1st Quarter Transportation Report FY 2015: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gregory, Louis [National Security Technologies, LLC, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

2015-02-20

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 1st quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report include minor volumes of non-radioactive classified waste/material that were approved for disposal (non-radioactive classified or nonradioactive classified hazardous). Volume reports showing cubic feet generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to rounding conventions for volumetric conversions from cubic meters to cubic feet.

Overview of Nevada Test Site Radioactive and Mixed Waste Disposal Operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carilli, J.T.; Krenzien, S.K.; Geisinger, R.G.; Gordon, S.J.; Quinn, B.

2009-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Environmental Management Program is responsible for carrying out the disposal of on-site and off-site generated low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and low-level radioactive mixed waste (MW) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Core elements of this mission are ensuring safe and cost-effective disposal while protecting workers, the public, and the environment. This paper focuses on the impacts of new policies, processes, and opportunities at the NTS related to LLW and MW. Covered topics include: the first year of direct funding for NTS waste disposal operations; zero tolerance policy for non-compliant packages; the suspension of mixed waste disposal; waste acceptance changes; DOE Consolidated Audit Program (DOECAP) auditing; the 92-Acre Area closure plan; new eligibility requirements for generators; and operational successes with unusual waste streams

Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations: Exploratory Shaft Facility fluids and materials evaluation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

West, K.A.

1988-11-01

The objective of this study was to determine if any fluids or materials used in the Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) of Yucca Mountain will make the mountain unsuitable for future construction of a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain, an area on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada, USA, is a candidate site for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power and defense nuclear activities. To properly characterize Yucca Mountain, it will be necessary to construct an underground test facility, in which in situ site characterization tests can be conducted. The candidate repository horizon at Yucca Mountain, however, could potentially be compromised by fluids and materials used in the site characterization tests. To minimize this possibility, Los Alamos National Laboratory was directed to evaluate the kinds of fluids and materials that will be used and their potential impacts on the site. A secondary objective was to identify fluids and materials, if any, that should be prohibited from, or controlled in, the underground. 56 refs., 19 figs., 11 tabs.

Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations: Exploratory Shaft Facility fluids and materials evaluation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

West, K.A.

1988-11-01

The objective of this study was to determine if any fluids or materials used in the Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) of Yucca Mountain will make the mountain unsuitable for future construction of a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain, an area on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada, USA, is a candidate site for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power and defense nuclear activities. To properly characterize Yucca Mountain, it will be necessary to construct an underground test facility, in which in situ site characterization tests can be conducted. The candidate repository horizon at Yucca Mountain, however, could potentially be compromised by fluids and materials used in the site characterization tests. To minimize this possibility, Los Alamos National Laboratory was directed to evaluate the kinds of fluids and materials that will be used and their potential impacts on the site. A secondary objective was to identify fluids and materials, if any, that should be prohibited from, or controlled in, the underground. 56 refs., 19 figs., 11 tabs

Flood Assessment Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Management

2007-01-01

A flood assessment was conducted at the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-1). The study area encompasses the watershed of Yucca Flat, a closed basin approximately 780 square kilometers (km2) (300 square miles) in size. The focus of this effort was on a drainage area of approximately 94 km2 (36 mi2), determined from review of topographic maps and aerial photographs to be the only part of the Yucca Flat watershed that could directly impact the Area 3 RWMS. This smaller area encompasses portions of the Halfpint Range, including Paiute Ridge, Jangle Ridge, Carbonate Ridge, Slanted Buttes, Cockeyed Ridge, and Banded Mountain. The Area 3 RWMS is located on coalescing alluvial fans emanating from this drainage area

3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gregory, Louis

2014-01-01

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014 in Tables 4 and 5. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report do not include minor volumes of non-radioactive materials that were approved for disposal. Volume reports showing cubic feet generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to differing rounding conventions.

Composite Analysis for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

V. Yucel

2001-09-01

This report summarizes the results of a Composite Analysis (CA) for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The Area 5 RWMS is a US Department of Energy (DOE)-operated low-level radioactive waste (LLW) management site located in northern Frenchman Flat on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 5 RWMS has disposed of low-level radioactive waste in shallow unlined pits and trenches since 1960. Transuranic waste (TRU) and high-specific activity waste was disposed in Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes from 1983 to 1989. The purpose of this CA is to determine if continuing operation of the Area 5 RWMS poses an acceptable or unacceptable risk to the public considering the total waste inventory and all other interacting sources of radioactive material in the vicinity. Continuing operation of the Area 5 RWMS will be considered acceptable if the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is less than 100 mrem in a year. If the TEDE exceeds 30 mrem in a year, a cost-benefit options analysis must be performed to determine if cost-effective management options exist to reduce the dose further. If the TEDE is found to be less than 30 mrem in a year, an analysis may be performed if warranted to determine if doses are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

Composite Analysis for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

V. Yucel

2001-01-01

This report summarizes the results of a Composite Analysis (CA) for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The Area 5 RWMS is a US Department of Energy (DOE)-operated low-level radioactive waste (LLW) management site located in northern Frenchman Flat on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 5 RWMS has disposed of low-level radioactive waste in shallow unlined pits and trenches since 1960. Transuranic waste (TRU) and high-specific activity waste was disposed in Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes from 1983 to 1989. The purpose of this CA is to determine if continuing operation of the Area 5 RWMS poses an acceptable or unacceptable risk to the public considering the total waste inventory and all other interacting sources of radioactive material in the vicinity. Continuing operation of the Area 5 RWMS will be considered acceptable if the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) is less than 100 mrem in a year. If the TEDE exceeds 30 mrem in a year, a cost-benefit options analysis must be performed to determine if cost-effective management options exist to reduce the dose further. If the TEDE is found to be less than 30 mrem in a year, an analysis may be performed if warranted to determine if doses are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)

2009 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2010-03-15

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Wate Management Site (RWMS) Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) in fiscal year (FY) 2009. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2009 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

2009 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) in fiscal year (FY) 2009. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2009 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R and D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R and D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

Low-level radioactive waste management at the Nevada Test Site - Current status

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Becker, B.D.; Crowe, B.M.; Gertz, C.P.; Clayton, W.A.

1999-01-01

The performance objectives of the Department of Energy's Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) disposal facilities located at the Nevada Test Site transcend those of any other radioactive waste disposal site in the US. Situated at the southern end of the Great Basin, 800 feet above the water table, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) has utilized a combination of engineered shallow land disposal cells and deep augured shafts to dispose a variety of waste streams. These include high volume low-activity wastes, classified materials, and high-specific-activity special case wastes. Twenty miles north of Area 5 is the Area 3 RWMS. Here bulk LLW disposal takes place in subsidence craters formed from underground testing of nuclear weapons. Earliest records indicate that documented LLW disposal activities have occurred at the Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS's since 1961 and 1968, respectively. However, these activities have only been managed under a formal program since 1978. This paper describes the technical attributes of the facilities, present and future capacities and capabilities, and provides a description of the process from waste approval to final disposition. The paper also summarizes the current status of the waste disposal operations

2008 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2009-03-30

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) for each of the facilities, with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) performed an annual review in fiscal year (FY) 2008 by evaluating operational factors and research results that impact the continuing validity of the PAs and CAs. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2008 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

2008 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) for each of the facilities, with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) performed an annual review in fiscal year (FY) 2008 by evaluating operational factors and research results that impact the continuing validity of the PAs and CAs. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2008 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R and D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R and D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

4th Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gregory, Louis

2014-01-01

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. There was one shipment of two drums sent for offsite treatment and disposal. This report summarizes the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014.

Methods and Data Used to Investigate Polonium-210 as a Source of Excess Gross-Alpha Radioactivity in Ground Water, Churchill County, Nevada

Science.gov (United States)

Seiler, Ralph L.

2007-01-01

Ground water is the major source of drinking water in the Carson River Basin, California and Nevada. Previous studies have shown that uranium and gross-alpha radioactivities in ground water can be greater than U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Maximum Contaminant Levels, particularly in the Carson Desert, Churchill County, Nevada. Studies also have shown that the primary source of the gross-alpha radioactivity and alpha-emitting radionuclides in ground water is the dissolution of uranium-rich granitic rocks and basin-fill sediments that have their origins in the Sierra Nevada. However, ground water sampled from some wells in the Carson Desert had gross-alpha radioactivities greater than could be accounted for by the decay of dissolved uranium. The occurrence of polonium-210 (Po-210) was hypothesized to explain the higher than expected gross-alpha radioactivities. This report documents and describes the study design, field and analytical methods, and data used to determine whether Po-210 is the source of excess gross-alpha radioactivity in ground water underlying the Carson Desert in and around Fallon, Nevada. Specifically, this report presents: 1) gross alpha and uranium radioactivities for 100 wells sampled from June to September 2001; and 2) pH, dissolved oxygen, specific conductance, and Po-210 radioactivity for 25 wells sampled in April and June 2007. Results of quality-control samples for the 2007 dataset are also presented.

Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The Proposed Action addressed in this EIS is to construct, operate and monitor, and eventually close a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in southern Nevada for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste currently in storage at 72 commercial and 5 DOE sites across the United States. The EIS evaluates (1) projected impacts on the Yucca Mountain environment of the construction, operation and monitoring, and eventual closure of the geologic repository; (2) the potential long-term impacts of repository disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste; (3) the potential impacts of transporting these materials nationally and in the State of Nevada; and (4) the potential impacts of not proceeding with the Proposed Action

NEVADA TEST SITE WASTE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NEVADA SITE OFFICE

2005-01-01

This document establishes the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) waste acceptance criteria (WAC). The WAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive and mixed waste for disposal. Mixed waste generated within the State of Nevada by NNSA/NSO activities is accepted for disposal. It includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the Nevada Test Site Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site for storage or disposal

Separating defence and civilian radioactive waste programs in Nevada: can the public navigate the maze?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nielsen, R.A.

1999-01-01

Nevada is at the centre of public policy debate with regards to high and low level radioactive waste disposal. Nevada's Yucca Mountain is the only site under consideration for a US geologic repository for commercial spent nuclear fuel and defence high level waste. The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has long been a low level waste (LLW) disposal facility for the Department of Energy (DOE) defence waste and is now expected to take even more LLW as the preferred site for a regional or centralised disposal facility. Furthermore, the primary mission at NTS, defence, continues to add more contamination to the site. Combined, these facts present a public policy enigma, confused further by the intentional separation of the programs by DOE, even though all are essentially conducted at the same site. Involving the public in policy decisions for these programs is a dilemma because the public does not make the same artificial distinctions between them as DOE, DOE credibility suffers from past public involvement efforts conducted during an era of Cold War secrecy and because DOE public involvement programs are operated independently, with little or no co-operation between programs. The public does not know where it fits into the DOE decision-making process or if it impacts the policy decisions being made that affect it. This paper examines the complex maze of radioactive policy and bureaucracy in order to unveil the enigma Nevada residents face. Are they able to navigate this maze to effectively participate in government policy and decision-making? Or, will they remain confused by the government bureaucracy which deliberately makes a mess of the situation and seeks to exploit a politically weak state with large tracts of federally controlled land? lt further evaluates the effect this enigma has in producing acceptable public policy for radioactive waste disposal in the US, the role of public participation in that policy, and the reason the public is disillusioned and disengaged in the

Public involvement in radioactive waste management decisions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1994-04-01

Current repository siting efforts focus on Yucca Mountain, Nevada, where DOE`s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is conducting exploratory studies to determine if the site is suitable. The state of Nevada has resisted these efforts: it has denied permits, brought suit against DOE, and publicly denounced the federal government`s decision to study Yucca Mountain. The state`s opposition reflects public opinion in Nevada, and has considerably slowed DOE`s progress in studying the site. The Yucca Mountain controversy demonstrates the importance of understanding public attitudes and their potential influence as DOE develops a program to manage radioactive waste. The strength and nature of Nevada`s opposition -- its ability to thwart if not outright derail DOE`s activities -- indicate a need to develop alternative methods for making decisions that affect the public. This report analyzes public participation as a key component of this openness, one that provides a means of garnering acceptance of, or reducing public opposition to, DOE`s radioactive waste management activities, including facility siting and transportation. The first section, Public Perceptions: Attitudes, Trust, and Theory, reviews the risk-perception literature to identify how the public perceives the risks associated with radioactivity. DOE and the Public discusses DOE`s low level of credibility among the general public as the product, in part, of the department`s past actions. This section looks at the three components of the radioactive waste management program -- disposal, storage, and transportation -- and the different ways DOE has approached the problem of public confidence in each case. Midwestern Radioactive Waste Management Histories focuses on selected Midwestern facility-siting and transportation activities involving radioactive materials.

2007 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2008-01-01

Section 2.5 discusses the recommended changes in disposal facility design and operations, monitoring and R&D activities, and the maintenance program. Similarly, the annual summary for the CAs (presented in Section 3.0) includes the following: Section 3.1 presents the assessment of the adequacy of the CAs, with a summary of the relevant factors reviewed in FY 2007; Section 3.2 presents an assessment of the relevant site activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) that would impact the sources of residual radioactive material considered in the CAs; Section 3.3 summarizes the monitoring and R&D results that were reviewed in FY 2007; Section 3.4 presents a summary of changes in relevant site programs (including monitoring, R&D, and the maintenance program) that occurred since the CAs were prepared; and Section 3.5 summarizes the recommended changes to these programs.

2007 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Management

2008-01-01

Section 2.5 discusses the recommended changes in disposal facility design and operations, monitoring and R and D activities, and the maintenance program. Similarly, the annual summary for the CAs (presented in Section 3.0) includes the following: Section 3.1 presents the assessment of the adequacy of the CAs, with a summary of the relevant factors reviewed in FY 2007; Section 3.2 presents an assessment of the relevant site activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) that would impact the sources of residual radioactive material considered in the CAs; Section 3.3 summarizes the monitoring and R and D results that were reviewed in FY 2007; Section 3.4 presents a summary of changes in relevant site programs (including monitoring, R and D, and the maintenance program) that occurred since the CAs were prepared; and Section 3.5 summarizes the recommended changes to these programs

Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This document supersedes DOE/NV/25946--801, 'Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Manual,' Revision 1 issued in February 2010. Brief Description of Revision: A complete revision to reflect a recent change in name for the NTS; changes in name for some tenant organizations; and to update references to current DOE policies, orders, and guidance documents. Article 237.2 was deleted. Appendix 3B was updated. Article 411.2 was modified. Article 422 was re-written to reflect the wording of DOE O 458.1. Article 431.6.d was modified. The glossary was updated. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection.' Programs covered by this manual are located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS); Nellis Air Force Base and North Las Vegas, Nevada; Santa Barbara and Livermore, California; and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In addition, fieldwork by NNSA/NSO at other locations is covered by this manual. Current activities at NNSS include operating low-level radioactive and mixed waste disposal facilities for United States defense-generated waste, assembly and execution of subcritical experiments, assembly/disassembly of special experiments, the storage and use of special nuclear materials, performing criticality experiments, emergency responder training, surface cleanup and site characterization of contaminated land areas, environmental activity by the University system, and nonnuclear test operations, such as controlled spills of hazardous materials at the Hazardous Materials Spill Center. Currently, the major potential for occupational radiation exposure is associated with the burial of

Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Radiological Control Managers’ Council

2012-03-26

This document supersedes DOE/NV/25946--801, 'Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Manual,' Revision 1 issued in February 2010. Brief Description of Revision: A complete revision to reflect a recent change in name for the NTS; changes in name for some tenant organizations; and to update references to current DOE policies, orders, and guidance documents. Article 237.2 was deleted. Appendix 3B was updated. Article 411.2 was modified. Article 422 was re-written to reflect the wording of DOE O 458.1. Article 431.6.d was modified. The glossary was updated. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection.' Programs covered by this manual are located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS); Nellis Air Force Base and North Las Vegas, Nevada; Santa Barbara and Livermore, California; and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In addition, fieldwork by NNSA/NSO at other locations is covered by this manual. Current activities at NNSS include operating low-level radioactive and mixed waste disposal facilities for United States defense-generated waste, assembly and execution of subcritical experiments, assembly/disassembly of special experiments, the storage and use of special nuclear materials, performing criticality experiments, emergency responder training, surface cleanup and site characterization of contaminated land areas, environmental activity by the University system, and nonnuclear test operations, such as controlled spills of hazardous materials at the Hazardous Materials Spill Center. Currently, the major potential for occupational radiation exposure is associated with the burial of

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria, December 2000

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-12-01

This document establishes the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office waste acceptance criteria. The waste acceptance criteria provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed waste for disposal. It includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the Nevada Test Site Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites for storage or disposal.

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria, December 2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This document establishes the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office waste acceptance criteria. The waste acceptance criteria provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed waste for disposal. It includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the Nevada Test Site Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites for storage or disposal

Transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This ninth chapter presents de CNEN-NE--5.01 norm 'Transport of radioactive material'; the specifications of the radioactive materials for transport; the tests of the packages; the requests for controlling the transport and the responsibilities during the transport of radioactive material

Hydrogeologic data for existing excavations and the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-12-01

The Special Projects Section of Reynolds Electrical ampersand Engineering Co., Inc. is responsible for characterizing the subsurface geology and hydrology of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Waste Management Division. Geologic description, in situ testing, and laboratory analyses of alluvium exposed in existing excavations are important subparts to the Area 5 Site Characterization Program designed to determine the suitability of the RWMS for disposal of low level waste mixed waste and transuranic waste. The primary purpose of the Existing Excavation Project is two-fold: first, to characterize important hydrologic properties of the near surface alluvium, thought to play an important role in the infiltration and redistribution of water and solutes through the upper unsaturated zone at the Area 5 RWMS; and second, to provide guidance for the design of future sampling and testing programs. The justification for this work comes from the state of Nevada review of the original DOE/NV Part B Permit application submitted in 1988 for disposal of mixed wastes at the RWMS. The state of Nevada determined that the permit was deficient in characterization data concerning the hydrogeology of the unsaturated zone. DOE/NV agreed with the state and proposed the study of alluvium exposed in existing excavations as one step toward satisfying these important site characterization data requirements. Other components of the site characterization process include the Science Trench Borehole and Pilot Well Projects

Public involvement in radioactive waste management decisions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-04-01

Current repository siting efforts focus on Yucca Mountain, Nevada, where DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is conducting exploratory studies to determine if the site is suitable. The state of Nevada has resisted these efforts: it has denied permits, brought suit against DOE, and publicly denounced the federal government's decision to study Yucca Mountain. The state's opposition reflects public opinion in Nevada, and has considerably slowed DOE's progress in studying the site. The Yucca Mountain controversy demonstrates the importance of understanding public attitudes and their potential influence as DOE develops a program to manage radioactive waste. The strength and nature of Nevada's opposition -- its ability to thwart if not outright derail DOE's activities -- indicate a need to develop alternative methods for making decisions that affect the public. This report analyzes public participation as a key component of this openness, one that provides a means of garnering acceptance of, or reducing public opposition to, DOE's radioactive waste management activities, including facility siting and transportation. The first section, Public Perceptions: Attitudes, Trust, and Theory, reviews the risk-perception literature to identify how the public perceives the risks associated with radioactivity. DOE and the Public discusses DOE's low level of credibility among the general public as the product, in part, of the department's past actions. This section looks at the three components of the radioactive waste management program -- disposal, storage, and transportation -- and the different ways DOE has approached the problem of public confidence in each case. Midwestern Radioactive Waste Management Histories focuses on selected Midwestern facility-siting and transportation activities involving radioactive materials

Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bechtel Nevada

2005-01-01

This document is an integrated plan for closing and monitoring two low-level radioactive waste disposal sites at the Nevada Test Site. This document is an integrated plan for closing and monitoring two low-level radioactive waste disposal sites at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) are managed and operated by Bechtel Nevada (BN) for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (ICMP) for these sites is based on guidance for developing closure plans issued by the DOE (DOE, 1999a). The plan does not closely follow the format suggested by the DOE guidance to better accommodate differences between the two RWMSs, especially in terms of operations and site characteristics. The modification reduces redundancy and provides a smoother progression of the discussion. Further, much of the information that would be included in the individual plans is the same, and integration provides efficient presentation. A cross-walk between the contents of the ICMP and the DOE guidance is given in Appendix A. Closure and monitoring were integrated because monitoring measures the degree to which the operational and closed disposal facilities are meeting performance objectives specified in the manual to DOE Order O 435.1. Department of Energy Order 435.1 governs management of radioactive waste, and associated with it are Manual DOE M 435.1-1 and Guidance DOE G 435.1-1. The performance objectives are intended to ensure protection of workers, the public, and the environment from radiological exposure associated with the RWMSs now and in the future

Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) management at the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Becker, B.D.; Gertz, C.P.; Clayton, W.A.; Crowe, B.M.

1998-01-01

In 1978, the Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), established a managed LLW disposal project at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Two, sites which were already accepting limited amounts of on-site generated waste for disposal and off-site generated Transuranic Waste for interim storage, were selected to house the disposal facilities. In those early days, these sites, located about 15 miles apart, afforded the DOE/NV the opportunity to use at least two technologies to manage its waste cost effectively. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose packaged waste while the Area 3 RWMS uses subsidence craters formed from underground testing of nuclear weapons for the disposal of packaged and unpackaged bulk waste. The paper describes the technical attributes of both Area 5 and Area 3 facilities, the acceptance process, the disposal processes, and present and future capacities of both sites

Dossier: transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mignon, H.; Brachet, Y.; Turquet de Beauregard, G.; Mauny, G.; Robine, F.; Plantet, F.; Pestel Lefevre, O.; Hennenhofer, G.; Bonnemains, J.

1997-01-01

This dossier is entirely devoted to the transportation of radioactive and fissile materials of civil use. It comprises 9 papers dealing with: the organization of the control of the radioactive materials transport safety (safety and security aspects, safety regulations, safety analysis and inspection, emergency plans, public information), the technical aspects of the regulation concerning the transport of radioactive materials (elaboration of regulations and IAEA recommendations, risk assessments, defense in depth philosophy and containers, future IAEA recommendations, expertise-research interaction), the qualification of containers (regulations, test facilities), the Transnucleaire company (presentation, activity, containers for spent fuels), the packages of radioactive sources for medical use (flux, qualification, safety and transport), an example of accident during radioactive materials transportation: the Apach train derailment (February 4, 1997), the sea transport of radioactive materials (international maritime organization (OMI), international maritime dangerous goods (IMDG) code, irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) safety rules), the transport of radioactive materials in Germany, and the point of view from an external observer. (J.S.)

Modelling magma-drift interaction at the proposed high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, USA

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Woods, Andrew W.; Sparks, Steve; Bokhove, Onno; Lejeune, Anne-Marie; Connor, Charles B.; Hill, Britain E.

2002-01-01

We examine the possible ascent of alkali basalt magma containing 2 wt percent water through a dike and into a horizontal subsurface drift as part of a risk assessment for the proposed high-level radioactive waste repository beneath Yucca Mountain, Nevada, USA. On intersection of the dike with the

Waste generation and pollution prevention progress fact sheet: Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

The Nevada Test Site is responsible for maintaining nuclear testing capability, supporting science-based Stockpile Stewardship experiments, maintaining nuclear agency response capability, applying environmental restoration techniques to areas affected by nuclear testing, managing low-level and mixed radioactive waste, investigating demilitarization technologies, investigating counter- proliferation technologies, supporting work-for-others programs and special Department of Defense activities, operating a hazardous materials spill test center, and providing for the commercial development of the site. This fact sheet provides information on routine waste generation and projected reduction by waste type. Also, materials recycled by the Nevada Test Site in 1994 are listed

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept DOE non-radioactive classified waste, DOE non-radioactive hazardous classified waste, DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW), DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW), and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste for permanent disposal. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and will be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project (WMP) at (702) 295-7063, and your call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2012-02-28

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept DOE non-radioactive classified waste, DOE non-radioactive hazardous classified waste, DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW), DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW), and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste for permanent disposal. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and will be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project (WMP) at (702) 295-7063, and your call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

2005-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) waste acceptance criteria (WAC). The WAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive (LLW) and mixed waste (MW) for disposal. It includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NTS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) for storage or disposal

Special Analysis of Transuranic Waste in Trench T04C at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Greg Shott; Vefa Yucel; Lloyd Desotell

2008-01-01

This Special Analysis (SA) was prepared to assess the potential impact of inadvertent disposal of a limited quantity of transuranic (TRU) waste in classified Trench 4 (T04C) within the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 5 RWMS is a low-level radioactive waste disposal site in northern Frenchman Flat on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 5 RWMS is regulated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under DOE Order 435.1 and DOE Manual (DOE M) 435.1-1. The primary objective of the SA is to evaluate if inadvertent disposal of limited quantities of TRU waste in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 RWMS is in compliance with the existing, approved Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) issued under DOE M 435.1-1. In addition, supplemental analyses are performed to determine if there is reasonable assurance that the requirements of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, can be met. The 40 CFR 191 analyses provide supplemental information regarding the risk to human health and the environment of leaving the TRU waste in T04C. In 1989, waste management personnel reviewing classified materials records discovered that classified materials buried in trench T04C at the Area 5 RWMS contained TRU waste. Subsequent investigations determined that a total of 102 55-gallon drums of TRU waste from Rocky Flats were buried in trench T04C in 1986. The disposal was inadvertent because unclassified records accompanying the shipment indicated that the waste was low-level. The exact location of the TRU waste in T04C was not recorded and is currently unknown. Under DOE M 435.1-1, Chapter IV, Section P.5, low-level waste disposal facilities must obtain a DAS. The DAS specifies conditions that must be met to operate within the radioactive waste management basis, consisting of a

Special Analysis of Transuranic Waste in Trench T04C at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greg Shott, Vefa Yucel, Lloyd Desotell

2008-05-01

This Special Analysis (SA) was prepared to assess the potential impact of inadvertent disposal of a limited quantity of transuranic (TRU) waste in classified Trench 4 (T04C) within the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 5 RWMS is a low-level radioactive waste disposal site in northern Frenchman Flat on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 5 RWMS is regulated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under DOE Order 435.1 and DOE Manual (DOE M) 435.1-1. The primary objective of the SA is to evaluate if inadvertent disposal of limited quantities of TRU waste in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 RWMS is in compliance with the existing, approved Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) issued under DOE M 435.1-1. In addition, supplemental analyses are performed to determine if there is reasonable assurance that the requirements of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, can be met. The 40 CFR 191 analyses provide supplemental information regarding the risk to human health and the environment of leaving the TRU waste in T04C. In 1989, waste management personnel reviewing classified materials records discovered that classified materials buried in trench T04C at the Area 5 RWMS contained TRU waste. Subsequent investigations determined that a total of 102 55-gallon drums of TRU waste from Rocky Flats were buried in trench T04C in 1986. The disposal was inadvertent because unclassified records accompanying the shipment indicated that the waste was low-level. The exact location of the TRU waste in T04C was not recorded and is currently unknown. Under DOE M 435.1-1, Chapter IV, Section P.5, low-level waste disposal facilities must obtain a DAS. The DAS specifies conditions that must be met to operate within the radioactive waste management basis, consisting of a

Geologic investigation of the Virgin River Valley salt deposits, Clark County, southeastern Nevada, to investigate their suitability for possible storage of radioactive waste material as of September 1977

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The results from a geologic investigation of the Virgin River Valley salt deposits, Clark County, southeastern Nevada, to examine their suitability for further study and consideration in connection with the possible storage of radioactive waste material are given. The results indicate that (1) approximately one-half of the salt body underlies the Overton Arm of Lake Mead and that the dry land portion of the salt body that has a thickness of 1,000 feet or more covers an area of about four and one-half square miles; (2) current tectonic activity in the area of the salt deposits is believed to be confined to seismic events associated with crustal adjustments following the filling of Lake Mead; (3) detailed information on the hydrology of the salt deposit area is not available at present but it is reported that a groundwater study by the U.S. Geological Survey is now in progress; (4) there is no evidence of exploitable minerals in the salt deposit area other than evaporites such as salt, gypsum, and possibly sand and gravel; (5) the salt deposit area is located inside the Lake Mead Recreation Area, outlined on the accompanying Location Plat, and several Federal, State, and Local agencies share regulatory responsibilities for the activities in the area; (6) other salt deposit areas of Arizona and Nevada, such as the Detrital Valley, Red Lake Dome, Luke Dome, and Mormon Mesa area, and several playa lake areas of central Nevada may merit further study; and (7) additional information, as outlined, is needed to more thoroughly evaluate the salt deposits of the Virgin River Valley and other areas referred to above

Summary of accidental releases of radioactivity detected off the Nevada Test Site, 1963--1986

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patzer, R.G.; Phillips, W.G.; Grossman, R.F.; Black, S.C.; Costa, C.F.

1988-08-01

Of the more than 450 underground nuclear explosives tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site from August 1963 (signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty) through the end of 1986, only 23 accidentally released radioactivity that was detectable beyond the boundary of the NTS. Of these 23, 4 were detectable off the NTS only by aircraft while the remainder were detectable by ground monitoring instruments. Since the Baneberry venting of December 1970, only two tests released radioactivity that was detectable off the NTS, and this was a seepage of radioactive noble gases. None of these releases from underground tests designed for complete containment caused exposure of the population living in the area that exceeded standards recommended by national and international radiation protection agencies. This report summarizes the releases from each of the tests, describes the monitoring that was conducted, and lists the location of the maximum exposure

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC), Rev. 7-01

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2009-05-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NTSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NTS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal.

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC), Rev. 7-01

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NTSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NTS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal.

Intermodal transportation of low-level radioactive waste to the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-09-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) presently serves as a disposal site for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) generated by DOE-approved generators. The environmental impacts resulting from the disposal of LLW at the NTS are discussed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Nevada Test Site Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada (NTS EIS). During the formal NTS EIS scoping period, it became clear that transportation of LLW was an issue that required attention. Therefore, the Nevada Transportation Protocol Working Group (TPWG) was formed in 1995 to identify, prioritize, and understand local issues and concerns associated with the transportation of LLW to the NTS. Currently, generators of LLW ship their waste to the NTS by legal-weight truck. In 1995, the TPWG suggested the DOE could reduce transportation costs and enhance public safety by using rail transportation. The DOE announced, in October 1996, that they would study the potential for intermodal transportation of LLW to the NTS, by transferring the LLW containers from rail cars to trucks for movements to the NTS. The TPWG and DOE/NV prepared the NTS Intermodal Transportation Facility Site and Routing Evaluation Study to present basic data and analyses on alternative rail-to-truck transfer sites and related truck routes for LLW shipments to the NTS. This Environmental Assessment (EA) identifies the potential environmental impacts and transportation risks of using new intermodal transfer sites and truck routes or continuing current operations to accomplish the objectives of minimizing radiological risk, enhancing safety, and reducing cost. DOE/NV will use the results of the assessment to decide whether or not to encourage the LLW generators and their transportation contractors to change their current operations to accomplish these objectives

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 2 with Errata Sheet

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wickline, Alfred

2006-12-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 168: Area 25 and 26, Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each corrective action site (CAS) within CAU 168. The corrective action investigation (CAI) was conducted in accordance with the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26, Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'', as developed under the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (1996). Corrective Action Unit 168 is located in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada and is comprised of the following 12 CASs: CAS 25-16-01, Construction Waste Pile; CAS 25-16-03, MX Construction Landfill; CAS 25-19-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 25-23-02, Radioactive Storage RR Cars; CAS 25-23-13, ETL - Lab Radioactive Contamination; CAS 25-23-18, Radioactive Material Storage; CAS 25-34-01, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; CAS 25-34-02, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; CAS 25-99-16, USW G3; CAS 26-08-01, Waste Dump/Burn Pit; CAS 26-17-01, Pluto Waste Holding Area; and CAS 26-19-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine contaminants of concern (COCs) for CASs within CAU 168. Radiological measurements of railroad cars and test equipment were compared to unrestricted (free) release criteria. Assessment of the data generated from the CAI activities revealed the following: (1) Corrective Action Site 25-16-01 contains hydrocarbon-contaminated soil at concentrations exceeding the PAL. The contamination is at discrete locations associated with asphalt debris. (2) No COCs were identified at CAS 25-16-03. Buried construction waste is present in at least two

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Materials and Energy Corporation Sealed Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shott, Gregory [National Security Technologies, LLC. (NSTec), Mercury, NV (United States)

2017-05-15

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Materials and Energy Corporation (M&EC) Sealed Source waste stream (PERM000000036, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the M&EC Sealed Source waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The M&EC Sealed Source waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

The safe transport of radioactive materials

CERN Document Server

Gibson, R

1966-01-01

The Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials is a handbook that details the safety guidelines in transporting radioactive materials. The title covers the various regulations and policies, along with the safety measures and procedures of radioactive material transport. The text first details the 1963 version of the IAEA regulation for the safe transport of radioactive materials; the regulation covers the classification of radionuclides for transport purposes and the control of external radiation hazards during the transport of radioactive materials. The next chapter deals with concerns in the im

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Waste Acceptance Criteria

1999-01-01

This document provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive and mixed waste for disposal; and transuranic and transuranic mixed waste for interim storage at the Nevada Test Site

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project

2008-06-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive (LLW) and LLW Mixed Waste (MW) for disposal.

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project

2008-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive (LLW) and LLW Mixed Waste (MW) for disposal

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2010-09-03

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

Bibliography with abstracts of geological literature pertaining to southern Nevada with particular reference to the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Connolly, J.R.; Hicks, R.T.; Emmanuel, K.M.; Cappon, J.P.; Sinnock, S.

1983-05-01

This bibliography (with abstracts) of geological literature pertains to the Nevada Test Site and its southern Nevada environs. Its purpose is to provide a convenient, general reference document for published geological information potentially useful for radioactive waste studies conducted by the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigation project at the Nevada Test Site. It is organized so that users of geological information about southern Nevada may find subject matter in their areas or topics of interest. The most current published literature included is dated 1980

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 561: Waste Disposal Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grant Evenson

2008-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 561 is located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 22, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 561 is comprised of the 10 corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 01-19-01, Waste Dump; (2) 02-08-02, Waste Dump and Burn Area; (3) 03-19-02, Debris Pile; (4) 05-62-01, Radioactive Gravel Pile; (5) 12-23-09, Radioactive Waste Dump; (6) 22-19-06, Buried Waste Disposal Site; (7) 23-21-04, Waste Disposal Trenches; (8) 25-08-02, Waste Dump; (9) 25-23-21, Radioactive Waste Dump; and (10) 25-25-19, Hydrocarbon Stains and Trench. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 561. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the Corrective Action Investigation for CAU 561 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct

Transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-07-01

The norm which establishes the requirements of radiation protection and safety related to the transport of radioactive materials, aiming to keep a suitable control level of eventual exposure of personnels, materials and environment of ionizing radiation, including: specifications on radioactive materials for transport, selection of package type; specification of requirements of the design and assays of acceptance of packages; disposal related to the transport; and liability and administrative requirements, are presented. This norm is applied to: truckage, water carriage and air service; design, fabrication, assays and mantenaince of packages; preparation, despatching, handling, loading storage in transition and reception in the ultimate storage of packages; and transport of void packages which have been contained radioactive materials. (M.C.K.) [pt

Analysis of gaseous-phase stable and radioactive isotopes in the unsaturated zone, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, I.C.; Haas, H.H.; Weeks, E.P.; Thorstenson, D.C.

1985-01-01

The Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations Project of the US Department of Energy provides that agency with data for evaluating volcanic tuff beneath Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine its suitability for a potential repository of high-level radioactive waste. Thickness of the unsaturated zone, which consists of fractured, welded and nonwelded tuff, is about 1640 to 2460 feet (500 to 750 meters). One question to be resolved is an estimate of minimum ground-water traveltime from the disturbed zone of the potentail repository to the accessible environment. Another issue is the potential for diffusive or convective gaseous transport of radionuclides from an underground facility in the unsaturated zone to the accessible environment. Gas samples were collected at intervals to a depth of 1200 feet from the unsaturated zone at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Samples were analyzed for major atmospheric gases; carbon dioxide in the samples was analyzed for carbon-14 activity and for delta 13 C; water vapor in the samples was analyzed for deuterium and oxygen-18. These data could provide insight into the nature of unsaturated zone transport processes. 15 refs., 4 figs., 4 tabs

Storage depot for radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Szulinski, M.J.

