutron. Proportional counters and fission counters are used for the total neutron emission rate measurements. (author)

  15. A training and educational tool for neutron coincidence measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huszti, J.; Bagi, J.; Langner, D.

    2009-01-01

    Neutron coincidence counting techniques are widely used for nuclear safeguards inspection. They are based on the detection of time correlated neutrons created from spontaneous or induced fission of plutonium and some other actinides. IAEA inspectors are trained to know and to use this technique, but it is not easy to illustrate and explain the basics of the neutron coincidence counting. The traditional shift registers or multiplicity counters give only multiplicity distributions and the singles, doubles and triples count rates. Using the list mode method for the recording and evaluation of neutron coincidence data makes it easier to teach this technique. List mode acquisition is a relatively new way to collect data in neutron coincidence counting. It is based on the recording of the follow-up times of neutron pulses originating from a neutron detector into a file. The recorded pulse train can be evaluated with special software after the measurement. Hardware and software for list mode neutron coincidence acquisition have been developed in the Institute of Isotopes and is called a Pulse Train Reader. A system called Virtual Source for replaying pulse trains registered with the list mode device has also been developed. The list mode device and the pulse train 're-player' together build a good educational tool for teaching the basics of neutron coincidence counting. Some features of the follow-up time, multiplicity and Rossi-alpha distributions can be well demonstrated by replaying artificially generated or pre-recorded pulse trains. The choice of real sources is stored on DVD. There is no need to transport and maintain real sources for the training. Virtual sources also give the possibility of investigating rare sources that trainees would not have access to otherwise. (authors)

  16. Distributed performance counters

    Science.gov (United States)

    Davis, Kristan D; Evans, Kahn C; Gara, Alan; Satterfield, David L

    2013-11-26

    A plurality of first performance counter modules is coupled to a plurality of processing cores. The plurality of first performance counter modules is operable to collect performance data associated with the plurality of processing cores respectively. A plurality of second performance counter modules are coupled to a plurality of L2 cache units, and the plurality of second performance counter modules are operable to collect performance data associated with the plurality of L2 cache units respectively. A central performance counter module may be operable to coordinate counter data from the plurality of first performance counter modules and the plurality of second performance modules, the a central performance counter module, the plurality of first performance counter modules, and the plurality of second performance counter modules connected by a daisy chain connection.

  17. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  18. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  19. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  20. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  1. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  2. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  3. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  4. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  5. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  6. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  7. Measurements Matter in Nuclear Safeguards & Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Jakopic, R.; Richter, S.; Schillebeeckx, P.; Hult, M.

    2015-01-01

    The deliverable of any laboratory is a measurement result with stated uncertainty and traceability (ISO/IEC 17025: 2005). Measurement results, particularly in safeguards, have to be accurate, comparable and traceable to a stated reference, preferably to the SI. Results provided by operator-, safeguards- or network laboratories have to be in compliance with specific quality goals for nuclear material and environmental sample analysis. Metrological quality control tools are prerequisites to build up confidence in measurement results that have to be translated into meaningful safeguards conclusions or to demonstrate conformity of findings with declared processes. The European Commission—Joint Research Centre (EC–JRC) has dedicated facilities, laboratories and projects to provide certified nuclear reference materials (CRM), to develop reference methods and to organize inter-laboratory comparisons (ILC) in compliance with ISO Guide 34, ISO17025 and ISO17043, including respective training. Recent examples are: – cooperation with the JAEA to investigate on the application of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) to quantify the amount of special nuclear material in particlelike debris of melted fuel as formed in the nuclear accident in Fukushima – training in metrology and gamma-ray spectrometry for EURATOM safeguards inspectors – development of uranium reference particle standards under a new EC support task to the IAEA. Currently, the JRC puts major efforts in producing CRMs and conformity assessment tools for “age-dating” of uranium and plutonium samples. They are needed for method validation in determining the date of the last chemical separation of uranium or plutonium from their daughter nuclides. These type of CRMs are not only needed in nuclear safeguards and forensics, but could support in the future a possible new type of “verification mechanism” as part of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), since measurements and measurement standards

  8. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  9. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  10. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  11. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  12. The Development of Advanced Processing and Analysis Algorithms for Improved Neutron Multiplicity Measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Santi, P.; Favalli, A.; Hauck, D.; Henzl, V.; Henzlova, D.; Ianakiev, K.; Iliev, M.; Swinhoe, M.; Croft, S.; Worrall, L.

    2015-01-01

    One of the most distinctive and informative signatures of special nuclear materials is the emission of correlated neutrons from either spontaneous or induced fission. Because the emission of correlated neutrons is a unique and unmistakable signature of nuclear materials, the ability to effectively detect, process, and analyze these emissions will continue to play a vital role in the non-proliferation, safeguards, and security missions. While currently deployed neutron measurement techniques based on 3He proportional counter technology, such as neutron coincidence and multiplicity counters currently used by the International Atomic Energy Agency, have proven to be effective over the past several decades for a wide range of measurement needs, a number of technical and practical limitations exist in continuing to apply this technique to future measurement needs. In many cases, those limitations exist within the algorithms that are used to process and analyze the detected signals from these counters that were initially developed approximately 20 years ago based on the technology and computing power that was available at that time. Over the past three years, an effort has been undertaken to address the general shortcomings in these algorithms by developing new algorithms that are based on fundamental physics principles that should lead to the development of more sensitive neutron non-destructive assay instrumentation. Through this effort, a number of advancements have been made in correcting incoming data for electronic dead time, connecting the two main types of analysis techniques used to quantify the data (Shift register analysis and Feynman variance to mean analysis), and in the underlying physical model, known as the point model, that is used to interpret the data in terms of the characteristic properties of the item being measured. The current status of the testing and evaluation of these advancements in correlated neutron analysis techniques will be discussed

  13. Status of safeguards instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, are described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed

  14. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

    2010-01-01

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  15. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  16. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  17. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1978-06-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  18. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1976-01-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  19. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  20. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  1. Cerenkov counters at ISABELLE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Etkin, A.; Kostoulas, I.; Leith, D.W.G.S.; Thun, R.

    1977-01-01

    The Cherenkov counter described for use at Isabelle is a threshold counter in which light is focussed on phototubes. The counter is applicable in large-angle, small-aperture magnetic spectrometers for measurement of particle yields at large p/sub T/. Three of these counters will provide complete π-K-p separation in the range of 7-20 GeV/c. Other Cherenkov counters are discussed and a bibliography of relevant literature on the counters utilizing photoionization is included

  2. Proton-recoil proportional counter tests at TREAT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fink, C.L.; Eichholz, J.J.; Burrows, D.R.; DeVolpi, A.

    1979-01-01

    A methane filled proton-recoil proportional counter will be used as a fission neutron detector in the fast-neutron hodoscope. To provide meaningful fuel-motion information the proportional counter should have: a linear response over a wide range of reactor powers background ratio (the number of high energy neutrons detected must be maximized relative to low energy neutrons, and gamma ray sensitivity must be kept small); and a detector efficiency for fission neutrons above 1 MeV of approximately 1%. In addition, it is desirable that the detector and the associated amplifier/discriminator be capable of operating at counting rates in excess of 500 kHz. This paper reports on tests that were conducted on several proportional counters at the TREAT reactor

  3. Nonproliferation and safeguarding via ionization detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koster, J.E.; Johnson, J.P.; Steadman, P.

    1995-01-01

    A significant signature of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) is ionizing radiation. SNM naturally decays with the emission of alpha particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. Detecting and monitoring these emissions is an important capability for international safeguards. A new detection method collects the ions produced by such radiation in ambient air. Alpha particles in particular are specific to heavy nuclei but have very short range. The ions produced by an alpha, however, can be transported tens of meters to an ion detector. These new monitors are rugged, very sensitive, respond in real time, and in most cases are quite portable

  4. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  5. Safeguards system design methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

  6. Technical basis of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buechler, C.

    1975-01-01

    Definition of nuclear materials control. Materials accountancy and physical control as technical possibilities. Legal possibilities and levels of responsibility: material holders, national and international authority. Detection vs. prevention. Physical security and containment surveillance. Accountancy: materials balance concept. Materials measurement: inventory taking, flow determination. IAEA safeguards; verification of operator's statement. (HP) [de

  7. Nuclear safeguards project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1978-10-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1977 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschungsanlage Juelich, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) 891 HP 892 AP [de

  8. Safeguards techniques and equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

  9. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  10. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  11. Brazilian reactors under safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    Three nuclear reactors in Brazil have been placed under Agency safeguards against diversion to military use. They are used for research purposes under a bilateral treaty with the USA, and are located at Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte

  12. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  13. Tests of BF3 counters with getter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Comte, R.; Dauphin, G.

    1968-01-01

    BF 3 counters with addition of a getter have been developed to improve operation characteristics of these detectors in presence of strong gamma flows. The getter is made of an active coal deposit on the cathode. As noticed by other studies, the degradation of these counters is related to the exposure to strong neutron flows and to gamma radiations. The authors report tests performed on these counters with a brief presentation of the counters, and a presentation of the test installation. A threshold curve and an amplitude spectrum are obtained, and counting is performed for a fixed threshold before and after the exposure of detectors to variable doses of γ radiation. The results after a first 2 hour long irradiation, a 230 hour long second irradiation, and a third irradiation under high voltage (2100 V) are discussed. Thermal tests are then performed and commented

  14. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  15. Determination of plutonium content in TRR spent fuel by nondestructive neutron counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, Y.-F.; Sheu, R.-J.; Chiao, L.-H.; Yuan, M.-C.; Jiang, S.-H.

    2010-01-01

    For the nuclear safeguard purpose, this work aims to nondestructively determine the plutonium content in the Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) spent fuel rods in the storage pool before the stabilization process, which transforms the metal spent fuel rods into oxide powder. A SPent-fuel-Neutron-Counter (SPNC) system was designed and constructed to carry out underwater scan measurements of neutrons emitting from the spent fuel rod, from which the 240 Pu mass in the fuel rod will be determined. The SAS2 H control module of the SCALE 5.1 code package was applied to calculate the 240 Pu-to-Pu mass ratio in the TRR spent fuel rod according to the given power history. This paper presents the methodology and design of our detector system as well as the measurements of four TRR spent fuel rods in the storage pool and the comparison of the measured results with the facility declared values.

  16. CEDAR counter (internal part)

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN PhotoLab

    1976-01-01

    Here on the mounting bench. The counter is a differential Cerenkov, corrected for chromaticity, able to differentiate pions from kaons up to 350 GeV. Counters of this type were used in all SPS hadron beams.

  17. Whole Body Counters (rev.)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woodburn, John H. [Walter Johnson High School, Rockville, MD; Lengemann, Frederick W. [Cornell University

    1967-01-01

    Whole body counters are radiation detecting and measuring instruments that provide information about the human body. This booklet describes different whole body counters, scientific principles that are applied to their design, and ways they are used.

  18. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  19. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  20. Absolute calibration of TFTR helium proportional counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strachan, J.D.; Diesso, M.; Jassby, D.; Johnson, L.; McCauley, S.; Munsat, T.; Roquemore, A.L.; Loughlin, M.

    1995-06-01

    The TFTR helium proportional counters are located in the central five (5) channels of the TFTR multichannel neutron collimator. These detectors were absolutely calibrated using a 14 MeV neutron generator positioned at the horizontal midplane of the TFTR vacuum vessel. The neutron generator position was scanned in centimeter steps to determine the collimator aperture width to 14 MeV neutrons and the absolute sensitivity of each channel. Neutron profiles were measured for TFTR plasmas with time resolution between 5 msec and 50 msec depending upon count rates. The He detectors were used to measure the burnup of 1 MeV tritons in deuterium plasmas, the transport of tritium in trace tritium experiments, and the residual tritium levels in plasmas following 50:50 DT experiments

  1. A gaseous scintillation counter filled with He{sup 3} for neutron spectrometry; Compteur a scintillateur gazeux rempli de {sup 3}He pour la spectrometrie des flux de neutrons; Gazovyj stsintillyatsionnyj schetchik napolnennyj He{sup 3} dlya spektrometrii potokov nejtronov; Contador de centelleador gaseoso cargado con helio-3 para la espectrometria neutronica

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baldin, S A; Matveev, V V

    1962-04-15

    The paper describes a gas plant and gaseous scintillation counter, and gives the results of experiments on the recording and spectrometry of neutron beams using a gaseous scintillation counter filled with a mixture of 10% xenene and 90% helium-3 at an overall pressure of 20 ata. Data are given on the design of the gas plant, which makes it possible to operate the counter continuously over long periods of time, as well as providing the required gas mixtures at overall pressures of up to 60 atm and ensuring constant freedom of the gas from contamination. In addition, the paper presents the results of research on the counter's energy resolution and linearity at different energy levels and indicates its efficiency in gamma fields of intensity up to 3 r/h; the possibility of extending the working energy-range of gaseous scintillation counters filled with helium-3 is also considered. (author) [French] FLes auteurs decrivent un compteur a scintillateur gazeux ainsi que les resultats des experiences d'enregistrement et de spectrometrie des flux de neutrons qui ont ete faites au moyen d'un compteur a scintillateur gazeux rempli d'un melange de 10% de xenon et de 90% d'helium-3 sous une pression de 20 atmospheres. Ils exposent les donnees relatives a la construction d'un appareillage qui assure le fonctionnement ininterrompu du compteur durant un laps de temps prolonge, l'obtention des melanges de gaz indispensables sous une pression totale de 60 atmospheres et l'epuration continue du gaz. En outre, ils examinent les resultats de l'etude du pouvoir de resolution en energie et de la linearite du compteur en fonction de l'energie, le fonctionnement du compteur dans les champs de rayonnement gamma d'une intensite allant jusqu'a 3 r/h, ainsi que la possibilite d'elargir la gamme d'energie dans laquelle on peut employer des compteurs a scintillateurs gazeux de {sup 3}He. (author) [Spanish] En esta memoria se describe un aparato de suministro de gas y un contador de centelleador

  2. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  3. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  4. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  5. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powers, J.A.

    1983-03-01

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  6. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  7. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  8. An annular BF3 counter of large sensitive volume

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janardhanan, S.; Swaminathan, N.

    1975-01-01

    An annular neutron counter having a large sensitive volume with inner and outer diameter 31 cms with multiple electrode system fabricated especially to measure the neutron output from fissile region of standard fast reactor fuel of length nearly equivalent to 500 cms is described. The counter efficiency is nearly 0.3% for neutron and sensitivity 0.0018 counts/neutron for (alpha, neutron) and spontaneous fission source. Its other potential applications which are indicated are : (1) quality control of fast reactor fuel pins (2) fuel inventory (3) assessing radioactivity of solid waste packets containing PuO 2 (4) uniformity of fuel loading of a reactor and (5) neutron monitoring in a fuel plant. (M.G.B.)

  9. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  10. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  11. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  12. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  13. A neutron portal monitor for vehicles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coop, K.L.; Fehlau, P.E.; Atwater, H.F.

    1987-01-01

    We have designed and built a portal vehicle monitoring systems for detecting neutron-emitting special nuclear material (SNM) such as plutonium. Monte Carlo calculations were used to optimize the design of the 15-cm-deep x 122-cm-high x 244-cm-long detector chambers, which utilize 3 He proportional counters inside a hollow polyethylene box. Results for a variety of parametric studies, including polyethylene thickness and detector number, are described. Our experimental measurements are in good agreement with the computer calculations. The monitor's decision logic uses the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) on Poisson distributed counting data, which is superior to other statistical tests in many applications. We performed computer simulations of the SPRT logic to determine expected false-positive decision rates. A controller unit of our design that uses this SPRT was built commercially. The cost of the complete monitoring system is similar to that of vehicle portal monitors that detect gamma rays. This new neutron monitor can serve as an addition to standard gamma-ray vehicle portals or as a stand-alone portal monitor in particular safeguards monitoring situations. The monitor is being tested at Los Alamos and is scheduled for in-plant evaluation of another DOE facility in 1987. 7 refs

  14. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  15. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  16. Research Projects at Chulalongkorn University for the Master Degree Programme in Nuclear Security and Safeguard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsuwankosit, S.

    2015-01-01

    The Department of Nuclear Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, began its master degree programme in nuclear security and safeguard in November 2013 with the support from the CBRN-Center of Excellence, European Union. This programme was planned as a way to raise the awareness of various local agencies in ASEAN countries regarding the threat of CBRN events. In the long run, the programme will also serve as the platform to develop the human resource and to provide the professional assistance required to counter such threat in the region. The programme closely follows the guideline as given by the IAEA and employs its materials as the main source of references. The first batch of 20 students came from countries in the ASEAN community. Due to the nature of the program, each student is required to conduct the research and a thesis based on such research is to be submitted as part of the requirement for the graduation. Currently, the research subjects that are readily available to the students can be classified into 5 categories: 1. subjects with neutron generator, 2. subjects with nuclear electronics and instruments, 3. subjects with industrial applications, 4. subjects with computer simulations, and 5. subjects with policy research. (author)

  17. Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    -destructive analysis (NDA) techniques, and compare their findings with the declared figures and the operator's records. The next level of verification has the aim of detecting whether a fraction of a declared amount is missing (partial defect) and may involve the weighing of items and measurements with NDA techniques such as neutron counting or gamma-ray spectrometry. For detecting bias defects, which would arise if small amounts of material were diverted over a protracted length of time, it is necessary to sample some of the items and to apply physical and chemical analysis techniques having the highest possible accuracy, typically less than one per cent. In order to apply these destructive analysis (DA) techniques, the IAEA requires access to laboratories which use such accurate techniques on a routine basis. Containment and surveillance (C/S) techniques, which are complementary to nuclear material accountancy techniques, are applied in order to maintain continuity of the knowledge gained through IAEA verification, by giving assurance that nuclear material follows predetermined routes, that the integrity of its containment remains unimpaired and that the material is accounted for at the correct measurement points. They also lead to savings in the safeguards inspection effort, e.g. by reducing the frequency of accountancy verification. A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. In remote monitoring, the unattended equipment transmits the data off-site. For unattended and remote monitoring, additional criteria must be met, including high reliability and authentication of the data source. Data communication costs have dropped dramatically in recent years. Data security is an important feature of unattended and remote monitoring systems. Environmental sampling, which allows detection of minute traces of nuclear material, was added to the IAEA's verification measures in the early 1990s as a powerful tool for detecting indications of undeclared

  18. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  19. Multimode pulse counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Natanzon, D.D.

    1982-01-01

    A pulse counter with code conversion is described. The counter is based on the integrated circuits of direct-counting devices of medium integration. The counter ensures various modes of pulse counting depending on the logical control signals: reversible, two-channel summing, one-channel summing binary, summing with ''storage'' signal code fixation without interrupting pulse counting. Arrangement of the suggested structure as a microcircuit of medium integration might contribute to reduction in the counter type nomenclature in digital families of widely used integrated circuits

  20. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  1. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  2. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  3. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  4. Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.; Hudson, P.

    2001-01-01

    The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

  5. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  6. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  7. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  8. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  9. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2001-01-01

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  10. The first CEDAR counter

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN PhotoLab

    1976-01-01

    The first differential Cerenkov counter with chromatic corrections (called CEDAR) successfully tested at the PS in July 75. These counters were used in the SPS hadronic beams for particle identification. Some of the eight photomultipliers can be seen: they receive the light reflected back through the annular diaphragm. René Maleyran stands on the left.

  11. Safeguarding on-power fuelled reactors - instrumentation and techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waligura, A.; Konnov, Y.; Smith, R.M.; Head, D.A.

    1977-01-01

    Instrumentation and techniques applicable to safeguarding reactors that are fuelled on-power, particularly the CANDU type, have been developed. A demonstration is being carried out at the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station in Canada. Irradiated nuclear materials in certain areas - the reactor and spent fuel storage bays - are monitored using photographic and television cameras, and seals. Item accounting is applied by counting spent-fuel bundles during transfer from the reactor to the storage bay and by placing these spent-fuel bundles in a sealed enclosure. Provision is made for inspection and verification of the bundles before sealing. The reactor's power history is recorded by a track-etch power monitor. Redundancy is provided so that the failure of any single piece of equipment does not invalidate the entire safeguards system. Several safeguards instruments and devices have beeen developed and evaluated. These include a super-8 mm surveillance camera system, a television surveillance system, a spent-fuel bundle counter, a device to detect dummy fuel bundles, a cover for enclosing a stack of spent-fuel bundles, and a seal suitable for underwater installation and ultrasonic interrogation. The information provided by these different instruments should increase the effectiveness of Agency safeguards and, when used in combination with other measures, will facilitate inspection at reactor sites

  12. Safeguards Technology Development Program 1st Quarter FY 2018 Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Prasad, Manoj K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2018-01-10

    LLNL will evaluate the performance of a stilbene-based scintillation detector array for IAEA neutron multiplicity counting (NMC) applications. This effort will combine newly developed modeling methodologies and recently acquired high-efficiency stilbene detector units to quantitatively compare the prototype system performance with the conventional He-3 counters and liquid scintillator alternatives.

  13. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  14. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  15. Programmable spark counter of tracks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Denisov, A.E.; Nikolaev, V.A.; Vorobjev, I.B.

    2005-01-01

    For the purpose, a new set-the programmable all-automatic spark counter AIST-4-has been developed and manufactured. Compared to our previous automated spark counter ISTRA, which was operated by the integrated fixed program, the new set is operated completely by a personal computer. The mechanism for pressing and pulling the aluminized foil is put into action by a step motor operated by a microcontroller. The step motor turns an axle. The axle has two eccentrics. One of them moves a pressing plate up and down. The second eccentric moves the aluminized foil by steps of ∼15mm after the end of each pulse counting. One turnover of the axle corresponds to one pulse count cycle. The step motor, the high-voltage block and the pulse count block are operated by the microcontroller PIC 16C84 (Microstar). The set can be operated either manually by keys on the front panel or by a PC using dialogue windows for radon or neutron measurements (for counting of alpha or fission fragment tracks). A number of algorithms are developed: the general procedures, the automatic stopping of the pulse counting, the calibration curve, determination of the count characteristics and elimination of the short circuit in a track

  16. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  17. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  18. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  19. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  20. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  1. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  2. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  3. Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, Ross.

    1981-01-01

    The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

  4. Interactive hypermedia training manual for spent-fuel bundle counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basso, R.A.

    1990-07-01

    Spent-fuel bundle counters, developed by the Canadian Safeguards Support Program for the International Atomic Energy Agency, provide a secure and independent means of counting the number of irradiated fuel bundles discharged into the fuel storage bays at CANDU nuclear power stations. Paper manuals have been traditionally used to familiarize IAEA inspectors with the operation, maintenance and extensive reporting capabilities of the bundle counters. To further assist inspectors, an interactive training manual has been developed on an Apple Macintosh computer using hypermedia software. The manual uses interactive animation and sound, in conjunction with the traditional text and graphics, to simulate the underlying operation and logic of the bundle counters. This paper presents the key features of the interactive manual and highlights the advantages of this new technology for training

  5. Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, J S; Kim, H D; Lee, Y G; Kang, H Y; Cha, H R; Byeon, K H; Park, Y S; Choi, H N [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    As the strategy for DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) process safeguards, the neutron detection method was introduced to account for nuclear materials in the whole DUPIC process by selectively measuring spontaneous fission neutron signals from {sup 244}Cm. DSNC was designed and manufactured to measure the account of curium in the fuel bundle and associated process samples in the DUPIC fuel cycle. The MCNP code had response profile along the length of the CANDU type fuel bundle. It was found experimentally that the output signal variation due to the overall azimuthal asymmetry was less than 0.2%. The longitudinal detection efficiency distribution at every position including both ends was kept less than 2% from the average value. Spent fuel standards almost similar to DUPIC process material were fabricated from a single spent PWR fuel rod and the performance verification of the DSNC is in progress under very high radiation environment. The results of this test will be eventually benchmarked with other sources such as code simulation, chemical analysis and gamma analysis. COREMAS-DUPIC has been developed for the accountability management of nuclear materials treated by DUPIC facility. This system is able to track the controlled nuclear materials maintaining the material inventory in near-real time and to generate the required material accountability records and reports. Concerning the containment and surveillance technology, a focused R and D effort is given to the development of unattended continuous monitoring system. Currently, the component technologies of radiation monitoring and surveillance have been established, and continued R and D efforts are given to the integration of the components into automatic safeguards diagnostics. (author).