1983-01-01

Vertical drilling of cylindrical holes in the soil, and the lining of such holes, provides storage vaults called caissons. A guarded depot is provided with a plurality of such caissons covered by shielded closures preventing radiation from penetrating through any linear gap to the atmosphere. The heat generated by the radioactive material is dissipated through the vertical liner of the well into the adjacent soil and thus to the ground surface so that most of the heat from the radioactive material is dissipated into the atmosphere in a manner involving no significant amount of biologically harmful radiation. The passive cooling of the radioactive material without reliance upon pumps, personnel, or other factor which might fail, constitutes one of the most advantageous features of this system. Moreover this system is resistant to damage from tornadoes or earthquakes. Hermetically sealed containers of radioactive material may be positioned in the caissons. Loading vehicles can travel throughout the depot to permit great flexibility of loading and unloading radioactive materials. Radioactive material can be shifted to a more closely spaced caisson after ageing sufficiently to generate much less heat. The quantity of material stored in a caisson is restricted by the average capacity for heat dissipation of the soil adjacent such caisson

Dossier: transport of radioactive materials; Dossier: le transport des matieres radioactives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mignon, H. [CEA Centre d`Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay, 91 - Gif-sur-Yvette (France). Direction du Cycle du Combustible; Niel, J.Ch. [CEA Centre d`Etudes Nucleaires de Fontenay-aux-Roses, 92 (France). Inst. de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire; Canton, H. [CEA Cesta, 33 - Bordeaux (France); Brachet, Y. [Transnucleaire, 75 - Paris (France); Turquet de Beauregard, G.; Mauny, G. [CIS bio international, France (France); Robine, F.; Plantet, F. [Prefecture de la Moselle (France); Pestel Lefevre, O. [Ministere de l`Equipement, des transports et du logement, (France); Hennenhofer, G. [BMU, Ministere de l`environnement, de la protection de la nature et de la surete des reacteurs (Germany); Bonnemains, J. [Association Robin des Bois (France)

1997-12-01

This dossier is entirely devoted to the transportation of radioactive and fissile materials of civil use. It comprises 9 papers dealing with: the organization of the control of the radioactive materials transport safety (safety and security aspects, safety regulations, safety analysis and inspection, emergency plans, public information), the technical aspects of the regulation concerning the transport of radioactive materials (elaboration of regulations and IAEA recommendations, risk assessments, defense in depth philosophy and containers, future IAEA recommendations, expertise-research interaction), the qualification of containers (regulations, test facilities), the Transnucleaire company (presentation, activity, containers for spent fuels), the packages of radioactive sources for medical use (flux, qualification, safety and transport), an example of accident during radioactive materials transportation: the Apach train derailment (February 4, 1997), the sea transport of radioactive materials (international maritime organization (OMI), international maritime dangerous goods (IMDG) code, irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) safety rules), the transport of radioactive materials in Germany, and the point of view from an external observer. (J.S.)

Summary of Natural Resources that Potentially Influence Human Intrusion at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Management

2007-01-01

In 1993, Raytheon Services Nevada completed a review of natural resource literature and other sources to identify potentially exploitable resources and potential future land uses near the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nye County, Nevada, that could lead to future inadvertent human intrusion and subsequent release of radionuclides to the accessible environment. National Security Technologies, LLC, revised the original limited-distribution document to conform to current editorial standards and U.S. Department of Energy requirements for public release. The researchers examined the potential for future development of sand, gravel, mineral, petroleum, water resources, and rural land uses, such as agriculture, grazing, and hunting. The study was part of the performance assessment for Greater Confinement Disposal boreholes. Sand and gravel are not considered exploitable site resources because the materials are common throughout the area and the quality at the Area 5 RWMS is not ideal for typical commercial uses. Site information also indicates a very low mineral potential for the area. None of the 23 mining districts in southern Nye County report occurrences of economic mineral deposits in unconsolidated alluvium. The potential for oil and natural gas is low for southern Nye County. No occurrences of coal, tar sand, or oil shale on the NTS are reported in available literature. Several potential future uses of water were considered. Agricultural irrigation is impractical due to poor soils and existing water supply regulations. Use of water for geothermal energy development is unlikely because temperatures are too low for typical commercial applications using current technology. Human consumption of water has the most potential for cause of intrusion. The economics of future water needs may create a demand for the development of deep carbonate aquifers in the region. However, the Area 5 RWMS is not an optimal location for

Radionuclide migration studies at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thompson, J.L.

1989-01-01

The United States government routinely tests nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in southern Nevada. A significant amount of radioactive material exists underground at the NTS with no containers or engineered barriers to inhibit its subsequent migration. The Department of Energy has sponsored for many years a research program on radionuclide movement in the geologic media at this location. Goals of this research program are to measure the extent of movement of radionuclides away from underground explosion sites and to determine the mechanisms by which such movement occurs. This program has acquired significance in another aspect of nuclear waste management because of the Yucca Mountain Project. Yucca Mountain at the NTS is being intensively studied as the possible site for a mined repository for high level nuclear waste. The NTS provides a unique setting for field studies concerning radionuclide migration; there is the potential for greatly increasing our knowledge of the behavior of radioactive materials in volcanogenic media. This review summarizes some of the significant findings made under this research program at the NTS and identifies reports in which the details of the research may be found. 36 refs., 4 figs

Consumer Products Containing Radioactive Materials

Science.gov (United States)

Fact Sheet Adopted: February 2010 Health Physics Society Specialists in Radiation Safety Consumer Products Containing Radioactive Materials Everything we encounter in our daily lives contains some radioactive material, ...

Transport of Radioactive Materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This address overviews the following aspects: concepts on transport of radioactive materials, quantities used to limit the transport, packages, types of packages, labeling, index transport calculation, tags, labeling, vehicle's requirements and documents required to authorize transportation. These requirements are considered in the regulation of transport of radioactive material that is in drafting step

Accidents during transport of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agarwal, S.P.

2008-01-01

Radioactive materials are a part of modern technology and life. They are used in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and electrical power generation. Tens of millions of packages containing radioactive materials are consigned for transport each year throughout the world. In India, about 80000 packages containing radioactive material are transported every year. The amount of radioactive material in these packages varies from negligible amounts used in consumer products to very large amounts in shipment of irradiator sources and spent nuclear fuel

Multi-discipline Waste Acceptance Process at the Nevada National Security Site - 13573

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Carilli, Jhon T. [US Department Of Energy, Nevada Site Office, P. O. Box 98518, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193-8518 (United States); Krenzien, Susan K. [Navarro-Intera, LLC, P. O. Box 98952, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193-8952 (United States)

2013-07-01

The Nevada National Security Site low-level radioactive waste disposal facility acceptance process requires multiple disciplines to ensure the protection of workers, the public, and the environment. These disciplines, which include waste acceptance, nuclear criticality, safety, permitting, operations, and performance assessment, combine into the overall waste acceptance process to assess low-level radioactive waste streams for disposal at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. Four waste streams recently highlighted the integration of these disciplines: the Oak Ridge Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators and Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project material, West Valley Melter, and classified waste. (authors)

Radioactive materials transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talbi, B.

1996-01-01

The development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy results in the increase of transport operations of radioactive materials. Therefore strong regulations on transport of radioactive materials turns out to be a necessity in Tunisia. This report presents the different axes of regulations which include the means of transport involved, the radiation protection of the carriers, the technical criteria of security in transport, the emergency measures in case of accidents and penalties in case of infringement. (TEC). 12 refs., 1 fig

Cask for radioactive material and method for preventing release of neutrons from radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gaffney, M.F.; Shaffer, P.T.

1981-01-01

A cask for radioactive material, such as nuclear reactor fuel or spent nuclear reactor fuel, includes a plurality of associated walled internal compartments for containing such radioactive material, with neutron absorbing material present to absorb neutrons emitted by the radioactive material, and a plurality of thermally conductive members, such as longitudinal copper or aluminum castings, about the compartment and in thermal contact with the compartment walls and with other such thermally conductive members and having thermal contact surfaces between such members extending, preferably radially, from the compartment walls to external surfaces of the thermally conductive members, which surfaces are preferably in the form of a cylinder. The ends of the shipping cask also preferably include a neutron absorber and a conductive metal covering to dissipate heat released by decay of the radioactive material. A preferred neutron absorber utilized is boron carbide, preferably as plasma sprayed with metal powder or as particles in a matrix of phenolic polymer, and the compartment walls are preferably of stainless steel, copper or other corrosion resistant and heat conductive metal or alloy. The invention also relates to shipping casks, storage casks and other containers for radioactive materials in which a plurality of internal compartments for such material, e.g., nuclear reactor fuel rods, are joined together, preferably in modular construction with surrounding heat conductive metal members, and the modules are joined together to form a major part of a finished shipping cask, which is preferably of cylindrical shape. Also within the invention are methods of safely storing radioactive materials which emit neutrons, while dissipating the heat thereof, and of manufacturing the present shipping casks

Radioactive waste material melter apparatus

Science.gov (United States)

Newman, D.F.; Ross, W.A.

1990-04-24

An apparatus for preparing metallic radioactive waste material for storage is disclosed. The radioactive waste material is placed in a radiation shielded enclosure. The waste material is then melted with a plasma torch and cast into a plurality of successive horizontal layers in a mold to form a radioactive ingot in the shape of a spent nuclear fuel rod storage canister. The apparatus comprises a radiation shielded enclosure having an opening adapted for receiving a conventional transfer cask within which radioactive waste material is transferred to the apparatus. A plasma torch is mounted within the enclosure. A mold is also received within the enclosure for receiving the melted waste material and cooling it to form an ingot. The enclosure is preferably constructed in at least two parts to enable easy transport of the apparatus from one nuclear site to another. 8 figs.

Radioactive waste material melter apparatus

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newman, D.F.; Ross, W.A.

1990-01-01

An apparatus for preparing metallic radioactive waste material for storage is disclosed. The radioactive waste material is placed in a radiation shielded enclosure. The waste material is then melted with a plasma torch and cast into a plurality of successive horizontal layers in a mold to form a radioactive ingot in the shape of a spent nuclear fuel rod storage canister. The apparatus comprises a radiation shielded enclosure having an opening adapted for receiving a conventional transfer cask within which radioactive waste material is transferred to the apparatus. A plasma torch is mounted within the enclosure. A mold is also received within the enclosure for receiving the melted waste material and cooling it to form an ingot. The enclosure is preferably constructed in at least two parts to enable easy transport of the apparatus from one nuclear site to another. 8 figs

Radioactive Materials Packaging (RAMPAC) Radioactive Materials Incident Report (RMIR). RAMTEMP users manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tyron-Hopko, A.K.; Driscoll, K.L.

1985-10-01

The purpose of this document is to familiarize the potential user with RadioActive Materials PACkaging (RAMPAC), Radioactive Materials Incident Report (RMIR), and RAMTEMP databases. RAMTEMP is a minor image of RAMPAC. This reference document will enable the user to access and obtain reports from databases while in an interactive mode. This manual will be revised as necessary to reflect enhancements made to the system

Nevada Risk Assessment/Management Program scientific peer review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bentz, E.J. Jr.; Bentz, C.B.; O'Hora, T.D.; Chen, S.Y.

1997-01-01

The 1,350 square-mile Nevada Test Site and additional sites in Nevada served as the continental sites for US nuclear weapons testing from 1951 to 1992. The Nevada Risk Assessment/Management Program (NRAMP) is a currently on-going effort of the Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) and the firm of E. J. Bentz and Associates, Inc., in cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Program. Argonne National Laboratory is one of several public and private organizations supporting personnel appointed by the NRAMP to the NRAMP Scientific Peer Review Panel. The NRAMP is part of a national effort by the DOE to develop new sources of information and approaches to risk assessment, risk management, risk communication, and public outreach relevant to the ecological and human health effects of radioactive and hazardous materials management and site remediation activities. This paper describes the development, conduct, and current results of the scientific peer review process which supports the goals of the NRAMP

Radioactive material generator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Czaplinski, T.V.; Bolter, B.J.; Heyer, R.E.; Bruno, G.A.

1975-01-01

A radioactive material generator includes radioactive material in a column, which column is connected to inlet and outlet conduits, the generator being embedded in a lead casing. The inlet and outlet conduits extend through the casing and are topped by pierceable closure caps. A fitting, containing means to connect an eluent supply and an eluate container, is adapted to pierce the closure caps. The lead casing and the fitting are compatibly contoured such that they will fit only if properly aligned with respect to each other

Nevada Test Site 2008 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Environmental monitoring data were collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada Test Site. These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, vadose zone, subsidence, and biota. This report summarizes the 2008 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities

Customs control of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Causse, B.

1998-01-01

Customs officers take part in the combat against illicit traffic od radioactive materials by means of different regulations dealing with nuclear materials, artificial radiation sources or radioactive wastes. The capability of customs officers is frequently incomplete and difficult to apply due to incompatibility of the intervention basis. In case of contaminated materials, it seems that the customs is not authorised directly and can only perform incidental control. In order to fulfil better its mission of fighting against illicit traffic of radioactive materials customs established partnership with CEA which actually includes practical and theoretical training meant to augment the capabilities of customs officers

A risk communication case study: the Nevada risk assessment/management program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hechanova, A.E.

2001-01-01

The Nevada Risk Assessment/Management Program is part of a national effort by the U.S. Department of Energy (Grant DE-FG01-96EW56093) to develop new sources of information and approaches to risk assessment, risk management, risk communication and public outreach as these objectives relate to the ecological and human health effects of radioactive and hazardous material management and site remediation activities. This paper reviews the innovation behind the Nevada Risk Assessment/Management Program and presents a synopsis of the effort that began in 1995 and will officially conclude on April 30, 2000. (author)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobiason, D. S.

2002-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for the Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps (CWD), Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143 in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order [FFACO] (FFACO, 1996) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 143: Area 25, Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 143 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-23-09 CWD No.1, and 25-23-03 CWD No.2. The Area 25 CWDs are historic disposal units within the Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD), and Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) compounds located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The R-MAD and E-MAD facilities originally supported a portion of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Area 25 of the NTS. CWD No.1 CAS 25-23-09 received solid radioactive waste from the R-MAD Compound (East Trestle and West Trench Berms) and 25-23-03 CWD No.2 received solid radioactive waste from the E-MAD Compound (E-MAD Trench)

Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gray, P.

1997-01-01

This paper discusses the broad problems presented by Naturally Occuring Radioactive Materials (NORM). Technologically Enhanced naturally occuring radioactive material includes any radionuclides whose physical, chemical, radiological properties or radionuclide concentration have been altered from their natural state. With regard to NORM in particular, radioactive contamination is radioactive material in an undesired location. This is a concern in a range of industries: petroleum; uranium mining; phosphorus and phosphates; fertilizers; fossil fuels; forestry products; water treatment; metal mining and processing; geothermal energy. The author discusses in more detail the problem in the petroleum industry, including the isotopes of concern, the hazards they present, the contamination which they cause, ways to dispose of contaminated materials, and regulatory issues. He points out there are three key programs to reduce legal exposure and problems due to these contaminants: waste minimization; NORM assesment (surveys); NORM compliance (training)

Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gray, P. [ed.

1997-02-01

This paper discusses the broad problems presented by Naturally Occuring Radioactive Materials (NORM). Technologically Enhanced naturally occuring radioactive material includes any radionuclides whose physical, chemical, radiological properties or radionuclide concentration have been altered from their natural state. With regard to NORM in particular, radioactive contamination is radioactive material in an undesired location. This is a concern in a range of industries: petroleum; uranium mining; phosphorus and phosphates; fertilizers; fossil fuels; forestry products; water treatment; metal mining and processing; geothermal energy. The author discusses in more detail the problem in the petroleum industry, including the isotopes of concern, the hazards they present, the contamination which they cause, ways to dispose of contaminated materials, and regulatory issues. He points out there are three key programs to reduce legal exposure and problems due to these contaminants: waste minimization; NORM assesment (surveys); NORM compliance (training).

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 561: Waste Disposal Areas, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with ROTC 1, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grant Evenson

2008-07-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 561 is located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 22, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 561 is comprised of the 10 corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: • 01-19-01, Waste Dump • 02-08-02, Waste Dump and Burn Area • 03-19-02, Debris Pile • 05-62-01, Radioactive Gravel Pile • 12-23-09, Radioactive Waste Dump • 22-19-06, Buried Waste Disposal Site • 23-21-04, Waste Disposal Trenches • 25-08-02, Waste Dump • 25-23-21, Radioactive Waste Dump • 25-25-19, Hydrocarbon Stains and Trench These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2008, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 561. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the Corrective Action Investigation for CAU 561 includes the following activities: • Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. • Conduct radiological surveys

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, REV 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 168 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps. CAU 168 consists of twelve Corrective Action Sites (CASs) in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The CASs contain surface and subsurface debris, impacted soil, and contaminated materials. Site characterization activities were conducted in 2002, and the results are presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 168 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). Site characterization results indicated that soil at several sites exceeded the clean-up criteria for total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and radionuclides. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved the proposed corrective actions specified in the CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The approved corrective actions include no further action, clean closure, and closure in place with administrative controls

Radioactive material accidents in the transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, D.L.; Magalhaes, M.H.; Sanches, M.P.; Sordi, G.M.A.A.

2008-01-01

Transport is an important part of the worldwide nuclear industry and the safety record for nuclear transport across the world is excellent. The increase in the use of radioactive materials in our country requires that these materials be moved from production sites to the end user. Despite the number of packages transported, the number of incidents and accidents in which they are involved is low. In Brazil, do not be records of victims of the radiation as a result of the transport of radioactive materials and either due to the accidents happened during the transports. The absence of victims of the radiation as result of accidents during the transports is a highly significant fact, mainly to consider that annually approximately two hundred a thousand packages containing radioactive material are consigned for transport throughout the country, of which eighty a thousand are for a medical use. This is due to well-founded regulations developed by governmental and intergovernmental organizations and to the professionalism of those in the industry. In this paper, an overview is presented of the activities related to the transport of radioactive material in the state of Sao Paulo. The applicable legislation, the responsibilities and tasks of the competent authorities are discussed. The categories of radioactive materials transported and the packaging requirements for the safe transport of these radioactive materials are also described. It also presents the packages amounts of carried and the accidents occurred during the transport of radioactive materials, in the last five years. The main occurred events are argued, demonstrating that the demanded requirements of security for any transport of radioactive material are enough to guarantee the necessary control of ionizing radiation expositions to transport workers, members of general public and the environment. (author)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kauss, Mark

2011-01-01

November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present; and (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: (1) At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. (2) At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed

Analogues to features and processes of a high-level radioactive waste repository proposed for Yucca Mountain, Nevada

Science.gov (United States)

Simmons, Ardyth M.; Stuckless, John S.; with a Foreword by Abraham Van Luik, U.S. Department of Energy

2010-01-01

Natural analogues are defined for this report as naturally occurring or anthropogenic systems in which processes similar to those expected to occur in a nuclear waste repository are thought to have taken place over time periods of decades to millennia and on spatial scales as much as tens of kilometers. Analogues provide an important temporal and spatial dimension that cannot be tested by laboratory or field-scale experiments. Analogues provide one of the multiple lines of evidence intended to increase confidence in the safe geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Although the work in this report was completed specifically for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the proposed geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste under the U.S. Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the applicability of the science, analyses, and interpretations is not limited to a specific site. Natural and anthropogenic analogues have provided and can continue to provide value in understanding features and processes of importance across a wide variety of topics in addressing the challenges of geologic isolation of radioactive waste and also as a contribution to scientific investigations unrelated to waste disposal. Isolation of radioactive waste at a mined geologic repository would be through a combination of natural features and engineered barriers. In this report we examine analogues to many of the various components of the Yucca Mountain system, including the preservation of materials in unsaturated environments, flow of water through unsaturated volcanic tuff, seepage into repository drifts, repository drift stability, stability and alteration of waste forms and components of the engineered barrier system, and transport of radionuclides through unsaturated and saturated rock zones.

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

none,

2013-06-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: • DOE hazardous and non-hazardous non-radioactive classified waste • DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW) • DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW) • U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and shall be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified waste may be sent to the NNSS as classified matter. Section 3.1.18 provides the requirements that must be met for permanent burial of classified matter. The NNSA/NFO and support contractors are available to assist the generator in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management Operations (EMO) at (702) 295-7063, and the call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: DOE hazardous and non-hazardous non-radioactive classified waste; DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW); DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW); and, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste. The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and shall be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified waste may be sent to the NNSS as classified matter. Section 3.1.18 provides the requirements that must be met for permanent burial of classified matter. The NNSA/NFO and support contractors are available to assist the generator in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management Operations (EMO) at (702) 295-7063, and the call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

Effects of non-radioactive material around radioactive material on PET image quality

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toshimitsu, Shinya; Yamane, Azusa; Hirokawa, Yutaka; Kangai, Yoshiharu

2015-01-01

Subcutaneous fat is a non-radioactive material surrounding the radioactive material. We developed a phantom, and examined the effect of subcutaneous fat on PET image quality. We created a cylindrical non-radioactive mimic of subcutaneous fat, placed it around a cylindrical phantom in up to three layers with each layer having a thickness of 20 mm to reproduce the obesity caused by subcutaneous fat. In the cylindrical phantom, hot spheres and cold spheres were arranged. The radioactivity concentration ratio between the hot spheres and B.G. was 4:1. The radioactivity concentration of B.G. was changed as follows : 1.33, 2.65, 4.00, and 5.30 kBq/mL. 3D-PET image were collected during 10 minutes. When the thickness of the mimicked subcutaneous fat increased from 0 mm to 60 mm, noise equivalent count decreased by 58.9-60.9% at each radioactivity concentration. On the other hand, the percentage of background variability increased 2.2-5.2 times. Mimic subcutaneous fat did not decrease the percentage contrast of the hot spheres, and did not affect the cold spheres. Subcutaneous fat decreases the noise equivalent count and increases the percentage of background variability, which degrades PET image quality. (author)

Transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-07-01

The purpose of this Norm is to establish, relating to the TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, safety and radiological protection requirements to ensure an adequate control level of the eventual exposure of persons, properties and environment to the ionizing radiation comprising: specifications on radioactive materials for transport; package type selection; specification of the package design and acceptance test requirements; arrangements relating to the transport itself; administrative requirements and responsibilities. (author)

Electrodeless light source provided with radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

Radioactive materials are used to assist in starting a discharge in an electrodeless light source. The radioactive emissions predispose on the inner surface of the lamp envelope loosely bound charges which thereafter assist in initiating discharge. The radioactive material can be enclosed within the lamp envelope in gaseous or non-gaseous form. Preferred materials are krypton 85 and americium 241. In addition, the radioactive material can be dispersed in the lamp envelope material or can be a pellet imbedded in the envelope material. Finally, the radioactive material can be located in the termination fixture. Sources of alpha particles, beta particles, or gamma rays are suitable. Because charges accumulate with time on the inner surface of the lamp envelope, activity levels as low as 10 -8 curie are effective as starting aids. (Auth.)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 425: Area 9 Main Lake Construction Debris Disposal Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

K. B. Campbell

2003-03-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 425 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 386 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 425 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS). CAS 09-08-001-TA09 consisted of a large pile of concrete rubble from the original Hard Target and construction debris associated with the Tornado Rocket Sled Tests. CAU 425 was closed in accordance with the FFACO and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection-approved Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 425: Area 9 Main Lake Construction Debris Disposal Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2002). CAU 425 was closed by implementing the following corrective actions: The approved corrective action for this unit was clean closure. Closure activities included: (1) Removal of all the debris from the site. (2) Weighing each load of debris leaving the job site. (3) Transporting the debris to the U.S. Air Force Construction Landfill for disposal. (4) Placing the radioactive material in a U.S. Department of Transportation approved container for proper transport and disposal. (5) Transporting the radioactive material to the Nevada Test Site for disposal. (6) Regrading the job site to its approximate original contours/elevation.

Life-Cycle Cost and Risk Analysis of Alternative Configurations for Shipping Low-Level Radioactive Waste to the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PM Daling; SB Ross; BM Biwer

1999-01-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a major receiver of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) for disposal. Currently, all LLW received at NTS is shipped by truck. The trucks use highway routes to NTS that pass through the Las Vegas Valley and over Hoover Dam, which is a concern of local stakeholder groups in the State of Nevada. Rail service offers the opportunity to reduce transportation risks and costs, according to the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (WM-PEIS). However, NTS and some DOE LLW generator sites are not served with direct rail service so intermodal transport is under consideration. Intermodal transport involves transport via two modes, in this case truck and rail, from the generator sites to NTS. LLW shipping containers would be transferred between trucks and railcars at intermodal transfer points near the LLW generator sites, NTS, or both. An Environmental Assessment (EA)for Intermodal Transportation of Low-Level Radioactive Waste to the Nevada Test Site (referred to as the NTSIntermodal -M) has been prepared to determine whether there are environmental impacts to alterations to the current truck routing or use of intermodal facilities within the State of Nevada. However, an analysis of the potential impacts outside the State of Nevada are not addressed in the NTS Intermodal EA. This study examines the rest of the transportation network between LLW generator sites and the NTS and evaluates the costs, risks, and feasibility of integrating intermodal shipments into the LLW transportation system. This study evaluates alternative transportation system configurations for NTS approved and potential generators based on complex-wide LLW load information. Technical judgments relative to the availability of DOE LLW generators to ship from their sites by rail were developed. Public and worker risk and life-cycle cost components are quantified. The study identifies and evaluates alternative scenarios that increase the use of rail (intermodal

Life-Cycle Cost and Risk Analysis of Alternative Configurations for Shipping Low-Level Radioactive Waste to the Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

PM Daling; SB Ross; BM Biwer

1999-12-17

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is a major receiver of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) for disposal. Currently, all LLW received at NTS is shipped by truck. The trucks use highway routes to NTS that pass through the Las Vegas Valley and over Hoover Dam, which is a concern of local stakeholder groups in the State of Nevada. Rail service offers the opportunity to reduce transportation risks and costs, according to the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (WM-PEIS). However, NTS and some DOE LLW generator sites are not served with direct rail service so intermodal transport is under consideration. Intermodal transport involves transport via two modes, in this case truck and rail, from the generator sites to NTS. LLW shipping containers would be transferred between trucks and railcars at intermodal transfer points near the LLW generator sites, NTS, or both. An Environmental Assessment (EA)for Intermodal Transportation of Low-Level Radioactive Waste to the Nevada Test Site (referred to as the NTSIntermodal -M) has been prepared to determine whether there are environmental impacts to alterations to the current truck routing or use of intermodal facilities within the State of Nevada. However, an analysis of the potential impacts outside the State of Nevada are not addressed in the NTS Intermodal EA. This study examines the rest of the transportation network between LLW generator sites and the NTS and evaluates the costs, risks, and feasibility of integrating intermodal shipments into the LLW transportation system. This study evaluates alternative transportation system configurations for NTS approved and potential generators based on complex-wide LLW load information. Technical judgments relative to the availability of DOE LLW generators to ship from their sites by rail were developed. Public and worker risk and life-cycle cost components are quantified. The study identifies and evaluates alternative scenarios that increase the use of rail (intermodal

Cleanup procedures at the Nevada Test Site and at other radioactively contaminated sites including representative costs of cleanup and treatment of contaminated areas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talmage, S.S.; Chilton, B.D.

1987-09-01

This review summarizes available information on cleanup procedures at the Nevada Test Site and at other radioactively contaminated sites. Radionuclide distribution and inventory, size of the contaminated areas, equipment, and cleanup procedures and results are included. Information about the cost of cleanup and treatment for contaminated land is presented. Selected measures that could be useful in estimating the costs of cleaning up radioactively contaminated areas are described. 76 refs., 16 tabs

Method of treating radioactive waste material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Allison, W.

1980-01-01

A method of treating radioactive waste material, particularly a radioactive sludge, is described comprising separating solid material from liquid material, compressing the solid material and encapsulating the solid material in a hardenable composition such as cement, bitumen or a synthetic resin. The separation and compaction stages are conveniently effected in a tube press. (author)

METHODOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS, AND BASELINE DATA FOR THE REPOSITORY DESIGN AND OPERATION, RAIL CORRIDORS, AND HEAVY TRUCK ROUTES, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, LINCOLN COUNTY, NEVADA, NYE COUNTY, NEVADA, ''REST OF NEVADA'', STATE OF NEVADA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This document was prepared in support of the ''Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain; Nye County, Nevada''. Specifically, the document evaluates potential socioeconomic impacts resulting from the various rail corridor and heavy haul truck route implementing alternatives, one of which would be selected to transport the nation's commercial and defense spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the proposed repository

Radioactive materials in recycled metals.

Science.gov (United States)

Lubenau, J O; Yusko, J G

1995-04-01

In recent years, the metal recycling industry has become increasingly aware of an unwanted component in metal scrap--radioactive material. Worldwide, there have been 35 instances where radioactive sources were unintentionally smelted in the course of recycling metal scrap. In some cases contaminated metal consumer products were distributed internationally. In at least one case, serious radiation exposures of workers and the public occurred. Radioactive material appearing in metal scrap includes sources subject to licensing under the Atomic Energy Act and also naturally occurring radioactive material. U.S. mills that have smelted a radioactive source face costs resulting from decontamination, waste disposal, and lost profits that range from 7 to 23 million U.S. dollars for each event. To solve the problem, industry and the government have jointly undertaken initiatives to increase awareness of the problem within the metal recycling industry. Radiation monitoring of recycled metal scrap is being performed increasingly by mills and, to a lesser extent, by scrap processors. The monitoring does not, however, provide 100% protection. Improvements in regulatory oversight by the government could stimulate improved accounting and control of licensed sources. However, additional government effort in this area must be reconciled with competing priorities in radiation safety and budgetary constraints. The threat of radioactive material in recycled metal scrap will continue for the foreseeable future and, thus, poses regulatory policy challenges for both developed and developing nations.

Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Management

2008-01-01

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells

Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2008-09-01

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells.

Disposal of low-level radioactive wastes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hendee, W.R.

1986-01-01

The generation of low-level radioactive waste is a natural consequence of the societal uses of radioactive materials. These uses include the application of radioactive materials to the diagnosis and treatment of human disease and to research into the causes of human disease and their prevention. Currently, low level radioactive wastes are disposed of in one of three shallow land-burial disposal sites located in Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina. With the passage in December 1980 of Public Law 96-573, The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, the disposal of low-level wastes generated in each state was identified as a responsibility of the state. To fulfill this responsibility, states were encouraged to form interstate compacts for radioactive waste disposal. At the present time, only 37 states have entered into compact agreements, in spite of the clause in Public Law 96-573 that established January 1, 1986, as a target date for implementation of state responsibility for radioactive wastes. Recent action by Congress has resulted in postponement of the implementation date to January 1, 1993

Detection of radioactive materials at borders

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-08-01

By international agreements, the movement of all radioactive materials within and between States should be subject to high standards of regulatory, administrative, safety and engineering controls to ensure that such movements are conducted in a safe and secure manner. In the case of nuclear materials, there are additional requirements for physical protection and accountability to ensure against threats of nuclear proliferation and to safeguard against any attempts at diversion. The results of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 emphasized the requirement for enhanced control and security of nuclear and radioactive materials. In this regard, measures are being taken to increase the global levels of physical protection and security for nuclear materials. Experience in many parts of the world continues to prove that movements of radioactive materials outside of the regulatory and legal frameworks continue to occur. Such movements may be either deliberate or inadvertent. Deliberate, illegal movements of radioactive materials, including nuclear material, for terrorist, political or illegal profit is generally understood to be illicit trafficking. The more common movements outside of regulatory control are inadvertent in nature. An example of an inadvertent movement might be the transport of steel contaminated by a melted radioactive source that was lost from proper controls. Such a shipment may present health and safety threats to the personnel involved as well as to the general public. States have the responsibility for combating illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements of radioactive materials. The IAEA co-operates with Member States and other international organizations in joint efforts to prevent incidents of illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements and to harmonize policies and measures by the provision of relevant advice through technical assistance and documents. As an example, the IAEA and the World Customs Organization (WCO) maintain a Memorandum

Detection of radioactive materials at borders

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-05-01

By international agreements, the movement of all radioactive materials within and between States should be subject to high standards of regulatory, administrative, safety and engineering controls to ensure that such movements are conducted in a safe and secure manner. In the case of nuclear materials, there are additional requirements for physical protection and accountability to ensure against threats of nuclear proliferation and to safeguard against any attempts at diversion. The results of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 emphasized the requirement for enhanced control and security of nuclear and radioactive materials. In this regard, measures are being taken to increase the global levels of physical protection and security for nuclear materials. Experience in many parts of the world continues to prove that movements of radioactive materials outside of the regulatory and legal frameworks continue to occur. Such movements may be either deliberate or inadvertent. Deliberate, illegal movements of radioactive materials, including nuclear material, for terrorist, political or illegal profit is generally understood to be illicit trafficking. The more common movements outside of regulatory control are inadvertent in nature. An example of an inadvertent movement might be the transport of steel contaminated by a melted radioactive source that was lost from proper controls. Such a shipment may present health and safety threats to the personnel involved as well as to the general public. States have the responsibility for combating illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements of radioactive materials. The IAEA co-operates with Member States and other international organizations in joint efforts to prevent incidents of illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements and to harmonize policies and measures by the provision of relevant advice through technical assistance and documents. As an example, the IAEA and the World Customs Organization (WCO) maintain a Memorandum

Detection of radioactive materials at borders

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-09-01

By international agreements, the movement of all radioactive materials within and between States should be subject to high standards of regulatory, administrative, safety and engineering controls to ensure that such movements are conducted in a safe and secure manner. In the case of nuclear materials, there are additional requirements for physical protection and accountability to ensure against threats of nuclear proliferation and to safeguard against any attempts at diversion. The results of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 emphasized the requirement for enhanced control and security of nuclear and radioactive materials. In this regard, measures are being taken to increase the global levels of physical protection and security for nuclear materials. Experience in many parts of the world continues to prove that movements of radioactive materials outside of the regulatory and legal frameworks continue to occur. Such movements may be either deliberate or inadvertent. Deliberate, illegal movements of radioactive materials, including nuclear material, for terrorist, political or illegal profit is generally understood to be illicit trafficking. The more common movements outside of regulatory control are inadvertent in nature. An example of an inadvertent movement might be the transport of steel contaminated by a melted radioactive source that was lost from proper controls. Such a shipment may present health and safety threats to the personnel involved as well as to the general public. States have the responsibility for combating illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements of radioactive materials. The IAEA co-operates with Member States and other international organizations in joint efforts to prevent incidents of illicit trafficking and inadvertent movements and to harmonize policies and measures by the provision of relevant advice through technical assistance and documents. As an example, the IAEA and the World Customs Organization (WCO) maintain a Memorandum

Radioactive certified reference materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Watanabe, Kazuo

2010-01-01

Outline of radioactive certified reference materials (CRM) for the analysis of nuclear materials and radioactive nuclides were described. The nuclear fuel CRMs are supplied by the three institutes: NBL in the US, CETAMA in France and IRMM in Belgium. For the RI CRMs, the Japan Radioisotope Association is engaged in activities concerning supply. The natural-matrix CRMs for the analysis of trace levels of radio-nuclides are prepared and supplied by NIST in the US and the IAEA. (author)

Nevada Applied Ecology Information Center: a review of technical information support provided to the Nevada Applied Ecology Group

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fore, C.S.; Pfuderer, H.A.

1983-01-01

The Nevada Applied Ecology Information Center (NAEIC) was established in January 1972 to serve the needs of the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) by identifying, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating technical information relevant to NAEG programs. Since its inception, the NAEIC has been active in providing specialized information support to NAEG staff in the following research areas: (1) environmental aspects of the transuranics; (2) historic literature (pre-1962) on plutonium and uranium; (3) cleanup and treatment of radioactively contaminated land; (4) bioenvironmental aspects of europium and rhodium; (5) NAEG contractor reports; and (6) uptake of radioactivity by food crops

Transport regulation for radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ha Vinh Phuong.

1986-01-01

Taking into account the specific dangers associated with the transport of radioactive materials (contamination, irradiation, heat, criticality), IAEA regulations concerning technical specifications and administrative procedures to ward off these dangers are presented. The international agreements related to the land transport, maritime transport and air transport of radioactive materials are also briefly reviewed

Accountability of Radioactive Materials in Malaysian Nuclear Agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Noor Fadilla Ismail; Wan Saffiey Wan Abdullah; Khairuddin Mohamad Kontol; Azimawati Ahmad; Suzilawati Muhd Sarowi; Mohd Fazlie Abdul Rashid

2016-01-01

Radioactive materials possessed in Malaysian Nuclear Agency have many beneficial applications for research and development, calibration, tracer and irradiation. There are two types of radioactive materials which consist of sealed sourced and unsealed sourced shall be accounted for and secured at all the times by following the security aspect. The Health Physics Group in the Department of Radiation Safety and Health Division is responsible to manage the issues related to any accountability for all radioactive material purchased or received under the radioactive material protocol. The accountability of radioactive materials in Malaysian Nuclear Agency is very important to ensure the security and control the radioactive materials to not to be lost or fall into the hands of people who do not have permission to possess or use it. The accountability of radioactive materials considered as a mandatory to maintaining accountability by complying the requirements of the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304) and regulations made thereunder and the conditions of license LPTA / A / 724. In this report describes the important element of accountability of radioactive materials in order to enhances security standard by allowing tracking of the locations of sources and to reduce the risk of radioactive materials falling into the wrong hands. (author)

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wills (editor), Cathy [National Security Technologies, LLC. (NSTec), Mercury, NV (United States)

2017-09-07

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple

Radioactive substances in the Danish building materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ulbak, K.