  6. Counter-cryptanalysis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    M.M.J. Stevens (Marc); R. Canetti; J.A. Garay

    2013-01-01

    textabstractWe introduce \\emph{counter-cryptanalysis} as a new paradigm for strengthening weak cryptographic primitives against cryptanalytic attacks. Redesigning a weak primitive to more strongly resist cryptanalytic techniques will unavoidably break backwards compatibility. Instead,

  7. The impact of gate width setting and gate utilization factors on plutonium assay in passive correlated neutron counting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henzlova, D., E-mail: henzlova@lanl.gov [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Menlove, H.O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States); Favalli, A.; Santi, P. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2015-10-11

    In the field of nuclear safeguards, passive neutron multiplicity counting (PNMC) is a method typically employed in non-destructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) for nonproliferation, verification and accountability purposes. PNMC is generally performed using a well-type thermal neutron counter and relies on the detection of correlated pairs or higher order multiplets of neutrons emitted by an assayed item. To assay SNM, a set of parameters for a given well-counter is required to link the measured multiplicity rates to the assayed item properties. Detection efficiency, die-away time, gate utilization factors (tightly connected to die-away time) as well as optimum gate width setting are among the key parameters. These parameters along with the underlying model assumptions directly affect the accuracy of the SNM assay. In this paper we examine the role of gate utilization factors and the single exponential die-away time assumption and their impact on the measurements for a range of plutonium materials. In addition, we examine the importance of item-optimized coincidence gate width setting as opposed to using a universal gate width value. Finally, the traditional PNMC based on multiplicity shift register electronics is extended to Feynman-type analysis and application of this approach to Pu mass assay is demonstrated.

  8. The impact of gate width setting and gate utilization factors on plutonium assay in passive correlated neutron counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henzlova, D.; Menlove, H.O.; Croft, S.; Favalli, A.; Santi, P.

    2015-01-01

    In the field of nuclear safeguards, passive neutron multiplicity counting (PNMC) is a method typically employed in non-destructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) for nonproliferation, verification and accountability purposes. PNMC is generally performed using a well-type thermal neutron counter and relies on the detection of correlated pairs or higher order multiplets of neutrons emitted by an assayed item. To assay SNM, a set of parameters for a given well-counter is required to link the measured multiplicity rates to the assayed item properties. Detection efficiency, die-away time, gate utilization factors (tightly connected to die-away time) as well as optimum gate width setting are among the key parameters. These parameters along with the underlying model assumptions directly affect the accuracy of the SNM assay. In this paper we examine the role of gate utilization factors and the single exponential die-away time assumption and their impact on the measurements for a range of plutonium materials. In addition, we examine the importance of item-optimized coincidence gate width setting as opposed to using a universal gate width value. Finally, the traditional PNMC based on multiplicity shift register electronics is extended to Feynman-type analysis and application of this approach to Pu mass assay is demonstrated

  9. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  10. Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, L.

    1984-01-01

    Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

  11. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  12. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  13. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1991-01-01

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  14. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  15. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  16. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  17. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

  18. Safeguards through secure automated fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMerschman, A.W.; Carlson, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    Westinghouse Hanford Company, a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, is constructing the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line for fabrication of mixed oxide breeder fuel pins. Fuel processing by automation, which provides a separation of personnel from fuel handling, will provide a means whereby advanced safeguards concepts will be introduced. Remote operations and the inter-tie between the process computer and the safeguards computer are discussed

  19. Neutron microdosimetry at RARAF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kliauga, P.

    1986-01-01

    A comprehensive series of measurements of neutron microdosimetry spectra is underway at the RARAF facility. The neutrons generated at RARAF are semi-monoenergetic to monoenergetic, depending on energy. Thus far, measurements have concentrated on 15 MeV, with a few measurements done at 6 MeV. One of the main reasons for undertaking this project is dissatisfaction with the state of accuracy of microdosimetric measurements of neutrons, not only previous measurements done at RARAF, but reports in the literature from all over the world. Only a relatively modest amount of data has been taken for neutrons, as compared to photons, and the survey of dose mean lineal energy values done for the recent ICRU Report No. 36 (December 1983) reveals a spread of values far in excess of accepted estimates of statistical uncertainty (5-10%). One of the major motivations in undertaking this project, therefore, was to elucidate some of the factors, including experimental artifacts, which are important in contributing to systematic errors in measurements. Among the methods being employed are determination of the effect of various counter parameters on neutron spectra, and electronic parameters, also. Another important method of obtaining information is a comparison between different counters. This laboratory has access to perhaps a greater variety of microdosimetric proportional counters than any in the world, from the standard Rossi counter, to various wall-less types of differing geometries. Controlled comparisons of spectra from such differing counters using the same analysis technique can yield much information on the effect of counter geometry on the microdosimetric spectrum

  20. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  1. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  2. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  3. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  4. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  5. Design of an extended range long counter using super Monte Carlo simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mazunga, Mohamed; Li, Taosheng; Li, Yanan; Hong, Bing; Wang, Yongfeng; Ji, Xiang

    2017-01-01

    We have designed an extended range neutron long counter on the basis of work optimized using SuperMC code. The problem of the existing traditional long counters is that their response function falls rapidly above 5 MeV. We proposed a new designed by adding two layers of converter material inside the polyethylene moderator. The relatively low density chromium and high density lead metals convert high energy neutron by (n, xn) spallation reaction. This produces more neutrons of lower energies, which have higher probability of being detected by thermal 3 He-counter. The response function at lower neutron energies was improved by inserting small polyethylene cylinder in front of 3 He counter. In this design we achieved to extent the flat response function of the long counter from few keV up to 150 MeV. The total fluctuation of response curve is less than ±9% over the entire energy range. The designed long counter is suitable to be used as neutron monitor for monitoring neutron fluence at high-energy neutron source. (authors)

  6. Safety, security and safeguard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zakariya, Nasiru Imam; Kahn, M.T.E.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • The 3S interface in the design of PPS is hereby proposed. • The 3S synergy enhances the reduction in vulnerability and terrorism. • Highlighted were concept of detection, delay and response. - Abstract: A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures, and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage and terrorist attacks. Therefore, this paper proposes the use of a systematic and measurable approach to the design of PPS and its emphases on the concept of detection, delay and response. The proposed performance based PPS has the capability of defeating adversaries thereby achieving its targets. Therefore, timely detection of intrusion – based on the use of sensors, signal lines and alarm systems – is a major principle in the proposed system. Also the need for deterrence such as barriers in form of guards, access control, close circuit television (CCTV), strong policy and procedures, then the security culture amongst the facility workers was appropriately discussed. Since nuclear power is considered the only source that can provide large scale electricity with comparatively minimal impact on the environment, the paper also considered base guidelines for the application of PPS in any nuclear and radioactive facilities, followed with the necessity to incorporate inherent safety, security and safeguard (3S) synergy innovation in the physical protection system design and other characteristics that will enhance to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear facilities and materials to theft sabotage and terrorist attacks

  7. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syed Azmi Syed Ali

    1985-01-01

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  8. Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably 239 Pu and 235 U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs

  9. Safeguard management for operation security in nuclear power plants (NPPs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, Tae-Ho; Lee, Un-Chul

    2011-01-01

    Safeguard modeling is conducted for the successful operations in the nuclear power plants (NPPs). The characteristics of the secure operation in NPPs are investigated using the network effect method which is quantified by the Monte-Carlo algorithm. Fundamentally, it is impossible to predict the exact time of a terror incident. So, the random sampling for the event frequency is a reasonable method, including the characteristics of network effect method such as the zero-sum quantification. The performance of operation with safeguard is the major concern of this study. There are three kinds of considerations as the neutronics, thermo-hydraulics, and safeguard properties which are organized as an aspect of safeguard considerations. The result, therefore, can give the stability of the operations when the power is decided. The maximum value of secure operation is 12.0 in the third month and the minimum value is 1.0 in the 18th and 54th months, in a 10 years period. Thus, the stability of the secure power operation increases 12 times higher than the lowest value according to this study. This means that the secure operation is changeable in the designed NPPs and the dynamical situation of the secure operation can be shown to the operator.

  10. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  11. Microdosimetry of intermediate energy neutrons in fast neutron fields

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saion, E.B.; Watt, D.E.

    1988-01-01

    A coaxial double cylindrical proportional counter has been constructed for microdosimetry of intermediate energy neutrons in mixed fields. Details are given of the measured gas gain and resolution characteristics of the counter for a wide range of anode voltages. Event spectra due to intermediate neutrons in any desired energy band is achieved by an appropriate choice of thickness of the common dividing wall in the counter and by appropriate use of the coincidence, anticoincidence pulse counting arrangements. Calculated estimates indicate that the dose contribution by fast neutrons to the energy deposition events in the intermediate neutron range may be as large as 25%. Empirical procedures being investigated aim to determine the necessary corrections to be applied to the microdose distributions, with a precision of 10%. (author)

  12. Use of fuel reprocessing plant instrumentation for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.L.

    1977-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has a program for developing instrumentation to be used by safeguards inspectors at reprocessing facilities. These instruments have generally been individual pieces of equipment for improving the accuracy of existing measurement instrumentation or equipment to perform nondestructive assay on a selected basis. It is proposed that greater use be made of redundant plant instrumentation and data recovery systems that could augment plant instrumentation to verify the validity of plant measurements. Use of these methods for verfication must be proven as part of an operating plant before they can be relied upon for safeguards surveillance. Inspectors must be qualified in plant operations, or have ready access to those so qualified, if the integrity of the operation is to be properly assessed. There is an immediate need for the development and in-plant proof testing of an integrated gamma, passive neutron, and active neutron measurement system for drum quantities of radioactive trash. The primary safeguards effort should be limited to plutonium and highly enriched uranium

  13. Analysis of experimental measurements of PWR fresh and spent fuel assemblies using Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    LaFleur, Adrienne M., E-mail: alafleur@lanl.gov; Menlove, Howard O., E-mail: hmenlove@lanl.gov

    2015-05-01

    Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) is a new NDA technique that was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to improve existing nuclear safeguards measurements for LWR fuel assemblies. The SINRD detector consists of four fission chambers (FCs) wrapped with different absorber filters to isolate different parts of the neutron energy spectrum and one ion chamber (IC) to measure the gross gamma rate. As a result, two different techniques can be utilized using the same SINRD detector unit and hardware. These techniques are the Passive Neutron Multiplication Counter (PNMC) method and the SINRD method. The focus of the work described in this paper is the analysis of experimental measurements of fresh and spent PWR fuel assemblies that were performed at LANL and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), respectively, using the SINRD detector. The purpose of these experiments was to assess the following capabilities of the SINRD detector: 1) reproducibility of measurements to quantify systematic errors, 2) sensitivity to water gap between detector and fuel assembly, 3) sensitivity and penetrability to the removal of fuel rods from the assembly, and 4) use of PNMC/SINRD ratios to quantify neutron multiplication and/or fissile content. The results from these simulations and measurements provide valuable experimental data that directly supports safeguards research and development (R&D) efforts on the viability of passive neutron NDA techniques and detector designs for partial defect verification of spent fuel assemblies. - Highlights: • Experimental measurements of PWR fresh and spent FAs were performed with SINRD. • Good agreement of MCNPX and measured results confirmed accuracy of SINRD model. • For fresh fuel, SINRD and PNMC ratios were not sensitive to water gaps of ≤5-mm. • Practical use of SINRD would be in Fork detector to reduce systematic uncertainties.

  14. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  15. Monte Carlo calculations of the neutron coincidence gate utilisation factor for passive neutron coincidence counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bourva, L.C.A.; Croft, S.