1986-01-01

Building materials as any other materials of natural occurrence contain small concentrations of natural radioactive elements. This natural radioactivity affects people inside buildings. This publiccation refers measurements of the Danish building materials, and radiation doses originating from this source affecting the Danish population are related to the other components of background radioactivity. (EG)

Import/Export Service of Radioactive Material and Radioactive Sources Service

CERN Multimedia

2004-01-01

Please note that the Import/Export Service of radioactive material (http://cern.ch/service-rp-shipping/ - e-mail : service-rp-shipping@cern.ch) and the Radioactive Sources Service (http://cern.ch/service-radioactive-sources - e-mail : service-radioactive-sources@cern.ch) at bldg. 24/E-024 will be closed on FRIDAY 10 SEPTEMBER 2004. Tel. 73171

Decision Support System For Management Of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal At The Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shott, G.; Yucel, V.; Desotell, L.; Carilli, J.T.

2006-01-01

The long-term safety of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) low-level radioactive disposal facilities is assessed by conducting a performance assessment -- a systematic analysis that compares estimated risks to the public and the environment with performance objectives contained in DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual. Before site operations, facilities design features such as final inventory, waste form characteristics, and closure cover design may be uncertain. Site operators need a modeling tool that can be used throughout the operational life of the disposal site to guide decisions regarding the acceptance of problematic waste streams, new disposal cell design, environmental monitoring program design, and final site closure. In response to these needs the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) has developed a decision support system for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site in Frenchman Flat on the Nevada Test Site. The core of the system is a probabilistic inventory and performance assessment model implemented in the GoldSim R simulation platform. The modeling platform supports multiple graphic capabilities that allow clear documentation of the model data sources, conceptual model, mathematical implementation, and results. The combined models have the capability to estimate disposal site inventory, contaminant concentrations in environmental media, and radiological doses to members of the public engaged in various activities at multiple locations. The model allows rapid assessment and documentation of the consequences of waste management decisions using the most current site characterization information, radionuclide inventory, and conceptual model. The model is routinely used to provide annual updates of site performance, evaluate the consequences of disposal of new waste streams, develop waste concentration limits, optimize the design of new disposal cells, and assess the adequacy of environmental

Estimation of global inventories of radioactive waste and other radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-06-01

A variety of nuclear activities have been carried out in the second part of the twentieth century for different purposes. Initially the emphasis was on military applications, but with the passage of time the main focus of nuclear activities has shifted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the use of radioactive material in industry, medicine and research. Regardless of the objectives, the nuclear activities generate radioactive waste. It was considered worthwhile to produce a set of worldwide data that could be assessed to evaluate the legacy of the nuclear activities performed up to the transition between the twentieth and the twenty first century. The assessment tries to cover the inventory of all the human produced radioactive material that can be considered to result from both military and civilian applications. This has caused remarkable difficulties since much of the data, particularly relating to military programmes, are not readily available. Consequently the data on the inventory of radioactive material should be considered as order-of-magnitude approximations. This report as a whole should be considered as a first iteration in a continuing process of updating and upgrading. The accumulations of radioactive materials can be considered a burden for human society, both at present and in the future, since they require continuing monitoring and control. Knowing the amounts and types of such radioactive inventories can help in the assessment of the relative burdens. Knowledge of the national or regional radioactive waste inventory is necessary for planning management operations, including the sizing and design of conditioning, storage and disposal facilities. A global inventory, either of radioactive waste or of other environmental accumulations of radioactive material, could be used to provide a perspective on the requirements and burdens associated with their management, by means of comparisons with the burdens caused by other types of waste or other

Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kgogo, Obonye

2016-04-01

The report provides insight and investigates whether Transport Regulations in Botswana follow international standards for transport of radioactive material. Radioactive materials are very useful in most of our activities and are manufactured in different countries, therefore end up traversing from one country to another and being transported in national roads .The IAEA regulation for the Transport of radioactive material is used as the reference guideline in this study. The current Regulations for Transport of radioactive material in Botswana do not cover all factors which need to be considered when transporting radioactive although they refer to IAEA regulations. Basing on an inadequacy of the regulations and category of radioactive materials in the country recommendations were made concerning security, packaging and worker training's. The regulations for the Transport of radioactive material in Botswana need to be reviewed and updated so that they can relate to international standard. (au)

Emergency Response to Radioactive Material Transport Accidents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

EL-shinawy, R.M.K.

2009-01-01

Although transport regulations issued by IAEA is providing a high degree of safety during transport opertions,transport accidents involving packages containing radioactive material have occurred and will occur at any time. Whenever a transport accident involving radioactive material accurs, and many will pose no radiation safety problems, emergency respnose actioms are meeded to ensure that radiation safety is maintained. In case of transport accident that result in a significant relesae of radioactive material , loss of shielding or loss of criticality control , that consequences should be controlled or mitigated by proper emergency response actions safety guide, Emergency Response Plamming and Prepardness for transport accidents involving radioactive material, was published by IAEA. This guide reflected all requirememts of IAEA, regulations for safe transport of radioactive material this guide provide guidance to the publicauthorites and other interested organziation who are responsible for establishing such emergency arrangements

Safe transport of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

Delivering radioactive material to where it is needed is a vital service to industry and medicine. Millions of packages are shipped all over the world by all modes of transport. The shipments pass through public places and must meet stringent safety requirements. This video explains how radioactive material is safely transported and describes the rules that carriers and handlers must follow

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543, Liquid Disposal Units, is listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. CAU 543 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 6 and 15 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 543 consists of the following seven CASs: (sm b ullet) CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad (sm b ullet) CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield (sm b ullet) CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area (sm b ullet) CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping From January 24, 2005 through April 14, 2005, CAU 543 site characterization activities were conducted, and are reported in Appendix A of the CAU 543 Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2005). The recommended corrective action as stated in the approved CADD is No Further Action for five of the CAU 543 CASs, and Closure In Place for the remaining two CASs

Security of radioactive sources and materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, C.; D'Amato, E.; Fernandez Moreno, S.

1998-01-01

The activities involving the use of radiation sources and radioactive materials are subject to the control of the national bodies dedicated to the nuclear regulation. The main objective of this control is to assure an appropriate level of radiological protection and nuclear safety. In Argentina, this function is carried out by the 'Nuclear Regulatory Authority' (ARN) whose regulatory system for radiation sources and radioactive materials comprises a registration, licensing and inspection scheme. The system is designed to keep track of such materials and to allow taking immediate corrective actions in case some incident occurs. Due to the appearance of a considerable number of illicit traffic events involving radiation sources and radioactive materials, the specialized national and international community has begun to evaluate the adoption of supplementary measures to those of 'safety' guided to its prevention and detection (i.e. 'security measures'). This paper presents a view on when the adoption of complementary 'security' measures to those of 'safety' would be advisable and which they would be. This will be done through the analysis of two hypothesis of illicit traffic, the first one with sources and radioactive materials considered as 'registered' and the second, with the same materials designated as 'not registered'. It will also describe succinctly the measures adopted by the ARN or under its analysis regarding the 'security' measures to sources and radioactive materials. (author)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mark Kauss

2011-06-01

, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low

Yucca Mountain, Nevada - A Proposed Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste (Volume 1) Introduction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

R.A. Levich; J.S. Stuckless

2006-01-01

Yucca Mountain in Nevada represents the proposed solution to what has been a lengthy national effort to dispose of high-level radioactive waste, waste which must be isolated from the biosphere for tens of thousands of years. This chapter reviews the background of that national effort and includes some discussion of international work in order to provide a more complete framework for the problem of waste disposal. Other chapters provide the regional geologic setting, the geology of the Yucca Mountain site, the tectonics, and climate (past, present, and future). These last two chapters are integral to prediction of long-term waste isolation

Yucca Mountain, Nevada - A Proposed Geologic Repository for High-Level Radioactive Waste (Volume 1) Introduction

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

R.A. Levich; J.S. Stuckless

2006-09-25

Yucca Mountain in Nevada represents the proposed solution to what has been a lengthy national effort to dispose of high-level radioactive waste, waste which must be isolated from the biosphere for tens of thousands of years. This chapter reviews the background of that national effort and includes some discussion of international work in order to provide a more complete framework for the problem of waste disposal. Other chapters provide the regional geologic setting, the geology of the Yucca Mountain site, the tectonics, and climate (past, present, and future). These last two chapters are integral to prediction of long-term waste isolation.

Development of radioactive materials inspection system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Lu; Wang Guobao; Chen Yuhua; Li Latu; Zhang Sujing

2005-01-01

Radioactive materials inspection system which is applied to inspect the horror activities of radioactive materials and its illegal transfer. The detector sections are made of highly stable and credible material. It has high sensitivity to radioactive materials. The inspect lowest limit of inspection is the 2-3 times to the background, the energy range is 30 keV-2.5 MeV and the response time is 0.5 s. Inspection message can be transmitted through wired or wireless web to implement remote control. The structure of the system is small, light and convenient. It is ideal for protecting society and public from the harm of the radiation. (authors)

Recovering method for high level radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fukui, Toshiki

1998-01-01

Offgas filters such as of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities and waste control facilities are burnt, and the burnt ash is melted by heating, and then the molten ashes are brought into contact with a molten metal having a low boiling point to transfer the high level radioactive materials in the molten ash to the molten metal. Then, only the molten metal is evaporated and solidified by drying, and residual high level radioactive materials are recovered. According to this method, the high level radioactive materials in the molten ashes are transferred to the molten metal and separated by the difference of the distribution rate of the molten ash and the molten metal. Subsequently, the molten metal to which the high level radioactive materials are transferred is heated to a temperature higher than the boiling point so that only the molten metal is evaporated and dried to be removed, and residual high level radioactive materials are recovered easily. On the other hand, the molten ash from which the high level radioactive material is removed can be discarded as ordinary industrial wastes as they are. (T.M.)

Packaging and transportation of radioactive materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1978-01-01

The presentations made at the Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials are included. The purpose of the meeting was for the interchange of information on the technology and politics of radioactive material transportation. Separate abstracts were prepared for individual items. (DC)

Packaging and transportation of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

The presentations made at the Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials are included. The purpose of the meeting was for the interchange of information on the technology and politics of radioactive material transportation. Separate abstracts were prepared for individual items

Waste Management at the Nevada Test Site Fiscal Year 2001 Current Status

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Becker, B.D.; Clayton, W.A.; Crowe, B.M.

2002-01-01

The performance objectives of the U. S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV) Low-level Radioactive Waste (LLW) disposal facilities located at the Nevada Test Site transcend those of any other radioactive waste disposal site in the United States. Situated at the southern end of the Great Basin, 244 meters (800 feet) above the water table, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) has utilized a combination of engineered shallow land disposal cells and deep augured shafts to dispose a variety of waste streams. These include high volume low-activity waste, classified radioactive material, and high-specific-activity special case waste. Fifteen miles north of Area 5 is the Area 3 RWMS. Here bulk LLW disposal takes place in subsidence craters formed from underground testing of nuclear weapons. Earliest records indicate that documented LLW disposal activities have occurred at the Area 5 and Area 3 RWMSs since 1961 and 1 968, respectively. However, these activities have only been managed under a formal program since 1978. This paper describes the technical attributes of the facilities, present and future capacities and capabilities, and provides a description of the process from waste approval to final disposition. The paper also summarizes the current status of the waste disposal operations

International conventions for measuring radioactivity of building materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tan Chenglong

2004-01-01

In buildings, whether civil or industrial, natural radioactivity always occurs at different degrees in the materials (main building materials, decorative materials). Concerns on radioactivity from building materials is unavoidable for human living and developing. As a member of WTO, China's measuring method of radioactivity for building materials, including radionuclides limitation for building materials, hazard evaluation system etc, should keep accordance with the international rules and conventions. (author)

A risk communication case study: the Nevada risk assessment/management program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hechanova, A.E.

2000-01-01

The Nevada Risk Assessment/Management Program (NRAMP) is part of a national effort by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to develop new sources of information and approaches to risk assessment, risk management, risk communication and public outreach as these objectives relate to the ecological and human health effects of radioactive and hazardous material management and site remediation activities. This paper reviews the innovation behind the NRAMP project and presents a synopsis of the NRAMP effort which occurred from 1995 to 2000. The primary goals of the DOE in awarding the cooperative agreement establishing NRAMP were to (I) use a risk-based approach to evaluate the consequences of alternative actions in DOE's Environmental Remediation Programs at sites in Nevada and (2) use a neutral and credible institution outside the DOE to perform the risk assessments and contribute to public education about environmental management issues at the Nevada Test Site. (author)

Airborne concentrations of radioactive materials in severe accidents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ross, D.F. Jr.; Denning, R.S.

1989-01-01

Radioactive materials would be released to the containment building of a commercial nuclear reactor during each of the stages of a severe accident. Results of analyses of two accident sequences are used to illustrate the magnitudes of these sources of radioactive materials, the resulting airborne mass concentrations, the characteristics of the airborne aerosols, the potential for vapor forms of radioactive materials, the effectiveness of engineered safety features in reducing airborne concentrations, and the release of radioactive materials to the environment. Ability to predict transport and deposition of radioactive materials is important to assessing the performance of containment safety features in severe accidents and in the development of accident management procedures to reduce the consequences of severe accidents

Radioactive materials' transportation main routes in Brazil. Radiation protection aspects about radioactive materials transportation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vaz, Solange dos Reis e; Andrade, Fernando de Menezes; Aleixo, Luiz Claudio Martins

2007-01-01

The heavy transportation in Brazil is generally done by highways. The radioactive material transportation follow this same rule. Whenever a radioactive material is carried by the road, by the sea or by the air, in some cases, a kind of combination of those transportation ways, the transport manager has to create a Transportation Plan and submit it to CNEN. Only after CNEN's approval, the transportation can be done. The plan must have the main action on Radiation Protection, giving responsibilities and showing all the directing that will be take. Although, the Brazilian's highways are not in good conditions, one could say that some of them are not good enough for any kind of transportation. But we are facing radioactive material use increase but the hospitals and industries, that the reason it's much more common that kind of transportation nowadays. So, because of that, a special attention by the governments must be provide to those activities. This paper goal is to show the real conditions of some important highways in Brazil in a radioactive protection's perspective and give some suggestions to adjust some of those roads to this new reality. (author)

Working safely with radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Davies, Wynne

1993-01-01

In common with exposure to many other laboratory chemicals, exposure to ionising radiations and to radioactive materials carries a small risk of causing harm. Because of this, there are legal limits to the amount of exposure to ionising radiations at work and special rules for working with radioactive materials. Although radiation protection is a complex subject it is possible to simplify to 10 basic things you should do -the Golden Rules. They are: 1) understand the nature of the hazard and get practical training; 2) plan ahead to minimise time spent handling radioactivity; 3) distance yourself appropriately from sources of radiation; 4) use appropriate shielding for the radiation; 5) contain radioactive materials in defined work areas; 6) wear appropriate protective clothing and dosimeters; 7) monitor the work area frequently for contamination control; 8) follow the local rules and safe ways of working; 9) minimise accumulation of waste and dispose of it by appropriate routes, and 10) after completion of work, monitor, wash, and monitor yourself again. These rules are expanded in this article. (author)

Decontamination method for radioactively contaminated material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shoji, Yuichi; Mizuguchi, Hiroshi; Sakai, Hitoshi; Komatsubara, Masaru

1998-01-01

Radioactively contaminated materials having surfaces contaminated by radioactive materials are dissolved in molten salts by the effect of chlorine gas. The molten salts are brought into contact with a low melting point metal to reduce only radioactive materials by substitution reaction and recover them into the low melting point metal. Then, a low melting point metal phase and a molten salt phase are separated. The low melting point metal phase is evaporated to separate the radioactive materials from molten metals. On the other hand, other metal ions dissolved in the molten salts are reduced into metals by electrolysis at an anode and separated from the molten salts and served for regeneration. The low melting point metals are reutilized together with contaminated lead, after subjected to decontamination, generated from facilities such as nuclear power plant or lead for disposal. Since almost all materials including the molten salts and the molten metals can be enclosed, the amount of wastes can be reduced. In addition, radiation exposure of operators who handle them can be reduced. (T.M.)

Radioactive material packaging performance testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Romano, T.; Cruse, J.M.

1991-02-01

To provide uniform packaging of hazardous materials on an international level, the United Nations has developed packaging recommendations that have been implemented worldwide. The United Nations packaging recommendations are performance oriented, allowing for a wide variety of package materials and systems. As a result of this international standard, efforts in the United States are being directed toward use of performance-oriented packaging and elimination of specification (designed) packaging. This presentation will focus on trends, design evaluation, and performance testing of radioactive material packaging. The impacts of US Department of Transportation Dockets HM-181 and HM-169A on specification and low-specific activity radioactive material packaging requirements are briefly discussed. The US Department of Energy's program for evaluating radioactive material packings per US Department of Transportation Specification 7A Type A requirements, is used as the basis for discussing low-activity packaging performance test requirements. High-activity package testing requirements are presented with examples of testing performed at the Hanford Site that is operated by Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy. 5 refs., 2 tabs

Safe transport of radioactive materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-12-31

The film shows the widespread use of radioactive materials in industry, medicine and research and explains the need for transporting nuclear material from producer to user. It shows the way in which packages containing radioactive materials are handled during transport and explains the most important provisions of the IAEA transport regulations, safety series no. 6, such as packaging design criteria and testing requirements, illustrated by various tests carried out, specimen packages and package and freight container labelling. Also illustrated are practical measures to be taken in case of an accident

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2008-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) documents closure activities for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543, Liquid Disposal Units, according to the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 543 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2007). CAU 543 is located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada (Figure 1), and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad; CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank; CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping; and CAS 06-07-01 is located at the Decontamination Facility in Area 6, adjacent to Yucca Lake. The remaining CASs are located at the former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm in Area 15. The purpose of this CR is to provide a summary of the completed closure activities, to document waste disposal, and to present analytical data confirming that the remediation goals were met. The closure alternatives consisted of closure in place for two of the CASs, and no further action with implementation of best management practices (BMPs) for the remaining five CASs.

Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cathy Wills

2008-09-01

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of nonradiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, a summary of compliance with environmental regulations, pollution prevention and waste minimization accomplishments, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2007. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This report meets these objectives for the NTS and three offsite Nevada facilities mentioned in this report.

Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cathy Wills

2008-01-01

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of nonradiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, a summary of compliance with environmental regulations, pollution prevention and waste minimization accomplishments, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2007. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This report meets these objectives for the NTS and three offsite Nevada facilities mentioned in this report

Transporting radioactive materials: Q ampersand A to your questions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-04-01

Over 2 million packages of radioactive materials are shipped each year in the United States. These shipments are carried by trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes every day just like other commodities. Compliance with Federal regulations ensures that radioactive materials are transported safely. Proper packaging is the key to safe shipment. Package designs for radioactive materials must protect the public and the environment even in case of an accident. As the level of radioactivity increases, packaging design requirements become more stringent. Radioactive materials have been shipped in this country for more than 40 years. As with other commodities, vehicles carrying these materials have been involved in accidents. However, no deaths or serious injuries have resulted from exposure to the radioactive contents of these shipments. People are concerned about how radioactive shipments might affect them and the environment. This booklet briefly answers some of the commonly asked questions about the transport of radioactive materials. More detailed information is available from the sources listed at the end of this booklet

Institutional storage and disposal of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

St Germain, J.

1986-01-01

Storage and disposal of radioactive materials from nuclear medicine operations must be considered in the overall program design. The storage of materials from daily operation, materials in transit, and long-term storage represent sources of exposure. The design of storage facilities must include consideration of available space, choice of material, occupancy of surrounding areas, and amount of radioactivity anticipated. Neglect of any of these factors will lead to exposure problems. The ultimate product of any manipulation of radioactive material will be some form of radioactive waste. This waste may be discharged into the environment or placed within a storage area for packaging and transfer to a broker for ultimate disposal. Personnel must be keenly aware of packaging regulations of the burial site as well as applicable federal and local codes. Fire codes should be reviewed if there is to be storage of flammable materials in any area. Radiation protection personnel should be aware of community attitudes when considering the design of the waste program

Transport of radioactive materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1960-04-15

The increasing use of radioactive substances, not only in reactor operations but also in medicine, industry and other fields, is making the movement of these materials progressively wider, more frequent and larger in volume. Although regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials have been in existence for many years, it has now become necessary to modify or supplement the existing provisions on an international basis. It is essential that the regulations should be applied uniformly by all countries. It is also desirable that the basic regulations should be uniform for all modes of transport so as to simplify the procedures to be complied with by shippers and carriers

Radioactive material packaging performance testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Romano, T.

1992-06-01

In an effort to provide uniform packaging of hazardous material on an international level, recommendations for the transport of dangerous goods have been developed by the United Nations. These recommendations are performance oriented and contrast with a large number of packaging specifications in the US Department of Transportation's hazard materials regulations. This dual system presents problems when international shipments enter the US Department of Transportation's system. Faced with the question of continuing a dual system or aligning with the international system, the Research and Special Programs Administration of the US Department of Transportation responded with Docket HM-181. This began the transition toward the international transportation system. Following close behind is Docket HM-169A, which addressed low specific activity radioactive material packaging. This paper will discuss the differences between performance-oriented and specification packaging, the transition toward performance-oriented packaging by the US Department of Transportation, and performance-oriented testing of radioactive material packaging by Westinghouse Hanford Company. Dockets HM-181 and HM-169A will be discussed along with Type A (low activity) and Type B (high activity) radioactive material packaging evaluations

Nevada Test Site Radiation Protection Program - Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Managers' Council

2008-01-01

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection,' establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This NTS RPP promulgates the radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for occupational exposure to ionizing radiation resulting from NNSA/NSO activities at the NTS and other operational areas as stated in 10 CFR 835.1(a). NNSA/NSO activities (including design, construction, operation, and decommissioning) within the scope of this RPP may result in occupational exposures to radiation or radioactive material. Therefore, a system of control is implemented through specific references to the site-specific NV/YMP RCM. This system of control is intended to ensure that the following criteria are met: (1) occupational exposures are maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), (2) DOE's limiting values are not exceeded, (3) employees are aware of and are prepared to cope with emergency conditions, and (4) employees are not inadvertently exposed to radiation or radioactive material

Nevada Test Site Radiation Protection Program - Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Radiological Control Managers' Council

2008-06-01

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection,' establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This NTS RPP promulgates the radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for occupational exposure to ionizing radiation resulting from NNSA/NSO activities at the NTS and other operational areas as stated in 10 CFR 835.1(a). NNSA/NSO activities (including design, construction, operation, and decommissioning) within the scope of this RPP may result in occupational exposures to radiation or radioactive material. Therefore, a system of control is implemented through specific references to the site-specific NV/YMP RCM. This system of control is intended to ensure that the following criteria are met: (1) occupational exposures are maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), (2) DOE's limiting values are not exceeded, (3) employees are aware of and are prepared to cope with emergency conditions, and (4) employees are not inadvertently exposed to radiation or radioactive material.

U.S. port commerce in radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marti, B.E.

1987-01-01

Much attention has focused on the movement of radioactive materials over land transport systems. On the other hand, maritime flow and associated throughput studies of such substances have been neglected. Although several peaks and troughs are evident between 1972 and 1981, radioactive tonnage moving through U.S. port facilities steadily increasing. In the ten-year period assessed, total radioactive materials handled at U.S. ports expanded by over 19,000 tons, which amounts to almost a 173 percent growth rate. The purpose of this exploratory research is threefold. First, it identifies all U.S. ports which were involved in loading or discharging radioactive materials. The major goal of the identification process is to broaden public awareness of these types of movement. Second, it classifies U.S. seaports based on the magnitude of radioactive tonnage handled. The function of the classification is to impose some order on the varied data, while at the same time categorizing large, medium, and small facilities. Finally, it seeks to verify whether or not a long term trend exists. The objective of the verification process is to ascertain if the distribution of radioactive materials handled at individual ports has remained constant. Port safety and contingency planning are clearly within the purview of coastal zone management. The results of this preliminary research should form a foundation for future studies which compare and evaluate local, state, and federal regulatory policy pertaining to port operations involving radioactive materials, including waste

Transport of radioactive materials by post

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-11-01

The objective of the Seminar was to encourage safe and efficient carriage of radioactive material by post. Adequate, up-to-date regulations for international and domestic shipment of radioactive material by all modes of transport, including by mail, have been published by the IAEA. UPU, ICAO, IATA and other international organizations as well as a majority of the countries of the world have adopted most sections of the Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. Although there is an apparent need for shipping radioactive material by mail, some countries allow only domestic shipments and the postal regulations applied in these countries often differs from the international regulations. Only about 25 countries are known to allow international (as well as domestic) shipments. From the discussions and comments at the Seminar, it appears that the option of shipment by post would be advantageous to enhance both the safety and economy of transporting, as well as to increase availability of, radioactive materials. The Agency's Regulations for transport by post as adopted by the UPU and ICAO are considered to provide a high level of safety and ensure a negligible element of risk. A more uniform application of these regulations within UPU Member States should be encouraged. The competent authority for implementation of the other parts of the Agency's Regulations in each of the Member States should be invited to advise the Postal Administrators and assist in applying the requirements to national as well as international postal shipments

Addendum 1 Composite Analysis for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vefa Yucel

2001-01-01

A disposal authorization statement (DAS) was issued by the U.S. Department of Energy/Headquarters (DOE/HQ) on December 5, 2000, authorizing the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office to continue the operation of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site for the disposal of low-level waste and mixed low-level waste. Prior to the issuance of the DAS, the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (LFRG) had conducted reviews of the performance assessment (PA) and the composite analysis (CA) for the Area 5 RWMS, in accordance with the requirements of the DOE Radioactive Waste Management Order DOE O 435.1. A brief history of the reviews is as follows. (The reviews were conducted by independent review teams chartered by the LFRG; the review findings and recommendations were issued in review team reports to the LFRG.) The LFRG accepted the initial PA, with conditions, on August 30, 1996. Revision 2.1 to the PA was issued in January 1998, implementing the conditions of acceptance of the 1996 PA. The LFRG reviewed Revision 2.1 as part of the Area 5 RWMS CA review during 2000, and found it acceptable. The CA and the Supplemental Information provided in response to issues identified during the initial review of the CA were accepted by the LFRG. The Supplemental Information (including the responses to four key issues) is included in the Review Team Report to the LFRG, which recommends that it be incorporated into the CA and issued to all known holders of the CA. The Area 5 RWMS DAS requires that the Supplemental Information generated during the DOE/HQ review of the CA be incorporated into the CA within one year of the date of issuance of the DAS. This report, the first addendum to the Area 5 CA, is prepared to fulfill that requirement. The Supplemental Information includes the following: Issues Identified in the Review Team Report; Crosswalk Presentation; and Maintaining Doses As Low As Reasonably

Very low level radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaller, K.H.; Linsley, G.; Elert, M.

1993-01-01

Man's environment contains naturally occurring radionuclides and doses from exposures to these radionuclides mostly cannot be avoided. Consequently, almost everything may be considered as very low level radioactive material. In practical terms, management and the selection of different routes for low level material is confined to material which was subject to industrial processing or which is under a system of radiological control. Natural radionuclides with concentrations reaching reporting or notification levels will be discussed below; nevertheless, the main body of this paper will be devoted to material, mainly of artificial origin, which is in the system involving notification, registration and licensing of practices and sources. It includes material managed in the nuclear sector and sources containing artificially produced radionuclides used in hospitals, and in industry. Radioactive materials emit ionising radiations which are harmful to man and his environment. National and international regulations provide the frame for the system of radiation protection. Nevertheless, concentrations, quantities or types of radionuclide may be such, that the material presents a very low hazard, and may therefore be removed from regulatory control, as it would be a waste of time and effort to continue supervision. These materials are said to be exempted from regulatory control. Material exempted in a particular country is no longer distinguishable from ''ordinary'' material and may be moved from country to country. Unfortunately, criteria for exempting radioactive materials differ strongly between countries and free trade. Therefore there is a necessity for an international approach to be developed for exemption levels

Response to Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Two response paths are discussed in the presentation. Reactive response follows when an alarm of a border monitor goes off or a notification is received about an incident involving or suspected to involve radioactive materials. The response can also be the result of the finding of a discrepancy between a customs declaration form and the corresponding actual shipment. Proactive response is undertaken upon receipt of intelligence information suggesting the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, notification about the discovery of non-compliance with transport regulations or if discrepancies are found in an inventory of radioactive materials.

Handbook for Response to Suspect Radioactive Materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cliff, William C.; Pappas, Richard A.; Arthur, Richard J.

2005-01-01

This document provides response actions to be performed following the initial port, airport, or border crossing discovery of material that is suspected of being radioactive. The purpose of this guide is to provide actions appropriate for handling radioactive material

A method for prevention of radioactive material release

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Uchida, Shunsuke; Sato, Chikara; Kitamura, Masao.

1975-01-01

Object: To provide a method for preventing an underwater radioactive material from being released in a simple and highly reliable manner, which can decrease an amount of radioactive materials discharged into open air from reactor water containing a large amount of radioactive materials such as a reactor core pool. Structure: Pure warm water higher in temperature than that of reactor water is poured from the top of a water surface of a water tank which stores reactor water containing radioactive materials such as radioactive iodine, and water is drawn through an outlet located downwardly of the pure warm water inlet to form a layer of pure warm water at the upper part of the water tank while preventing diffusion of the reactor water into the pure warm water by the difference in density between the reactor water and the pure warm water and downward movement of the pure warm water, thereby preventing contact of the reactor water with the atmosphere and diffusion of the radioactive material into the atmosphere. (Kamimura, M.)

Nevada Test Site, site treatment plan 1999 annual update

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-03-01

A Site Treatment Plan (STP) is required for facilities at which the US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) generates or stores mixed waste (MW), defined by the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFC Act) as waste containing both a hazardous waste subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and a radioactive material subject to the Atomic Energy Act. This STP was written to identify specific treatment facilities for treating DOE/NV generated MW and provides proposed implementation schedules. This STP was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and provided the basis for the negotiation and issuance of the FFC Act Consent Order (CO) dated March 6, 1996, and revised June 15, 1998. The FFC Act CO sets forth stringent regulatory requirements to comply with the implementation of the STP

Background radioactivity in environmental materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maul, P.R.; O'Hara, J.P.

1989-01-01

This paper presents the results of a literature search to identify information on concentrations of 'background' radioactivity in foodstuffs and other commonly available environmental materials. The review has concentrated on naturally occurring radioactivity in foods and on UK data, although results from other countries have also been considered where appropriate. The data are compared with established definitions of a 'radioactive' substance and radionuclides which do not appear to be adequately covered in the literature are noted. (author)

Radioactive material inventory control at a waste characterization facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yong, L.K.; Chapman, J.A.; Schultz, F.J.

1996-01-01

Due to the recent introduction of more stringent Department of Energy (DOE) regulations and requirements pertaining to nuclear and criticality safety, the control of radioactive material inventory has emerged as an important facet of operations at DOE nuclear facilities. In order to comply with nuclear safety regulations and nuclear criticality requirements, radioactive material inventories at each nuclear facility have to be maintained below limits specified for the facility in its safety authorization basis documentation. Exceeding these radioactive material limits constitutes a breach of the facility's nuclear and criticality safety envelope and could potentially result in an accident, cause a shut-down of the facility, and bring about imminent regulatory repercussions. The practice of maintaining control of radioactive material, especially sealed and unsealed sources, is commonplace and widely implemented; however, the requirement to track the entire radioactivity inventory at each nuclear facility for the purpose of ensuring nuclear safety is a new development. To meet the new requirements, the Applied Radiation Measurements Department at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has developed an information system, called the open-quotes Radioactive Material Inventory Systemclose quotes (RMIS), to track the radioactive material inventory at an ORNL facility, the Waste Examination and Assay Facility (WEAF). The operations at WEAF, which revolve around the nondestructive assay and nondestructive examination of waste and related research and development activities, results in an ever-changing radioactive material inventory. Waste packages and radioactive sources are constantly being brought in or taken out of the facility; hence, use of the RMIS is necessary to ensure that the radioactive material inventory limits are not exceeded

Waste minimization for commercial radioactive materials users generating low-level radioactive waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.K.; Gitt, M.; Williams, G.A.; Branch, S.; Otis, M.D.; McKenzie-Carter, M.A.; Schurman, D.L.

1991-07-01

The objective of this document is to provide a resource for all states and compact regions interested in promoting the minimization of low-level radioactive waste (LLW). This project was initiated by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and Massachusetts waste streams have been used as examples; however, the methods of analysis presented here are applicable to similar waste streams generated elsewhere. This document is a guide for states/compact regions to use in developing a system to evaluate and prioritize various waste minimization techniques in order to encourage individual radioactive materials users (LLW generators) to consider these techniques in their own independent evaluations. This review discusses the application of specific waste minimization techniques to waste streams characteristic of three categories of radioactive materials users: (1) industrial operations using radioactive materials in the manufacture of commercial products, (2) health care institutions, including hospitals and clinics, and (3) educational and research institutions. Massachusetts waste stream characterization data from key radioactive materials users in each category are used to illustrate the applicability of various minimization techniques. The utility group is not included because extensive information specific to this category of LLW generators is available in the literature

The safe transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swindell, G.E.

1975-01-01

In the course of transport by road, rail, sea and air, consignments of radioactive material are in close proximity to ordinary members of the public and in most cases they are loaded and unloaded by transport workers who have no special training or experience in the handling of radioactive substances. The materials being transported cover a wide variety - ranging from small batches of short-lived radionuclides used in medical practice which can be transported in small sealed lead pots in cardboard boxes, to large, extremely radioactive consignments of irradiated nuclear fuel in flasks weighing many tons. With the growing development of nuclear power programmes the transport of irradiated fuel is likely to increase markedly. It is clear that unless adequate regulations concerning the design and assembly of the packages containing these materials are precisely set down and strictly carried out, there would be a high probability that some of the radioactive contents would be released, leading to contamination of other transported goods and the general environment, and to the delivery of a radiation dose to the transport workers and the public. An additional requirement is that the transport should proceed smoothly and without delay. This is particularly important for radioactive materials of short half-life, which would lose significant amounts of their total activity in unnecessary delays at international boundaries. Therefore, it is essential that the regulations are also enforced, to ensure that the radioactive material is contained and the surrounding radiation level reduced to a value which poses no threat to other sensitive goods such as photographic film, or to transport workers and other passengers. These regulations should be as uniform as possible on an international basis, so that consignments can move freely from one country to another with as little delay as possible at the frontiers. (author)

Spreadsheet application to classify radioactive material for shipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, A.N.

1997-12-01

A spreadsheet application has been developed at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory to aid the shipper when classifying nuclide mixtures of normal form, radioactive materials. The results generated by this spreadsheet are used to confirm the proper US Department of Transportation (DOT) classification when offering radioactive material packages for transport. The user must input to the spreadsheet the mass of the material being classified, the physical form (liquid or not), and the activity of each regulated nuclide. The spreadsheet uses these inputs to calculate two general values: (1) the specific activity of the material, and (2) a summation calculation of the nuclide content. The specific activity is used to determine if the material exceeds the DOT minimal threshold for a radioactive material (Yes or No). If the material is calculated to be radioactive, the specific activity is also used to determine if the material meets the activity requirement for one of the three Low Specific Activity designations (LSA-I, LSA-II, LSA-III, or Not LSA). Again, if the material is calculated to be radioactive, the summation calculation is then used to determine which activity category the material will meet (Limited Quantity, Type A, Type B, or Highway Route Controlled Quantity)

Development of an expert system for radioactive material transportation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tamanoi, K.; Ishitobi, M.; Shinohara, Y.

1990-01-01

An expert system to deal with radioactive material transportation was developed. This expert system is based on 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material' by IAEA issued 1985. IAEA published the regulations under such environments that safety transportation has become increasingly being focused as uses of radioactive materials are more pervasive, not only in nuclear field but also in non-nuclear purposes. Attentions are payed for operators and environment to establish safety in handling radioactive materials. In the 1985 regulations, detailed categorization of radioactive materials and, correspondingly, new classification of packages are introduced. This categorization is more complicated than old regulations, leading us to develop an expert system to evaluate easily the packages categorization. (author)

The management of radioactive materials spills

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ryan, M.T.; Ebenhack, D.G.

1985-01-01

The management and handling of a radioactive materials spill must be swift and effective to reduce or mitigate any adverse impacts on public health and safety. Spills within nuclear facilities generally pose less of a public health impact than spills in areas of public access. The essential elements of spill management include prior planning by agencies which may be required to respond to a spill. Any plan for the management of radioactive materials spills must be flexible enough to be applied in a variety of situations. The major elements of a radioactive materials spill plan, however, apply in every case. It is essential that communications be clear and effective, that the management of a spill be directed by a responsible party whose authority is recognized by everyone involved and that the actions, according to the principles discussed above, be taken to assure the safety of any injured personnel, containment and stabilization and clean up the spill and to verify through radiological surveys and sample analyses that the clean up is complete. Any spill of radioactive materials, minor or major, should be assessed so that similar spills or accidents can be prevented

Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2005

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cathy A. Wills

2006-01-01

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2005 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts

Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2005

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cathy A. Wills

2006-10-01

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2005 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts.

Engineering materials for high level radioactive waste repository

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wen Zhijian

2009-01-01

Radioactive wastes can arise from a wide range of human activities and have different physical and chemical forms with various radioactivity. The high level radioactive wastes (HLW)are characterized by nuclides of very high initial radioactivity, large thermal emissivity and the long life-term. The HLW disposal is highly concerned by the scientists and the public in the world. At present, the deep geological disposal is regarded as the most reasonable and effective way to safely dispose high-level radioactive wastes in the world. The conceptual model of HLW geological disposal in China is based on a multi-barrier system that combines an isolating geological environment with an engineering barrier system(EBS). The engineering materials in EBS include the vitrified HLW, canister, overpack, buffer materials and backfill materials. Referring to progress in the world, this paper presents the function, the requirement for material selection and design, and main scientific projects of R and D of engineering materials in HLW repository. (authors)

Transport of radioactive material in Sudan practice and regulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abdalla, M. K. E.

2010-12-01

In the last couple of decades there has been an impressive increase in applications of radioactive material. Such an extensive and widely spread usage of radioactive materials demands safe transportation of radioactive material from the production site to the application location, as well as quick and effective response in a case of an unexpected transportation event according to Sudan Atomic Energy Commission (SAEC) regulation. The thesis described the local practice for transport of radioactive material as compared to the international standards for radiation protection, and also discussed the emergency procedures that must be follow in case of accident during transport of radioactive material. Furthermore, the objective of this study was also to set proposals for how to cope in the event of a radiological accident. The study methods included survey of current literature on safe transport of radioactive material, survey of national regulations on the subjects in additional to case studies aimed at investigating the practical issues pertinent to transport of radioactive materials in Sudan. A comprehensive review was presented on how to classification of radioactive packages and general requirement for all packaging and packages according to international standard. transport of number of radioactive sources from Khartoum airport to the field was evaluated with regard transport index, category of source, type of package, dose rate around the source, time to destination and means of transport of doses to public, worker are be made. All results were within the limit specified in the national as well as international regulation. The study has addressed for the first time the practice of transport of radioactive material in Sudan. It is anticipated that the results will encourage national organizational and professional bodies to enhance radiation protection and safety of radioactive sources. (Author)

Transport of radioactive material in Bangladesh: a regulatory perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mollah, A.S.

2004-01-01

Radioactive material is transported in Bangladesh in various types of packages and by different modes of transport. The transport of radioactive materials involves a risk both for the workers and members of the public. The safe transport of radioactive material is ensured in Bangladesh by compliance with Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) Act-93 and NSRC Rules-97. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) is the competent authority for the enforcement of the NSRC act and rules. The competent authority has established regulatory control at each stage to ensure radiation safety to transport workers, members of general public and the environment. An overview is presented of the activities related to the transport of radioactive material in Bangladesh. In particular, the applicable legislation, the scope of authority and the regulatory functions of the competent authority are discussed. The categories of radioactive materials transported and the packaging requirements for the safe transport of these radioactive materials are also described. (author)

Disposal containers for radioactive waste materials and separation systems for radioactive waste materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rubin, L.S.

1986-01-01

A separation system for dewatering radioactive waste materials includes a disposal container, drive structure for receiving the container, and means for releasably attaching the container to the drive structure. The separation structure disposed in the container adjacent the inner surface of the side wall structure retains solids while allowing passage of liquids. The inlet port structure in the container top wall is normally closed by first valve structure that is centrifugally actuated to open the inlet port and the discharge port structure at the container periphery receives liquid that passes through the separation structure and is normally closed by a second valve structure that is centrifugally actuated to open the discharge ports. The container also includes a coupling structure for releasable engagement with the centrifugal drive structure. The centrifugal force produced when the container is driven in rotation by the drive structure opens the valve structures, and radioactive waste material introduced into the container through the open inlet port is dewatered, and the waste is compacted. The ports are automatically closed by the valves when the container drum is not subjected to centrifugal force such that containment effectiveness is enhanced and exposure of personnel to radioactive materials is minimized. (author)

49 CFR 173.428 - Empty Class 7 (radioactive) materials packaging.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Empty Class 7 (radioactive) materials packaging... SHIPPERS-GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND PACKAGINGS Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials § 173.428 Empty Class 7 (radioactive) materials packaging. A packaging which previously contained Class 7 (radioactive...

The radioactivity of house-building materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sos, K.

2007-01-01

The paper compares the natural radioactivity and radon emission properties of different building materials like bricks, concretes, cements, sands, limes, marmors of different origin. A description of the radioactive model of apartments is also given. (TRA)

Procedures for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Jang Lyul; Chung, K. K.; Lee, J. I.; Chang, S. Y.; Lee, T. Y

2007-11-15

This technical report describes the procedure and work responsibility along with the regulation and standard necessary for the safe transport of radioactive or contaminated materials. This report, therefore, can be effectively used to secure the public safety as well as to prevent the disastrous event which might be resulted from the transport process of radioactive materials by establishing a procedure and method on the safe packing, handling and transport of radioactive materials.

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wills, Cathy

2013-09-11

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) (formerly designated as the Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO]). The new field office designation occurred in March 2013. Published reports cited in this 2012 report, therefore, may bear the name or authorship of NNSA/NSO. This and previous years’ reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NFO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2012 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is

Test for radioactive material transport package safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Guoqiang; Zhao Bing; Zhang Jiangang; Wang Xuexin; Ma Anping

2012-01-01

Regulations on radioactive material transport in China were introduced. Test facilities and data acquiring instruments for radioactive material package in China Institute for Radiation Protection were also introduced in this paper, which were used in drop test and thermal test. Test facilities were constructed according to the requirements of IAEA's 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material' (TS-R-l) and Chinese 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material' (GB 11806-2004). Drop test facilities were used in free drop test, penetration test, mechanical test (free drop test Ⅰ, free drop test Ⅱ and free drop test Ⅲ) of type A and type B packages weighing less than thirteen tons. Thermal test of type B packages can be carried out in the thermal test facilities. Certification tests of type FCo70-YQ package, type 30A-HB-01 package, type SY-I package and type XAYT-I package according to regulations were done using these facilities. (authors)

Issues in recycling and disposal of radioactively contaminated materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kluk, A.F.; Hocking, E.K.; Roberts, R.; Phillips, J.W.

1993-01-01

The Department of Energy's present stock of potentially re-usable and minimally radioactively contaminated materials will increase significantly as the Department's remediation activities expand. As part of its effort to minimize wastes, the Department is pursuing several approaches to recover valuable materials such as nickel, copper, and steel, and reduce the high disposal costs associated with contaminated materials. Key approaches are recycling radioactively contaminated materials or disposing of them as non-radioactive waste. These approaches are impeded by a combination of potentially conflicting Federal regulations, State actions, and Departmental policies. Actions to promote or implement these approaches at the Federal, State, or Departmental level involve issues which must be addressed and resolved. The paramount issue is the legal status of radioactively contaminated materials and the roles of the Federal and State governments in regulating those materials. Public involvement is crucial in the debate surrounding the fate of radioactively contaminated materials

Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Reference material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

This publication is intended for individuals and organizations that may be called upon to deal with the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. It will also be useful for legislators, law enforcement agencies, government officials, technical experts, lawyers, diplomats and users of nuclear technology. This manual emphasizes the international initiatives for improving the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. However, it is recognized that effective measures for controlling the transfer of equipment, non-nuclear material, technology or information that may assist in the development of nuclear explosive devices, improvised nuclear devices (INDs) or other radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are important elements of an effective nuclear security system. In addition, issues of personal integrity, inspection and investigative procedures are not discussed in this manual, all of which are essential elements for an effective overall security system. The manual considers a variety of elements that are recognized as being essential for dealing with incidents of criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Depending on conditions in a specific State, including its legal and governmental infrastructure, some of the measures discussed will need to be adapted to suit that State's circumstances. However, much of the material can be applied directly in the context of other national programmes. This manual is divided into four main parts. Section 2 discusses the threat posed by criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as the policy and legal bases underlying the international effort to restrain such activities. Sections 3 and 4 summarize the major international undertakings in the field. Sections 5-8 provide some basic technical information on radiation, radioactive material, the health consequences of radiation

Radioactive Material Containment Bags

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2000-01-01

The audit was requested by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman based on allegations made by a contractor, Defense Apparel Services, about the Navy's actions on three contracts for radioactive material containment bags...

Survey of degradation modes of candidate materials for high-level radioactive-waste disposal containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Farmer, J.C.; Van Konynenburg, R.A.; McCright, R.D.; Gdowski, G.E.

1988-06-01

Three copper-based alloys, CDA 102 (oxygen-free, high-purity copper), CDA 613 (aluminum bronze), and CDA 715 (Cu-30Ni), are candidates for the fabrication of high-level radioactive-waste disposal containers. Waste will include spent fuel assemblies from reactors as well as borosilicate glass, and will be sent to the prospective repository site at Yucca Mountain in Nye County, Nevada. The decay of radionuclides will result in the generation of substantial heat and in fluxes of gamma radiation outside the containers. In this environment, container materials might degrade by atmospheric oxidation, general aqueous phase corrosion, localized corrosion (LC), and stress corrosion cracking (SCC). This volume is a critical survey of available data on pitting and crevice corrosion of the copper-based candidates. Pitting and crevice corrosion are two of the most common forms of LC of these materials. Data on the SCC of these alloys is surveyed in Volume 4. Pitting usually occurs in water that contains low concentrations of bicarbonate and chloride anions, such as water from Well J-13 at the Nevada Test Site. Consequently, this mode of degradation might occur in the repository environment. Though few quantitative data on LC were found, a tentative ranking based on pitting corrosion, local dealloying, crevice corrosion, and biofouling is presented. CDA 102 performs well in the categories of pitting corrosion, local dealloying, and biofouling, but susceptibility to crevice corrosion diminishes its attractiveness as a candidate. The cupronickel alloy, CDA 715, probably has the best overall resistance to such localized forms of attack. 123 refs., 11 figs., 3 tabs

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Neutron Products Incorporated Sealed Source Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None, None

2014-08-31

The purpose of this special analysis (SA) is to determine if the Neutron Products Incorporated (NPI) Sealed Sources waste stream (DRTK000000056, Revision 0) is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The NPI Sealed Sources waste stream consists of 850 60Co sealed sources (Duratek [DRTK] 2013). The NPI Sealed Sources waste stream requires a special analysis (SA) because the waste stream 60Co activity concentration exceeds the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) Action Levels.

Regulation of naturally occurring radioactive materials in non-nuclear industries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scott, L.M.

1997-01-01

The volume and concentrations of naturally occurring radioactive material is large across a variety of industries commonly thought not to involve radioactive material. The regulation of naturally occurring radioactive material in the United States is in a state of flux. Inventory of naturally occurring radioactive materials is given, along with a range of concentrations. Current and proposed regulatory limits are presented. (author)

Transportation accidents/incidents involving radioactive materials (1971--1991)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cashwell, C.E.; McClure, J.D.

1992-01-01

The Radioactive Materials Incident Report (RMIR) database contains information on transportation-related accidents and incidents involving radioactive materials that have occurred in the United States. The RMIR was developed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to support its research and development program efforts for the US Department of Energy (DOE). This paper will address the following topics: background information on the regulations and process for reporting a hazardous materials transportation incident, overview data of radioactive materials transportation accidents and incidents, and additional information and summary data on how packagings have performed in accident conditions

Denials and Delays of Radioactive Material Shipments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

El-Shinawy, R.M.K.

2011-01-01

delays of shipments of radioactive materials forms an important issue today. Radioactive materials need to be transported using all modes of transport for use in different applications such as public health, industry, research and production of nuclear power. The transport of radioactive materials is governed by national and international regulations, which are based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations for safe transport of radioactive materials (TS-R-1). These regulations ensure high standards of safety. Recently there were increasing numbers of instances of denials and delays of shipments of radioactive materials even when complying with the regulations. The denials and delays can result in difficulties to patients and others who rely on products sterilized by radiation. Therefore there is an urgent need for a universally accepted approach to solve this problem. In response, the IAEA has formed an International Steering Committee (ISC) on denials and delays of radioactive materials. Also, it designate the National Focal Points (NFP) representative to help the ISC members and the IAEA by informing about denial operations and how they can help. The Steering Committee developed and adopted an action plan which includes the action to be taken. This plan is based on: Awareness, Training, Communication, Lobbying for marketing, Economic and Harmonization among member states. It is important to work within the mandate of the ISC and in the line of action plan on denials and delays. It identified the following network members such as: National Focal Points, Regional Coordinators, National Committee, National Representative for different modes of transport and similar bodies, Carriers, Producers and Suppliers, Different civil societies, NGO's, Ministry of transport and others.

Nevada Test Site site treatment plan. Final annual update. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-04-01

A Site Treatment Plan (STP) is required for facilities at which the US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) generates or stores mixed waste (MW), defined by the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCAct) as waste containing both a hazardous waste subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and a radioactive material subject to the Atomic Energy Act. This STP was written to identify specific treatment facilities for treating DOE/NV generated MW and provides proposed implementation schedules. This STP was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and provided the basis for the negotiation and issuance of the FFCAct Consent Order (CO) dated March 6, 1996. The FFCAct CO sets forth stringent regulatory requirements to comply with the implementation of the STP

Treating agent for urea containing radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ogawa, Hiroshi; Maki, Kentaro.

1973-01-01

Object: To add a coagulant into urea containing radioactive material to precipitate and remove the radioactive material in the urea. Structure: Iodosalt is added into urea and next, a mixed reagent in which silver ion or silver acetic ion and iron hydroxide precipitation or ferrite ion coexist is added therein. The urea is treated to have a sufficient alkaline, after which it is introduced into a basket type centrifuge formed with a filter layer in combination of an upper glass fiber layer and a lower active carbon layer. The treating agent can uniformly remove radioactive ion and radioactive chelate within urea containing inorganic salt and various metabolites. (Nakamura, S.)

Safety of transport of radioactive material. Contributed papers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-07-01

Radioactive material has been transported for decades within and between countries as the use of radioactive material to benefit mankind has expanded. The transport can involve many types of materials (radionuclides and radiation sources for applications in agriculture, energy production, industry, and medicine) and all modes of transport (road, rail, sea and waterways, and air). Among the organizations in the United Nations system, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the statutory function to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health against exposure to ionizing radiation. Within its statutory mandate and pursuant to this request, in 1961, the IAEA issued Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (the IAEA Transport Regulations). The Transport Regulations were periodically reviewed and, as appropriate, have been amended or revised. The latest version of the Transport Regulations was issued in 2000 by the IAEA as Publication TS-R-1 (ST-1, Revised). In addition, the IAEA is entrusted by its Statute to provide for the application of its standards at the request of States. The objective of the Conference is to foster the exchange of information on issues related to the safety of transport of radioactive material by providing an opportunity for representatives from sponsoring international organizations and their Member States and from other co-operating and participating organizations to discuss critical issues relating to the safety of transport of radioactive material by all modes and to formulate recommendations, as appropriate, regarding further international co-operation in this area. The following topics have been identified by the Technical Programme Committee as the subjects to be covered in the background briefing sessions: History and Status of the IAEA Transport Regulation Development; Experience in adoption of the IAEA Transport Regulations at the international level; Implementation of the IAEA Transport

Classified Component Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 13454

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Poling, Jeanne; Arnold, Pat [National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), P.O. Box 98521, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8521 (United States); Saad, Max [Sandia National Laboratories, P.O. Box 5800, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States); DiSanza, Frank [E. Frank DiSanza Consulting, 2250 Alanhurst Drive, Henderson, NV 89052 (United States); Cabble, Kevin [U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, P.O. Box 98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518 (United States)

2013-07-01

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) has added the capability needed for the safe, secure disposal of non-nuclear classified components that have been declared excess to national security requirements. The NNSS has worked with U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration senior leadership to gain formal approval for permanent burial of classified matter at the NNSS in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. Additionally, by working with state regulators, the NNSS added the capability to dispose non-radioactive hazardous and non-hazardous classified components. The NNSS successfully piloted the new disposal pathway with the receipt of classified materials from the Kansas City Plant in March 2012. (authors)

Classified Component Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 13454

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poling, Jeanne; Arnold, Pat; Saad, Max; DiSanza, Frank; Cabble, Kevin

2013-01-01

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) has added the capability needed for the safe, secure disposal of non-nuclear classified components that have been declared excess to national security requirements. The NNSS has worked with U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration senior leadership to gain formal approval for permanent burial of classified matter at the NNSS in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. Additionally, by working with state regulators, the NNSS added the capability to dispose non-radioactive hazardous and non-hazardous classified components. The NNSS successfully piloted the new disposal pathway with the receipt of classified materials from the Kansas City Plant in March 2012. (authors)

Alternate Materials In Design Of Radioactive Material Packages

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blanton, P.; Eberl, K.

2010-01-01

This paper presents a summary of design and testing of material and composites for use in radioactive material packages. These materials provide thermal protection and provide structural integrity and energy absorption to the package during normal and hypothetical accident condition events as required by Title 10 Part 71 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Testing of packages comprising these materials is summarized.

Spread-sheet application to classify radioactive material for shipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, A.N.

1998-01-01

A spread-sheet application has been developed at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory to aid the shipper when classifying nuclide mixtures of normal form, radioactive materials. The results generated by this spread-sheet are used to confirm the proper US DOT classification when offering radioactive material packages for transport. The user must input to the spread-sheet the mass of the material being classified, the physical form (liquid or not) and the activity of each regulated nuclide. The spread-sheet uses these inputs to calculate two general values: 1)the specific activity of the material and a summation calculation of the nuclide content. The specific activity is used to determine if the material exceeds the DOT minimal threshold for a radioactive material. If the material is calculated to be radioactive, the specific activity is also used to determine if the material meets the activity requirement for one of the three low specific activity designations (LSA-I, LSA-II, LSA-III, or not LSA). Again, if the material is calculated to be radioactive, the summation calculation is then used to determine which activity category the material will meet (Limited Quantity, Type A, Type B, or Highway Route Controlled Quantity). This spread-sheet has proven to be an invaluable aid for shippers of radioactive materials at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. (authors)

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 137: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wickline, Alfred

2005-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 137: Waste Disposal Sites. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 137 contains sites that are located in Areas 1, 3, 7, 9, and 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 137 is comprised of the eight corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; (2) CAS 03-23-01, Waste Disposal Site; (3) CAS 03-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (4) CAS 03-99-15, Waste Disposal Site; (5) CAS 07-23-02, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (6) CAS 09-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (7) CAS 12-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; and (8) CAS 12-23-07, Waste Disposal Site. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 137 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting corrective action

Pore-water extraction from unsaturated tuff by triaxial and one-dimensional compression methods, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mower, T.E.; Higgins, J.D.; Yang, In C.; Peters, C.A.

1994-01-01

The hydrologic system in the unsaturated tuff at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is being evaluated for the US Department of Energy by the Yucca Mountain Project Branch of the US Geological Survey as a potential site for a high-level radioactive-waste repository. Part of this investigation includes a hydrochemical study that is being made to assess characteristics of the hydrologic system such as: traveltime, direction of flow, recharge and source relations, and types and magnitudes of chemical reactions in the unsaturated tuff. In addition, this hydrochemical information will be used in the study of the dispersive and corrosive effects of unsaturated-zone water on the radioactive-waste storage canisters. This report describes the design and validation of laboratory experimental procedures for extracting representative samples of uncontaminated pore water from welded and nonwelded, unsaturated tuffs from the Nevada Test Site

The safe transport of radioactive material in South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jutle, K.K.

1997-01-01

An overview is presented of the activities related to the transport of radioactive material in South Africa. In particular, the applicable legislation, the scope of authority and regulatory functions of the Competent Authority are discussed. The categories of radioactive materials transported and the packaging requirements for the safe transport of these radioactive materials are also described. (Author)

The safe transport of radioactive material in South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jutle, K.K.

2000-01-01

An overview is presented of the activities related to the transport of radioactive material in South Africa. In particular, the applicable legislation, the scope of authority and the regulatory functions of the Competent Authority are discussed. The categories of radioactive materials transported and the packaging requirements for the safe transport of these radioactive materials are also described. (author)

Nuclear Materials Management for the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jesse C. Schreiber

2007-01-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has transitioned from its historical role of weapons testing to a broader role that is focused on being a solution to multiple National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) challenges and opportunities with nuclear materials for the nation. NTS is supporting other NNSA sites challenged with safe nuclear materials storage and disposition. NNSA, with site involvement, is currently transforming the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure to meet the 2030 vision. Efforts are under way to make the production complex smaller, more consolidated, and more modern. With respect to the nuclear material stockpile, the NNSA sites are currently reducing the complex nuclear material inventory through dispositioning and consolidating nuclear material. This includes moving material from other sites to NTS. State-of-the-art nuclear material management and control practices at NTS are essential for NTS to ensure that these new activities are accomplished in a safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner. NTS is aggressively addressing this challenge

The measurement theory of radioactivity in building materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qu Jinhui; Wang Renbo; Zhang Xiongjie; Tan Hai; Zhu Zhipu; Man Zaigang

2010-01-01

Radioactivity in Building Materials is the main source of natural radiation dose that the individual is received, which has caused serious concern of all Social Sector. The paper completely introduce the measurement theory of the Radioactivity in Building Materials along with the measurement principle of natural radioactivity, design of shielding facility, choosing measurement time, sample prepared and spectrum analyzed. (authors)

Miscellaneous radioactive materials detected during uranium mill tailings surveys

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson, M.J.

1993-10-01

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management directed the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Pollutant Assessments Group in the conduct of radiological surveys on properties in Monticello, Utah, associated with the Mendaciously millsite National Priority List site. During these surveys, various radioactive materials were detected that were unrelated to the Monticello millsite. The existence and descriptions of these materials were recorded in survey reports and are condensed in this report. The radioactive materials detected are either naturally occurring radioactive material, such as rock and mineral collections, uranium ore, and radioactive coal or manmade radioactive material consisting of tailings from other millsites, mining equipment, radium dials, mill building scraps, building materials, such as brick and cinderblock, and other miscellaneous sources. Awareness of the miscellaneous and naturally occurring material is essential to allow DOE to forecast the additional costs and schedule changes associated with remediation activities. Also, material that may pose a health hazard to the public should be revealed to other regulatory agencies for consideration

Aspects of potential magmatic disruption of a high-level radioactive waste repository in southern Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crowe, B.; Self, S.; Vaniman, D.; Amos, R.; Perry, F.

1983-01-01

Volcanic hazard studies, combining standard techniques of hazard appraisal and risk assessment are being undertaken with respect to storage of high-level, radioactive waste in southern Nevada. Consequence studies, the emphasis of this work, are evaluated by tracing the steps of ascent of basaltic magma including intersection and disruption of a repository followed by surface eruption. Theoretical considerations suggest basalt magma ascends rapidly from mantle depth (10's of cm/sec in the bubble-free regime) but may be trapped temporarily and fractionate at the mantle/crust interface. Basalt centers are fed from narrow linear dikes. Local sheet-like intrusions formed at depths of 200 to 300 m probably due to a combination of extensional faulting during emplacement and trapping within low-density tuff country rock, aided in part by a low magma-volatile content. Incorporation of radioactive waste in basalt magma is controlled by the dimensions of basalt dikes at repository depths and the depth of magma fragmentation. Dispersal pathways of waste should follow the pyroclastic component of a Strombolian eruption. The maximum volume of waste deposited with basaltic tephra can be traced approximately by assuming waste material is dispersed in the same patterns as country rock lithic fragments. Based on a basalt magma cycle that is similar to typical Strombolian centers, 180 m 3 of a repository inventory will be deposited in a scoria cone (of which approx. 1 m 3 will be exposed to the surface in a 10,000-year period), 320 to 900 m 3 will be deposited in a scoria-fall sheet (up to 12-km dispersal), and 21 m 3 will be dispersed regionally with a fine-grained particle component. 62 references, 8 figures, 2 tables

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

David Strand

2006-01-01

Corrective Action Unit 166 is located in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 166 is comprised of the seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 02-42-01, Cond. Release Storage Yd - North; (2) 02-42-02, Cond. Release Storage Yd - South; (3) 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area; (4) 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard; (5) 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum; (6) 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (7) 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on February 28, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 166. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the CAI for CAU 166 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct radiological surveys. (3) Perform field screening. (4) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine if

Evaluation of soil radioactivity data from the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-03-01

Since 1951, 933 nuclear tests have been conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and test areas on the adjacent Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and Nellis Air Force Range (NAFR). Until the early 1960s. the majority of tests were atmospheric, involving detonation of nuclear explosive devices on the ground or on a tower, suspended from a balloon or dropped from an airplane. Since the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, most tests have been conducted underground, although several shallow subsurface tests took place between 1962 and 1968. As a result of the aboveground and near-surface nuclear explosions, as well as ventings of underground tests, destruction of nuclear devices with conventional explosives, and nuclear-rocket engine tests, the surface soil on portions of the NTS has been contaminated with radionuclides. Relatively little consideration was given to the environmental effects of nuclear testing during the first two decades of operations at the NTS. Since the early 1970s, however, increasingly strict environmental regulations have forced greater attention to be given to contamination problems at the site and how to remediate them. One key element in the current environmental restoration program at the NTS is determining the amount and extent of radioactivity in the surface soil. The general distribution of soil radioactivity on the NTS is already well known as a result of several programs carried out in the 1970s and 1980s. However, questions have been raised as to whether the data from those earlier studies are suitable for use in the current environmental assessments and risk analyses. The primary purpose of this preliminary data review is to determine to what extent the historical data collected at the NTS can be used in the characterization/remediation process

Nuclear radioactive techniques applied to materials research

CERN Document Server

Correia, João Guilherme; Wahl, Ulrich

2011-01-01

In this paper we review materials characterization techniques using radioactive isotopes at the ISOLDE/CERN facility. At ISOLDE intense beams of chemically clean radioactive isotopes are provided by selective ion-sources and high-resolution isotope separators, which are coupled on-line with particle accelerators. There, new experiments are performed by an increasing number of materials researchers, which use nuclear spectroscopic techniques such as Mössbauer, Perturbed Angular Correlations (PAC), beta-NMR and Emission Channeling with short-lived isotopes not available elsewhere. Additionally, diffusion studies and traditionally non-radioactive techniques as Deep Level Transient Spectroscopy, Hall effect and Photoluminescence measurements are performed on radioactive doped samples, providing in this way the element signature upon correlation of the time dependence of the signal with the isotope transmutation half-life. Current developments, applications and perspectives of using radioactive ion beams and tech...

Storage of solid and liquid radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matijasic, A.; Gacinovic, O.

1961-01-01

Solid radioactive waste collected during 1961 from the laboratories of the Institute amounted to 22.5 m 3 . This report contains data about activity of the waste collected from january to November 1961. About 70% of the waste are short lived radioactive material. Material was packed in metal barrels and stored in the radioactive storage in the Institute. There was no contamination of the personnel involved in these actions. Liquid radioactive wastes come from the Isotope production laboratory, laboratories using tracer techniques, reactor cooling; decontamination of the equipment. Liquid wastes from isotope production were collected in plastic bottles and stored. Waste water from the RA reactor were collected in special containers. After activity measurements this water was released into the sewage system since no activity was found. Table containing data on quantities and activity of radioactive effluents is included in this report

Licenses for possessing and applying radioactive sources, materials, etc

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1977-01-01

Commercial and governmental institutions have been licensed by Dutch authorities to possess and apply radioactive sources, materials, etc. A summary is given and the list is subdivided into a number of sections such as radioactive sources, radioactive materials, X-ray equipment and technetium-generators

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SENSORS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mayo, Robert M.; Stephens, Daniel L.

2009-01-01

Providing technical means to detect, prevent, and reverse the threat of potential illicit use of radiological or nuclear materials is among the greatest challenges facing contemporary science and technology. In this short article, we provide brief description and overview of the state-of-the-art in sensor development for the detection of radioactive materials, as well as an identification of the technical needs and challenges faced by the detection community. We begin with a discussion of gamma-ray and neutron detectors and spectrometers, followed by a description of imaging sensors, active interrogation, and materials development, before closing with a brief discussion of the unique challenges posed in fielding sensor systems.

Regulation of Transportation of Radioactive Material in Indonesia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nirwono, Muttaqin Margo; Choi, Kwang Sik

2011-01-01

1.1. Background Indonesia is a biggest archipelago country with 17,508 islands in 33 provinces. In transportation Indonesia has large number of airports, railways, roadways, waterways, and merchant marines. Since nuclear and radiation utilizations are expanding on whole country, the mobilization of these is usually placed outside of controlled facilities, in the public domain, and often entails movement between countries. The Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) is responsible for supervision and also authorization of the transport of radioactive material (TRM). TRM is the specific movement of a radioactive material consignment from origin to destination by public transportation (road or rail, water and air). This study aims to determine whether national regulation is harmonized with international practice in ensuring safety and security of TRM. The finding of this study will provide recommendation for enhancement of regulation on TRM. 1.2. Regulation of TRM in Indonesia Government Regulation (GR) No. 26, 2002 on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material is implemented pursuant to Act 10, 1997 on Nuclear Energy. This GR was repealed GR 13, 1975 on TRM. The GR 26 consist of 16 chapters and 39 articles, included licensing: authority and responsibilities: packaging: radiation protection programme; training: quality assurance programme: type and activity limit of radioactive materials: radioactive materials with other dangerous properties: emergency preparedness: administrative sanction: and penal provisions. Principally, this GR adopted IAEA-TS-R-1, 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material', 1996's Edition

Rooting Characteristics of Vegetation near Areas 3 and 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dennis J. Hansen and W. Kent Ostler

2003-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy emplaced high-specific-activity low-level radioactive wastes and limited quantities of classified transuranic wastes in Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes from 1984 to 1989. The boreholes are located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in southern Nevada. The boreholes were backfilled with native alluvium soil. The surface of these boreholes and trenches is expected to be colonized by native vegetation in the future. Considering the long-term performance of the disposal facilities, bioturbation (the disruption of buried wastes by biota) is considered a primary release mechanism for radionuclides disposed in GCD boreholes as well as trenches at both Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs. This report provides information about rooting characteristics of vegetation near Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs. Data from this report are being used to resolve uncertainties involving parameterization of performance assessment models used to characterize the biotic mixing of soils and radionuclide transport processes by biota. The objectives of this study were to: (1) survey the prior ecological literature on the NTS and identify pertinent information about the vegetation, (2) conduct limited field studies to describe the current vegetation in the vicinity of Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs so as to correlate findings with more extensive vegetation data collected at Yucca Mountain and the NTS, (3) review prior performance assessment documents and evaluate model assumptions based on current ecological information, and (4) identify data deficiencies and make recommendations for correcting such deficiencies

Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2009

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cathy Wills, ed.

2010-09-13

The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2009 was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years’ Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs) are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1A, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NTSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2009 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL)-Nellis. It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

Protection of environmental contamination by radioactive materials and remediation of environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-05-01

This report consisted of the environmental contamination of radioactive and non-radioactive materials. 38 important accident examples of environmental contamination of radioactive materials in the world from 1944 to 2001 are stated. Heavily polluted areas by accidents are explained, for example, Chernobyl, atomic reactor accidents, development of nuclear weapon in USA and USSR, radioactive waste in the sea. The environmental contamination ability caused by using radioactive materials, medical use, operating reactor, disposal, transferring, crashing of airplane and artificial satellite, release are reported. It contains measurements and monitor technologies, remediation technologies of environmental contamination and separation and transmutation of radioactive materials. On the environmental contamination by non-radioactive materials, transformation of the soil contamination in Japan and its control technologies are explained. Protection and countermeasure of environmental contamination of radioactive and non-radioactive materials in Japan and the international organs are presented. There are summary and proposal in the seventh chapter. (S.Y.)

Nevada Test Site Site Treatment Plan. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-03-01

Treatment Plans (STPS) are required for facilities at which the US Department of Energy (DOE) or stores mixed waste, defined by the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCAct) as waste containing both a hazardous waste subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and a radioactive material subject to the Atomic Energy Act. On April 6, 1993, DOE published a Federal Register notice (58 FR 17875) describing its proposed process for developing the STPs in three phases including a Conceptual, a Draft, and a Proposed Site Treatment Plan (PSTP). All of the DOE Nevada Operations Office STP iterations have been developed with the state of Nevada's input. The options and schedules reflect a ''bottoms-up'' approach and have been evaluated for impacts on other DOE sites, as well as impacts to the overall DOE program. Changes may have occurred in the preferred option and associated schedules between the PSTP, which was submitted to the state of Nevada and US Environmental Protection Agency April 1995, and the Final STP (hereafter referred to as the STP) as treatment evaluations progressed. The STP includes changes that have occurred since the submittal of the PSTP as a result of state-to-state and DOE-to-state discussions

State statutes and regulations on radioactive materials transportation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Foster, B.

1981-11-01

The transport of radioactive material is controlled by numerous legislative and regulatory actions at the federal, state, and local levels. This document is a compilation of the state level laws and regulations. The collected material is abstracted and indexed by states. Each state section contains three divisions: (1) abstracts of major statutes, (2) legislative rules, and (3) photocopies of relevant paragraphs from the law or regulation. This document was prepared for use by individuals who are involved in the radioactive material transportation process. This document will not be updated. The legislative rules section contains the name of the state agency primarily responsible for monitoring the transport of radioactive materials

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wills, Cathy

2012-01-01

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.' Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2011 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cathy Wills, ed

2012-09-12

This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.' Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2011 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

Measurement of liquid radioactive materials for monitoring radioactive emissions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-10-01

This draft regulation applies to measuring equipment for liquid radioactive materials for the monitoring of the radioactive discharges from stationary nuclear power plants with LWR and HTR reactors. Demands made on the measuring procedure, methods of concentration determination, balancing, indication of limiting values, and inspections are layed down. The draft regulation deals with: 1) Monitoring liquid radioactive discharges: Water and similar systems; radionuclides and their detection limits, radioactively contaminated water (waste water); secondary cooling water; power house cooling water; primary cooling water; flooding water; 2) Layout of the measuring and sampling equipment and demands made on continuous and discontinuous measuring equipment; demands made on discontinuous α and β measuring equipment; 3) Maintenance and repair work; inspections; repair of defects; 4) Demands made on documentation; reports to authorities; 5) Supplement: List of general and reference regulations. (orig./HP) [de

Security of radioactive materials for medical use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elliott, A.

2006-01-01

Both sealed and unsealed radioactive sources are used in hospitals throughout the world for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. High activity single sealed sources are used in teletherapy units, although these are becoming less common as they are replaced by linear accelerators, and in blood irradiator units, which are in widespread use. Lower activity sealed sources are used in brachytherapy. High activity unsealed sources are used typically for the treatment of thyroid cancer and neuroblastoma in inpatients while diagnostic doses of unsealed radioactive materials have much lower activities. In the case of a central radiopharmacy producing patient doses of radiopharmaceutical for several Nuclear Medicine departments, however, quite large amounts of radioactive materials may be held. Hospitals are, by their nature, less secure than other licensed nuclear sites and the ever-changing patient /visitor (and staff) population is a further complicating factor. Hitherto, security of radioactive materials in hospitals has tended to be considered from the perspective only of radiation safety but this approach is no longer sufficient

Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vefa Yucel

2007-01-01

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual M 435.1-1 requires that performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for low-level waste (LLW) disposal facilities be maintained by the field offices. This plan describes the activities performed to maintain the PA and the CA for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This plan supersedes the Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (DOE/NV/11718--491-REV 1, dated September 2002). The plan is based on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 (DOE, 1999a), DOE Manual M 435.1-1 (DOE, 1999b), the DOE M 435.1-1 Implementation Guide DOE G 435.1-1 (DOE, 1999c), and the Maintenance Guide for PAs and CAs (DOE, 1999d). The plan includes a current update on PA/CA documentation, a revised schedule, and a section on Quality Assurance

Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Philosophy and Overview

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

EL-Shinawy, R M.K. [Radiation Protection Dept., Nuclear Rasearch Center, Atomic Energy Authority, Cairo (Egypt)

2008-07-01

Safe transport of radioactive material regulations issued by IAEA since 1961, provide standards for insuring a high level of safety of people,transport workers, property and environment against radiation, contamination and criticality hazards as well as thermal effects associated with the transport of the radioactive wastes and material. The history ,development, philosophy and scope of these international and national regulations were mentioned as well as the different supporting documents to the regulations for safe transport of radioactive material were identified.The first supporting document , namely TS - G-1.1(ST-2) ,Advisory material is also issued by the IAEA.It contains both the advisory and explanatory materials previously published in safety series Nos 7and 37 and therefore TS-G-1.1 (ST-2) will supersede safety series Nos 7 and 37. The second supporting document namely TS-G-1.2 (ST-3), planning and preparing for emergency response to transport accidents involving radioactive material ,which will supersede safety series No 87. In addition to quality assurance (SS no.113), compliance assurance (SS no. 112), the training manual and others.

Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Philosophy and Overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

EL-Shinawy, R.M.K.