    1999-01-01

    The general purpose neutron-photon-electron Monte Carlo N-Particle code, MCNP TM , has been used to simulate the neutronic characteristics of the on-site laboratory passive neutron coincidence counter to be installed, under Euratom Safeguards Directorate supervision, at the Sellafield reprocessing plant in Cumbria, UK. This detector is part of a series of nondestructive assay instruments to be installed for the accurate determination of the plutonium content of nuclear materials. The present work focuses on one aspect of this task, namely, the accurate calculation of the coincidence gate utilisation factor. This parameter is an important term in the interpretative model used to analyse the passive neutron coincidence count data acquired using pulse train deconvolution electronics based on the shift register technique. It accounts for the limited proportion of neutrons detected within the time interval for which the electronics gate is open. The Monte Carlo code MCF, presented in this work, represents a new evaluation technique for the estimation of gate utilisation factors. It uses the die-away profile of a neutron coincidence chamber generated either by MCNP TM , or by other means, to simulate the neutron detection arrival time pattern originating from independent spontaneous fission events. A shift register simulation algorithm, embedded in the MCF code, then calculates the coincidence counts scored within the electronics gate. The gate utilisation factor is then deduced by dividing the coincidence counts obtained with that obtained in the same Monte Carlo run, but for an ideal detection system with a coincidence gate utilisation factor equal to unity. The MCF code has been benchmarked against analytical results calculated for both single and double exponential die-away profiles. These results are presented along with the development of the closed form algebraic expressions for the two cases. Results of this validity check showed very good agreement. On this

  16. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  17. A 4π scintillation counter-optical spark chamber system for neutral particles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demarzo, C.; Distante, A.; Guerriero, L.; Niccolini, C.; Posa, F.; Walder, F.; Chen, G.T.Y.; Fletcher, C.R.; Lanou, R.E. Jr.; Thornton, R.K.; Barton, D.S.; Lyons, T.; Marx, M.; Rosenson, L.; Thern, R.

    1975-01-01

    The authors describe a scintillation counter-optical spark chamber system developed for the detection of high energy gamma rays and neutrons. They describe the system components and their use in two completed experiments. (Auth.)

  18. Analysis on approach of safeguards implementation at research reactor handling item count and bulk material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun Jo; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung Doo; Jung, Juang

    2016-01-01

    KiJang research reactor (KJRR) will be constructed to produce the radioisotope such as Mo-99 etc., provide the neutron transmutation doping (NTD) service of silicon, and develop the core technologies of research reactor. In this paper, the features of the process and nuclear material flow are reviewed and the material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) are established based on the nuclear material flow. Also, this paper reviews the approach on safeguards and nuclear material accountancy at the facility level for Safeguards-by-Design at research reactor handling item count and bulk material. In this paper, MBA and KMPs are established through the analysis on facility features and major process at KJRR handling item count and bulk material. Also, this paper reviews the IAEA safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy at KJRR. It is necessary to discuss the safeguards approach on the fresh FM target assemblies and remaining uranium in the intermediate level liquid wastes

  19. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  20. Analysis on approach of safeguards implementation at research reactor handling item count and bulk material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Hyun Jo; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung Doo; Jung, Juang [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    KiJang research reactor (KJRR) will be constructed to produce the radioisotope such as Mo-99 etc., provide the neutron transmutation doping (NTD) service of silicon, and develop the core technologies of research reactor. In this paper, the features of the process and nuclear material flow are reviewed and the material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) are established based on the nuclear material flow. Also, this paper reviews the approach on safeguards and nuclear material accountancy at the facility level for Safeguards-by-Design at research reactor handling item count and bulk material. In this paper, MBA and KMPs are established through the analysis on facility features and major process at KJRR handling item count and bulk material. Also, this paper reviews the IAEA safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy at KJRR. It is necessary to discuss the safeguards approach on the fresh FM target assemblies and remaining uranium in the intermediate level liquid wastes.

  1. The optimum choice of gate width for neutron coincidence counting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Croft, S., E-mail: crofts@ornl.gov [Safeguards and Security Technology (SST), Global Nuclear Security Technology Divisions, PO Box 2008, Building 5700, MS-6166, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6166 (United States); Henzlova, D.; Favalli, A.; Hauck, D.K.; Santi, P.A. [Safeguards Science and Technology Group (NEN-1), Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division, MS-E540, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2014-11-11

    In the measurement field of international nuclear safeguards, passive neutron coincidence counting is used to quantify the spontaneous fission rate of certain special nuclear materials. The shift register autocorrelation analysis method is the most commonly used approach. However, the Feynman-Y technique, which is more commonly applied in reactor noise analysis, provides an alternative means to extract the correlation information from a pulse train. In this work we consider how to select the optimum gate width for each of these two time-correlation analysis techniques. The optimum is considered to be that which gives the lowest fractional precision on the net doublets rate. Our theoretical approach is approximate but is instructional in terms of revealing the key functional dependence. We show that in both cases the same performance figure of merit applies so that common design criteria apply to the neutron detector head. Our prediction is that near optimal results, suitable for most practical applications, can be obtained from both techniques using a common gate width setting. The estimated precision is also comparable in the two cases. The theoretical expressions are tested experimentally using {sup 252}Cf spontaneous fission sources measured in two thermal well counters representative of the type in common use by international inspectorates. Fast accidental sampling was the favored method of acquiring the Feynman-Y data. Our experimental study confirmed the basic functional dependences predicted although experimental results when available are preferred. With an appropriate gate setting Feynman-Y analysis provides an alternative to shift register analysis for safeguards applications which is opening up new avenues of data collection and data reduction to explore.

  2. Isotopic safeguards statistics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmerman, C.L.; Stewart, K.B.

    1978-06-01

    The methods and results of our statistical analysis of isotopic data using isotopic safeguards techniques are illustrated using example data from the Yankee Rowe reactor. The statistical methods used in this analysis are the paired comparison and the regression analyses. A paired comparison results when a sample from a batch is analyzed by two different laboratories. Paired comparison techniques can be used with regression analysis to detect and identify outlier batches. The second analysis tool, linear regression, involves comparing various regression approaches. These approaches use two basic types of models: the intercept model (y = α + βx) and the initial point model [y - y 0 = β(x - x 0 )]. The intercept model fits strictly the exposure or burnup values of isotopic functions, while the initial point model utilizes the exposure values plus the initial or fabricator's data values in the regression analysis. Two fitting methods are applied to each of these models. These methods are: (1) the usual least squares fitting approach where x is measured without error, and (2) Deming's approach which uses the variance estimates obtained from the paired comparison results and considers x and y are both measured with error. The Yankee Rowe data were first measured by Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) and remeasured by Nuclear Audit and Testing Company (NATCO). The ratio of Pu/U versus 235 D (in which 235 D is the amount of depleted 235 U expressed in weight percent) using actual numbers is the isotopic function illustrated. Statistical results using the Yankee Rowe data indicates the attractiveness of Deming's regression model over the usual approach by simple comparison of the given regression variances with the random variance from the paired comparison results

  3. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  4. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  5. Preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards at Chalmers - Stage 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kitamura, Yasunori; Pazsit, Imre

    2004-12-01

    This report gives an account of the work performed at the Dept. of Reactor Physics at Chalmers Univ. of Technology in the second stage of the preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material management. The program is aimed at utilizing the experimental facilities as well as the experience in reactor physics, criticality safety, signal processing and unfolding, and experimental nuclear techniques, in tackling problems in non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. During the present project, the following three main subjects were dealt with: first tests and pilot measurements were performed with one of the two newly acquired {sup 252}Cf detectors that were obtained from JNC Japan; the second exercise of the ESARDA benchmark. which consisted of the evaluation of the pulse train generated by Los Alamos Laboratory for multiplicity counting was performed and reported to the organisers of the benchmark; the modified Monte-Carlo code MCNP-PoliMi was installed, tested and work started for generating (although outside the ESARDA benchmark), pulse train data as obtained from various neutron sources with or without the presence of fissile material, as detected with an Active Well Coincidence Counter.

  6. Preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards at Chalmers - Stage 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitamura, Yasunori; Pazsit, Imre

    2004-12-01

    This report gives an account of the work performed at the Dept. of Reactor Physics at Chalmers Univ. of Technology in the second stage of the preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material management. The program is aimed at utilizing the experimental facilities as well as the experience in reactor physics, criticality safety, signal processing and unfolding, and experimental nuclear techniques, in tackling problems in non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. During the present project, the following three main subjects were dealt with: first tests and pilot measurements were performed with one of the two newly acquired 252 Cf detectors that were obtained from JNC Japan; the second exercise of the ESARDA benchmark. which consisted of the evaluation of the pulse train generated by Los Alamos Laboratory for multiplicity counting was performed and reported to the organisers of the benchmark; the modified Monte-Carlo code MCNP-PoliMi was installed, tested and work started for generating (although outside the ESARDA benchmark), pulse train data as obtained from various neutron sources with or without the presence of fissile material, as detected with an Active Well Coincidence Counter

  7. Nuclear timer/counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wuthayavanich, S.

    1978-01-01

    This thesis represents the development of a Timer/COUNTER compatible to the standard Nuclear Instrument Module Specifications. The unit exhibits high accuracy, light weight and ease of maintenance. The unit also has a built-in precision discriminator to discriminate unwanted signals that may cause interference in counting. With line frequency time base the timer can be preset in steps from 0.1 sec. to 9 x 10 5 min. The counter with six digits miniature display and an overflow output has a maximum counting rate of 10 MHz. The accumulated counting data can be transferred to a teletype or printer for hard copy printout with the aid of ORTEC 777 Line Printer or 432 A Print-out Control or any print out interface with input compatible to the print output of the Timer/Counter. Owing to its NIM compatibility the unit is directly powered by the NIM power supply

  8. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  9. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  10. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  11. Safeguarding on-power fuelled reactors - instrumentation and techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waligura, A.; Konnov, Y.; Smith, R.M.; Head, D.A.

    1977-05-01

    Instrumentation and techniques applicable to safeguarding reactors that are fuelled on-power, particularly the CANDU type, have been developed. A demonstration is being carried out at the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station in Canada. Irradiated nuclear materials in certain areas - the reactor and spent fuel storage bays - are monitored using photographic and television cameras, and seals. Item accounting is applied by counting spent-fuel bundles during transfer from the reactor to the storage bay and by placing these spent-fuel bundles in a sealed enclosure. Provision is made for inspection and verification of the bundles before sealing. The reactor's power history is recorded by a Track-Etch power monitor. Redundancy is provided so that the failure of any single piece of equipment does not invalidate the entire safeguards system. Several safeguards instruments and devices have been developed and evaluated. These include a super-8-mm surveillance camera system, a television surveillance system, a spent-fuel bundle counter, a device to detect dummy fuel bundles, a cover for enclosing a stack of spent-fuel bundles, and a seal suitable for underwater installation and ultrasonic interrogation. (author)

  12. An efficient anticoincidence counter

    CERN Multimedia

    1977-01-01

    This scintillation counter (about 25 cm diameter) was prepared at CERN for an experiment at the Saclay 600 MeV electron linac studying molecular processes originated in liquid hydrogen by muons. The counter is meant to surround the target and detect charged particles emerging from the hydrogen. The experiment was a CERN-Saclay collaboration which used the linac so as to take advantage of the time structure of the electron beam(see CERN Courier Sep 1977 and J. Bardin et al. Phys. Lett. B104 (1981) 320)

  13. Summary of neutron measurements for the Viking Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, M.E.

    1975-01-01

    The results of neutron measurements for 238 Pu-fueled, 683-W (thermal) capsules fabricated for the Viking Program (Mars Lander) are presented. These results include, for each capsule, the total neutron emission rate and neutron multiplication and, for one capsule, the neutron energy spectrum. A precision long counter was used for the neutron emission rate measurements and a single stilbene crystal for the neutron spectrum measurement. (U.S.)

  14. Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevini, F.

    2013-01-01

    The export control of dual use goods has developed since the early seventies to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed. On the EU level, the paper summarises the framework set by the European Council Regulation 428/2009, requiring Member States to impose control on exports, brokering and transit of dual use goods. The Regulation includes the so-called 'EU dual-use control list' integrating the lists of dual-use items defined by the international regimes and requires also the control on intangible technology transfers as foreseen by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. ESARDA has recently launched a new sub-Working Group on export control, which raised large interest and may evolve to a full-fledged working group. Export control may provide an opportunity of technical collaboration between ESARDA and INMM. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  15. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  16. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  17. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

    2010-01-01

    Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

  18. Neutron coincidence counting with digital signal processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bagi, Janos; Dechamp, Luc; Dransart, Pascal; Dzbikowicz, Zdzislaw; Dufour, Jean-Luc; Holzleitner, Ludwig; Huszti, Joseph; Looman, Marc; Marin Ferrer, Montserrat; Lambert, Thierry; Peerani, Paolo; Rackham, Jamie; Swinhoe, Martyn; Tobin, Steve; Weber, Anne-Laure; Wilson, Mark

    2009-01-01

    Neutron coincidence counting is a widely adopted nondestructive assay (NDA) technique used in nuclear safeguards to measure the mass of nuclear material in samples. Nowadays, most neutron-counting systems are based on the original-shift-register technology, like the (ordinary or multiplicity) Shift-Register Analyser. The analogue signal from the He-3 tubes is processed by an amplifier/single channel analyser (SCA) producing a train of TTL pulses that are fed into an electronic unit that performs the time- correlation analysis. Following the suggestion of the main inspection authorities (IAEA, Euratom and the French Ministry of Industry), several research laboratories have started to study and develop prototypes of neutron-counting systems with PC-based processing. Collaboration in this field among JRC, IRSN and LANL has been established within the framework of the ESARDA-NDA working group. Joint testing campaigns have been performed in the JRC PERLA laboratory, using different equipment provided by the three partners. One area of development is the use of high-speed PCs and pulse acquisition electronics that provide a time stamp (LIST-Mode Acquisition) for every digital pulse. The time stamp data can be processed directly during acquisition or saved on a hard disk. The latter method has the advantage that measurement data can be analysed with different values for parameters like predelay and gate width, without repeating the acquisition. Other useful diagnostic information, such as die-away time and dead time, can also be extracted from this stored data. A second area is the development of 'virtual instruments.' These devices, in which the pulse-processing system can be embedded in the neutron counter itself and sends counting data to a PC, can give increased data-acquisition speeds. Either or both of these developments could give rise to the next generation of instrumentation for improved practical neutron-correlation measurements. The paper will describe the

  19. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  20. IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, P.

    1986-01-01

    The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

  1. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  2. Developing a simulation for border safeguarding

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Rooyen, S

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available Border safeguarding is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and this is a joint responsibility of the military and the police. Military doctrine for conventional warfare is not sufficient for Border Safeguarding operations due...

  3. Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacArthur, D.A.; Wolford, J.K.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illustrate the evolution of other successful systems

  4. Counter radicalization development assistance

    OpenAIRE

    van Hippel, Karin

    2006-01-01

    The paper reviews current research and practice and recommends strategies for development agencies working in the Arab and Muslim world. It builds on the basic assumption that the realization of the Millennium Development Goals will be vital to reduce support for terrorism in the long term. Within this overall framework, emphasis is placed on particular programs that could be specifically applied to counter radicalization.

  5. Whole-body counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fedorov, G A; Kosterev, V V

    1975-01-24

    A counter for detecting radiation of a man (CRM) is described, which consists of two measuring converters and a recording device. In order to obtain data on spatial distribution of a gamma-radiating nuclide studied, a fixed collimator and a mobile coder made of separate slit elements are placed between the measuring converters and an object investigated.

  6. Electromagnetically Operated Counter

    Science.gov (United States)

    Goldberg, H D; Goldberg, M I

    1951-12-18

    An electromagnetically operated counter wherein signals to be counted are applied to cause stepwise rotation of a rotatable element which is connected to a suitable register. The mechanism involved consists of a rotatable armature having three spaced cores of magnetic material and a pair of diametrically opposed electromagnets with a suitable pulsing circuit to actuate the magnets.

  7. Microchip Coulter particle counter

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Larsen, Ulrik Darling; Blankenstein, Gert; Branebjerg, J.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents a micro device employing the Coulter principle for counting and sizing of living cells and particles in liquid suspension. The microchip Coulter particle counter (μCPC) has been employed in a planar silicon structure covered with glass, which enables detailed observation during...

  8. International safeguards and nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moglewer, S.

    1987-01-01

    This report provides a critical review of the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against potential acts of nuclear terrorism. The author argues that IAEA safeguards should be made applicable to deterring diversions of nuclear materials from civil to weapons purposes by subnational groups as well as by nations. Both technical and institutional factors are considered, and suggestions for organizational restructuring and further technical development are made. Awareness of the necessity for effective preventive measures is emphasized, and possible directions for further effort are suggested

  9. Tour of safeguards equipment van

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, B.W.; Fager, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

  10. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  11. Neutron producing reactions in PuBe neutron sources

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bagi, János [European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) (Germany); Lakosi, László; Nguyen, Cong Tam [Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest (Hungary)

    2016-01-01

    There are a plenty of out-of-use plutonium–beryllium neutron sources in Eastern Europe presenting both nuclear safeguards and security issues. Typically, their actual Pu content is not known. In the last couple of years different non-destructive methods were developed for their characterization. For such methods detailed knowledge of the nuclear reactions taking place within the source is necessary. In this paper we investigate the role of the neutron producing reactions, their contribution to the neutron yield and their dependence on the properties of the source.

  12. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  13. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  14. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  15. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  16. Safeguards on MOX assemblies at LWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arenas Carrasco, J.; Koulikov, I.; Heinonen, O.J.; Arlt, R.; Grigoleit, K.; Clarke, R.; Swinhoe, M.

    2000-01-01

    Operating within the framework of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) for unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in LWRs, the IAEA and EURATOM have gained experience in safeguarding 13 LWRs licensed to operate with MOX assemblies. In order to fulfil SIR requirements, verification methods and techniques capable of measuring MOX assemblies under water have been and are still being developed. These encompass both qualitative tests for the detection of plutonium (gross attribute tests) and quantitative tests for the measurement of the amount of plutonium (partial defect tests) and are based on gamma and neutron detection techniques. There are nine PWR and two BWR where the reactor and the spent fuel pond can be covered by the same surveillance device. These are Type I reactors where the reactor and the pond are located in the same hall. In these types of facilities relying on surveillance during the MOX refuelling is especially difficult at the BWRs due to the depth of the core pond. There are two PWR type facilities where the reactor and the spent fuel pond are located in different halls and cannot be covered by the same surveillance device (Type II). An open core camera has not been installed during refuelling and therefore indirect surveillance is currently used to survey MOX loading. Improvements are therefore required and are under consideration. After receipt at the facility, there are a few facilities which must keep the received fresh MOX fuel in wet storage, not only for a short period prior to refuelling, but for more than a year, until the next refuelling campaign. In these cases timely inspections for direct use fresh nuclear material require considerable inspection effort. Additionally, where human surveillance of core loading and finally core closure are necessary there is also a large demand for manpower. Either an agreement should be reached with the operators to delay the MOX loading until the end of the fuelling campaign, or alternative approaches should be

  17. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagner, W.

    2000-01-01

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  18. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  19. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinrich, L.A.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

  20. Proportional counter end effects eliminator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meekins, J.F.

    1976-01-01

    An improved gas-filled proportional counter which includes a resistor network connected between the anode and cathode at the ends of the counter in order to eliminate ''end effects'' is described. 3 Claims, 2 Drawing Figures

  1. Over-the-Counter Medicines

    Science.gov (United States)

    Over-the-counter (OTC) medicines are drugs you can buy without a prescription. Some OTC medicines relieve aches, pains and itches. ... medicine is safe enough to sell over-the-counter. Taking OTC medicines still has risks. Some interact ...

  2. Enriched Boron-Doped Amorphous Selenium Based Position-Sensitive Solid-State Thermal Neutron Detector for MPACT Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mandal, Krishna [Univ. of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States)

    2017-09-29

    High-efficiency thermal neutron detectors with compact size, low power-rating and high spatial, temporal and energy resolution are essential to execute non-proliferation and safeguard protocols. The demands of such detector are not fully covered by the current detection system such as gas proportional counters or scintillator-photomultiplier tube combinations, which are limited by their detection efficiency, stability of response, speed of operation, and physical size. Furthermore, world-wide shortage of 3He gas, required for widely used gas detection method, has further prompted to design an alternative system. Therefore, a solid-state neutron detection system without the requirement of 3He will be very desirable. To address the above technology gap, we had proposed to develop new room temperature solidstate thermal neutron detectors based on enriched boron (10B) and enriched lithium (6Li) doped amorphous Se (As- 0.52%, Cl 5 ppm) semiconductor for MPACT applications. The proposed alloy materials have been identified for its many favorable characteristics - a wide bandgap (~2.2 eV at 300 K) for room temperature operation, high glass transition temperature (tg ~ 85°C), a high thermal neutron cross-section (for boron ~ 3840 barns, for lithium ~ 940 barns, 1 barn = 10-24 cm2), low effective atomic number of Se for small gamma ray sensitivity, and high radiation tolerance due to its amorphous structure.

  3. Enriched Boron-Doped Amorphous Selenium Based Position-Sensitive Solid-State Thermal Neutron Detector for MPACT Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mandal, Krishna

    2017-01-01

    High-efficiency thermal neutron detectors with compact size, low power-rating and high spatial, temporal and energy resolution are essential to execute non-proliferation and safeguard protocols. The demands of such detector are not fully covered by the current detection system such as gas proportional counters or scintillator-photomultiplier tube combinations, which are limited by their detection efficiency, stability of response, speed of operation, and physical size. Furthermore, world-wide shortage of 3 He gas, required for widely used gas detection method, has further prompted to design an alternative system. Therefore, a solid-state neutron detection system without the requirement of 3 He will be very desirable. To address the above technology gap, we had proposed to develop new room temperature solidstate thermal neutron detectors based on enriched boron ( 10 B) and enriched lithium ( 6 Li) doped amorphous Se (As- 0.52%, Cl 5 ppm) semiconductor for MPACT applications. The proposed alloy materials have been identified for its many favorable characteristics - a wide bandgap (~2.2 eV at 300 K) for room temperature operation, high glass transition temperature (t g ~ 85°C), a high thermal neutron cross-section (for boron ~ 3840 barns, for lithium ~ 940 barns, 1 barn = 10 -24 cm 2 ), low effective atomic number of Se for small gamma ray sensitivity, and high radiation tolerance due to its amorphous structure.

  4. Transit Matching for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

    2015-01-01

    In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

  5. Safeguards against Takeover after Volkswagen

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Werlauff, Erik

    2009-01-01

    The article analyses the significance of the European Court's decision on the effects of the rules on the free movement of capital on the takeover safeguards in Volkswagen AG for restrictions on the right to vote, ownership ceilings, division into A and B share classes, increased majority require...

  6. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  7. The future for safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zykov, S.

    2013-01-01

    The present paper presents some elements of an emerging vision of a new and updated potential role for safeguard instrumentation in the overall process of deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The paper focusses on installed, transportable and portable measurement systems and in-situ techniques for maintaining continuity of knowledge. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  8. Enrichment plant management and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, N.H.

    1978-01-01

    The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

  9. MACSSA (Macintosh Safeguards Systems Analyzer)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Kohl, M.

    1986-01-01

    This paper discusses MACSSA a fully interactive menu-driven software system for accountancy of nuclear safeguards systems written for Apple Macintosh. Plant inventory and inventory change records can be entered interactively or can be downloaded from a mainframe database. Measurement procedures and instrument parameters can be defined. Partial or total statistics on propagated errors is performed and shown in tabular or graphic form

  10. Safeguards Technology Strategic Planning Pentachart

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, C. J.

    2017-01-01

    Builds on earlier strategic planning workshops conducted for SGIT, SGTS, and SGCP. Many of recommendations from these workshops have been successfully implemented at the IAEA. Provide a context for evaluating new approaches for anticipated safeguards challenges of the future. Approach used by government and military to plan for an uncertain future. Uses consensus decision-making.

  11. Neutron stars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irvine, J.M.

    1978-01-01

    The subject is covered in chapters entitled: introduction (resume of stellar evolution, gross characteristics of neutron stars); pulsars (pulsar characteristics, pulsars as neutron stars); neutron star temperatures (neutron star cooling, superfluidity and superconductivity in neutron stars); the exterior of neutron stars (the magnetosphere, the neutron star 'atmosphere', pulses); neutron star structure; neutron star equations of state. (U.K.)

  12. Experimental evaluation of the extended Dytlewski-style dead time correction formalism for neutron multiplicity counting

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lockhart, M.; Henzlova, D.; Croft, S.; Cutler, T.; Favalli, A.; McGahee, Ch.; Parker, R.