2008-01-01

Safe transport of radioactive material regulations issued by IAEA since 1961, provide standards for insuring a high level of safety of people,transport workers, property and environment against radiation, contamination and criticality hazards as well as thermal effects associated with the transport of the radioactive wastes and material. The history ,development, philosophy and scope of these international and national regulations were mentioned as well as the different supporting documents to the regulations for safe transport of radioactive material were identified.The first supporting document , namely TS - G-1.1(ST-2) ,Advisory material is also issued by the IAEA.It contains both the advisory and explanatory materials previously published in safety series Nos 7and 37 and therefore TS-G-1.1 (ST-2) will supersede safety series Nos 7 and 37. The second supporting document namely TS-G-1.2 (ST-3), planning and preparing for emergency response to transport accidents involving radioactive material ,which will supersede safety series No 87. In addition to quality assurance (SS no.113), compliance assurance (SS no. 112), the training manual and others

Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

S. E. Rawlinson

2001-09-01

Bechtel Nevada (BN) manages two low-level Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) (one site is in Area 3 and the other is in Area 5) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV). The current DOE Order governing management of radioactive waste is 435.1. Associated with DOE Order 435.1 is a Manual (DOE M 435.1-1) and Guidance (DOE G 435.1-1). The Manual and Guidance specify that preliminary closure and monitoring plans for a low-level waste (LLW) management facility be developed and initially submitted with the Performance Assessment (PA) and Composite Analysis (CA) for that facility. The Manual and Guidance, and the Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) issued for the Area 3 RWMS further specify that the preliminary closure and monitoring plans be updated within one year following issuance of a DAS. This Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (ICMP) fulfills both requirements. Additional updates will be conducted every third year hereafter. This document is an integrated plan for closing and monitoring both RWMSs, and is based on guidance issued in 1999 by the DOE for developing closure plans. The plan does not follow the format suggested by the DOE guidance in order to better accommodate differences between the two RWMSs, especially in terms of operations and site characteristics. The modification reduces redundancy and provides a smoother progression of the discussion. The closure and monitoring plans were integrated because much of the information that would be included in individual plans is the same, and integration provides efficient presentation and program management. The ICMP identifies the regulatory requirements, describes the disposal sites and the physical environment where they are located, and defines the approach and schedule for both closing and monitoring the sites.

Radioactivity of building materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Terpakova, E.

2000-01-01

In this paper the gamma-spectrometric determination of natural radioactivity in the different building materials and wares applied in Slovakia was performed. The specific activities for potassium-40, thorium, radium as well as the equivalent specific activities are presented

Statistics of foreign trade in radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2001-01-01

The German Federal Office for Industry and Foreign Trade Control (BAFA) keeps annual statistics of the imports and exports of radioactive materials, nuclear fuels included. The entries, some of them with precise details, cover the participating countries and the radionuclides concerned as well as all kinds of radioactive materials. The tables listed in the article represent the overall balance of the development of imports and exports of radioactive materials for the years 1983 to 2000 arranged by activity levels, including the development of nuclear fuel imports and exports. For the year 2000, an additional trade balance for irradiated and unirradiated nuclear fuels and source materials differentiated by enrichment is presented for the countries involved. In 2000, some 2446 t of nuclear fuels and source materials were imported into the Federal Republic, while approx. 2720 t were exported. The chief trading partners are countries of the European Union and Russia, South Korea, and Brazil. (orig.) [de

Radioactive Substances Act 1960. Keeping and use of radioactive materials; list of registrations in England and Wales issued under the Radioactive Substances Act 1960 for the keeping and use of radioactive materials and mobile

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-05-01

Through the Radioactive Substances Act 1960 (RSA 60), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (Radioactive Substances) (HMIP) exercises control, on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Environment, over the keeping and use of radioactive material and the accumulation and disposal of radioactive waste in England. HMIP also provides technical advice to the Secretary of State for Wales in connection with the enforcement of RSA 60 in Wales. Registrations under RSA 60 for the keeping and use of radioactive materials in England and Wales are issued respectively by the Secretaries of State for the Environment and Wales, following careful assessment of the radiological consequences for members of the public. Registrations impose strict limits and conditions and premises and apparatus are subject to scrutiny by HMIP Inspectors to ensure compliance. A list contains names and addresses of those registered in England and Wales for the keeping and use of radioactive materials and mobile apparatus

Radiological dose assessment for residual radioactive material in soil at the clean slate sites 1, 2, and 3, Tonopah Test Range

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-06-01

A radiological dose assessment has been performed for Clean Slate Sites 1, 2, and 3 at the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 390 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The assessment demonstrated that the calculated dose to hypothetical individuals who may reside or work on the Clean Slate sites, subsequent to remediation, does not exceed the limits established by the US Department of Energy for protection of members of the public and the environment. The sites became contaminated as a result of Project Roller Coaster experiments conducted in 1963 in support of the US Atomic Energy Commission (Shreve, 1964). Remediation of Clean Slate Sites 1, 2, and 3 is being performed to ensure that the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent to a hypothetical individual who lives or works on a Clean Slate site should not exceed 100 millirems per year. The DOE residual radioactive material guideline (RESRAD) computer code was used to assess the dose. RESRAD implements the methodology described in the DOE manual for establishing residual radioactive material guidelines (Yu et al., 1993a). In May and June of 1963, experiments were conducted at Clean Slate Sites 1, 2, and 3 to study the effectiveness of earth-covered structures for reducing the dispersion of nuclear weapons material as a result of nonnuclear explosions. The experiments required the detonation of various simulated weapons using conventional chemical explosives (Shreve, 1964). The residual radioactive contamination in the surface soil consists of weapons grade plutonium, depleted uranium, and their radioactive decay products

Radiological dose assessment for residual radioactive material in soil at the clean slate sites 1, 2, and 3, Tonopah Test Range

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-06-01

A radiological dose assessment has been performed for Clean Slate Sites 1, 2, and 3 at the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 390 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The assessment demonstrated that the calculated dose to hypothetical individuals who may reside or work on the Clean Slate sites, subsequent to remediation, does not exceed the limits established by the US Department of Energy for protection of members of the public and the environment. The sites became contaminated as a result of Project Roller Coaster experiments conducted in 1963 in support of the US Atomic Energy Commission (Shreve, 1964). Remediation of Clean Slate Sites 1, 2, and 3 is being performed to ensure that the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent to a hypothetical individual who lives or works on a Clean Slate site should not exceed 100 millirems per year. The DOE residual radioactive material guideline (RESRAD) computer code was used to assess the dose. RESRAD implements the methodology described in the DOE manual for establishing residual radioactive material guidelines (Yu et al., 1993a). In May and June of 1963, experiments were conducted at Clean Slate Sites 1, 2, and 3 to study the effectiveness of earth-covered structures for reducing the dispersion of nuclear weapons material as a result of nonnuclear explosions. The experiments required the detonation of various simulated weapons using conventional chemical explosives (Shreve, 1964). The residual radioactive contamination in the surface soil consists of weapons grade plutonium, depleted uranium, and their radioactive decay products.

Transport of bundles and equipment which contain radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

This norm settles down: 1) The requirements that should be completed in relation to safety precautions and protection against ionizing radiations during the transport radioactive material and/or equipment containing it, in order to avoid risks to the collective and the environment. 2) The basic information on procedures that will be completed in the event of happening accidents during the transport or the transit storage of radioactive material and/or equipment that contain it. 3) The measures of security and physical protection during the transport of radioactive material and/or equipment containing it. This norm is applied: 1) To all the ways of transport (by air, by ground and by ship, fluvial and marine) of radioactive material and/or equipment that contain it. 2) To all natural or legal, public or private person, devoted to install, produce, trade, market, import or export radioactive materials and/or equipment containing it, and that needs to transport them as main or secondary activity [es

International measures needed to protect metal recycling facilities from radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mattia, M.; Wiener, R.

1999-01-01

In almost every major city and region of every country, there is a recycling facility that is designed to process or consume scrap metal. These same countries will probably have widespread applications of radioactive materials and radiation generating equipment. This material and equipment will have metal as a primary component of its housing or instrumentation. It is this metal that will cause these sources of radioactivity, when lost, stolen or mishandled, to be taken to a metal recycling facility to be sold for the value of the metal. This is the problem that has faced scrap recycling facilities for many years. The recycling industry has spent millions of dollars for installation of radiation monitors and training in identification of radioactive material. It has expended millions more for the disposal of radioactive material that has mistakenly entered these facilities. Action must be taken to prevent this material from entering the conventional recycling process. There are more than 2,300 known incidents of radioactive material found in recycled metal scrap. Worldwide, more than 50 smeltings of radioactive sources have been confirmed. Seven fatal accidents involving uncontrolled radioactive material have also been documented. Hazardous exposures to radioactive material have plagued not just the workers at metal recycling facilities. The families of these workers, including their children, have been exposed to potentially harmful levels of radioactivity. The threat from this material does not stop there. Radioactive material that is not caught at recycling facilities can be melted and the radioactivity has been found in construction materials used to build homes, as well as shovels, fencing material, and furniture offered for sale to the general public. The time has come for the international community to address the issue of the uncontrolled sources of radioactive material. The following are the key points that must be addressed. (i) Identification of sources

Rural communities and awareness of DOE Environmental Management Programs at the Nevada Test Site: Do outreach efforts matter?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neill, H.R.; Snyder, K.K.; Ward, J.N.

2009-01-01

Are residents living in communities around the Nevada Test Site aware of environmental remediation activities and do outreach efforts contribute to awareness? Through a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) grant, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas administered a mail questionnaire to 14,083 residents and received 1,721 responses. Approximately 90% of the respondents reported awareness of past nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site; 63% reported awareness of low-level radioactive waste disposal at the site; and 41% are aware that the Yucca Mountain Project for high level waste disposal is part of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management and not part of the Office of Environmental Management. Using both logit and probit regression models, at a 1% level of significance, respondents who reported obtaining information from the Community Advisory Board for Nevada Test Site Programs are more likely to be knowledgeable about low-level radioactive waste disposal activities and are more likely to be knowledgeable that the missions of the Office of Environmental Management and Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management are different. (authors)

Regulations related to the transport of radioactive material in Brazil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sahyun, Adelia; Sordi, Gian-Maria A.A.; Sanches, Matias P.

2001-01-01

The transport of radioactive material has raised great interest on the part of national regulatory authorities, thus resulting in a safety measures improvement for all kinds of transportation. The transport of radioactive material is regulated by safety criteria much more than those applied to conventional hazardous material. All radioactive material transportation run in Brazilian territory must be in accordance with what is established by the CNEN-NE 5.01 - Transport of Radioactive Material. There are other national and international regulations for radioactive material transportation, which have to be accomplished with and adopted during the operation of radioactive material transportation. The aim of this paper is to verify the criteria set up in the existing regulations and propose a consensus for all the intervening organizations in the regulation process for land, air or sea transportation. This kind of transportation can not depend on the efforts of only one person, a group of workers or even any governmental body, but must be instead a shared responsibility among workers, transport firms and all regulative transportation organizations. (author)

Regulations related to the transport of radioactive material in Brazil

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sahyun, Adelia; Sordi, Gian-Maria A.A. [ATOMO Radioprotecao e Seguranca Nuclear, Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)]. E-mail: atomo@atomo.com.br; Sanches, Matias P. [Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)]. E-mail: msanches@net.ipen.br

2001-07-01

The transport of radioactive material has raised great interest on the part of national regulatory authorities, thus resulting in a safety measures improvement for all kinds of transportation. The transport of radioactive material is regulated by safety criteria much more than those applied to conventional hazardous material. All radioactive material transportation run in Brazilian territory must be in accordance with what is established by the CNEN-NE 5.01 - Transport of Radioactive Material. There are other national and international regulations for radioactive material transportation, which have to be accomplished with and adopted during the operation of radioactive material transportation. The aim of this paper is to verify the criteria set up in the existing regulations and propose a consensus for all the intervening organizations in the regulation process for land, air or sea transportation. This kind of transportation can not depend on the efforts of only one person, a group of workers or even any governmental body, but must be instead a shared responsibility among workers, transport firms and all regulative transportation organizations. (author)

Transport of radioactive materials: the need for radiation protection programmes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Masinza, S.A.

2004-01-01

The increase in the use of radioactive materials worldwide requires that these materials be moved from production sites to the end user or in the case of radioactive waste, from the waste generator to the repository. Tens of millions of packages containing radioactive material are consigned for transport each year throughout the world. The amount of radioactive material in these packages varies from negligible quantities in shipments of consumer products to very large quantities of shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel. Transport is the main way in which the radioactive materials being moved get into the public domain. The public is generally unaware of the lurking danger when transporting these hazardous goods. Thus radiation protection programmes are important to assure the public of the certainty of their safety during conveyance of these materials. Radioactive material is transported by land (road and rail), inland waterways, sea/ocean and air. These modes of transport are regulated by international 'modal' regulations. The international community has formulated controls to reduce the number of accidents and mitigate their consequences should they happen. When accidents involving the transport of radioactive material occur, it could result in injury, loss of life and pollution of the environment. In order to ensure the safety of people, property and the environment, national and international transport regulations have been developed. The appropriate authorities in each state utilise them to control the transport of radioactive material. Stringent measures are required in these regulations to ensure adequate containment, shielding and the prevention of criticality in all spheres of transport, i.e. routine, minor incidents and accident conditions. Despite the extensive application of these stringent safety controls, transport accidents involving packages containing radioactive material have occurred and will continue to occur. When a transport accident occurs, it

Trasmar: automated vehicle for transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Segovia R, J.A.; Martinez J, L.

2001-01-01

Traditionally robots have been used for industrial applications, even though area in which these devices had a deep impact is in the nuclear industry. The ININ is an Institute that must to manage and to work with radioactive substances. The ININ is also responsible of the storage and supervision of radioactive wastes in the country, therefore the applications of the automated systems in the Institute have as the main objective to reduce the exposure and the contact of personnel with the radioactive material. Here to, it has been proposed the project called Assisted Transportation of Radioactive Material (TRASMAR). (Author)

210Po in Nevada groundwater and its relation to gross alpha radioactivity

Science.gov (United States)

Seiler, R.L.

2011-01-01

Polonium-210 (210Po) is a highly toxic alpha emitter that is rarely found in groundwater at activities exceeding 1 pCi/L. 210Po activities in 63 domestic and public-supply wells in Lahontan Valley in Churchill County in northern Nevada, United States, ranged from 0.01 ± 0.005 to 178 ± 16 pCi/L with a median activity of 2.88 pCi/L. Wells with high 210Po activities had low dissolved oxygen concentrations (less than 0.1 mg/L) and commonly had pH greater than 9. Lead-210 activities are low and aqueous 210Po is unsupported by 210Pb, indicating that the 210Po is mobilized from aquifer sediments. The only significant contributors to alpha particle activity in Lahontan Valley groundwater are 234/238U, 222Rn, and 210Po. Radon-222 activities were below 1000 pCi/L and were uncorrelated with 210Po activity. The only applicable drinking water standard for 210Po in the United States is the adjusted gross alpha radioactivity (GAR) standard of 15 pCi/L. 210Po was not volatile in a Nevada well, but volatile 210Po has been reported in a Florida well. Additional information on the volatility of 210Po is needed because GAR is an inappropriate method to screen for volatile radionuclides. About 25% of the samples had 210Po activities that exceed the level associated with a lifetime total cancer risk of 1× 10−4 (1.1 pCi/L) without exceeding the GAR standard. In cases where the 72-h GAR exceeds the uranium activity by more than 5 to 10 pCi/L, an analysis to rule out the presence of 210Po may be justified to protect human health even though the maximum contaminant level for adjusted GAR is not exceeded.

Ionising radiations, radioactive materials and the fire services

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Button, J.C.E.

1981-05-01

Extensive experience has shown that ionizing radiations and radioactive materials can be used safely in a wide variety of applications, provided a number of precautions are implemented. Transport of radioactive materials is common and regulations designed to ensure safety in such transport have resulted in an excellent safety record. Pre-planning for fire situations in buildings where radioactive materials are known to be present is very desirable. An Australian Standard, AS2243, recommends that Station Officers of the local fire brigade be appraised of the hazards and the need to take particular care in areas marked with ionizing radiation warning signs

Storage containers for radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cassidy, D.A.; Dates, L.R.; Groh, E.F.

1981-01-01

A radioactive material storage system is disclosed for use in the laboratory. This system is composed of the following: a flat base plate with a groove in one surface thereof and a hollow pedestal extending perpendicularly away from the other surface thereof; a sealing gasket in the groove, a cover having a filter therein and an outwardly extending flange which fits over the plate; the groove and the gasket, and a clamp for maintaining the cover and the plate are sealed together, whereby the plate and the cover and the clamp cooperate to provide a storage area for radioactive material readily accessible for use or inventory. Wall mounts are provided to prevent accidental formation of critical masses during storage

State of Nevada, Agency for Nuclear Projects/Nuclear Waste Project Office narrative report, January 1992

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

The Agency for Nuclear Projects/Nuclear Waste Project Office (NWPO) is the State of Nevada agency designated by State law to monitor and oversee US Department of Energy (DOE) activities relative to the possible siting, construction, operation and closure of a high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain and to carry out the State of Nevada's responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. During the reporting period the NWPO continued to work toward the five objectives designed to implement the Agency's oversight responsibilities: (1) Assure that the health and safety of Nevada's citizens are adequately protected with regard to any federal high-level radioactive waste program within the State; (2) Take the responsibilities and perform the duties of the State of Nevada as described in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-425) and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987; (3) Advise the Governor, the State Commission on Nuclear Projects and the Nevada State Legislature on matters concerning the potential disposal of high-level radioactive waste in the State; (4) Work closely and consult with affected local governments and State agencies; (5) Monitor and evaluate federal planning and activities regarding high-level radioactive waste disposal. Plan and conduct independent State studies regarding the proposed repository

Method of treatment in a system passing radioactive material

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kamiya, K; Kinoshita, M; Asakura, Y

1976-05-14

A method to ensure the safety of the reactor and reduce radiation exposure dose by preventing oxygen hydrogen reaction of the reactor off-gas and accumulation of the radioactive material is described. Substances which are accumulated in an off-gas duct and are likely to capture radioactive material (for instance Pd catalyst falling from a recombiner) is changed into a stable material (for instance, PdI/sub 2/) which is hot likely to capture radioactive material through reaction with a stabilizer (for instance, I/sub 2/, Cl/sub 2/, HCl, etc.). This stabilized material is washed off the atomic power plant system.

The development of shifting radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen Haiteng; Chen Yonghong; Yin Fujun; Che Mingsheng; Hu Xiaodan; Yao Shouzhong

2010-01-01

In nuclear field, When the nuclear material shifting from the glove-box,use the technology of plastic welding package in accordance with tradition. There are some defects in this technology because of the plastic character, such as package pierced easily, wrapper not fitted storage for long term, etc. Because of this limit. Plastic shifting technology is only fit for shifting radwaste and nuclear material not need storage from radioactive close area to non-radioactive open area for long term.As the nuclear material exiting leak when shifting in plastic package,and the plastic material don't meet the need of storaging safely for long term.We research into a new technology of nuclear material shifting. When nuclear material is carried out from the glove box. It should be sealed by welding case, then it can be storaged safely for long term. At the same time, nuclear material wouldn't pollute the glove box outside.The study achieved well effect in apply. (authors)

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cox, D. H.

2000-01-01

The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks site Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135 will be closed by unrestricted release decontamination and verification survey, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consert Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU includes one Corrective Action Site (CAS). The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine-Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999 discussed in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (DOE/NV,1999a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples that exceeded the preliminary action levels are polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. Unrestricted release decontamination and verification involves removal of concrete and the cement-lined pump sump from the vault. After verification that the contamination has been removed, the vault will be repaired with concrete, as necessary. The radiological- and chemical-contaminated pump sump and concrete removed from the vault would be disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The vault interior will be field surveyed following removal of contaminated material to verify that unrestricted release criteria have been achieved

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

D. H. Cox

2000-07-01

The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks site Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135 will be closed by unrestricted release decontamination and verification survey, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consert Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU includes one Corrective Action Site (CAS). The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine-Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999 discussed in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (DOE/NV,1999a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples that exceeded the preliminary action levels are polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. Unrestricted release decontamination and verification involves removal of concrete and the cement-lined pump sump from the vault. After verification that the contamination has been removed, the vault will be repaired with concrete, as necessary. The radiological- and chemical-contaminated pump sump and concrete removed from the vault would be disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The vault interior will be field surveyed following removal of contaminated material to verify that unrestricted release criteria have been achieved.

Regulations relevant to the transport of radioactive materials in Switzerland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, L.

1996-01-01

As is the case in many countries, the transport of radioactive materials in Switzerland is primarily regulated by the national regulations for the transport of dangerous goods. Currently these regulations, in the case of radioactive material, incorporate the 1985 IAEA Safety Series 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (As amended 1990). However, as is also the case in some other countries, consignors, shippers and carriers of radioactive materials must also comply with additional laws when shipping radioactive materials. The most important of these other laws and their accompanying regulations are those concerned with radiation protection (import, export and carriers licences) and nuclear power (import, export, inland transport and transit licences). This paper sets out to describe the collective requirements resulting from all three of these sets of regulations. (Author)

Beatty, Nevada: A section in U.S. Geological Survey research in radioactive waste disposal - Fiscal years 1986-1990 (WRI 91-4084)

Science.gov (United States)

Andraski, Brian J.; Fisher, Jeffrey M.; Prudic, David E.; Trask, N.J.; Stevens, P.R.

1991-01-01

A low-level radioactive-waste disposal facility in the Amargosa Desert of Nevada, about 17 km southeast of Beatty and 169 km northwest of Las Vegas, has been operating since 1962. This was the first commercially operated radioactive waste disposal facility in the United States. Wastes at the facility are emplaced in 2 to 15-m deep trenches and covered by backfilling with previously excavated materials. Annual precipitation in the area averages about 112 mm. Vegetation is sparse with creosote bush (Larrea tridentata) being the dominant species. Soils in the area are skeletal and are underlain by more than 170 m of unconsolidated alluvial-fan, fluvial, and ephemeral-lake deposits. Depth to water is about 85 m.Initial field investigations (1976-1980) included monitoring of soil-water content and water potential in an unvegetated soil profile, and collection of meteorological data at the disposal facility. Design of additional hydrogeologic investigations and long-term studies of soil-water movement in a vegetated soil profile began in 1982 and field data collection has been ongoing since 1984. Studies to evaluate the modifying effects of trench construction on the natural site environment and to determine changes in trench structural stability began in 1987. Design of studies to measure gas and vapor movement in the trenches at the facility began in 1989.

Safe transport of radioactive materials in Egypt

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

El-Shinawy, R.M.K.

1994-01-01

In Egypt the national regulations for safe transport of radioactive materials (RAM) are based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. In addition, regulations for the safe transport of these materials through the Suez Canal (SC) were laid down by the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA) and the Suez Canal Authority (SCA). They are continuously updated to meet the increased knowledge and the gained experience. The technical and protective measures taken during transport of RAM through SC are mentioned. Assessment of the impact of transporting radioactive materials through the Suez Canal using the INTERTRAN computer code was carried out in cooperation with IAEA. The transported activities and empty containers, the number of vessels carrying RAM through the canal from 1963 and 1991 and their nationalities are also discussed. The protective measures are mentioned. A review of the present situation of the radioactive wastes storage facilities at the Atomic Energy site at Inshas is given along with the regulation for safe transportation and disposal of radioactive wastes. (Author)

Atmospheric dispersion of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chino, Masamichi

1988-01-01

The report describes currently available techniques for predicting the dispersion of accidentally released radioactive materials and techniques for visualization using computer graphics. A simulation study is also made on the dispersion of radioactive materials released from the Chernobyl plant. The simplest models include the Gauss plume model and the puff model, which cannot serve to analyze the effects of the topography, vertical wind shear, temperature inversion layer, etc. Numerical analysis methods using advection and dispersion equations are widely adopted for detailed evaluation of dispersion in an emergency. An objective analysis model or a hydrodynamical model is often used to calculate the air currents which are required to determine the advection. A small system based on the puff model is widely adopted in Europe, where the topography is considered to have only simple effects. A more sophisticated large-sized system is required in nuclear facilities located in an area with more complex topographic features. An emergency system for dispersion calculation should be equipped with a graphic display to serve for quick understanding of the radioactivity distribution. (Nogami, K.)

Radioactive material in residues of health services residues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Costa R, A. Jr.; Recio, J.C.

2006-01-01

The work presents the operational actions developed by the one organ responsible regulator for the control of the material use radioactive in Brazil. Starting from the appearance of coming radioactive material of hospitals and clinical with services of nuclear medicine, material that that is picked up and transported in specific trucks for the gathering of residuals of hospital origin, and guided one it manufactures of treatment of residuals of services of health, where they suffer radiological monitoring before to guide them for final deposition in sanitary embankment, in the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil. The appearance of this radioactive material exposes a possible one violation of the norms that govern the procedures and practices in that sector in the country. (Author)

The regulation concerning transportation of radioactive materials by vehicles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

The Regulation is established on the basis of The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Law for the prevention of radiation injuries due to radioisotopes.'' The prescriptions cover the transport of radioactive materials by railway, street rail way, ropeway, trolley buses, motorcars and light vehicles. Terms are explained, such as nuclear fuel materials, radioisotopes, radioactive substances, transported radioactive things, transported fissile things, vehicles, containers, exclusive loading, surrounding inspection area. Four types of transported radioactive things are specified, L and A types being less dangerous and BM and BU being more dangerous. Transported fissile things are classified to three kinds according to the safety to criticality of such things. Transported radioactive things except those of L type and containers with transported fissile things shall not be loaded or unloaded at the places where persons other than those concerned come in usually. Loading and unloading of such things shall be carried out so that the safety of such things is not injured. The maximum dose rate of radiation of the containers with transported radioactive things shall not be more than 200 millirem per hour on the surface and 10 millirem per hour at the distance of 1 meter. Specified transported radioactive things shall be particularly marked by the letter of ''radioactive'' or other signs indicating as such. (Okada, K.)

Safe transport of radioactive material. Second edition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

The transport of radioactive material embraces the carriage of radioisotopes for industrial, medical and research uses, and the movement of waste, in addition to consignments of nuclear fuel cycle material. It has been estimated that between eighteen and thirty-eight million package shipments take place each year. On the recommendation of the Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SAGSTRAM), which enjoys wide representations from the Agency's Member States and international organizations, the Secretariat is preparing a training kit comprising this training manual and complementary visual aids. The kit is intended to be the basis for an extensive course on the subject and can be used in whole or in part for inter-regional, regional and even national training purposes. Member States can thus benefit from the material either through training courses sponsored by the Agency, or, alternatively, organized by themselves. As a step towards achieving that goal, the current training manual was compiled using material from the first Inter-Regional Training Course on the Safe Transport of Radioactive material that was held in co-operation with the Nuclear Power Training Centre of the then Central Electricity Generating Board at Bristol, United Kingdom. This Manual was initially published in 1990. On the recommendation of the Agency's Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SAGSTRAM), the Manual has since been expanded and updated in time for the second Inter-Regional Training Course, that will in 1991 similarly be held in Bristol. Refs, figs, tabs

Characterizing the proposed geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada: hydrology and geochemistry

Science.gov (United States)

Stuckless, John S.; Levich, Robert A.

2012-01-01

This hydrology and geochemistry volume is a companion volume to the 2007 Geological Society of America Memoir 199, The Geology and Climatology of Yucca Mountain and Vicinity, Southern Nevada and California, edited by Stuckless and Levich. The work in both volumes was originally reported in the U.S. Department of Energy regulatory document Yucca Mountain Site Description, for the site characterization study of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the proposed U.S. geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. The selection of Yucca Mountain resulted from a nationwide search and numerous committee studies during a period of more than 40 yr. The waste, largely from commercial nuclear power reactors and the government's nuclear weapons programs, is characterized by intense penetrating radiation and high heat production, and, therefore, it must be isolated from the biosphere for tens of thousands of years. The extensive, unique, and often innovative geoscience investigations conducted at Yucca Mountain for more than 20 yr make it one of the most thoroughly studied geologic features on Earth. The results of these investigations contribute extensive knowledge to the hydrologic and geochemical aspects of radioactive waste disposal in the unsaturated zone. The science, analyses, and interpretations are important not only to Yucca Mountain, but also to the assessment of other sites or alternative processes that may be considered for waste disposal in the future. Groundwater conditions, processes, and geochemistry, especially in combination with the heat from radionuclide decay, are integral to the ability of a repository to isolate waste. Hydrology and geochemistry are discussed here in chapters on unsaturated zone hydrology, saturated zone hydrology, paleohydrology, hydrochemistry, radionuclide transport, and thermally driven coupled processes affecting long-term waste isolation. This introductory chapter reviews some of the reasons for choosing to study Yucca Mountain as a

Characterizing the proposed geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada--hydrology and geochemistry

Science.gov (United States)

Stuckless, John S.; Levich, Robert A.

2012-01-01

This hydrology and geochemistry volume is a companion volume to the 2007 Geological Society of America Memoir 199, The Geology and Climatology of Yucca Mountain and Vicinity, Southern Nevada and California, edited by Stuckless and Levich. The work in both volumes was originally reported in the U.S. Department of Energy regulatory document Yucca Mountain Site Description, for the site characterization study of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the proposed U.S. geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. The selection of Yucca Mountain resulted from a nationwide search and numerous committee studies during a period of more than 40 yr. The waste, largely from commercial nuclear power reactors and the government's nuclear weapons programs, is characterized by intense penetrating radiation and high heat production, and, therefore, it must be isolated from the biosphere for tens of thousands of years. The extensive, unique, and often innovative geoscience investigations conducted at Yucca Mountain for more than 20 yr make it one of the most thoroughly studied geologic features on Earth. The results of these investigations contribute extensive knowledge to the hydrologic and geochemical aspects of radioactive waste disposal in the unsaturated zone. The science, analyses, and interpretations are important not only to Yucca Mountain, but also to the assessment of other sites or alternative processes that may be considered for waste disposal in the future. Groundwater conditions, processes, and geochemistry, especially in combination with the heat from radionuclide decay, are integral to the ability of a repository to isolate waste. Hydrology and geochemistry are discussed here in chapters on unsaturated zone hydrology, saturated zone hydrology, paleohydrology, hydrochemistry, radionuclide transport, and thermally driven coupled processes affecting long-term waste isolation. This introductory chapter reviews some of the reasons for choosing to study Yucca Mountain as a

Illicit trafficking of radioactive material in Hungary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Golder, I.

1996-01-01

Hungary, due to its geographical location is a convenient region for illegal transit of nuclear material between source and target countries. In recent years nine cases have became known and altogether 21.7 kg depleted, 4.6 kg natural, and 2.5 kg low enriched uranium have been confiscated. A brief summary is given of possible origin of the illicitly transported radioactive material. The most important elements of the security of sources including the national and accounting system of radioactive material and the intervention plans are discussed. (author)

Method of processing radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kondo, Susumu; Moriya, Tetsuo; Ishibashi, Tadashi; Kariya, Masahiro.

1986-01-01

Purpose: To improve contamination proofness, water proofness, close bondability and stretching performance of strippable paints coated to substrates liable to be contaminated with radioactive materials. Method: Strippable paints are previously coated on substrates which may possibly be contaminated with radioactive materials. After the contamination, the coated membranes are stripped and removed. Alternatively, the strippable paints may be coated on the already contaminated substrates and, after drying, the paints are stripped and removed. The strippable paints used herein have a composition comprising a styrene-butadiene block copolymer containing from 60 to 80 wt% of styrene as a main ingredient and from 0.3 to 5 % by weight of a higher alkyl amine compound having 12 to 18 carbon atoms blended with the copolymer. (Ikeda, J.)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fitzmaurice, T. M.

2001-01-01

This closure report (CR) provides documentation for the closure of the Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area (RCRSA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 407 identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). CAU 407 is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The TTR is approximately 225 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The RCRSA is located on the northeast comer of the intersection of Main Road and Browne's Lake Road, which is approximately 8 km (5 mi) south of Area 3 (Figure 1). The RCRSA was used during May and June of 1963 to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, and personnel from the Double Tracks and Clean Slate tests. Investigation of the RCRSA was conducted from June through November of 1998. A Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOEN], 1999) was approved in October of 1999. The purpose of this CR is to: Document the closure activities as proposed in the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (DOEM, 2000). Obtain a Notice of Completion from the NDEP. Recommend the movement of CAU 407 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO. The following is the scope of the closure actions implemented for CAU 407: Removal and disposal of surface soils which were over three times background for the area. Soils identified for removal were disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Excavated areas were backfilled with clean borrow soil located near the site. A soil cover was constructed over the waste disposal pit area, where subsurface constituents of concern remain. The site was fenced and posted as an ''Underground Radioactive Material'' area

Instructions for safe transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

This entrance includes 5 chapters and tables and supplement. Chapter I contains the definitions and general provisions contained 5 materials. Chapter II contains radioactive materials packaging and permissible limits and it contains 8 materials. The provisions of Chapter III contains descriptions Missionaries. Chapter IV describes shipping instructions. As for the separation of V It contains Final provisions. The entrance contains number of tables speaks of the basic values of radioactive isotopes and radiation also limits activity and the requirements of industrial parcels and limits transactions to transport freight containers, as well as the International Classification of hazardous materials. This also includes entrance to the Supplement to some forms and Alohat

Storage of radioactive material - accidents - precipitation - personnel monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matijasic, A.; Gacinovic, O.

1961-12-01

This volume covers the reports on four routine tasks concerned with safe handling of radioactive material and influence of nuclear facilities on the environment. The tasks performed were as follows: Storage of solid and liquid radioactive material; actions in case of accidents; radiation monitoring of the fallout, water and ground; personnel dosimetry

2011 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs), with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE, 1999a; 2000). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for fiscal year (FY) 2011. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2011 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R and D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R and D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2011 include the following: (1) Operation of a new shallow land disposal unit and a new Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-compliant lined disposal unit at the Area 5 RWMS; (2) Development of new closure inventory estimates based on disposals through FY 2011; (3) Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis; (4) Development of

2011 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Management

2012-03-20

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs), with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE, 1999a; 2000). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for fiscal year (FY) 2011. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2011 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R and D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R and D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2011 include the following: (1) Operation of a new shallow land disposal unit and a new Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-compliant lined disposal unit at the Area 5 RWMS; (2) Development of new closure inventory estimates based on disposals through FY 2011; (3) Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis; (4) Development of

The safety of radioactive materials transport; La surete des transports de matieres radioactives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2007-07-01

The rule of the radioactive materials transport contains two different objectives: the safety, or physical protection, consists in preventing the losses, the disappearances, the thefts and the diversions of the nuclear materials (useful materials for weapons); the high civil servant of defence near the Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry is the responsible authority; the safety consists in mastering the risks of irradiation, contamination and criticality presented by the radioactive and fissile materials transport, in order that man and environment do not undergo the nuisances. The control of the safety is within the competence of the Asn. (N.C.)

Material for radioactive protection

Science.gov (United States)

Taylor, R.S.; Boyer, N.W.

A boron containing burn resistant, low-level radiation protection material useful, for example, as a liner for radioactive waste disposal and storage, a component for neutron absorber, and a shield for a neutron source is described. The material is basically composed of borax in the range of 25 to 50%, coal tar in the range of 25 to 37.5%, with the remainder being an epoxy resin mix. A preferred composition is 50% borax, 25% coal tar and 25% epoxy resin. The material is not susceptible to burning and is about 1/5 the cost of existing radiation protection material utilized in similar applications.

Import/export Service of Radioactive Material

CERN Multimedia

2004-01-01

Please note that the Import/Export service of radioactive material (24/E-024) is open from Monday to Friday, 8:00 to 11:00. No request will be treated the afternoon. Web site: http://cern.ch/service-rp-shipping/ Tel.: 73171 E-mail: service-rp-shipping@cern.ch Radioactive Sources Service Please note that the radioactive sources service (24/E-024) is open from Monday to Friday, 8:00 to 11:00. No request will be treated the afternoon. Moreover, the service being reduced transports between Swiss and French sites (and vice versa) will now be achieved by internal transport. Web site : http://cern.ch/service-radioactive-sources/ Tel.: 73171 E-mail: service-rp-shipping@cern.ch

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 529: Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert F. Boehlecke

2004-11-01

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 529, Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash, is the only CAS in CAU 529 and is located in Area 25 of the NTS, in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-2). Corrective Action Site 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash, was divided into nine parcels because of the large area impacted by past operations and the complexity of the source areas. The CAS was subdivided into separate parcels based on separate and distinct releases as determined and approved in the Data Quality Objectives (DQO) process and Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP). Table 1-1 summarizes the suspected sources for the nine parcels. Corrective Action Site 25-23-17 is comprised of the following nine parcels: (1) Parcel A, Kiwi Transient Nuclear Test (TNT) 16,000-foot (ft) Arc Area (Kiwi TNT); (2) Parcel B, Phoebus 1A Test 8,000-ft Arc Area (Phoebus); (3) Parcel C, Topopah Wash at Test Cell C (TCC); (4) Parcel D, Buried Contaminated Soil Area (BCSA) l; (5) Parcel E, BCSA 2; (6) Parcel F, Borrow Pit Burial Site (BPBS); (7) Parcel G, Drain/Outfall Discharges; (8) Parcel H, Contaminated Soil Storage Area (CSSA); and (9) Parcel J, Main Stream/Drainage Channels.

Radioactive material transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

White, M.C.