    2018-01-01

    Over the past few decades, neutron multiplicity counting has played an integral role in Special Nuclear Material (SNM) characterization pertaining to nuclear safeguards. Current neutron multiplicity analysis techniques use singles, doubles, and triples count rates because a methodology to extract and dead time correct higher order count rates (i.e. quads and pents) was not fully developed. This limitation is overcome by the recent extension of a popular dead time correction method developed by Dytlewski. This extended dead time correction algorithm, named Dytlewski-Croft-Favalli(DCF), is detailed in reference Croft and Favalli (2017), which gives an extensive explanation of the theory and implications of this new development. Dead time corrected results can then be used to assay SNM by inverting a set of extended point model equations which as well have only recently been formulated. The current paper discusses and presents the experimental evaluation of practical feasibility of the DCF dead time correction algorithm to demonstrate its performance and applicability in nuclear safeguards applications. In order to test the validity and effectiveness of the dead time correction for quads and pents, 252Cf and SNM sources were measured in high efficiency neutron multiplicity counters at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the count rates were extracted up to the fifth order and corrected for dead time. In order to assess the DCF dead time correction, the corrected data is compared to traditional dead time correction treatment within INCC. The DCF dead time correction is found to provide adequate dead time treatment for broad range of count rates available in practical applications.

  13. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beddingfield, David H.; Lafleur, Adrienne M.

    2009-01-01

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of 241 Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased (α,n) production in oxide fuels from the 241 Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of 241 Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of 241 Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of 241 Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  14. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  15. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  16. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  17. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  18. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  19. Fundamentals of gas counters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bateman, J.E.

    1994-01-01

    The operation of gas counters used for detecting radiation is explained in terms of the four fundamental physical processes which govern their operation. These are 1) conversion of neutral radiation into charged particles, 2) ionization of the host gas by a fast charge particle 3) transport of the gas ions to the electrodes and 4) amplification of the electrons in a region of enhanced electric field. Practical implications of these are illustrated. (UK)

  20. Safeguards: Modelling of the Detection and Characterization of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Enqvist, Andreas

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards is a collective term for the tools and methods needed to ensure nonproliferation and safety in connection to utilization of nuclear materials. It encompasses a variety of concepts from legislation to measurement equipment. The objective of this thesis is to present a number of research results related to nuclear materials control and accountability, especially the area of nondestructive assay. Physical aspects of nuclear materials are often the same as for materials encountered in everyday life. One special aspect though is that nuclear materials also emit radiation allowing them to be qualitatively and quantitatively measured without direct interaction with the material. For the successful assay of the material, the particle generation and detection needs to be well understood, and verified with measurements, simulations and models. Four topics of research are included in the thesis. First the generation and multiplication of neutrons and gamma rays in a fissile multiplying sample is treated. The formalism used enables investigation of the number of generated, absorbed and detected particles, offering understanding of the different processes involved. Secondly, the issue of relating the coincident detector signals, generated by both neutrons and gamma rays, to sample parameters is dealt with. Fission rate depends directly on the sample mass, while parameters such as neutron generation by alpha decay and neutron leakage multiplication are parameters that depend on the size, composition and geometry of the sample. Artificial neural networks are utilized to solve the inverse problem of finding sample characteristics from the measured rates of particle multiples. In the third part the interactions between neutrons and organic scintillation detectors are treated. The detector material consists of hydrogen and carbon, on which the neutrons scatter and transfer energy. The problem shares many characteristics with the area of neutron moderation found in

  1. Investigation of the Pulse Height Distribution of Boron Trifluoride Proportional Counters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, I Oe; Malmskog, S

    1962-08-15

    The report describes a theoretical and experimental investigation of the factors that determine the pulse height distribution of BF{sub 3}, proportional counters irradiated by thermal neutrons. The branching ratio of the {sup 10}B (n,{alpha}) {sup 7}Li reaction for thermal neutrons has been measured.

  2. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  3. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOE, J.

    2007-01-01

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders

  4. Development of a semiconductor counter telescope with low background for the investigations of charged particles produced in reactions induced by neutrons; Realisation et mise au point d'un telescope a semi-conducteurs et a faible bruit-de-fond pour l'etude des reactions neutronsparticules chargees

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Helleboid, J M [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Grenoble (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1967-08-15

    A AE-E counter telescope for charged particles (p, d, t) produced in reactions with neutrons has been constructed. The semiconductor counter telescope method allows the investigations of two and three-body reactions {sup 6}Li(n,p), D(n,np)n induced by 14 MeV neutrons. By using a coincidence of associated alpha particle pulses with those ({delta}E,E) in the telescope, the background is considerably reduced for all angles outside the coincidence cone, i.e. larger than 15 deg. (L). For forward angles, the same telescope ({delta}E{sub 2}/E) plus a thin semiconductor ({delta}E{sub 1}) allows keeping a low background. The multiparameter analysing method ({delta}E{sub 1}, {delta}E{sub 2}, E) from the experimental range-energy data gives a linearity, an efficiency and an identifying power which are satisfactory. The identification is performed by differed time on a IBM 7044 computer. (author) [French] On a realise un spectrometre de particules chargees (p, d, t) avec identification des particules, pour l'etude des reactions neutrons-particules chargees. La methode du telescope a semi-conducteurs permet d'effectuer l'etude de reactions a deux corps [{sup 6}Li(n,p)] et de reactions a trois corps [D(n,pn)n] a 14 MeV. L'utilisation de la particule alpha associee en coincidence avec les impulsions ({delta}E,E) du telescope permet d'obtenir un bruit-de-fond tres faible pour tous les angles situes en dehors du cone de coincidence, c'est-a-dire superieurs a {approx_equal} 15 deg. (L). Pour les angles avant, le meme telescope ({delta}E{sub 2}/E) plus un semi-conducteur mince ({delta}E{sub 1}) permet de conserver un faible bruit-de-fond. La methode d'analyse multiparametrique ({delta}E{sub 1}, {delta}E{sub 2}, E) a partir des donnees experimentales parcours-energie, donne une linearite, une efficacite et un pouvoir d'identification satisfaisants. L'identification est effectuee en temps differe sur un calculateur numerique IBM 7044. (auteur)

  5. Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezniczek, A.

    2013-01-01

    Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  6. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  7. In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) Technique: Cost-Effective Tool for NDA Verification in IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braverman, E.; Lebrun, A.; Nizhnik, V.; Rorif, F.

    2010-01-01

    Uranium materials measurements using the ISOCS technique play an increasing role in IAEA verification activities. This methodology provides high uranium/plutonium sensitivity and a low detection limit together with the capability to measure items with different shapes and sizes. In addition, the numerical absolute efficiency calibration of a germanium detector which is used by the technique does not require any calibration standards or reference materials. ISOCS modelling software allows performing absolute efficiency calibration for items of arbitrary container shape and wall material, matrix chemical composition, material fill-height, uranium or plutonium weight fraction inside the matrix and even nuclear material/matrix non-homogeneous distribution. Furthermore, in a number of cases, some key parameters such as matrix density and U/Pu weight fraction can be determined along with analysis of nuclear material mass and isotopic composition. These capabilities provide a verification solution suitable for a majority of cases where quantitative and isotopic analysis should be performed. Today, the basic tool for uranium and plutonium mass measurement used in Safeguards verification activities is the neutron counting technique which employs neutron coincidence and multiplicity counters. In respect to the neutron counting technique, ISOCS calibrated detectors have relatively low cost. Taking into account its advantages, this methodology becomes a cost-effective solution for nuclear material NDA verification. At present, the Agency uses ISOCS for quantitative analysis in a wide range of applications: - Uranium scrap materials; - Uranium contaminated solid wastes; - Uranium fuel elements; - Some specific verification cases like measurement of Pu-Be neutron sources, quantification of fission products in solid wastes etc. For uranium hold-up measurements, ISOCS the only available methodology for quantitative and isotopic composition analysis of nuclear materials deposited

  8. Passive neutron coincidence counting with plastic scintillators for the characterization of radioactive waste drums

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Deyglun, C.; Simony, B.; Perot, B.; Carasco, C. [CEA, DEN, Cadarache, Nuclear Measurement Laboratory, F-13108 Saint-Paul-lez-Durance (France); Saurel, N.; Colas, S. [CEA, DAM, Valduc, F-21120 Is-sur-Tille (France); Collot, J. [Laboratoire de Physique Subatomique et de Cosmologie, Universite Grenoble Alpes, CNRS/IN2P3, Grenoble (France)

    2015-07-01

    The quantification of radioactive material is essential in the fields of safeguards, criticality control of nuclear processes, dismantling of nuclear facilities and components, or radioactive waste characterization. The Nuclear Measurement Laboratory (LMN) of CEA is involved in the development of time-correlated neutron detection techniques using plastic scintillators. Usually, 3He proportional counters are used for passive neutron coincidence counting owing to their high thermal neutron capture efficiency and gamma insensitivity. However, the global {sup 3}He shortage in the past few years has made these detectors extremely expensive. In addition, contrary to {sup 3}He counters for which a few tens of microseconds are needed to thermalize fast neutrons, in view to maximize the {sup 3}He(n,p){sup 3}H capture cross section, plastic scintillators are based on elastic scattering and therefore the light signal is formed within a few nanoseconds, correlated pulses being detected within a few dozen- or hundred nanoseconds. This time span reflects fission particles time of flight, which allows reducing accordingly the duration of the coincidence gate and thus the rate of random coincidences, which may totally blind fission coincidences when using {sup 3}He counters in case of a high (α,n) reaction rate. However, plastic scintillators are very sensitive to gamma rays, requiring the use of a thick metallic shield to reduce the corresponding background. Cross talk between detectors is also a major issue, which consists on the detection of one particle by several detectors due to elastic or inelastic scattering, leading to true but undesired coincidences. Data analysis algorithms are tested to minimize cross-talk in simultaneously activated detectors. The distinction between useful fission coincidences and the correlated background due to cross-talk, (α,n) and induced (n,2n) or (n,n'γ) reactions, is achieved by measuring 3-fold coincidences. The performances of a

  9. ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palacios, E.

    1998-01-01

    Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

  10. Simulation enabled safeguards assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Bjornard, Trond; Larson, Tom

    2007-01-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wire-frame construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed. (authors)

  11. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-01-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed

  12. Machine safety: proper safeguarding techniques.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martin, K J

    1992-06-01

    1. OSHA mandates certain safeguarding of machinery to prevent accidents and protect machine operators. OSHA specifies moving parts that must be guarded and sets criteria for the guards. 2. A 1989 OSHA standard for lockout/tagout requires locking the energy source during maintenance, periodically inspecting for power transmission, and training maintenance workers. 3. In an amputation emergency, first aid for cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shock, and bleeding are the first considerations. The amputated part should be wrapped in moist gauze, placed in a sealed plastic bag, and placed in a container of 50% water and 50% ice for transport. 4. The role of the occupational health nurse in machine safety is to conduct worksite analyses to identify proper safeguarding and to communicate deficiencies to appropriate personnel; to train workers in safe work practices and observe compliance in the use of machine guards; to provide care to workers injured by machines; and to reinforce safe work practices among machine operators.

  13. Safeguards instrumentation: past, present, future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    Instruments are essential for accounting, for surveillance and for protection of nuclear materials. The development and application of such instrumentation is reviewed, with special attention to international safeguards applications. Active and passive nondestructive assay techniques are some 25 years of age. The important advances have been in learning how to use them effectively for specific applications, accompanied by major advances in radiation detectors, electronics, and, more recently, in mini-computers. The progress in seals has been disappointingly slow. Surveillance cameras have been widely used for many applications other than safeguards. The revolution in TV technology will have important implications. More sophisticated containment/surveillance equipment is being developed but has yet to be exploited. On the basis of this history, some expectations for instrumentation in the near future are presented

  14. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained

  15. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP

  16. National safeguard systems - Inspector formation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1986-01-01

    The safeguards' inspector profile, in consequence of the tasks to be performed is described. An activities'hierarchy which will lead, to the structure and content of an introductory course's curriculum is established. The auditing activity as well as the material verification are described in details. Complementary resources for the upgrading the inspector's knowledge and skills are analised and the paper concludes presenting the training period, its dinamics as well as the recrutment criterium for the candidates. (Author) [pt

  17. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-01-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

  18. Tamper proofing of safeguards monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Riley, R.J.

    1982-11-01

    The tamper proofing of safeguards monitors is essential if the data they produce is, and can be seen to be, reliable. This report discusses the problem of tamper proofing and gives guidance on when and how to apply tamper proofing techniques. The report is split into two parts. The first concerns the fundamental problem of how much tamper proofing to apply and the second describes methods of tamper proofing and discusses their usefulness. Both sections are applicable to all safeguards monitors although particular reference will be made to doorway monitors in some cases. The phrase 'tamper proofing' is somewhat misleading as it is impossible to completely tamper proof any device. Given enough time and resources, even the most elaborate tamper proofing can be overcome. In safeguards applications we are more interested in making the device tamper resistant and tamper indicating. That is, it should be able to resist a certain amount of tampering, and if tampering proves successful, that fact should be immediately obvious. Techniques of making a device tamper indicating and tamper resistant will be described below. The phrase tamper proofing will be used throughout this report as a generic term, including both tamper resistance and tamper indicating. (author)

  19. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.

    2002-05-01

    DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

  20. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  1. Safeguards uses of confirmatory measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.

    1985-01-01

    An analysis is made of the role of shipper and receiver measurements in safeguarding special nuclear materials (SNM) transferred from one facility to another, with emphasis on the case where the receiver requires an analytical accounting measurement of the transferred SNM and does not need the material for process purposes at the time of receipt. Seven possible diversion periods are considered, ranging from the interval between the shipper's final accounting measurement on the material and the time it is placed in the shipper's vault, through the actual transport of the material between facilities, to the time the material is removed from the receiver's vault and placed in the process. The detection power of various combinations of six possible shipper/receiver measurements for these diversion opportunities is then evaluated; the measurements considered include the shipper's and receiver's accounting measurements, the latter at two possible times, and various nondestructive assay (NDA) confirmatory measurements. It is concluded that all safeguards measurement objectives can be met by a combination of a shipper's accounting measurement at the time the material is removed from the process, an appropriate shipper's NDA confirmatory measurement either immediately after canning or immediately before shipping, an equivalent receiver's NDA confirmatory measurement immediately after the material is received, and a receiver's accounting measurement when the material is placed in the process. Furthermore, it is found that a receiver's analytical accounting measurement immediately after receipt when the material is not yet required for process has dubious safeguards value

  2. Safeguarding the fuel cycle: Methodologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1984-01-01

    The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is characterized by the extent to which they achieve their basic purpose - credible verification that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses. This effectiveness depends inter alia but significantly on manpower in terms of the number and qualifications of inspectors. Staff increases will be required to improve effectiveness further, if this is requested by Member States, as well as to take into account new facilities expected to come under safeguards in the future. However, they are difficult to achieve due to financial constraints set by the IAEA budget. As a consequence, much has been done and is being undertaken to improve utilization of available manpower, including standardization of inspection procedures; improvement of management practices and training; rationalization of planning, reporting, and evaluation of inspection activities; and development of new equipment. This article focuses on certain aspects of the verification methodology presently used and asks: are any modifications of this methodology conceivable that would lead to economies of manpower, without loss of effectiveness. It has been stated in this context that present safeguards approaches are ''facility-oriented'' and that the adoption of a ''fuel cycle-oriented approach'' might bring about the desired savings. Many studies have been devoted to this very interesting suggestion. Up to this moment, no definite answer is available and further studies will be necessary to come to a conclusion. In what follows, the essentials of the problem are explained and some possible paths to a solution are discussed

  3. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R and D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  4. Electromagnetic shower counter

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN PhotoLab

    1974-01-01

    The octogonal block of lead glass is observed by eight photomultiplier tubes. Four or five such counters, arranged in succession, are used on each arm of the bispectrometer in order to detect heavy particles of the same family as those recently observed at Brookhaven and SLAC. They provide a means of identifying electrons. The arrangement of eight lateral photomultiplier tubes offers an efficient means of collecting the photons produced in the showers and determining, with a high resolution, the energy of the incident electrons. The total width at half-height is less than 6.9% for electrons having an energy of 1 GeV.

  5. Neutron flux monitoring device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goto, Yasushi; Mitsubori, Minehisa; Ohashi, Kazunori.

    1997-01-01

    The present invention provides a neutron flux monitoring device for preventing occurrence of erroneous reactor scram caused by the elevation of the indication of a start region monitor (SRM) due to a factor different from actual increase of neutron fluxes. Namely, judgement based on measured values obtained by a pulse counting method and a judgment based on measured values obtained by a Cambel method are combined. A logic of switching neutron flux measuring method to be used for monitoring, namely, switching to an intermediate region when both of the judgements are valid is adopted. Then, even if the indication value is elevated based on the Cambel method with no increase of the counter rate in a neutron source region, the switching to the intermediate region is not conducted. As a result, erroneous reactor scram such as 'shorter reactor period' can be avoided. (I.S.)

  6. Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of Limits and Safeguards

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bérénice Boutin.

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available This Research Paper analyses the increasing use of administrative measures, such as travel bans and control orders, in the counter-terrorism context. On the basis of a review of the use of these measures in three selected states (the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, the paper provides a critical assessment of the use of administrative measures in counter-terrorism. It identifies in which situations it might be justified to use administrative measures, and assesses the impact of the use of these measures on the protection of human rights. In conclusion, the paper recommends to establish limits and safeguards around the use of administrative measures in counter-terrorism.

  7. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  8. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  9. Measurement of the energy spectrum with proportional counters with spherical cathodes between 20 keV and 2.5 MeV with the propagation of 14 MeV neutrons in liquid nitrogen and liquid air

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider-Kuehnle, P.

    1974-01-01

    This work deals with the measurement of the energy spectrum of a 14 MeV neutron source in liquid nitrogen and liquid air in the energy region of 20 keV to 2.5 MeV as a function of the distance from the source. The measured results together with those of a scintispectrometer which measures the energies between 2.5 MeV and 14 MeV, are to serve as experimentally-supported input data for shielding calculations and are to enable the checking of transport theoretical calculations. (orig./LH) [de

  10. Safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, H. S.

    2010-01-01

    Although the safeguards system of Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) seems similar to that of Light Water Reactor (LWR), it was raised safeguards challenges of SFR that resulted from the visual opacity of liquid sodium, chemical reactivity of sodium and other characteristics of fast reactor. As it is the basic concept stage of the safeguards of SFR in Korea, this study tried to analyze the latest similar study of safeguards issues of the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) at Joyo and Monju in Japan. For this reason, this study is to introduce some potential safeguards challenges of Fast Breeder Reactor. With this analysis, future study could be to address the safeguards challenges of SFR in Korea

  11. Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP): overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D; Engi, D.

    1979-08-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems provide physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The outputs provided by the SNAP simulation program supplements the safeguards analyst's evaluative capabilities and supports the evaluation of existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  12. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, P.

    1999-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  13. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  14. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  15. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

  16. Neutron detection gamma ray sensitivity criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kouzes, Richard T.; Ely, James H.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Mace, Emily K.; Stephens, Daniel L.; Woodring, Mitchell L.

    2011-01-01

    The shortage of 3 He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security and safeguards applications. Any new detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: (1) it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and (2) it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level, while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. It is the purpose of this paper to define measureable gamma ray sensitivity criteria for neutron detectors. Quantitative requirements are specified for: intrinsic gamma ray detection efficiency and gamma ray absolute rejection. The gamma absolute rejection ratio for neutrons (GARRn) is defined, and it is proposed that the requirement for neutron detection be 0.9 3 He based neutron detector is provided showing that this technology can meet the stated requirements. Results from tests of some alternative technologies are also reported.

  17. An acoustical bubble counter for superheated drop detectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, C.; Montvila, D.; Flynn, D.; Brennan, C.; D'Errico, F.

    2006-01-01

    A new bubble counter has been developed based on the well-established approach of detecting vaporization events acoustically in superheated drop detectors (SDDs). This counter is called the Framework Scientific ABC 1260, and it represents a major improvement over prior versions of this technology. By utilizing advanced acoustic pattern recognition software, the bubble formation event can be differentiated from ambient background noise, as well as from other acoustic signatures. Additional structural design enhancements include a relocation of the electronic components to the bottom of the device; thus allowing for greater stability, easier access to vial SDDs without exposure to system electronics. Upgrades in the electronics permit an increase in the speed of bubble detection by almost 50%, compared with earlier versions of the counters. By positioning the vial on top of the device, temperature and sound insulation can be accommodated for extreme environments. Lead shells can also be utilized for an enhanced response to high-energy neutrons. (authors)

  18. An acoustical bubble counter for superheated drop detectors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Chris; Montvila, Darius; Flynn, David; Brennan, Christopher; d'Errico, Francesco

    2006-01-01

    A new bubble counter has been developed based on the well-established approach of detecting vaporization events acoustically in superheated drop detectors (SDDs). This counter is called the Framework Scientific ABC 1260, and it represents a major improvement over prior versions of this technology. By utilizing advanced acoustic pattern recognition software, the bubble formation event can be differentiated from ambient background noise, as well as from other acoustic signatures. Additional structural design enhancements include a relocation of the electronic components to the bottom of the device; thus allowing for greater stability, easier access to vial SDDs without exposure to system electronics. Upgrades in the electronics permit an increase in the speed of bubble detection by almost 50%, compared with earlier versions of the counters. By positioning the vial on top of the device, temperature and sound insulation can be accommodated for extreme environments. Lead shells can also be utilized for an enhanced response to high-energy neutrons.

  19. The design of the DUPIC spent fuel bundle counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Rinard, P.M.; Kroncke, K.E.; Lee, Y.G.

    1997-05-01

    A neutron coincidence detector had been designed to measure the amount of curium in the fuel bundles and associated process samples used in the direct use of plutonium in Canadian deuterium-uranium (CANDU) fuel cycle. All of the sample categories are highly radioactive from the fission products contained in the pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel feed stock. Substantial shielding is required to protect the He-3 detectors from the intense gamma rays. The Monte Carlo neutron and photon calculational code has been used to design the counter with a uniform response profile along the length of the CANDU-type fuel bundle. Other samples, including cut PWR rods, process powder, waste, and finished rods, can be measured in the system. This report describes the performance characteristics of the counter and support electronics. 3 refs., 23 figs., 6 tabs

  20. Past, present and future of safeguards implementation for the on-load RMBK-1500 reactors in Ignalina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zendel, M.; Yim, S.; Monticone, C.; Kurselis, S.

    1999-01-01

    The on-load refueled RBMKs ('Reactor Bolshoy Moschnosti Kanalniy - Large Power Channel Type Reactor') are very different from all other power reactors which the Agency has been safeguarding over the past decades. Distinct differences in fuel properties and handling necessitated the formulation of separate, facility specific approaches. The spent fuel management at the RBMKs in Ignalina uses hot cells to cut each spent fuel assembly into two subassemblies. A large number of subassemblies are subsequently stored in large capacity, compact storage baskets at the spent fuel storage ponds adjacent to the reactor hall. The development of the safeguards approach is presented considering limitation in core access, technological feasibility, operation mode and financial as well as human resources of the Agency. The safeguards approach is based on a quarterly inspection scheme using Containment and Surveillance (C/S) measures, verification of fresh and spent fuel by Non Destructive Assay (NDA), establishing of flow balances to complement the material accountancy and the application of neutron/gamma monitors in a continuous, unattended mode. The implementation of these safeguards measures is discussed and actual inspection experience with an emphasis on the application of the neutron/gamma monitors is given. The neutron/gamma monitors serve multiple safeguards functions, such as monitoring shipments of waste from cutting operations for irradiated fuel in the hot cells, confirming the unloading history for the on-load reactors, complementing C/S by detecting movements of irradiated fuel materials in the reactor halls and verifying the operational status and the power output of the reactors. Actual measurement results are presented to demonstrate their effectiveness. Power Considerations are given for future safeguards implementation matters at Ignalina Nuclear plant (INPP) including measures for the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS). (author)

  1. Spent Nuclear Fuel Cask and Storage Monitoring with {sup 4}He Scintillation Fast Neutron Detectors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Hee jun; Kelley, Ryan P; Jordan, Kelly A [Univ. of Florida, Florida (United States); Lee, Wanno [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Chung, Yong Hyun [Yonsei Univ., Wonju (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    With this increasing quantity of spent nuclear fuel being stored at nuclear plants across S. Korea, the demand exists for building a long-term disposal facility. However, the Korean government first requires a detailed plan for the monitoring and certification of spent fuel. Several techniques have been developed and applied for the purpose of spent fuel monitoring, including the digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD), spent fuel attribute tester (SFAT), and FORK detector. Conventional gamma measurement methods, however, suffer from a lack of nuclear data and interfering background radiation. To date, the primary method of neutron detection for spent fuel monitoring has been through the use of thermal neutron detectors such as {sup 3}He and BF{sub 3} proportional counters. Unfolding the neutron spectrum becomes extremely complicated. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, a new fast neutron measurement system is currently being developed at the University of Florida. This system is based on the {sup 4}He scintillation detector invented by Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd. These detectors are a relatively new technological development and take advantage of the high {sup 4}He cross-section for elastic scattering at fast neutron energies, particularly the resonance around 1 MeV. This novel {sup 4}He scintillation neutron detector is characterized by its low electron density, leading to excellent gamma rejection. This detector also has a fast response time on the order of nanoseconds and most importantly, preserves some neutron energy information since no moderator is required. Additionally, these detectors rely on naturally abundant {sup 4}He as the fill gas. This study proposes a new technique using the neutron spectroscopy features of {sup 4}He scintillation detectors to maintain accountability of spent fuel in storage. This research will support spent fuel safeguards and the detection of fissile material, in order to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation

  2. A nuclear proportional counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The invention relates to a nuclear proportional counter comprising in a bulb filled with a low-pressure gas, a wire forming an anode and a cathode, characterized in that said cathode is constituted by two plane plates parallel to each other and to the anode wire, and in that two branches of a circuit are connected to the anode wire end-portions, each branch comprising a pre-amplifier, a measuring circuit consisting of a differentiator-integrator-differentiator amplifier and a zero detector, one of the branches comprising an adjustable delay circuit, both branches jointly attacking a conversion circuit for converting the pulse duration into amplitudes said conversion circuit being followed by a multi-channel analyzer, contingently provided with a recorder [fr

  3. Silica aerogel Cerenkov counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yasumi, S.; Masaike, A.; Yamamoto, A.; Yoshimura, Y.; Kawai, H.