1979-10-01

All movements of radioactive materials in Canada are governed by a comprehensive body of regqlations, both national and international. These regulations are designed to maximize shielding to the public and transport workers, allow for heat dissipation, and to prevent criticality accidents, by prescribing specific packaging arrangements, administrative controls, labelling and storage measures. This report describes in some detail specific requirements and summarizes some incidents that occurred between 1974 and 1978

Radioactive Material (Road Transport) Act 1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

This Act came into force on 27 August 1991. It replaces earlier legislation dating from 1948 and enables the United Kingdom to give effect to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) latest recommended Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. The new Act clarifies and extends the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding, among other things, the design, labelling, handling, transport and delivery of packages containing radioactive material and the placarding of vehicles transporting such packages. The Act gives the Secretary of State the power to appoint inspectors to assist him in enforcing the regulations. (NEA)

Microwave processing of radioactive materials-I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

White, T.L.; Berry, J.B.

1989-01-01

This paper is the first of two papers that reviews the major past and present applications of microwave energy for processing radioactive materials, with particular emphasis on processing radioactive wastes. Microwave heating occurs through the internal friction produced inside a dielectric material when its molecules vibrate in response to an oscillating microwave field. For this presentation, we shall focus on the two FCC-approved microwave frequencies for industrial, scientific, and medical use, 915 and 2450 MHz. Also, because of space limitations, we shall postpone addressing plasma processing of hazardous wastes using microwave energy until a later date. 13 refs., 4 figs

Information from the Import/Export of radioactive material Service

CERN Multimedia

DGS Unit

2010-01-01

The radiation protection group reminds you that the import/export of all radioactive material must be declared in advance. In the case of exports, an EDH shipping request form must be completed, ticking the box “radioactive material”. In the case of imports, an electronic form must be completed before the material arrives on the CERN site. Any requests which do not comply with the above procedure will be refused. The import of any radioactive material that has not been declared in advance will be systematically refused. For further information, please consult the web site: http://cern.ch/service-rp-shipping Yann Donjoux / Radioactive Shipping Service Tél: +41 22 767.31.71 Fax: +41 22 766.92.00

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobiason, D. S.

2003-01-01

This Closure Report (CR) documents the activities undertaken to close Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Site closure was performed in accordance with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 262 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office [NNSA/NV, 2002a]). CAU 262 is located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 262 consists of the following nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the NTS: CAS 25-02-06, Underground Storage tank CAS 25-04-06, Septic Systems A and B CAS 25-04-07, Septic System CAS 25-05-03, Leachfield CAS 25-05-05, Leachfield CAS 25-05-06, Leachfield CAS 25-05-08, Radioactive Leachfield CAS 25-05-12, Leachfield CAS 25-51-01, Dry Well

Qualifications of and acceptance criteria for transporting special form radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hovingh, J.

1991-01-01

A special form radioactive material is a radioactive material that is in an inert, insoluble, indispersible form such that even in the event of an accident, it will not be dispersed into the environment in a way that could have an adverse impact on public health and safety. Methods of qualifying a special form radioactive material are discussed. Interpretation of acceptance criteria are proposed for the transportation of Type B quantities of a special form radioactive material. 11 refs

Nevada test site low-level and mixed waste repository design in the unsaturated zone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kawamura, T.A.; Warren, D.M.

1989-01-01

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is used for shallow land disposal of Low-Level Radioactive (LLW) and for retrievable disposal of Mixed Wastes (MW) from various Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. The site is situated in southern Nevada, one of the most arid regions of the United States. Design considerations include vadose zone monitoring in lieu of groundwater monitoring, stringent waste acceptance and packaging criteria, a waste examination and real-time radiography facility, and trench design. 4 refs

Surficial geology and performance assessment for a Radioactive Waste Management Facility at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Snyder, K.E.; Gustafson, D.L.; Huckins-Gang, H.E.; Miller, J.J.; Rawlinson, S.E.

1995-02-01

At the Nevada Test Site, one potentially disruptive scenario being evaluated for the Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) Facility Performance Assessment is deep post-closure erosion that would expose buried radioactive waste to the accessible environment. The GCD Facility located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) lies at the juncture of three alluvial fan systems. Geomorphic surface mapping in northern Frenchman Flat indicates that reaches of these fans where the RWMS is now located have been constructional since at least the middle Quaternary. Mapping indicates a regular sequence of prograding fans with entrenchment of the older fan surfaces near the mountain fronts and construction of progressively younger inset fans farther from the mountain fronts. At the facility, the oldest fan surfaces are of late Pleistocene and Holocene age. More recent geomorphic activity has been limited to erosion and deposition along small channels. Trench and pit wall mapping found maximum incision in the vicinity of the RWMS to be less than 1.5 m. Based on collected data, natural geomorphic processes are unlikely to result in erosion to a depth of more than approximately 2 m at the facility within the 10,000-year regulatory period

Report of the State of Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-11-01

Chapter One of the report presents a brief overview of the commission's functions and statutory charges. It also contains a summary of developments which have affected the overall nuclear waste disposal issue since the last Commission report was published. This chapter summarizes the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA), which significantly modified federal waste disposal policy and identified Nevada's Yucca Mountain as the only site to be evaluated for suitability as a nuclear waste repository. Chapter Two contains a synthesis of Commission activities and reports on the findings of the Commission relative to the geotechnical, environmental, socioeconomic, transportation, intergovernmental and legal aspects of federal and state nuclear waste program efforts. Chapter Three of the report presents recommendations which the Commission is making to the 1989 Nevada Legislature, the governor, and others concerned with matters surrounding the proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain and with repository-related activities, such as the transportation of radioactive materials

Computed tomography of radioactive objects and materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sawicka, B.D.; Murphy, R.V.; Tosello, G.; Reynolds, P.W.; Romaniszyn, T.

1990-01-01

Computed tomography (CT) has been performed on a number of radioactive objects and materials. Several unique technical problems are associated with CT of radioactive specimens. These include general safety considerations, techniques to reduce background-radiation effects on CT images and selection criteria for the CT source to permit object penetration and to reveal accurate values of material density. In the present paper, three groups of experiments will be described, for objects with low, medium and high levels of radioactivity. CT studies on radioactive specimens will be presented. They include the following: (1) examination of individual ceramic reactor-fuel (uranium dioxide) pellets, (2) examination of fuel samples from the Three Mile Island reactor, (3) examination of a CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium: registered trademark) nuclear-fuel bundle which underwent a simulated loss-of-coolant accident resulting in high-temperature damage and (4) examination of a PWR nuclear-reactor fuel assembly. (orig.)

Determination of detailed standards for transportation of radioactive materials by ships

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

These provisions are established on the basis of the ''Regulations on the transport and storage of dangerous things by ships''. The terms used hereinafter are according to those used in the Regulations. Radioactive materials, etc., include uranium 233, uranium 235, plutonium 238, plutonium 239, plutonium 241, the compounds of such materials and the substances containing one or two and more of such materials, excluding such materials of not more than 15 grams. The permissible surface density of radioactive materials is 1/100,000 of one microcurie per cm 2 for the radioactive materials emitting alpha-ray and 1/10,000 of one microcurie per cm 2 for the radioactive materials not emitting alpha-ray. For the radioactive materials which can be transported as L type cargo, their quantity of radioactivity is defined in their solid, liquid and gaseous forms. The limit of quantity of such cargo is described in detail in the lists attached. Transporting conditions of A, BM and BU type cargos are specified respectively in the particular sections. (Okada, K.)

Aspects of possible magmatic disruption of a high-level radioactive waste repository in southern Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crowe, B.; Amos, R.; Perry, F.; Self, S.; Vaniman, D.

1982-10-01

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) region is located within the central section of a north-northeast-trending basaltic volcanic belt of late Cenozoic age, a part of the Quaternary volcanic province of the Great Basin. Future volcanism within the belt represents a potential hazard to storage of high-level radioactive waste within a buried repository located in the southwestern NTS. The hazards of future volcanism in the region are being characterized through a combination of volcanic hazards studies, probability determinations, and consequence analyses. Basaltic activity within the NTS regions is divided into two age groups consisting of relatively large-volume silicic cycle basalts (8 to 10 Myr) and rift basalts (< 8 to 0.3 Myr). This paper describes the processes of basaltic magmatism ranging from derivation of basalt melts at depth, through ascent through the upper mantle and crust, to surface eruption. Each stage in the evolution and dispersal of basaltic magma is described, and the disruption and potential dispersal of stored radioactive waste is evaluated. These data document areas of knowns and unknowns in the processes of basaltic volcanisms and provide background data necessary to assist calculations of radiation release levels due to disruption of a repository. 9 figures, 11 tables

Transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lenail, B.

1984-01-01

Transport of radioactive materials is dependent of transport regulations. In practice integrated doses for personnel during transport are very low but are more important during loading or unloading a facility (reactor, plant, laboratory, ...). Risks occur also if packagings are used outside specifications. Recommendations to avoid these risks are given [fr

Radiological impact of radioactive materials transport in France

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamard, J.

1987-01-01

Radiation doses of personnel and populations are estimated between 1983 and 1985 during road transport of radiopharmaceuticals, spent fuels, wastes and other radioactive materials. Dose equivalent received by air transport and others are difficult to know. Results are summed up in 8 tables. Radioactive materials transport represents less than 1% of exposures related to the fuel cycle [fr

Natural radioactivity for some Egyptian building material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eissa, M. F.; Mostafa, R. M.; Shahin, F.; Hassan, K. F.; Saleh, Z. A.; Yahia, A.

2007-01-01

Study of the radiation hazards for the building materials is interested in most international countries. Measurements of natural radioactivity was verified for some egyptian building materials to assess any possible radiological hazard to man by the use of such materials. The measurements for the level of natural radioactivity in the materials was determined by γ-ray spectrum using HP Ge detector. A track detector Cr-39 was used to measure the radon exhalation rate from these materials. The radon exhalation rates were found to vary from 2.83±0.86 to 41.57 ± 8.38 mBqm -2 h -1 for egyptian alabaster. The absorbed dose rate in air is lower than the international recommended value (55 n Gy h -1 ) for all test samples

Licensing of radioactive materials and facilities in the Philippines

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mateo, A.J.

1976-12-01

The importation, acquisition, possession, use, sale and/ or transfer of radioactive materials need to be regulated and controlled in order to safeguard the importer, possessor, user or seller and the general public as well. The Philippine Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to Republic Act No. 2067, as amended and Republic Act No. 5207, has been charged by the government to control, regulate and license all the radioactive materials and facilities in the Philippines. Licensing and control is accomplished through a system of rules and regulations applicable to all importers, possessors, users or sellers of radioactive materials

Completion of the Radioactive Materials Packaging Handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shappert, L.B.

1998-02-01

The Radioactive Materials Packaging Handbook: Design, Operation and Maintenance, which will serve as a replacement for the Cask Designers Guide (Shappert, 1970), has now been completed and submitted to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) electronics publishing group for layout and printing; it is scheduled to be printed in late spring 1998. The Handbook, written by experts in their particular fields, is a compilation of technical chapters that address the design aspects of a package intended for transporting radioactive material in normal commerce; it was prepared under the direction of M. E. Wangler of the US Department of Energy (DOE) and is intended to provide a wealth of technical guidance that will give designers a better understanding of the regulatory approval process, preferences of regulators on specific aspects of package design, and the types of analyses that should be considered when designing a package to carry radioactive materials

Ontario hydro radioactive material transportation field guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howe, W.

1987-01-01

The recent introduction of both the AECB Transport Packaging of Radioactive Material Regulations and Transport Canada's Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations have significantly altered the requirements for transporting radioactive material in Canada. Extensive additional training as well as certification of several hundred Ontario Hydro employees has been necessary to ensure compliance with the additional and revised regulatory requirements. To assist in the training of personnel, an 'active' corporate Ontario Hydro Field Guide for Radioactive Material Transport document has been developed and published. The contents of this Field Guide identify current Ontario Hydro equipment and procedures as well as the updated relevant regulatory requirements within Canada. In addition, to satisfying Ontario Hydro requirements for this type of information over two thousand of these Field Guides have been provided to key emergency response personnel throughout the province of Ontario to assist in their transportation accident response training

HMPT: Basic Radioactive Material Transportation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-02-29

Hazardous Materials and Packaging and Transportation (HMPT): Basic Radioactive Material Transportation Live (#30462, suggested one time) and Test (#30463, required initially and every 36 months) address the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) function-specific [required for hazardous material (HAZMAT) handlers, packagers, and shippers] training requirements of the HMPT Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Labwide training. This course meets the requirements of 49 CFR 172, Subpart H, Section 172.704(a)(ii), Function-Specific Training.

Management of radioactive wastes produced by users of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

This report is intended as a document to provide guidance for regulatory, administrative and technical authorities who are responsible for, or are involved in, planning, approving, executing and reviewing national waste management programmes related to the safe use of radioactive materials in hospitals, research laboratories, industrial and agricultural premises and the subsequent disposal of the radioactive wastes produced. It provides information and guidance for waste management including treatment techniques that may be available to establishments and individual users

Advisory material for the IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material (1985 edition). 3. ed.

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material provide standards for ensuring a high level of safety of people, property and the environment against radiation and criticality hazards as well as thermal effects associated with the transport of radioactive material. The basic requirements to be met are: Effective containment of radioactive material; Effective control of radiation emitted from the package; A subcritical condition for any fissile material; and Adequate dissipation of any heat generated within the package. Effective quality assurance and compliance assurance programmes are required, for example: (a) Appropriate and sound packages are used; (b) The activity of radioactive material in each package does not exceed the regulatory activity limit for that material and that package type; (c) The radiation levels external to, and the contamination levels on, surfaces of packages do not exceed the appropriate limits; (d) Packages are properly marked and labelled and transport documents are completed; (e) the number of packages containing radioactive material in a conveyance is within the regulatory limits; (f) Packages of radioactive material are stowed in conveyances and are stored at a safe distance from persons and photosensitive materials; (g) Only those transport and lifting devices which have been tested are used in loading, conveying and unloading packages of radioactive material; and (h) Packages of radioactive material are properly secured for transport. The control of the transport of radioactive materials may be necessary also for other reasons, e.g. safeguards control and physical protection of nuclear materials and control of a property. For radioactive materials having other dangerous properties, the regulations of Member States, modal conventions and agreements, and other relevant documents of international organizations need to be applied. A Member State may require in its national regulations that an additional approval be

Data about shipping of radioactive material for medical use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanches, M.P.; Rodrigues, D.L.

2006-01-01

The transport of radioactive materials implies a risk for the personnel of the team, those members of the public and the environment. While the safety in the transports is based on the designs of the bulks, the programs of radiological protection are important to assure the radiological control to the workers, the public and the environment during the transport of these materials. Although the biggest interest in the transport of radioactive materials it spreads to be centered in the nuclear industry, the transport in great measure it happens for the materials of medical use. These are mainly transported in bulks of the A Type and excepted bulks. The transport ones are forced, by national regulations, to send to the competent authority, in our case the National Comissao of Nuclear Energy (CNEN), all the data of the transported materials. This work has by objective to aim the efforts made to settle down and to manage the data regarding the transported radioactive materials. The existent data in the Radiopharmaceuticals Center, of the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Investigations 'IPEN/CNEN' it contains the information on all the radioactive materials consigned for the transport during every year. A statistic of the number of deliveries of the radioactive material for the period from 2001 to 2005 is provided. Based on this statistic its are presented the number of bulks, the quantity of activity and the ways of the transport for the period in study. (Author)

Nevada test site waste acceptance criteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

This document provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive and mixed waste for disposal; and transuranic and transuranic mixed waste for interim storage at the NTS. Review each section of this document. This document is not intended to include all of the requirements; rather, it is meant as a guide toward meeting the regulations. All references in this document should be observed to avoid omission of requirements on which acceptance or rejection of waste will be based. The Department of Energy/Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document

Nevada test site waste acceptance criteria

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-09-01

This document provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive and mixed waste for disposal; and transuranic and transuranic mixed waste for interim storage at the NTS. Review each section of this document. This document is not intended to include all of the requirements; rather, it is meant as a guide toward meeting the regulations. All references in this document should be observed to avoid omission of requirements on which acceptance or rejection of waste will be based. The Department of Energy/Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document.

Transport of radioactive material in Canada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

In this report, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS) presents the results of its study on how the system of the transport of radioactive material (TRM) in Canada is regulated, how it operates, and how it performs. The report deals with the transport of packages, including Type B packages which are used to carry large quantities of radioactive material, but not with the transport of spent nuclear fuel or with the transport of low-level historical waste. The ACNS has examined the Canadian experience in the TRM area, the regulatory framework in Canada with respect to the TRM some relevant aspects of training workers and monitoring compliance with regulatory requirements, the state of the emergency preparedness of organizations involved in the TRM and the process of updating present regulations by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). As a result of this study, the ACNS concludes that the current Canadian regulatory system in the TRM is sound and that the TRM is, for the most part, conducted safely. However, improvements can be made in a number of areas, such as: determining the exposures of workers who transport radioactive material; rewording the proposed Transport Regulations in plain language; training all appropriate personnel regarding the AECB and Transport Canada (TC) Regulations; enforcing compliance with the regulations; and increasing the level of cooperation between the federal agencies and provincial authorities involved in the inspection and emergency preparedness aspects of the TRM. It is also noted that Bill C-23, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, imposes a new requirement, subject to the Regulations, for a licence for a carrier to transport some types of radioactive material

Transport of radioactive material in Canada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-09-01

In this report, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety (ACNS) presents the results of its study on how the system of the transport of radioactive material (TRM) in Canada is regulated, how it operates, and how it performs. The report deals with the transport of packages, including Type B packages which are used to carry large quantities of radioactive material, but not with the transport of spent nuclear fuel or with the transport of low-level historical waste. The ACNS has examined the Canadian experience in the TRM area, the regulatory framework in Canada with respect to the TRM some relevant aspects of training workers and monitoring compliance with regulatory requirements, the state of the emergency preparedness of organizations involved in the TRM and the process of updating present regulations by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). As a result of this study, the ACNS concludes that the current Canadian regulatory system in the TRM is sound and that the TRM is, for the most part, conducted safely. However, improvements can be made in a number of areas, such as: determining the exposures of workers who transport radioactive material; rewording the proposed Transport Regulations in plain language; training all appropriate personnel regarding the AECB and Transport Canada (TC) Regulations; enforcing compliance with the regulations; and increasing the level of cooperation between the federal agencies and provincial authorities involved in the inspection and emergency preparedness aspects of the TRM. It is also noted that Bill C-23, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, imposes a new requirement, subject to the Regulations, for a licence for a carrier to transport some types of radioactive material.

Development of solid water-equivalent radioactive certified reference materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Finke, E.; Greupner, H.; Groche, K.; Rittwag, R.; Geske, G.

1991-01-01

This paper presents a brief description of the development of solid water-equivalent beta volume radioactive certified reference materials. These certified reference materials were prepared for the beta fission nuclides 90 Sr/ 90 Y, 137 Cs, 147 Pm and 204 Tl. Comparative measurements of liquid and solid water-equivalent beta volume radioactive certified reference materials are discussed. (author)

Radioactive materials and emergencies at sea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shaw, K.B.

1988-01-01

Recent events have heightened awareness of the problems raised by accidents at sea involving radioactive materials. The NEA Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) noted that, while the transport of radioactive materials at sea is governed by extensive international regulations, deficiencies remained, particularly concerning mechanisms for early accident reporting and the development of generic safety assessments and accident analysises for various kinds of sea transport. As a contribution towards improving international guidance in this field, the NEA appointed a consultant to review the current status of activities carried out by the principal international organizations concerned with the transport of radioactive materials (the IAEA, IMO and the CEC), to identify the various areas where additional work is required and to suggest appropriate improvements. Only the radiation protection aspects of sea transport have been considered here. After having examined the consultant report, the CRPPH felt that its wide distribution to national regulatory authorities in OECD countries would serve a useful purpose. The report is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD and does not commit Member Governments or the Organization

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with ROTC 1 and 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David A. Strand

2004-05-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S Department of Defense (DoD). Corrective Action Unit 543 is located in Area 6 and Area 15 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Seven corrective action sites (CASs) comprise CAU 543 and are listed below: (1) 06-07-01, Decon Pad; (2) 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; (3) 15-04-01, Septic Tank; (4) 15-05-01, Leachfield; (5) 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; (6) 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; and (7) 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping. Corrective Action Site 06-07-01, Decon Pad, is located in Area 6 and consists of the Area 6 Decontamination Facility and its components that are associated with decontamination of equipment, vehicles, and materials related to nuclear testing. The six CASs in Area 15 are located at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm and are related to waste disposal activities at the EPA Farm. The EPA Farm was a fully-functional dairy associated with animal experiments conducted at the on-site laboratory. The corrective action investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, video-mole surveys, and sampling of media, where appropriate. Data will also be obtained to support waste management decisions. The CASs within CAU 543 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present at concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The seven CASs in CAU 543

Transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huck, W.

1992-01-01

The book presents a systematic survey of the legal provisions governing the transport of radioactive materials, placing emphasis on the nuclear licensing provisions of sections 4, 4b of the Atomic Energy, Act (AtG) and sections 8-10 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance (StrlSchV), also considering the provisions of the traffic law governing the carriage of hazardous goods. The author's goal is to establish a systematic basis by comparative analysis of the licensing regulations under atomic energy law, for the purpose of formulating a proposed amendment to the law, for the sake of clarity. The author furthermore looks for and develops criteria that can be of help in distinguishing the regulations governing the carriage of hazardous goods from the nuclear regulatory provisions. He also examines whether such a differentiation is detectable, particularly in those amendments to the StrlSchV which came after the Act on Carriage of Hazardous Goods. The regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials under the AtG meet with the problem of different classification systems being applied, to radioactive materials in the supervisory regulations on the one hand, and to nuclear materials in Annex 1 to the AtG on the other hand. A classification of natural, non-nuclear grade uranium e.g. by the financial security provisions is difficult as a result of these differences in the laws. The author shows that the transport regulations of the StrlSchV represent an isolated supervisory instrument that has no connecting factor to the sections 28 ff StrlSchV, as radiation protection is provided for by the regulations of the Act on Carriage of Hazardous Goods. The author suggests an amendment of existing law incorporating the legal intent of sections 8-10 StrlSchV and of sections 4, 4b AtG into two sections, and abolishing the supervisory provisions of the StrlSchV altogether. (orig./HP) [de

Determination of detailed regulations concerning transportation of radioactive materials by vehicles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

These provisions are established on the basis of the ''Regulations concerning transportation of radioactive materials by vehicles''. The terms used hereinafter are according to those used in the Regulations. Radioactive materials include uranium 233, uranium 235, plutonium 238, plutonium 239, plutonium 241, the compounds of such materials and the substances containing one or two and more of such materials, excluding the radioactive materials with not more than 15 grams of such uranium and plutonium. The permissible surface density is 1/100,000 microcurie per cm 2 for radioactive materials emitting alpha-ray and 1/10,000 microcurie per cm 2 for such materials which does not emit alpha-ray. For the radioactive materials which can be transported as L type loads, their kinds and quantities are specified in the forms of solid, liquid and gas, respectively. Transporting conditions including the quantity and leakage in A, BM and BU type loads are provided for, respectively, in the lists attached and in the particular sections. (Okada, K.)

Measures Against-Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barakat, M.B.; Nassef, M.H.; El Mongy, S.A.

2008-01-01

Since the early nineties, illicit trafficking (IT) of nuclear materials and radioactive sources appeared as a new trend which raised the concern of the international community due to the grave consequences that would merge if these materials or radioactive sources fell into the hands of terrorist groups. However, by the end of the last century illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources lost its considerable salience, in spite of seizure of considerable amounts of 2 '3'5U (76% enrichment) in Bulgaria (May 1999) and also 235 U (30% enrichment) in Georgia (April 2000). Nevertheless, IT should be always considered as a continued and viable threat to the international community. Awareness of the problem should be developed and maintained among concerned circles as the first step towards combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources. Illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials needs serious consideration and proper attention by the governmental law enforcement authorities. Measures to combat with IT of nuclear material or radioactive sources should be effective in recovery, of stolen, removed or lost nuclear materials or radioactive sources due to the failure of the physical protection system or the State System Accounting and Control (SSAC) system which are normally applied for protecting these materials against illegal actions. Measures such as use of modern and efficient radiation monitoring equipment at the borders inspection points, is an important step in preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across the borders. Also providing radiological training to specific personnel and workers in this field will minimize the consequences of a radiological attack in case of its occurrence. There is a real need to start to enter into cooperative agreements to strengthen borders security under the umbrella of IAEA to faster as an international cooperation in the illicit trafficking

Statistics of foreign trade in radioactive materials 2004

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2006-01-01

The German Federal Office for Industry and Foreign Trade Control (BAFA) keeps annual statistics of the imports and exports of radioactive materials, nuclear fuels included. The entries, some of them with precise details, cover the participating countries and the radionuclides concerned as well as all kinds of radioactive materials. The tables listed in the article represent the overall balance of the development of imports and exports of radioactive materials for the years 1986 to 2004 arranged by activity levels, including the development of nuclear fuel imports and exports. For the year 2004, an additional trade balance for irradiated and unirradiated nuclear fuels and source materials differentiated by enrichment is presented for the countries involved. In 2004, some 2,558 t of nuclear fuels and source materials were imported into the Federal Republic, while approx. 1,971 t were exported. The chief trading partners are countries of the European Union, Canada, Russia and the USA. (orig.)

Statistics of foreign trade in radioactive materials 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2003-01-01

The German Federal Office for Industry and Foreign Trade Control (BAFA) keeps annual statistics of the imports and exports of radioactive materials, nuclear fuels included. The entries, some of them with precise details, cover the participating countries and the radionuclides concerned as well as all kinds of radioactive materials. The tables listed in the article represent the overall balance of the development of imports and exports of radioactive materials for the years 1983 to 2002 arranged by activity levels, including the development of nuclear fuel imports and exports. For the year 2002, an additional trade balance for irradiated and unirradiated nuclear fuels and source materials differentiated by enrichment is presented for the countries involved. In 2002, some 3 070 t of nuclear fuels and source materials were imported into the Federal Republic, while approx. 3 052 t were exported. The chief trading partners are countries of the European Union, Russia, and the USA. (orig.)

Dispersion of radioactive materials in air and water

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tolksdorf, P.; Meurin, G.

1976-01-01

A review of current analytical methods for treating the dispersion of radioactive material in air and water is given. It is shown that suitable calculational models, based on experiments, exist for the dispersion in air. By contrast, the analysis of the dispersion of radioactive material in water still depends on the evaluation of experiments with site-specific models. (orig.) [de

Radioactive materials transporting container and vehicles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reese, S.L.

1980-01-01

A container and vehicle therefor for transporting radioactive materials is provided. The container utilizes a removable system of heat conducting fins made of a light weight highly heat conductive metal, such as aluminum or aluminum alloys. This permits a substantial reduction in the weight of the container during transport, increases the heat dissipation capability of the container and substantially reduces the scrubbing operation after loading and before unloading the radioactive material from the container. The vehicle utilizes only a pair of horizontal side beams interconnecting a pair of yoke members to support the container and provide the necessary strength and safety with a minimum of weight

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

C. Wills, ed.

2011-09-13

This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2010 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

Sediment properties and water movement through shallow unsaturated alluvium at an arid site for disposal of low-level radioactive waste near Beatty, Nye County, Nevada

Science.gov (United States)

Fischer, Jeffrey M.

1992-01-01

A commercial disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste has been in operation near Beatty, Nevada, since 1962. The facility is in the arid Amargosa Desert where wastes are buried in trenches excavated into unsaturated alluvial sediments. Thick unsaturated zones in arid environments offer many potential advantages for disposal of radioactive wastes, but little is known about the natural movement of water near such facilities. Thus, a study was begun in 1982 to better define the direction and rates of water movement through the unsaturated zone in undisturbed sediments near the disposal facility. This report discusses the analyses of data collected between 1983 and 1988.

Regulations of safe transport of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patel, R.J.; Sumathi, E.

2017-01-01

BARC is a multi-disciplinary nuclear research organisation with facilities located at various parts of the country. The nuclear and radiological facilities in BARC include fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear research reactors, radiological laboratories, nuclear recycle facilities, waste management facilities and other associated facilities. RAdioactive Material (RAM) such as fresh nuclear fuel, irradiated fuel, radioactive sources, vitrified high level wastes, special nuclear material etc., are transported between these facilities either within the controlled premises or in public domain. In BARC the regulatory approval for the packages used for transport of RAM is issued by BARC Safety Council (BSC). Competent Authority for issuing the design approval for the BARC packages in public domain is Director, BARC. In this aspect BSC is assisted by Safety Review Committee-Transport of Radioactive Material (SRC-TRM) constituted by BSC entrusted with the mandate to ensure the packages are designed, manufactured and transported in accordance with the current regulations. This article summarizes the regulatory requirements for transport of RAM and experience in BARC facilities

Integrated Corrosion Facility for long-term testing of candidate materials for high-level radioactive waste containment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estill, J.C.; Dalder, E.N.C.; Gdowski, G.E.; McCright, R.D.

1994-10-01

A long-term-testing facility, the Integrated Corrosion Facility (I.C.F.), is being developed to investigate the corrosion behavior of candidate construction materials for high-level-radioactive waste packages for the potential repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Corrosion phenomena will be characterized in environments considered possible under various scenarios of water contact with the waste packages. The testing of the materials will be conducted both in the liquid and high humidity vapor phases at 60 and 90 degrees C. Three classes of materials with different degrees of corrosion resistance will be investigated in order to encompass the various design configurations of waste packages. The facility is expected to be in operation for a minimum of five years, and operation could be extended to longer times if warranted. A sufficient number of specimens will be emplaced in the test environments so that some can be removed and characterized periodically. The corrosion phenomena to be characterized are general, localized, galvanic, and stress corrosion cracking. The long-term data obtained from this study will be used in corrosion mechanism modeling, performance assessment, and waste package design. Three classes of materials are under consideration. The corrosion resistant materials are high-nickel alloys and titanium alloys; the corrosion allowance materials are low-alloy and carbon steels; and the intermediate corrosion resistant materials are copper-nickel alloys

Rooting Characteristics of Vegetation Near Areas 3 and 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site--Part 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

D. J. Hansen

2003-09-30

The U.S. Department of Energy emplaced high-specific-activity low-level radioactive wastes and limited quantities of classified transuranic wastes in Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes from 1984 to 1989. The boreholes are located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in southern Nevada. The boreholes were backfilled with native alluvium soil. The surface of these boreholes and trenches is expected to be colonized by native vegetation in the future. Considering the long-term performance of the disposal facilities, bioturbation (the disruption of buried wastes by biota) is considered a primary release mechanism for radionuclides disposed in GCD boreholes as well as trenches at both Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs. This report provides information about rooting characteristics of vegetation near Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs. Data from this report are being used to resolve uncertainties involving parameterization of performance assessment models used to characterize the biotic mixing of soils and radionuclide transport processes by biota. The objectives of this study were to: (1) survey the prior ecological literature on the NTS and identify pertinent information about the vegetation, (2) conduct limited field studies to describe the current vegetation in the vicinity of Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs so as to correlate findings with more extensive vegetation data collected at Yucca Mountain and the NTS, ( 3 ) review prior performance assessment documents and evaluate model assumptions based on current ecological information, and (4) identify data deficiencies and make recommendations for correcting such deficiencies.

Rooting Characteristics of Vegetation Near Areas 3 and 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site--Part 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hansen, D.J.

2003-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy emplaced high-specific-activity low-level radioactive wastes and limited quantities of classified transuranic wastes in Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes from 1984 to 1989. The boreholes are located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in southern Nevada. The boreholes were backfilled with native alluvium soil. The surface of these boreholes and trenches is expected to be colonized by native vegetation in the future. Considering the long-term performance of the disposal facilities, bioturbation (the disruption of buried wastes by biota) is considered a primary release mechanism for radionuclides disposed in GCD boreholes as well as trenches at both Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs. This report provides information about rooting characteristics of vegetation near Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs. Data from this report are being used to resolve uncertainties involving parameterization of performance assessment models used to characterize the biotic mixing of soils and radionuclide transport processes by biota. The objectives of this study were to: (1) survey the prior ecological literature on the NTS and identify pertinent information about the vegetation, (2) conduct limited field studies to describe the current vegetation in the vicinity of Areas 3 and 5 RWMSs so as to correlate findings with more extensive vegetation data collected at Yucca Mountain and the NTS, ( 3 ) review prior performance assessment documents and evaluate model assumptions based on current ecological information, and (4) identify data deficiencies and make recommendations for correcting such deficiencies

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 214 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 5, 11, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, CAU 214 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-99-01, Fallout Shelters; 11-22-03, Drum; 25-99-12, Fly Ash Storage; 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials; 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage; 25-99-18, Storage Area; 25-34-03, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); 25-34-04, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker); and 25-34-05, Motor Dr/Gr Assembly (Bunker). These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). The suspected contaminants and critical analyte s for CAU 214 include oil (total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel-range organics [TPH-DRO], polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]), pesticides (chlordane, heptachlor, 4,4-DDT), barium, cadmium, chronium, lubricants (TPH-DRO, TPH-gasoline-range organics [GRO]), and fly ash (arsenic). The land-use zones where CAU 214 CASs are located dictate that future land uses will be limited to nonresidential (i.e., industrial) activities. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the corrective action decision document

2009 National inventory of radioactive material and wastes. Synthesis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Third edition of the ANDRA's national inventory report on radioactive wastes that are present on the French territory (as recorded until december, 2007). After a brief historical review of the national inventory and the way it is constructed, the report gives the basics on radioactive wastes, their classification, origins and management processes, followed by a general presentation and discussion of the inventory results (radioactive wastes and materials). Results are then detailed for the different activity sectors using radioactive materials (nuclear industry, medical domain, scientific research, conventional industry, Defense...). Information is also given concerning radioactive polluted areas (characterization and site management) and radioactive waste inventories in various foreign countries

Technical regulations for road transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Juul-Jensen, P.; Ulbak, K.

1990-01-01

The technical regulations for the transport of radioactive materials in Denmark are set down by the (Danish) National Board of Health in collaboration with the (Danish) National Institute for Radiation Hygiene in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Danish Ministry of Justice's Executive Order no. 2 of 2, January 1985 on the national road transport of dangerous goods by road, as amended by exutive order no. 251 of April 29th 1987 and no. 704 of November 1989. These regulations are presented here. They are almost identical, with only very few exceptions indicated in the publication, with the rules for Class 7 of the European convention on international transport of dangerous goods by road (ADR). In addition to the aforementioned regulations for national road transport of radioactive materials the general rules for the transport of radioactive materials found in the National Board of Health's executive order no. 721 of November 27th 1989 on the transport of radioactive materials are valid. The abovementioned executive orders, with the exception of certain supplements which are not part of the technical regulations, are also contained in this publication. (AB)

Development of solid water-equivalent radioactive certified reference materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Finke, E.; Greupner, H.; Groche, K.; Rittwag, R. (Office for Standardization, Metrology and Quality Control (ASMW), Berlin (Germany, F.R.)); Geske, G. (Jena Univ. (Germany, F.R.))

1991-01-01

This paper presents a brief description of the development of solid water-equivalent beta volume radioactive certified reference materials. These certified reference materials were prepared for the beta fission nuclides {sup 90}Sr/{sup 90}Y, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 147}Pm and {sup 204}Tl. Comparative measurements of liquid and solid water-equivalent beta volume radioactive certified reference materials are discussed. (author).

Fruit and vegetable radioactivity survey, Nevada Test Site environs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andrews, V.E.; Vandervort, J.C.

1978-04-01

During the 1974 growing season, the Environmental Monitoring and Support Laboratory-Las Vegas, of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, collected samples of fruits and vegetables grown in the off-site area surrounding the Nevada Test Site. The objective was to estimate the potential radiological dose to off-site residents from consumption of locally grown foodstuffs. Irrigation water and soil were collected from the gardens and orchards sampled. Soil concentrations of cesium-137 and plutonium-239 reflected the effects of close-in fallout from nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site. The only radionuclide measured in fruit and vegetable samples which might be related to such fallout was strontium-90, for which the first year estimated dose to bone marrow of an adult with an assumed rate of consumption of the food would be 0.14 millirad

Fate and transport processes controlling the migration of hazardous and radioactive materials from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estrella, R.

1994-10-01

Desert vadose zones have been considered as suitable environments for the safe and long-term isolation of hazardous wastes. Low precipitation, high evapotranspiration and thick unsaturated alluvial deposits commonly found in deserts make them attractive as waste disposal sites. The fate and transport of any contaminant in the subsurface is ultimately determined by the operating retention and transformation processes in the system and the end result of the interactions among them. Retention (sorption) and transformation are the two major processes that affect the amount of a contaminant present and available for transport. Retention processes do not affect the total amount of a contaminant in the soil system, but rather decrease or eliminate the amount available for transport at a given point in time. Sorption reactions retard the contaminant migration. Permanent binding of solute by the sorbent is also possible. These processes and their interactions are controlled by the nature of the hazardous waste, the properties of the porous media and the geochemical and environmental conditions (temperature, moisture and vegetation). The present study summarizes the available data and investigates the fate and transport processes that govern the migration of contaminants from the Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). While the site is currently used only for low-level radioactive waste disposal, past practices have included burial of material now considered hazardous. Fundamentals of chemical and biological transformation processes are discussed subsequently, followed by a discussion of relevant results

Fate and transport processes controlling the migration of hazardous and radioactive materials from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Estrella, R.