    1984-03-01

    In order to obtain silica aerogel radiators of good quality, the prescription used by Saclay group has been developed. We have done several experiments using beams from KEK.PS to test the performance of a Cerenkov counter with aerogel modules produced in KEK. It turned out that these modules had excellent quality. The production rate of silica aerogel in KEK is 15 -- 20 litres a week. Silica aerogel modules of 20 x 10 x 3 cm 3 having the refractive index of 1.058 are successfully being used by Kyoto University group in the KEK experiment E92 (Σ). Methodes to produce silica aerogel with higher refractive index than 1.06 has been investigated both by heating an module with the refractive index of 1.06 and by hydrolyzing tetraethyl silicate. (author)

  4. Scintillation counter, segmented shield

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olson, R.E.; Thumim, A.D.

    1975-01-01

    A scintillation counter, particularly for counting gamma ray photons, includes a massive lead radiation shield surrounding a sample-receiving zone. The shield is disassembleable into a plurality of segments to allow facile installation and removal of a photomultiplier tube assembly, the segments being so constructed as to prevent straight-line access of external radiation through the shield into radiation-responsive areas. Provisions are made for accurately aligning the photomultiplier tube with respect to one or more sample-transmitting bores extending through the shield to the sample receiving zone. A sample elevator, used in transporting samples into the zone, is designed to provide a maximum gamma-receiving aspect to maximize the gamma detecting efficiency. (U.S.)

  5. 77 FR 38033 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-26

    ... DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Foreign Agricultural Service WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels... and trigger levels for safeguard measures provided for in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement... measures under the safeguard provisions of the WTO [[Page 38034

  6. Commercial bacterial colony counter for semiautomatic track counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Griffith, R.V.; McMahon, T.A.; Espinosa, G.

    1983-01-01

    Bacterial colony counters have not been widely used for track counting. However, they do provide an economical alternative to sophisticated optical analyzers for applications that require reproducible track density measurements for large numbers of samples. Simple measurements of size characteristics can be made when there is little need for high resolutions. Such systems are particularly well suited for neutron and alpha dosimetry work, particularly if electrochemical etching or some other track enhancement method has been used. 5 refs., 3 figs

  7. Lanthanides separation by counter - current electrophoretic using α - hydroxyisobutyric acid

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alleluia, I.B.

    1975-01-01

    Studies about counter-current electrophoretic separation of rare earth metal ions using α-hydroxyisobutyric acid as complexing electrolyte are discussed. La, Pr, Nd, Sm and Eu were separated and fractions with purities better than 99,9% were obtained, using neutron activation analysis. A relation between the first stability constant of the α-hydroxyisobutyrate/lanthanide complexes and their migration velocities were observed. (M.J.C.) [pt

  8. Space and power efficient hybrid counters array

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gara, Alan G [Mount Kisco, NY; Salapura, Valentina [Chappaqua, NY

    2009-05-12

    A hybrid counter array device for counting events. The hybrid counter array includes a first counter portion comprising N counter devices, each counter device for receiving signals representing occurrences of events from an event source and providing a first count value corresponding to a lower order bits of the hybrid counter array. The hybrid counter array includes a second counter portion comprising a memory array device having N addressable memory locations in correspondence with the N counter devices, each addressable memory location for storing a second count value representing higher order bits of the hybrid counter array. A control device monitors each of the N counter devices of the first counter portion and initiates updating a value of a corresponding second count value stored at the corresponding addressable memory location in the second counter portion. Thus, a combination of the first and second count values provide an instantaneous measure of number of events received.

  9. Safeguards agreements - their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (''Safeguards Agreements'') between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute (Articles II, III A.5 and XII). On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: (a) The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968 (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2); and (b) The basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT (INFCIRC/153). The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is verified through the application of various safeguards measures (design review, records, reports and inspection). Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. NPT Safeguards Agreements foresee as one of their specific features the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 - i.e. the non-NPT safeguards agreements - implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular as to the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the safeguards system of document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 which is incorporated in these agreements by reference are in continuous evolution. Document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and further provision for notification, inventories

  10. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab

  11. Aspects of agents for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kotte, U.

    1999-01-01

    With the development of the Internet and the WWW, information treatment has gained a new dimension. (Intelligent) software agents are one of the means expected to relieve human staff of the burden of information overload, and in the future to contribute to safeguards data acquisition, data evaluation and decision-making. An overview is given for the categories of Internet, intranet and desktop agents. Aspects of the potential application of agents are described in three fields: information access and delivery, collaboration and workflow management, adaptive interfaces and learning assistants. Routine application of agents is not yet in sight, but the scientific and technical progress seems to be encouraging. (author)

  12. Safeguards approach for irradiated fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harms, N.L.; Roberts, F.P.

    1987-03-01

    IAEA verification of irradiated fuel has become more complicated because of the introduction of variations in what was once presumed to be a straightforward flow of fuel from reactors to reprocessing plants, with subsequent dissolution. These variations include fuel element disassembly and reassembly, rod consolidation, double-tiering of fuel assemblies in reactor pools, long term wet and dry storage, and use of fuel element containers. This paper reviews future patterns for the transfer and storage of irradiated LWR fuel and discusses appropriate safeguards approaches for at-reactor storage, reprocessing plant headend, independent wet storage, and independent dry storage facilities

  13. The IAEA: politicization and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1983-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is widely understood to be an essential element of an effective international nonproliferation regime which is itself a condition sine qua non to international nuclear cooperation and commerce. The progressive intrusion into Agency activities of extraneous political issues has threatened the Agency's integrity and undermined confidence in the organization. The consequences of continued deterioration would be substantial, most particularly for international safeguards which are unique and invaluable to peaceful nuclear development and international security. Measures to reverse this trend are identified and discussed

  14. The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

  15. The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

  16. Permanently calibrated interpolating time counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jachna, Z; Szplet, R; Kwiatkowski, P; Różyc, K

    2015-01-01

    We propose a new architecture of an integrated time interval counter that provides its permanent calibration in the background. Time interval measurement and the calibration procedure are based on the use of a two-stage interpolation method and parallel processing of measurement and calibration data. The parallel processing is achieved by a doubling of two-stage interpolators in measurement channels of the counter, and by an appropriate extension of control logic. Such modification allows the updating of transfer characteristics of interpolators without the need to break a theoretically infinite measurement session. We describe the principle of permanent calibration, its implementation and influence on the quality of the counter. The precision of the presented counter is kept at a constant level (below 20 ps) despite significant changes in the ambient temperature (from −10 to 60 °C), which can cause a sevenfold decrease in the precision of the counter with a traditional calibration procedure. (paper)

  17. Lessons learned in testing of Safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, Susan; Farnitano, Michael; Carelli, Joseph

    2001-01-01

    Full text: During the 1990s, the IAEA Department of Safeguards began a transition from analog to digital equipment. This included surveillance equipment, seals, NDA measurement systems, and other instruments. The transition to digital equipment was intended to facilitate compatibility between and integration of instruments, remote communication of data, improved data storage, and modernization. Many of the instruments are designed to operate on battery power during loss of facility power, and therefore, are designed to consume minimal power. In 2000, the IAEA experienced a number of failures in digital image surveillance (DIS) equipment. A study of the performance data revealed that the failures occurred in 'high risk' environments where the systems were exposed to neutrons. As a supporter of IAEA equipment development and implementation, the U.S. Support Program worked with the IAEA, the equipment designer, and the equipment manufacturer in special meetings on DIS to determine the cause of the failures. It was as a result of these meetings that single event upset (SEU) was determined to be the root cause of the failures. The meeting participants also identified a list of actions to improve the reliability of DIS systems. As a result of the DIS meetings and the identified actions, the U.S. Support Program approved a request from the IAEA and established Task E.125, 'Remote Monitoring and Unattended Digital Surveillance Systems.' This task is an umbrella task intended to provide a mechanism for response to IAEA needs related to improving the reliability of unattended, remote monitoring and DIS equipment. Subtasks approved under this task include: E.125.1, 'SDIS Software Consolidation and DCM-14 Audit' - This subtask involves the consolidation of a number of individual upgrades to the SDIS and review of the DCM-14 software. As the sponsor of the design of the DCM-14 by Dr. Neumann, the German Support Program is also a participant in this subtask; E.125.2, 'DIS

  18. Neutron measurements in search of cold fusion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, R.E.; Goulding, C.A.; Johnson, M.W.; Butterfield, K.B.; Gottesfeld, S.; Baker, D.A.; Springer, T.E.; Garzon, F.H.; Bolton, R.D.; Leonard, E.M.; Chancellor, T.

    1990-01-01

    We have conducted a research for neutron emission from cold fusion systems of the electrochemical type and, to a lesser extent, the high-pressure gas cell type. Using a high-efficiency well counter and an NE 213 scintillator, the experiments were conducted on the earth's surface and in a shielded cave approximately 50 ft underground. After approximately 6500 h of counting time, we have obtained no evidence for cold fusion processes leading to neutron production. However, we have observed all three types of neutron data that have been presented as evidence for cold fusion: large positive fluctuations in the neutron counting rate, weak peaks near 2.5 MeV in the neutron energy spectrum, and bursts of up to 145 neutrons in 500-μs intervals. The data were obtained under circumstances that clearly show our results to be data encountered as a part of naturally occurring neutron background, which is due primarily to cosmic rays. Thus, observing these types of data does not, of itself, provide evidence for the existence of cold fusion processes. Artifacts in the data that were due to counter misbehavior were also to lead to long-term ''neutron bursts'' whose time duration varied from several hours to several days. We conclude that any experiments which attempt to observe neutron emission must include strong steps to ensure that the experiments deal adequately with both cosmic-ray processes and counter misbehavior. 13 refs., 14 figs

  19. Quality measurement by proportional counter with B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Onizuka, Yoshihiko; Endo, Satoru; Tanaka, Kenichi

    2005-01-01

    The dosimetry of air and the tissue-equivalent phantom made of acryl are carried out by the tissue-equivalent proportional counter (TEPC) and TEPC with wall contained B, and both results were compared. The changes of quality with distance from the beam center are determined by the frequency mean renewal energy y F (y)and the dose mean renewal energy y D (y) as indicators of quality. Both y F (y)and y D (y) of tissue-equivalent phantom are larger than air, but very large change was not observed in all distance. The dose rate is determined by y D (y), the number of events and measurement time. Change of dose rate was larger than the change of quality. The maximum value of dose rate depended on γray and neutron beam showed at the point 2 cm away from the center. (S.Y.)

  20. Elementary survey of nuclear safeguards problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobias, M.L.

    1975-01-01

    The discussion presented on nuclear safeguards is confined primarily to the subject of safeguards for fixed sites. The legal and quasi-legal requirements are briefly outlined. Preventive measures against theft, terrorism, sabotage, or irrational acts by employees and against sabotage by armed gangs are the aspects emphasized. Some of the cost aspects are indicated