1994-10-01

Desert vadose zones have been considered as suitable environments for the safe and long-term isolation of hazardous wastes. Low precipitation, high evapotranspiration and thick unsaturated alluvial deposits commonly found in deserts make them attractive as waste disposal sites. The fate and transport of any contaminant in the subsurface is ultimately determined by the operating retention and transformation processes in the system and the end result of the interactions among them. Retention (sorption) and transformation are the two major processes that affect the amount of a contaminant present and available for transport. Retention processes do not affect the total amount of a contaminant in the soil system, but rather decrease or eliminate the amount available for transport at a given point in time. Sorption reactions retard the contaminant migration. Permanent binding of solute by the sorbent is also possible. These processes and their interactions are controlled by the nature of the hazardous waste, the properties of the porous media and the geochemical and environmental conditions (temperature, moisture and vegetation). The present study summarizes the available data and investigates the fate and transport processes that govern the migration of contaminants from the Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). While the site is currently used only for low-level radioactive waste disposal, past practices have included burial of material now considered hazardous. Fundamentals of chemical and biological transformation processes are discussed subsequently, followed by a discussion of relevant results.

Actions of radiation protection in the collection of discarded radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neri, E.P.M.; Silva, F.C.A. da

2017-01-01

Brazil has approximately 2000 radiative facilities that use radiation sources in their processes and are controlled by The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - CNEN through standards, authorizations and inspections. These radioactive materials, whether in the form of waste or radioactive source, used in medical, industrial, research, etc. are sometimes discarded and found in inappropriate places, such as garbage dumps, industrial waste, streets, squares, etc. found by urban cleaning professionals without the proper knowledge of them. The work presents the radiation protection actions required for the safe collection of radioactive material to be performed by these professionals. According to the type of radioactive material the main actions of radiation protection are, among others: recognition of a radioactive material; correct use of personal protective equipment to contain possible radiation contamination; implementation of an area control etc. In order for the actions of recognition and collection of discarded radioactive material to be effective, there is a need to implement a training program in radiation protection for urban cleaning professionals

Environmental assessment for liquid waste treatment at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This environmental assessment (EA) examines the potential impacts to the environment from treatment of low-level radioactive liquid and low-level mixed liquid and semi-solid wastes generated at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The potential impacts of the proposed action and alternative actions are discussed herein in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended in Title 42 U.S.C. (4321), and the US Department of Energy (DOE) policies and procedures set forth in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1021 and DOE Order 451.1, ''NEPA Compliance Program.'' The potential environmental impacts of the proposed action, construction and operation of a centralized liquid waste treatment facility, were addressed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada. However, DOE is reevaluating the need for a centralized facility and is considering other alternative treatment options. This EA retains a centralized treatment facility as the proposed action but also considers other feasible alternatives

State summary of radioactive material transport sector in Brazil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heilbron Filho, P.F.L.; Xavier, A.M.

1991-07-01

The main aim of this work is the scientific cooperation with the CNEA (Argentina) in the area of safe transport of radioactive materials, intending to find solutions to some rural problems and, also, to standardize the transport of radioactive materials between Brazil and Argentina. (E.O.)

44 years of testing radioactive materials packages at ORNL

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shappert, L.B.; Ludwig, S.B. [Oak Ridge National Lab., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2004-07-01

This paper briefly reviews the package testing at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) since 1960 and then examines the trends in the testing activities that occurred during the same period. Radioactive material shipments have been made from ORNL since the 1940s. The first fully operating reactor built at the ORNL site was patterned after the graphite pile constructed by Enrico Fermi under Stagg Field in Chicago. After serving as a test bed for future reactors, it became useful as a producer of radioactive isotopes. The Isotopes Division was established at ORNL to furnish radioactive materials used in the medical community. Often these shipments have been transported by aircraft worldwide due to the short half-lives of many of the materials. This paper touches briefly on the lighter and smaller radioisotope packages that were being shipped from ORNL in large numbers and then deals with the testing of packages designed to handle large radioactive sources, such as spent fuel, and other fissile materials.

44 years of testing radioactive materials packages at ORNL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shappert, L.B.; Ludwig, S.B.

2004-01-01

This paper briefly reviews the package testing at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) since 1960 and then examines the trends in the testing activities that occurred during the same period. Radioactive material shipments have been made from ORNL since the 1940s. The first fully operating reactor built at the ORNL site was patterned after the graphite pile constructed by Enrico Fermi under Stagg Field in Chicago. After serving as a test bed for future reactors, it became useful as a producer of radioactive isotopes. The Isotopes Division was established at ORNL to furnish radioactive materials used in the medical community. Often these shipments have been transported by aircraft worldwide due to the short half-lives of many of the materials. This paper touches briefly on the lighter and smaller radioisotope packages that were being shipped from ORNL in large numbers and then deals with the testing of packages designed to handle large radioactive sources, such as spent fuel, and other fissile materials

Management system for regulating transport of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopez Vietri, Jorge; Capadona, Nancy; Barenghi, Leonardo

2008-01-01

Full text: The objective of this paper is to describe the main characteristics and fundamentals of the Nuclear regulatory Authority's (Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, ARN) management system applied to the regulation of transport of radioactive material, in Argentina. In the frame of ARN's quality policy, 'Protection against ionizing radiation on transport of radioactive materials' was selected as one of the regulatory processes, named TRM process from now on. ARN's quality management system is integrally based on ISO 9000 system addressed to help organizations in designing and implementing their quality management systems. TRM process was split into five sub processes in order to facilitate the implementation of quality system. Such sub processes were defined taking account of the main functions developed by ARN in the branch of safe transport of radioactive materials and are listed below: 1) Development and updating of standards and regulatory guides; 2) Licensing of packages, special radioactive materials and consignments of radioactive materials; 3) Compliance assurance during the transport of radioactive materials, and 4) Training, advising and communications. For each of these sub processes were specified their objectives, inputs, activities and outputs, the clients and stakeholders, responsibilities, supporting documents, control of documents and records, control of non-conformances, monitoring and measurements, audits, feedback and improvement. It was decided to develop a quality plan to organize and manage activities to meet quality requirements, to optimize the use of limited resources of the organization and to be used as a basis for monitoring and assessing compliance with the requirements, both internal and external. Supporting documents for sub processes were issued, validated, reviewed and improved as an essential point to implement continuous improving. Simultaneously, some indexes were defined to monitor and measure the sub processes as a way to show

A development of radioactive material tracking and location control system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joo, Gwang Tae; Jung Seung Yong; Song, Jung Ho

2005-01-01

As the whole industry fields such as construction, chemistry, machine, medicine including nuclear-related field have extended the range of radioactive material uses, it is tendency that domestic uses of radioactive material have been increased in quantity and number. In addition, as the transportation, transfer and use of radioactive material have been frequent, its loss, robbery, and carelessness of handling may cause not only employees in charge but the public to worry about damage of explosion and put an obstacle to increase trust in nuclear-related industry. At present, though the transportation, use and storage of radioactive material conform to the institution and standard of the atomic energy law, if we tracking radioactive material in real time, we can take immediate actions to prevent its loss, robbery. As our research institute developed a terminal that control location and tracking real time location for gamma-ray projector used in transporting, transferring, and using nondestructive test, we take a good look at utilities by using GPS-Cell ID bases location control

Determination of standards for transportation of radioactive material by aircrafts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

These provisions are established on the basis of the Enforcement Regulation for the Law on Aviation. Terms are explained, such as exclusive loading and containers. Spontaneously ignitable liquid radioactive materials and the radioactive substances required to be contained in special vessels and others particularly operated during the transport, are excluded from the radioactive materials permissible for transport. The radioactive substances required to be transported as radioactive loadings don't include empty vessels used to contain radioactive materials and other things contaminated by such materials, when they conform to the prescriptions. The technical standards on radioactive loadings are defined, such as maximum radiation dose rate of 0.5 millirem per hour on the surface of L type loadings, 200 millirem per hour for A, and 1000 millirem per hour at the distance of 1 m for BM and BU types, respectively. Confirmation of the safeness of radioactive loadings may be made through the written documents prepared by the competent persons acknowledged by the Minister of Transport. The requisite of fissile loadings is that such loadings shall not reach critical state during the transport in the specified cases. Radioactive loadings or the containers with such loadings shall be loaded so that the safeness of such loadings is not injured by movement, overturn and fall during the transport. The maximum radiation dose rate of the containers with radioactive loadings shall not be more than 200 millirem per hour on the surface. The written documents describing the handling method and other matters for attention and the measures to be taken on accidents shall be carried with for the transport of radioactive loadings. (Okada, K.)

Applications of inorganic ion-exchange materials in managing radioactivity wastewater

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

He Jiaheng; Li Xingliang; Li Shoujian

2007-01-01

This article introduces the application of abio-ion exchange materials in managing radioactivity wastewater, which would be useful for latter research of new inorganic materials that used in managing radioactivity wastewater. (authors)

Vacuum drilling of unsaturated tuffs at a potential radioactive-waste repository, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitfield, M.S.

1985-01-01

A vacuum reverse-air circulation drilling method was used to drill two 17-1/2-inch (44.5-centimeter) diameter test holes to depths of 1269 feet (387 meters) and 1887 feet (575 meters) at Yucca Mountain near the Nevada Test Site. The site is being considered by the US Department of Energy for construction of a high-level radioactive-waste repository. One of these two test holes (USW UZ-1) has been equipped with instrumentation to obtain a long-term record of pressure and moisture potential data; the other test hole (USW UZ-6) will be similarly instrumented in the near future. These investigations are being conducted as part of the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations Project of the US Department of Energy. The test holes were drilled using a 5-1/2-inch (14-centimeter) by 8-5/8-inch (22-centimeter) dual-string reverse-vacuum assembly. A vacuum, induced at the land surface, removed the drill cuttings through the inner string. Compressed air was injected into the dual-string annulus to cool the bit and to keep the bit and inner string clean. A tracer gas, sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 ), was added to the compressed air for a later determination of atmospheric contamination that might have occurred during the drilling. After reaching the surface, the drill cuttings were routed to a dry separator for sample collection. Then return air and dust from the cuttings were routed to a wet separator where the dust was removed by a water spray, and the remaining air was exhausted through the vacuum unit (blower) to the atmosphere. 6 refs., 4 figs

Radioactive waste solidification material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nishihara, Yukio; Wakuta, Kuniharu; Ishizaki, Kanjiro; Koyanagi, Naoaki; Sakamoto, Hiroyuki; Uchida, Ikuo.

1992-01-01

The present invention concerns a radioactive waste solidification material containing vermiculite cement used for a vacuum packing type waste processing device, which contains no residue of calcium hydroxide in cement solidification products. No residue of calcium hydroxide means, for example, that peak of Ca(OH) 2 is not recognized in an X ray diffraction device. With such procedures, since calcium sulfoaluminate clinker and Portland cement themselves exhibit water hardening property, and slugs exhibit hydration activity from the early stage, the cement exhibits quick-hardening property, has great extension of long term strength, further, has no shrinking property, less dry- shrinkage, excellent durability, less causing damages such as cracks and peeling as processing products of radioactive wastes, enabling to attain highly safe solidification product. (T.M.)

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David Strand

2006-06-01

Corrective Action Unit 166 is located in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 166 is comprised of the seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 02-42-01, Cond. Release Storage Yd - North; (2) 02-42-02, Cond. Release Storage Yd - South; (3) 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area; (4) 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard; (5) 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum; (6) 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (7) 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on February 28, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 166. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the CAI for CAU 166 includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling. (2) Conduct radiological surveys. (3) Perform field screening. (4) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine if

Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Manual, Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Management. The NTS has been the primary location for testing nuclear explosives in the continental United States since 1951. The topographical and geological characteristics of the NTS afford some protection to the inhabitants of the surrounding areas from potential radiation exposure as a result of release of radioactivity or contamination from nuclear testing operations. Historically, testing programs at the NTS have included atmospheric testing in the 1950s and early 1960s; underground testing in drilled, vertical holes and horizontal tunnels; earth-cratering experiments; and open air nuclear reactor and engine testing. Current activities include operating low-level radioactive and mixed waste disposal facilities for United States defense-generated waste, assembly and execution of subcritical experiments, assembly/disassembly of special experiments, the storage and use of special nuclear materials, performing criticality experiments, emergency responder training, surface cleanup and site characterization of contaminated land areas, environmental activity by the University system, and nonnuclear test operations, such as controlled spills of hazardous materials at the Hazardous Materials Spill Center. Currently, the major potential for occupational radiation exposure is associated with the burial of low-level radioactive waste and the handling of radioactive sources. Remediation of contaminated land areas may also result in radiological exposures. The Tenant Organizations (TOs) that are responsible for conducting operations, according to this manual, include National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Desert Research Institute, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Navarro Nevada Environmental Services, LLC, Sandia National Laboratories, and WSI. These organizations operate under this manual only when they are performing activities under the purview of NNSA/NSO. To ensure that the appropriate procedures

Method of electrolytic decontamination of contaminated metal materials for radioactivity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harada, Yoshio; Ishibashi, Masaru; Matsumoto, Hiroyo.

1985-01-01

Purpose: To electrolytically eliminate radioactive materials from metal materials contaminated with radioactive materials, as well as efficiently remove metal ions leached out in an electrolyte. Method: In the case of anodic dissolution of metal materials contaminated with radioactivity in an electrolyte to eliminate radioactive contaminating materials on the surface of the metal materials, a portion of an electrolytic cell is defined with partition membranes capable of permeating metal ions therethrough. A cathode connected to a different power source is disposed to the inside of the partition membranes and fine particle of metals are suspended and floated in the electrolyte. By supplying an electric current between an insoluble anode disposed outside of the partition membranes and the cathode, metal ions permeating from the outside of the partition membranes are deposited on the fine metal particles. Accordingly, since metal ions in the electrolyte are removed, the electrolyte can always be kept clean. (Yoshihara, H.)

Development and implementation of automated radioactive materials handling systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jacoboski, D.L.

1992-12-01

Material handling of radioactive and hazardous materials has forced the need to pursue remotely operated and robotic systems in light of operational safety concerns. Manual maneuvering, repackaging, overpacking and inspecting of containers which store radioactive and hazardous materials is the present mode of operation at the Department of Energy (DOE) Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) in Fernald Ohio. The manual methods are unacceptable in the eyes of concerned site workers and influential community oversight committees. As an example to respond to the FEMP material handling needs, design efforts have been initiated to provide a remotely operated system to repackage thousands of degradated drums containing radioactive Thorium: Later, the repackaged Thorium will be shipped offsite to a predesignated repository again requiring remote operation

Nuclide-related exemption limits for radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Przyborowski, S.; Scheler, R.

1984-01-01

A procedure has been proposed for setting nuclide-related exemption limits for radioactive materials. It consists in grading the radionuclides into 4 groups of radiotoxicity and assigning only one activity limit to each of them. Examples are given for about 200 radionuclides. The radiation exposures resulting from a continuous steady release of activity fractions or from short-period release of the entire activity were assessed to remain below 0.1 ALI in both of these borderline cases, thus justifying the license-free utilization of radioactive materials below the exemption limits. (author)

Considerations concerning the secure transport of radioactive materials in Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vieru, Gheorghe

2002-01-01

As UNO member and founding member of the IAEA, Romania has implemented national regulations concerning the transport of radioactive materials in complete safety, complying with recommendations by IAEA and other international organizations. Accordingly, the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, CNCAN, issued the Directive no. 374/October 2001 which provides the rules for secure radioactive material transport in Romania on roads, rail ways, sea/fluvial and air ways. The paper presents the main sources of producing radioactive materials focussing the following: mining of natural uranium ore, nuclear fuel fabrication plants, nuclear power plants operation, nuclear research reactors, industrial use of radioactive sources (as gamma radiography), use of radioisotope in scientific, educational or medical units. The paper pays attention to the special routes and containers adopted for most secure transport of radioactive waste. Finally, one presents specific issues relating to identification and evaluation of the risk factors occurring at the transport of radioactive waste, as well as the potential radiological consequences upon population and environment. Estimated are the collective risk doses for different categories of populations from areas adjacent to the routes of radioactive materials transportation. It is stressed that the annual collective dose which the population is exposed to in case of accident is comparable with the dose from the natural (cosmic radiation background)

Meeting the regulatory information needs of users of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacDurmon, G.W.

1996-01-01

The use of radioactive materials is one of the most regulated areas of research. Researchers face ever increasing regulatory requirements and issues involving the disposal of radioactive material, while meeting the demands of higher productivity. Radiation safety programs must maximize regulatory compliance, minimize barriers, provide services and solutions, and effectively communicate with users of radioactive materials. This talk will discuss methods by which a radiation safety program can meet the needs of both the research staff and regulatory compliance staff

Meeting the regulatory information needs of users of radioactive materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MacDurmon, G.W. [American Cyanamid Company, Princeton, NJ (United States)

1996-10-01

The use of radioactive materials is one of the most regulated areas of research. Researchers face ever increasing regulatory requirements and issues involving the disposal of radioactive material, while meeting the demands of higher productivity. Radiation safety programs must maximize regulatory compliance, minimize barriers, provide services and solutions, and effectively communicate with users of radioactive materials. This talk will discuss methods by which a radiation safety program can meet the needs of both the research staff and regulatory compliance staff.

The Safe Transportation of Radioactive Materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Megrahi, Abdulhafeed; Abu-Ali, Giuma; Enhaba; Ahmed

2008-01-01

In this paper, we present the essential conditions that should be required for transporting the radioactive materials. We demonstrate the procedure for transporting the radioactive iodine-131 from the Centre of Renewable Energies and Desalination of Water in Tajoura, Libya to Tripoli Medical Center. The safe measures were taken during the process of the transportation of the isotope produced in the centre including dosimetry analysis and the thickness of the container. (author)

First response to transportation emergencies involving radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This FEMA/DOE/DOT videocourse describes the basis for procedures to be used by emergency first responders for transportation accidents which involve radioactive materials. Various commercial and government sector radioactive materials shipment programs will be described and will include information about hazards and the elements of safety, proper first response actions, notification procedures, and state or federal assistance during emergencies. Primary audience: fire service and emergency management personnel

Development of a state radioactive materials storage facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schmidt, P.S.

1995-01-01

The paper outlines the site selection and facility development processes of the state of Wisconsin for a radioactive materials facility. The facility was developed for the temporary storage of wastes from abandoned sites. Due to negative public reaction, the military site selected for the facility was removed from consideration. The primary lesson learned during the 3-year campaign was that any project involving radioactive materials is a potential political issue

Radioactive materials in ashes from peat fired plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Erlandsson, B.; Hedvall, R.

1984-11-01

Measurements of the gamma radiation have been used for determination of radioactive materials in peat ashes from five Swedish heating plants. The results show that the amount of radioactive materials was almost the same in all samples. The concentration of 125 Sb, 137 Cs, 144 Cs and 155 Eu were in good conformity with the concentrations found in the environment. The 235 U-concentration was hardly possible to measure. (Edv)

Radioactive materials transportation life-cycle cost

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gregory, P.C.; Donovan, K.S.; Spooner, O.R.

1993-01-01

This paper discusses factors that should be considered when estimating the life-cycle cost of shipping radioactive materials and the development of a working model that has been successfully used. Today's environmental concerns have produced an increased emphasis on cleanup and restoration of production plants and interim storage sites for radioactive materials. The need to transport these radioactive materials to processing facilities or permanent repositories is offset by the reality of limited resources and ever-tightening budgets. Obtaining the true cost of transportation is often difficult because of the many direct and indirect costs involved and the variety of methods used to account for fixed and variable expenses. In order to make valid comparisons between the cost of alternate transportation systems for new and/or existing programs, one should consider more than just the cost of capital equipment or freight cost per mile. Of special interest is the cost of design, fabrication, use, and maintenance of shipping containers in accordance with the requirements of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A spread sheet model was developed to compare the life-cycle costs of alternate fleet configurations of TRUPACT-II, which will be used to ship transuranic waste from U.S. Department of Energy sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico

Radioactive materials in construction projects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Herrmann, Ralf; Ohlendorf, Frank; Kaltz, Andrea Christine

2014-01-01

Till 1990 residues often of the former uranium mining were partly used as building material for road construction, terrain compensation and house construction in Saxony. These recommendations for action are addressed to applicants, planners and building constructors in the engineering and construction sector. It provides information for planning, preliminary investigations, applications, construction supervision related to radiation protection measures and documentation of construction projects where radioactive materials are expected.

Plutonium, americium, and uranium in blow-sand mounds of safety-shot sites at the Nevada Test Site and the Tonopah Test Range

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Essington, E.H.; Gilbert, R.O.; Wireman, D.L.; Brady, D.N.; Fowler, E.B.

1977-01-01

Blow-sand mounds or miniature sand dunes and mounds created by burrowing activities of animals were investigated by the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) to determine the influence of mounds on plutonium, americium, and uranium distributions and inventories in areas of the Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range. Those radioactive elements were added to the environment as a result of safety experiments of nuclear devices. Two studies were conducted. The first was to estimate the vertical distribution of americium in the blow-sand mounds and in the desert pavement surrounding the mounds. The second was to estimate the amount or concentration of the radioactive materials accumulated in the mound relative to the desert pavement. Five mound types were identified in which plutonium, americium, and uranium concentrations were measured: grass, shrub, complex, animal, and diffuse. The mount top (that portion above the surrounding land surface datum), the mound bottom (that portion below the mound to a depth of 5 cm below the surrounding land surface datum), and soil from the immediate area surrounding the mound were compared separately to determine if the radioactive elements had concentrated in the mounds. Results of the studies indicate that the mounds exhibit higher concentrations of plutonium, americium, and uranium than the immediate surrounding soil. The type of mound does not appear to have influenced the amount of the radioactive material found in the mound except for the animal mounds where the burrowing activities appear to have obliterated distribution patterns

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2007-01-01

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units is listed in Appendix III of the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) which was agreed to by the state of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). CAU 543 sites are located in Areas 6 and 15 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 543 consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) (Figure 1): CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad; CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank; CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; and CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping. All Area 15 CASs are located at the former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm, which operated from 1963 to 1981 and was used to support animal experiments involving the uptake of radionuclides. Each of the Area 15 CASs, except CAS 15-23-01, is associated with the disposal of waste effluent from Building 15-06, which was the primary location of the various tests and experiments conducted onsite. Waste effluent disposal from Building 15-06 involved piping, sumps, outfalls, a septic tank with leachfield, underground storage tanks, and an aboveground storage tank (AST). CAS 15-23-01 was associated with decontamination activities of farm equipment potentially contaminated with radiological constituents, pesticides, and herbicides. While the building structures were removed before the investigation took place, all the original tanks, sumps, piping, and concrete building pads remain in place. The Area 6 CAS is located at the Decontamination Facility in Area 6, a facility which operated from 1971 to 2001 and was used to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, clothing, and other materials that had become contaminated during nuclear testing activities. The CAS includes the effluent collection and distribution systems for Buildings

Radioactive deposits found at Ottawa after the atomic explosions of January and February 1951

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rose, D C; Katzman, J

1952-01-01

Gamma-ray measurements indicated that considerable radioactive matter, apparently consisting of fission products, fell on January 29 and on February 7, 1951. The earlier fallout came from an explosion in Nevada on January 27, and the February 7 material appeared to be 3 to 5 days old. The quantity was estimated to be equivalent to 1 ..gamma.. Ra per square mile.

Truck transportation of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Madsen, M.M.; Wilmot, E.L.

1983-01-01

Analytical models in RADTRAN II are used to calculate risks to population subgroups such as people along transport routes, people at stops, and crewman. The stops model, which calculates the dose to persons adjacent to the transport vehicle while it is stopped, frequently provides the largest contribution to incident-free radiological impacts. Components such as distances from the vehicle containing radioactive material to nearby people at stops, stop duration, and number of crew members are required for the stops model as well as other incident-free models. To provide supporting data for RADTRAN II based on operational experience, selected truck shipments of radioactive material were observed from origin to destination. Other important aspects of this program were to correlate package size to effective shipment transport index (TI) using radiological surveys and to characterize population distributions and proximities of people to the shipment at a generic truck stop

Beatty, Nevada: A section in U.S. Geological Survey research in radioactive waste disposal - Fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985 (WRI 87-4009)

Science.gov (United States)

Fischer, Jeffrey M.; Nichols, William D.; Dinwiddie, G.A.; Trask, N.J.

1986-01-01

A commercial low-level radioactive-waste disposal site has been operating near Beatty, Nevada, about 150 km northwest of Las Vegas, since 1962. The 32-ha site is situated in a desolate region of the Amargosa River Valley, sometimes referred to as the Amargosa Desert. Average annual precipitation is only about 114 mm. The site is underlain by 175 m of unconsolidated, generally coarse-grained, alluvial-fan and flood-plain deposits. The water table is at a depth of 90 m.

Raising students and educators awareness of radioactive materials transport through creative classroom materials and exhibits

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holm, J.; Sandoz, C.; Dickenson, J.; Lee, J.C.; Smith, A.M.

1994-01-01

The public is concerned about how the shipping and handling of radioactive materials affects them and their environment. Through exhibit showings doing professional education conferences and smaller, focussed workshops, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) has found teachers and students to be an especially interested audience for hazardous and radioactive materials transportation information. DOE recognizes the importance of presenting educational opportunities to students about scientific and societal issues associated with planning for and safely transporting these types of materials. Raising students' and educators' awareness of hazardous and radioactive materials transport through creative classroom materials and exhibits may help them make informed decisions as adults about this often controversial and difficult issue

Radioactive waste solidifying material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ono, Keiichi; Sakai, Etsuro.

1989-01-01

The solidifying material according to this invention comprises cement material, superfine powder, highly water reducing agent, Al-containing rapid curing material and coagulation controller. As the cement material, various kinds of quickly hardening, super quickly hardening and white portland cement, etc. are usually used. As the superfine powder, those having average grain size smaller by one order than that of the cement material are desirable and silica dusts, etc. by-produced upon preparing silicon, etc. are used. As the highly water reducing agent, surface active agents of high decomposing performance and comprising naphthalene sulfonate, etc. as the main ingredient are used. As the Al-containing rapidly curing material, calcium aluminate, etc. is used in an amount of less than 10 parts by weight based on 100 parts by weight of the powdery body. As the coagulation controller, boric acid etc. usually employed as a retarder is used. This can prevent dissolution or collaption of pellets and reduce the leaching of radioactive material. (T.M.)

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

K. B. Campbell email = campbek@nv.doe.gov

2002-01-01

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides selected corrective action alternatives and proposes the closure methodology for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262, Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point. CAU 262 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Remediation of CAU 262 is required under the FFACO. CAU 262 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), approximately 100 kilometers (km) (62 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs) within CAU 262 are located in the Nuclear Rocket Development Station complex. Individual CASs are located in the vicinity of the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD); Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD); and Test Cell C compounds. CAU 262 includes the following CASs as provided in the FFACO (1996); CAS 25-02-06, Underground Storage Tank; CAS 25-04-06, Septic Systems A and B; CAS 25-04-07, Septic System; CAS 25-05-03, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-05, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-06, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-08, Radioactive Leachfield; CAS 25-05-12, Leachfield; and CAS 25-51-01, Dry Well. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the locations of the R-MAD, the E-MAD, and the Test Cell C CASs, respectively. The facilities within CAU 262 supported nuclear rocket reactor engine testing. Activities associated with the program were performed between 1958 and 1973. However, several other projects used the facilities after 1973. A significant quantity of radioactive and sanitary waste was produced during routine operations. Most of the radioactive waste was managed by disposal in the posted leachfields. Sanitary wastes were disposed in sanitary leachfields. Septic tanks, present at sanitary leachfields (i.e., CAS 25-02-06,2504-06 [Septic Systems A and B], 25-04-07, 25-05-05,25-05-12) allowed solids to settle out of suspension prior to entering the leachfield. Posted leachfields do not contain septic tanks. All CASs located in CAU 262 are

Determination of detailed standards for transportation of radioactive materials by ships

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

The notification is defined under the regulations concerning marine transport and storage of dangerous things. Radioactive materials include hereunder uranium 233 and 235, plutonium 238, 239 and 241, their compounds and those materials which contain one or more than two of such materials. Materials whose quantities or quantities of components are less than 15 grams, and natural or depleted uranium are excluded. Permissible surface concentrations are 1/100,000 micro-curie per centi-meter 2 for radioactive materials emitting alpha rays, and 1/10,000 micro-curie per centi-meter 2 for radioactive materials not emitting alpha rays. Radioactive materials to be transported as L loads shall be not dispersing solid substances or those tightly enclosed in capsules, one of whose exterior sides at least is more than 0.5 centi-meter, having other several specified features. Other kinds of liquid and gas L loads are stipulated. Limits of radioactivity of L and A loads are provided for with tables attached. Transport conditions of A, BM and BU loads are fixed with bylaws. Leakages of BM and BU loads are also prescribed. Radioactive loads shall be marked by particular signals. Measures shall be taken to control exposures, which involve measurement of doses and exposure doses on board and appointment of exposure controllers. (Okada, K.)

Safe transport of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

Recently the Agency redefined its policy for education and training in radiation safety. The emphasis is now on long-term strategic planning of general education and training programmes. In line with this general policy the Agency's Standing Advisory Group for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SAGSTRAM) in its 7th meeting (April 1989) agreed that increased training activity should be deployed in the area of transport. SAGSTRAM specifically recommended the development of a standard training programme on this subject area, including audio-visual aids, in order to assist Member States in the implementation of the Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. This training programme should be substantiated by a biennial training course which is thought to be held either as an Interregional or a Regional Course depending on demand. This training manual, issued as a first publication in the Training Course Series, represents the basic text material for future training courses in transport safety. The topic areas covered by this training manual and most of the texts have been developed from the course material used for the 1987 Bristol Interregional Course on Transport Safety. The training manual is intended to give guidance to the lecturers of a course and will be provided to the participants for retention. Refs, figs and tabs

Regulatory requirements on management of radioactive material safe transport in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chu, C.

2016-01-01

Since 1980s, the IAEA Regulation for safe transport of radioactive material was introduced into China; the regulatory system of China began with international standards, and walked towards the institutionalized. In 2003 the National People’s Congress (NPC) promulgated “the Act on the Prevention of Radioactive Pollution of the People's Republic of China”. In 2009 “Regulation for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material” (Referred to “Regulation”) was promulgated by the State Council. Subsequently, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) began to formulate executive detailed department rules, regulations guidelines and standards. The present system of acts, regulations and standards on management of safe transport of radioactive material in China and future planning were introduced in this paper. Meanwhile, the paper described the specific administration requirements of the Regulation on classification management of radioactive materials, license management of transport packaging including design, manufacture and use, licensing management of transport activities and the provisions of illegal behaviors arising in safe transport of radioactive material. (author)

United States Geological Survey, programs in Nevada

Science.gov (United States)

,

1995-01-01

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has been collecting and interpreting natural-resources data in Nevada for more than 100 years. This long-term commitment enables planners to manage better the resources of a State noted for paradoxes. Although Nevada is one of the most sparsely populated States in the Nation, it has the fastest growing population (fig. 1). Although 90 percent of the land is rural, it is the fourth most urban State. Nevada is the most arid State and relies heavily on water resources. Historically, mining and agriculture have formed the basis of the economy; now tourism and urban development also have become important. The USGS works with more than 40 local, State, and other Federal agencies in Nevada to provide natural-resources information for immediate and long-term decisions.Subjects included in this fact sheet:Low-Level Radioactive-Waste DisposalMining and Water in the Humboldt BasinAquifer Systems in the Great BasinWater Allocation in Truckee and Carson BasinsNational Water-Quality Assessment ProgramMinerals Assessment for Land ManagementIrrigation DrainageGround-Water Movement at Nevada Test SiteOil and Gas ResourcesNational Mapping ProgramDigital Mapping and Aerial PhotographyCollection of Hydrologlc DataGeologic MappingEarthquake HazardsAssessing Mineral Resources of the SubsurfaceEarth Observation DataCooperative Programs

Localized corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of candidate materials for high-level radioactive waste disposal containers in U.S

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Farmer, J.C.; McCright, R.D.

1989-01-01

Three ion-based to nickel-based austenitic alloys and three copper-based alloys are being considered in the United States as candidate materials for the fabrication of high-level radioactive waste containers. The austenitic alloys are Types 304L and 316L stainless steels as well as the high-nickel material Alloy 825. The copper-based alloys are CDA 102 (oxygen-free copper) CDA 613 (Cu7Al), and CDA 715 (Cu-30Ni). Waste in the forms of spent fuel assemblies from reactors and borosilicate glass will be sent to a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The decay of radionuclides will result in the generation of substantial heat and in gamma radiation. Container materials may undergo any of several modes of degradation in this environment, including: undesirable phase transformations due to a lack of phase stability; atmospheric oxidation; general aqueous corrosion; pitting; crevice corrosion; intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC); and transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC). This paper is an analysis of data from the literature relevant to the pitting, crevice corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of these alloys

Legislative developments in radioactive materials transportation, September 1993--June 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Worthley, J.A.; Reed, J.B.; Cummins, J.

1994-07-01

This is the eighth report prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) on developments in radioactive materials transportation. It updates information contained in the September 1993 report on Legislative Developments in Radioactive Materials Transportation and describes activities for the period September 1, 1993--June 30, 1994. NCSL currently is updating an on-line data base that contains abstracts of federal, state and local laws and regulations relating to the transportation of radioactive materials. The data base will be operated by NCSL under a cooperative agreement with the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Availability of on-line capability is anticipated by the end of August 1994. Users approved by DOE and NCSL will have access to the data base. This report contains the current status of legislation introduced in the 1993 and 1994 state legislative sessions, not previously reviewed in past reports. Bills that address nuclear materials transportation and the broader area of hazardous materials transportation are grouped by state according to their status--enacted, pending or failed. In addition, bills that deal with emergency preparedness are described. (General nuclear waste legislation with no transportation element is no longer tracked.) Also included are Federal Register notices and changes in federal regulations pertinent to radioactive waste and hazardous materials transportation

Import/export Service of Radioactive Material

CERN Multimedia

2004-01-01

Please note that the Import/Export service of radioactive material (24/E-024) is open from Monday to Friday, 8:00 to 11:00. No request will be treated the afternoon. Web site: http://cern.ch/service-rp-shipping/ Tel.: 73171 E-mail: service-rp-shipping@cern.ch Radioactive Sources Service Please note that the radioactive sources service (24/E-024) is open from Monday to Friday, 8:00 to 11:00. No request will be treated the afternoon. Moreover, the service being reduced, transports between Swiss and French sites (and vice versa) will now be achieved by internal transport. Web site : http://cern.ch/service-rp-sources Tel.: 73171 E-mail: service-rp-sources@cern.ch

Inventory of accidents and losses at sea involving radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-09-01

The present report describes the content of the inventory of accidents and losses at sea involving radioactive material. It covers accidents and losses resulting in the actual release of radioactive materials into the marine environment and also those which have the potential for release. For completeness, records of radioactive materials involved in accidents but which were recovered intact from the sea are also reported. Information on losses of sealed sources resulting in actual or potential release of activity to the marine environment nad of sealed sources that were recovered intact is also presented

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 137: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.:0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wickline, Alfred

2005-12-01

This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 137: Waste Disposal Sites. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 137 contains sites that are located in Areas 1, 3, 7, 9, and 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 137 is comprised of the eight corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; (2) CAS 03-23-01, Waste Disposal Site; (3) CAS 03-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (4) CAS 03-99-15, Waste Disposal Site; (5) CAS 07-23-02, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (6) CAS 09-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (7) CAS 12-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; and (8) CAS 12-23-07, Waste Disposal Site. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 137 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting

Some Experience with Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials in Tanzania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ngaile, J.E.; Banzi, F.P.; Kifanga, L.D.

2008-01-01

Illicit trafficking of radioactive materials (orphan sources or disuse sources) is of global concern. Reports on the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) indicates increasing trend of incidents recorded in more than 40 countries on six continents[1]. It is suspected that nuclear trafficking is fueled by nuclear terrorism and is a threat for increasing illegal trade in nuclear and radioactive materials to manufacture Radiological Disposal Devices (RDD)- dirty bombs. As such, the international co-operative efforts are needed to uncover and combat nuclear trafficking in order to minimize its consequences such as external radiation exposure of persons from source to various radiation levels during illicit movement and after seizure; rupture of source leading to internal exposure of persons and environmental contamination. Although accidents with radioactive materials have not occurred in the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized possession of radioactive materials has occurred thus prompting the Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC) to strengthen its nuclear security of nuclear and radioactive material in the URT. Nuclear faclities and radioactive sources lacks adequate physical protection against theft, fire or different forms of unauthorized access. Tanzaniaia has recorded about thirteen (13) illicit trafficking incidents of radioactive between 1996-2006. Caesium-137, Uranium-238; and Uranium oxide standard and Radium-226 with activity ranging from low to significantly high were among the radiounuclides which were intercepted. Most of these incidents had their original outside Tanzania. The incidents were uncovered by informers in cooperation with the police. Despite the fact that the management of these incidents by the police were adequate, it was observed that there is an inadequate radiation protection arrangements during transport of seized sources; lack of precautions for safety when handling seized

Transportation of radioactive materials: legislative and regulatory information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fore, C.S.; Heiskell, M.M.

1980-01-01

The transportation of radioactive materials, as well as hazardous materials in general, has been an issue of ever-increasing concern and an object of numerous regulations and legislative actions worldwide. The Transportation Technology Center of the US Department of Energy's Sandia Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is currently involved in developing a national program to assure the safe shipment of radioactive materials. At Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, this overall effort is being supported in a specialized manner. As part of the Logistics Modeling program at ORNL, the Ecological Sciences Information Center has developed comprehensive data bases containing legislative and regulatory actions relevant to the transportation of hazardous materials. The data bases are separated according to status level of the legislation. The Current Legislation Data Base includes all new legislative actions introduced during the present year (1980) or those bills carried over from the previous year's sessions. The second data file, Historical Legislation Data Base, consists of all legislative actions since 1976 that have passed and become public laws, as well as those actions that were unsuccessful and were classified as denied by law. Currently the data bases include state-, local-, and federal, level legislation, with emphasis on the transportation of radioactive materials. Because of their relevance to the transportation issues, actions involving related subject areas such as, disposal and storage of radioactive wastes, moratoriums on power plant construction, and remedial actions studies, special agencies to regulate shipment of radioactive materials, and requirements of advanced notification, permits and escorts are also included in the data bases

Emergency preparedness and response in transport of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takani, Michio

2008-01-01

Nuclear power has been providing clean, affordable electricity in many parts of the world for nearly half a century. The national and international transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials is essential to support this activity. To sustain the nuclear power industry, fuel cycle materials have to be transported safely and efficiently. The nature of the industry is such that most countries with large-scale nuclear power industries cannot provide all the necessary fuel services themselves and consequently nuclear fuel cycle transport activities are international. The radioactive material transport industry has an outstanding safety record spanning over 45 years; however the transport of radioactive materials cannot and most not be taken for granted. Efficient emergency preparedness and response in the transport of radioactive material is an important element to ensure the maximum safety in accident conditions. The World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), founded by International Nuclear Services (INS) of the United Kingdom, AREVA of France an the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) of Japan, represents the collective interest of the radioactive material transport sector, and those who rely on safe, effective and reliable transport. As part of its activities, WNTI has conducted two surveys through its members on emergency preparedness and response in the transport of radioactive material and emergency exercises. After recalling the International Atomic Energy Agency approach on emergency response, this paper will be discussing the main conclusion of surveys, in particular the national variations in emergency response and preparedness on the national and local levels of regulations, the emergency preparedness in place, the emergency response organisation (who and how), communication and exercises. (author)

Natural Radioactivity in Ceramic Materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abu Khadra, S.A.; Kamel, N.H.

2005-01-01

Ceramics are one of the most important types of the industrial building materials. The raw materials of the ceramic are made of a mixture of clay, feldspar, silica, talc kaolin minerals together with zirconium silicates (ZrSiO4).The ceramic raw materials and the final products contain naturally occurring radionuclide mainly U-238 and, Th-232 series, and the radioactive isotope of potassium K-40. Six raw ceramic samples were obtained from the Aracemco Company at Egypt together with a floor tile sample (final product) for measuring radioactive concentration levels., The activity of the naturally U-238, Th-232, and K-40 were determined as (Bq/kg) using gamma spectroscopy (Hyperactive pure germanium detector). Concentration of U and Th were determined in (ppm) using spectrophotometer technique by Arsenazo 111 and Piridy l-Azo -Resorcinol (PAR) indicators. Sequential extraction tests were carried out in order to determine the quantity of the radionuclide associated with various fractions as exchangeable, carbonate, acid soluble and in the residue. The results evaluated were compared to the associated activity indices (AI) that were defined by former USSR and West Germany

Safe transport of radioactive material. 3. ed

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-12-01

The IAEA has developed a standardized approach to transport safety training as a means of helping Member States to implement the Transport Regulations. The training manual is an anchor of this standardized approach to training: it contains all the topics presented in the sequential order recommended by the IAEA for the student to gain a thorough understanding of the body of knowledge that is needed to ensure that radioactive material ranked as Class 7 in the United Nations' nomenclature for dangerous goods - is transported safely. The explanations in the text refer, where needed, to the appropriate requirements in the IAEA's Transport Regulations; additional useful information is also provided. Thus, the training manual in addition to the Transport Regulations and their supporting documents is used by the IAEA as the basis for delivering all of its training courses on the safe transport of radioactive material. Enclosed with the training manual is a CD-ROM that contains the text of the manual as well as the visual aids that are used at the IAEA's training courses. The following topics are covered: review of radioactivity and radiation; review of radiation protection principles; regulatory terminology; basic safety concepts: materials and packages; activity limits and material restrictions; selection of optimal package type; test procedures: material and packages; requirements for transport; control of material in transport; fissile material: regulatory requirements and operational aspects; quality assurance; national competent authority; additional regulatory constraints for transport; international liability and insurance; emergency planning and preparedness; training; services provided by the IAEA.

Safe transport of radioactive material. 3. ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The IAEA has developed a standardized approach to transport safety training as a means of helping Member States to implement the Transport Regulations. The training manual is an anchor of this standardized approach to training: it contains all the topics presented in the sequential order recommended by the IAEA for the student to gain a thorough understanding of the body of knowledge that is needed to ensure that radioactive material ranked as Class 7 in the United Nations' nomenclature for dangerous goods - is transported safely. The explanations in the text refer, where needed, to the appropriate requirements in the IAEA's Transport Regulations; additional useful information is also provided. Thus, the training manual in addition to the Transport Regulations and their supporting documents is used by the IAEA as the basis for delivering all of its training courses on the safe transport of radioactive material. Enclosed with the training manual is a CD-ROM that contains the text of the manual as well as the visual aids that are used at the IAEA's training courses. The following topics are covered: review of radioactivity and radiation; review of radiation protection principles; regulatory terminology; basic safety concepts: materials and packages; activity limits and material restrictions; selection of optimal package type; test procedures: material and packages; requirements for transport; control of material in transport; fissile material: regulatory requirements and operational aspects; quality assurance; national competent authority; additional regulatory constraints for transport; international liability and insurance; emergency planning and preparedness; training; services provided by the IAEA

Anticipated development in radioactive materials packaging and transport systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, L.D.; Rhoads, R.E.; Hall, R.J.

1976-07-01

Closing the light water reactor fuel cycle and the use of mixed oxide fuels will produce materials such as solidified high level waste, cladding hulls and plutonium from Pu recycle fuel that have not been transported extensively in the past. Changes in allowable gaseous emissions from fuel cycle facilities may require the collection and transportation of radioactive noble gases and tritium. Although all of these materials could be transported in existing radioactive material packaging, economic considerations will make it desirable to develop new packaging specifically designed for each material. Conceptual package designs for these materials are reviewed. Special Nuclear Material transportation safeguards are expected to have a significant impact on future fuel cycle transportation. This subject is reviewed briefly. Other factors that could affect fuel cycle transportation are also discussed. Development of new packaging for radioactive materials is not believed to require the development of new technologies. New package designs will be primarily an adaptation of existing technology to fit the changing needs of a growing nuclear power industry. 23 references

Refilling material for underground disposal of radioactive waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yajima, Tatsuya; Kato, Hiroyasu.

1995-01-01

Generally, the underground circumstance where radioactive wastes are to be processed is in high pH and highly ionized state due to ingredients leached out of cement of a concrete pit and solidifying products. A refilling material for underground disposal are demanded to adsorb radioactive nuclides such as 137 Cs even in such a state. As the refilling material, a mixture of bentonite and sintered vermiculite, preferably, comprising 10 to 40wt% of vermiculite is used. The refilling material has a high water hold out barrier performance of bentonite and a high radioactive nuclide adsorbing performance of vermiculite. In a state of highly ionized state when the adsorbing performance of bentonite is reduced, the nuclide-absorbing performance is improved by vermiculite and since the content of the vermiculite is not more than 40wt%, the water hold out barrier performance of the bentonite is not deteriorated. (N.H.)

The contribution of human factors to risks from radioactive material transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blenkin, J.J.; Ridsdale, E.; Wilkinson, H.L.

1998-01-01

The use of probabilistic risk assessment to assess the safety of radioactive material transport operations is well accepted. However, quantitative risk assessment of radioactive material transport operations have generally not explicitly considered human factors in estimating risks. Given the high profile of human factors as the root cause of many serious transport incidents omission of an explicit consideration of human factors in a risk assessment could lead to assessments losing credibility. In addition, scrutiny of radioactive material transport incident databases reveals a large number of operational incidents and minor accidents that would have been avoided if more attention had been paid to human factors aspects, and provides examples of instances where improvements have been achieved. This paper examines the areas of radioactive material transport risk assessments (both qualitative and quantitative) which could be strengthened by further examination of the impact of human errors. It is concluded that a more complete and detailed understanding of the effects of human factors on the risks from radioactive material transport operations has been obtained. Quality assurance has a key part to play in ensuring that packages are correctly manufactured and prepared for transport. Risk assessments of radioactive material transport operations can be strengthened by concentrating on the key human factors effects. (authors)

Survey of degradation modes of candidate materials for high-level radioactive-waste disposal containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Farmer, J.C.; McCright, R.D.; Kass, J.N.

1988-06-01

Three iron- to nickel-based austenitic alloys and three copper-based alloys are being considered as candidate materials for the fabrication of high-level radioactive-waste disposal containers. The austenitic alloys are Types 304L and 316L stainless steels and the high-nickel material Alloy 825. The copper-based alloys are CDA 102 (oxygen-free copper), CDA 613 (Cu-7Al), and CDA 715 (Cu-30Ni). Waste in the forms of both spent fuel assemblies from reactors and borosilicate glass will be sent to the prospective repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The decay of radionuclides will result in the generation of substantial heat and gamma radiation. Container materials may undergo any of several modes of degradation in this environment, including undesirable phase transformations due to a lack of phase stability; atmospheric oxidation; general aqueous corrosion; pitting; crevice corrosion; intergranular stress corrosion cracking; and transgranular stress corrosion cracking. Problems specific to welds, such as hot cracking, may also occur. A survey of the literature has been prepared as part of the process of selecting, from among the candidates, a material that is adequate for repository conditions. The modes of degradation are discussed in detail in the survey to determine which apply to the candidate alloys and the extent to which they may actually occur. The eight volumes of the survey are summarized in Sections 1 through 8 of this overview. The conclusions drawn from the survey are also given in this overview

Status of radioactive material transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kueny, Laurent

2012-01-01

As about 900.000 parcels containing radioactive materials are transported every year in France, the author recalls the main risks and safety principles associated with such transport. He indicates the different types of parcels defined by the regulation: excepted parcels, industrial non fissile parcels (type A), type B and fissile parcels, and highly radioactive type C parcels. He briefly presents the Q-system which is used to classify the parcels. He describes the role of the ASN in the control of transport safety, and indicates the different contracts existing between France or Areva and different countries (Germany, Japan, Netherlands, etc.) for the processing of used fuels in La Hague

Characterization Report Operational Closure Covers for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bechtel Nevada Geotechnical Sciences

2005-01-01

Bechtel Nevada (BN) manages two low-level Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The Area 3 RWMS is located in south-central Yucca Flat and the Area 5 RWMS is located about 15 miles south, in north-central Frenchman Flat. Though located in two separate topographically closed basins, they are similar in climate and hydrogeologic setting. The Area 5 RWMS uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose of packaged waste, while the Area 3 RWMS uses subsidence craters formed from underground testing of nuclear weapons for the disposal of packaged and unpackaged bulk waste. Over the next several decades, most waste disposal units at both the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are anticipated to be closed. Closure of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs will proceed through three phases: operational closure, final closure, and institutional control. Many waste disposal units at the Area 5RWMS are operationally closed and final closure has been placed on one unit at the Area 3 RWMS (U-3ax/bl). Because of the similarities between the two sites (e.g., type of wastes, environmental factors, operational closure cover designs, etc.), many characterization studies and data collected at the Area 3 RWMS are relevant and applicable to the Area 5 RWMS. For this reason, data and closure strategies from the Area 3 RWMS are referred to as applicable. This document is an interim Characterization Report - Operational Closure Covers, for the Area 5 RWMS. The report briefly describes the Area 5 RWMS and the physical environment where it is located, identifies the regulatory requirements, reviews the approach and schedule for closing, summarizes the monitoring programs, summarizes characterization studies and results, and then presents conclusions and recommendations

Environmental effects associated with the transportation of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McClure, J.D.; Pope, R.B.; Yoshimura, H.R.

1979-01-01

The primary aim of this paper has been to describe some of the background information concerning nuclear materials transportation systems, accident statistics, accident severities, and test information - all of which when combined yield an environmental statement of the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials. The results of the ultimate risk analysis are expressed in terms of numbers of fatalities and, in that sense at least, tend to be an absolute measure of risk. When these risks are compared with other accepted societal risks, the relative risks associated with radioactive material transportation can be established. This information can be used to make decisions at the governmental level and to inform an interested public about these risks. It can be concluded that the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive material are low relative to the other risks that society has already accepted

Quality assurance for packaging of radioactive and hazardous materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gustafson, L.D.

1986-01-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) has required for many years that quality assurance programs be established and implemented for the packaging of radioactive and hazardous materials. This paper identifies various requirement principles and related actions involved in establishing effective quality assurance for packaging of radioactive and hazardous materials. A primary purpose of these quality assurance program activities is to provide assurance that the packaging and transportation of hazardous materials, which includes radioactive and fissile materials, are in conformance with appropriate governmental regulations. Applicable regulations include those issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). DOE Order 5700.6A establishes that quality assurance requirements are to be applied in accordance with national consensus standards where suitable ones are available. In the nuclear area, ANSI/ASME NQA-1 is the preferred standard

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary 2016

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wills, Cathy [National Security Technologies, LLC. (NSTec), Mercury, NV (United States)

2017-09-07

This document is a summary of the full 2016 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/ NFO). This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER. NNSA/NFO prepares the NNSSER to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from potential nonradiological impacts. It is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. The NNSS is currently the nation’s unique site for ongoing national security–related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access as well as by lands that are open to public entry. In 2016, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), was the NNSS Management and Operations Contractor accountable for ensuring work was performed in compliance with environmental regulations. NNSS activities in 2016 continued to be diverse, with the primary goal to ensure that the existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe and reliable. Other activities included weapons of mass destruction first responder training; the controlled release of hazardous material at the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC); remediation of legacy contamination sites; characterization of waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho; disposal of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste; and environmental research. Facilities and

Radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sugiura, Yoshio; Shimizu, Makoto.

1975-01-01

The problems of radioactivity in the ocean with marine life are various. Activities in this field, especially the measurements of the radioactivity in sea water and marine life are described. The works first started in Japan concerning nuclear weapon tests. Then the port call to Japan by U.S. nuclear-powered naval ships began. On the other hand, nuclear power generation is advancing with its discharge of warm water. The radioactive pollution of sea water, and hence the contamination of marine life are now major problems. Surveys of the sea areas concerned and study of the radioactivity intake by fishes and others are carried out extensively in Japan. (Mori, K.)

Analysis of radioactivity concentration in naturally occurring radioactive materials used in coal-fired plants in Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Yong Geom; Kim, Si Young; Ji, Seung Woo; Park, Il; Kim, Min Jun; Kim, Kwang Pyo [Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

2017-02-15

Coals and coal ashes, raw materials and by-products, in coal-fired power plants contain naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). They may give rise to internal exposure to workers due to inhalation of airborne particulates containing radioactive materials. It is necessary to characterize radioactivity concentrations of the materials for assessment of radiation dose to the workers. The objective of the present study was to analyze radioactivity concentrations of coals and by-products at four coal-fired plants in Korea. High purity germanium detector was employed for analysis of uranium series, thorium series, and potassium 40 in the materials. Radioactivity concentrations of {sup 226}Ra, {sup 228}Ra, and {sup 40}K were 2⁓53 Bq kg{sup -1}, 3⁓64 Bq kg{sup -1}, and 14⁓431 Bq kg{sup -1} respectively in coal samples. For coal ashes, the radioactivity concentrations were 77⁓133 Bq kg{sup -1}, 77⁓105 Bq kg{sup -1}, and 252⁓372 Bq kg{sup -1} in fly ash samples and 54⁓91 Bq kg{sup -1}, 46⁓83 Bq kg{sup -1}, and 205⁓462 Bq kg{sup -1} in bottom ash samples. For flue gas desulfurization (FGD) gypsum, the radioactivity concentrations were 3⁓5 Bq kg{sup -1}, 2⁓3 Bq kg{sup -1}, and 22⁓47 Bq kg{sup -1}. Radioactivity was enhanced in coal ash compared with coal due to combustion of organic matters in the coal. Radioactivity enhancement factors for {sup 226}Ra, {sup 228}Ra, and {sup 40}K were 2.1⁓11.3, 2.0⁓13.1, and 1.4⁓7.4 for fly ash and 2.0⁓9.2, 2.0⁓10.0, 1.9⁓7.7 for bottom ash. The database established in this study can be used as basic data for internal dose assessment of workers at coal-fred power plants. In addition, the findings can be used as a basic data for development of safety standard and guide of Natural Radiation Safety Management Act.

Framework for assessing the effects of radioactive materials transportation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zoller, J.N.

1996-01-01

Radioactive materials transport may result in environmental effects during both incident-free and accident conditions. These effects may be caused by radiation exposure, pollutants, or physical trauma. Recent environmental impact analyses involving the transportation of radioactive materials are cited to provide examples of the types of activities which may be involved as well as the environmental effects which can be estimated

Security of material: Preventing criminal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nilsson, A.

2001-01-01

The report emphasizes the need for national regulatory authorities to include in the regulatory systems, measures to control and protect nuclear materials from being used in illegal activities, as well as aspects of relevance for detecting and responding to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The report will give an overview of the international treaties and agreements that underpin the establishment of a regulatory structure necessary for States to meet their non-proliferation policy and undertakings. Ongoing work to strengthen the protection of nuclear material and to detect and respond to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material will be included. The focus of the paper is on the need for standards and national regulation in the nuclear security area. (author)

Method of preventing contaminations in radioactive material handling facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Inoue, Shunji.

1986-01-01

Purpose: To prevent the contamination on the floor surface of working places by laying polyvinyl butyral sheets over the floor surface, replacing when the sheets are contaminated, followed by burning. Method: Polyvinyl butyral sheets comprising 50 - 70 mol% of butyral component are laid in a radioactive material handling facility, radioactive materials are handled on the polyvinyl butyral sheets and the sheets are replaced when contaminated. The polyvinyl butyral sheets used contain 62 - 68 mol% of butyral component and has 0.03 - 0.2 mm thickness. The contaminated sheets are subjected to burning processing. This can surely collect radioactive materials and the sheets have favorable burnability, releasing no corrosive or deleterious gases. In addition, they are inexpensive and give no hindrance to the workers walking. (Takahashi, M.)

Radioactive material package seal tests

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Madsen, M.M.; Humphreys, D.L.; Edwards, K.R.

1990-01-01

General design or test performance requirements for radioactive materials (RAM) packages are specified in Title 10 of the US Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1983). The requirements for Type B packages provide a broad range of environments under which the system must contain the RAM without posing a threat to health or property. Seals that provide the containment system interface between the packaging body and the closure must function in both high- and low-temperature environments under dynamic and static conditions. A seal technology program, jointly funded by the US Department of Energy Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM) and the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), was initiated at Sandia National Laboratories. Experiments were performed in this program to characterize the behavior of several static seal materials at low temperatures. Helium leak tests on face seals were used to compare the materials. Materials tested include butyl, neoprene, ethylene propylene, fluorosilicone, silicone, Eypel, Kalrez, Teflon, fluorocarbon, and Teflon/silicone composites. Because most elastomer O-ring applications are for hydraulic systems, manufacturer low-temperature ratings are based on methods that simulate this use. The seal materials tested in this program with a fixture similar to a RAM cask closure, with the exception of silicone S613-60, are not leak tight (1.0 x 10 -7 std cm 3 /s) at manufacturer low-temperature ratings. 8 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab

Using computer technology to identify the appropriate radioactive materials packaging

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Driscoll, K.L.; Conan, M.R.

1989-01-01

The Radioactive Materials Packaging (RAMPAC) database is designed to store and retrieve information on all non-classified packages certified for the transport of radioactive materials within the boundaries of the US. The information in RAMPAC is publicly available, and the database has been designed so that individuals without programming experience can search for and retrieve information using a menu-driven system. RAMPAC currently contains information on over 650 radioactive material shipping packages. Information is gathered from the US Department of Energy (DOE), the US Department of transportation (DOT), and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). RAMPAC is the only tool available to radioactive material shippers that contains and reports packaging information from all three Federal Agencies. The DOT information includes package listings from Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, which have DOT revalidations for their certificates of competent authority and are authorized for use within the US for import and export shipments only. RAMPAC was originally developed in 1981 by DOE as a research and development tool. In recent years, however, RAMPAC has proven to be highly useful to operational personnel. As packages become obsolete or materials to be transported change, shippers of radioactive materials must be able to determine if alternative packages exist before designing new packages. RAMPAC is designed to minimize the time required to make this determination, thus assisting the operational community in meeting their goals

Legislative developments in radioactive materials transportation, April 1993--August 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reed, J.B.; Cummins, J.

1993-09-01

This is the seventh report prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) on developments in radioactive materials transportation. It updates information contained in the April 1993 report on Legislative Developments in Radioactive Materials Transportation and describes activities for the period April 1, 1993--August 31, 1993. NCSL currently is updating an on-line data base that contains abstracts of federal, state and local laws and regulations relating to the transportation of radioactive materials. The data base will be operated by NCSL under a cooperative agreement with the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Limited availability of on-line capability is anticipated by the end of 1993. Users approved by DOE and NCSL will have access to the data base. A copy of any legislation listed in this report can be obtained by contacting the people listed below. This report contains the current status of legislation introduced in the 1993 state legislative sessions, not previously reviewed in past reports. Bills that address nuclear materials transportation and the broader area of hazardous materials transportation are grouped by state according to their status--enacted, pending or failed. In addition, bills that deal with emergency preparedness are described. (General nuclear waste legislation with no transportation element is no longer tracked.) Also included are Federal Register notices pertinent to radioactive waste and hazardous materials transportation

Legislative developments in radioactive materials transportation, November 1992--March 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reed, J.B.; Cummins, J.

1993-04-01

This is the sixth report prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) on developments in radioactive materials transportation. It updates information contained in the November 1992 Legislative and Legal Developments in Radioactive Materials Transportation report and describes activities for the period November 1, 1992--March 31, 1993. NCSL is working to bring on-line a data base that contains abstracts of state laws and regulations relating to the transportation of radioactive materials. The data base will be operated by NCSL under a cooperative agreement with the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Limited availability of on-line capability is anticipated by the end of July 1993. Users approved by DOE and NCSL will have access to the data base. Hard copy of any legislation listed in this report can be obtained by contacting the people listed below. This report contains summaries of legislation introduced in the 1993 state legislative sessions. Bills that address nuclear materials transportation and the broader area of hazardous materials transportation are grouped by state according to their status--enacted, pending or failed. In addition, bills that deal with emergency preparedness and general nuclear waste issues are described. Also included are Federal Register notices pertinent to radioactive waste and hazardous materials transportation. A recent court decision is also summarized

The safe transport of radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Messenger, W. de L.M.

1979-02-01

The hazards of radioactive materials in transport are surveyed. The system whereby they are safely transported between nuclear establishments in the United Kingdom and overseas is outlined. Several popular misconceptions are dealt with. (author)

Transportation incidents involving Canadian shipments of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jardine, J.M.

1979-06-01

This paper gives a brief statement of the legislation governing the transportation of radioactive materials in Canada, reviews the types of shipments made in Canada in 1977, and surveys the transportation incidents that have been reported to the Atomic Energy Control Board over the period 1947-1978. Some of the more significant incidents are described in detail. A totAl of 135 incidents occurred from 1947 to 1978, during which time there were 644750 shipments of radioactive material in Canada

Radiological consequences of radioactive substances in building materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tschurlovits, M.

1982-01-01

A review of radiological consequences of radioactive substances in building materials is given. Where the other contributing papers are dealing with technical problems and measuring techniques, this paper is going beyond the term dose and is considering the risk by radioactive substances in building materials in relation to conventional risks. The present state of international standards is also discussed. If a limit of 1 mSv is adopted, it is shown that this limit is just met at present conditions. (Author) [de

Priorities for technology development and policy to reduce the risk from radioactive materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duggan, Ruth Ann

2010-01-01

The Standing Committee on International Security of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials in the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Division conducted its fourth annual workshop in February 2010 on Reducing the Risk from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials. This workshop examined new technologies in real-time tracking of radioactive materials, new risks and policy issues in transportation security, the best practices and challenges found in addressing illicit radioactive materials trafficking, industry leadership in reducing proliferation risk, and verification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article VI. Technology gaps, policy gaps, and prioritization for addressing the identified gaps were discussed. Participants included academia, policy makers, radioactive materials users, physical security and safeguards specialists, and vendors of radioactive sources and transportation services. This paper summarizes the results of this workshop with the recommendations and calls to action for the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) membership community.

Completion of the radioactive materials packaging handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shappert, L.B.

1998-01-01

'The Radioactive Materials Packaging Handbook: Design, Operation and Maintenance', which will serve as a replacement for the 'Cask Designers Guide'(1970), has now been completed and submitted to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) electronics publishing group for layout and printing; it is scheduled to be printed in late spring 1998. The Handbook, written by experts in their particular fields, is a compilation of technical chapters that address the design aspects of a package intended for transporting radioactive material in normal commerce; it was prepared under the direction of M. E. Wangler of the US DOE and is intended to provide a wealth of technical guidance that will give designers a better understanding of the regulatory approval process, preferences of regulators on specific aspects of package design, and the types of analyses that should be considered when designing a package to carry radioactive materials. Even though the Handbook is concerned with both small and large packagings, most of the emphasis is placed on large packagings that are capable of transporting fissile, radioactive sources (e.g. spent fuels). The safety analysis reports for packagings (SARPs) must address the widest range of technical topics in order to meet United States and/or international regulations, all of which are covered in the Handbook. One of the primary goals of the Handbook is to provide information which would guide designers of radioactive materials packages to make decisions that would most likely be acceptable to regulatory agencies during the approval process of the packaging. It was therefore important to find those authors who not only were experts in one or more of the areas that are addressed in a SARP, but who also had been exposed to the regulatory process or had operational experience dealing with a wide variety of package types. Twenty-five such people have contributed their time and talents to the development of this document, mostly on a volunteer basis

SOR/89-426, Transport Packaging of Radioactive Materials Regulations, amendment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

These Regulations of 24 August 1989 amend the Transport Packaging of Radioactive Materials Regulations by clarifying the text and specifying certain requirements. In particular certain definitions have been replaced, namely those of ''Fissile Class III package'' and ''Special form radioactive material''. Also, this latter material may not be carried without a certificate attesting that it meets the requirements of the Regulations. (NEA)

Transports of radioactive materials. Legal regulations, safety and security concepts, experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schwarz, Guenther

2012-01-01

In Germany, approximately 650,000 to 750,000 units containing radioactive materials for scientific, medical and technical applications are shipped annually by surface, air and water transports. Legally speaking, radioactive materials are dangerous goods which can cause hazards to life, health, property and the environment as a result of faulty handling or accidents in transit. For protection against these hazards, their shipment therefore is regulated in extensive national and international rules of protection and safety. The article contains a topical review of the international and national transport regulations and codes pertaining to shipments of radioactive materials, and of the protection concepts underlying these codes so as to ensure an adequate standard of safety and security in shipping radioactive materials in national and international goods traffic. (orig.)

Development of a wireless radioactive material sensor network

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Katsis, Dimosthenis, E-mail: katsisdc@ieee.org [US Army Research Laboratory, Athena Energy Corporation, Adelphi, Bowie, MD (United States); Burns, David; Henriquez, Stanley; Howell, Steve; Litz, Marc [US Army Research Laboratory, Athena Energy Corporation, Adelphi, Bowie, MD (United States)

2011-10-01

Our team at the United States Army Research Laboratory (ARL) has designed and developed a low-power, compact, wireless-networked gamma sensor (WGS) array. The WGS system provides high sensitivity gamma photon detection and remote warning for a broad range of radioactive materials. This sensor identifies the presence of a 1 {mu}Ci Cs137 source at a distance of 1.5 m. The networked array of sensors presently operates as a facility and laboratory sensor for the movement of radioactive check sources. Our goal has been to apply this architecture for field security applications by incorporating low-power design with compact packaging. The performance of this radiation measurement network is demonstrated for both detection and location of radioactive material.

Transport of radioactive materials. 2. rev. ed.

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vogt, H.W.; Falkhof, W.; Heibach, K.; Ungermann, N.; Hungenberg, H.

1991-01-01

With the last changes in the Ordinance Concerning the Transport of Hazardous Goods two regulations which are important for the carrying trade were introduced: 1. The conveyer must train the driver. He must only employ reliable drivers. 2. The driver must participate in a training course (as of July 1, 1991). These obligations, which already existed in the past in regard to the transport of nuclear fuel, have been extended to include the transport of other radioactive materials. In part I the book deals with basic training courses for parcelled goods, and part II goes into the special knowledge which is required of drivers of radioactive materials. The parts consist of the following sections: 1. General regulations, 2, Responsibility when transporting hazardous goods, 3. General danger features, 4. Information on dangers and their designation, 5. The vehicle's equipment and carrying out the transport, 6. Measures for avoiding accidents. At the end of each section the participant in the course finds a series of questions which pertain to the subject matter just treated so that he can test his own learning performance. So as to make things easier for the trainee, the corect answers are listed in the appendix. As a supplementary section on radioactive materials, part II offers additional detailed explanations by experts in the field on the features of radioactive materials and the dangers they pose. In the margin - next to the instructory text - the key words are given so that the right place in the text of the instruction manual can be readily found. These key words are compiled in the appendix to form an index. (orig./HP) [de

Dangerous quantities of radioactive material (D-values)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Radioactive material is widely used in industry, medicine, education and agriculture. In addition, it occurs naturally. The health risk posed by these materials vary widely depending on many factors, the most important of which are the amount of the material involved and its physical and chemical form. Therefore, there is a need to identify the quantity and type of radioactive material for which emergency preparedness and other arrangements (e.g. security) are warrant due to the health risk they pose. The aim of this publication is to provide practical guidance for Member States on that quantity of radioactive material that may be considered dangerous. A dangerous quantity is that, which if uncontrolled, could be involved in a reasonable scenario resulting in the death of an exposed individual or a permanent injury, which decreases that person's quality of life. This publication is published as part of the IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response Series. It supports several publications including: the IAEA Safety Requirements 'Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency', IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2. IAEA, Vienna (2002). IAEA Safety Guide 'Categorization of Radioactive Sources', IAEA Safety Standards Series No RS-G-1.9, IAEA, Vienna (2005) and IAEA Safety Guide 'Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency' IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, IAEA, Vienna (2006). The procedures and data in this publication have been prepared with due attention to accuracy. However, as part of the review process, they undergo ongoing quality assurance checks. Comments are welcome and, following a period that will allow for a more extensive review, the IAEA may revise this publication as part of the process of continuous improvement. The publication uses a number of exposure scenarios, risk models and dosimetric data, which could be used during the response to nuclear or radiological emergency or other purposes

Procedure for permanently storing radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canevall, J.

1987-01-01

This patent describes a method of storing radioactive material in a hollow construction having an access opening. The construction is located below the surface of the ground within a rock chamber. The chamber has walls, a floor, and a ceiling. The construction is completely spaced from the walls, floor, and ceiling of the rock chamber to form an outer spacing, and the construction is made of material impervious to water. The construction comprises a capsule storage area and a capsule handling passageway adjacent thereto having a track and being connected to a lift-shaft running to the surface. The method includes the steps of: completely filling the outer spacing between the walls, ceiling, and floor of the rock chamber and the construction with material not impervious to water; placing capsules containing the radioactive waste in encapsulated form into the capsule storage area; filling the storage area around the loaded capsule with a sealing material to enclose the capsules; repeating the placing and filling steps until the storage area has been completely filled in with the capsules and sealing material; loading the passageway adjacent the storage area with a removable material different than the sealing material; closing the construction and sealing the lift-shaft at least at the construction level and at ground level; and providing means for collecting any water penetrating into the outer spacing

Measurement of naturally occurring radioactive materials in commonly used building materials in Hyderabad, India

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balbudhe, A.Y.; Vishwa Prasad, K.; Vidya Sagar, D.; Jha, S.K.; Tripathi, R.M.

2018-01-01

Building materials can cause significant gamma dose indoors, due to their natural radioactivity content. The knowledge of the natural radioactivity level of building materials is important for determination of population exposure, as most people spend 80-90% of their time indoors furthermore, it is useful in setting the standards and national guidelines for the use and management of these materials. The concentrations of natural radionuclides in building materials vary depending on the local geological and geographical conditions as well as geochemical characteristics of those materials. The aim of the study is to determine levels of natural radionuclide in the commonly used building materials in Hyderabad, India

Smectite dehydration and stability: Applications to radioactive waste isolation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bish, D.L.

1988-03-01

Montmorillonite-beidellite smectites are present in amounts up to 50% in the rocks directly underlying the potential high-level radioactive waste repository horizon at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The thermal reactions of concern include reversible collapse/expansion of the smectite layers due to loss/gain of interlayer water;irreversible collapse due to loss of interlayer water and migration of interlayer cations into the 2:1 silicate layers;irreversible reduction of the osmotic swelling ability through reaction in a steam atmosphere;and inhomogeneous transformation of the smectite into an interstratified illite/smectite. Reversible collapse should be of minor importance because any thermally driven collapse will be reversed when water is introduced and temperatures go down. The amounts of smectite in the potential repository horizon itself are probably insufficient to give rise to rock strength problems due to reversible collapse. The irreversible reduction of somotic selling capacity in a steam environment may be significant in the rocks near the repository horizon. This effect on naturally occurring Na-rich smectites would probably increase permeabilitie shut would also provide for increased cation exchange by the smectite. 60 refs., 9 figs

Natural radioactivity in granite stones and their radiological aspects as building material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kumaravel, S.; Sunil, C.N.; Narashimha Nath, V.; Raghunath, T.; Prashanth Kumar, M.; Ramakrishna, V.; Nair, B.S.K.; Purohit, R.G.; Tripati, R.M.

2014-01-01

Natural radioactivity in building and building decorating materials comes mainly from natural radioactive series like 238 U, 232 Th and 40 K. India is one of the leading users of granite stones as it is preferred by decorators and architects. The knowledge of presence of natural radioactivity in these materials is required for the assessment of radiation exposure due to them. The objective of this study is to determine the natural radioactivity and radiological aspects of granite stones as building material

Safe transport of radioactive material. 4. ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The IAEA has been publishing Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material since 1961. Meeting its statutory obligation to foster the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, the IAEA has developed a standardized approach to transport safety training. This training manual is an anchor of the standardized approach to training. It is a compendium of training modules for courses related to the different aspects of safety of transport of radioactive material. Keeping in view the specific needs of the potential users, the manual includes material that can be used for a variety of training programmes of duration ranging from half-a-day to ten days, for specific audiences such as competent authority personnel, public authorities, emergency response personnel and cargo handlers

Processing method for liquid waste containing various kinds of radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toyabe, Keiji; Nabeshima, Masahiro; Ozeki, Noboru; Muraki, Tsutomu.

1996-01-01

Various kind of radioactive materials and heavy metal elements dissolved in liquid wastes are removed from the liquid wastes by adsorbing them on chitin or chitosan. In this case, a hydrogen ion concentration in the liquid wastes is adjusted to a pH value of from 1 to 3 depending on the kinds of the radioactive materials and heavy metal elements to be removed. Since chitin or chitosan has a special ion exchange performance or adsorbing performance, chemical species comprising radioactive materials or heavy metals dissolved in the liquid wastes are adsorbed thereto by ion adsorption or physical adsorption. With such procedures, radioactive materials and heavy metal elements are removed from the liquid wastes, and the concentration thereof can be reduced to such a level that they can be discharged into environments. On the other hand, since chitin or chitosan adsorbing the radioactive materials and heavy metal elements has a structure of polysaccharides, it is easily burnt into gaseous carbon dioxide. Accordingly, the amount of secondary wastes can remarkably be reduced. (T.M.)

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mark Krauss

2011-06-01

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-99-20, EMAD Compound, located within Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 566 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 566 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From October 2010 through May 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 566. Assessment of the data from collected soil samples, and from radiological and visual surveys of the site, indicates the FALs were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and radioactivity. Corrective actions were implemented to remove the following: • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL at two locations • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL with