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Sample records for public goods dilemma

  1. Public goods dilemma in asexual ant societies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dobata, Shigeto; Tsuji, Kazuki

    2013-10-01

    Cooperation in biological, social, and economic groups is underpinned by public goods that are generated by group members at some personal cost. Theory predicts that public goods will be exploited by cheaters who benefit from the goods by not paying for them, thereby leading to the collapse of cooperation. This situation, described as the "public goods dilemma" in game theory, makes the ubiquity of cooperation a major evolutionary puzzle. Despite this generalization, the demonstration of genetic background and fitness effects of the public goods dilemma has been limited to interactions between viruses and between cells, and thus its relevance at higher levels of organismal complexity is still largely unexplored. Here we provide experimental evidence for the public goods dilemma in a social insect, the ant Pristomyrmex punctatus. In this species, all workers are involved in both asexual reproduction and cooperative tasks. Genetic cheaters infiltrate field colonies, reproducing more than the workers but shunning cooperative tasks. In laboratory experiments, cheaters outcompeted coexisting workers in both survival and reproduction, although a group composed only of cheaters failed to produce offspring. The operations of the public goods dilemma in P. punctatus showed a remarkable convergence with those in microbial societies, not only in fitness consequences but also in behavioral mechanisms. Our study reinforces the evolutionary impact of cheaters on diverse cooperative systems in the laboratory and in the field.

  2. Dilemma of dilemmas: how collective and individual perspectives can clarify the size dilemma in voluntary linear public goods dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shank, Daniel B; Kashima, Yoshihisa; Saber, Saam; Gale, Thomas; Kirley, Michael

    2015-01-01

    Empirical findings on public goods dilemmas indicate an unresolved dilemma: that increasing size-the number of people in the dilemma-sometimes increases, decreases, or does not influence cooperation. We clarify this dilemma by first classifying public goods dilemma properties that specify individual outcomes as individual properties (e.g., Marginal Per Capita Return) and group outcomes as group properties (e.g., public good multiplier), mathematically showing how only one set of properties can remain constant as the dilemma size increases. Underpinning decision-making regarding individual and group properties, we propose that individuals are motivated by both individual and group preferences based on a theory of collective rationality. We use Van Lange's integrated model of social value orientations to operationalize these preferences as an amalgamation of outcomes for self, outcomes for others, and equality of outcomes. Based on this model, we then predict how the public good's benefit and size, combined with controlling individual versus group properties, produce different levels of cooperation in public goods dilemmas. A two (low vs. high benefit) by three (2-person baseline vs. 5-person holding constant individual properties vs. 5-person holding constant group properties) factorial experiment (group n = 99; participant n = 390) confirms our hypotheses. The results indicate that when holding constant group properties, size decreases cooperation. Yet when holding constant individual properties, size increases cooperation when benefit is low and does not affect cooperation when benefit is high. Using agent-based simulations of individual and group preferences vis-à-vis the integrative model, we fit a weighted simulation model to the empirical data. This fitted model is sufficient to reproduce the empirical results, but only when both individual (self-interest) and group (other-interest and equality) preference are included. Our research contributes to

  3. Dilemma of dilemmas: how collective and individual perspectives can clarify the size dilemma in voluntary linear public goods dilemmas.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Daniel B Shank

    Full Text Available Empirical findings on public goods dilemmas indicate an unresolved dilemma: that increasing size-the number of people in the dilemma-sometimes increases, decreases, or does not influence cooperation. We clarify this dilemma by first classifying public goods dilemma properties that specify individual outcomes as individual properties (e.g., Marginal Per Capita Return and group outcomes as group properties (e.g., public good multiplier, mathematically showing how only one set of properties can remain constant as the dilemma size increases. Underpinning decision-making regarding individual and group properties, we propose that individuals are motivated by both individual and group preferences based on a theory of collective rationality. We use Van Lange's integrated model of social value orientations to operationalize these preferences as an amalgamation of outcomes for self, outcomes for others, and equality of outcomes. Based on this model, we then predict how the public good's benefit and size, combined with controlling individual versus group properties, produce different levels of cooperation in public goods dilemmas. A two (low vs. high benefit by three (2-person baseline vs. 5-person holding constant individual properties vs. 5-person holding constant group properties factorial experiment (group n = 99; participant n = 390 confirms our hypotheses. The results indicate that when holding constant group properties, size decreases cooperation. Yet when holding constant individual properties, size increases cooperation when benefit is low and does not affect cooperation when benefit is high. Using agent-based simulations of individual and group preferences vis-à-vis the integrative model, we fit a weighted simulation model to the empirical data. This fitted model is sufficient to reproduce the empirical results, but only when both individual (self-interest and group (other-interest and equality preference are included. Our research contributes

  4. Spatial dilemmas of diffusible public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Allen, Benjamin; Gore, Jeff; Nowak, Martin A

    2013-12-17

    The emergence of cooperation is a central question in evolutionary biology. Microorganisms often cooperate by producing a chemical resource (a public good) that benefits other cells. The sharing of public goods depends on their diffusion through space. Previous theory suggests that spatial structure can promote evolution of cooperation, but the diffusion of public goods introduces new phenomena that must be modeled explicitly. We develop an approach where colony geometry and public good diffusion are described by graphs. We find that the success of cooperation depends on a simple relation between the benefits and costs of the public good, the amount retained by a producer, and the average amount retained by each of the producer's neighbors. These quantities are derived as analytic functions of the graph topology and diffusion rate. In general, cooperation is favored for small diffusion rates, low colony dimensionality, and small rates of decay of the public good. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.01169.001.

  5. A social dilemma structure in diffusible public goods

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    Matsuzawa, Ryo; Tanimoto, Jun

    2016-11-01

    Encouraged by the interaction between two species of microbes, in which one species is capable of replenishing the public resources and the other is not, the dilemma structure (the long-term sustainability of the population) hidden in a system where public goods are defined as diffusible was examined. In a series of simulations in which the three major parameters governing the dynamics of the system were varied, following the effect of the spatial structure that results from resource diffusion and distribution, the dynamics show a rich diversity, including cooperator-dominated, extinct, and coexistent results. If the dilemma is strong, the chance of surviving cooperators is small and the population tends to extinction even though coexistence is possible. By contrast, if a weak dilemma is given, the affluent resources make cooperators dominant over defectors.

  6. Solutions to the public goods dilemma in bacterial biofilms

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drescher, Knut; Nadell, Carey D.; Stone, Howard A.; Wingreen, Ned S.; Bassler, Bonnie L.

    2014-03-01

    Bacteria frequently live in densely populated surface-bound communities, termed biofilms. Biofilm-dwelling cells rely on secretion of extracellular substances to construct their communities and to capture nutrients from the environment. Some secreted factors behave as cooperative public goods: they can be exploited by non-producing cells. The means by which public-good-producing bacteria avert exploitation in biofilm environments are largely unknown. Using experiments with Vibrio cholerae, which secretes extracellular enzymes to digest its primary food source, the solid polymer chitin, we show that the public goods dilemma may be solved by two very different mechanisms: cells can produce thick biofilms that confine the goods to producers, or fluid flow can remove soluble products of chitin digestion, denying access to non-producers. Both processes are unified by limiting the distance over which enzyme-secreting cells provide benefits to neighbors, resulting in preferential benefit to nearby clonemates and allowing kin selection to favor public good production. Our results demonstrate new mechanisms by which the physical conditions of natural habitats can interact with bacterial physiology to promote the evolution of cooperation.

  7. Solutions to the public goods dilemma in bacterial biofilms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drescher, Knut; Nadell, Carey D; Stone, Howard A; Wingreen, Ned S; Bassler, Bonnie L

    2014-01-06

    Bacteria frequently live in densely populated surface-bound communities, termed biofilms [1-4]. Biofilm-dwelling cells rely on secretion of extracellular substances to construct their communities and to capture nutrients from the environment [5]. Some secreted factors behave as cooperative public goods: they can be exploited by nonproducing cells [6-11]. The means by which public-good-producing bacteria avert exploitation in biofilm environments are largely unknown. Using experiments with Vibrio cholerae, which secretes extracellular enzymes to digest its primary food source, the solid polymer chitin, we show that the public goods dilemma may be solved by two very different mechanisms: cells can produce thick biofilms that confine the goods to producers, or fluid flow can remove soluble products of chitin digestion, denying access to nonproducers. Both processes are unified by limiting the distance over which enzyme-secreting cells provide benefits to neighbors, resulting in preferential benefit to nearby clonemates and allowing kin selection to favor public good production. Our results demonstrate new mechanisms by which the physical conditions of natural habitats can interact with bacterial physiology to promote the evolution of cooperation.

  8. Hierarchical Prisoner's Dilemma in Hierarchical Public-Goods Game

    CERN Document Server

    Fujimoto, Yuma; Kaneko, Kunihiko

    2016-01-01

    The dilemma in cooperation is one of the major concerns in game theory. In a public-goods game, each individual pays a cost for cooperation, or to prevent defection, and receives a reward from the collected cost in a group. Thus, defection is beneficial for each individual, while cooperation is beneficial for the group. Now, groups (say, countries) consisting of individual players also play games. To study such a multi-level game, we introduce a hierarchical public-goods (HPG) game in which two groups compete for finite resources by utilizing costs collected from individuals in each group. Analyzing this HPG game, we found a hierarchical prisoner's dilemma, in which groups choose the defection policy (say, armaments) as a Nash strategy to optimize each group's benefit, while cooperation optimizes the total benefit. On the other hand, for each individual within a group, refusing to pay the cost (say, tax) is a Nash strategy, which turns to be a cooperation policy for the group, thus leading to a hierarchical d...

  9. Physical solutions to the public goods dilemma in bacterial biofilms

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drescher, Knut; Nadell, Carey; Stone, Howard; Wingreen, Ned; Bassler, Bonnie

    2013-11-01

    Bacteria frequently live in densely populated surface-bound communities, termed biofilms. Biofilm-dwelling cells rely on secretion of extracellular substances to construct their communities and to capture nutrients from the environment. Some secreted factors behave as cooperative public goods: they can be exploited by non-producing cells. The means by which public good producing bacteria avert exploitation in biofilm environments are largely unknown. Using experiments with Vibrio cholerae, which secretes extracellular enzymes to digest its primary food source, the solid polymer chitin, we show that the public goods dilemma may be solved by two dramatically different, physical mechanisms: cells can produce thick biofilms that confine the goods to producers, or fluid flow can remove soluble products of chitin digestion, denying access to non-producers. Both processes limit the distance over which enzyme-secreting cells provide a benefit to neighbors, resulting in preferential benefit to nearby clonemates. Our results demonstrate how bacterial physiology and environmental conditions can interact with social phenotypes to influence the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation within biofilms.

  10. Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma.

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    Willems, Erik P; Arseneau, T Jean M; Schleuning, Xenia; van Schaik, Carel P

    2015-12-05

    Classic socio-ecological theory holds that the occurrence of aggressive range defence is primarily driven by ecological incentives, most notably by the economic defendability of an area or the resources it contains. While this ecological cost-benefit framework has great explanatory power in solitary or pair-living species, comparative work on group-living primates has always found economic defendability to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition to account for the distribution of effective range defence across the taxon. This mismatch between theory and observation has recently been ascribed to a collective action problem among group members in, what is more informatively viewed as, a public goods dilemma: mounting effective defence of a communal range against intrusions by outgroup conspecifics. We here further develop this framework, and report on analyses at three levels of biological organization: across species, across populations within a single lineage and across groups and individuals within a single population. We find that communal range defence in primates very rarely involves collective action sensu stricto and that it is best interpreted as the outcome of opportunistic and strategic individual-level decisions. Whether the public good of a defended communal range is produced by solitary, joint or collective action is thus the outcome of the interplay between the unique characteristics of each individual, local and current socio-ecological conditions, and fundamental life-history traits of the species.

  11. A general model of the public goods dilemma.

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    Frank, Steven A

    2010-06-01

    An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favours individual contribution to public good [corrected] only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analysed as public goods shaped by kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favours selfish individuals to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the public good. Thus, purely selfish behaviour causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that contribute greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower classes that contribute little to the public good. Second, if group success absolutely requires production of the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively high. By contrast, if group success depends weakly on the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively weak. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the role of baseline success is important. However, discussions of public goods problems sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently. The models here suggest simple tests for the roles of resource variation and baseline success. Given the widespread importance of public goods, better models and tests would greatly deepen our understanding of many processes in biology and sociality.

  12. Cooperation as a volunteer's dilemma and the strategy of conflict in public goods games.

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    Archetti, M

    2009-11-01

    Conflict and cooperation for the exploitation of public goods are usually modelled as an N-person prisoner's dilemma. Many social dilemmas, however, would be described more properly as a volunteer's dilemma, in which a certain number of individuals are necessary to produce a public good. If volunteering is costly, but so is failure to produce the public good, cheaters can invade and form a stable mixed equilibrium with cooperators. The dilemma is that the benefit for the group decreases with group size because the larger the group is, the less likely it is that someone volunteers. This problem persists even in the presence of a high degree of relatedness between group members. This model provides precise, testable predictions for the stability of cooperation. It also suggests a counterintuitive but practical solution for this kind of social dilemmas: increasing the damage resulting from the failure to produce the public good increases the probability that the public good is actually produced. Adopting a strategy that entails a deliberate risk (brinkmanship), therefore, can lead to a benefit for the society without being detrimental for the individual.

  13. Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods dilemma

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    Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Wang, Long

    2016-04-01

    How to exploit public non-renewable resources is a public goods dilemma. Individuals can choose to limit the depletion in order to use the resource for a longer time or consume more goods to benefit themselves. When the resource is used up, there is no benefit for the future generations any more, thus the evolutionary process ends. Here we investigate what mechanisms can extend the use of resources in the framework of evolutionary game theory under two updating rules based on imitation and aspiration, respectively. Compared with imitation process, aspiration dynamics may prolong the sustainable time of a public resource.

  14. Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment.

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    Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István

    2012-04-21

    We review the theory of public goods in biology. In the N-person prisoner's dilemma, where the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions, cooperation requires some form of assortment, for example due to kin discrimination, population viscosity or repeated interactions. In most social species ranging from bacteria to humans, however, public goods are usually a non-linear function of the contributions, which makes cooperation possible without assortment. More specifically, a polymorphic state can be stable in which cooperators and non-cooperators coexist. The existence of mixed equilibria in public goods games is a fundamental result in the study of cooperation that has been overlooked so far, because of the disproportionate attention given to the two- and N-person prisoner's dilemma. Methods and results from games with pairwise interactions or linear benefits cannot, in general, be extended to the analysis of public goods. Game theory helps explain the production of public goods in one-shot, N-person interactions without assortment, it leads to predictions that can be easily tested and allows a prescriptive approach to cooperation.

  15. Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods dilemma

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Du, Jinming, E-mail: jmdu@pku.edu.cn [Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China); Wu, Bin, E-mail: bin.wu@evolbio.mpg.de [School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Communications, Beijing 100876 (China); Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön (Germany); Wang, Long, E-mail: longwang@pku.edu.cn [Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China)

    2016-04-01

    How to exploit public non-renewable resources is a public goods dilemma. Individuals can choose to limit the depletion in order to use the resource for a longer time or consume more goods to benefit themselves. When the resource is used up, there is no benefit for the future generations any more, thus the evolutionary process ends. Here we investigate what mechanisms can extend the use of resources in the framework of evolutionary game theory under two updating rules based on imitation and aspiration, respectively. Compared with imitation process, aspiration dynamics may prolong the sustainable time of a public resource. - Highlights: • We establish a game model to capture the sustainable time of public goods. • We propose a theoretical method to study how fast an evolutionary process ends. • Strong selection shortens the evolutionary time of public resource dilemma. • Compared with imitation process, aspiration dynamics prolong the sustainable time. • The sustainable time is the shortest for the intermediate aspiration level.

  16. The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology

    OpenAIRE

    Dionisio, F; Gordo, I.

    2006-01-01

    Problem: In the study of conflicts, both economists and evolutionary biologists use the concepts ‘tragedy of the commons’ and ‘public goods dilemma’. What is the relationship between the economist and evolutionist views of these concepts? Model features: The economics literature defines the tragedy of the commons and the public goods dilemma in terms of rivalry and excludability of the good. In contrast, evolutionists define these conflicts based on fitness functions with two c...

  17. Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas.

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    Pinheiro, Flávio L; Vasconcelos, Vítor V; Santos, Francisco C; Pacheco, Jorge M

    2014-11-01

    Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call All-Or-None (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2-person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well-known Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in the limit of the repeated 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma.

  18. Public Education, Public Good.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tomlinson, John

    1986-01-01

    Criticizes policies which would damage or destroy a public education system. Examines the relationship between government-provided education and democracy. Concludes that privatization of public education would emphasize self-interest and selfishness, further jeopardizing the altruism and civic mindedness necessary for the public good. (JDH)

  19. Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István

    2011-04-01

    The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. This mixed equilibrium is absent in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions. We also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Dilemma are the two opposite extremes of a general public goods game, and that all intermediate cases can have a mixed equilibrium like the Volunteer's Dilemma. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors, therefore, is a typical outcome of most social dilemmas, which requires neither relatedness nor iterations.

  20. Modern approaches regarding public goods

    OpenAIRE

    2015-01-01

    This article is trying to present general elements regarding public goods. It is presenting also all types of public goods and optimum provision of public goods. Public Goods designate goods, benefits which belong to all citizens, or community. Four categories of goods can be delimited Public goods; Private goods; Common goods; Taxable goods. We also introduce two new concepts of public goods: “Club Goods” and “Joint” Goods.

  1. Public goods and procreation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anomaly, Jonathan

    2014-01-01

    Procreation is the ultimate public goods problem. Each new child affects the welfare of many other people, and some (but not all) children produce uncompensated value that future people will enjoy. This essay addresses challenges that arise if we think of procreation and parenting as public goods. These include whether individual choices are likely to lead to a socially desirable outcome, and whether changes in laws, social norms, or access to genetic engineering and embryo selection might improve the aggregate outcome of our reproductive choices.

  2. ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Silvia PUIU

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available The article offers an insight on the ethical dilemmas specific to a public sector and brings some suggestions for coping with these. Ethics management is a complex system that deals also with ethical dilemmas. The instruments and tools of ethics management are helpful in dealing with these issues. There are a lot of cases in which public employees do not know what to do or how to react in a certain situation, so, a debate on this subject is very useful for people working in public institutions.

  3. Replicator dynamics for optional public good games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hauert, C.; De Monte, Silvia; Hofbauer, J.;

    2002-01-01

    The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods....... In contrast to the compulsory public goods game, optional participation provides a natural way to avoid deadlocks in the state of mutual defection. The three resulting strategies-collaboration or defection in the public goods game, as well as not joining at all-are studied by means of a replicator dynamics...... participation makes cooperation feasible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game....

  4. Cultural Interest Goods as Public Goods

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Juan Manuel Vargas-Ayala

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents the debate regarding the nature of goods of cultural interest as public goods, discussion until now overlooked by the legal doctrine in Administrative Law. Through the exam of judicial decisions, it seeks to question their inalienable character, and their aptitude to be acquired by the State, case in which they shift their nature into public goods.

  5. Ethical dilemmas in journal publication.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Babalola, Olubukola; Grant-Kels, Jane M; Parish, Lawrence Charles

    2012-01-01

    Physicians often face tremendous pressures and incentives to publish, sometimes leading to a compromise of ethical standards, either consciously or unconsciously. From the vantage of ethical authorship, we discuss what constitutes authorship; avoidance of ghost authorship; plagiarism, as well as self-plagiarism and duplicate publication; falsification; and fabrication. Editors also face ethical challenges, including how best to manage peer-review bias, to address reviewer tardiness, and to locate reviewers with appropriate expertise and professionalism. Editors need to deal with authors who fragment their work into multiple publications to enhance their curriculum vitae ("salami factor"), as well as to manage the financial benefits of advertising and to avoid conflicts of interest for the journal. Both authors and editors should be straightforward and principled throughout the publication process. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  6. Private and public decisions in social dilemmas

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Houser, Daniel; Montinari, Natalia; Piovesan, Marco

    2012-01-01

    Are selfish impulses less likely to be pursued when decisions are publicly observable? Is the presence of peers a potential solution to social dilemmas? In this paper we report data on the self-control decisions of children aged 6 to 11 who participated in games that require one to resist a selfish...... impulse for several minutes in order to benefit others. In Public Condition children make decisions in public view of the group of other participants, while in Private Condition they have the possibility to decide privately. We find that children aged 9 and higher are better able to resist selfish...... impulses in public environments. Younger children, however, display no such effect. Further, we find self-control substantially impacted by group size. When decisions are public, self-control is better in larger groups, while in private condition the opposite holds....

  7. Private Money, Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kelly, Andrew P.; McShane, Michael Q.

    2013-01-01

    It's no secret that states and the federal government have found themselves in a financial pinch when it comes to higher education. After years of recession and sluggish recovery, states have slashed per-pupil public spending on higher education by 14.6 percent since 2008. At the federal level, though money for Pell Grants has more than doubled…

  8. Private Money, Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kelly, Andrew P.; McShane, Michael Q.

    2013-01-01

    It's no secret that states and the federal government have found themselves in a financial pinch when it comes to higher education. After years of recession and sluggish recovery, states have slashed per-pupil public spending on higher education by 14.6 percent since 2008. At the federal level, though money for Pell Grants has more than doubled…

  9. Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wakano, Joe Yuichiro; Nowak, Martin A; Hauert, Christoph

    2009-05-12

    The production, consumption, and exploitation of common resources ranging from extracellular products in microorganisms to global issues of climate change refer to public goods interactions. Individuals can cooperate and sustain common resources at some cost or defect and exploit the resources without contributing. This generates a conflict of interest, which characterizes social dilemmas: Individual selection favors defectors, but for the community, it is best if everybody cooperates. Traditional models of public goods do not take into account that benefits of the common resource enable cooperators to maintain higher population densities. This leads to a natural feedback between population dynamics and interaction group sizes as captured by "ecological public goods." Here, we show that the spatial evolutionary dynamics of ecological public goods in "selection-diffusion" systems promotes cooperation based on different types of pattern formation processes. In spatial settings, individuals can migrate (diffuse) to populate new territories. Slow diffusion of cooperators fosters aggregation in highly productive patches (activation), whereas fast diffusion enables defectors to readily locate and exploit these patches (inhibition). These antagonistic forces promote coexistence of cooperators and defectors in static or dynamic patterns, including spatial chaos of ever-changing configurations. The local environment of cooperators and defectors is shaped by the production or consumption of common resources. Hence, diffusion-induced self-organization into spatial patterns not only enhances cooperation but also provides simple mechanisms for the spontaneous generation of habitat diversity, which denotes a crucial determinant of the viability of ecological systems.

  10. Depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games

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    Shi, Dong-Mei; Zhuang, Yong; Li, Yu-Jian; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2011-10-01

    In real situations, the value of public goods will be reduced or even lost because of external factors or for intrinsic reasons. In this work, we investigate the evolution of cooperation by considering the effect of depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games on a square lattice. It is assumed that each individual gains full advantage if the number of the cooperators nc within a group centered on that individual equals or exceeds the critical mass (CM). Otherwise, there is depreciation of the public goods, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r to (nc/CM)r. It is shown that the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for CM > 1 even at small values of r, and a global cooperative level is achieved at an intermediate value of CM = 4 at a small r. We further study the effect of depreciation of public goods on different topologies of a regular lattice, and find that the system always reaches global cooperation at a moderate value of CM = G - 1 regardless of whether or not there exist overlapping triangle structures on the regular lattice, where G is the group size of the associated regular lattice.

  11. Maintenance of cooperation induced by punishment in public goods games

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    Wang, Zhen; Xu, Zhao-Jin; Huang, Jian-Hua; Zhang, Lian-Zhong

    2010-10-01

    In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.

  12. Religiosity as a public good.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sherlock, Richard

    2008-09-01

    Public Goods can be seen as one important way in which societies sustain themselves over time. These are part of the puzzle of the development of political order. Public goods like the rule of law are non-substractable and non-excludable . For economists the classic textbook examples are national defense and police protection. In this paper I argue that religiosity can function like police protection, a means of sustaining order through fear of punishment from a transcendent source. As a means of reducing defection from social norms it has a role to play as a public good. But religion cannot at the same time be seen as the source of such norms or dissention will undermine the very order that punishment seems to reinforce.

  13. Nudge for (the public) good

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Piovesan, Marco

    2015-01-01

    In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast...... majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider...

  14. Nudge for (the public) good

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Piovesan, Marco

    2015-01-01

    majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider...... default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default....

  15. Optimal Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Verdelin, Nicolaj

    2012-01-01

    The standard approach to the optimal provision of public goods highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. A new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the income tax schedule. We demonstrate that both approaches are derived from the same ba...... of optimal provision are different, and the modified Samuelson rule is likely to lead to underprovision...

  16. Optimal Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Verdelin, Nicolaj

    2009-01-01

    There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income...... for the optimal level of a public good without imposing strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis...... tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula...

  17. Optimal Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Verdelin, Nicolaj

    There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income...... for the optimal level of a public good without imposing any separability assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its...... tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula...

  18. Group-size diversity in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peña, Jorge

    2012-03-01

    Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of a public good while defectors free ride on the contributions of cooperators. In the traditional framework of evolutionary game theory, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors result from interactions in groups formed by binomial sampling from an infinite population. Despite empirical evidence showing that group-size distributions in nature are highly heterogeneous, most models of social evolution assume that the group size is constant. In this article, I remove this assumption and explore the effects of having random group sizes on the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games. By a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality, I show that the outcome of general nonlinear public goods games depends not only on the average group size but also on the variance of the group-size distribution. This general result is illustrated with two nonlinear public goods games (the public goods game with discounting or synergy and the N-person volunteer's dilemma) and three different group-size distributions (Poisson, geometric, and Waring). The results suggest that failing to acknowledge the natural variation of group sizes can lead to an underestimation of the actual level of cooperation exhibited in evolving populations.

  19. Nudge for (the public) good

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Piovesan, Marco

    majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where there default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free...... rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default....

  20. Social dilemmas and public range management in Nevada

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kooten, van G.C.; Thomsen, P.; Hobby, T.; Eagle, A.J.

    2006-01-01

    Increasing tension in the Nevada ranch community may have had a negative impact on social capital. Social capital is important because it facilitates cooperation in resolving social dilemmas related to public range management. In this paper, we use a survey of public grazing permit holders in Nevada

  1. Patriotic values for public goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Dallimer, Martin; Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl; Lundhede, Thomas;

    2015-01-01

    The natural environment is central to human well-being through its role in ecosystem service (ES) provision. Managing ES often requires coordination across international borders. Although this may deliver greater conservation gains than countries acting alone, we do not know whether the public...... supports such an international approach. Using the same questionnaire in three countries, we quantified public preferences for ES in home countries and across international borders. In all three countries, the people were generally willing to pay for ES. However, our results show that there is a limit...... to the extent that environmental goods can be considered global. ES with a use element (habitat conservation, landscape preservation) attracted a patriotic premium, such that the people were willing to pay significantly more for locally delivered services. Supranational management of ES needs to be balanced...

  2. Emergence of cooperation in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kurokawa, Shun; Ihara, Yasuo

    2009-04-07

    Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the 'cooperative' equilibrium state shrinks rapidly as the group size increases. However, this argument is based on the analysis of models that consider the deterministic process. More recently, stochastic models of two-player games have been developed and the conditions for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation in finite populations have been specified. These conditions have been given as a mathematically simple expression, which is called the one-third law. In this paper, we investigate a stochastic model of n-player games and show that natural selection can favour a reciprocator replacing a population of defectors in the n-player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We also derive a generalized version of the one-third law (the {2/[n(n+1)]}1/(n-1) law). Additionally, contrary to previous studies, the model suggests that the evolution of cooperation in public goods game can be facilitated by larger group size under certain conditions.

  3. Public Goods and State Services

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ignatova T.V.

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available The article argues that state services are classified into two groups depending on the level of market mechanism use: public services and private services. These services have different characteristics: individual choice of consumption, type and quality of goods, financing, institutional regulation, decision-making subject, external effects, opportunity of effects control. The mechanism of public state services regulation is based on the influence on formal institutes, while the mechanism of private state services regulation is based on informal institutes. Joint mechanism of both types of state services provision includes the procedures of standartization and regulatory activity implying the provision of services by “one stop” principle and minimization of consumer - agent contacts. The optimization of services rendering process and their quality improvement are ensured by administrative regulations which establish strict standards of public service provided by the bodies of executive power and subordinate organizations The means of institutional regulation allow inclusion of market elements but on the condition of state control that ensures stimulation of public institutes. During the process of market institutes initialization in the sphere of state services rendering to government bodies, it is necessary to consider their dependence on marginal profits of one or another institute. In the long-term prospect those institutes got a foothold in the market that strengthen and encompass marginal effect for all individuals under the growth of individuals who observe the rules and restrictions. The activities organized by these institutes deserve positive response on behalf of the majority of individuals and, therefore there is no need in enforcement and violence in order to keep rules and restrictions. In the sphere of state and municipal services we can find the example of services provided in the scope of free contraction, in particular the

  4. Cooperation versus Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Classroom Experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marks, Melanie; Lehr, David; Brastow, Ray

    2006-01-01

    The authors present a classroom public goods experiment on the basis of a provision-point mechanism (PPM), where subjects must make an all or nothing decision about providing the public good. As a teaching tool, this design is superior to traditional prisoner's dilemma games because it creates multiple equilibrium in which individual financial…

  5. Professionals and Public Good Capabilities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Melanie Walker

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Martha Nussbaum (2011 reminds us that, all over the world people are struggling for a life that is fully human - a life worthy of human dignity. Purely income-based and preference-based evaluations, as Sen (1999 argues, do not adequately capture what it means for each person to have quality of life. There are other things that make life good for a person, including access to publicly provided professional services. The question then is what version of education inflects more towards the intrinsic and transformational possibilities of professional work and contributions to decent societies? This paper suggests that we need a normative approach to professional education and professionalism; it is not the case that any old version will do. We also need normative criteria to move beyond social critique and to overcome a merely defensive attitude and to give a positive definition to the potential achievements of the professions. Moreover universities are connected to society, most especially through the professionals they educate; it is reasonable in our contemporary world to educate professional graduates to be in a position to alleviate inequalities, and to have the knowledge, skills and values to be able to do so. To make this case, we draw on the human capabilities approach of Sen (1999, 2009 and Nussbaum (2000, 2011 to conceptualise professional education for the public good as an ally of the struggles of people living in poverty and experiencing inequalities, expanding the well-being of people to be and to do in ways they have reason to value – to be mobile, cared for, respected, and so on. In particular we are interested in which human capabilities and functionings are most needed for a professional practice and professionalism that can contribute to transformative social change and how professional development is enabled via pedagogical arrangements.

  6. [Ethical dilemmas in public health care organizations].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pereda Vicandi, M

    2014-01-01

    Today you can ask if you can apply ethics to organizations because much of the greater overall impact decisions are not made by private individuals, are decided by organizations. Any organization is legitimate because it satisfies a need of society and this legitimacy depends if the organization does with quality. To offer a good service, quality service, organizations know they need to do well, but seem to forget that should do well not only instrumental level, must also make good on the ethical level. Public health care organizations claim to promote attitudes and actions based on ethics, level of their internal functioning and level of achievement of its goals, but increased awareness and analysis of its inner workings can question it. Such entities, for its structure and procedures, may make it difficult for ethical standards actually govern its operation, also can have negative ethical consequences at the population level. A healthcare organization must not be organized, either structurally or functionally, like any other organization that offers services. In addition, members of the organization can not simply be passive actors. It is necessary that operators and users have more pro-ethical behaviors. Operators from the professionalism and users from liability. Copyright © 2014 SECA. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

  7. Contribution of organic farming to public goods in Denmark

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jespersen, Lizzie Melby; Baggesen, Dorte Lau; Fog, Erik

    2017-01-01

    The potential contribution of organic farming to the public goods, ‘Nature and Biodiversity’, ‘Environment’, ‘Energy and Climate’, ‘Human Health and Welfare’ and ‘Animal Health and Welfare’ in Denmark is guided and partly secured by the principles and specific requirements of the EU Organic...... such uses in organic farming, as examples, the positive and negative contributions of organic farming in relation to selected public goods were analysed. The contributions of organic farming to Nature and Biodiversity and Human and Animal Health and Welfare are mainly positive compared to conventional...... to the public goods Energy and Climate, which at present are not addressed in the EU Organic Regulation. Moreover, some organic farming requirements and practices cause dilemmas; e.g. more space per animal and outdoor access improves Animal Health and Welfare but at the same time has negative effects...

  8. Contribution of organic farming to public goods in Denmark

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jespersen, Lizzie Melby; Baggesen, Dorte Lau; Fog, Erik

    2017-01-01

    to the public goods Energy and Climate, which at present are not addressed in the EU Organic Regulation. Moreover, some organic farming requirements and practices cause dilemmas; e.g. more space per animal and outdoor access improves Animal Health and Welfare but at the same time has negative effects......The potential contribution of organic farming to the public goods, ‘Nature and Biodiversity’, ‘Environment’, ‘Energy and Climate’, ‘Human Health and Welfare’ and ‘Animal Health and Welfare’ in Denmark is guided and partly secured by the principles and specific requirements of the EU Organic...... such uses in organic farming, as examples, the positive and negative contributions of organic farming in relation to selected public goods were analysed. The contributions of organic farming to Nature and Biodiversity and Human and Animal Health and Welfare are mainly positive compared to conventional...

  9. Divine moral goodness, supererogation and The Euthyphro Dilemma

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Archer, Alfred

    2016-01-01

    How can we make sense of God’s moral goodness if God cannot be subject to moral obligations? This question is troubling for Divine Command Theorists, as if we cannot make sense of God’s moral goodness then it seems hard to see how God’s commands could be morally good. William P. Alston (1989) argues

  10. Conspicuous Public Goods and Leadership Selection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Jennings, C.; Roelfsema, H.J.

    2004-01-01

    If voters care for the relative supply of public goods compared to otherjurisdictions, decentralized provision of public goods will be too high.Potentially, centralization internalizes the negative externalities fromthe production of these `conspicuous' public goods. However, in amodel of strategic

  11. Alternative Funding For Public Goods Provision

    OpenAIRE

    Kodrat Wibowo

    2002-01-01

    Finding alternatives in public good financing is one of the most recent issues in the government sector. Tax-financed for pure public good is well known results further problems like externalities and economic inequity. This paper only addresses the qualitative analysis in discussing benefits and costs of the society in applying some alternatives in funding public good provisions, pure and impure one.

  12. Privatization and the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lambert, Matthew T.

    2015-01-01

    After two centuries of public higher education in the United States, the covenant between public colleges and universities and the public that created and funded them is under strain. In a time of scarce resources and changing policy in many corners of the country and around the globe, privatization has emerged as a possible replacement for the…

  13. Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game

    OpenAIRE

    Liming Pan; Dong Hao; Zhihai Rong; Tao Zhou

    2015-01-01

    Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents’ payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods game, a representative multi-pl...

  14. Higher Education and Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marginson, Simon

    2011-01-01

    Policy debate about whether to maintain public subsidies for higher education has stimulated reconsideration of the public mission of higher education institutions, especially those that provide student places conferring private benefits. If the work of higher education institutions is defined simply as the aggregation of private interests, this…

  15. Isn't that Just Good Teaching? Disaggregate Instruction and the Language Identity Dilemma

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown, Bryan A.

    2011-01-01

    The manuscript examines the relationship between language, identity, and classroom learning. Through an exploration of a series of research studies conducted over the course of 6 years, this manuscript examines how the idea of "Good Teaching" fails to account for the language-identity learning dilemma. In stage one of the research, a series of…

  16. Reframing Public Education as a Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Froese-Germain, Bernie

    2013-01-01

    In his 1847 "Report on a System of Public Elementary Instruction for Upper Canada", Egerton Ryerson stated that public education was created in Canada to ensure that youth were prepared for their "appropriate duties and employments of life … as persons of business, and also as members of the civil community in which they live."…

  17. The stigmatization dilemma in public health policy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ploug, Thomas; Holm, Søren; Gjerris, Mickey

    2015-01-01

    Background Multi-resistant bacteria pose an increasing and significant public health risk. As awareness of the severity of the problem grows, it is likely that it will become the target for a range of public health interventions. Some of these can intentionally or unintentionally lead...... to stigmatization of groups of citizens. Discussion The article describes the phenomenon of stigmatization within the health care area by discussing the concept in relation to AIDS and psychiatric diagnosis. It unfolds the ethical aspects of using stigmatization as a public health instrument to affect unwanted...... behaviours e.g. smoking. Moreover it discusses stigmatization as an unintended albeit expected side effect of public health instruments potentially used to counter the challenge of multi-resistant bacteria with particular reference to the Danish case of the growing problems with Methicillin...

  18. Optimal Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Verdelin, Nicolaj

    tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula...

  19. Optimal Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Verdelin, Nicolaj

    2009-01-01

    tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula...

  20. Private Goods and Public Bads

    Science.gov (United States)

    Renshaw, Edward F.

    1975-01-01

    The author of this article has developed a simple economic growth model which suggests that public concern for the environment increases as the quality of the environment, for any number of reasons, becomes worse. Using this model, the author believes that Earth Day, 1970, could have been predicted. (MA)

  1. How insurance affects altruistic provision in threshold public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan; Cao, Ming

    2015-03-13

    The occurrence and maintenance of cooperative behaviors in public goods systems have attracted great research attention across multiple disciplines. A threshold public goods game requires a minimum amount of contributions to be collected from a group of individuals for provision to occur. Here we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection by adding a third strategy, called insured cooperation, which corresponds to buying an insurance covering the potential loss resulted from the unsuccessful public goods game. Particularly, only the contributing agents can opt to be insured, which is an effort decreasing the amount of the potential loss occurring. Theoretical computations suggest that when agents face the potential aggregate risk in threshold public goods games, more contributions occur with increasing compensation from insurance. Moreover, permitting the adoption of insurance significantly enhances individual contributions and facilitates provision, especially when the required threshold is high. This work also relates the strategy competition outcomes to different allocation rules once the resulted contributions exceed the threshold point in populations nested within a dilemma.

  2. Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert

    Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one...

  3. Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila

    2010-01-01

    The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced cooperation has lead some to reconsider reward as the main catalyst behind collaborative efforts. Here we elaborate on the "stick versus carrot" dilemma by studying the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides the traditional cooperators and defectors, rewarding cooperators supplement the array of possible strategies. The latter are willing to reward cooperative actions at a personal cost, thus effectively downgrading pure cooperators to second-order free-riders due to their unwillingness to bear these additional costs. Consequently, we find that defection remains viable, especially if the rewarding is costly. Rewards, however, can promote cooperation, especially if the synergetic effects of cooperation are low. Surprisingly, moderate reward...

  4. Public Goods Games on Adaptive Coevolutionary Networks

    CERN Document Server

    Shapiro, Avi M

    2016-01-01

    Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, can reap public goods benefits. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a network without spatial constraints in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise ...

  5. 'Utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A C; Earp, Brian D; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

    2015-01-01

    A growing body of research has focused on so-called 'utilitarian' judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such 'utilitarian' judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between 'utilitarian' judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of 'utilitarian' judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that 'utilitarian' judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between 'utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in 'utilitarian' judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics. Copyright © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  6. Social science knowledge as a public good

    OpenAIRE

    Dalrymple, D.G.

    2005-01-01

    Metadata only record This chapter provides some notions and information that could help stimulate a more widespread awareness of social science knowledge as a public good. It starts from the point of view of economics and then moves to some other components of the social sciences. The characteristics of public social science research, the funding and prioritization of public social science research, and some implications for social research at the CGIAR, are discussed. (CAB Abstract)

  7. GOOD DRUG POLICY IS GOOD PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch

    2010-01-01

    @@ 1 Introduction At present, there is a myriad of contradictions between international illicit drug policy and good, evidence-based public health policy. Largely to blame are the unrealistic goals which policymakers set themselves ten years ago when Pino Arlacchi, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), announced plans to create a drug-free world' and to eliminate or significantly reduce the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008[1].

  8. Ecological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hauert, Christoph; Wakano, Joe Yuichiro; Doebeli, Michael

    2008-03-01

    The Public Goods Game is one of the most popular models for studying the origin and maintenance of cooperation. In its simplest form, this evolutionary game has two regimes: defection goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is smaller than the interaction group size N, whereas cooperation goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is larger than the interaction group size N. Hauert et al. [Hauert, C., Holmes, M., Doebeli, M., 2006a. Evolutionary games and population dynamics: Maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 273, 2565-2570] have introduced the Ecological Public Goods Game by viewing the payoffs from the evolutionary game as birth rates in a population dynamic model. This results in a feedback between ecological and evolutionary dynamics: if defectors are prevalent, birth rates are low and population densities decline, which leads to smaller interaction groups for the Public Goods game, and hence to dominance of cooperators, with a concomitant increase in birth rates and population densities. This feedback can lead to stable co-existence between cooperators and defectors. Here we provide a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the Ecological Public Goods Game, showing that the model exhibits various types of bifurcations, including supercritical Hopf bifurcations, which result in stable limit cycles, and hence in oscillatory co-existence of cooperators and defectors. These results show that including population dynamics in evolutionary games can have important consequences for the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.

  9. Genetically modified foods as global public goods

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Susana Herrero Olarte

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available "Genetically modified (GM food has become very important in the field of research, as a result of its expansion in recent decades. As the right to food is a human right, it cannot be left in the hands of private sector developments exclusively, due to the capacity of the public sector to limit or drive it, and in any case, contributing to food safety. To achieve this, and for its cross-border development, GM needs to be treated as Global Public Goods (GPG, defined as pure or impure public goods that cannot be provided or regulated from a national or regional level, but from a global perspective. Its definition as GPG, and the fact of being public goods, assumes greater involvement by the public sector for its supply or regulation. It is therefore necessary to analyze the positive and negative externalities generated by transgenic foods becoming public goods, but from a global perspective. The difficulty is, that according to the author, GMs are positive or negative, so that there is no consensus to restrict and even prevent them or encourage them. But, there is a consensus on some key issues of GM food, such as improving productivity, contributing to the reduction of the species, the dependence of farmers, or monopoly companies with the patent. Identifying these issues can serve to initiate the appropriate regulation."

  10. Paying for international environmental public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arriagada, Rodrigo; Perrings, Charles

    2011-11-01

    Supply of international environmental public goods must meet certain conditions to be socially efficient, and several reasons explain why they are currently undersupplied. Diagnosis of the public goods failure associated with particular ecosystem services is critical to the development of the appropriate international response. There are two categories of international environmental public goods that are most likely to be undersupplied. One has an additive supply technology and the other has a weakest link supply technology. The degree to which the collective response should be targeted depends on the importance of supply from any one country. In principle, the solution for the undersupply lies in payments designed to compensate local providers for the additional costs they incur in meeting global demand. Targeted support may take the form of direct investment in supply (the Global Environment Facility model) or of payments for the benefits of supply (the Payments for Ecosystem Services model).

  11. Representing Others in a Public Good Game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Karen Evelyn Hauge

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men’s choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives.

  12. Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert

    Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot ...... in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds....

  13. Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert

    2010-01-01

    Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public-good game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot e...... is approved in a referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling and commitment effects, but they are not strong enough to significantly improve the efficiency of thresholds....

  14. Framing and misperception in public good experiments

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland

    2017-01-01

    in misperceptions are linked to the framing effect on subjects' cooperation behavior. When we do not control for the different levels of misperceptions between frames, we observe a significant framing effect on subjects’ cooperation preferences. However, this framing effect becomes insignificant once we remove......Earlier studies have found that framing has substantial impact on the degree of cooperation observed in public good experiments. We show that the way the public good game is framed affects misperceptions about the incentives of the game. Moreover, we show that such framing-induced differences...

  15. Food Science for the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, Cassandra

    If you are interested in food science, looking for a meaningful career path, and are motivated by the desire to make a difference, you may find that a career working for the public good can be very rewarding. Often, such opportunities address issues of social responsibility, sustainability, public health, and/or economic development. Food scientists who choose this path typically have an interest in social and public health issues, and are usually driven by the achievement of some sort of social, health, or societal gain. As food science in itself is a very broad discipline, applying this knowledge for the public good can also take a variety of paths. Whether you're interested in manufacturing, food safety, nutrition, food policy, product development, quality control, marketing and sales, or any other discipline that makes up the diverse field of food science, various opportunities exist to make a difference to society.

  16. Comparison of Ethical Dilemmas across Public and Private Sectors in Rehabilitation Counseling Practice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beveridge, Scott; Garcia, Jorge; Siblo, Matt

    2015-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the nature of ethical dilemmas most frequently reported by rehabilitation counselors in the private and public sectors and determine if significant differences exist in how practitioners experience ethical dilemmas in these two settings. Method: A mixed-methods internet-based survey design was utilized and included descriptive,…

  17. Comparison of Ethical Dilemmas across Public and Private Sectors in Rehabilitation Counseling Practice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beveridge, Scott; Garcia, Jorge; Siblo, Matt

    2015-01-01

    Purpose: To examine the nature of ethical dilemmas most frequently reported by rehabilitation counselors in the private and public sectors and determine if significant differences exist in how practitioners experience ethical dilemmas in these two settings. Method: A mixed-methods internet-based survey design was utilized and included descriptive,…

  18. Higher Education for the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perez, Angel B.

    2012-01-01

    In his 1988 article, Nathaniel Jackson inspired NACAC with four objectives to meet the challenge of leading the charge in minority students access. In this article, the author discusses three more that he believes will challenge colleges in the decades ahead: (1) Focus on the Public Good; (2) Honor Transparency; and (3) Measure Collective Success.…

  19. Country Size and Public Good Provision

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    K. Staal (Klaas)

    2004-01-01

    textabstractThis paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision mak- ing while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there ex

  20. Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pichler, Elgar; Shapiro, Avi M.

    2017-07-01

    Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, reap public goods benefits, which are shares of the contributions amplified by a synergy factor. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a complex network in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs relative to past payoffs parameterized by greediness. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.

  1. Global Public Goods and The Role of Emerging Power: Considering the Concept of Impure Public Goods

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Liu Rieshøj Yi

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available The existing analysis of global public goods over-emphasizes the significance of public. Great power as a main provider has played an active role in these strategic initiatives, which may be ignored. In fact, main power has thought about the possible free-riders when providing public goods and making its foreign strategic plan. China’s announcement to “welcome the neighbouring countries to be a free-rider and benefit from China’s rise” is a good example. It is necessary to think about the theory of public goods and take another look at the free-riding phenomenon. The concept of impure public goods may be useful and effective when we understand the reason why global public goods are being provided and are relatively efficient. As an emerging power, China should have a clear strategy on global public goods with a possible “marketing” viewpoint, including more initiatives and specific measures, so that the global public goods provision may be more diverse and well-planned.

  2. Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    A. Mulder (Arjen)

    2004-01-01

    textabstractFollowing his graduation, Arjen Mulder (1970, MSc Erasmus University)has worked as an energy sector economist at the Netherlands Economic Institute (NEI, nowadays Ecorys). At NEI, he became more and more interested in industrial organisation and market working. He started lecturing at

  3. Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    A. Mulder (Arjen)

    2004-01-01

    textabstractFollowing his graduation, Arjen Mulder (1970, MSc Erasmus University)has worked as an energy sector economist at the Netherlands Economic Institute (NEI, nowadays Ecorys). At NEI, he became more and more interested in industrial organisation and market working. He started lecturing at th

  4. Is globalization really good for public health?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tausch, Arno

    2016-10-01

    In the light of recent very prominent studies, especially that of Mukherjee and Krieckhaus (), one should be initially tempted to assume that nowadays globalization is a driver of a good public health performance in the entire world system. Most of these studies use time series analyses based on the KOF Index of Globalization. We attempt to re-analyze the entire question, using a variety of methodological approaches and data. Our re-analysis shows that neoliberal globalization has resulted in very important implosions of public health development in various regions of the world and in increasing inequality in the countries of the world system, which in turn negatively affect health performance. We use standard ibm/spss ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, time series and cross-correlation analyses based on aggregate, freely available data. Different components of the KOF Index, most notably actual capital inflows, affect public health negatively. The "decomposition" of the available data suggests that for most of the time period of the last four decades, globalization inflows even implied an aggregate deterioration of public health, quite in line with globalization critical studies. We introduce the effects of inequality on public health, widely debated in global public health research. Our annual time series for 99 countries show that globalization indeed leads to increased inequality, and this, in turn, leads to a deteriorating public health performance. In only 19 of the surveyed 99 nations with complete data (i.e., 19.1%), globalization actually preceded an improvement in the public health performance. Far from falsifying globalization critical research, our analyses show the basic weaknesses of the new "pro-globalization" literature in the public health profession. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  5. Isn't That Just Good Teaching? Disaggregate Instruction and the Language Identity Dilemma

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown, Bryan A.

    2011-12-01

    The manuscript examines the relationship between language, identity, and classroom learning. Through an exploration of a series of research studies conducted over the course of 6 years, this manuscript examines how the idea of "Good Teaching" fails to account for the language-identity learning dilemma. In stage one of the research, a series of studies demonstrated how students encountered cultural conflicts as they attempted to use the language of science. The results of that research lead to the development of the construct of Discursive Identity as a lens to understand language interactions. Stage two of the research involved a series of examinations of alternative approaches to teaching that would assist minority students in their science learning. The implications of this research highlight the relationship between students' cognition and the sociocultural interaction that effect students' willingness to engage in academic discourse.

  6. Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pan, Liming; Hao, Dong; Rong, Zhihai; Zhou, Tao

    2015-08-21

    Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents' payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player game where in each round each player will choose whether or not to put his tokens into a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor larger than one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-player games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication factor, a player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other players; (ii) a player is able to set the ratio between his payoff and the total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of players.

  7. Effect of the depreciation of public goods in spatial public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shi, Dong-Mei; Zhuang, Yong; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2012-02-01

    In this work, the depreciation effect of public goods is considered in the public goods games, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r‧=r( (β≥0). It is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit r of the public goods if all the players of this group are cooperators. Otherwise, the value of public goods is reduced to r‧. It is found that compared with the original version (β=0), the emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for β>0, and there exist intermediate values of β inducing the best cooperation. Particularly, there exists a range of β inducing the highest cooperative level, and this range of β broadens as r increases. It is further presented that the variation of cooperator density with noise has close relations with the values of β and r, and cooperation at an intermediate value of β=1.0 is most tolerant to noise.

  8. Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific mutualism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István

    2013-02-07

    The existence of cooperation between species raises a fundamental problem for evolutionary theory. Why provide costly services to another species if the feedback of this provision also happens to benefit intra-specific competitors that provide no service? Rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors can help maintain mutualism; this is not possible, however, when one can only respond to the collective action of one's partners, which is likely to be the case in many common symbioses. We show how the theory of public goods can explain the stability of mutualism when discrimination between cooperators and defectors is not possible: if two groups of individuals trade goods that are non-linear, increasing functions of the number of contributions, their mutualistic interaction is maintained by the exchange of these public goods, even when it is not possible to punish defectors, which can persist at relatively high frequencies. This provides a theoretical justification and testable predictions for the evolution of mutualism in the absence of discrimination mechanisms.

  9. Money as a Global Public Good

    OpenAIRE

    Donath, Liliana; POPESCU Alexandra-Codruta

    2009-01-01

    The main objective of this paper is to discuss a complex and yet not taken in consideration global public good: money. Money is a social convention created and accepted by people in order to facilitate economic transactions, being a symbol, without an intrinsic value (fiduciary money). It is universally used and it has value only in connection with the products and services that can be acquired, based on people’s consent and their psychological acceptance. In other words, its value lies in th...

  10. Punishment in optional public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Zhen; Xu, Zhao-Jin; Zhang, Lian-Zhong

    2010-11-01

    In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

  11. Punishment in optional public goods games

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Wang Zhen; Xu Zhao-Jin; Zhang Lian-Zhong

    2010-01-01

    In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

  12. Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yanling; Wu, Te; Chen, Xiaojie; Xie, Guangming; Wang, Long

    2013-10-07

    The relationship between group's contribution and public goods produced often exhibits nonlinearity, which constitutes the generalized public goods game. Far less attention has been paid to how the mixed strategy evolves in such generalized games. Here, we study the effects of nonlinear production functions on the evolution of the mixed strategy in finite populations for the first time. When the group size and the population size are comparable, cooperation is doomed irrespective of the production function. Otherwise, nonlinear production functions may induce a convergent evolutionary stable strategy (CESS) or a repeller, but cannot yield the evolutionary branching. Moreover, we particularly consider three representative families of production functions, intriguingly which all display the hysteresis effect. For two families of production functions including concave and convex curves, a unique CESS or a unique repeller may occur even if the group size is two. Whereas for the third class encompassing symmetrically sigmoidal and inverse sigmoidal curves, the coexistence of a CESS and a repeller only occurs if group size is above two, and two saddle-node bifurcations appear. Our work includes some evidently different results by comparing with the evolution of continuous investment or binary strategy.

  13. Open Access: (Social Sciences as Public Good

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Katja Mruck

    2004-05-01

    Full Text Available The need to provide open access to articles published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals is becoming apparent to researchers as well as the non-scientific public as a result of "Budapest Open Access Initiative," the "Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities" and other initiatives. The core question that concerns open access is the following: since scientific information is usually financed by public funding, and therefore a public good, shouldn't the access be free of cost to all interested parties. Currently the open access movement is encountering the movement against the "Digital Divide," and therefore it is not surprising that the demand for open access has extended to a political level as reflected in the "WSIS Declaration of Principles" and the "WSIS Plan of Action." This article begins by providing a brief summary of the historical background of the open access movement and its major aims (Section 2. It then lists examples that explain possible links between the open access movement and the initiatives against the "Digital Divide" (Section 3. Section 4 considers some important barriers responsible for the fact that open access publishing is still not part of the everyday scientific publishing practices. This has various consequences. Selected consequences concerning the recent debate on redistribution processes between "information poor" and "information rich" are summarized in Section 5. URN: urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0402141

  14. Institutionalize Reciprocity to Overcome the Public Goods Provision Problem.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hiroki Ozono

    Full Text Available Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and one of the important paths for its emergence and maintenance is reciprocity. In prisoner's dilemma (PD experiments, reciprocal strategies are often effective at attaining and maintaining high cooperation. In many public goods (PG games or n-person PD experiments, however, reciprocal strategies are not successful at engendering cooperation. In the present paper, we attribute this difficulty to a coordination problem against free riding among reciprocators: Because it is difficult for the reciprocators to coordinate their behaviors against free riders, this may lead to inequality among players, which will demotivate them from cooperating in future rounds. We propose a new mechanism, institutionalized reciprocity (IR, which refers to embedding the reciprocal strategy as an institution (i.e., institutionalizing the reciprocal strategy. We experimentally demonstrate that IR can prevent groups of reciprocators from falling into coordination failure and achieve high cooperation in PG games. In conclusion, we argue that a natural extension of the present study will be to investigate the possibility of IR to serve as a collective punishment system.

  15. Institutionalize Reciprocity to Overcome the Public Goods Provision Problem.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ozono, Hiroki; Kamijo, Yoshio; Shimizu, Kazumi

    2016-01-01

    Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and one of the important paths for its emergence and maintenance is reciprocity. In prisoner's dilemma (PD) experiments, reciprocal strategies are often effective at attaining and maintaining high cooperation. In many public goods (PG) games or n-person PD experiments, however, reciprocal strategies are not successful at engendering cooperation. In the present paper, we attribute this difficulty to a coordination problem against free riding among reciprocators: Because it is difficult for the reciprocators to coordinate their behaviors against free riders, this may lead to inequality among players, which will demotivate them from cooperating in future rounds. We propose a new mechanism, institutionalized reciprocity (IR), which refers to embedding the reciprocal strategy as an institution (i.e., institutionalizing the reciprocal strategy). We experimentally demonstrate that IR can prevent groups of reciprocators from falling into coordination failure and achieve high cooperation in PG games. In conclusion, we argue that a natural extension of the present study will be to investigate the possibility of IR to serve as a collective punishment system.

  16. Benefits of tolerance in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szolnoki, Attila; Chen, Xiaojie

    2015-10-01

    Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest income for nonparticipants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing some tolerance toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh environments but in fact results in a surprisingly high average payoff for group members in public goods games. Phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal the high complexity of evolving states where cyclic dominant strategies or two-strategy alliances can characterize the final state of evolution. We identify microscopic mechanisms which are responsible for the superiority of global solutions containing tolerant players. This phenomenon is robust and can be observed both in well-mixed and in structured populations highlighting the importance of tolerance in our everyday life.

  17. Instrumenting Beliefs in Threshold Public Goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Oliveira, Angela C M; Spraggon, John M; Denny, Matthew J

    2016-01-01

    Understanding the causal impact of beliefs on contributions in Threshold Public Goods (TPGs) is particularly important since the social optimum can be supported as a Nash Equilibrium and best-response contributions are a function of beliefs. Unfortunately, investigations of the impact of beliefs on behavior are plagued with endogeneity concerns. We create a set of instruments by cleanly and exogenously manipulating beliefs without deception. Tests indicate that the instruments are valid and relevant. Perhaps surprisingly, we fail to find evidence that beliefs are endogenous in either the one-shot or repeated-decision settings. TPG allocations are determined by a base contribution and beliefs in a one shot-setting. In the repeated-decision environment, once we instrument for first-round allocations, we find that second-round allocations are driven equally by beliefs and history. Moreover, we find that failing to instrument prior decisions overstates their importance.

  18. Benefits of tolerance in public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila

    2015-01-01

    Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest income for non-participants. In this paper we demonstrate that showing some tolerance toward defectors could not only save cooperation in harsh environments, but in fact results in a surprisingly high average payoff for group members in public goods games. Phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal the high complexity of evolving states where cyclic dominant strategies or two-strategy alliances can characterize the final state of evolution. We identify microscopic mechanisms which are responsible for the superiority of global solutions containing tolerant players. This phenomenon is robust and can be observed both in well-mixed and in structured populations highlighting the importance of tolerance in our everyday life.

  19. Demand of Rural Public Goods in Western Ethnic Minority Areas

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2012-01-01

    In the context of Development of the West Regions and the construction of new countryside,on the basis of defining the concept of public goods,this article analyzes the status quo and layers of demand of rural public goods in western ethnic minority areas:the demand of rural public goods in ethnic minority areas shows "pyramid" structure,that is,the most basic layer is production-based rural public goods,followed by life-based rural public goods and democratic-management-based rural public goods.Finally the countermeasures for achieving effective demand of rural public goods are put forward as follows:adhere to customers(farmers)-oriented principle;innovate upon the rural residents’ demand expression mechanism of public goods in ethnic minority areas;achieve diversification of supply subject of rural public goods in ethnic minority areas.

  20. Effect of depreciation of the public goods in spatial public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Shi, Dong-Mei; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2011-01-01

    In this work, depreciated effect of the public goods is considered in the public goods games, which is realized by rescaling the multiplication factor r of each group as r' = r(nc/G)^beta (beat>= 0). It is assumed that each individual enjoys the full profit of the public goods if all the players of this group are cooperators, otherwise, the value of the public goods is reduced to r'. It is found that compared with the original version (beta = 0), emergence of cooperation is remarkably promoted for beta > 0, and there exit optimal values of beta inducing the best cooperation. Moreover, the optimal plat of beta broadens as r increases. Furthermore, effect of noise on the evolution of cooperation is studied, it is presented that variation of cooperator density with the noise is dependent of the value of beta and r, and cooperation dominates over most of the range of noise at an intermediate value of beta = 1.0. We study the initial distribution of the multiplication factor at beta = 1.0, and find that all the di...

  1. Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    夏承遗; 张娟娟; 王祎玲; 王劲松

    2011-01-01

    We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature (London) 425 (2003) 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner's and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner's payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner's payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

  2. Cooperation transition of spatial public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Xu-Wen; Nie, Sen; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2016-12-01

    In the public goods games, players attempt to optimize their payoffs, following as fair, generous, and extortionate rules according to the pattern needed for obtaining their expected profits compared to those of their opponents. In first type of rule (the fair one), players seek equal profits of the opponent, and the generous rule induces to lower payoff than that of opposite players, while the extortionate rule leads to higher payoffs than that of their opponents. To model the three types of behaviors, we introduce a conditional strategy with a parameter χ, which control conditions of existence of the three behaviors. Therefore, players may contribute in a group, but may not contribute in the other group, because it depends on conditions of their opponents. Simulation results show that there exists a pure cooperation state when parameter χ is moderate, even for a lower multiplication factor. Because conditional players cautiously contribute they can form compact clusters to prevent the invasion of defection and finally spread the cooperation when defectors die out.

  3. Cooperation, Trust, and Antagonism: How Public Goods Are Promoted.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Parks, Craig D; Joireman, Jeff; Van Lange, Paul A M

    2013-12-01

    antagonism are relevant. Power, and its abuse, is a major factor, and a specific application to collective goods is the notion of a "gatekeeper," or a person who can completely determine whether a public good exists or a common-pool resource can be used. Gatekeepers tend to demand ample compensation from others in order for the good or resource to go forward. If this demand is resisted, as it often is, the end result is that the good is not provided or the resource not accessed. Another facet is the desire to see an out-group be harmed. Sometimes, this motivation is so strong that people will deny themselves a good outcome in order to see the harm occur. Why someone would want to see an out-group be harmed is debatable, but it may be attributable to a desire to be seen as a winner, or it may be a strategy designed to produce a net benefit for one's in-group. Emotions also play a role, with people tending to assume that out-group members have just basic emotions such as happiness and sadness and not secondary emotions such as guilt and shame. Because out-group members are emotionally simple, it is seen as acceptable to treat them badly. Complicating matters even further is that antagonism can sometimes be seen against in-group members who deviate, in either direction, from the group norm and against individuals who are behaving in a clearly selfless manner, like volunteers. A number of approaches have been proposed to the resolution of public goods problems. Structural solutions act to alter the basic dynamic of the dilemma by means of interventions such as rewards for cooperation, punishment for noncooperation, and selection of a single group member to chart a course of action for everyone. Third-party solutions involve the bringing in of an external agent to help determine how group members should behave. These agents may be more passive and merely suggest solutions, or they may be more active and dictate how decisions will be made, what decision will be made, or both

  4. Pure Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert

    We study pure redistribution as a device to increase cooperation and efficiency in the provision of public goods. Experimental subjects play a two-stage game. The first stage is the standard linear public goods game. In the second stage, subjects can redistribute payoffs among other subjects...... cooperation in the provision of public goods...

  5. Critical mass of public goods and its coevolution with cooperation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shi, Dong-Mei; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2017-07-01

    In this study, the enhancing parameter represented the value of the public goods to the public in public goods game, and was rescaled to a Fermi-Dirac distribution function of critical mass. Public goods were divided into two categories, consumable and reusable public goods, and their coevolution with cooperative behavior was studied. We observed that for both types of public goods, cooperation was promoted as the enhancing parameter increased when the value of critical mass was not very large. An optimal value of critical mass which led to the best cooperation was identified. We also found that cooperations emerged earlier for reusable public goods, and defections became extinct earlier for the consumable public goods. Moreover, we observed that a moderate depreciation rate for public goods resulted in an optimal cooperation, and this range became wider as the enhancing parameter increased. The noise influence on cooperation was studied, and it was shown that cooperation density varied non-monotonically as noise amplitude increased for reusable public goods, whereas decreased monotonically for consumable public goods. Furthermore, existence of the optimal critical mass was also identified in other three regular networks. Finally, simulation results were utilized to analyze the provision of public goods in detail.

  6. Take Good Care of Public Facilities

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    张冰; 金业祥

    2004-01-01

    However,it is a great pity that in many places,some of the public facilities have been purposely damaged.Some electric bulbs were smashed; some traffic signs were damaged beyond recognition,some public telephones cannot work; some statues stand there without an arm or a leg.What's worse,some people even stole the covers of the sewers.

  7. ‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

    2015-01-01

    A growing body of research has focused on so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ‘utilitarian’ judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ‘utilitarian’ judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that ‘utilitarian’ judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in ‘utilitarian’ judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics. PMID:25460392

  8. Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martina eVogelsang

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available Despite the benefits of cooperation, selfish individuals often produce outcomes where everyone is worse off. This tragedy of the commons has been demonstrated experimentally in adults with the public goods game. Contributions to a public good decline over time due to free-riders who keep their endowments. Little is known about how children behave when confronted with this social dilemma. Forty-eight five-year-olds were tested using a novel nonverbal procedure and simplified choices more appropriate to their age than standard economic approaches. The rate of cooperation was initially very low and rose in the second round for the girls only. Children were affected by their previous outcome, as they free rode more after experiencing a lower outcome compared to the other group members.

  9. Preschoolers are sensitive to free riding in a public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vogelsang, Martina; Jensen, Keith; Kirschner, Sebastian; Tennie, Claudio; Tomasello, Michael

    2014-01-01

    Despite the benefits of cooperation, selfish individuals often produce outcomes where everyone is worse off. This "tragedy of the commons" has been demonstrated experimentally in adults with the public goods game. Contributions to a public good decline over time due to free-riders who keep their endowments. Little is known about how children behave when confronted with this social dilemma. Forty-eight preschoolers were tested using a novel non-verbal procedure and simplified choices more appropriate to their age than standard economic approaches. The rate of cooperation was initially very low and rose in the second round for the girls only. Children were affected by their previous outcome, as they free rode more after experiencing a lower outcome compared to the other group members.

  10. Cooperative investment in public goods is kin directed in communal nests of social birds.

    Science.gov (United States)

    van Dijk, René E; Kaden, Jennifer C; Argüelles-Ticó, Araceli; Dawson, Deborah A; Burke, Terry; Hatchwell, Ben J

    2014-09-01

    The tragedy of the commons predicts social collapse when public goods are jointly exploited by individuals attempting to maximize their fitness at the expense of other social group members. However, animal societies have evolved many times despite this vulnerability to exploitation by selfish individuals. Kin selection offers a solution to this social dilemma, but in large social groups mean relatedness is often low. Sociable weavers (Philetairus socius) live in large colonies that share the benefits of a massive communal nest, which requires individual investment for construction and maintenance. Here, we show that despite low mean kinship within colonies, relatives are spatially and socially clustered and that nest-building males have higher local relatedness to other colony members than do non-building males. Alternative hypotheses received little support, so we conclude that the benefits of the public good are shared with kin and that cooperative investment is, despite the large size and low relatedness of these communities, kin directed.

  11. Men behaving nicely: public goods as peacock tails.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Vugt, Mark; Iredale, Wendy

    2013-02-01

    Insights from sexual selection and costly signalling theory suggest that competition for females underlies men's public good contributions. We conducted two public good experiments to test this hypothesis. First, we found that men contributed more in the presence of an opposite sex audience, but there was no parallel effect for the women. In addition, men's public good contributions went up as they rated the female observer more attractive. In the second experiment, all male groups played a five round public good game and their contributions significantly increased over time with a female audience only. In this condition men also volunteered more time for various charitable causes. These findings support the idea that men compete with each other by creating public goods to impress women. Thus, a public good is the human equivalent of a peacock's tail.

  12. Moral dilemmas in professions of public trust and the assumptions of ethics of social consequences

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dubiel-Zielińska Paulina

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available The aim of the article is to show the possibility of applying assumptions from ethics of social consequences when making decisions about actions, as well as in situations of moral dilemmas, by persons performing occupations of public trust on a daily basis. Reasoning in the article is analytical and synthetic. Article begins with an explanation of the basic concepts of “profession” and “the profession of public trust” and a manifestation of the difference between these terms. This is followed by a general description of professions of public trust. The area and definition of moral dilemmas is emphasized. Furthermore, representatives of professions belonging to them are listed. After a brief characterization of axiological foundations and the main assumptions of ethics of social consequences, actions according to Vasil Gluchman and Włodzimierz Galewicz are discussed and actions in line with ethics of social consequences are transferred to the practical domain. The article points out that actions in professional life are obligatory, impermissible, permissible, supererogatory and unmarked in the moral dimension. In the final part of the article an afterthought is included on how to solve moral dilemmas when in the position of a representative of the profession of public trust. The article concludes with a summary report containing the conclusions that stem from ethics of social consequences for professions of public trust, followed by short examples.

  13. Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dercole, Fabio; De Carli, Marco; Della Rossa, Fabio; Papadopoulos, Alessandro V

    2013-06-07

    The fixation of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. It is investigated by means of public goods games, the generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to more than two players. In compulsory public goods games, defect is the dominant strategy, while voluntary participation overcomes the social dilemma by allowing a cyclic coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and non-participants. Experimental and theoretical research has shown how the combination of voluntary participation and altruistic punishment-punishing antisocial behaviors at a personal cost-provides a solution to the problem, as long as antisocial punishment-the punishing of cooperators-is not allowed. Altruistic punishment can invade at low participation and pave the way to the fixation of cooperation. Specifically, defectors are overpunished, in the sense that their payoff is reduced by a sanction proportional to the number of punishers in the game. Here we show that qualitatively equivalent results can be achieved with a milder punishing mechanism, where defectors only risk a fixed penalty per round-as in many real situations-and the cost of punishment is shared among the punishers. The payoffs for the four strategies-cooperate, defect, abstain, and cooperate-&-punish-are derived and the corresponding replicator dynamics analyzed in full detail.

  14. Money and Finance as Global Public Goods

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guido Montani

    2011-10-01

    Full Text Available The 2007-2008 financial crisis caused not only a dramatic fall in global output and employment but also a serious deterioration of public indebtedness for many governments, forced to rescue the banking system from failure. The crisis showed that national governments are not able to regulate the global market by means of the traditional instruments of political economy. The aim of this article is to identify new supranational instruments of economic policy. As a first step, to avoid a new financial crisis, it is necessary to understand the intimate connection between the international monetary system, founded on the dollar as key currency, and the international financial system. Only some economists were able to see the causes of the recent crisis as a by-product of an asymmetric monetary system. In this article, after having discussed the monetary roots of the financial crisis, the discussion is focused on monetary sovereignty, financial sovereignty, and fiscal sovereignty as the main economic responsibilities of a national government, to show that, today, a supranational economic government should have similar powers. An appendix (disposable on the website of the author on “Global imbalances: A false objective of economic policy” shows how the balance of payments imposes wrong goals to national economic policies. The discussion is focused on (a the neo-Ricardian theory of economic integration, (b financial capital flows, and (c the Keynesian equations of an open economy.

  15. Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ten Raa, T.; Gilles, R.P.

    2000-01-01

    Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as

  16. Universities, the Public Good and Professional Education in the UK

    Science.gov (United States)

    East, Linda; Stokes, Rebecca; Walker, Melanie

    2014-01-01

    In times of economic uncertainty, questions of the purpose and value of higher education come to the fore. Such questions have particular relevance when directed towards the preparation of professionally qualified graduates who might be expected to contribute to the public good. However, definitions of the public good are contested and the role of…

  17. Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ten Raa, T.; Gilles, R.P.

    2000-01-01

    Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as pur

  18. Local Residential Sorting and Public Goods Provision: A Classroom Demonstration

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brouhle, Keith; Corrigan, Jay; Croson, Rachel; Farnham, Martin; Garip, Selhan; Habodaszova, Luba; Johnson, Laurie Tipton; Johnson, Martin; Reiley, David

    2005-01-01

    This classroom exercise illustrates the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that residential sorting across multiple jurisdictions leads to a more efficient allocation of local public goods. The exercise places students with heterogeneous preferences over a public good into a single classroom community. A simple voting mechanism determines the level of…

  19. Research on Effective Supply Mode of Rural Public Goods

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2011-01-01

    On the basis of definition and classification of rural public goods, this paper analyses the status quo of public goods supply in vast rural areas of China, and it indicates that the electricity and communication facility in rural areas have not yet been popularized; the culture and education facility is critically backward; the medical care and social warfare institutions are short. It points out the rational supply model of public goods as follows: the government plays dominant role in the public goods supply with a large amount of investments, related to the quality of living and production of multitudinous farmers; small wieldy quasi-public goods that can be easily supplied and marginalized public goods can introduce multiplex supply main body under the framework of government guidance. According to this model, corresponding policy suggestions are put forward as follows: increase financial inputs, and perfect local financial system; actively encourage the majority of farmers in rural areas to participate in public goods supply mechanism, so that the supply has pertinence; vigorously develop multiplex supply system of rural public goods, to ensure effective supply.

  20. The Contest for Olympic Succes as a Public Good

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Groot, L.F.M.

    2008-01-01

    This study considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality m

  1. Pure redistribution and the provision of public goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert

    2007-01-01

    We show that a simple redistribution scheme can increase the provision of public goods and that the scheme is popular. This suggests that imposed redistribution as in the mechanism by Falkinger [Falkinger, J., 1996. Efficient private provision of public goods when deviations from average...

  2. Democracy, redistributive taxation and the private provision of public goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Markussen, Thomas

    2011-01-01

    The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition the private provision of public goods embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on production of public goods, to which Olson (1965) pointed, is weakened...

  3. Democracy, Redistributive Taxation and the Private Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Markussen, Thomas

    The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition how the private provision of public goods is affected when it is embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on public goods production, which Olson (1965...

  4. Explaining contributions to public goods : Formalizing the social exchange heuristic

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, J.

    The public good game is a popular model of cooperation problems. Rational egoism predicts that in finitely repeated public good games no contributions are made. At least 4 observations are inconsistent with this prediction: contributions (i) are frequently positive, (ii) increase in the marginal

  5. Enforcement Dilemma: Voluntary Nature of Public Relations Codes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wright, Donald K.

    1993-01-01

    Argues that, although valuable, ethical codes in public relations are unenforceable. Suggests that, with or without professional codes of conduct, most people who practice public relations will choose to be ethical because they believe in themselves and want others to respect them. (SR)

  6. Professionalization and public health: historical legacies, continuing dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Starr, Paul

    2009-11-01

    Professionalization in public health reflects wider institutional and political forces. Depending on the historical context in different countries, public health has developed as a medical specialty or as an independent field, entirely within the state or in mixed public-private institutions, closely or weakly tied to social movements, and in varying relations to fields such as engineering, nursing, environmental science, and the military. In early 20th-century America, the rise of the medical profession and the biomedical model of disease had a formative influence on public health, leading to a different institutional pattern from Britain. Public health in the United States emerged (1) largely outside the medical profession, but under the sway of the biomedical model; (2) without medicine's command of an exclusive jurisdiction and high status; and (3) with a limited role in healthcare organization and planning. Professionalism in public health continues to be subjected to contradictory pressures and uncertainties. Healthcare reform, bioterrorism, and environmental crises could expand its mandate and access to resources, but conflicts with other institutions are likely to result in limits on the capacity of public health professionals to assert an exclusive jurisdiction.

  7. Privatization and the Public Good: Public Universities in the Balance

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lambert, Matthew T.

    2014-01-01

    "Public education is in crisis--and it has been for some time. The problem is, no one can agree on the problem, and when there is no agreement on the problem, developing solutions is nearly impossible." Thus writes Matthew T. Lambert in this study of present-day public higher education, which is currently plagued by momentous challenges.…

  8. Information-sharing ethical dilemmas and decision-making for public health nurses in Japan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suzuki, Chisato; Ota, Katsumasa; Matsuda, Masami

    2015-08-01

    Information sharing is one of the most important means of public health nurses collaborating with other healthcare professionals and community members. There are complicated ethical issues in the process. To describe the ethical dilemmas associated with client information sharing that Japanese public health nurses experience in daily practice and to clarify their decision-making process to resolve these dilemmas. Data were collected using a three-phase consensus method consisting of semi-structured interviews, self-administered questionnaires and a group interview. We surveyed administrative public health nurses in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan. The semi-structured interviews were carried out with 12 administrative public health nurses, and the self-administered questionnaires were sent to all 899 administrative public health nurses. The group interview was carried out with eight administrative public health nurses. Ethical approval was granted by the ethics committee of the School of Health Sciences, Nagoya University, Japan (8-158, 9-130). Information-sharing ethical dilemmas occurred most often when clients' decisions did not coincide with the nurses' own professional assessments, particularly when they faced clinical issues that were inherently ambiguous. In their decision-making processes, nurses prioritised 'protection of health and life'. These findings suggest that, above all, they sought to address urgent risks to clients' lives while upholding the principle of client autonomy as much as possible. In such cases, the nurses made decisions regarding whether to share information about the client depending on the individual situation. Public health nurses should protect the client's health while taking into consideration their relationship with the client. © The Author(s) 2014.

  9. Schools within Schools: An Answer to the Public School Dilemma.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seldin, Clement A.

    In this book, the findings of a study on schools within schools are described. The professional research and literature on alternative public education, with a focus on schools within schools, is explored. Based on the research, a list of elements characteristic to and useful for the implementation and perpetuation of optional alternative programs…

  10. Democracy, Redistributive Taxation and the Private Provision of Public Goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Markussen, Thomas

    The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition how the private provision of public goods is affected when it is embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on public goods production, which Olson (1965......) pointed to, is weakened and might even be reversed in this context. Also, the median voter may choose a negative tax rate, even if he is poorer than the mean, in order to stimulate public goods production. The relevance of the model is illustrated with an application to the finance of higher education....

  11. How Good Is Crude MDL for Solving the Bias-Variance Dilemma? An Empirical Investigation Based on Bayesian Networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cruz-Ramírez, Nicandro; Acosta-Mesa, Héctor Gabriel; Mezura-Montes, Efrén; Guerra-Hernández, Alejandro; Hoyos-Rivera, Guillermo de Jesús; Barrientos-Martínez, Rocío Erandi; Gutiérrez-Fragoso, Karina; Nava-Fernández, Luis Alonso; González-Gaspar, Patricia; Novoa-del-Toro, Elva María; Aguilera-Rueda, Vicente Josué; Ameca-Alducin, María Yaneli

    2014-01-01

    The bias-variance dilemma is a well-known and important problem in Machine Learning. It basically relates the generalization capability (goodness of fit) of a learning method to its corresponding complexity. When we have enough data at hand, it is possible to use these data in such a way so as to minimize overfitting (the risk of selecting a complex model that generalizes poorly). Unfortunately, there are many situations where we simply do not have this required amount of data. Thus, we need to find methods capable of efficiently exploiting the available data while avoiding overfitting. Different metrics have been proposed to achieve this goal: the Minimum Description Length principle (MDL), Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), among others. In this paper, we focus on crude MDL and empirically evaluate its performance in selecting models with a good balance between goodness of fit and complexity: the so-called bias-variance dilemma, decomposition or tradeoff. Although the graphical interaction between these dimensions (bias and variance) is ubiquitous in the Machine Learning literature, few works present experimental evidence to recover such interaction. In our experiments, we argue that the resulting graphs allow us to gain insights that are difficult to unveil otherwise: that crude MDL naturally selects balanced models in terms of bias-variance, which not necessarily need be the gold-standard ones. We carry out these experiments using a specific model: a Bayesian network. In spite of these motivating results, we also should not overlook three other components that may significantly affect the final model selection: the search procedure, the noise rate and the sample size. PMID:24671204

  12. How good is crude MDL for solving the bias-variance dilemma? An empirical investigation based on Bayesian networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cruz-Ramírez, Nicandro; Acosta-Mesa, Héctor Gabriel; Mezura-Montes, Efrén; Guerra-Hernández, Alejandro; Hoyos-Rivera, Guillermo de Jesús; Barrientos-Martínez, Rocío Erandi; Gutiérrez-Fragoso, Karina; Nava-Fernández, Luis Alonso; González-Gaspar, Patricia; Novoa-del-Toro, Elva María; Aguilera-Rueda, Vicente Josué; Ameca-Alducin, María Yaneli

    2014-01-01

    The bias-variance dilemma is a well-known and important problem in Machine Learning. It basically relates the generalization capability (goodness of fit) of a learning method to its corresponding complexity. When we have enough data at hand, it is possible to use these data in such a way so as to minimize overfitting (the risk of selecting a complex model that generalizes poorly). Unfortunately, there are many situations where we simply do not have this required amount of data. Thus, we need to find methods capable of efficiently exploiting the available data while avoiding overfitting. Different metrics have been proposed to achieve this goal: the Minimum Description Length principle (MDL), Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), among others. In this paper, we focus on crude MDL and empirically evaluate its performance in selecting models with a good balance between goodness of fit and complexity: the so-called bias-variance dilemma, decomposition or tradeoff. Although the graphical interaction between these dimensions (bias and variance) is ubiquitous in the Machine Learning literature, few works present experimental evidence to recover such interaction. In our experiments, we argue that the resulting graphs allow us to gain insights that are difficult to unveil otherwise: that crude MDL naturally selects balanced models in terms of bias-variance, which not necessarily need be the gold-standard ones. We carry out these experiments using a specific model: a Bayesian network. In spite of these motivating results, we also should not overlook three other components that may significantly affect the final model selection: the search procedure, the noise rate and the sample size.

  13. Ostracism and the provision of a public good

    OpenAIRE

    Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.; Martinsson, Peter; Staffiero, Gianandrea

    2005-01-01

    We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contributions. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant.

  14. Framing and misperceptions in a public good experiment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fosgaard, Toke; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland

    Earlier studies have found that a substantial part of the contributions in public good games can be explained by subjects misperceiving the game's incentives. Using a large-scale public good experiment, we show that subtle changes in how the game is framed substantially affect such misperceptions...... and that this explains major parts of framing effect on subjects' behavior. When controlling for the different levels of misperception between frames, the framing effect on subjects' cooperation preferences disappears.......Earlier studies have found that a substantial part of the contributions in public good games can be explained by subjects misperceiving the game's incentives. Using a large-scale public good experiment, we show that subtle changes in how the game is framed substantially affect such misperceptions...

  15. Public Records and Archives as Tools for Good Governance ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Public Records and Archives as Tools for Good Governance: Reflections Within the ... AFRICAN JOURNALS ONLINE (AJOL) · Journals · Advanced Search · USING AJOL ... It demonstrates that whereas records and archives are useful tools for ...

  16. Private Financing of Public Goods by Means of 'Eco-Goods' Schemes

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ueda, Yoshifumi; Wegener, Andreas; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

    2010-01-01

    With a view to applying to the problem of collective action for the global commons, we analyze a three-stage game model where public goods are provided by the costly leadership of a social entrepreneur for undertaking 'eco-goods' scheme. We derive (i) the conclusion that the social entrepreneur can...

  17. Avoiding or restricting defectors in public goods games?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, The Anh; Pereira, Luís Moniz; Lenaerts, Tom

    2015-02-06

    When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.

  18. The Contest for Olympic Succes as a Public Good

    OpenAIRE

    Groot, L.F.M.

    2008-01-01

    This study considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can be successfully applied to the distribution of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with alternative hyp...

  19. Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sasaki, Tatsuya; Unemi, Tatsuo

    2011-10-21

    Which punishment or rewards are most effective at maintaining cooperation in public goods interactions and deterring defectors who are willing to freeload on others' contribution? The sanction system is itself a public good and can cause problematic "second-order free riders" who do not contribute to the provisions of the sanctions and thus may subvert the cooperation supported by sanctioning. Recent studies have shown that public goods games with punishment can lead to a coercion-based regime if participation in the game is optional. Here, we reveal that even with compulsory participation, rewards can maintain cooperation within an infinitely large population. We consider three strategies for players in a standard public goods game: to be a cooperator or a defector in a standard public goods game, or to be a rewarder who contributes to the public good and to a fund that rewards players who contribute during the game. Cooperators do not contribute to the reward fund and are therefore classified as second-order free riders. The replicator dynamics for the three strategies exhibit a rock-scissors-paper cycle, and can be analyzed fully, despite the fact that the expected payoffs are nonlinear. The model does not require repeated interaction, spatial structure, group selection, or reputation. We also discuss a simple method for second-order sanctions, which can lead to a globally stable state where 100% of the population are rewarders.

  20. Public goods games with reward in finite populations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forsyth, Peter A I; Hauert, Christoph

    2011-07-01

    Public goods games paraphrase the problem of cooperation in game theoretical terms. Cooperators contribute to a public good and thereby increase the welfare of others at a cost to themselves. Defectors consume the public good but do not pay its cost and therefore outperform cooperators. Hence, according to genetic or cultural evolution, defectors should be favored and the public good disappear - despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. The maximization of short term individual profits causes the demise of the common resource to the detriment of all. This outcome can be averted by introducing incentives to cooperate. Negative incentives based on the punishment of defectors efficiently stabilize cooperation once established but cannot initiate cooperation. Here we consider the complementary case of positive incentives created by allowing individuals to reward those that contribute to the public good. The finite-population stochastic dynamics of the public goods game with reward demonstrate that reward initiates cooperation by providing an escape hatch out of states of mutual defection. However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to a persistent minority of cooperators.

  1. Adaptive evolution of cooperation through Darwinian dynamics in Public Goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Kuiying; Chu, Tianguang

    2011-01-01

    The linear or threshold Public Goods game (PGG) is extensively accepted as a paradigmatic model to approach the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we explore the significant effect of nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population by adopting Darwinian dynamics, which simultaneously consider the evolution of populations and strategies on a continuous adaptive landscape, and extend the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a coalition of strategies that is both convergent-stable and resistant to invasion. Results show (i) that in the linear PGG contributing nothing is an ESS, which contradicts experimental data, (ii) that in the threshold PGG contributing the threshold value is a fragile ESS, which cannot resist the invasion of contributing nothing, and (iii) that there exists a robust ESS of contributing more than half in the sigmoid PGG if the return rate is relatively high. This work reveals the significant effect of the nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of cooperation, and suggests that, compared with the linear or threshold PGG, the sigmoid PGG might be a more proper model for the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population.

  2. The public goods game with a new form of shared reward

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Chunyan; Chen, Zengqiang

    2016-10-01

    Altruistic contribution to a common good evenly enjoyed by all group members is hard to explain because of the greater benefits obtained by a defector than a cooperator. A variety of mechanisms have been proposed to resolve the collective dilemma over the years, including rewards for altruism. An underrated and easily ignored phenomenon is that the altruistic behaviors of cooperators not only directly enhance the benefits of their game opponents, but also indirectly produce good influences to other allied members in their surroundings (e.g. relatives or friends). Here we propose a shared reward, in the form of extensive benefits, to extend the traditional definition of the public goods game. Mathematical analysis using the Moran process helps us to obtain the fixation probability for one ‘mutant’ cooperator to invade and dominate the whole defecting population. Results suggest that a tunable parameter exists, above a certain critical value of which natural selection favors cooperation over defection. In addition, analytical results with replicator dynamics show that this critical value influencing the evolution of altruism is closely correlated with the population size, the gaming group size and the synergy factor of the public goods game. These results, based on an extended notion of shared reward and extensive benefits, are expected to provide novel explanations for the emergence of altruistic behaviors.

  3. Parent Trigger Policies, Representation, and the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Allen, Ann; Saultz, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Using theories of representation and democratic education, this article examines the impetus of parent trigger policies in the United States and their potential effects on public good goals for public education. The article also uses theories of representation and responsible democratic governance to assess the parent trigger policies, or what are…

  4. A Unique Pedagogical Approach to Voting and Public Goods

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schuler, Douglas A.; Chappell, Matthew; Baggett, L. Scott

    2010-01-01

    Fourth grade students at a public elementary school in Houston, Texas, participated in a one-week exercise intended to mimic the process of creating a public good through a democratic process. The exercise involved students in four separate classes designing a class party with different characteristics (theme, music, and food) through a voluntary…

  5. Parent Trigger Policies, Representation, and the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Allen, Ann; Saultz, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Using theories of representation and democratic education, this article examines the impetus of parent trigger policies in the United States and their potential effects on public good goals for public education. The article also uses theories of representation and responsible democratic governance to assess the parent trigger policies, or what are…

  6. The Pizzagame: A virtual public goods game to assess cooperative behavior in children and adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keil, Jan; Michel, Andrea; Sticca, Fabio; Leipold, Kristina; Klein, Annette M; Sierau, Susan; von Klitzing, Kai; White, Lars O

    2017-08-01

    Social dilemmas are characterized by conflicts between immediate self-interest and long-term collective goals. Although such conflicts lie at the heart of various challenging social interactions, we know little about how cooperation in these situations develops. To extend work on social dilemmas to child and adolescent samples, we developed an age-appropriate computer task (the Pizzagame) with the structural features of a public goods game (PGG). We administered the Pizzagame to a sample of 191 children 9 to 16 years of age. Subjects were led to believe they were playing the game over the Internet with three sets of two same-aged, same-sex co-players. In fact, the co-players were computer-generated and programmed to expose children to three consecutive conditions: (1) a cooperative strategy, (2) a selfish strategy, and (3) divergent cooperative-selfish strategies. Supporting the validity of the Pizzagame, our results revealed that children and adolescents displayed conditional cooperation, such that their contributions rose with the increasing cooperativeness of their co-players. Age and gender did not influence children and adolescents' cooperative behavior within each condition. However, older children adapted their behavior more flexibly between conditions to parallel the strategies of their co-players. These results support the utility of the Pizzagame as a feasible, reliable, and valid instrument for assessing and quantifying child and adolescent cooperative behavior. Moreover, these findings extend previous work showing that age influences cooperative behavior in the PGG.

  7. The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    dos Santos, Miguel

    2015-01-07

    Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions. © 2014 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

  8. Towards Rock-paper-scissors patterns in the Optional Public Goods Game under random mobility

    CERN Document Server

    Valverde, Pablo A; Stock, Eduardo V

    2016-01-01

    Social dilemmas concern a natural conflict between cooperation and self interests among individuals in large populations. The emergence of cooperation and its maintenance is the key for the understanding of fundamental concepts about the evolution of species. In order to understand the mechanisms involved in this framework, here we study the Optional Public Good Games with focus on the effects of diffusive aspects in the emergent patterns of cyclic dominance between the strategies. Differently from other works, we showed that rock-paper-scissors (RPS) patterns occur by introducing a simple kind of random mobility in a lattice sparsely occupied. Such pattern has been revealed to be very important in the conservation of the species in ecological and social environments. The goal of this paper is to show that we do not need more elaborated schemes for construction of the neighbourhood in the game to observe RPS patterns as suggested in the literature. As an interesting additional result, in this contribution we ...

  9. Generalisations of Hamilton's Rule Applied to Non-Additive Public Goods Games with Random Group Size

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    James A R Marshall

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available Inclusive fitness theory has been described as being limited to certain special cases of social evolution. In particular some authors argue that the theory can only be applied to social interactions having additive fitness effects, and involving only pairs of individuals. This article takes an elegant formulation of non-additive public goods games from the literature, and shows how the two main generalisations of Hamilton's rule can be applied to such games when group sizes are random. In doing so inclusive fitness theory is thus applied to a very general class of social dilemmas, thereby providing further evidence for its generality. Interestingly, one of the two predominant versions of Hamilton's rule is found to be mathematically easier to apply to the scenario considered, despite both necessarily giving equivalent predictions.

  10. Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hauert, Christoph; De Monte, Silvia; Hofbauer, Josef; Sigmund, Karl

    2002-05-01

    The evolution of cooperation among nonrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. Reciprocal altruism fails to provide a solution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large. Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors can be traced and identified. Here we present a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. Optional participation can foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. In voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist. We show that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms, leading usually not to an equilibrium but to an unending cycle of adjustments (a Red Queen type of evolution). Thus, voluntary participation offers an escape hatch out of some social traps. Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random.

  11. Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Chen, Xiaojie

    2016-01-01

    In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we also consider a player's individual wealth when to decide about participation? To address this issue we propose a model in which the probabilistic participation in the public goods game is combined with a conditional investment mode that is based on individual wealth: if a player's wealth exceeds a threshold value then it is qualified and can participate in the joint venture. Otherwise, the participation is forbidden in the investment interactions. We show that if only probabilistic participation is considered, spatially structured populations cannot support cooperation better than well-mixed populations where full defecti...

  12. The global public good concept: a means of promoting good veterinary governance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eloit, M

    2012-08-01

    At the outset, the concept of a 'public good' was associated with economic policies. However, it has now evolved not only from a national to a global concept (global public good), but also from a concept applying solely to the production of goods to one encompassing societal issues (education, environment, etc.) and fundamental rights, including the right to health and food. Through their actions, Veterinary Services, as defined by the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Terrestrial Code) of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), help to improve animal health and reduce production losses. In this way they contribute directly and indirectly to food security and to safeguarding human health and economic resources. The organisation and operating procedures of Veterinary Services are therefore key to the efficient governance required to achieve these objectives. The OIE is a major player in global cooperation and governance in the fields of animal and public health through the implementation of its strategic standardisation mission and other programmes for the benefit of Veterinary Services and OIE Member Countries. Thus, the actions of Veterinary Services and the OIE deserve to be recognised as a global public good, backed by public investment to ensure that all Veterinary Services are in a position to apply the principles of good governance and to comply with the international standards for the quality of Veterinary Services set out in the OIE Terrestrial Code (Section 3 on Quality of Veterinary Services) and Aquatic Animal Health Code (Section 3 on Quality of Aquatic Animal Health Services).

  13. An overview of European good practices in public procurement

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ada POPESCU

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available Public procurement has always been a major source of corruption in Europe, as acknowledged by national and European officials, by NGOs and by representatives of civil society. Too often, public procurement serves the personal interests of corrupt officials rather than the best interest of the community. During the last decade, anti-corruption efforts have increasingly focused on public procurement corruption. Most European countries, including European Union members, have tried to eliminate public procurement corruption by implementing new legal rules to ensure compliance with public procurement standards and by prosecuting offenders. After surveying a variety of good practices for eliminating corruption in public procurement in Europe, this paper concludes that the new rules have produced mixed results, with the most unfavourable outcomes occurring in Central and Eastern European countries where public procurement corruption is more virulent than elsewhere in Europe.

  14. Different goods, different effects: Exploring the roles of generalized trust in public goods provision

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sønderskov, Kim

    This paper tests the hypothesis that generalized trust helps solve large-n collective action problems in a rationalistic framework. A rigors test is employed in that the hypothesis is tested in two different choice situations; a pure public good situation (whether to recycle or not) and a joint...... week positive effect on organic food consumption. Hence, generalized trust only affects public good provision when a collective action problem is present. The analyses thus sustain the hypothesis. It is furthermore concluded that the effect of generalized trust is due to strategic behavior...

  15. A tale of two contribution mechanisms for nonlinear public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yanling; Fu, Feng; Wu, Te; Xie, Guangming; Wang, Long

    2013-01-01

    Amounts of empirical evidence, ranging from microbial cooperation to collective hunting, suggests public goods produced often nonlinearly depend on the total amount of contribution. The implication of such nonlinear public goods for the evolution of cooperation is not well understood. There is also little attention paid to the divisibility nature of individual contribution amount, divisible vs. non-divisible ones. The corresponding strategy space in the former is described by a continuous investment while in the latter by a continuous probability to contribute all or nothing. Here, we use adaptive dynamics in finite populations to quantify and compare the roles nonlinearity of public-goods production plays in cooperation between these two contribution mechanisms. Although under both contribution mechanisms the population can converge into a coexistence equilibrium with an intermediate cooperation level, the branching phenomenon only occurs in the divisible contribution mechanism. The results shed insight into understanding observed individual difference in cooperative behavior.

  16. Potential follow-up increases private contributions to public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rogers, Todd; Ternovski, John; Yoeli, Erez

    2016-05-10

    People contribute more to public goods when their contributions are made more observable to others. We report an intervention that subtly increases the observability of public goods contributions when people are solicited privately and impersonally (e.g., mail, email, social media). This intervention is tested in a large-scale field experiment (n = 770,946) in which people are encouraged to vote through get-out-the-vote letters. We vary whether the letters include the message, "We may call you after the election to ask about your voting experience." Increasing the perceived observability of whether people vote by including that message increased the impact of the get-out-the-vote letters by more than the entire effect of a typical get-out-the-vote letter. This technique for increasing perceived observability can be replicated whenever public goods solicitations are made in private.

  17. Hygiene and good manufacturing practice in terms of public health

    OpenAIRE

    Sibel CEVİZCİ; Önal, Ayşe Emel

    2009-01-01

    With globalization, presenting service and product which have good quality and conformity with hygienic regulations, have become more important in health, pharmacy and food sectors. That’s why the quality control and documentation systems which are also considerable in terms of public health, were about to change. Today, lots of companies especially in health sector, prefer “Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP)”- including a developed quality-hygiene control and documentation method - that they...

  18. Horizontal gene transfer in osmotrophs: playing with public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Richards, Thomas A; Talbot, Nicholas J

    2013-10-01

    Osmotrophic microorganisms, such as fungi and oomycetes, feed by secreting depolymerizing enzymes to process complex food sources in the extracellular environment, and taking up the resulting simple sugars, micronutrients and amino acids. As a consequence of this lifestyle, osmotrophs engage in the acquisition and protection of public goods. In this Opinion article, we propose that horizontal gene transfer (HGT) has played a key part in shaping both the repertoire of proteins required for osmotrophy and the nature of public goods interactions in which eukaryotic microorganisms engage.

  19. Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju

    the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political......The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating...

  20. The impact of market exposure on public goods provision

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Shami, Mahvish

    Low levels of public goods provision in many developing countries’ rural communities often force the poor to approach someone with considerable command over both financial and social resources to act as their patron. However engaging with the patron – typically a landlord – does not guarantee...... to pressurize their patron to broker public goods for them, by increasing their alternative options through connectivity. In order to empirically test the viability of this solution the paper makes use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan. Using household-level data...... public provision, as inequality and lack of alternative options considerably weakens peasants’ bargaining power, thus enabling the landlord to use peasant’ votes to secure public resources for his own benefit. This paper proposes to increase peasants’ bargaining power, and thus their ability...

  1. What's so Good About a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ahlström, Kristoffer

    2012-01-01

    that the public tends to be largely ignorant on the issues relevant to governance. To make matters worse, social psychological research on how ignorance tends to breed overconfidence gives us reason to believe that the public will not only lack knowledge on the relevant issues, but also wisdom, in the Socratic......—irrespective of what account of wisdom available in the literature we opt for. In fact, it might just be that what the public needs is nothing but the most basic epistemic good: true belief....

  2. Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Offerman, T.J.S.; Schram, A.J.H.C.; Sonnemans, J.H.

    1996-01-01

    An experimental analysis of voluntary, binary contributions for step-level public goods is presented. Independent information is obtained on individual value orientation and expectations about the behavior of other subjects using incentive compatible mechanisms. The effects of increasing payoffs for

  3. Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Sonnemans, J.; Schram, A.; Offermans, T.

    1996-01-01

    An experimental analysis of voluntary, binary contributions for step-level public goods is presented. Independent information is obtained on individual value orientation and expectations about the behavior of other subjects using incentive compatible mechanisms. The effects of increasing payoffs for

  4. Rational bandits: Plunder, public goods, and the Vikings

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

    2003-01-01

    stationary banditry profitable. The most efficient bandits monopolize violence, begin to tax and provide some amounts of public goods in order to stimulate economic growth. The analysis demonstrates how the Vikings' activities and settlements are consistent with such an explanation, with the dynamics...

  5. Negotiating Whose Property It Is, for the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhoades, Gary

    2017-01-01

    This chapter analyzes collective bargaining agreements in 4-year institutions of higher education, examining language surrounding ownership, use, and distribution of the proceeds of intellectual property in distance education, and identifying ways in which the public good can be, and occasionally is, built in to contractual provisions.

  6. The role of noise in the spatial public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Javarone, Marco Alberto; Battiston, Federico

    2016-07-01

    In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial public goods game, one of the most famous games in evolutionary game theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a number of parameters and processes, namely the topology of interactions among the agents, the synergy factor, and the strategy revision phase. The latter is a process that allows agents to change their strategy. Notably, rational agents tend to imitate richer neighbors, in order to increase the probability to maximize their payoff. By implementing a stochastic revision process, it is possible to control the level of noise in the system, so that even irrational updates may occur. In particular, in this work we study the effect of noise on the macroscopic behavior of a finite structured population playing the public goods game. We consider both the case of a homogeneous population, where the noise in the system is controlled by tuning a parameter representing the level of stochasticity in the strategy revision phase, and a heterogeneous population composed of a variable proportion of rational and irrational agents. In both cases numerical investigations show that the public goods game has a very rich behavior which strongly depends on the amount of noise in the system and on the value of the synergy factor. To conclude, our study sheds a new light on the relations between the microscopic dynamics of the public goods game and its macroscopic behavior, strengthening the link between the field of evolutionary game theory and statistical physics.

  7. The impact of market exposure on public goods provision

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Shami, Mahvish

    Low levels of public goods provision in many developing countries’ rural communities often force the poor to approach someone with considerable command over both financial and social resources to act as their patron. However engaging with the patron – typically a landlord – does not guarantee...

  8. A public goods approach to major evolutionary innovations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Erwin, D H

    2015-07-01

    The history of life is marked by a small number of major transitions, whether viewed from a genetic, ecological, or geological perspective. Specialists from various disciplines have focused on the packaging of information to generate new evolutionary individuals, on the expansion of ecological opportunity, or the abiotic drivers of environmental change to which organisms respond as the major drivers of these episodes. But the critical issue for understanding these major evolutionary transitions (METs) lies in the interactions between environmental, ecologic, and genetic change. Here, I propose that public goods may serve as one currency of such interactions: biological products that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Such biological public goods may be involved in either the generation of new evolutionary variation, as with genetic sequences that are easily transferred between different microbial lineages, or in the construction of new ecological niches, as with the progressive oxygenation of the oceans and atmosphere. Attention to public goods emphasizes the processes by which organisms actively construct their own evolutionary opportunities. Such public goods may have facilitated some METs.

  9. Government Service as a Public and Personal Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rimer, Barbara K.

    2016-01-01

    The concerted, strategic efforts of government leaders can create rapid accelerations in knowledge and the application of that knowledge for the public good. Government service can represent part or all of one's career. Working at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) early in my career helped me develop a macro-level understanding of how the…

  10. The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, T B; Rodrigues, A M M; Gardner, A; Buckling, A

    2013-12-01

    Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alleviates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altruistic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolution. Here, we investigate - both experimentally (using bacteria) and theoretically - how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition to recovering the well-known theoretical result that the optimal level of dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high, the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout available patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.

  11. Teaching Public Goods Theory with a Classroom Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pickhardt, Michael

    2005-01-01

    The author extends the work of Holt and Laury (1997) on a simple noncomputerized card game for teaching the essential aspects of public goods theory. He suggests a course of several lectures and discusses the behavior of subjects in various game sessions. Among other things, the results provide experimental evidence with respect to the private…

  12. Gender Beliefs and Cooperation in a Public Goods game Experiment

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    I.P. van Staveren (Irene); E-M. Sent (Esther-Mirjam); J. Vyrastekova (Jana)

    2009-01-01

    textabstractWe study the role of gender beliefs for cooperation in a public goods game experiment. Controlling for risk preferences and for subjects’ unconditional willingness to cooperate, we find that gender beliefs affect behavior in homogenous groups where the group composition was announced.

  13. Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility.

    OpenAIRE

    Eide, Erling

    2002-01-01

    In this paper the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) is substituted for the theory of expected utility (EU) in a model of optimal provision of public goods. The substitution generalizes the Samuelson rule, previously modified to include deadweight loss and tax evasion loss.

  14. Efficacy, Beliefs, and Investment in Step-Level Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, J.; Oude Mulders, J.

    2014-01-01

    behavior in terms of increasing group well-being. We report a decision and game theoretical analysis of efficacy in step-level public goods (SPGs). Previous research shows a positive relation between efficacy and contributions to SPGs and explains this relation by a purely motivational account. We s

  15. Rational bandits: Plunder, public goods, and the Vikings

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

    2003-01-01

    The paper applies and extends insights from Mancur Olson's study of state making to the Vikings. In a world of roving bandits, a sub-optimal provision of public goods exists, most notably of security. Roving banditry leads to over-plundering and zero profits for the plunderers, which makes...

  16. The stigmatization dilemma in public health policy - the case of MRSA in Denmark

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ploug, Thomas; Holm, Søren; Gjerris, Mickey

    2015-01-01

    to stigmatization of groups of citizens. Discussion The article describes the phenomenon of stigmatization within the health care area by discussing the concept in relation to AIDS and psychiatric diagnosis. It unfolds the ethical aspects of using stigmatization as a public health instrument to affect unwanted......-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) within pig production. Summary We argue that using stigmatization as a direct means to achieve public health outcomes is almost always ethically illegitimate. Autonomy and dignity considerations count against it, and the cost-benefit analysis that might by some be taken to outweigh...... these considerations will be fundamentally uncertain. We further argue that interventions where stigmatization is a side-effect need to fulfil requirements of proportionality, and that they may fall prey to ‘the stigmatization dilemma’, i.e. the dilemma that arises when all policy options are potentially stigmatizing...

  17. Negative regulation of bacterial quorum sensing tunes public goods cooperation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gupta, Rashmi; Schuster, Martin

    2013-11-01

    Bacterial quorum sensing (QS) often coordinates the expression of other, generally more costly public goods involved in virulence and nutrient acquisition. In many Proteobacteria, the basic QS circuitry consists of a synthase that produces a diffusible acyl-homoserine lactone and a cognate receptor that activates public goods expression. In some species, the circuitry also contains negative regulators that have the potential to modulate the timing and magnitude of activation. In this study, we experimentally investigated the contribution of this regulatory function to the evolutionary stability of public goods cooperation in the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We compared fitness and public goods expression rates of strains lacking either qteE or qscR, each encoding a distinct negative regulator, with those of the wild-type parent and a signal-blind receptor mutant under defined growth conditions. We found that (1) qteE and qscR mutations behave virtually identically and have a stronger effect on the magnitude than on the timing of expression, (2) high expression in qteE and qscR mutants imposes a metabolic burden under nutrient conditions that advance induction and (3) high expression in qteE and qscR mutants increases population growth when QS is required, but also permits invasion by both wild-type and receptor mutant strains. Our data indicate that negative regulation of QS balances the costs and benefits of public goods by attenuating expression after transition to the induced state. As the cells cannot accurately assess the amount of cooperation needed, such bet-hedging would be advantageous in changing parasitic and nonparasitic environments.

  18. Good Governance in Public Procurement: A South African Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R Roos

    2008-08-01

    Full Text Available In this article good governance in public procurement, with particular reference to accountability is discussed. The principle of providing adequate remedies in public procurement is put under the spotlight. This is done with reference to the decision in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape. In this case the Constitutional Court had to consider whether an initially successful tenderer could lodge a delictual claim for damages to compensate for expenses incurred after conclusion of a contract, which was subsequently rendered void on an application for review of the tender award. The applicable principles of good governance and the applicable provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and the WTO plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement are analysed. This is done to enable an evaluation of the decision by the Constitutional Court in the above case. It is concluded that the South African public procurement system does in this instance comply with the basic principles of good governance with regard to accountability.

  19. Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuan, Wu-Jie; Xia, Cheng-Yi

    2014-01-01

    Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter α. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of α (increment of heterogeneous investment) is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.

  20. Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wu-Jie Yuan

    Full Text Available Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter α. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of α (increment of heterogeneous investment is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.

  1. Promotion of the good life by public health nurses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uosukainen, L M

    2001-01-01

    The question of what is the good life has been discussed by philosophers since antiquity. The good of an individual and of a community is complicated. Communities influence an individual's experiences and world views, which are always individual. Public health nurses promoting the good life need multidisciplinary knowledge, as well as other skills such as personal competence and qualifications. The focus of the theoretical framework of promotion of the good life is based on models of health promotion and sustainable development. Working with different clients requires nursing theories, other theories, and multidisciplinary models in practice. Continual quality improvement is needed in order to increase customer satisfaction. This article discusses a doctoral thesis that consists of three empirical studies. The theoretical framework for promotion of the good life as the work of public health nurses is outlined, and the outcomes of the first study, the qualifications concerning health, and the environment are described. In the other parts of the study, curriculum building using future methodology and evaluation with concept maps is reported.

  2. Public Service Broadcasting as a Public Good: Challenges in the Digital Era

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ivana Andrijašević

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available This article presents a summary of the most important standpoints of the economic debate about public service broadcasting as a public good, and its provision in both the analogue and digital age of broadcasting. Due to frequent technological developments, which heavily influence the broadcasting sector, this debate, initiated in 1958 by American economist Paul A. Samuelson, has continued up to the present day. It also reflects on the concept of PSM as a public good in a globalizing, multi-platform, usergenerated content infused media landscape. Finally, it ponders the future developments of PSM as a public good in the digital era of broadcasting.

  3. Sociality as a natural mechanism of public goods provision.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berkman, Elliot T; Lukinova, Evgeniya; Menshikov, Ivan; Myagkov, Mikhail

    2015-01-01

    In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been offered to explain patterns of human behavior in social environments. In particular, these patterns include 'prosocial' ones, such as fairness, cooperation, and collective good provision. Psychologists suggest that these prosocial behaviors are driven not by miscalculations, but by salience of social identity, in-group favoritism, emotion, or evolutionary adaptations. This paper imports psychology scholarship into an economic model and results in a sustainable solution to collective action problems without any external enforcement mechanisms. This natural mechanism of public goods provision is created, analyzed, and observed in a controlled laboratory environment using experimental techniques.

  4. KNOWLEDGE FROM RESEARCH AS A QUASI-PUBLIC GOOD

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Attila György

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available Knowledge is a special quasi-public good which is delivered by several types of institutions, including public and private universities. Knowledge to be produced in bigger quantities, the state should contribute with budgetary financial support as subsidies or grants to cover a part of expenses. States are supporting research from public resources, especially the basic research which enjoy a smaller interest from the private research units due its small potential to be implemented and recovered throughout price. Public co-founding of research generates problems regarding the regime of patents’ ownership because financing bodies have divergent opinion regarding the utility of research in society’s development. There are different approaches offered in solving this problem, taking into account the forms of realizing this quasi-public good, approaches based especially on different type of joint-ventures. Academic research, perceived as a very important and income generating activity, is done in a very large scale of combinations between universities and private entities. These complicated relations generates information asymmetry specific to principal-agent relations in economy. The control of information asymmetry level is important because a high level corresponds to inefficient use of funds and smaller satisfaction of general needs.

  5. Intergroup information exchange drives cooperation in the public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gracia-Lázaro, C; Gómez-Gardeñes, J; Floría, L M; Moreno, Y

    2014-10-01

    In this paper we explore the onset of cooperative traits in the public goods game. This well-known game involves N-agent interactions and thus reproduces a large number of social scenarios in which cooperation appears to be essential. Many studies have recently addressed how the structure of the interaction patterns influences the emergence of cooperation. Here we study how information about the payoffs collected by each individual in the different groups it participates in influences the decisions made by its group partners. Our results point out that cross-information plays a fundamental and positive role in the evolution of cooperation for different versions of the public goods game and different interaction structures.

  6. Culture and cooperation in a spatial public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stivala, Alex; Kashima, Yoshihisa; Kirley, Michael

    2016-09-01

    We study the coevolution of culture and cooperation by combining the Axelrod model of cultural dissemination with a spatial public goods game, incorporating both noise and social influence. Both participation and cooperation in public goods games are conditional on cultural similarity. We find that a larger "scope of cultural possibilities" in the model leads to the survival of cooperation, when noise is not present, and a higher probability of a multicultural state evolving, for low noise rates. High noise rates, however, lead to both rapid extinction of cooperation and collapse into cultural "anomie," in which stable cultural regions fail to form. These results suggest that cultural diversity can actually be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation, but that cultural information needs to be transmitted accurately in order to maintain both coherent cultural groups and cooperation.

  7. Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games

    CERN Document Server

    Sasaki, Tatsuya

    2014-01-01

    Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process hardly succeeds due to lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied using threshold public good games in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise, it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool to shape human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders to cooperators with a perceived smal...

  8. Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods

    CERN Document Server

    Nax, Heinrich H

    2015-01-01

    We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to ...

  9. Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sasaki, Tatsuya; Uchida, Satoshi

    2014-01-01

    Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems, such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process rarely succeeds, owing to a lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied here using threshold public good games, in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool for shaping human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here, we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders into cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure. PMID:24478200

  10. Solving Optimization Problems by the Spatial Public Goods Game

    CERN Document Server

    Javarone, Marco Alberto

    2016-01-01

    We introduce a method based on the spatial Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e., a problem whose search space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities, then becoming NP-hard. The proposed method considers a population whose agents are provided with a random solution to the given problem. Then, agents interact by playing the Public Goods Game using the fitness of their solution as currency of the game. In doing so, agents with better solutions provide higher contributions, while agents with lower ones tend to imitate the solution of richer agents to increase their fitness. Numerical simulations show that the proposed method allows to compute exact solutions, and suboptimal ones, in the considered search spaces. As result, beyond to propose a new heuristic for combinatorial optimization tasks, our work aims to highlight the potentiality of evolutionary game theory outside its current horizons.

  11. A comment on framing effects in linear public good games

    OpenAIRE

    Cartwright, Edward

    2016-01-01

    A number of recent papers have looked at framing effects in linear public good games. In this comment, I argue that, within this literature, the distinction between give-take and positive–negative framing effects has become blurred, and that this is a barrier towards understanding the experimental evidence on framing effects. To make these points, I first illustrate that frames can differ along both an externality and choice dimension. I then argue that the existing evidence is consistent wit...

  12. Organizing public good provision: Lessons from managerial accounting

    OpenAIRE

    Arruñada, Benito; Hansen, Stephen Eliot

    2014-01-01

    This paper applies ideas and findings from Managerial Accounting to the problem of public good provision. It first links the problems of traditional bureaucracies with those of "discretionary expense centers", which are characterized by poor user and supplier incentives as well as overproduction. It then describes alternative hybrid organizations that delegate authority and provide incentives on some dimensions, while maintaining control on others. Finally, it illustrates the ideas with sever...

  13. Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Brien, Siobhán; Luján, Adela M; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael A; Buckling, Angus

    2017-07-26

    Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin-an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulating an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in. © 2017 The Authors.

  14. Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István

    2016-10-07

    In evolutionary game theory, the effect of public goods like diffusible molecules has been modelled using linear, concave, sigmoid and step functions. The observation that biological systems are often sigmoid input-output functions, as described by the Hill equation, suggests that a sigmoid function is more realistic. The Michaelis-Menten model of enzyme kinetics, however, predicts a concave function, and while mechanistic explanations of sigmoid kinetics exist, we lack an adaptive explanation: what is the evolutionary advantage of a sigmoid benefit function? We analyse public goods games in which the shape of the benefit function can evolve, in order to determine the optimal and evolutionarily stable Hill coefficients. We find that, while the dynamics depends on whether output is controlled at the level of the individual or the population, intermediate or high Hill coefficients often evolve, leading to sigmoid input-output functions that for some parameters are so steep to resemble a step function (an on-off switch). Our results suggest that, even when the shape of the benefit function is unknown, biological public goods should be modelled using a sigmoid or step function rather than a linear or concave function.

  15. Emergence of social cooperation in threshold public goods games with collective risk

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Jing; Fu, Feng; Wu, Te; Wang, Long

    2009-07-01

    In real situations, people are often faced with the option of voluntary contribution to achieve a collective goal, for example, building a dam or a fence, in order to avoid an unfavorable loss. Those who do not donate, however, can free ride on others’ sacrifices. As a result, cooperation is difficult to maintain, leading to an enduring collective-risk social dilemma. To address this issue, here we propose a simple yet effective theoretical model of threshold public goods game with collective risk and focus on the effect of risk on the emergence of social cooperation. To do this, we consider the population dynamics represented by replicator equation for two simplifying scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers, who contribute the minimum average amount versus defectors and the other with altruists contributing more than average versus defectors. For both cases, we find that the dilemma is relieved in high-risk situations where cooperation is likely to persist and dominate defection in the population. Large initial endowment to individuals also encourages the risk-averse action, which means that, as compared to poor players (with small initial endowment), wealthy individuals (with large initial endowment) are more likely to cooperate in order to protect their private accounts. In addition, we show that small donation amount and small threshold (collective target) can encourage and sustain cooperation. Furthermore, for other parameters fixed, the impacts of group size act differently on the two scenarios because of distinct mechanisms: in the former case where the cost of cooperation depends on the group size, large size of group readily results in defection, while easily maintains cooperation in the latter case where the cost of cooperation is fixed irrespective of the group size. Our theoretical results of the replicator dynamics are in excellent agreement with the individual based simulation results.

  16. Dilemmas of balancing organizational and public interests: how environment affects strategy in Dutch main ports

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kolk, A.; van der Veen, M.L.

    2002-01-01

    Corporate social responsibility implies more attention to company relationships with governments and other stakeholders. The need for intensive interaction is most conspicuous when company activities come close to the provision of (former) public goods, which also have strong environmental and

  17. Hygiene and good manufacturing practice in terms of public health

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sibel CEVİZCİ

    2009-04-01

    Full Text Available With globalization, presenting service and product which have good quality and conformity with hygienic regulations, have become more important in health, pharmacy and food sectors. That’s why the quality control and documentation systems which are also considerable in terms of public health, were about to change. Today, lots of companies especially in health sector, prefer “Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP”- including a developed quality-hygiene control and documentation method - that they can easily adapt to their operation system. Food industry is the first application area and contains hygiene and quality management systems. In recent years, conscious of prevention of human health started to reflect on every stages of production of goods and services. In conclusion, GMP came into use in different sectors and demanded in international business trade as a reference. The aim of this review is to present some information about importance and concept of GMP to prevent of public health and to examine its use of areas in various sectors.

  18. Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nax, Heinrich H; Perc, Matjaž

    2015-01-26

    We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.

  19. Optional contributions have positive effects for volunteering public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Song, Qi-Qing; Li, Zhen-Peng; Fu, Chang-He; Wang, Lai-Sheng

    2011-11-01

    Public goods (PG) games with the volunteering mechanism are referred to as volunteering public goods (VPG) games, in which loners are introduced to the PG games, and a loner obtains a constant payoff but not participating the game. Considering that small contributions may have positive effects to encourage more players with bounded rationality to contribute, this paper introduces optional contributions (high value or low value) to these typical VPG games-a cooperator can contribute a high or low payoff to the public pools. With the low contribution, the logit dynamics show that cooperation can be promoted in a well mixed population comparing to the typical VPG games, furthermore, as the multiplication factor is greater than a threshold, the average payoff of the population is also enhanced. In spatial VPG games, we introduce a new adjusting mechanism that is an approximation to best response. Some results in agreement with the prediction of the logit dynamics are found. These simulation results reveal that for VPG games the option of low contributions may be a better method to stimulate the growth of cooperation frequency and the average payoff of the population.

  20. The Supply-Demand Analysis and Mechanism Innovation of Chinese Rural Public Goods

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2011-01-01

    The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers’ demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers’ demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers’ demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.

  1. From Adam Smith to Ronald Reagan: Public Libraries as a Public Good.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Braverman, Miriam

    1982-01-01

    Contrasts the arguments of economists who measure the value of library services to society by business standards with the criteria of "the public good" which predominated during the development of public libraries and argues that libraries must continue to serve the whole community. Twenty references are cited. (RAA)

  2. Analysis of good practice of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Min Xu; Shi-Xue Li

    2015-01-01

    Objective:To study the public health Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)in the US, the European Union, the UK and Australia, and summarize the good practice for the improvement of National Health Emergency Response Command Center in Chinese National Health and Family Planning Commission.Methods:Literature review was conducted to explore the EOCs of selected countries.Results:The study focused on EOC function, organizational structure, human resources and information management. The selected EOCs had the basic EOC functions of coordinating and commanding as well as the public health related functions such as monitoring the situation, risk assessment, and epidemiological briefings. The organizational structures of the EOCs were standardized, scalable and flexible. Incident Command System was the widely applied organizational structure with a strong preference. The EOCs were managed by a unit of emergency management during routine time and surge staff were engaged upon emergencies. The selected EOCs had clear information management framework including information collection, assessment and dissemination.Conclusions:The performance of National Health Emergency Response Command Center can be improved by learning from the good practice of the selected EOCs, including setting clear functions, standardizing the organizational structure, enhancing the human resource capacity and strengthening information management.

  3. Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

    2016-08-01

    Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game. We show that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate. We observe complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.

  4. Biological Invasion Risks and the Public Good: an Economic Perspective

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jason Shogren

    2002-06-01

    Full Text Available We postulate that the causes of the problem of invasive alien species are primarily economic and, as such, require economic solutions. Invasive alien species are of increasing concern for four reasons. First, introductions are increasing sharply, while mechanisms for excluding or eradicating alien species have been either withdrawn or progressively weakened. Both trends are due to the liberalization of and increase in international travel and trade, an economic phenomenon. Second, the costs of invasions are rising rapidly due partly to increasing human population density, and partly to increasing intensity of production in genetically impoverished agricultural systems. Third, biological invasions are associated with a high degree of uncertainty both because they involve novel interactions, and because invasion risks are endogenous. Actual risks depend on how people react to the possibility of invasions. Fourth, the exclusion and control of invasive species is a "weakest-link" public good. This places the well-being of society in the hands of the least effective provider. We argue that an economic solution to the problem of invasive species has two components. One is to use incentives to change human behavior so as to enhance protection against the introduction, establishment, and spread of invasive behavior. The other is to develop institutions that support the weakest members of global society, converting a "weakest-link" to a "best-shot" public good.

  5. The Role of Noise in the Spatial Public Goods Game

    CERN Document Server

    Javarone, Marco Alberto

    2016-01-01

    In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial Public Goods Game, one of the most famous games in Evolutionary Game Theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a number of parameters and processes, namely the topology of interactions among the agents, the synergy factor, and the strategy revision phase. The latter is a process that allows agents to change their strategy. Notably, rational agents tend to imitate richer neighbors, in order to increase the probability to maximize their payoff. By implementing a stochastic revision process, it is possible to control the level of noise in the system, so that even irrational updates may occur. In particular, in this work we study the effect of noise on the macroscopic behavior of a finite structured population playing the Public Goods Game. We consider both the case of a homogeneous population, where the noise in the system is controlled by tuning a parameter representing the level of stochasticity in the strategy revision phase, and a heterog...

  6. Global oscillations in the Optional Public Goods Game under spatial diffusion

    Science.gov (United States)

    Valverde, Pablo A.; da Silva, Roberto; Stock, Eduardo V.

    2017-05-01

    Social dilemmas lead to natural conflict between cooperation and self interests among individuals in large populations. The emergence of cooperation and its maintenance is the key for the understanding of fundamental concepts about the evolution of species. In order to comprehend the mechanisms involved in this framework, here we study the Optional Public Good Games with focus on the effects of diffusive aspects in the emergent patterns of cyclic dominance between the strategies. Differently from other works, we showed that rock-paper-scissors (RPS) patterns occur by introducing a simple kind of random mobility in a lattice sparsely occupied. Such pattern has been revealed to be very important in the conservation of the species in ecological and social environments. The goal of this paper is to show that we do not need more elaborated schemes for construction of the neighbourhood in the game to observe RPS patterns as suggested in the literature. As an interesting additional result, in this contribution we also propose an alternative method to quantify the RPS density in a quantitative context of the game theory which becomes possible to perform a finite size scaling study. Such approach can be very interesting to be applied in other games generically.

  7. Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xiaojie; Szolnoki, Attila

    2016-09-06

    In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we also consider a player's individual wealth when to decide about participation? To address this issue we propose a model in which the probabilistic participation in the public goods game is combined with a conditional investment mode that is based on individual wealth: if a player's wealth exceeds a threshold value then it is qualified and can participate in the joint venture. Otherwise, the participation is forbidden in the investment interactions. We show that if only probabilistic participation is considered, spatially structured populations cannot support cooperation better than well-mixed populations where full defection state can also be avoided for small participation probabilities. By adding the wealth-based criterion of participation, however, structured populations are capable to augment network reciprocity relevantly and allow cooperator strategy to dominate in a broader parameter interval.

  8. Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xiaojie; Szolnoki, Attila

    2016-09-01

    In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we also consider a player’s individual wealth when to decide about participation? To address this issue we propose a model in which the probabilistic participation in the public goods game is combined with a conditional investment mode that is based on individual wealth: if a player’s wealth exceeds a threshold value then it is qualified and can participate in the joint venture. Otherwise, the participation is forbidden in the investment interactions. We show that if only probabilistic participation is considered, spatially structured populations cannot support cooperation better than well-mixed populations where full defection state can also be avoided for small participation probabilities. By adding the wealth-based criterion of participation, however, structured populations are capable to augment network reciprocity relevantly and allow cooperator strategy to dominate in a broader parameter interval.

  9. Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xia, Cheng-Yi; Moreno, Yamir

    2017-01-01

    Public goods games (PGGs) represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution—known as Pareto Law—and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of PGGs that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional PGGs, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the pay-offs naturally emerges but also that if players do not invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators. Our results not only give an explanation for wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also point to a conceptual change on cooperation in collective dilemmas. PMID:28405406

  10. Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meloni, Sandro; Xia, Cheng-Yi; Moreno, Yamir

    2017-03-01

    Public goods games (PGGs) represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution-known as Pareto Law-and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of PGGs that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional PGGs, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the pay-offs naturally emerges but also that if players do not invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators. Our results not only give an explanation for wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also point to a conceptual change on cooperation in collective dilemmas.

  11. Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jürgen Fleiß

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the allocator mechanism differs between two treatments. In the coordinator treatment, the randomly selected allocator can set a uniform contribution for all group members, including herself. In the dictator treatment, the allocator can choose different contributions for herself and all other group members. We find that subjects willingly submit to authority in both treatments, even when competing with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The allocator groups achieve high contribution levels in both treatments.

  12. Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila

    2016-01-01

    Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game. We show that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate. We observe complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results high...

  13. 'The deserving': Moral reasoning and ideological dilemmas in public responses to humanitarian communications.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seu, Irene Bruna

    2016-12-01

    This study investigates everyday moral reasoning in relation to donations and prosocial behaviour in a humanitarian context. The discursive analysis focuses on the principles of deservingness which members of the public use to decide who to help and under what conditions. The study discusses three repertoires of deservingness - 'seeing a difference', 'waiting in queues', and 'something for nothing' - to illustrate participants' dilemmatic reasoning and to examine how the position of 'being deserving' is negotiated in humanitarian crises. Discursive analyses of these dilemmatic repertoires of deservingness identify the cultural and ideological resources behind these constructions and show how humanitarianism intersects and clashes with other ideologies and value systems. The data suggest that a neoliberal ideology, which endorses self-gratification, materialistic and individualistic ethics, and cultural assimilation of helper and receiver play important roles in decisions about humanitarian helping. The study argues for the need for psychological research to engage more actively with the dilemmas involved in the moral reasoning related to humanitarianism and to contextualize decisions about giving and helping within the sociocultural and ideological landscape in which the helper operates.

  14. Cannabis, pesticides and conflicting laws: the dilemma for legalized States and implications for public health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stone, Dave

    2014-08-01

    State laws on the legalization of medical and recreational cannabis are rapidly evolving. Similar to other crops, cannabis is susceptible to multiple pests during cultivation. Growers have an economic incentive to produce large yields and high quality plants, and may resort to pesticides to achieve these outcomes. Currently, there are no pesticides registered for cannabis in the United States, given its illegal status by the federal government. This discrepancy creates a regulatory vacuum and dilemma for States with legal medical and recreational cannabis that seek to balance lawful compliance with pesticides and worker or public health. Pesticide use presents occupational safety issues that can be mitigated through established worker protection measures. The absence of approved products for cannabis may result in consumer exposures to otherwise more hazardous pesticides or higher residue levels. While many legal and scientific hurdles exist to register conventional pesticides for use on cannabis, legalized States have explored other opportunities to leverage the present regulatory infrastructure. Stakeholder engagement and outreach to the cannabis industry from credible sources could mitigate pesticide misuse and harm.

  15. High-performance parallel computing in the classroom using the public goods game as an example

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perc, Matjaž

    2017-07-01

    The use of computers in statistical physics is common because the sheer number of equations that describe the behaviour of an entire system particle by particle often makes it impossible to solve them exactly. Monte Carlo methods form a particularly important class of numerical methods for solving problems in statistical physics. Although these methods are simple in principle, their proper use requires a good command of statistical mechanics, as well as considerable computational resources. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the usage of widely accessible graphics cards on personal computers can elevate the computing power in Monte Carlo simulations by orders of magnitude, thus allowing live classroom demonstration of phenomena that would otherwise be out of reach. As an example, we use the public goods game on a square lattice where two strategies compete for common resources in a social dilemma situation. We show that the second-order phase transition to an absorbing phase in the system belongs to the directed percolation universality class, and we compare the time needed to arrive at this result by means of the main processor and by means of a suitable graphics card. Parallel computing on graphics processing units has been developed actively during the last decade, to the point where today the learning curve for entry is anything but steep for those familiar with programming. The subject is thus ripe for inclusion in graduate and advanced undergraduate curricula, and we hope that this paper will facilitate this process in the realm of physics education. To that end, we provide a documented source code for an easy reproduction of presented results and for further development of Monte Carlo simulations of similar systems.

  16. Study on Problems and Countermeasures of Rural Public Goods Supplying System

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    JIANG Hua

    2006-01-01

    In current China, the main problem existing in the rural public goods supplying system is the unbalanced condition of public goods supply, and the chief reason for which is unitary system of supply main body.Thus the leading countermeasure for corner of public goods supply is to reform the present unitary rural public goods supplying system, to strengthen functional transfer of rural grass-roots directive organization, to adopt diversified mode and provide public goods on the base of overall planning of urban and rural areas and to implement unitary and diversified supplying strategy. In this way, supplying efficiency of the rural public goods will be improved.

  17. Priming Cooperation in Social Dilemma Games

    OpenAIRE

    Drouvelis, Michalis; Metcalfe, Robert; Powdthavee, Nattavudh

    2010-01-01

    Research on public goods mainly focuses its attention on the ability of incentives, beliefs and group structure to affect behaviour in social dilemma interactions. This paper investigates the pure effects of a rather subtle mechanism on social preferences in a one-shot linear public good game. Using priming techniques from social psychology, we activate the concept of cooperation and explore the extent to which this intervention brings about changes in people’s voluntary contributions to the ...

  18. Reconstructing direct and indirect interactions in networked public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Xiao; Shen, Zhesi; Wang, Wen-Xu; Lai, Ying-Cheng; Grebogi, Celso

    2016-07-01

    Network reconstruction is a fundamental problem for understanding many complex systems with unknown interaction structures. In many complex systems, there are indirect interactions between two individuals without immediate connection but with common neighbors. Despite recent advances in network reconstruction, we continue to lack an approach for reconstructing complex networks with indirect interactions. Here we introduce a two-step strategy to resolve the reconstruction problem, where in the first step, we recover both direct and indirect interactions by employing the Lasso to solve a sparse signal reconstruction problem, and in the second step, we use matrix transformation and optimization to distinguish between direct and indirect interactions. The network structure corresponding to direct interactions can be fully uncovered. We exploit the public goods game occurring on complex networks as a paradigm for characterizing indirect interactions and test our reconstruction approach. We find that high reconstruction accuracy can be achieved for both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, and a number of empirical networks in spite of insufficient data measurement contaminated by noise. Although a general framework for reconstructing complex networks with arbitrary types of indirect interactions is yet lacking, our approach opens new routes to separate direct and indirect interactions in a representative complex system.

  19. Reconstructing direct and indirect interactions in networked public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Xiao; Shen, Zhesi; Wang, Wen-Xu; Lai, Ying-Cheng; Grebogi, Celso

    2016-07-22

    Network reconstruction is a fundamental problem for understanding many complex systems with unknown interaction structures. In many complex systems, there are indirect interactions between two individuals without immediate connection but with common neighbors. Despite recent advances in network reconstruction, we continue to lack an approach for reconstructing complex networks with indirect interactions. Here we introduce a two-step strategy to resolve the reconstruction problem, where in the first step, we recover both direct and indirect interactions by employing the Lasso to solve a sparse signal reconstruction problem, and in the second step, we use matrix transformation and optimization to distinguish between direct and indirect interactions. The network structure corresponding to direct interactions can be fully uncovered. We exploit the public goods game occurring on complex networks as a paradigm for characterizing indirect interactions and test our reconstruction approach. We find that high reconstruction accuracy can be achieved for both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, and a number of empirical networks in spite of insufficient data measurement contaminated by noise. Although a general framework for reconstructing complex networks with arbitrary types of indirect interactions is yet lacking, our approach opens new routes to separate direct and indirect interactions in a representative complex system.

  20. Heritability of decisions and outcomes of public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hiraishi, Kai; Shikishima, Chizuru; Yamagata, Shinji; Ando, Juko

    2015-01-01

    Prosociality is one of the most distinctive features of human beings but there are individual differences in cooperative behavior. Employing the twin method, we examined the heritability of cooperativeness and its outcomes on public goods games using a strategy method. In two experiments (Study 1 and Study 2), twin participants were asked to indicate (1) how much they would contribute to a group when they did not know how much the other group members were contributing, and (2) how much they would contribute if they knew the contributions of others. Overall, the heritability estimates were relatively small for each type of decision, but heritability was greater when participants knew that the others had made larger contributions. Using registered decisions in Study 2, we conducted seven Monte Carlo simulations to examine genetic and environmental influences on the expected game payoffs. For the simulated one-shot game, the heritability estimates were small, comparable to those of game decisions. For the simulated iterated games, we found that the genetic influences first decreased, then increased as the numbers of iterations grew. The implication for the evolution of individual differences in prosociality is discussed.

  1. Heritability of decisions and outcomes of public goods games

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kai eHiraishi

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available Prosociality is one of the most distinctive features of human beings but there are individual differences in cooperative behavior. Employing the twin method, we examined the heritability of cooperativeness and its outcomes on public goods games using a strategy method. In two experiments (Study 1 and Study 2, twin participants were asked to indicate 1 how much they would contribute to a group when they did not know how much the other group members were contributing, and 2 how much they would contribute if they knew the contributions of others. Overall, the heritability estimates were relatively small for each type of decision, but heritability was greater when participants knew that the others had made larger contributions. Using registered decisions in Study 2, we conducted five Monte Carlo simulations to examine genetic and environmental influences on the expected game payoffs. For the simulated one-shot game, the heritability estimates were small, comparable to those of game decisions. For the simulated iterated games, we found that the genetic influences first decreased, then increased as the numbers of iterations grew. The implication for the evolution of individual differences in prosociality is discussed.

  2. Tolerance-based punishment in continuous public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gao, Jia; Li, Zhi; Cong, Rui; Wang, Long

    2012-08-01

    Altruistic punishment for defectors is considered as a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. However, there is no clear border between the cooperative and defective behaviors in a continuous strategy game. We propose a model to study the effect of punishment on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods game, wherein individuals have the traits to punish the co-players based on social tolerance. We show that a reasonable punishment with a uniform tolerance can spur individuals to make more investments. Additionally, for a fixed punishment cost and a fixed fine, a moderate value of tolerance can result in the best promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of investment and tolerance. We find that the population splits into two branches: high-tolerance individuals who make high investments and low-tolerance individuals who make low investments. A dynamic equilibrium is achieved between these two types of individuals. Our work extends punishment to continuous cooperative behaviors and the results may enhance the understanding of altruistic punishment in the evolution of human cooperation.

  3. Male Mating Signaling in Social Dilemma Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Niels Holm

    2013-01-01

    being observed by an attractive woman engage in competitive economic altruism in three social dilemma games — the Dictator Game, Trust Game (2nd mover), and Public Goods Game — in comparison to men being observed by a non-attractive woman. Results showed that altruistic contributions in the games were...

  4. ENGINEER IN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHING: DILEMMAS, CONTRADICTIONS AND CHALLENGES OF A PROFESSIONAL BEGINNER

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Raimunda Maria da Cunha Ribeiro

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available The main question underlying this research concerns the role of the pedagogical coordinator, especially the beginner coordinator this function as well as its dilemmas and challenges. It aims at understanding the function of the pedagogical coordinator and their respective roles, identify the main dilemmas and challenges from beginner coordinator and recognize through their perceptions trademarks of their work in relation to the objective and subjective aspects. The methodology was qualitative and the data collection instrument were the daily class, following the guidelines of Zabalza. To address the role of dilemmas, the coordinator must overcome challenges as enhance their own training, establish harmonious relations, respect and professionalism, build a reasoned collective work discussion of ideas to change the school culture without imposing, but by necessity.

  5. Public Good and the Nexus of Social Justice, Feminism, and Rock "n" Roll

    Science.gov (United States)

    DePrince, Anne P.

    2009-01-01

    This essay was developed from a talk delivered during the Public Good Conference at the University of Denver (October 2008). The theme of the conference was "Making Public Good Work." Conference speakers were asked to address questions about how we make public good work in both teaching and research. In particular, what inspires us to do this…

  6. Put your money where your mouth is : Reciprocity, social preferences, trust and contributions to public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dijkstra, Jacob

    2013-01-01

    It is argued that trust and positive social preferences promote public goods production. However, public goods produced by any in-group may have favourable or unfavourable consequences for out-groups (called benign' and malignant' public goods, respectively). I develop a theoretical model of heterog

  7. How Can ABER Serve the Public Good? A Critical Brechtian Perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blumenfeld-Jones, Donald

    2014-01-01

    In this special issue, each author addresses how ABER work connects with and/or directly addresses society's need/s and the public good as perceived by the researcher. As there are many construals of the "public good" and the relation to art-making and the arts to this "public good," each author will conceptualize her/his…

  8. Doing Arts-Based Educational Research for the Public Good: An Impossible Possibility?

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Donoghue, Donal

    2014-01-01

    In this special issue, each author addresses how arts-based educational research (ABER) work connects with and/or directly addresses society's need/s and the public good as perceived by the researcher. As there are many construals of the "public good" and the relation to art-making and the arts to this "public good," each…

  9. Characteristics utilization of public space in Padang City based on good public space index

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eriawan, T.

    2017-06-01

    Padang is a metropolitan city which has 40 units of open space like plansum park, playground, and sports park with 10,88 hectar of total area. These open spaces are publics’, but not all of them are able to use as active public open spaces it caused by some of the parks are dormant parks beacuse they only for planted ground not for public activites.This study conducted to assess the quality of public space that exsist in Padang; Imam Bonjol park (representing of city open space (go-green)), H. Agus Salim sport center ( representing of sports park) and Pantai Muaro Padang area (representing of recreation/tourism).The method of this research conducted in several stages, first was the identification toward space’s function (Carmona,2008) and assess the space utilization index based approach to public space index (Metha,2007). The spaced quality is measured based on variable in Good Public Space Index which is the intensity of use, social activities, duration of activities, variation and pattern of use. The urgency of this research related to the effort to evaluate the policy of space arrangement and space control through the assessment of the use of existed spaces, until it can be references to Padang goverment in improving and increasing the quality of space thorugh development of spaces that have high quality.The assesment of quality of public open spaces in Padang conducted by assessed five space quality variables, result of analysis, utilization of public space was 0.69. based on the result it can be concluded the quality of public space in some parks in Padang has moderate index quality. This is caused by the time differentiation of the society, there is no interaction among society, and short time duration of the society in visiting the public space.

  10. LOCAL RURAL DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL INACTION AND THE TRAGEDY OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Carmelo CANNARELLA

    2008-07-01

    Full Text Available Empirical observation can confirm that not all rural communities enjoy an optimal level of local public goods: some public goods are provided more often and in a better quality than others. Given the vital importance of public goods for the welfare of local communities (among which the management of the local natural resource base for sustainable development plays a relevant role, the relation between existing local political institutions and their competences represents a critical issue for the concrete possibilities to properly produce, manage and provide local public goods. A better understanding of the nature of local public goods may increase the awareness of interdependence between local economic, environmental and social development not only in order to stop their continuing eroding but also to increase the possibility to produce local public goods and to design the institutional setting to overcome generic problems of public goods provision.

  11. What Colleges Must Do to Keep the Public's Good Will

    Science.gov (United States)

    Callan, Patrick; Immerwahr, John

    2008-01-01

    Colleges have lived a charmed life. According to the public-opinion studies that the authors have conducted over the past 15 years, many fields--athletics, accounting, politics--have lost the public's trust, but higher education continues to receive praise for its accomplishments, while criticisms usually fail to stick. The honeymoon may be slowly…

  12. Good Governance in Public Procurement: A South African Case Study

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad ... for damages to compensate for expenses incurred after conclusion of a contract, ... The applicable principles of good governance and the applicable provisions ...

  13. Professionals and Public-Good Capabilities Melanie Walker1 and ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    combined the theoretical resources of the capabilities approach with empirical data and ... including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction ... events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. ...... This publication is covered by a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 ...

  14. Changing Public Perception in Wisconsin: Manufacturing a "Good Life"

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jorgensen, Haley

    2006-01-01

    Careers in manufacturing are high-wage and high-tech. Yet, a future workforce shortage may be on the horizon. It appears a negative public perception--one that brings to mind low wages, assembly-line work and lay-offs--is thwarting young adults from pursuing manufacturing careers across the country. This article describes how the Wisconsin…

  15. The Grail of Goodness: The Effective Public Library.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Childers, Thomas; Van House, Nancy A.

    1989-01-01

    Describes a national survey aimed at defining effectiveness for public libraries that asked 7 constituent groups (library managers, staff, trustees, users, friends of the library, local officials, and community leaders) to rate the importance of 61 effectiveness indicators. The complex and multidimensional nature of the results is discussed and…

  16. Introduction The 'Missing' Concept: What is the 'Public Sphere' Good ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    chifaou.amzat

    2012-03-06

    Mar 6, 2012 ... discourse and practice in the 1980s, following the collapse of the nationalist ... concept of civil society, and not that of public sphere. Implicit in the neo- .... improve current economic and political policy making processes in Africa. .... sphere may be useful, indeed important, in the analysis of African history,.

  17. Tourism as a Public Good – Local Government Perspective

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Katarzyna Kopczewska

    2009-12-01

    Full Text Available Development of tourism should be based on common participation of local governments, enterprises and communities. Strong impulse for building and enlargement of infrastructure and tourism service was given by European funds, for which local governments and firms can apply. This support should be analyzed two-fold: subjective „who” and geographical „where” funds were used and what is their potential. The article presents spatial analysis of tourism development in Poland from the perspective of public sector.

  18. Diagnostic Dilemma: Lymphocytopenia in a Patient with Thymoma - Side Effect due to Irradiation Treatment or Development of Good's Syndrome?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Raaschou-Jensen, Klas; Katzenstein, Terese L; Marquart, Hanne

    2010-01-01

    A case of persistent B-cell lymphocytopenia in a 40-year-old woman with lymphoid-epithelial thymoma treated with chemotherapy, surgery and irradiation is described. The possible diagnosis of Good's syndrome (hypogammaglobulinaemia and thymoma) is discussed....

  19. Crime and punishment: is "justice" good public policy?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Curtis, George C; Nygaard, Richard L

    2008-01-01

    Dysfunctional features of American penology are mitigated somewhat by the application (though uneven) of modern science. Unfortunately, these advances do not address major flaws in the ideas on which the system is erected. These include retribution, proportional punishment, and all-or-none notions of criminal responsibility. We propose abandoning retribution for its own sake; making punishment proportional to its effectiveness for behavior change rather than to the indignation evoked by the offense; and incorporating punishment into sentences based on the clinical and behavioral characteristics of the offender, including containment as necessary for public safety. Every offender would be held responsible, but the meaning and consequences thereof would change. The proposed changes could only occur incrementally. New systems of oversight and accountability would be required. Legislative bodies could provide guidelines, and courts could oversee, but neither could micromanage. Few are better qualified to work toward these goals than readers of this journal.

  20. Analysis of Public Goods Supply of New Generation Migrant Workers’ Urban and Rural Double Marginalization

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2010-01-01

    Status quo of urban and rural public goods supply in China is analyzed.Firstly,public goods supply in rural areas is inadequate,for example,inadequate supply of agricultural infrastructure,lack of expenditure in agricultural science and technology,problems of rural drinking water safety,problems of rural roads and transportation,low levels of health care,weak rural public culture,short supply of farmers’ education.Secondly,the system and level of urban public goods provision can’t meet migrant workers’ demand,for example,less migrant workers are employed by the governments’ direction;migrant workers are isolated by urban housing project and these workers have difficulty in receiving city social security.One reason of new generation migrant workers facing the double marginalization of rural and urban crisis is that urban and rural public goods supply are different in particular the inadequate supply of public goods in rural areas.Three countermeasures are put forward in order to relieve new generation migrant workers’ double marginalization of urban and rural,which include increasing financial input in rural areas in order to achieve equalization of urban and rural public goods,perfecting the preferential agricultural policy to increase rural public goods supply,making urban public goods supply as a guide to promote the new generation migrant workers into the city.

  1. Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweitzer's Open Club Model Semi-Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ten Raa, T.; Gilles, R.P.

    2003-01-01

    Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy.An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer s concept of club e ciency under a variable number of economic agents.We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature.We

  2. The evolution of altruism in spatial threshold public goods games via an insurance mechanism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

    2015-01-01

    The persistence of cooperation in public goods situations has become an important puzzle for researchers. This paper considers the threshold public goods games where the option of insurance is provided for players from the standpoint of diversification of risk, envisaging the possibility of multiple

  3. A Critical Exploration of Changing Definitions of Public Good in Relation to Higher Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, Joanna

    2016-01-01

    Discussion of the relationship between higher education (HE) and public good can be traced to Kant's argument that universities critically held society to account. Mill, Newman and Arnold suggested knowledge itself was a public good. In the twentieth century, economists argued education could drive national technological progress. More recently…

  4. Student Learning in Guatemala: An Untenured Faculty Perspective on International Service Learning and Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Matthew J.

    2009-01-01

    In this article I explain how I combined service learning, public-good work, and research in Guatemala. This path has not been easy. Indeed, it has been risky because the time invested in public-good work and teaching field classes could have detracted from research productivity. Taking a risk under the current and traditional academic model at…

  5. Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweitzer's Open Club Model Semi-Public Goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ten Raa, T.; Gilles, R.P.

    2003-01-01

    Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy.An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer s concept of club e ciency under a variable number of economic agents.We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature.We

  6. Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; van der Heijden, Eline

    2007-01-01

    We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so…

  7. A Critical Exploration of Changing Definitions of Public Good in Relation to Higher Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, Joanna

    2016-01-01

    Discussion of the relationship between higher education (HE) and public good can be traced to Kant's argument that universities critically held society to account. Mill, Newman and Arnold suggested knowledge itself was a public good. In the twentieth century, economists argued education could drive national technological progress. More recently…

  8. Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Heterogeneity and Incomplete Information

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levati, M. Vittoria; Sutter, Matthias; van der Heijden, Eline

    2007-01-01

    We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so…

  9. Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the Contribution Function Approach

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brandts, J.; Schram, A.

    2001-01-01

    We introduce a new design for experiments with the voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods. Subjects report a complete con-tri-bution function in each period, i.e., a contribution level for various marginal rates of transformation between a public and a private good. The results show that

  10. Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Chu, Tianguang; Weissing, Franz J.

    2013-01-01

    In a public goods game, cooperation can be a stable outcome if defectors are facing efficient punishment. In some public goods systems, punishment is undermined by an insurance system where speculators buy a policy that sequentially covers all punishment costs. Here, we study a simple model to inves

  11. Resource supply and the evolution of public-goods cooperation in bacteria

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Racey Dan

    2008-05-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Explaining public-goods cooperation is a challenge for evolutionary biology. However, cooperation is expected to more readily evolve if it imposes a smaller cost. Such costs of cooperation are expected to decline with increasing resource supply, an ecological parameter that varies widely in nature. We experimentally tested the effect of resource supply on the evolution of cooperation using two well-studied bacterial public-good traits: biofilm formation by Pseudomonas fluorescens and siderophore production by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Results The frequency of cooperative bacteria increased with resource supply in the context of both bacterial public-good traits. In both cases this was due to decreasing costs of investment into public-goods cooperation with increasing resource supply. Conclusion Our empirical tests with bacteria suggest that public-goods cooperation is likely to increase with increasing resource supply due to reduced costs of cooperation, confirming that resource supply is an important factor in the evolution of cooperation.

  12. Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis

    OpenAIRE

    Besley, Timothy J.; Coate, Stephen

    2000-01-01

    This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. The point of departure is to model a centralized system as one in which public spending is financed by general taxation, but districts can receive different levels of local public goods. In a world of benevolent governments, the disadvantages of centralization stressed in the existing literature disappear, suggesting that the case for decentralization must be driven by politic...

  13. The macroeconomic analysis of public goods and their influence in the region of Czech Republic

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Richard POSPÍŠIL

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available In the region of Czech Republic, the provision of public goods is one of the State’s most important activities with society-wide impacts. Therefore, the debate on the structure and scope of public budgets is legitimate and ongoing on a society-wide scale. Mainstream fiscal theory considers public goods to be one of the failures of market equilibrium, classifying them as being close to positive externalities. In this case, the activity of the State brings benefits to other entities that are not involved in this activity and do not even directly pay for it. The main characteristics of these goods include irreducibility of their amount in society, non-excludability and non-rivalry. There are a number of goods between purely private and purely public goods which, to varying extents, exhibit both elements. Today, the majority of goods provided by the public sector are of such a nature; as a result, the form of allocation and the subsequent redistribution of resources are crucial when analysing public goods. The present paper analyses public goods in the Czech Republic from an economic and legal perspective using Cost-Benefit Analysis, including their efficiency and society-wide benefits.

  14. 77 FR 33019 - International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-04

    ... Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested persons that PHMSA will conduct a public meeting in preparation for the 41st session of the United...

  15. 77 FR 69927 - International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-21

    ... Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested persons that PHMSA will conduct a public meeting in preparation for the 42nd session of the United...

  16. 75 FR 63534 - International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-15

    ... Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested persons that PHMSA will conduct a public meeting in preparation for the 38th session of the United...

  17. 76 FR 25774 - International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-05

    ... Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested persons that PHMSA will conduct a public meeting in preparation for the 39th session of the United...

  18. 75 FR 19671 - International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-15

    ... Administration International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested persons that PHMSA will conduct a public meeting...

  19. 76 FR 68829 - International Standards on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-07

    ... Dangerous Goods; Public Meeting AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Notice of public meeting. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested persons that PHMSA will conduct a public meeting in preparation for the 40th session of the United...

  20. A Case Study of Institutional Visioning, Public Good, and the Renewal of Democracy: The Theory and Practice of Public Good Work at the University of Denver

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fretz, Eric; Cutforth, Nick; Nicotera, Nicole; Thompson, Sheila Summers

    2009-01-01

    In 2001, the University of Denver included language in its vision statement that committed the institution to becoming "a great private university dedicated to the public good." This essay (1) explains how the development of an institutional visioning statement led to the implementation of a series of campus dialogues and action steps…

  1. Incentive Mechanism Design for Public Goods Provision: Price Cap Regulation and Optimal Regulation

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    ZHENG Jun-jun; YIN Hong; WANG Xian-jia

    2005-01-01

    This paper studies the mechanism design that induces firms to provide public goods under two regulatory means: price cap regulation and optimal regulation, respectively. We first outline two models of monopoly regulation with unobservable marginal costs and effort, which can be regard as an optimal problem with dual restrictions. By solving this problem, we get the two optimal regulatory mechanisms to induce the provision of public goods. Further, by comparative statics, the conclusion is drawn that the welfare loss associated with price cap regulation, with respective to optimal regulation, increases more with increase of the expense of public goods.

  2. Can Teaching Social Dilemmas Make People More Prosocial? An Experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martins, Julia; Fortmüller, Richard; Powell, Owen

    2017-01-01

    Economics and business students regularly behave less prosocially than others. Can ethics training reverse this tendency? Results from a repeated public goods experiment reveal that it can. Students who attend an interactive lecture on social dilemmas show significantly more cooperation than others. However, the lecture does not appear to increase…

  3. Can Teaching Social Dilemmas Make People More Prosocial? An Experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martins, Julia; Fortmüller, Richard; Powell, Owen

    2017-01-01

    Economics and business students regularly behave less prosocially than others. Can ethics training reverse this tendency? Results from a repeated public goods experiment reveal that it can. Students who attend an interactive lecture on social dilemmas show significantly more cooperation than others. However, the lecture does not appear to increase…

  4. Good governance and public contracts. A comparative perspective on the balance between public and private law in Rwanda

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zigirinshuti, F.

    2013-01-01

    The central focus of this study is an analysis of the law of public contracts in Rwanda with a view to placing it within the normative framework of legality supplied by the principles of good governance. From a comparative examination of the public contracts law in countries of divergence (Rwanda, F

  5. PPP as a modern concept for providing public goods and services and its application in Serbia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Drljača-Kanazir Svetlana

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Public-private partnership (hereinafter: PPP is an unconventional and modern pattern used to finance the construction and exploitation of public goods, which introduces the market based principles of operation in the public sector in the leading word economies as a result of market deregulation and liberalization. The purpose of this paper is to present the basic PPP characteristics, models of funding, and to highlight that this concept of financing the public goods and services is not sufficiently used in Serbia despite the fact that the necessary legal framework and educated staff in the public private and financial sectors, and active promotion of the concept as such are in place. This paper is intended to point that PPP is the only sustainable model of public infrastructure development (roads, tunnels, bridges, power generation plants, etc. in Serbia which is struggling with the significant budget deficit, huge public debt, high unemployment rate and a stagnating economy.

  6. The Theoretical Foundation and its Mode Transformation of Rural Public Goods Supply in the Perspective of Organizational Competition

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2011-01-01

    Theoretical expositions of public goods supply by the liberalism,new institutionalism and the school of public choice are conducted in the perspective of organizational competition.And the theoretical foundation of rural public goods is put forward.Then,the changes of the supply mode of rural public goods are discussed before and after the tax reform,that is,the "Community Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods before the tax reform and the "Organization Cooperation" supply mode of rural public goods after the tax reform.Finally,the diversification of rural public goods supply in China in future is forecasted.

  7. Book Review: Regulating Private Tutoring for Public Good: Policy Options for Supplementary Education in Asia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    T. Marimuthu

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available Book Review Regulating Private Tutoring for Public Good: Policy Options for Supplementary Education in Asia By Mark Bray and Ora Kwo (2014, 93pp. ISBN: 978-988-17852-9-9, Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre.

  8. Devolution and grant-in-aid design for the provision of impure public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levaggi, Laura; Levaggi, Rosella

    2016-01-01

    Traditional fiscal federalism theory postulates that devolution for the provision of local public goods increases welfare. However, most of the services offered at local level are local impure public goods whose characteristics may prevent devolution from being efficient. Our paper shows that devolution is the optimal choice only for local impure public goods. For an environment characterised by coordination and asymmetry of information problems, we propose the optimal grants-in-aid formula that Central Government should use to reduce welfare losses and we compare it with what suggested by the mainstream literature. Finally, we show under which conditions devolution should be preferred to a centralised solution. From a policy point of view, our paper may explain the heterogeneity in the choices made by countries in terms of devolution in the provision of merit and impure public goods.

  9. Stimulating Contributions to Public Goods through Information Feedback: Some Experimental Results.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Janssen, Marco A; Lee, Allen; Sundaram, Hari

    2016-01-01

    In traditional public good experiments participants receive an endowment from the experimenter that can be invested in a public good or kept in a private account. In this paper we present an experimental environment where participants can invest time during five days to contribute to a public good. Participants can make contributions to a linear public good by logging into a web application and performing virtual actions. We compared four treatments, with different group sizes and information of (relative) performance of other groups. We find that information feedback about performance of other groups has a small positive effect if we control for various attributes of the groups. Moreover, we find a significant effect of the contributions of others in the group in the previous day on the number of points earned in the current day. Our results confirm that people participate more when participants in their group participate more, and are influenced by information about the relative performance of other groups.

  10. Public Goods, Environmental Protection,and the Development Paradigm in Rural China

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LiZhou

    2004-01-01

    Ecological environment protection will and should not stop as regional public goods;instead, it has been gradually regarded as global public goods. That is why the responsibility of environment protection belongs to public institutions: government organizations (GO) and non-government organizations (NGO). The ecological environment protection problems in China's rural areas stem from the absence of government responsibilities with regard to consensuses on issues of rural public goods that are basically sourced from two superstitions on the government's development paradigm: one is attaching too much importance on economic growth; the other is relying entirely on market resource-allocation capacity. These two superstitions of China "s government obviously lead to the shortage of public goods in rural areas. It is necessary that GO's and NGO's clearly define their specific responsibilities, reflect on the development paradigm; establish a more scientific development model and take concrete actions based on it.

  11. Ethics Instruction for Future Geoscientists: Essential for Contributions to Good Public Policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leinen, M.; Mogk, D. W.

    2016-12-01

    Geoscientists work in a world of uncertainty in the complex, dynamic, and chaotic Earth system that is fraught with opportunities to become involved in ethical dilemmas. To be effective contributors to the public discourse on Earth science policy, geoscientists must conduct their work according to the highest personal and professional ethical standards. The geosciences as a discipline relies on the fidelity of geoscience data and their interpretations, geoscience concepts and methodologies must be conveyed to policy makers in ways that allow them to make informed decisions, corporations require a workforce that conducts their affairs according to the highest standards, and the general public expects the highest standards of conduct of geoscientists as they underwrite much of the research supported through tax dollars and the applications of this research impacts personal and societal lives. Geoscientists must have the foundations to identify ethical dilemmas in the first instance, and to have the ethical decision-making skills to either prevent, mitigate or otherwise address ethical issues that arise in professional practice. Awareness of ethical issues arises in many dimensions: Ethics and self (engaging self-monitoring and self-regulating behaviors); Ethics and profession (working according to professional standards); Ethics and society (communicating effectively to policy makers and the general public about the underlying science that informs public policy); and, Ethics and Earth (recognizing the unique responsibilities of geoscientists in the stewardship of Earth). To meet these ethical challenges, training of future geoscientists must be done a) at the introductory level as all students should be aware of ethical implications of geoscience concepts as they impact societal issues; undergraduate geoscience majors need to be explicitly trained in the standards and norms of the geoscience community of practice; graduate students need to be fully prepared to deal

  12. Evaluation on the Efficiency and Fairness of Coordinating Public Goods Supply in Urban and Rural Areas

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Shan; YU; Zhongmin; DING

    2015-01-01

    By setting the urban-rural public goods supply model,this paper evaluates the effects of coordinating supply public goods on resource allocation and welfare from efficiency and fairness,and examines the necessity and possibility of coordinating public goods supply in urban and rural areas. The model assumes that the population size of urban and rural areas is different,and the population can not flow freely between urban and rural areas; there are different degrees of spillover in the public goods supply. Model results show that coordinating public goods supply in urban and rural areas is the result of optimizing resource allocation efficiency,but the residents’ individual utility level will not necessarily improve,so residents’ willingness to support coordinated urban-rural supply is different,and public goods spillover and different tax systems are the factors that affect the residents’ utility level. Finally,this paper uses the practice of coordinating urban and rural compulsory education in Chengdu City to confirm the above conclusions.

  13. Evolution of staying together in the context of diffusible public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Olejarz, Jason W; Nowak, Martin A

    2014-11-07

    We study the coevolution of staying together and cooperation. Staying together means that replicating units do not separate after reproduction, but remain in proximity. For example, following cell division the two daughter cells may not fully separate but stay attached to each other. Repeated cell division thereby can lead to a simple multi-cellular complex. We assume that cooperators generate a diffusible public good, which can be absorbed by any cell in the system. The production of the public good entails a cost, while the absorption leads to a benefit. Defectors produce no public good. Defectors have a selective advantage unless a mechanism for evolution of cooperation is at work. Here we explore the idea that the public good produced by a cooperating cell is absorbed by cells of the same complex with a probability that depends on the size of the complex. Larger complexes are better at absorbing the public goods produced by their own individuals. We derive analytical conditions for the evolution of staying together, thereby studying the coevolution of clustering and cooperation. If cooperators and defectors differ in their intrinsic efficiency to absorb the public good, then we find multiple stable equilibria and the possibility for coexistence between cooperators and defectors. Finally we study the implications of disadvantages that might arise if complexes become too large.

  14. Green marketing, renewables, and free riders: increasing customer demand for a public good

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiser, R.; Pickle, S.

    1997-09-01

    Retail electricity competition will allow customers to select their own power suppliers and some customers will make purchase decisions based, in part, on their concern for the environment. Green power marketing targets these customers under the assumption that they will pay a premium for ``green`` energy products such as renewable power generation. But renewable energy is not a traditional product because it supplies public goods; for example, a customer supporting renewable energy is unable to capture the environmental benefits that their investment provides to non-participating customers. As with all public goods, there is a risk that few customers will purchase ``green`` power and that many will instead ``free ride`` on others` participation. By free riding, an individual is able to enjoy the benefits of the public good while avoiding payment. This report reviews current green power marketing activities in the electric industry, introduces the extensive academic literature on public goods, free riders, and collective action problems, and explores in detail the implications of this literature for the green marketing of renewable energy. Specifically, the authors highlight the implications of the public goods literature for green power product design and marketing communications strategies. They emphasize four mechanisms that marketers can use to increase customer demand for renewable energy. Though the public goods literature can also contribute insights into the potential rationale for renewable energy policies, they leave most of these implications for future work (see Appendix A for a possible research agenda).

  15. The Rural Elite and the Supply of Public Goods in Rural Areas

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LAN Xu-peng

    2012-01-01

    Based on the theory of collective action and social capital theory,social capital is introduced into the game analysis of the supply of public goods between the rural elite and ordinary villagers.I establish the income model of public goods utility concerning the rural elite and ordinary villagers;research the incentive of social capital for the rural elite and villagers,and impact of social capital on the rural elite and villagers.Three inferences can be drawn from the model:the precondition for the elite to prompt the collective cooperation is having " good reputation" ;" good reputation" of the elite in the supply of public goods can abate farmers’ motive of " free rider" ;the role of the elite in organizing the supply of public goods can save the transaction costs in the process of collective action.Taking the case of Shunhe Village,Panyu District,Guangzhou City,I explain this model.Finally,some policy recommendations are put forth as follows:rebuilding the community credit;giving full play to the role of the rural elite in the supply of public goods in rural areas.

  16. Seller's liability for conformity of the goods with public law standards: Frozen pork case

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fišer-Šobot Sandra

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available When the goods are exported from one country to another an important question arises - do the goods have to comply with the public law requirements of the seller's country, buyer's country or even with the rules in effect in some third country. The question is of high importance because the public law requirements, including standards established by environmental law, can have decisive impact on the possibility to use the goods. In order to avoid potential disputes parties should explicitly or implicitly stipulate the qualities of the goods and applicable public law standards. In case law, there are no uniform standards for determination and application of criteria for assessment whether the goods are in conformity with public law requirements. The best solution is to follow the rules established in Mussels case and to consider every case separately. Finally, according to our opinion, fitness for the purpose for which the goods would ordinarily be used does not imply the obligation of the seller to deliver the goods conforming to the public law standards of the import country, unless he knew or ought to have known of such standards. On the other hand, legal standards in effect in buyer's place or in the place of destination will be relevant when requirements for application of the Art. 35(2(b are fulfilled i.e. when particular purpose was expressly or impliedly made known to the seller and when the buyer relied on the seller's skill and judgment.

  17. Education as a Global Public Good: The Applicability and Implications of a Framework

    Science.gov (United States)

    Menashy, Francine

    2009-01-01

    This paper addresses a growing literature on global public goods theory, in particular the use of this framework to promote the equitable provision of goods and social services, such as basic education, on an international scale. Due to a lack of research into this theory's applicability to education, the author aims to discern how such a…

  18. Governance Frameworks for International Public Goods: The Case of Concerted Entrepreneurship

    Science.gov (United States)

    Andersson, Thomas; Formica, Piero

    2007-01-01

    In the "participation age", emerging cross-border, transnational communities driven by innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives--in short, international entrepreneurial communities--give impetus to the rise of international public goods. With varying intensity, a non-voting international mobile public--still a small but an increasing fraction…

  19. Orienting to the Public Good: Developing a Moral Self in the Middle Grades

    Science.gov (United States)

    Power, Ann Marie R.; Roney, Kathleen; Power, F. Clark

    2008-01-01

    This study takes up the challenge of middle level researchers to investigate the extent to which schools prepare young adolescents to commit themselves to serve the public interest. One way of assessing the orientation of children and adolescents to the public good is through their emerging self-understanding. This study analyzes middle school…

  20. When the Majority Rules: Ballot Initiatives, Race-Conscious Education Policy, and the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Moses, Michele S.; Saenz, Lauren P.

    2012-01-01

    This chapter examines the following central question: How do direct democratic ballot initiatives affect the public good? A second, related question is this: When voters collectively make policy decisions, what responsibilities do researchers have to contribute to informing public deliberation about the relevant issues? In an attempt to answer…

  1. Influencing public policies: Two (very good) reasons to look toward scientific knowledge in public policy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gagnon, François; Bellefleur, Olivier

    2014-07-11

    The healthy public policy movement rests on the belief that a range of public policies should be at least partly informed by evidence demonstrating the positive effects of these policies on population health, health inequalities and their determinants. In order to address certain difficulties that the movement faces, knowledge produced in various scientific disciplines regarding public policies may provide some valuable guidance. In this short commentary, we examine how knowledge from the scientific disciplines investigating public policies makes it possible to address two difficulties in the development of healthy public policies: 1) adequately anticipating the effects of public policies, and 2) assessing the political viability of the policies being promoted. Since urban traffic policies are of interest to most of the other contributors to this supplement, we use examples from this field to illustrate some of our points.

  2. Self-Interest and Scholarly Publication: The Dilemma of Researchers, Reviewers, and Editors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Calabrese, Raymond L.; Roberts, Brian

    2004-01-01

    Academic misconduct in research is of growing concern to funding agencies, scholars, and academic journal editors. Scholarly publication has ethical implications researchers, reviewers, and journal editors. The theoretical background of the ethics of scholarly publication is explored as well as the use of a case study of an untenured researcher…

  3. Organic farming and the prospects for stimulating public goods under the CAP 2014-2020

    OpenAIRE

    Stolze, Matthias; Sanders, Jürn; Kasperczyk, Nadja; Madsen, Gudula

    2016-01-01

    The 2013 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 2014–2020 period aimed to be a flagship initiative for the delivery of more environmental and climate friendly agriculture, encapsulated in the slogan "public money for public goods”. To achieve its environmental and climate change goals, the EU uses key instruments of Pillars 1 and 2 to provide more public goods from EU agriculture. Organic farming is recognised under both instruments for the first time in terms of its contribut...

  4. Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jun-Zhou He

    Full Text Available It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals. These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a "strong" player is greater than the "weak" players in the model of Diekmann (1993. This contradicts Selten's (1980 model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.

  5. Jeb Stewart's Dilemma

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cedo, Kelli M.; Dickerson, William E.

    2010-01-01

    This case study creates a dilemma that many school districts face. Public education is under-funded. Principals are expected to be the instructional leaders and are held accountable for student achievement. Is it appropriate then for public schools to have local businesses as benefactors when teaching personnel are involved? The conflict between…

  6. Good legal governance in authoritative public-private partnerships. Conceptualising legitimate partnerships with public authority

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Heldeweg, M.A.; Sanders, M.P.T.

    2013-01-01

    The discourse on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is focused most on Procurement or on what we name ‘Market-PPP’. Placing PPP in the shift from government to governance calls for attention especially to those PPP, which are geared to exercise public legal powers. These ‘Authoritative PPP’ are most

  7. Good legal governance in authoritative public-private partnerships. Conceptualising legitimate partnerships with public authority

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Heldeweg, Michiel A.; Sanders, Maurits

    2013-01-01

    The discourse on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is focused most on Procurement or on what we name ‘Market-PPP’. Placing PPP in the shift from government to governance calls for attention especially to those PPP, which are geared to exercise public legal powers. These ‘Authoritative PPP’ are most

  8. From the Classics to the Cuts: Valuing Teaching Public Administration as a Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shand, Rory; Howell, Kerry E.

    2015-01-01

    This article intends to raise a number of issues regarding teaching public administration in the higher education sector and the value it has for individuals and society. The article explores the issue of value with reference to the teaching and learning of Public Administration as a discipline in the wider societal context. The article argues…

  9. Public Goods and Public Interests: Scholarly Communication and Government Documents in Research Libraries

    Science.gov (United States)

    Potvin, Sarah; Sare, Laura

    2016-01-01

    Federal mandates requiring that publicly funded research be made openly accessible recast scholarly information as public information and provide an impetus to join the efforts of scholarly communication and government information programs in United States research libraries. Most major research libraries are long-standing participants in the…

  10. On the evaluation of cultural and environmental public goods, and its implications for social innovation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Graffeo, Michele; Bonini, Nicolao

    2013-01-01

    Public goods (e.g., parks) and welfare services (e.g., garbage disposal and transportation policies) are extremely important for the citizens' well-being but in the complex modern societies their influence and effectiveness are affected by the citizens' support. For this reason, it is crucial to understand which are the factors that influence the citizens' perception of the benefits, costs, and risks associated to public goods and welfare services. In this chapter, we describe some psychological variables that are relevant for the evaluation process of the public goods, but that are not considered by the standard economic models. At the same time, we show that some variables of central importance for the economic models do not significantly affect the citizens' evaluations. Finally, we discuss the concept of Nudge, a policy-making approach that suggests the use of psychological mechanisms to increase the citizens' support to public provision of welfare services.

  11. Bikes, helmets, and public health: decision-making when goods collide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bateman-House, Alison

    2014-06-01

    How ought public officials address policy choices that entail trade-offs between desirable public health goods? Increasing cycling improves public health both by promoting physical activity and by decreasing vehicle use, thus reducing vehicular emissions. Proponents of bicycle helmets argue that, used properly, they protect individual cyclists; however, there is concern that mandating helmet use may result in a decrease in cycling. In 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg opposed a bicycle helmet mandate, concerned that it would have a negative impact on the city's cycling rate, which he had sought to increase. The mayor did not explain his rationale, leaving constituents unsure why he opposed the proposal. This case study underscores the challenge of creating public policy in the context of competing public health goods.

  12. A More Accurate Measure of Local Public Goods: Overlapping Government Combinations as Units of Analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Samuel B. Stone

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This study posits and tests the viability of a new unit of analysis for local public goods in metropolitan areas: overlapping government combinations (OGCs. Counties, municipalities, school districts, and other special districts operate simultaneously within the same space, each providing their own set of local public goods. Residents of the same city can live within the boundaries of different counties, school districts and other special districts and thus receive (and pay for very different quantities and qualities of public goods. Though there is a great deal of literature devoted to the variation of local public goods in a fragmented metropolitan region, there is none that cumulates the different local government types into units that represent the true bundles of local public goods that are provided to citizens and property owners. This study tackles this problem through the application of geographic information systems (GIS to stack counties, municipalities, and school districts in the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington CMSA into unique OGCs. The unique OGCs are compared to their underlying component governments with respect to property tax rates and school performance and are found to be statistically distinct.

  13. Evolution of Trust and Trustworthiness between Cooperators and Non-Cooperators in Public Goods : Evidence from Field Experiment: Ethiopia

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kitessa, Rahel Jigi

    2017-01-01

    The standard economic theory predicts that collective action problem arise because the selfish agents have no incentive to contribute to public goods. However, considerable shares of mankind, conditional cooperators, contribute to public goods as revealed by numerous empirical and experimental

  14. E-procurement in Contracting-out of Public Goods and Services: Evidence from Slovakia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Svidroňová Mária Murray

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available Recently growing attention has been paid to the issue of public-sector innovation: scholars have progressively developed a fully-fledged field of study in this direction, since remarkable differences exist between public and private organizations. Perhaps paradoxically, the decline of NPM itself from the 1990s onwards has paved the way to further developments of this field of study, surpassing the existent model through the exploration of innovative tools for stakeholders’ involvement in public decision-making. New Public Management reforms of public administration combined with the use of information and communication technologies have brought many innovations to the public sector, among others also public e-procurement. Our objective is to identify the driver and barriers of e-procurement use in contracting-out of public goods and services based on analysis in one selected region and its four municipalities in Slovakia. This study uses a qualitative and quantitative approach and is based on original data from our own research, including data collected within the LIPSE (Learning from Innovation in Public Sector Environments research project. The main findings of our analysis are that the use of public e-procurement is an innovative tool for contracting out the public services and as such facilitates modern public-administration reforms based on information and communication technologies.

  15. "Standard" Issue: Public Discourse, "Ayers v. Fordice," and the Dilemma of the Basic Writer

    Science.gov (United States)

    Inman, Joyce Olewski

    2013-01-01

    This article involves an examination of public discourse surrounding "Ayers v. Fordice," one of the most prominent desegregation cases in higher education, in an attempt to explore how such discourse affects our understandings of basic writing programming in the state of Mississippi, but also more globally. Archived local newspaper…

  16. The Dilemma of Public Administration Education in South Africa: Teaching or Learning?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kroukamp, Hendri; de Vries, Michiel S.

    2014-01-01

    This article points to the adverse circumstances in which public administration education and training has to take place in developing countries, more specifically in South Africa. This is especially seen in the combination of scarce resources and rapidly increasing enrolment. The consequence thereof is that the didactics of education and training…

  17. Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Edward J. Cartwright

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.

  18. Chicago neoliberalism versus Cowles planning: perspectives on patents and public goods in Cold War economic thought.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Horn, Robert; Klaes, Matthias

    2011-01-01

    In post-Sputnik America, when many policymakers and social scientists feared the Soviet Union had a technological advantage over the United States, assessing the relative importance of patents for inventive activity and examining whether scientific research constituted a public good were paramount concerns. The neoliberals of the University of Chicago and the planners of the Cowles Commission both spoke to these issues. This paper sheds light on their views on patents and public goods in the late 1950s and early 1960s by examining representatives of Cowles and Chicago, Kenneth Arrow and Ronald Coase, respectively. Furthermore, it evaluates whether their views on patents and public goods clashed with the interests of RAND, at which both Arrow and Coase worked at some point during this time period. The paper argues that the Chicago-neoliberal position of Coase undermined the interests of RAND, while the Cowles-planning conclusions of Arrow furthered those interests. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  19. Identification and Valuation of Public Goods within the Vertical of Cattle Breeding

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. Malý

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available The paper identifies and discusses the production of public goods in the vertical of cattle breeding. The cattle breeding vertical was divided into four basic levels – producer, processor, retailer, and consumer and main public goods were determined and discussed. Moreover, it provides the methods for the valuation of public goods. The method is applied in the estimation of manure shadow price. Using the fitted multiple output distance function with two market and one non-market output and applying the Lagrange method and the Shephard’s dual lemma the shadow price of manure was calculated. The results show that the shadow prices differ significantly among the groups of farmers. This especially holds for the classification of groups according to the size and technology of production.

  20. Competition between species can stabilize public-goods cooperation within a species.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Celiker, Hasan; Gore, Jeff

    2012-01-01

    Competition between species is a major ecological force that can drive evolution. Here, we test the effect of this force on the evolution of cooperation within a species. We use sucrose metabolism of budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as a model cooperative system that is subject to social parasitism by cheater strategies. We find that when cocultured with a bacterial competitor, Escherichia coli, the frequency of cooperator phenotypes in yeast populations increases dramatically as compared with isolated yeast populations. Bacterial competition stabilizes cooperation within yeast by limiting the yeast population density and also by depleting the public goods produced by cooperating yeast cells. Both of these changes induced by bacterial competition increase the cooperator frequency because cooperator yeast cells have a small preferential access to the public goods they produce; this preferential access becomes more important when the public good is scarce. Our results indicate that a thorough understanding of species interactions is crucial for explaining the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in nature.

  1. Heterogeneous resource allocation can change social hierarchy in public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Meloni, Sandro; Moreno, Yamir

    2016-01-01

    Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions. The typical shape of wealth distribution - known as Pareto Law - and the microscopic organization of wealth production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of Public Goods Games that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional Public Goods Games on networks, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the payoffs naturally emerges but also that if players don't invest enough in one round...

  2. The tobacco industry, researchers, and ethical access to UK Biobank: using the public interest and public good.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Capps, Benjamin James; van der Eijk, Yvette

    2014-10-01

    We have asked whether the strategic purpose of the tobacco industry is something that a public resource, such as UK Biobank, should support. Tobacco industry health research has been known to work irreconcilably with the purposes of such institutions, which can be surmised as for the public good and defined to improve the provision, diagnosis, and treatment of illness and the promotion of health throughout society. We have isolated possible conflicts of interest that underlie vested research agendas of the tobacco industry and that may extend to tobacco industry-funded researchers. With respect to research, we find that the tobacco industry is entirely at odds with the purposes of public biobanking.

  3. The Measurement of Subjective Value and Its Relation to Contingent Valuation and Environmental Public Goods.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mel W Khaw

    Full Text Available Environmental public goods--including national parks, clean air/water, and ecosystem services--provide substantial benefits on a global scale. These goods have unique characteristics in that they are typically "nonmarket" goods, with values from both use and passive use that accrue to a large number of individuals both in current and future generations. In this study, we test the hypothesis that neural signals in areas correlated with subjective valuations for essentially all other previously studied categories of goods (ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum also correlate with environmental valuations. We use contingent valuation (CV as our behavioral tool for measuring valuations of environmental public goods. CV is a standard stated preference approach that presents survey respondents with information on an issue and asks questions that help policymakers determine how much citizens are willing to pay for a public good or policy. We scanned human subjects while they viewed environmental proposals, along with three other classes of goods. The presentation of all four classes of goods yielded robust and similar patterns of temporally synchronized brain activation within attentional networks. The activations associated with the traditional classes of goods replicate previous correlations between neural activity in valuation areas and behavioral preferences. In contrast, CV-elicited values for environmental proposals did not correlate with brain activity at either the individual or population level. For a sub-population of participants, CV-elicited values were correlated with activity within the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, a region associated with cognitive control and shifting decision strategies. The results show that neural activity associated with the subjective valuation of environmental proposals differs profoundly from the neural activity associated with previously examined goods and preference measures.

  4. The Measurement of Subjective Value and Its Relation to Contingent Valuation and Environmental Public Goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khaw, Mel W; Grab, Denise A; Livermore, Michael A; Vossler, Christian A; Glimcher, Paul W

    2015-01-01

    Environmental public goods--including national parks, clean air/water, and ecosystem services--provide substantial benefits on a global scale. These goods have unique characteristics in that they are typically "nonmarket" goods, with values from both use and passive use that accrue to a large number of individuals both in current and future generations. In this study, we test the hypothesis that neural signals in areas correlated with subjective valuations for essentially all other previously studied categories of goods (ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum) also correlate with environmental valuations. We use contingent valuation (CV) as our behavioral tool for measuring valuations of environmental public goods. CV is a standard stated preference approach that presents survey respondents with information on an issue and asks questions that help policymakers determine how much citizens are willing to pay for a public good or policy. We scanned human subjects while they viewed environmental proposals, along with three other classes of goods. The presentation of all four classes of goods yielded robust and similar patterns of temporally synchronized brain activation within attentional networks. The activations associated with the traditional classes of goods replicate previous correlations between neural activity in valuation areas and behavioral preferences. In contrast, CV-elicited values for environmental proposals did not correlate with brain activity at either the individual or population level. For a sub-population of participants, CV-elicited values were correlated with activity within the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, a region associated with cognitive control and shifting decision strategies. The results show that neural activity associated with the subjective valuation of environmental proposals differs profoundly from the neural activity associated with previously examined goods and preference measures.

  5. The Problem of Dirty Hands: The Moral Dilemma of Public Life.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1981-04-21

    Plavs by Jean - Paul Sartre (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). iv. arguments which will then be presented on the question of whether the problem is a real...of Ethics. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939. _ The Right and the Good. Oxford, The Claren- don Press, 1930. Sartre , Jean - Paul . Dirty Hands (Les Mains...Sales). In No Exit and Three Other Plays by Jean - Paul Sartre , pp. 131-248. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. Existentialism as a Humanism. Translated by

  6. What Does It Mean to Have an N of 1? Art Making, Education, Research, and the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sullivan, Graeme

    2014-01-01

    In this special issue, each author addresses how ABER work connects with and/or directly addresses society's need/s and the public good as perceived by the researcher. As there are many construals of the "public good" and the relation to art-making and the arts to this "public good," each author will conceptualize her/his…

  7. 全球公共品视角下的SNA%SNA under the Framework of Global Public Goods

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    邱东; 徐强

    2004-01-01

    The System of National Accounts (SNA) is a public good in essence. SNA is nonexcludable and nonrival throughout the world, so it is a global public good(GPG). From the viewpoint of global public goods, this paper analyzes the characteristics, roles, supply, and demand of SNA.

  8. E's Are Good: Standards of Quality in Public Administration as Reflected in Discourse on Canadian Public Policy Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baker, Dana Lee; Miller, Audrey Anna; Bratton, Todd

    2015-01-01

    Promoting understanding of quality in the context of good governance can be a challenging classroom exercise not only because of the potential for hijacking politicization of the discussion, but also because of the variety of ways in which public sector goals can be defined, even in the context of a single policy. Standards of quality in the…

  9. E's Are Good: Standards of Quality in Public Administration as Reflected in Discourse on Canadian Public Policy Design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baker, Dana Lee; Miller, Audrey Anna; Bratton, Todd

    2015-01-01

    Promoting understanding of quality in the context of good governance can be a challenging classroom exercise not only because of the potential for hijacking politicization of the discussion, but also because of the variety of ways in which public sector goals can be defined, even in the context of a single policy. Standards of quality in the…

  10. The Public Goods Hypothesis for the evolution of life on Earth.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McInerney, James O; Pisani, Davide; Bapteste, Eric; O'Connell, Mary J

    2011-08-23

    It is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile the observed extent of horizontal gene transfers with the central metaphor of a great tree uniting all evolving entities on the planet. In this manuscript we describe the Public Goods Hypothesis and show that it is appropriate in order to describe biological evolution on the planet. According to this hypothesis, nucleotide sequences (genes, promoters, exons, etc.) are simply seen as goods, passed from organism to organism through both vertical and horizontal transfer. Public goods sequences are defined by having the properties of being largely non-excludable (no organism can be effectively prevented from accessing these sequences) and non-rival (while such a sequence is being used by one organism it is also available for use by another organism). The universal nature of genetic systems ensures that such non-excludable sequences exist and non-excludability explains why we see a myriad of genes in different combinations in sequenced genomes. There are three features of the public goods hypothesis. Firstly, segments of DNA are seen as public goods, available for all organisms to integrate into their genomes. Secondly, we expect the evolution of mechanisms for DNA sharing and of defense mechanisms against DNA intrusion in genomes. Thirdly, we expect that we do not see a global tree-like pattern. Instead, we expect local tree-like patterns to emerge from the combination of a commonage of genes and vertical inheritance of genomes by cell division. Indeed, while genes are theoretically public goods, in reality, some genes are excludable, particularly, though not only, when they have variant genetic codes or behave as coalition or club goods, available for all organisms of a coalition to integrate into their genomes, and non-rival within the club. We view the Tree of Life hypothesis as a regionalized instance of the Public Goods hypothesis, just like classical mechanics and euclidean geometry are seen as regionalized

  11. The public goods hypothesis for the evolution of life on Earth

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bapteste Eric

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract It is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile the observed extent of horizontal gene transfers with the central metaphor of a great tree uniting all evolving entities on the planet. In this manuscript we describe the Public Goods Hypothesis and show that it is appropriate in order to describe biological evolution on the planet. According to this hypothesis, nucleotide sequences (genes, promoters, exons, etc. are simply seen as goods, passed from organism to organism through both vertical and horizontal transfer. Public goods sequences are defined by having the properties of being largely non-excludable (no organism can be effectively prevented from accessing these sequences and non-rival (while such a sequence is being used by one organism it is also available for use by another organism. The universal nature of genetic systems ensures that such non-excludable sequences exist and non-excludability explains why we see a myriad of genes in different combinations in sequenced genomes. There are three features of the public goods hypothesis. Firstly, segments of DNA are seen as public goods, available for all organisms to integrate into their genomes. Secondly, we expect the evolution of mechanisms for DNA sharing and of defense mechanisms against DNA intrusion in genomes. Thirdly, we expect that we do not see a global tree-like pattern. Instead, we expect local tree-like patterns to emerge from the combination of a commonage of genes and vertical inheritance of genomes by cell division. Indeed, while genes are theoretically public goods, in reality, some genes are excludable, particularly, though not only, when they have variant genetic codes or behave as coalition or club goods, available for all organisms of a coalition to integrate into their genomes, and non-rival within the club. We view the Tree of Life hypothesis as a regionalized instance of the Public Goods hypothesis, just like classical mechanics and euclidean geometry are

  12. The public goods hypothesis for the evolution of life on Earth

    LENUS (Irish Health Repository)

    McInerney, James O

    2011-08-23

    Abstract It is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile the observed extent of horizontal gene transfers with the central metaphor of a great tree uniting all evolving entities on the planet. In this manuscript we describe the Public Goods Hypothesis and show that it is appropriate in order to describe biological evolution on the planet. According to this hypothesis, nucleotide sequences (genes, promoters, exons, etc.) are simply seen as goods, passed from organism to organism through both vertical and horizontal transfer. Public goods sequences are defined by having the properties of being largely non-excludable (no organism can be effectively prevented from accessing these sequences) and non-rival (while such a sequence is being used by one organism it is also available for use by another organism). The universal nature of genetic systems ensures that such non-excludable sequences exist and non-excludability explains why we see a myriad of genes in different combinations in sequenced genomes. There are three features of the public goods hypothesis. Firstly, segments of DNA are seen as public goods, available for all organisms to integrate into their genomes. Secondly, we expect the evolution of mechanisms for DNA sharing and of defense mechanisms against DNA intrusion in genomes. Thirdly, we expect that we do not see a global tree-like pattern. Instead, we expect local tree-like patterns to emerge from the combination of a commonage of genes and vertical inheritance of genomes by cell division. Indeed, while genes are theoretically public goods, in reality, some genes are excludable, particularly, though not only, when they have variant genetic codes or behave as coalition or club goods, available for all organisms of a coalition to integrate into their genomes, and non-rival within the club. We view the Tree of Life hypothesis as a regionalized instance of the Public Goods hypothesis, just like classical mechanics and euclidean geometry are seen as

  13. Private provision of a public good: cooperation and altruism of internet forum users

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alejandro Ros-Galvez

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available We ran an experiment with users of Internet forums. In a dictator game, we find that the level of altruism is positively related to the activity in the forum. In a public good game, there is no relation between cooperation in the game and contribution to the content of the forum. Subjects are not more altruistic with partners from the same forum but do cooperate more with them. These results suggest that the public good provided in Internet forums is mainly provided by a group of unconditional altruistic users, and that the sense of belonging supports the cooperation in that provision.

  14. Trustees "versus" Directors, Whom Do They Serve? Boards, For-Profits and the Public Good in the United States

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fox Garrity, Bonnie

    2015-01-01

    Postsecondary education in the United States is provided by public, not-for-profit and for-profit institutions. Public and not-for-profit institutions are expected to serve the public good due to state control or chartering requirements; for-profit institutions are not. Therefore, the decision to serve the public good is vested in the board. The…

  15. Walk the Talk? The Effect of Voting and Excludability in Public Goods Experiments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hans J. Czap

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of voting and excludability on individual contributions to group projects. We conducted two experiments on excludable and nonexcludable public goods, which provided several important results. First, contrary to our expectations, subjects are generally contributing more to the non-excludable compared to the excludable public good. Second, participating in a vote to choose a public project per se makes no difference in contributions. However, if the project that the individual voted for also gets selected by the group, they contribute significantly more to that project. Third, empathy and locus of control are important driving forces of participation in common projects. Our results have implications on the procedural design of obtaining funding for public projects. First, the public should get involved and have a say in the determination of which project should be realized. Second, it might well pay off to attempt to develop a consensus among the population and obtain near unanimous votes, because in our experiment, subjects discriminate between the project they voted for and the project chosen by the majority. Third, the policy proposers should stress the other-regarding interest of the public good rather than just pecuniary incentives.

  16. Offerpositionens dilemmaer

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Søndergaard, Dorte Marie

    2008-01-01

    Denne artikel handler om nogle af de dilemmaer, som offerpositionering kan indebære. Der er tale om dilemmaer, som ofte overses af de autoriteter, der har med mennesker udsat for relationel aggression at gøre. At indtage en eksplicit offerposition kan nogle gange betyde endelig eksklusion fra de ...

  17. Visual Graphics for Human Rights, Social Justice, Democracy and the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nanackchand, Vedant; Berman, Kim

    2012-01-01

    The value of human rights in a democratic South Africa is constantly threatened and often waived for nefarious reasons. We contend that the use of visual graphics among incoming university visual art students provides a mode of engagement that helps to inculcate awareness of human rights, social responsibility, and the public good in South African…

  18. Stimulating Contributions to Public Goods through Information Feedback: Some Experimental Results.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marco A Janssen

    Full Text Available In traditional public good experiments participants receive an endowment from the experimenter that can be invested in a public good or kept in a private account. In this paper we present an experimental environment where participants can invest time during five days to contribute to a public good. Participants can make contributions to a linear public good by logging into a web application and performing virtual actions. We compared four treatments, with different group sizes and information of (relative performance of other groups. We find that information feedback about performance of other groups has a small positive effect if we control for various attributes of the groups. Moreover, we find a significant effect of the contributions of others in the group in the previous day on the number of points earned in the current day. Our results confirm that people participate more when participants in their group participate more, and are influenced by information about the relative performance of other groups.

  19. How to solve the tragedy of the commons? Social entrepreneurs and global public goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ueda, Yoshifumi; Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard

    2002-01-01

    We show that when a star type network is formed by an entrepreneur, a non-profit organization run by a social entrepreneur is more reconcilable with the social objective of providing the global public good than a profit organization run by a business entrepreneur. This network formation...

  20. Corruption, Investments and Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from Rural Liberia

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Beekman, Gonne; Bulte, Erwin; Nillisen, Eleonora

    2014-01-01

    We analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods. We obtain a proxy for corruption among Liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention, measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to t

  1. Corruption, investments and contributions to public goods: experimental evidence from rural Liberia

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Beekman, G.; Bulte, E.H.; Nillesen, E.E.M.

    2014-01-01

    We analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods. We obtain a proxy for corruption among Liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention, measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to t

  2. Third-party cooperation: How reducing material involvement enhances contributions to the public good

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Losecaat Vermeer, A.B.; Heerema, R.L.; Sanfey, A.G.

    2016-01-01

    Decisions to cooperate are often delegated to a third party. We examined whether cooperation differs when decisions are made for a third party compared with ourselves and specified which motives are important for third-party cooperation. Participants played multiple rounds of a public goods game

  3. To whom it may concern : International human rights law and global public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Augenstein, Daniel

    2015-01-01

    Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address matters of common global concern. The aim of the present contribution is to disentangle the two notions to shed some critical light on their respective potential to attend to cont

  4. To whom it may concern : International human rights law and global public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Augenstein, Daniel

    2016-01-01

    Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address matters of common global concern. The aim of the present contribution is to disentangle the two notions to shed some critical light on their respective potential to attend to cont

  5. Third-party cooperation: How reducing material involvement enhances contributions to the public good

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Losecaat Vermeer, A.B.; Heerema, R.L.; Sanfey, A.G.

    2016-01-01

    Decisions to cooperate are often delegated to a third party. We examined whether cooperation differs when decisions are made for a third party compared with ourselves and specified which motives are important for third-party cooperation. Participants played multiple rounds of a public goods game (PG

  6. To whom it may concern : International human rights law and global public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Augenstein, Daniel

    2015-01-01

    Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address matters of common global concern. The aim of the present contribution is to disentangle the two notions to shed some critical light on their respective potential to attend to

  7. To whom it may concern : International human rights law and global public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Augenstein, Daniel

    2016-01-01

    Public goods and human rights are sometimes treated as intimately related, if not interchangeable, strategies to address matters of common global concern. The aim of the present contribution is to disentangle the two notions to shed some critical light on their respective potential to attend to

  8. Transforming Educational Knowledge through Making Explicit the Embodied Knowledge of Educators for the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Delong, Jacqueline; Whitehead, Jack

    2011-01-01

    This paper focuses on making explicit the embodied knowledge of educators using a living theory methodology and inciting the social imagination to create educational research for the public good. Using evidence from international contexts, the meanings of the energy-flowing values that educators use to explain their educational influences in their…

  9. Collecting and Utilizing Evaluation Research for Public Good and on Behalf of African American Children

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thomas, Veronica G.; McKie, Brooke K.

    2006-01-01

    A study indicates that researchers entrusted with evaluating the educational outcomes of African American children must engage their practice for the public good and on behalf of these students. The Howard University Evaluation Training Institute is used as a guide to describe the steps for conducting quality evaluations, and to highlight the…

  10. Evolutionary dynamics of public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Jing; Wu, Bin; Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Long

    2010-05-01

    The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations. The theory of stochastic process is innovatively adopted to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the public goods games involving a diversity of contributions. In the limit of rare mutations, the general stationary distribution of this stochastic process can be analytically approximated by means of diffusion theory. Moreover, we demonstrate that increasing the diversity of contributions greatly reduces the probability of finding the population in a homogeneous state full of defectors. This increase also raises the expectation of the total contribution in the entire population and thus promotes social cooperation. Furthermore, by investigating the evolutionary dynamics of optional public goods games with diverse contributions, we find that nonparticipation can assist players who contribute more in resisting invasion and taking over individuals who contribute less. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to confirm our analytical results. Our results may provide insight into the effect of diverse contributions on cooperative behaviors in the real world.

  11. Love for efficiency or confusion? A QRE analysis of individual contributions in a public good game

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Corazzini, L.; Tyszler, M.

    2010-01-01

    Does the hypothesis of 'love for (group) efficiency' account for subjects' over-contribution in public good games? By using data from a VCM experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) extension of a model in which subjects hav

  12. Human Security and Energy Security: A Sustainable Energy System as a Public Good

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S.I.S.E.; Jollands, N.

    2013-01-01

    This chapter is dedicated to the concept of human security and its link to energy and energy governance, particularly global energy governance. Through this focus emerges the need to look at the links between the concept of public goods and energy. Our starting argument is that conventional notions

  13. Faculty Voice in Intellectual Property Policies: Collective Action for the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kezar, Adrianna

    2017-01-01

    This chapter synthesizes the previous chapters to offer to readers practical recommendations for navigating IP issues, including resources and advice for faculty and administrations to engage in more equitable discussions about the rights of faculty and the interests of the public good.

  14. Adaptive and Bounded Investment Returns Promote Cooperation in Spatial Public Goods Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xiaojie; Liu, Yongkui; Zhou, Yonghui; Wang, Long; Perc, Matjaž

    2012-01-01

    The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations. PMID:22615836

  15. Adaptive and bounded investment returns promote cooperation in spatial public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xiaojie; Liu, Yongkui; Zhou, Yonghui; Wang, Long; Perc, Matjaž

    2012-01-01

    The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations.

  16. Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Control Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferrari, Giorgio, E-mail: giorgio.ferrari@uni-bielefeld.de; Riedel, Frank, E-mail: frank.riedel@uni-bielefeld.de; Steg, Jan-Henrik, E-mail: jsteg@uni-bielefeld.de [Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (Germany)

    2017-06-15

    In this paper we study continuous-time stochastic control problems with both monotone and classical controls motivated by the so-called public good contribution problem. That is the problem of n economic agents aiming to maximize their expected utility allocating initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and irreversible contributions to increase the level of some public good. We investigate the corresponding social planner problem and the case of strategic interaction between the agents, i.e. the public good contribution game. We show existence and uniqueness of the social planner’s optimal policy, we characterize it by necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn–Tucker conditions and we provide its expression in terms of the unique optional solution of a stochastic backward equation. Similar stochastic first order conditions prove to be very useful for studying any Nash equilibria of the public good contribution game. In the symmetric case they allow us to prove (qualitative) uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, which we again construct as the unique optional solution of a stochastic backward equation. We finally also provide a detailed analysis of the so-called free rider effect.

  17. Universities, Professional Capabilities and Contributions to the Public Good in South Africa

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walker, Melanie

    2012-01-01

    The generation of a public-good, capabilities-based approach to professional education in South African universities is outlined and proposed as a contribution to wider social transformation. The relevance and importance of understanding what Amartya Sen describes as "capability failure" in the lives of people living in poverty is…

  18. Examining Theories of Distributive Justice with an Asymmetric Public Goods Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schmidt, Stephen J.

    2015-01-01

    In this article, the author presents an asymmetric version of the familiar public goods classroom experiment, in which some players are given more tokens to invest than others, and players collectively decide whether to divide the return to the group investment asymmetrically as well. The asymmetry between players raises normative issues about…

  19. Examining Theories of Distributive Justice with an Asymmetric Public Goods Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schmidt, Stephen J.

    2015-01-01

    In this article, the author presents an asymmetric version of the familiar public goods classroom experiment, in which some players are given more tokens to invest than others, and players collectively decide whether to divide the return to the group investment asymmetrically as well. The asymmetry between players raises normative issues about…

  20. Cooperation among cancer cells as public goods games on Voronoi networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Archetti, Marco

    2016-05-07

    Cancer cells produce growth factors that diffuse and sustain tumour proliferation, a form of cooperation that can be studied using mathematical models of public goods in the framework of evolutionary game theory. Cell populations, however, form heterogeneous networks that cannot be described by regular lattices or scale-free networks, the types of graphs generally used in the study of cooperation. To describe the dynamics of growth factor production in populations of cancer cells, I study public goods games on Voronoi networks, using a range of non-linear benefits that account for the known properties of growth factors, and different types of diffusion gradients. The results are surprisingly similar to those obtained on regular graphs and different from results on scale-free networks, revealing that network heterogeneity per se does not promote cooperation when public goods diffuse beyond one-step neighbours. The exact shape of the diffusion gradient is not crucial, however, whereas the type of non-linear benefit is an essential determinant of the dynamics. Public goods games on Voronoi networks can shed light on intra-tumour heterogeneity, the evolution of resistance to therapies that target growth factors, and new types of cell therapy.

  1. Adaptive and bounded investment returns promote cooperation in spatial public goods games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xiaojie Chen

    Full Text Available The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations.

  2. Eco-evolutionary feedbacks between private and public goods: evidence from toxic algal blooms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Driscoll, William W; Hackett, Jeremiah D; Ferrière, Régis

    2016-01-01

    The importance of 'eco-evolutionary feedbacks' in natural systems is currently unclear. Here, we advance a general hypothesis for a particular class of eco-evolutionary feedbacks with potentially large, long-lasting impacts in complex ecosystems. These eco-evolutionary feedbacks involve traits that mediate important interactions with abiotic and biotic features of the environment and a self-driven reversal of selection as the ecological impact of the trait varies between private (small scale) and public (large scale). Toxic algal blooms may involve such eco-evolutionary feedbacks due to the emergence of public goods. We review evidence that toxin production by microalgae may yield 'privatised' benefits for individual cells or colonies under pre- and early-bloom conditions; however, the large-scale, ecosystem-level effects of toxicity associated with bloom states yield benefits that are necessarily 'public'. Theory predicts that the replacement of private with public goods may reverse selection for toxicity in the absence of higher level selection. Indeed, blooms often harbor significant genetic and functional diversity: bloom populations may undergo genetic differentiation over a scale of days, and even genetically similar lineages may vary widely in toxic potential. Intriguingly, these observations find parallels in terrestrial communities, suggesting that toxic blooms may serve as useful models for eco-evolutionary dynamics in nature. Eco-evolutionary feedbacks involving the emergence of a public good may shed new light on the potential for interactions between ecology and evolution to influence the structure and function of entire ecosystems.

  3. The Availability of Original Data and Statistics: An Improvement in Good Publication Practice

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Morselli-Labate AM

    2003-11-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this paper is to highlight the aspects of good publication practices, with particular reference to data analysis, and to propose an innovative initiative for improving the quality of scientific information in this field. Several committees within the scientific community provide information and publish guidelines in order to support scientists in the application of good publication practices and to improve quality in medical research. Those guidelines suggest that the possibility of verifying the original data warrants the reliability of the published results by reducing the occurrence of misconduct related to data analysis. The initiative proposed in this article is aimed at making the original data and the statistical reports available to the scientific community together with the actual paper. Such a practice is undoubtedly an improvement in the quality of publication permitting verification of the results as well as allowing for further elaboration of the same data.

  4. Dilemmas of Modernity in Change

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sultana Suta-Selejan

    2006-09-01

    Full Text Available The subject-matter of this paper is to try to find out some reference points in order to understand many dilemmas which accompanied modern society – its birth, evolution and spread throughout countries and centuries. The most frequent such dilemmas concerned the paramount criteria for choosing between individual or societal matters, between private propriety or public (state one, between private or public interests, between market mechanism or government policy as basis of the best decisions in human actions and matters. While analyzing such inconsistencies and dilemmas we can better understand the real nature of modernity and liberalism, especially what some researchers call “postmodernity”.

  5. Dilemmas of Modernity in Change

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sultana Suta-Selejan

    2006-07-01

    Full Text Available The subject-matter of this paper is to try to find out some reference points in order to understand many dilemmas which accompanied modern society – its birth, evolution and spread throughout countries and centuries. The most frequent such dilemmas concerned the paramount criteria for choosing between individual or societal matters, between private propriety or public (state one, between private or public interests, between market mechanism or government policy as basis of the best decisions in human actions and matters. While analyzing such inconsistencies and dilemmas we can better understand the real nature of modernity and liberalism, especially what some researchers call “postmodernity”.

  6. Evolutionary dynamics of interlinked public goods traits: an experimental study of siderophore production in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ross-Gillespie, A; Dumas, Z; Kümmerli, R

    2015-01-01

    Public goods cooperation is common in microbes, and there is much interest in understanding how such traits evolve. Research in recent years has identified several important factors that shape the evolutionary dynamics of such systems, yet few studies have investigated scenarios involving interactions between multiple public goods. Here, we offer general predictions about the evolutionary trajectories of two public goods traits having positive, negative or neutral regulatory influence on one another's expression, and we report on a test of some of our predictions in the context of Pseudomonas aeruginosa's production of two interlinked iron-scavenging siderophores. First, we confirmed that both pyoverdine and pyochelin siderophores do operate as public goods under appropriate environmental conditions. We then tracked their production in lines experimentally evolved under different iron-limitation regimes known to favour different siderophore expression profiles. Under strong iron limitation, where pyoverdine represses pyochelin, we saw a decline in pyoverdine and a concomitant increase in pyochelin - consistent with expansion of pyoverdine-defective cheats derepressed for pyochelin. Under moderate iron limitation, pyochelin declined - again consistent with an expected cheat invasion scenario - but there was no concomitant shift in pyoverdine because cross-suppression between the traits is unidirectional only. Alternating exposure to strong and moderate iron limitation caused qualitatively similar though lesser shifts compared to the constant-environment regimes. Our results confirm that the regulatory interconnections between public goods traits can significantly modulate the course of evolution, yet also suggest how we can start to predict the impacts such complexities will have on phenotypic divergence and community stability.

  7. Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Semmann, Dirk; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Milinski, Manfred

    2003-09-01

    Collective efforts are a trademark of both insect and human societies. They are achieved through relatedness in the former and unknown mechanisms in the latter. The problem of achieving cooperation among non-kin has been described as the `tragedy of the commons', prophesying the inescapable collapse of many human enterprises. In public goods experiments, initial cooperation usually drops quickly to almost zero. It can be maintained by the opportunity to punish defectors or the need to maintain good reputation. Both schemes require that defectors are identified. Theorists propose that a simple but effective mechanism operates under full anonymity. With optional participation in the public goods game, `loners' (players who do not join the group), defectors and cooperators will coexist through rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Here we show experimentally that volunteering generates these dynamics in public goods games and that manipulating initial conditions can produce each predicted direction. If, by manipulating displayed decisions, it is pretended that defectors have the highest frequency, loners soon become most frequent, as do cooperators after loners and defectors after cooperators. On average, cooperation is perpetuated at a substantial level.

  8. The Tobacco Industry, Researchers, and Ethical Access to UK Biobank: Using the Public Interest and Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    van der Eijk, Yvette

    2014-01-01

    We have asked whether the strategic purpose of the tobacco industry is something that a public resource, such as UK Biobank, should support. Tobacco industry health research has been known to work irreconcilably with the purposes of such institutions, which can be surmised as for the public good and defined to improve the provision, diagnosis, and treatment of illness and the promotion of health throughout society. We have isolated possible conflicts of interest that underlie vested research agendas of the tobacco industry and that may extend to tobacco industry–funded researchers. With respect to research, we find that the tobacco industry is entirely at odds with the purposes of public biobanking. PMID:25122018

  9. (Inadvertently) Instructing Missionaries in (Public University) World Religions Courses: Examining a Pedagogical Dilemma, Its Dimensions, and a Course Section Solution

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karapanagiotis, Nicole

    2017-01-01

    In this article, I explore an ethical and pedagogical dilemma that I encounter each semester in my world religions courses: namely, that a great number of students enroll in the courses as part of their missionary training programs, and come to class understanding successful learning to mean gathering enough information about the world's religious…

  10. The Good Samaritan and the marketer: public perceptions of humanitarian and international development NGOs

    OpenAIRE

    2015-01-01

    This article reports on a nationwide study investigating public responses to humanitarian communications.\\ud Based on focus group data with members of the UK public, the paper discusses two key models\\ud through which NGOs identities and activities are understood and judged, both positively and negatively:\\ud the Good Samaritan and the Marketer. Thematic analysis of the focus groups extracts exposes the salience\\ud of these models in people’s thinking, how they speak to each other and how the...

  11. Ethical dilemmas

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aabro, Christian

    2015-01-01

    What are the characteristics of an ethical dilemma? And how do we handle them in the area of early childhood education? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this chapter.......What are the characteristics of an ethical dilemma? And how do we handle them in the area of early childhood education? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this chapter....

  12. Ethical dilemmas

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aabro, Christian

    2015-01-01

    What are the characteristics of an ethical dilemma? And how do we handle them in the area of early childhood education? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this chapter.......What are the characteristics of an ethical dilemma? And how do we handle them in the area of early childhood education? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this chapter....

  13. Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila

    2012-01-01

    The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily to the spo...

  14. Unchecked strategy diversification and collapse in continuous voluntary public good games

    CERN Document Server

    Sasaki, Tatsuya; Okada, Isamu; Unemi, Tatsuo

    2015-01-01

    Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not well understood. Here we investigate the continuous voluntary public good game, in which individuals have two types of continuous-valued options: a probability of joining the public good game and a level of cooperative investment in the game. Our numerical results reveal hitherto unreported phenomena: (i) The evolutionary dynamics are initially characterized by oscillations in individual cooperation and participation levels, in contrast to the population-level oscillations that have previously been reported. (ii) Eventually, the population's average cooperation and participation levels converge to and stabilize at a center. (iii) Then, a most peculiar phenomenon unfolds: The strategies present in the population diversify and give rise to a "cloud" of tinkering individuals who each tries...

  15. Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Chu, Tianguang; Weissing, Franz J

    2013-03-21

    In a public goods game, cooperation can be a stable outcome if defectors are facing efficient punishment. In some public goods systems, punishment is undermined by an insurance system where speculators buy a policy that sequentially covers all punishment costs. Here, we study a simple model to investigate the question whether stable cooperation can break down in the presence of such speculation. We do indeed find scenarios where speculation either leads to the reduction of the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium or even the loss of stability of this equilibrium. This however only happens if the costs of the insurance are lower than the expected fines faced by a defector. We argue that an insurance of this type is not viable and conclude that under realistic assumptions speculation does not destabilize cooperation.

  16. Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eckel, Catherine C; Fatas, Enrique; Godoy, Sara; Wilson, Rick K

    2016-01-01

    When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.

  17. Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szolnoki, Attila; Szabó, György; Perc, Matjaž

    2011-03-01

    The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool punishers as the three competing strategies. Fines and costs of pool punishment are considered as the two main parameters determining the stationary distributions of strategies on the square lattice. Each player collects a payoff from five five-person public goods games, and the evolution of strategies is subsequently governed by imitation based on pairwise comparisons at a low level of noise. The impact of pool punishment on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is significantly different from that reported previously for peer punishment. Representative phase diagrams reveal remarkably rich behavior, depending also on the value of the synergy factor that characterizes the efficiency of investments payed into the common pool. Besides traditional single- and two-strategy stationary states, a rock-paper-scissors type of cyclic dominance can emerge in strikingly different ways.

  18. Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool-punishment

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaz

    2011-01-01

    The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool-punishers as the three competing strategies. Fine and cost of pool-punishment are considered as the two main parameters determining the stationary distributions of strategies on the square lattice. Each player collects its payoff from five five-person public goods games, and the evolution of strategies is subsequently governed by imitation based on pairwise comparisons at a low level of noise. The impact of pool-punishment on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is significantly different from that reported previously for peer-punishment. Representative phase diagrams reveal remarkably rich behavior, depending also on the value of the synergy factor that characterizes the efficiency of investments payed into the common pool. Besides traditional single and two-strategy stationary states, a rock-pape...

  19. Coupled dynamics of mobility and pattern formation in optional public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Zhong, Li-Xin; Shi, Yong-Dong; Qiu, Tian

    2012-01-01

    In a static environment, optional participation and cooperator agglomeration are found to be beneficial for the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation. In the optional public goods game, the rock-scissors-paper cycles of different strategies yield the oscillatory persistence of cooperation but not different levels of stable cooperation. In this paper, by incorporating population density and individual mobility into the spatial optional public goods game, we study the coevolutionary dynamics of strategy updating and benefit-seeking movement. With low population density and slow movement, an optimal level of cooperation is easy to be reached. Both the increase of population density and the speed-up of free-floating of competing agents will lead to the decrease of cooperation. A log-log relation between the levels of cooperation and the free-floating probability is found. Theoretical analysis indicates that the decrease of cooperator frequency in the present model should result from the increase of the intera...

  20. Punishment in public goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hintze, Arend; Adami, Christoph

    2015-06-02

    The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the population. Evolutionary game theory has shown that under certain conditions, cooperation nonetheless evolves stably, for example if players have the opportunity to punish cheaters that benefit from a public good yet refuse to pay into the common pool. However, punishment has remained enigmatic because it is costly and difficult to maintain. On the other hand, cooperation emerges naturally in the public goods game if the synergy of the public good (the factor multiplying the public good investment) is sufficiently high. In terms of this synergy parameter, the transition from defection to cooperation can be viewed as a phase transition with the synergy as the critical parameter. We show here that punishment reduces the critical value at which cooperation occurs, but also creates the possibility of meta-stable phase transitions, where populations can 'tunnel' into the cooperating phase below the critical value. At the same time, cooperating populations are unstable even above the critical value, because a group of defectors that are large enough can 'nucleate' such a transition. We study the mean-field theoretical predictions via agent-based simulations of finite populations using an evolutionary approach where the decisions to cooperate or to punish are encoded genetically in terms of evolvable probabilities. We recover the theoretical predictions and demonstrate that the population shows hysteresis, as expected in systems that exhibit super-heating and super-cooling. We conclude that punishment can stabilize populations of cooperators below the critical point, but it is a two-edged sword: it can also stabilize defectors above the critical point.

  1. Interests, Norms, and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Cooperation

    OpenAIRE

    Bechtel, Michael; Genovese, Federica; Kenneth F. Scheve

    2016-01-01

    Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cross-referencing individuals’ sectors of employmen...

  2. Punishment in public goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hintze, Arend; Adami, Christoph

    2015-07-01

    The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the population. Evolutionary game theory has shown that under certain conditions, cooperation nonetheless evolves stably, for example if players have the opportunity to punish cheaters that benefit from a public good yet refuse to pay into the common pool. However, punishment has remained enigmatic because it is costly and difficult to maintain. On the other hand, cooperation emerges naturally in the public goods game if the synergy of the public good (the factor multiplying the public good investment) is sufficiently high. In terms of this synergy parameter, the transition from defection to cooperation can be viewed as a phase transition with the synergy as the critical parameter. We show here that punishment reduces the critical value at which cooperation occurs, but also creates the possibility of meta-stable phase transitions, where populations can ‘tunnel’ into the cooperating phase below the critical value. At the same time, cooperating populations are unstable even above the critical value, because a group of defectors that are large enough can ‘nucleate’ such a transition. We study the mean-field theoretical predictions via agent-based simulations of finite populations using an evolutionary approach where the decisions to cooperate or to punish are encoded genetically in terms of evolvable probabilities. We recover the theoretical predictions and demonstrate that the population shows hysteresis, as expected in systems that exhibit super-heating and super-cooling. We conclude that punishment can stabilize populations of cooperators below the critical point, but it is a two-edged sword: it can also stabilize defectors above the critical point.

  3. Leadership and influence: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment on local public good provision

    OpenAIRE

    2011-01-01

    This paper studies the effect of leadership on the level and evolution of pro-social behavior using an artefactual field experiment on local public good provision. Participants decide how much to contribute to an actual conservation project. They can then revise their donations after being randomly matched in pairs on the basis of their authority and having observed each other’s contributions. Authority is measured through a social ranking exercise identifying formal and moral leaders within ...

  4. "I am Spartacus":Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Collaborative Obfuscation and Privacy as a Public Good

    OpenAIRE

    Kwecka, Z.; Buchanan, W.; Schafer, B; Rauhofer, J.

    2014-01-01

    The paper introduces an approach to privacy enhancing technologies that sees privacy not merely as an individual right, but as a public good. This idea finds its correspondence in our approach to privacy protection through obfuscation, where everybody in a group takes a small privacy risk to protect the anonymity of fellow group members. We show how these ideas can be computationally realised in an Investigative Data Acquisition Platform (IDAP). IDAP is an efficient symmetric Private Informat...

  5. The evolution of altruism in spatial threshold public goods games via an insurance mechanism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

    2015-05-01

    The persistence of cooperation in public goods situations has become an important puzzle for researchers. This paper considers the threshold public goods games where the option of insurance is provided for players from the standpoint of diversification of risk, envisaging the possibility of multiple strategies in such scenarios. In this setting, the provision point is defined in terms of the minimum number of contributors in one threshold public goods game, below which the game fails. In the presence of risk and insurance, more contributions are motivated if (1) only cooperators can opt to be insured and thus their contribution loss in the aborted games can be (partly or full) covered by the insurance; (2) insured cooperators obtain larger compensation, at lower values of the threshold point (the required minimum number of contributors). Moreover, results suggest the dominance of insured defectors who get a better promotion by more profitable benefits from insurance. We provide results of extensive computer simulations in the realm of spatial games (random regular networks and scale-free networks here), and support this study with analytical results for well-mixed populations. Our study is expected to establish a causal link between the widespread altruistic behaviors and the existing insurance system.

  6. The United Nations and Global Public Goods: Historical Contributions and Future Challenges.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bruce Jenks

    2012-03-01

    Full Text Available Published by Palgrave MacmillanThis chapter explores the thesis that the United Nations’ (UN most important contribution to the production of global public goods has been its role in creating the space and capacity to generate shared values. Starting with the UN Charter itself, the chapter traces the evolution of this contribution through different historical phases. It analyses the impact of globalisation on the role of the UN; in particular it identifies the quality of porousness as a product of globalisation which is critical to understanding the current challenges faced by the UN as well as central to the global public goods agenda. Through this lens the author briefly reviews the evolution of the UN’s role in the fields of peace and security, human rights and development cooperation. He concludes by identifying eight levers for change that will determine the UN’s ability to contribute significantly to the global public goods: the generation of norms and shared values, the quality of leadership, improved governance, innovative financing, institutional realignment, the further consolidation of legal instruments, focus, and the power of networks.

  7. Images of eyes enhance investments in a real-life public good.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Damien Francey

    Full Text Available A key issue in cooperation research is to determine the conditions under which individuals invest in a public good. Here, we tested whether cues of being watched increase investments in an anonymous public good situation in real life. We examined whether individuals would invest more by removing experimentally placed garbage (paper and plastic bottles from bus stop benches in Geneva in the presence of images of eyes compared to controls (images of flowers. We provided separate bins for each of both types of garbage to investigate whether individuals would deposit more items into the appropriate bin in the presence of eyes. The treatment had no effect on the likelihood that individuals present at the bus stop would remove garbage. However, those individuals that engaged in garbage clearing, and were thus likely affected by the treatment, invested more time to do so in the presence of eyes. Images of eyes had a direct effect on behaviour, rather than merely enhancing attention towards a symbolic sign requesting removal of garbage. These findings show that simple images of eyes can trigger reputational effects that significantly enhance on non-monetary investments in anonymous public goods under real life conditions. We discuss our results in the light of previous findings and suggest that human social behaviour may often be shaped by relatively simple and potentially unconscious mechanisms instead of very complex cognitive capacities.

  8. Physiological framework for the regulation of quorum sensing-dependent public goods in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mellbye, Brett; Schuster, Martin

    2014-03-01

    Many bacteria possess cell density-dependent quorum-sensing (QS) systems that often regulate cooperative secretions involved in host-microbe or microbe-microbe interactions. These secretions, or "public goods," are frequently coregulated by stress and starvation responses. Here we provide a physiological rationale for such regulatory complexity in the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Using minimal-medium batch and chemostat cultures, we comprehensively characterized specific growth rate-limiting macronutrients as key triggers for the expression of extracellular enzymes and metabolites directly controlled by the las and rhl QS systems. Expression was unrelated to cell density, depended on the secreted product's elemental composition, and was induced only when the limiting nutrient was not also a building block of the product; rhl-dependent products showed the strongest response, caused by the largely las-independent induction of the regulator RhlR and its cognate signal. In agreement with the prominent role of the rhl system, slow growth inverted the las-to-rhl signal ratio, previously considered a characteristic distinguishing between planktonic and biofilm lifestyles. Our results highlight a supply-driven, metabolically prudent regulation of public goods that minimizes production costs and thereby helps stabilize cooperative behavior. Such regulation would be beneficial for QS-dependent public goods that act broadly and nonspecifically, and whose need cannot always be accurately assessed by the producing cell. Clear differences in the capacities of the las and rhl systems to integrate starvation signals help explain the existence of multiple QS systems in one cell.

  9. Punishment Mechanism with Self-Adjusting Rules in Spatial Voluntary Public Goods Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Zhong-Wei; Xu, Zhao-Jin; Zhang, Lian-Zhong

    2014-11-01

    The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the “tragedy of the commons”. The recent research shows that high punishment can improve the cooperation of the population. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into spatial voluntary public goods games with every individual only knowing his own payoff in each round. Using the self-adjusting rules, we find that the different cost for punishment can lead to different effects on the voluntary public goods games. Especially, when the cost for punishment is decreased, a higher contribution region will appear in the case of low r value. It means even for the low r value, individuals can form the contributing groups in large quantities to produce a more efficient outcome than that in moderate r value. In addition, we also find the players' memory can have effects on the average outcome of the population.

  10. Is quality of cardiac hospital care a public or private good?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Hsueh-Fen; Bazzoli, Gloria J; Harless, David W; Clement, Jan P

    2010-11-01

    There are many studies examining the effects of financial pressure from different payment sources on hospital quality of care, but most have assumed that quality of care is a public good in that payment changes from one payer will affect all hospital patients rather than just those directly associated with the payer. Although quality of hospital care can be either a public or private good, few studies have tested which of these scenarios are more likely to hold. To examine whether the change in the magnitude of in-hospital mortality for Medicare and managed care patients is different based on financial pressure resulting from the Balanced Budget Act and growing managed care market penetration; and to examine what role hospital competition may play in affecting these changes. The unit of analysis for the study was the hospital. Multiple data sources were used including the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality State Inpatient Databases, American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, Area Resource File, and health maintenance organization data from InterStudy. A difference-in-difference-in-difference model was applied for a 2-period panel design. In general, Balanced Budget Act financial pressure and managed care market share did not magnify the difference in in-hospital mortality rates between Medicare and managed care patients. The results suggest that quality of cardiac care in the hospital setting is more likely to be a public good; however, more investigation using other quality indicators and the role of hospital competition under different payment systems is recommended.

  11. Fostering cooperation of selfish agents through public goods in relation to the loners

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Chen, Zengqiang; Liu, Zhongxin

    2016-03-01

    Altruistic behaviors in multiplayer groups have obtained great attention in the context of the public goods game, which poses a riddle from the evolutionary viewpoint. Here we focus on a particular type of public goods game model in which the benefits of cooperation are either discounted or synergistically enhanced at the appearance of multiple cooperators in a group. Moreover, we focus on the three-strategies profile by adding the role of loners, besides the often-used cooperation and defection. Using the replicator dynamic equations, we investigate a range of dynamical portraits that characterizes the properties of the steady state. Analysis results indicate that loners and cooperators both have chances to be the stable equilibrium points in the presence of perturbations, while defectors fail to do so in this three-strategy competition. Moreover, the coexistence state, in which all three strategies exist in equilibrium, can be led by suitable parameters and stabilized for perturbations. These results elucidate the interplay between the characteristics of the public goods game and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

  12. Fostering cooperation of selfish agents through public goods in relation to the loners.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Chen, Zengqiang; Liu, Zhongxin

    2016-03-01

    Altruistic behaviors in multiplayer groups have obtained great attention in the context of the public goods game, which poses a riddle from the evolutionary viewpoint. Here we focus on a particular type of public goods game model in which the benefits of cooperation are either discounted or synergistically enhanced at the appearance of multiple cooperators in a group. Moreover, we focus on the three-strategies profile by adding the role of loners, besides the often-used cooperation and defection. Using the replicator dynamic equations, we investigate a range of dynamical portraits that characterizes the properties of the steady state. Analysis results indicate that loners and cooperators both have chances to be the stable equilibrium points in the presence of perturbations, while defectors fail to do so in this three-strategy competition. Moreover, the coexistence state, in which all three strategies exist in equilibrium, can be led by suitable parameters and stabilized for perturbations. These results elucidate the interplay between the characteristics of the public goods game and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

  13. Constructing "sound science" and "good epidemiology": tobacco, lawyers, and public relations firms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ong, E K; Glantz, S A

    2001-11-01

    The tobacco industry has attacked "junk science" to discredit the evidence that secondhand smoke-among other environmental toxins-causes disease. Philip Morris used public relations firms and lawyers to develop a "sound science" program in the United States and Europe that involved recruiting other industries and issues to obscure the tobacco industry's role. The European "sound science" plans included a version of "good epidemiological practices" that would make it impossible to conclude that secondhand smoke-and thus other environmental toxins-caused diseases. Public health professionals need to be aware that the "sound science" movement is not an indigenous effort from within the profession to improve the quality of scientific discourse, but reflects sophisticated public relations campaigns controlled by industry executives and lawyers whose aim is to manipulate the standards of scientific proof to serve the corporate interests of their clients.

  14. Constructing “Sound Science” and “Good Epidemiology”: Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ong, Elisa K.; Glantz, Stanton A.

    2001-01-01

    The tobacco industry has attacked “junk science” to discredit the evidence that secondhand smoke—among other environmental toxins—causes disease. Philip Morris used public relations firms and lawyers to develop a “sound science” program in the United States and Europe that involved recruiting other industries and issues to obscure the tobacco industry's role. The European “sound science” plans included a version of “good epidemiological practices” that would make it impossible to conclude that secondhand smoke—and thus other environmental toxins—caused diseases. Public health professionals need to be aware that the “sound science” movement is not an indigenous effort from within the profession to improve the quality of scientific discourse, but reflects sophisticated public relations campaigns controlled by industry executives and lawyers whose aim is to manipulate the standards of scientific proof to serve the corporate interests of their clients. PMID:11684593

  15. Individual differences in behavioural inhibition explain free riding in public good games when punishment is expected but not implemented

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Skatova Anya

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The literature on social dilemmas and punishment focuses on the behaviour of the punisher. However, to fully explain the effect of punishment on cooperation, it is important to understand the psychological mechanisms influencing the behaviour of those who expect to be punished. This paper examines whether the expectation of punishment, rather than the implementation of punishment is sufficient to prevent individuals from free riding. Individual differences in the punishment sensitivity have been linked to both threat responses (flight, fight, fear system, or the FFFS and to the response to the uncertainty of punishment (BIS-anxiety.The paper, therefore, examines if individual differences in BIS-anxiety and FFFS can explain some of the variability in free riding in the face of implemented and non-implemented punishment. Methods Participants took part in a series of one-shot Public Goods Games (PGGs facing two punishment conditions (implemented and non-implemented and two standard non-punishment PGGs. The punishment was implemented as a centralized authority punishment (i.e., if one participant contributed less than their group members, they were automatically fined. Individual contribution levels and presence/absence of zero contributions indexed free riding. Individual differences in behavioural inhibition were assessed. Results Individuals contributed more under the threat of punishment (both implemented and non-implemented. However, individuals contributed less when the punishment was not implemented compared to when it was. Those scoring high in BIS-anxiety contributed more when the punishment expectations were not implemented. This effect was not observed for FFFS. Conclusion Supporting previous research, punishment had a powerful effect in increasing contribution levels in the PGGs. However, when expected punishment was not implemented, individual differences in punishment sensitivity, specifically in BIS-anxiety, were

  16. Efficiency and Sustainability of Local Public Goods and Services. Case Study for Romania

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marius Sorin Dincă

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available The aim of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency and sustainability of some local publicly-provided services (social, educational, public utilities. We have measured the Romanian local administrations expenditures’ efficiency in supplying public goods and services using the non-parametric model of data envelopment analysis. The appraisal of efficiency and sustainability is mandatory when studying the optimization of public sector costs born out of taxpayers’ money and the increase in the quantity and quality of supplied services. The services we have selected for this article cover many aspects of citizens’ life quality. We have processed data from 2011 for all 41 Romanian counties and the municipality of Bucharest. For each decision unit, we have established a technical score, either quantifying the efficiency of expenditures allocated for supplying a certain level of services or measuring results’ sustainability in terms of services rendered to local collectivities, considering a constant expenditure level. Based on the analyzed data, we have concluded that only 11 counties satisfy the required conditions. Furthermore, units registering a lower level of per capita expenditures have efficiency scores above the overall average, while counties with more citizens/taxpayers provided more public services compared to others.

  17. Public investment does not crowd out private supply of environmental goods on private land.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duncan, David H; Kyle, Garreth; Morris, William K; Smith, F Patrick

    2014-04-01

    In landscapes where private land tenure is prevalent, public funds for ecological landscape restoration are sometimes spent subsidising the revegetation of cleared land, and the protection of remnant vegetation from livestock. However, the total area treated may be unclear because such projects are not always recorded, and landholders may undertake similar activities without subsidisation. In the absence of empirical data, in the state of Victoria, Australia, a reporting assumption has been employed that suggests that wholly privately funded sites match publicly subsidised sites on a hectare for hectare basis (a so-called "x2" assumption). Conversely, the "crowding out" theory of investment in public goods such as environmental benefits suggests that public investment may supplant private motivation. Using aerial photography we mapped the extent of revegetation, native vegetation fencing and restoration on 71 representative landholdings in rural south-eastern Australia. We interviewed each landholder and recorded the age and funding model of each site. Contrary to the local "x2" reporting assumption, about 75% of the total area of the 412 sites was from subsidised sites, and that proportion was far higher for the period after 1997. However, rather than displacing unsubsidised activity, our modelling showed that landholders who had recently been subsidised for a project were more likely to have subsequently completed unsubsidised work. This indicates that, at least in terms of medium-term economic impact, the large increase in public subsidies did not diminish privately funded activity, as might be expected according to the theory of crowding out.

  18. Allelopathy as an emergent, exploitable public good in the bloom-forming microalga Prymnesium parvum.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Driscoll, William W; Espinosa, Noelle J; Eldakar, Omar T; Hackett, Jeremiah D

    2013-06-01

    Many microbes cooperatively secrete extracellular products that favorably modify their environment. Consistent with social evolution theory, structured habitats play a role in maintaining these traits in microbial model systems, by localizing the benefits and separating strains that invest in these products from 'cheater' strains that benefit without paying the cost. It is thus surprising that many unicellular, well-mixed microalgal populations invest in extracellular toxins that confer ecological benefits upon the entire population, for example, by eliminating nutrient competitors (allelopathy). Here we test the hypotheses that microalgal exotoxins are (1) exploitable public goods that benefit all cells, regardless of investment, or (2) nonexploitable private goods involved in cell-level functions. We test these hypotheses with high-toxicity (TOX+) and low-toxicity (TOX-) strains of the damaging, mixotrophic microalga Prymnesium parvum and two common competitors: green algae and diatoms. TOX+ actually benefits from dense populations of competing green algae, which can also be prey for P. parvum, yielding a relative fitness advantage over coexisting TOX-. However, with nonprey competitors (diatoms), TOX- increases in frequency over TOX+, despite benefiting from the exclusion of diatoms by TOX+. An evolutionary unstable, ecologically devastating public good may emerge from traits selected at lower levels expressed in novel environments. © 2013 The Author(s). Evolution © 2013 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

  19. Regulatory theory: commercially sustainable markets rely upon satisfying the public interest in obtaining credible goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warren-Jones, Amanda

    2017-10-01

    Regulatory theory is premised on the failure of markets, prompting a focus on regulators and industry from economic perspectives. This article argues that overlooking the public interest in the sustainability of commercial markets risks markets failing completely. This point is exemplified through health care markets - meeting an essential need - and focuses upon innovative medicines as the most desired products in that market. If this seemingly invulnerable market risks failure, there is a pressing need to consider the public interest in sustainable markets within regulatory literature and practice. Innovative medicines are credence goods, meaning that the sustainability of the market fundamentally relies upon the public trusting regulators to vouch for product quality. Yet, quality is being eroded by patent bodies focused on economic benefits from market growth, rather than ensuring innovatory value. Remunerative bodies are not funding medicines relative to market value, and market authorisation bodies are not vouching for robust safety standards or confining market entry to products for 'unmet medical need'. Arguably, this failure to assure quality heightens the risk of the market failing where it cannot be substituted by the reputation or credibility of providers of goods and/or information such as health care professionals/institutions, patient groups or industry.

  20. Does the "Celtic Tiger" Society Need to Debate the Role of Higher Education and the Public Good?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fisher, Sandra

    2006-01-01

    Calls for sustaining and increasing investment in higher education are often made on the basis that higher education is a "public good". The idea of higher education as a public good is frequently conceptualised in terms of its contribution to economic development. If more people participate in higher education then society as a whole…

  1. The Public Good and Academic Capitalism: Science and Engineering Doctoral Students and Faculty on the Boundary of Knowledge Regimes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szelényi, Katalin; Bresonis, Kate

    2014-01-01

    This article examines the research-related experiences of 48 doctoral students and 22 faculty in science and engineering fields at three research universities, with specific emphasis on the intersection of the public good and academic capitalism. Identifying an expansive, intersecting organizational space between the public good and academic…

  2. The Public Good and Academic Capitalism: Science and Engineering Doctoral Students and Faculty on the Boundary of Knowledge Regimes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szelényi, Katalin; Bresonis, Kate

    2014-01-01

    This article examines the research-related experiences of 48 doctoral students and 22 faculty in science and engineering fields at three research universities, with specific emphasis on the intersection of the public good and academic capitalism. Identifying an expansive, intersecting organizational space between the public good and academic…

  3. God's punishment and public goods : A test of the supernatural punishment hypothesis in 186 world cultures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, Dominic D P

    2005-12-01

    Cooperation towards public goods relies on credible threats of punishment to deter cheats. However, punishing is costly, so it remains unclear who incurred the costs of enforcement in our evolutionary past. Theoretical work suggests that human cooperation may be promoted if people believe in supernatural punishment for moral transgressions. This theory is supported by new work in cognitive psychology and by anecdotal ethnographic evidence, but formal quantitative tests remain to be done. Using data from 186 societies around the globe, I test whether the likelihood of supernatural punishment-indexed by the importance of moralizing "high gods"-is associated with cooperation.

  4. Reciprocity in Locating Contributions: Experiments on the Neighborhood Public Good Game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephan Schosser

    2013-04-01

    Full Text Available In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field.

  5. Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game

    CERN Document Server

    Chen, Xiaojie; Perc, Matjaz

    2015-01-01

    Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest level of public cooperation is always attainable through a selection mechanism. Interestingly, the selection not necessarily favors the evolution of punishers who would be able to prevail on their own against the defectors, nor does it always hinder the evolution of punishers who would be unable to prevail on their own. Instead, the evolutionary success of punishing strategies depends sensitively on their invasion velocities, which in turn reveals fascinating examples of both competition and cooperation among them. Furthermore, we show that under favorable conditions, when punishment is not strictly necessary for the main...

  6. Group-size effects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila; 10.1103/PhysRevE.84.047102

    2011-01-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the effects that are brought about by different sizes of groups where individuals collect their payoffs and search for potential strategy donors. We find that increasing the group size does not necessarily lead to mean-field behavior, as is traditionally observed for games governed by pairwise interactions, but rather that public cooperation may be additionally promoted by means of enhanced spatial reciprocity that sets in for very large groups. Our results highlight that the promotion of cooperation due to spatial interactions is not rooted solely in having restricted connections amongst players, but also in individuals having the opportunity to collect payoffs separately from their direct opponents. Moreover, in large groups the presence of a small number of defectors is bearable, which makes the mixed phase region expand with increasing group size. Having a chance of exploiting distant players, however, offers de...

  7. Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Pei, Zhenhua; Du, Jinming

    2016-01-01

    Income redistribution is the transfer of income from some individuals to others directly or indirectly by means of social mechanisms, such as taxation, public services and so on. Employing a spatial public goods game, we study the influence of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation. Two kinds of evolutionary models are constructed, which describe local and global redistribution of income respectively. In the local model, players have to pay part of their income after each PGG and the accumulated income is redistributed to the members. While in the global model, all the players pay part of their income after engaging in all the local PGGs, which are centered on himself and his nearest neighbours, and the accumulated income is redistributed to the whole population. We show that the cooperation prospers significantly with increasing income expenditure proportion in the local redistribution of income, while in the global model the situation is opposite. Furthermore, the cooperation drops dramatical...

  8. Interaction effects of cell diffusion, cell density and public goods properties on the evolution of cooperation in digital microbes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dobay, A; Bagheri, H C; Messina, A; Kümmerli, R; Rankin, D J

    2014-09-01

    Microbial cooperation typically consists in the sharing of secreted metabolites (referred to as public goods) within the community. Although public goods generally promote population growth, they are also vulnerable to exploitation by cheating mutants, which no longer contribute, but still benefit from the public goods produced by others. Although previous studies have identified a number of key factors that prevent the spreading of cheaters, little is known about how these factors interact and jointly shape the evolution of microbial cooperation. Here, we address this issue by investigating the interaction effects of cell diffusion, cell density, public good diffusion and durability (factors known to individually influence costs and benefits of public goods production) on selection for cooperation. To be able to quantify these effects across a wide parameter space, we developed an individual-based simulation platform, consisting of digital cooperator and cheater bacteria inhabiting a finite two-dimensional continuous toroidal surface. Our simulations, which closely mimic microbial microcolony growth, revealed that: (i) either reduced cell diffusion (which keeps cooperators together) or reduced public good diffusion (which keeps the public goods closer to the producer) is not only essential but also sufficient for cooperation to be promoted; (ii) the sign of selection for or against cooperation can change as a function of cell density and in interaction with diffusion parameters; and (iii) increased public goods durability has opposing effects on the evolution of cooperation depending on the level of cell and public good diffusion. Our work highlights that interactions between key parameters of public goods cooperation give rise to complex fitness landscapes, a finding that calls for multifactorial approaches when studying microbial cooperation in natural systems.

  9. Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games

    OpenAIRE

    Hauert, Christoph; Holmes, Miranda; Doebeli, Michael

    2006-01-01

    The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and publ...

  10. An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation, Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier

    2013-01-01

    We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment. PMID:24260101

  11. An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Moritz Hetzer

    Full Text Available We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

  12. State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

    2015-01-01

    We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it...... the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters’ characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting.......We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions......, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting...

  13. Effect of heterogeneous investments on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Keke; Wang, Tao; Cheng, Yuan; Zheng, Xiaoping

    2015-01-01

    Understanding the emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game remains a grand challenge across disciplines. In most previous studies, it is assumed that the investments of all the cooperators are identical, and often equal to 1. However, it is worth mentioning that players are diverse and heterogeneous when choosing actions in the rapidly developing modern society and researchers have shown more interest to the heterogeneity of players recently. For modeling the heterogeneous players without loss of generality, it is assumed in this work that the investment of a cooperator is a random variable with uniform distribution, the mean value of which is equal to 1. The results of extensive numerical simulations convincingly indicate that heterogeneous investments can promote cooperation. Specifically, a large value of the variance of the random variable can decrease the two critical values for the result of behavioral evolution effectively. Moreover, the larger the variance is, the better the promotion effect will be. In addition, this article has discussed the impact of heterogeneous investments when the coevolution of both strategy and investment is taken into account. Comparing the promotion effect of coevolution of strategy and investment with that of strategy imitation only, we can conclude that the coevolution of strategy and investment decreases the asymptotic fraction of cooperators by weakening the heterogeneity of investments, which further demonstrates that heterogeneous investments can promote cooperation in spatial public goods game.

  14. Cell-cell contacts confine public goods diffusion inside Pseudomonas aeruginosa clonal microcolonies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Julou, Thomas; Mora, Thierry; Guillon, Laurent; Croquette, Vincent; Schalk, Isabelle J; Bensimon, David; Desprat, Nicolas

    2013-07-30

    The maintenance of cooperation in populations where public goods are equally accessible to all but inflict a fitness cost on individual producers is a long-standing puzzle of evolutionary biology. An example of such a scenario is the secretion of siderophores by bacteria into their environment to fetch soluble iron. In a planktonic culture, these molecules diffuse rapidly, such that the same concentration is experienced by all bacteria. However, on solid substrates, bacteria form dense and packed colonies that may alter the diffusion dynamics through cell-cell contact interactions. In Pseudomonas aeruginosa microcolonies growing on solid substrate, we found that the concentration of pyoverdine, a secreted iron chelator, is heterogeneous, with a maximum at the center of the colony. We quantitatively explain the formation of this gradient by local exchange between contacting cells rather than by global diffusion of pyoverdine. In addition, we show that this local trafficking modulates the growth rate of individual cells. Taken together, these data provide a physical basis that explains the stability of public goods production in packed colonies.

  15. Public good dynamics drive evolution of iron acquisition strategies in natural bacterioplankton populations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cordero, Otto X; Ventouras, Laure-Anne; DeLong, Edward F; Polz, Martin F

    2012-12-01

    A common strategy among microbes living in iron-limited environments is the secretion of siderophores, which can bind poorly soluble iron and make it available to cells via active transport mechanisms. Such siderophore-iron complexes can be thought of as public goods that can be exploited by local communities and drive diversification, for example by the evolution of "cheating." However, it is unclear whether bacterial populations in the environment form stable enough communities such that social interactions significantly impact evolutionary dynamics. Here we show that public good games drive the evolution of iron acquisition strategies in wild populations of marine bacteria. We found that within nonclonal but ecologically cohesive genotypic clusters of closely related Vibrionaceae, only an intermediate percentage of genotypes are able to produce siderophores. Nonproducers within these clusters exhibited selective loss of siderophore biosynthetic pathways, whereas siderophore transport mechanisms were retained, suggesting that these nonproducers can act as cheaters that benefit from siderophore producers in their local environment. In support of this hypothesis, these nonproducers in iron-limited media suffer a significant decrease in growth, which can be alleviated by siderophores, presumably owing to the retention of transport mechanisms. Moreover, using ecological data of resource partitioning, we found that cheating coevolves with the ecological specialization toward association with larger particles in the water column, suggesting that these can harbor stable enough communities for dependencies among organisms to evolve.

  16. A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhong, Li-Xin; Xu, Wen-Juan; He, Yun-Xin; Zhong, Chen-Yang; Chen, Rong-Da; Qiu, Tian; Shi, Yong-Dong; Ren, Fei

    2017-08-01

    Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual contribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found.

  17. Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; Nax, Heinrich H; West, Stuart A

    2015-02-22

    Economic games such as the public goods game are increasingly being used to measure social behaviours in humans and non-human primates. The results of such games have been used to argue that people are pro-social, and that humans are uniquely altruistic, willingly sacrificing their own welfare in order to benefit others. However, an alternative explanation for the empirical observations is that individuals are mistaken, but learn, during the game, how to improve their personal payoff. We test between these competing hypotheses, by comparing the explanatory power of different behavioural rules, in public goods games, where individuals are given different amounts of information. We find: (i) that individual behaviour is best explained by a learning rule that is trying to maximize personal income; (ii) that conditional cooperation disappears when the consequences of cooperation are made clearer; and (iii) that social preferences, if they exist, are more anti-social than pro-social. © 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

  18. Resource and competitive dynamics shape the benefits of public goods cooperation in a plant pathogen.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Platt, Thomas G; Fuqua, Clay; Bever, James D

    2012-06-01

    Cooperative benefits depend on a variety of ecological factors. Many cooperative bacteria increase the population size of their groups by making a public good available. Increased local population size can alleviate the constraints of kin competition on the evolution of cooperation by enhancing the between-group fitness of cooperators. The cooperative pathogenesis of Agrobacterium tumefaciens causes infected plants to exude opines--resources that provide a nearly exclusive source of nutrient for the pathogen. We experimentally demonstrate that opines provide cooperative A. tumefaciens cells a within-group fitness advantage over saprophytic agrobacteria. Our results are congruent with a resource-consumer competition model, which predicts that cooperative, virulent agrobacteria are at a competitive disadvantage when opines are unavailable, but have an advantage when opines are available at sufficient levels. This model also predicts that freeloading agrobacteria that catabolize opines but cannot infect plants competitively displace the cooperative pathogen from all environments. However, we show that these cooperative public goods also promote increased local population size. A model built from the Price Equation shows that this effect on group size can contribute to the persistence of cooperative pathogenesis despite inherent kin competition for the benefits of pathogenesis.

  19. 从“善有恶报”看当今社会的伦理困境%A Critical Look at Ethical Dilemma in Contemporary Society from "One Good Turn Never Deserves Another"

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    李仁; 吴杨婷

    2011-01-01

    Based on the analysis of the various immoral phenomena caused by some people′s ill-treatment towards good deeds,starting from the moral options of utilitarianism as well as the ineffectiveness of the moral law,the paper critically analyzed the ethical dilemma in contemporary society,and proposed relevant measures to solve current moral problems.%分析各种"善有恶报"的不道德现象,从功利主义的道德选择和道德律令的失效着手,深入剖析当今社会的伦理困境,在此基础上提出解决现存道德问题的相应对策。

  20. Decelerated invasion and waning-moon patterns in public goods games with delayed distribution.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

    2013-05-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, focusing on the effects that are brought about by the delayed distribution of goods that accumulate in groups due to the continuous investments of cooperators. We find that intermediate delays enhance network reciprocity because of a decelerated invasion of defectors, who are unable to reap the same high short-term benefits as they do in the absence of delayed distribution. Long delays, however, introduce a risk because the large accumulated wealth might fall into the wrong hands. Indeed, as soon as the curvature of a cooperative cluster turns negative, the engulfed defectors can collect the heritage of many generations of cooperators and by doing so start a waning-moon pattern that nullifies the benefits of decelerated invasion. Accidental meeting points of growing cooperative clusters may also act as triggers for the waning-moon effect, thus linking the success of cooperators with their propensity to fail in a rather bizarre way. Our results highlight that "investing in the future" is a good idea only if that future is sufficiently near and not likely to be burdened by inflation.

  1. Antisocial Punishment in Two Social Dilemmas

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Enrique eFatas

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and an otherwise identical social dilemma in which the minimum contribution determines the group outcome. Experiments were run in a culture with traditionally high antisocial punishment (Southern Europe. We replicate the detrimental effect of antisocial sanctions on cooperation in the linear case. However, we find that punishment is still widely effective when actions are complementary: the provision of the public good significantly and substantially increases with sanctions, participants punish significantly less and sanctions radically transform conditional cooperation patterns to generate significant welfare gains.

  2. Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xiaojie; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

    2015-07-01

    Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest level of public cooperation is always attainable through a selection mechanism. Interestingly, the selection does not necessarily favor the evolution of punishers who would be able to prevail on their own against the defectors, nor does it always hinder the evolution of punishers who would be unable to prevail on their own. Instead, the evolutionary success of punishing strategies depends sensitively on their invasion velocities, which in turn reveals fascinating examples of both competition and cooperation among them. Furthermore, we show that under favorable conditions, when punishment is not strictly necessary for the maintenance of public cooperation, the less aggressive, mild form of sanctioning is the sole victor of the selection process. Our work reveals that natural strategy selection cannot only promote, but sometimes also hinders competition among prosocial strategies.

  3. Using Lotteries to Finance Public Goods%用彩票为公共品融资

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    侯向群; 刘杰

    2012-01-01

    For the free-ride problem in voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) of public goods and inefficiency that govemment provides public goods, we need to seek new financing mechanism to manage public goods. The relevance literature based on microcosmic behavior of individual indicates lotteries as one kind of financing can solve the two problems mentioned above. But some other conclusions from these analyses can not be explained fully by the theory existing, such as poor people buying the lottery, underground lottery and the problem of lottery and equality. This paper based on a basic model introduces the current situation and the problems facing lottery research.%一方面私人总是因为可以搭便车而缺乏提供公共品的激励,另一方面社会中又总是存在由私人提供公共品的现象。这两种现象的并存表明有一种既能消除私人自愿供给的“搭便车”问题,也能实现社会最优水平公共品供给机制的可能。近年来国外相关研究表明:彩票作为一种融资工具能较好地解决上述两大问题。但各国的实践证明了这一点的同时,也存在目前理论无法解释的问题,如穷人博彩,地下彩票,彩票与平等问题。本文围绕彩票作为公共品融资工具这一中心,系统地介绍了国内外已有文献关于彩票研究的现状及其问题,以便为我国寻求新的公共品融资机制提供理论参考。

  4. Public goods and private interests: The role of voluntary green power demand in achieving environmental improvements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wiser, Ryan Hayes

    This dissertation explores the role of consumer purchasing behavior in providing public, environmental goods. It does so by empirically evaluating one market---voluntary demand for renewable energy. The dissertation addresses the following five research questions: (1) What does early experience with green power marketing tell us about the prospects for this market to deliver environmental benefits? (2) What product design and marketing approaches might be used to increase voluntary demand? (3) What motivates non-residential customers to voluntarily purchase green power? (4) What role might public policy play in the creation of the green power market? (5) What preferences do individuals hold on the most appropriate forms of support for renewable energy? By helping to answer these questions, this dissertation seeks to better understand the gap between widespread positive attitudes for the environment and an often-anemic response to green product offerings. It contributes to not only the public goods and environmental marketing literatures, but also to contingent valuation methodology and to an emerging literature on the motivations of firms to contribute to environmental causes. The analysis performed is diverse, and includes: a literature review, a mail survey of green power marketers, a mail survey of non-residential green power customers, and contingent valuation and opinion surveys of U.S. residents. Detailed statistical analysis is performed on the data collected from the residential and non-residential surveys. The analysis reveals that customer participation in green power programs to date has been weak. The possibility that the traditional economic concept of "free riding" may explain this low response is raised, and the dissertation identifies a number of marketing approaches that might be used to partially combat this problem. Analysis of survey data shows that non-residential green power purchases have been motivated principally by altruistic concerns

  5. Cycles of strategies and changes of distribution in public goods game: An experimental investigation

    CERN Document Server

    Xu, Bin

    2013-01-01

    In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated by means of velocity. It is, furthermore, elaborated that the strategies of cooperation, defection and nonparticipant form a Rock-Paper-Scissors type cycle, and the cycle of three strategies are persistent over 200 rounds. This cycle is very similar to the cycle given by evolutionary dynamics e.g. replicator dynamics. The mechanism that nonparticipant can sustain cooperation is driven by the Rock-Paper-Scissors type of cyclic dominance in the three strategies. That is, if the cycle is existent, the cooperation will always sustain. Meanwhile, the distribution of social states changes in the state space and from cooperation as the most frequent strategy to defection and, from defection to nonparticipant, forms a clear rotation path in a long run. These results seem to implicate that the evolutio...

  6. The global warming, public goods and carbon market; Calentamiento global, bienes publicos y mercado de carbono

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Quadri de la Torre, Gabriel [EcoSecurities (Mexico)

    2007-07-15

    The global warming is an issue of the public goods, and demands an outstanding multilateral action, which must to ensure both efficiency and unchanging transition towards an economy of low intensity of carbon. The new system, which is going to replace the Kyoto Protocol, will have compromises for the developing countries and deep implication in the relative competitivity of the nations and companies. [Spanish] El calentamiento global es un problema de bienes publicos que exige una extraordinaria accion multilateral. Esta debe asegurar eficiencia y una transicion fluida hacia una economia de baja intensidad de carbono. El nuevo sistema que sucedera al Protocolo de Kyoto significara compromisos para los paises en vias de desarrollo, y tendra profundas implicaciones en la competitividad relativa de naciones y empresas.

  7. Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations

    CERN Document Server

    Helbing, Dirk; Perc, Matjaz; Szabo, Gyorgy

    2010-01-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of costly punishment, besides the usual strategy adoption dynamics we also apply strategy mutations. As expected, frequent mutations create kind of well-mixed conditions, which support the spreading of defectors. However, when the mutation rate is small, the final stationary state does not significantly differ from the state of the mutation-free model, independently of the values of the punishment fine and cost. Nevertheless, the mutation rate affects the relaxation dynamics. Rare mutations can largely accelerate the spreading of costly punishment. This is due to the fact that the presence of defectors breaks the balance of power between both cooperative strategies, which leads to a different kind of dynamics.

  8. Reciprocity in spatial evolutionary public goods game on double-layered network

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Jinho; Yook, Soon-Hyung; Kim, Yup

    2016-08-01

    Spatial evolutionary games have mainly been studied on a single, isolated network. However, in real world systems, many interaction topologies are not isolated but many different types of networks are inter-connected to each other. In this study, we investigate the spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) on double-layered random networks (DRN). Based on the mean-field type arguments and numerical simulations, we find that SEPGG on DRN shows very rich interesting phenomena, especially, depending on the size of each layer, intra-connectivity, and inter-connected couplings, the network reciprocity of SEPGG on DRN can be drastically enhanced through the inter-connected coupling. Furthermore, SEPGG on DRN can provide a more general framework which includes the evolutionary dynamics on multiplex networks and inter-connected networks at the same time.

  9. Spatial evolutionary public goods game on complete graph and dense complex networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Jinho; Chae, Huiseung; Yook, Soon-Hyung; Kim, Yup

    2015-03-23

    We study the spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) with voluntary or optional participation on a complete graph (CG) and on dense networks. Based on analyses of the SEPGG rate equation on finite CG, we find that SEPGG has two stable states depending on the value of multiplication factor r, illustrating how the "tragedy of the commons" and "an anomalous state without any active participants" occurs in real-life situations. When r is low (). We also derive the exact scaling relation for r*. All of the results are confirmed by numerical simulation. Furthermore, we find that a cooperator-dominant state emerges when the number of participants or the mean degree, 〈k〉, decreases. We also investigate the scaling dependence of the emergence of cooperation on r and 〈k〉. These results show how "tragedy of the commons" disappears when cooperation between egoistic individuals without any additional socioeconomic punishment increases.

  10. Chimera states in a network-organized public goods game with destructive agents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kouvaris, Nikos E.; Requejo, Rubén J.; Hizanidis, Johanne; Díaz-Guilera, Albert

    2016-12-01

    We found that a network-organized metapopulation of cooperators, defectors, and destructive agents playing the public goods game with mutations can collectively reach global synchronization or chimera states. Global synchronization is accompanied by a collective periodic burst of cooperation, whereas chimera states reflect the tendency of the networked metapopulation to be fragmented in clusters of synchronous and incoherent bursts of cooperation. Numerical simulations have shown that the system's dynamics switches between these two steady states through a first order transition. Depending on the parameters determining the dynamical and topological properties, chimera states with different numbers of coherent and incoherent clusters are observed. Our results present the first systematic study of chimera states and their characterization in the context of evolutionary game theory. This provides a valuable insight into the details of their occurrence, extending the relevance of such states to natural and social systems.

  11. Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game

    CERN Document Server

    Helbing, Dirk; Perc, Matjaz; Szabo, Gyorgy

    2010-01-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies loose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In case of cooperating punishers, increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishin...

  12. Stickers versus wafers: The value of resource in a public goods game with children

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Phiética Raíssa Rodrigues da Silva

    Full Text Available Abstract We investigated how the type of resource, food (wafer or non-food (sticker, age and sex influence cooperation in children. 251 children were tested in a public goods game during eight rounds in two experimental conditions: wafer or sticker condition. Wafers were all of the same kind but stickers were varied. The results indicated that 1 older children donated more stickers than younger children, but they did not differ in relation to wafer donations; and 2 sticker donations remained high along the rounds, while wafer donations decreased. We propose that different strategies may be adopted according to the quality, particularly to the diversity of the resource used, and the cost of cooperation may be overcome when it is more advantageous to wait for a future reward.

  13. The evolution of human mobility based on the public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yan, Shiqing

    2017-07-01

    We explore the evolution of human mobility behavior based on public goods game. By using mean field method, the population distribution in different regions is theoretical calculated. Numerical simulation results show that the correlation between the region's degree and its final population is not significant under a larger human migration rate. Human mobility could effectively promote cooperative behavior and the population balance of different regions. Therefore, encouraging individuals to migrate may increase the total benefits of the whole society. Moreover, increasing the cooperation cost could reduce the number of cooperators, and that would happen to the correlation between the region's degree and its final population. The results indicate the total population could not dramatically rise with the region's degree under an unfair society.

  14. Group penalty on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Chunyan; Zhang, Jianlei; Xie, Guangming; Wang, Long

    2010-12-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that aims to integrate group penalty into the framework of evolutionary games. Existing groups are deleted whenever the collective gains of the focal individuals are less than a deletion threshold value. Meanwhile, newcomers are added after each game iteration to maintain the fixed population size. The networking effect is also studied via four representative interaction networks which are associated with the population structure. We conclude that the cooperation level has a strong dependence on the deletion threshold, and the suitable value range of the deletion threshold which is associated with the maximal cooperation frequency has been found. Simulation results also show that optimum values of the deletion threshold can still warrant the most potent promotion of cooperation, irrespective of which of the four topologies is applied.

  15. Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila; Czako, Lilla

    2011-01-01

    We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by imitation based on random sequential comparison of neighbors' payoff for a fixed level of noise. Using numerical simulations we have evaluated the strategy frequencies and phase diagrams when varying the synergy factor, punishment cost, and fine. Our attention is focused on two extreme cases describing all the relevant behaviors in such a complex system. According to our numerical data peer punishers prevail and control the system behavior in a large segments of parameters while pool punishers can only survive in the limit of weak peer punishment when a rich variety of solutions is observed. Paradoxically, the two types of punishment may extinguish each other's impact resulting in the triumph of defectors. The technical difficulties and suggested meth...

  16. Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Helbing, Dirk; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž; Szabó, György

    2010-05-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explore the robustness of the cooperation-promoting effect of costly punishment, besides the usual strategy adoption dynamics we also apply strategy mutations. As expected, frequent mutations create kind of well-mixed conditions, which support the spreading of defectors. However, when the mutation rate is small, the final stationary state does not significantly differ from the state of the mutation-free model, independently of the values of the punishment fine and cost. Nevertheless, the mutation rate affects the relaxation dynamics. Rare mutations can largely accelerate the spreading of costly punishment. This is due to the fact that the presence of defectors breaks the balance of power between both cooperative strategies, which leads to a different kind of dynamics.

  17. Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tavoni, Alessandro; Dannenberg, Astrid; Kallis, Giorgos; Löschel, Andreas

    2011-07-19

    International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail, they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. In some treatments, we give players the option to communicate intended contributions. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signaling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordination-promoting institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations are both decisive for the avoidance of global calamities, such as disruptive climate change.

  18. Customer Relations Management sebagai Salah Satu Upaya Public Relations Perusahaan Jasa Perbankan Menciptakan Good Image

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Prima Ayu Rizqi Mahanani

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available This article deals with marketing trends in the 21st century is shifting from a transactional approach to the relational approach with focus on the fulfillment of needs, satisfaction, and pleasure affect business banking customers are very dependent on the customer. Map business services banking services fickle demands creativity public relations in providing the best service to its customers get a good image. Service concept using the service paradigm leading to cultivate the power of the customer based on the customer satisfaction-oriented, widely used by business banking services at this time. Paradigms that focus on how to provide services to the customer so that the customer was satisfied, beyond what can be given to something that is important and not to be underestimated. Skills to understand and fulfill customer expectations should be every company’s business philosophy of banking services and customer relationship management is a strategy

  19. Success-driven distribution of public goods promotes cooperation but preserves defection

    CERN Document Server

    Perc, Matjaz

    2011-01-01

    Established already in the Biblical times, the Matthew effect stands for the fact that in societies rich tend to get richer and the potent even more powerful. Here we investigate a game theoretical model describing the evolution of cooperation on structured populations where the distribution of public goods is driven by the reproductive success of individuals. Phase diagrams reveal that cooperation is promoted irrespective of the uncertainty by strategy adoptions and the type of interaction graph, yet the complete dominance of cooperators is elusive due to the spontaneous emergence of super-persistent defectors that owe their survival to extremely rare microscopic patterns. This indicates that success-driven mechanisms are crucial for effectively harvesting benefits from collective actions, but that they may also account for the observed persistence of maladaptive behavior.

  20. Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection, cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Számadó Szabolcs

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The origin and stability of cooperation is a hot topic in social and behavioural sciences. A complicated conundrum exists as defectors have an advantage over cooperators, whenever cooperation is costly so consequently, not cooperating pays off. In addition, the discovery that humans and some animal populations, such as lions, are polymorphic, where cooperators and defectors stably live together -- while defectors are not being punished--, is even more puzzling. Here we offer a novel explanation based on a Threshold Public Good Game (PGG that includes the interaction of individual and group level selection, where individuals can contribute to multiple collective actions, in our model group hunting and group defense. Results Our results show that there are polymorphic equilibria in Threshold PGGs; that multi-level selection does not select for the most cooperators per group but selects those close to the optimum number of cooperators (in terms of the Threshold PGG. In particular for medium cost values division of labour evolves within the group with regard to the two types of cooperative actions (hunting vs. defense. Moreover we show evidence that spatial population structure promotes cooperation in multiple PGGs. We also demonstrate that these results apply for a wide range of non-linear benefit function types. Conclusions We demonstrate that cooperation can be stable in Threshold PGG, even when the proportion of so called free riders is high in the population. A fundamentally new mechanism is proposed how laggards, individuals that have a high tendency to defect during one specific group action can actually contribute to the fitness of the group, by playing part in an optimal resource allocation in Threshold Public Good Games. In general, our results show that acknowledging a multilevel selection process will open up novel explanations for collective actions.

  1. Evolutionary emergence of angiogenesis in avascular tumors using a spatial public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Salimi Sartakhti, Javad; Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein; Basanta, David; Sadeghi, Mehdi

    2017-01-01

    Natural selection in cancer often results in the emergence of increasingly malignant tumor cells that display many if not all of the hallmarks of cancer. One of the most important traits acquired during cancer progression is angiogenesis. Tumor cells capable of secreting pro-angiogenic factors can be seen as cooperators where the improved oxygenation, nutrient delivery and waste disposal resulting from angiogenesis could be seen as a public good. Under this view, the relatively costly secretion of molecular signals required to orchestrate angiogenesis would be undertaken exclusively by cooperating tumor cells but the benefits of angiogenesis would be felt by neighboring tumor cells regardless of their contribution to the process. In this work we detail a mathematical model to better understand how clones capable of secreting pro-angiogenic factors can emerge in a tumor made of non-cooperative tumor cells. Given the importance of the spatial configuration of the tumor in determining the efficacy of the secretion of pro-angiogenic factors as well as the benefits of angiogenesis we have developed a spatial game theoretic approach where interactions and public good diffusion are described by graphs. The results show that structure of the population affects the evolutionary dynamics of the pro-angiogenic clone. Specifically, when the benefit of angiogenesis is represented by sigmoid function with regards to the number of pro-angiogenic clones then the probability of the coexistence of pro-angiogenic and angiogenesis-neutral clones increases. Our results demonstrate that pro-angiogenic clone equilibrates into clusters that appear from surrounding vascular tissues towards the center of tumor. These clusters appear notably less dense after anti-angiogenic therapy.

  2. Coordination between veterinary services and other relevant authorities: a key component of good public governance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bellemain, V

    2012-08-01

    Coordination between Veterinary Services and other relevant authorities is a key component of good public governance, especially for effective action and optimal management of available resources. The importance of good coordination is reflected in the World Organisation for Animal Health'Tool forthe Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services', which includes a critical competency on coordination. Many partners from technical, administrative and legal fields are involved. The degree of formalisation of coordination tends to depend on a country's level of organisation and development. Contingency plans against avian influenza led to breakthroughs in many countries in the mid-2000s. While interpersonal relationships remain vital, not everything should hinge on them. Organisation and management are critical to operational efficiency. The distribution of responsibilities needs to be defined clearly, avoiding duplication and areas of conflict. Lead authorities should be designated according to subject (Veterinary Services in animal health areas) and endowed with the necessary legitimacy. Lead authorities will be responsible for coordinating the drafting and updating of the relevant documents: agreements between authorities, contingency plans, standard operating procedures, etc.

  3. Decelerated invasion and waning moon patterns in public goods games with delayed distribution

    CERN Document Server

    Szolnoki, Attila

    2013-01-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, focusing on the effects that are brought about by the delayed distribution of goods that accumulate in groups due to the continuous investments of cooperators. We find that intermediate delays enhance network reciprocity because of a decelerated invasion of defectors, who are unable to reap the same high short-term benefits as they do in the absence of delayed distribution. Long delays, however, introduce a risk because the large accumulated wealth might fall into the wrong hands. Indeed, as soon as the curvature of a cooperative cluster turns negative, the engulfed defectors can collect the heritage of many generations of cooperators, and by doing so start a waning moon pattern that nullifies the benefits of decelerated invasion. Accidental meeting points of growing cooperative clusters may also act as triggers for the waning moon effect, thus linking the success of cooperators with their propensity to fail in a rather bizarre way. Our r...

  4. Drugs that target pathogen public goods are robust against evolved drug resistance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pepper, John W

    2012-11-01

    Pathogen drug resistance is a central problem in medicine and public health. It arises through somatic evolution, by mutation and selection among pathogen cells within a host. Here, we examine the hypothesis that evolution of drug resistance could be reduced by developing drugs that target the secreted metabolites produced by pathogen cells instead of directly targeting the cells themselves. Using an agent-based computational model of an evolving population of pathogen cells, we test this hypothesis and find support for it. We also use our model to explain this effect within the framework of standard evolutionary theory. We find that in our model, the drugs most robust against evolved drug resistance are those that target the most widely shared external products, or 'public goods', of pathogen cells. We also show that these drugs exert a weak selective pressure for resistance because they create only a weak correlation between drug resistance and cell fitness. The same principles apply to design of vaccines that are robust against vaccine escape. Because our theoretical results have crucial practical implications, they should be tested by empirical experiments.

  5. Effects of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pei, Zhenhua; Wang, Baokui; Du, Jinming

    2017-01-01

    Income redistribution is the transfer of income from some individuals to others directly or indirectly by means of social mechanisms, such as taxation, public services and so on. Employing a spatial public goods game, we study the influence of income redistribution on the evolution of cooperation. Two kinds of evolutionary models are constructed, which describe local and global redistribution of income respectively. In the local model, players have to pay part of their income after each PGG and the accumulated income is redistributed to the members. While in the global model, all the players pay part of their income after engaging in all the local PGGs, which are centred on himself and his nearest neighbours, and the accumulated income is redistributed to the whole population. We show that the cooperation prospers significantly with increasing income expenditure proportion in the local redistribution of income, while in the global model the situation is opposite. Furthermore, the cooperation drops dramatically from the maximum curvature point of income expenditure proportion. In particular, the intermediate critical points are closely related to the renormalized enhancement factors.

  6. TV programs that denounce unfair advantage impact women's sensitivity to defection in the public goods game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Seongmin A; Jeong, Soyeong; Jeong, Jaeseung

    2013-01-01

    We explore the neural underpinnings of gender differences in cooperation and their modulation by intensive media watching. We compared cooperative decisions and electroencephalograph data between genders from who participated in repeated rounds of the public goods game (PGG) and investigated within groups changes that occurred after watching a TV program known as "investigative reporting" that denounces unfair advantages taken by free-riders against the public. Women tended to be more cooperative than men during early rounds of PGG, mostly because they react differently to the defection of others; women also had greater β and γ band activity in regions estimated to be associated with social cognition. These gender differences disappeared after participants watched the TV programs: women were more likely to choose free-riding in response to the defection of others that elicits significant increases in γ band activities that were estimated to be right insula. Greater activity in social cognition leads women to make decisions considering the motives of others, while men tend to make a decision by complying with the social norm. Watching the investigative TV reports produced a greater negative emotion to the defection and led women, in a similar manner as men, to opt for a "tit-for-tat" strategy.

  7. Good governance of animal health systems and public-private partnerships: an Australian case study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Black, P F

    2012-08-01

    The animal health system in Australia has evolved over more than 100 years and includes innovative public-private partnership arrangements. The establishment in 1996 of Animal Health Australia (AHA), a not-for-profit company, was a crucial development which formalised arrangements for shared decision-making and funding across both government and industry stakeholders. However, Federal and State governments retain legislative authority for animal health control. Accordingly, all programmes must recognise that the public sector remains an executive arm of government, accountable for its actions. Hence, much effort has been invested in ensuring that the governance arrangements within AHA are lawful and transparent. The Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) is a very good example of governance arrangements that are sustainably financed, widely available, provided efficiently, without waste or duplication, and in a manner that is transparent and free of fraud or corruption. The benefits of EADRA include certainty and greater transparency of funding; greater efficiency through increased probability of a rapid response to an occurrence of any of 65 diseases; and industry participation in the management and financing of such a response.

  8. Difficulties in Implementing Supply Mechanism of Rural Public Goods in the Context of Urban-rural Integration

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2012-01-01

    Through in-depth interviews and questionnaires,we take Mianyang City,Aba Prefecture,and Suining City in Sichuan Province as the study object,to analyze the relationship between the basic situation of farmers and the supply mechanism implementation of rural public goods.The research results show that the younger the farmers,the higher the educational level,the higher the annual household income,and the higher the enthusiasm in participating the discussion of the supply of rural public goods.And the correlation between farmers’annual household income and participation in the supply of public goods is the highest.Finally corresponding countermeasures and proposals are put forth based on farmers’ educational level and annual household income,the two difficulties in supply mechanism implementation of rural public goods.

  9. Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision

    OpenAIRE

    Hannes Rusch

    2015-01-01

    Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of these theories abstract away from the effects of kinship on the incentives for public goods provision, though. Here, it is investigated analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive struct...

  10. On the Supply Efficiency of Public Goods%公共物品供给效率研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    林洁

    2014-01-01

    充足的公共物品供给在经济建设中有重大意义。文章分析了公共物品的性质及其供给模式,运用博弈论对公共物品的市场供给和政府供给效率进行了比较,认为我国应该构建多元的公共物品供给模式,推进服务型政府改革,明确政府和市场边界,减少公共物品供给中寻租行为。%Sufficient supply of public goods to society is of great significance in economic construction.Based on the analysis of the property and modes of public goods supply,and comparison on the efficiency of public goods supply in the market mode and the government mode by the method of Game Theory,the author thinks that (1 )China should adopt a multiple mode of public goods supply,(2)the construction of service-oriented government should be continued,(3)the distinguish between market and government made clear in public goods supply,(4)and the rent-seeking behavior in the supply of public goods reduced.

  11. 全球公共品供给的筹资分析%Analysis on Financing of Global Public Goods

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    孙彦彦

    2013-01-01

      传统理论将国内公共品的供给机制分为市场供给、政府供给和自愿供给三种。现有的全球公共品供给的分析基本上是沿传统的国内公共品供给理论展开的,但这种推演却因全球公共品与国内公共品间的些许差异而在理论上陷入困境。全球公共品供给呈现新的特征,即特定条件下的市场供给和很多情况下的自愿供给。%The traditional theory of public goods supply mechanism is divided into market supply, government supply and voluntary supply. The analysis of the existing supply of global public goods is basically carried out along the traditional theory of domestic public goods supply, but this deduction because of the small differences between the global public goods and domestic public goods. The supply of global public goods presents new characteristics, that is, under certain conditions, the market supply and many cases of voluntary supply.

  12. The Role of Religion in 21st-Century Public Schools: Historic Perspectives on God and Goodness in the Classroom

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Steven P.; Sheffield, Eric C.

    2010-01-01

    No other educational issue hits a more sensitive nerve with the American public than the role of religion in the public schools. While the intentions and actions of the religious and non-religious parents and community members overlap a great deal as they conceive of the good people they want their children to become, there is no apparent…

  13. What Is the Greater Good? The Discourse on Public and Private Roles of Higher Education in the New Economy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hensley, Brad; Galilee-Belfer, Mika; Lee, Jenny J.

    2013-01-01

    This study examined the ways that the "public good" of higher education is being conceptualised as economic benefits and cost/benefit rationalities in the current economic downturn. Based on the case of Arizona in the United States, a discourse analysis of speeches was performed on the way public, state and institutional leaders…

  14. Peculiarities of Calculating the Cost of Public Goods (from the Necessary to the Desired: Domestic Realities and European Experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Aleksieieva N. I.

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Social needs and instruments for their satisfaction — public goods — have been studied. Attention is drawn to the fact that social needs are composed of individual and collective needs of economic entities. They are interrelated and complementary. An important difference between individual and collective needs is in their personification (individualization and divisibility. Proper consideration has been paid to concepts related to the needs of society — the public interest (as a form of social needs, public goods (all the goods, services that can satisfy social needs. For studying social needs and benefits in this work there was taken one of the most popular of their classification, which lies in their division into primary and secondary ones. Emphasis is placed on importance of its use in determining the priority of financing public goods. The focus is on the approach to calculating the cost of public goods. It is regarded as one of the stages in satisfying social needs (along with planning and analysis of the degree for their satisfaction. An approach to determining the structure of financing the total volume of public goods, calculating minimum admissible and desired volume of financing has been presented. The current interest in the European experience prompted the authors to analyze the cost and structure of financing public goods in France, the available statistical base allowing it to be implemented. The determined dependence between the indicators enabled conducting calculations of the desired volumes of financing the public needs per person according to three scenarios: optimistic, satisfactory and critical relevant to phases of the economic cycle. This simulation is aimed at being used in management decisionmaking, development of social and economic policy, etc. There have been noted serious shortcomings related to the lack of quality and reliable statistical information on Ukraine, which hamper the calculation and consideration

  15. Poverty Eradication Dilemma: Understanding Poverty Dynamics in ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    sulaiman.adebowale

    2008-10-20

    Oct 20, 2008 ... dilemma using the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), an all-inclusive ... security, conflict resolution and disaster management; (iv) good .... modernization and industrialization even if it has meant forest, schools and.

  16. The interplay between relatedness and horizontal gene transfer drives the evolution of plasmid-carried public goods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mc Ginty, Sorcha É; Lehmann, Laurent; Brown, Sam P; Rankin, Daniel J

    2013-06-22

    Plasmids carry a wide range of genes that are often involved in bacterial social behaviour. The question of why such genes are frequently mobile has received increasing attention. Here, we use an explicit population genetic approach to model the evolution of plasmid-borne bacterial public goods production. Our findings highlight the importance of both transmission and relatedness as factors driving the evolution of plasmid-borne public goods production. We partition the effects of plasmid transfer of social traits into those of infectivity and the effect of increased relatedness. Our results demonstrate that, owing to its effect on relatedness, plasmid mobility increases the invasion and stability of public goods, in a way not seen in individually beneficial traits. In addition, we show that plasmid transfer increases relatedness when public goods production is rare but this effect declines when production is common, with both scenarios leading to an increase in the frequency of plasmid-borne public goods. Plasmids remain important vectors for the spread of social genes involved in bacterial virulence thus an understanding of their dynamics is highly relevant from a public health perspective.

  17. Are pediatric Open Access journals promoting good publication practice? An analysis of author instructions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wolff Robert F

    2011-04-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Several studies analyzed whether conventional journals in general medicine or specialties such as pediatrics endorse recommendations aiming to improve publication practice. Despite evidence showing benefits of these recommendations, the proportion of endorsing journals has been moderate to low and varied considerably for different recommendations. About half of pediatric journals indexed in the Journal Citation Report referred to the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE but only about a quarter recommended registration of trials. We aimed to investigate to what extent pediatric open-access (OA journals endorse these recommendations. We hypothesized that a high proportion of these journals have adopted recommendations on good publication practice since OA electronic publishing has been associated with a number of editorial innovations aiming at improved access and transparency. Methods We identified 41 journals publishing original research in the subject category "Health Sciences, Medicine (General, Pediatrics" of the Directory of Open Access Journals http://www.doaj.org. From the journals' online author instructions we extracted information regarding endorsement of four domains of editorial policy: the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts, trial registration, disclosure of conflicts of interest and five major reporting guidelines such as the CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials statement. Two investigators collected data independently. Results The Uniform Requirements were mentioned by 27 (66% pediatric OA journals. Thirteen (32% required or recommended trial registration prior to publication of a trial report. Conflict of interest policies were stated by 25 journals (61%. Advice about reporting guidelines was less frequent: CONSORT was referred to by 12 journals (29% followed by other reporting guidelines (MOOSE, PRISMA or STARD (8 journals, 20

  18. Are pediatric Open Access journals promoting good publication practice? An analysis of author instructions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meerpohl, Joerg J; Wolff, Robert F; Antes, Gerd; von Elm, Erik

    2011-04-09

    Several studies analyzed whether conventional journals in general medicine or specialties such as pediatrics endorse recommendations aiming to improve publication practice. Despite evidence showing benefits of these recommendations, the proportion of endorsing journals has been moderate to low and varied considerably for different recommendations. About half of pediatric journals indexed in the Journal Citation Report referred to the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) but only about a quarter recommended registration of trials. We aimed to investigate to what extent pediatric open-access (OA) journals endorse these recommendations. We hypothesized that a high proportion of these journals have adopted recommendations on good publication practice since OA electronic publishing has been associated with a number of editorial innovations aiming at improved access and transparency. We identified 41 journals publishing original research in the subject category "Health Sciences, Medicine (General), Pediatrics" of the Directory of Open Access Journals http://www.doaj.org. From the journals' online author instructions we extracted information regarding endorsement of four domains of editorial policy: the Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts, trial registration, disclosure of conflicts of interest and five major reporting guidelines such as the CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials) statement. Two investigators collected data independently. The Uniform Requirements were mentioned by 27 (66%) pediatric OA journals. Thirteen (32%) required or recommended trial registration prior to publication of a trial report. Conflict of interest policies were stated by 25 journals (61%). Advice about reporting guidelines was less frequent: CONSORT was referred to by 12 journals (29%) followed by other reporting guidelines (MOOSE, PRISMA or STARD) (8 journals, 20%) and STROBE (3 journals, 7%). The EQUATOR

  19. Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Mei-huan; Wang, Li; Sun, Shi-wen; Wang, Juan; Xia, Cheng-yi

    2016-01-01

    We present a new spatial public goods game model, which takes the individual reputation and behavior diversity into account at the same time, to investigate the evolution of cooperation. Initially, each player x will be endowed with an integer Rx between 1 and Rmax to characterize his reputation value, which will be adaptively varied according to the strategy action at each time step. Then, the agents play the game and the system proceeds in accordance with a Fermi-like rule, in which a multiplicative factor (wy) to denote the individual difference to perform the strategy transfer will be placed before the traditional Fermi probability. For influential participants, wy is set to be 1.0, but be a smaller value w (0 reputation threshold (RC), and the greater the threshold, the higher the fraction of cooperators. The origin of promotion of cooperation will be attributed to the fact that the larger reputation threshold renders the higher heterogeneity in the fraction of two types of players and strategy spreading capability. Our work is conducive to a better understanding of the emergence of cooperation within many real-world systems.

  20. Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suri, Siddharth; Watts, Duncan J

    2011-03-11

    A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation were contagious only to direct neighbors in the network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs.

  1. Third-Party Cooperation: How Reducing Material Involvement Enhances Contributions to the Public Good.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Losecaat Vermeer, Annabel B; Heerema, Roeland L; Sanfey, Alan G

    2016-03-01

    Decisions to cooperate are often delegated to a third party. We examined whether cooperation differs when decisions are made for a third party compared with ourselves and specified which motives are important for third-party cooperation. Participants played multiple rounds of a public goods game (PGG). In Study 1, we varied personal involvement from high to low; participants played for themselves (Self), for themselves and a third party (Shared), and solely for a third party (Third Party). Participants contributed most when personal involvement was lowest (i.e., Third Party) and least when personal involvement was high (i.e., Self). Study 2 explored if social motives underlie third-party cooperation by comparing cooperation with social (human) and non-social (computer) group members. Reducing personal involvement in the PGG (i.e., Third Party) increased cooperation in social contexts compared with non-social contexts, indicating enhanced collective interest. Increased cooperation for a third party may result from taking the other's perspective, thereby increasing social norm preferences. © 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

  2. The Bio-Economy Concept and Knowledge Base in a Public Goods and Farmer Perspective

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Otto Schmidt

    2012-05-01

    Full Text Available Currently an industrial perspective dominates the EU policy framework for a European bio-economy. The Commission’s proposal on the bio-economy emphasises greater resource-efficiency, largely within an industrial perspective on global economic competitiveness, benefiting capital-intensive industries at higher levels of the value chain. However a responsible bio-economy must initially address the sustainable use of resources. Many farmers are not only commodity producers but also providers of quality food and managers of the eco-system. A public goods-oriented bio-economy emphasises agro-ecological methods, organic and low (external input farming systems, ecosystem services, social innovation in multi-stakeholder collective practices and joint production of knowledge. The potential of farmers and SMEs to contribute to innovation must be fully recognised. This approach recognises the importance of local knowledge enhancing local capabilities, while also accommodating diversity and complexity. Therefore the bio-economy concept should have a much broader scope than the dominant one in European Commission innovation policy. Socio-economic research is needed to inform strategies, pathways and stakeholder cooperation towards sustainability goals.

  3. Conformity-driven agents support ordered phases in the spatial public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Javarone, Marco Alberto; Antonioni, Alberto; Caravelli, Francesco

    2016-05-01

    We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady state. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors.

  4. Conformity-Driven Agents Support Ordered Phases in the Spatial Public Goods Game

    CERN Document Server

    Javarone, Marco Alberto; Caravelli, Francesco

    2016-01-01

    We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of conformity-driven agents on a bi-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The present setting usually considers fitness-driven agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. Here, fitness is a general property usually adopted to quantify the extent to which individuals are able to succeed, or at least to survive, in a competitive environment. However, when social systems are considered, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformity, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady-state. In doing so, we use two types of strategy update rules: fitness-driven and conformity-driven. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driv...

  5. Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Siddharth Suri

    Full Text Available A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation were contagious only to direct neighbors in the network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs.

  6. Harbouring public good mutants within a pathogen population can increase both fitness and virulence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lindsay, Richard J; Kershaw, Michael J; Pawlowska, Bogna J; Talbot, Nicholas J; Gudelj, Ivana

    2016-01-01

    Existing theory, empirical, clinical and field research all predict that reducing the virulence of individuals within a pathogen population will reduce the overall virulence, rendering disease less severe. Here, we show that this seemingly successful disease management strategy can fail with devastating consequences for infected hosts. We deploy cooperation theory and a novel synthetic system involving the rice blast fungus Magnaporthe oryzae. In vivo infections of rice demonstrate that M. oryzae virulence is enhanced, quite paradoxically, when a public good mutant is present in a population of high-virulence pathogens. We reason that during infection, the fungus engages in multiple cooperative acts to exploit host resources. We establish a multi-trait cooperation model which suggests that the observed failure of the virulence reduction strategy is caused by the interference between different social traits. Multi-trait cooperative interactions are widespread, so we caution against the indiscriminant application of anti-virulence therapy as a disease-management strategy. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.18678.001 PMID:28029337

  7. The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dong, Yali; Zhang, Boyu; Tao, Yi

    2016-06-24

    The empirical research on the public goods game (PGG) indicates that both institutional rewards and institutional punishment can curb free-riding and that the punishment effect is stronger than the reward effect. Self-regarding models that are based on Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies or evolutionary game dynamics correctly predict which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, but individuals do not play these rational strategies overall. The goal of our study is to investigate the dynamics of human decision making in the repeated PGG with institutional incentives. We consider that an individual's contribution is affected by four factors, which are self-interest, the behavior of others, the reaction to rewards, and the reaction to punishment. We find that people on average do not react to rewards and punishment, and that self-interest and the behavior of others sufficiently explain the dynamics of human behavior. Further analysis suggests that institutional incentives promote cooperation by affecting the self-regarding preference and that the other-regarding preference seems to be independent of incentive schemes. Because individuals do not change their behavioral patterns even if they were not rewarded or punished, the mere potential to punish defectors and reward cooperators can lead to considerable increases in the level of cooperation.

  8. Neural correlates of prosocial peer influence on public goods game donations during adolescence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Hoorn, Jorien; Van Dijk, Eric; Güroğlu, Berna; Crone, Eveline A

    2016-06-01

    A unique feature of adolescent social re-orientation is heightened sensitivity to peer influence when taking risks. However, positive peer influence effects are not yet well understood. The present fMRI study tested a novel hypothesis, by examining neural correlates of prosocial peer influence on donation decisions in adolescence. Participants (age 12-16 years; N = 61) made decisions in anonymous groups about the allocation of tokens between themselves and the group in a public goods game. Two spectator groups of same-age peers-in fact youth actors-were allegedly online during some of the decisions. The task had a within-subjects design with three conditions: (1) EVALUATION: spectators evaluated decisions with likes for large donations to the group, (2) Spectator: spectators were present but no evaluative feedback was displayed and (3) Alone: no spectators nor feedback. Results showed that prosocial behavior increased in the presence of peers, and even more when participants received evaluative feedback from peers. Peer presence resulted in enhanced activity in several social brain regions including medial prefrontal cortex, temporal parietal junction (TPJ), precuneus and superior temporal sulcus. TPJ activity correlated with donations, which suggests similar networks for prosocial behavior and sensitivity to peers. These findings highlight the importance of peers in fostering prosocial development throughout adolescence.

  9. Randomly biased investments and the evolution of public goods on interdependent networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Wei; Wu, Te; Li, Zhiwu; Wang, Long

    2017-08-01

    Deciding how to allocate resources between interdependent systems is significant to optimize efficiency. We study the effects of heterogeneous contribution, induced by such interdependency, on the evolution of cooperation, through implementing the public goods games on two-layer networks. The corresponding players on different layers try to share a fixed amount of resources as the initial investment properly. The symmetry breaking of investments between players located on different layers is able to either prevent investments from, or extract them out of the deadlock. Results show that a moderate investment heterogeneity is best favorable for the evolution of cooperation, and random allocation of investment bias suppresses the cooperators at a wide range of the investment bias and the enhancement effect. Further studies on time evolution with different initial strategy configurations show that the non-interdependent cooperators along the interface of interdependent cooperators also are an indispensable factor in facilitating cooperative behavior. Our main results are qualitatively unchanged even diversifying investment bias that is subject to uniform distribution. Our study may shed light on the understanding of the origin of cooperative behavior on interdependent networks.

  10. Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations

    CERN Document Server

    Sasaki, Tatsuya; Chen, Xiaojie

    2015-01-01

    Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustai...

  11. Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Helbing, Dirk; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž; Szabó, György

    2010-08-01

    We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers, increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.

  12. Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sasaki, Tatsuya; Uchida, Satoshi; Chen, Xiaojie

    2015-03-01

    Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and institutions.

  13. Bank Risk Profile, Good Corporate Governance And Company Values in Banking Companies Go Public in Indonesia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Susi Retna Cahyaningtyas

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The latest Bank Indonesia Regulation No.14/18/PBI/2012 requires bank to have minimum capital of 8%-14% depends on the risk profile of each bank. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to assess whether the total of inherent risk profile of each bank meets the terms of this regulation. In addition, this study aims to examine the impact of inherent risk profile and GCG on the banking company value. The sample in this study is determined by purposive sampling method and resulted in 24 banks or 72 observations during 2011-2013. The results showed that 23 banks had low risk and low to moderate risk, and only one bank had moderate risk. The results also showed that inherent risk profile rating is equivalent to capital adequacy. In other words, inherent risk profile of these banks have complied with Bank Indonesia Regulation No.14/18/PBI/2012. Furthermore, this study indicated that GCG has significant and positive influence on the company value, while the inherent risk has no influence on the company value. Overall, this study suggest that go public banks in Indonesia are one of good alternative means of investment for its soundness as reflected by the fulfillment of minimum capital ratio required by the regulator.

  14. Visual graphics for human rights, social justice, democracy and the public good

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vedant Nanackchand

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available The value of human rights in a democratic South Africa is constantly threatened and often waived for nefarious reasons. We contend that the use of visual graphics among incoming university visual art students provides a mode of engagement that helps to inculcate awareness of human rights, social responsibility, and the public good in South African higher education. Visual graphics, the subject of the research project which forms a key component of a Masters dissertation by one of the authors, provides an opportunity to counter a noticeable decline in the students' response and sensitivity to the freedoms entrenched in the South African Bill of Rights. The article presents a study using an action research approach in the classroom between 2005-2010, in order to inculcate awareness of human rights among participating students and deepen their understanding of social responsibility. The method used involved an introduction to specific visual art curricular intervention projects which required incoming first-year students to develop visual responses to address selected human rights violations and, in their second year, to develop their visual voice in order to promote human rights advocacy through civic engagement. The critical outcomes impact positively on the use of graphic images in the curriculum as a visual methodology to re-insert the discourse of human rights as a basic tenet of constitutional democracy in higher education.

  15. Puzzler's dilemma

    CERN Document Server

    Niederman, Derrick

    2012-01-01

    The Puzzler's Dilemma explores the world of classic logic puzzles, and tells the amazing stories behind them, from the Lighthouse of Alexandria to code-breaking with the Enigma machine. Here are brain teasers that even maths whizzes have never seen explained by a mind as nimble and playful as Derrick Niederman's, the author of Number Freak and the New York Times's near-genius crossword setter. A man is found dead in a room, hanging from a rope with only a puddle of water beneath him: What happened? Just the thing to get your brain working at full speed!

  16. Is using social media "good" for the public relations profession? A critical reflection

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Valentini, Chiara

    2015-01-01

    Scholarship in public relations seems to be overly positive about social media. The dominant discourse in public relations is that using social media is “good”, because social media can help organizations in developing dialogs and relationships with publics and in engaging with them. Yet empirical...... evidence in public relations is mostly case-dependent and limited to the realm of understanding current organizational practices, with limited understanding of the concrete value for organizations or for publics. In this paper I question the utility of social media for publics, organizations and public...... relations, and I argue that the positive view of social media held by the majority of public relations scholars is grounded on the profession’s need to reconcile the two sides of public relations identity—the rhetorical and the relational. A discussion of whether current public relations practices in social...

  17. Pancreatic Pseudocyst: Therapeutic Dilemma

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. K. Khanna

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Pancreatic pseudocyst develops in both acute and chronic pancreatitis. It is an entity likely to either remain asymptomatic or develop devastating complications. Despite being diagnosed easily, treatment exercise is still at crossroads whether in the form of internal or external drainage or endoscopic, laparoscopic, or open intervention with a good radiological guidance. The therapeutic dilemma whether to treat a patient with a pancreatic pseudocyst, as well as when and with what technique, is a difficult one. This paper is intended to get information about diagnostic and therapeutic exercises most appropriate for acute and chronic pancreatic pseudocyst.

  18. 78 FR 59413 - International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel; Notice of Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-26

    ... Federal Aviation Administration International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel... meeting. SUMMARY: In preparation for the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous... Organization's Dangerous Goods Panel's (ICAO DGP's) 24th Panel Meeting. The agenda for the Working Group is...

  19. 77 FR 53250 - International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel; Notice of Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-31

    ... Federal Aviation Administration International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel... meeting. SUMMARY: In preparation for the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous... International Civil Aviation Organization's Dangerous Goods Panel's (ICAO DGP's) Working Group of the Whole...

  20. 78 FR 16756 - International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel; Notice of Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-18

    ... Federal Aviation Administration International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel... meeting. SUMMARY: In preparation for the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous... prepares for the International Civil Aviation Organization's Dangerous Goods Panel's (ICAO DGP's)...

  1. 76 FR 46351 - International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel; Notice of Public Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-02

    ... Federal Aviation Administration International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel... Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel (DGP) to be held October 11-21, 2011, in Montreal, Quebec, Canada... Aviation Organization's Dangerous Goods Panel (ICAO DGP) Meeting. Proposals that are approved by the...

  2. Ethical Obligations in the Face of Dilemmas Concerning Patient Privacy and Public Interests: The Sasebo Schoolgirl Murder Case.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kadooka, Yasuhiro; Okita, Taketoshi; Asai, Atsushi

    2016-09-01

    A murder case that had some features in common with the Tarasoff case occurred in Sasebo City, Japan, in 2014. A 15-year-old high school girl was murdered and her 16-year-old classmate was arrested on suspicion of homicide. One and a half months before the murder, a psychiatrist who had been examining the girl called a prefectural child consultation centre to warn that she might commit murder, but he did not reveal her name, considering it his professional duty to keep it confidential. Article 134 of the Japanese Criminal Law states that doctors should not disclose patient information obtained in clinical practice without a legitimate reason, but the Japanese Supreme Court has not specified what constitutes a legitimate reason. Mass media and commentators suggested that the murder could have been prevented if the psychiatrist had disclosed the girl's name to the authorities or had isolated her coercively in a psychiatric ward. However, the authors disagree with such claims. This article discusses obligations imposed on concerned individuals and third party members in cases involving ethical dilemmas regarding patient confidentiality and information disclosure. It is concluded that everyone should fulfill their obligations to prevent such tragedies and one should judge the appropriateness of others' actions based not on the consequences of their actions, but on the processes used to decide on a course of action and their commitment. It is necessary for us to establish a society in which concerned parties can do what they think is ethically best without fearing ungrounded charges. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  3. Global public goods and the global health agenda: problems, priorities and potential

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    MacKellar Landis

    2007-09-01

    Full Text Available Abstract The 'global public good' (GPG concept has gained increasing attention, in health as well as development circles. However, it has suffered in finding currency as a general tool for global resource mobilisation, and is at risk of being attached to almost anything promoting development. This overstretches and devalues the validity and usefulness of the concept. This paper first defines GPGs and describes the policy challenge that they pose. Second, it identifies two key areas, health R&D and communicable disease control, in which the GPG concept is clearly relevant and considers the extent to which it has been applied. We point out that that, while there have been many new initiatives, it is not clear that additional resources from non-traditional sources have been forthcoming. Yet achieving this is, in effect, the entire purpose of applying the GPG concept in global health. Moreover, the proliferation of disease-specific programs associated with GPG reasoning has tended to promote vertical interventions at the expense of more general health sector strengthening. Third, we examine two major global health policy initiatives, the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM and the bundling of long-standing international health goals in the form of Millennium Development Goals (MDG, asking how the GPG perspective has contributed to defining objectives and strategies. We conclude that both initiatives are best interpreted in the context of traditional development assistance and, one-world rhetoric aside, have little to do with the challenge posed by GPGs for health. The paper concludes by considering how the GPG concept can be more effectively used to promote global health.

  4. Recorded punishment promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

    CERN Document Server

    Jin, Qing; Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin

    2011-01-01

    Previous studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas it still lacks specific evidence that punishment maintains cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game as well. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of recorded punishment, involved with memory and punishment, into spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We find that increasing punishment rate or memory length promotes the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Interestingly, compared with traditional version, recorded punishment will facilitate cooperation better through a recovery effect. Moreover, through examining the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation to this promotion phenomenon, namely, the recovery effect can be warranted by an evolution resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we confirm our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions. We hope that our work may sharpen the understanding of the cooperativ...

  5. 中国传统行政组织文化与公共权力制约困境%The traditional Administrative Organization Culture of China and the Dilemma on Public Power Restriction

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    毛小敏; 白福臣

    2012-01-01

      With strong penetrability and historical continuity,Chinese traditional administrative organization culture causes a certain dilemma on public power restriction.This paper expounds the representation on public power restriction dilemma of Chinese traditional administrative organization culture,combines positive and negative factors of Chinese traditional administrative organization culture with government administrative personality duality,to analyse reasons that emerge from Chinese traditional administrative organization culture on public power restrict, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures to the reasons of dilemma.%  中国传统行政组织文化极强的穿透性与历史延续性的影响对现今公共权力制约造成一定的困境。本文阐述了中国传统行政组织文化对公权力制约困境的表现形式;基于行政人格二重性和中国传统行政组织文化的正负价值,分析中国传统行政组织文化对公权力制约困境产生的原因;并针对困境原因提出相应的对策

  6. Why don’t we do what we want? Non-consumers and the public dilemma in cultural promotion.

    OpenAIRE

    Pau Rausell-Köster; Francisco Marco- Serrano

    2004-01-01

    We deal with tastes and preferences, revising the linkages between both in order to analyse the special case where we express preferences to goods that do not appeal to us. We deduce the concept of a deconstructed demand and define two types of goods (embarrassing and reputable). With the help of this structure we build a demand function for cultural promotion, where the non-market-expressed non-consumers’ preferences are the basis of the “demand for cultural policies”. Finally, in this frame...

  7. Does the mixture of policy instruments matter? An empirical test of government support for the private provision of public goods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    A. Mulder (Arjen)

    2004-01-01

    textabstractGovernments wishing to encourage the private sector provision of a public good can choose amongst a wide variety of economic instruments. This paper analyses how governments in the EU(15) countries have succeeded in stimulating investment in wind turbines between 1985 and 2000, using nat

  8. Literacy Inequalities, Mediation and the Public Good: A Case Study of Physical Proximity and Social Distance in Nepal

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maddox, Bryan; Esposito, Lucio

    2013-01-01

    Literacy is considered to be a public good--one that benefits not only literate people, but also others in society through mechanisms of sharing and mediation. But to what extent do the benefits of literacy extend to socially distant groups? This paper applies the sociological concept of social distance to examine how social stratification impacts…

  9. Age-Related Differences in Altruism across Adulthood: Making Personal Financial Gain versus Contributing to the Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Freund, Alexandra M.; Blanchard-Fields, Fredda

    2014-01-01

    Four studies utilizing different methodological approaches investigated adult age-related differences in altruism (i.e., contributions to the public good) and the self-centered value of increasing personal wealth. In Study 1, data from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association, 2009) provided 1st evidence of a negative association…

  10. The Supreme Court Permits Religious Groups To Use Public School Facilities: Good News Club v. Milford Central School.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Russo, Charles J.; Mawdsley, Ralph D.

    2001-01-01

    Reviews basis for U.S. Supreme Court's June 2001 decision in "Good News Club v. Milford Central School," where Court held that the Christian religious club for students had the Constitutional right under the Free Speech Clause to use public school facilities after school hours. Explains impact of decision on board of education policy.…

  11. The Public Good vs. Commercial Interest: Research Scientists in Search of an Accommodation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wong, Rose H. C.; Westwood, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The environment for scientific research in public organisations is undergoing radical change, particularly with commercialisation pressures and blurring of the distinction between public and private research. The commercialisation pressures are reflected in government policy frameworks and institutional contexts for scientific work which are…

  12. The Public Good vs. Commercial Interest: Research Scientists in Search of an Accommodation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wong, Rose H. C.; Westwood, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The environment for scientific research in public organisations is undergoing radical change, particularly with commercialisation pressures and blurring of the distinction between public and private research. The commercialisation pressures are reflected in government policy frameworks and institutional contexts for scientific work which are…

  13. Good Intentions, Stubborn Practice: A critical appraisal of a public event on cancer genomics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Verhoeff, R.P.; Waarlo, A.J.

    2013-01-01

    Science communication has shifted considerably in Europe over the last decades. In the theoretical realm, one-way information has been replaced by models of science communication that stress public engagement and public participation in science and technology. Dialogue seems to have become a communi

  14. Systems Science: A Good Investment for the Public's Health

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mabry, Patricia L.; Kaplan, Robert M.

    2013-01-01

    This supplement of "Health Education & Behavior" showcases the current state of the field of systems science applications in health promotion and public health. Behind this work lies a steady stream of public dollars at the federal level. This perspective details nearly a decade of investment by the National Institutes of…

  15. The Concept of Public Goods, the State, and Higher Education Finance: A View from the BRICs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carnoy, Martin; Froumin, Isak; Loyalka, Prashant K.; Tilak, Jandhyala B.

    2014-01-01

    Because higher education serves both public and private interests, the way it is conceived and financed is contested politically, appearing in different forms in different societies. What is public and private in education is a political--social construct, subject to various political forces, primarily interpreted through the prism of the state.…

  16. Too good to be true: publication bias in two prominent studies from experimental psychology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Francis, Gregory

    2012-04-01

    Empirical replication has long been considered the final arbiter of phenomena in science, but replication is undermined when there is evidence for publication bias. Evidence for publication bias in a set of experiments can be found when the observed number of rejections of the null hypothesis exceeds the expected number of rejections. Application of this test reveals evidence of publication bias in two prominent investigations from experimental psychology that have purported to reveal evidence of extrasensory perception and to indicate severe limitations of the scientific method. The presence of publication bias suggests that those investigations cannot be taken as proper scientific studies of such phenomena, because critical data are not available to the field. Publication bias could partly be avoided if experimental psychologists started using Bayesian data analysis techniques.

  17. Voluntary Provision and Fair Distribution of Public Goods based on Goodness:Behavioral Economic Experiments between China and USA%基于善意本性的公共品自愿供给与公平分配--中美行为经济实验研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    柴盈; 王翊; Marco A.Janssen

    2015-01-01

    主流经济学的理性思维与现实中人的思维存在偏差。本文设计了一系列行为经济实验(信任、囚徒困境、公共品、独裁和最后通牒实验)并在中美两国大学课堂上实施。研究表明:人们天生具有善意本质和社会性思维,能够自愿供给公共品,偏好经济利益的公平分配;而在信任度、合作偏好、合作水平和公平偏好的量化方面,美方都表现出更高(强)的特征。本文建议政策制定者有必要充分了解人们的社会性思维及相应的微观行为,政策的重点有必要充分考虑到这些思维、能力和行动,以及为人们自愿解决集体行动问题提供信息平台。%The rational thinking assumption by main stream economics has a far distance from real people.This paper designs a series of behavioral economic experiments ( trust, prisoners’ dilemma, public good, dictator and ultimatum games) and conducts them in two university classrooms of China and USA.It shows that people intrinsically have goodness and social thinking, and can provide public goods voluntarily and have fair preference of economic interest distribution.However, the American students show higher trust degree and cooperation level, and stronger preferences of cooperation and fairness than the Chinese ones.Therefore, this paper suggests that policy makers are necessary to fully understand people's social thinking and micro behavior and they are necessary to emphasize on publicizing this kind of thinking, ability and action, and should provide information platform for people to solve collective dilemmas voluntarily.

  18. A Study of Effect of Reward and Punishment Mechanisms in Public Goods Experiment%公共品实验中奖惩机制效应的研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘建华

    2012-01-01

      This paper adopts experimental method, based on the voluntary contribution mechanism, to study the symmetries of effect of reward mechanism and punishment mechanism and the impact of reward and punishment mechanism on public goods contribution. The experiment find that there is an asymmetrical effect between reward and punishment mechanism, and the joint of reward and punishment can improve the public goods contribution effectively. The results has a certain realistic guiding significance for easing the social dilemma, coordinating groups’ interests and building a harmonious society.%  本文采用经济学实验的方法,以公共品自愿捐赠机制为基础,考察奖励机制与惩罚机制效应的对称性和奖惩联合机制对公共品自愿捐赠的影响。实验发现,奖励机制与惩罚机制的效应不对称;奖惩联合机制能较有效地提供公共品。实验结论对解决社会两难问题、协调群体利益以及构建和谐社会具有一定的现实指导意义。

  19. Social learning in cooperative dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lamba, Shakti

    2014-07-22

    Helping is a cornerstone of social organization and commonplace in human societies. A major challenge for the evolutionary sciences is to explain how cooperation is maintained in large populations with high levels of migration, conditions under which cooperators can be exploited by selfish individuals. Cultural group selection models posit that such large-scale cooperation evolves via selection acting on populations among which behavioural variation is maintained by the cultural transmission of cooperative norms. These models assume that individuals acquire cooperative strategies via social learning. This assumption remains empirically untested. Here, I test this by investigating whether individuals employ conformist or payoff-biased learning in public goods games conducted in 14 villages of a forager-horticulturist society, the Pahari Korwa of India. Individuals did not show a clear tendency to conform or to be payoff-biased and are highly variable in their use of social learning. This variation is partly explained by both individual and village characteristics. The tendency to conform decreases and to be payoff-biased increases as the value of the modal contribution increases. These findings suggest that the use of social learning in cooperative dilemmas is contingent on individuals' circumstances and environments, and question the existence of stably transmitted cultural norms of cooperation.

  20. Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yali Dong

    Full Text Available People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner's dilemma (PD game and the public goods game (PGG, whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious "dominant" strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals' strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players' choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games.

  1. Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dong, Yali; Li, Cong; Tao, Yi; Zhang, Boyu

    2015-01-01

    People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game and the public goods game (PGG), whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious "dominant" strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals' strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players' choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games.

  2. Who Shall Pay for the Public Good? Comparative Trends in the Funding Crisis of Public Higher Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lebeau, Yann; Stumpf, Rolf; Brown, Roger; Lucchesi, Martha Abrahao Saad; Kwiek, Marek

    2012-01-01

    The aftermath of the international financial crisis of 2008/2009 and current economic downturn in the world economy has unsurprisingly put publicly-funded higher education (HE) systems under immense pressure in most parts of the world. Added to measures of the past 20 years, aiming at introducing cost effective management approaches imported from…

  3. Male Mating Signaling in Social Dilemma Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Niels Holm

    2013-01-01

    According to sexual selection theory and costly signaling theory, men benefit from signaling costly mate qualities to attractive women. To date, several studies have investigated whether men use conspicuous altruism to attract women, but the findings are mixed. This study investigated whether men...... being observed by an attractive woman engage in competitive economic altruism in three social dilemma games — the Dictator Game, Trust Game (2nd mover), and Public Goods Game — in comparison to men being observed by a non-attractive woman. Results showed that altruistic contributions in the games were...... not significantly larger in the attractive observer group than in the non-attractive observer group. Exploratory analyses did reveal, however, that amongst participants with an attractive observer only, dispositional generosity had a strongly positive effect on altruism while dispositional dominance had a negative...

  4. The Dishwater Menace: Healthy Drinking Spaces and the Public Good in Post-Prohibition Ontario.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malleck, Dan

    2017-01-01

    This paper examines inter-bureaucracy tension, negotiation, and resolution in the case of the oversight of beverage room sanitation in Ontario in the 1930s and 1940s. Both the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) and various public health authorities claimed authority over the health status of public drinking spaces. But the LCBO had legislative priority. The ensuing debates regarding health and cleanliness linked issues of beverage room glass sanitation to a biopolitical approach to public drinking. Developing a more scientifically sophisticated approach to beverage glass cleaning required a balancing of administrative priorities. Perfect sanitation was expensive and complicated, and the LCBO's mandate demanded attention to the financial viability of beverage rooms. The LCBO needed to forge a trade off between safety and viability, while maintaining a public drinking system that dissuaded illegal drinking. The subsequent compromise in beverage room glass sanitation tied contemporary chemical sanitizers to the challenging economics of depression-era beverage room management.

  5. Dissection of a Truth Regime: The Narrowing Effects on the Public Good of Neoliberal Discourse in the Virginia Performance-Based Funding Policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Letizia, Angelo J.

    2016-01-01

    A major role of all public higher education institutions is to foster the public good. In democratic societies, the public good emphasizes the more collective activities and benefits and how resources are accessible to all in a society. Institutions of higher education create new knowledge, promote cultural tolerance, increase civic activity, and…

  6. Painful dilemmas

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lund, Thomas Bøker; Mørkbak, Morten Raun; Lassen, Jesper;

    2014-01-01

    The conflict between animal costs and human benefits has dominated public as well as academic debates about animal research. However, surveys of public perceptions of animal research rarely focus on this part of attitude formation. This paper traces the prevalence of different attitudes to animal...... research in the public when people are asked to take benefit and cost considerations into account concurrently. Results from the examination of two representative samples of the Danish public identify three reproducible attitude stances. Approximately 30–35% of people questioned approved of animal research...

  7. How Do Private Sector Schools Serve the Public Good by Fostering Inclusive Service Delivery Models?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scanlan, Martin; Tichy, Karen

    2014-01-01

    Conversations about promoting educational reforms that redress educational inequities often ignore private schools as irrelevant. Yet pursuits of inclusivity in private sector schools serve the public interest. This article focuses on how the system of Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of St. Louis has been purposefully striving for 2 decades to…

  8. 77 FR 13513 - Modernizing the Regulation of Clinical Trials and Approaches to Good Clinical Practice; Public...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-03-07

    .... ] Individuals who wish to attend or present at the public hearing must register on or before close of business..., increased frequency of outsourcing) and globalization are posing challenges for sponsors, clinical... globalization? For each of the suggested efforts, specifically identify how the effort could help mitigate...

  9. Information as Property and as a Public Good: Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Property Rights.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCain, Roger A.

    1988-01-01

    Reviews the economic theory of property rights and explores four applications of the transaction cost theory of property rights and free distribution in the economics of information: (1) copying technology; (2) computer software and copy protection; (3) satellite television and encryption; and (4) public libraries. (56 references) (MES)

  10. The Public Good. Historical and Political Roots of Municipal Preschools in Emilia Romagna

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lazzari, Arianna

    2012-01-01

    According to the findings of a recent European study on competence requirement for the early childhood education and care workforce, competent systems that succeed in achieving high levels of professionalism are embedded in coherent public policies that build on consultation with key stakeholders, particularly at local level. In order to flourish,…

  11. Data Base Legislation in the Digital Age: Balancing the Public Good and the Owners' Rights

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kennedy, Lynn M.

    2013-01-01

    This dissertation is a study of the impact of federal legislative proposals considered between 1997 and 2004 that offer protection to databases. It investigates the effect that the proposals had on the balance between the economic interests of owners and the right of the public to unfettered access to information. This identified legislation…

  12. Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When Partners Really Become Strangers

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Sonnemans, J.H.; Schram, A.J.H.C.; Offerman, T.J.S.

    1999-01-01

    (Abstract of the extended working paper) We use a new design to (re)examine the occurrence of strategic behavior in voluntary contributions mechanism experiments. Subjects are in groups that remain constant for a number of periods before they change. The change is public knowledge and always consist

  13. Unions and the Public Interest: Is Collective Bargaining for Teachers Good for Students?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahlenberg, Richard D.; Greene, Jay P.

    2012-01-01

    Three years after Barack Obama's election signaled a seeming resurgence for America's unions, the landscape looks very different. Republican governors in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio have limited the reach of collective bargaining for public employees. The moves, especially in Wisconsin, set off a national furor that has all but obscured the…

  14. A Reflexive Interrogation: Talking Out Loud and Finding Spaces for Works of Public Good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gonzales, Leslie D.; Satterfield, James

    2013-01-01

    Over a year, we engaged in an ongoing dialogue about what it means to be a professor and how we might do a better job of making the public contributions of our work more explicit. Throughout our dialogue, we continually discussed how we, as faculty members, must always work within the institutional constraints that allow the professoriate to exist…

  15. Data Base Legislation in the Digital Age: Balancing the Public Good and the Owners' Rights

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kennedy, Lynn M.

    2013-01-01

    This dissertation is a study of the impact of federal legislative proposals considered between 1997 and 2004 that offer protection to databases. It investigates the effect that the proposals had on the balance between the economic interests of owners and the right of the public to unfettered access to information. This identified legislation…

  16. Dilemma's of sustainable consumption. A study of public support for making consumption more sustainable; Dilemma's rond duurzame consumptie. Een onderzoek naar het draagvlak voor verduurzaming van consumptie

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vringer, K.; Vollebergh, H.; Dietz, F. [Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving PBL, Den Haag (Netherlands); Van Soest, D. [VU University, Amsterdam (Netherlands); Van der Heijden, E. [Tilburg University, Tilburg (Netherlands)

    2013-02-15

    Dutch consumers choose sustainable products only sparsely. But at the same time, Dutch consumers indicate that they find sustainability important and that the government should take measures. A frequently heard explanation is the social dilemma in which everyone is better off if all decide to consume more sustainable, whereas for every individual it is even better to not do this themselves. The question that rises is: do consumers truly want to become more sustainable? To answer this question, the social support for enhancing the sustainability of consumption and corresponding dilemmas have been examined by means of an economic behavioural experiment. The study confirms that a large group of consumers deem sustainability important, but do not always act on their beliefs. As people do not always match their behaviour with what they deem important, the currently limited market shares of more sustainable product variants are not reliable predictors of the social support for government policy. To encourage more sustainable consumption, it therefore seems useful if the Dutch government emphasizes the pleasure of individually contributing to sustainability, ensuring the consumer's awareness of other people also buying the more sustainable product variants. Consumers prefer soft persuasion through for example subsidies, even if this is more expensive for them than mandatory measures [Dutch] Consumenten kiezen maar mondjesmaat voor duurzame producten. Tegelijk geven zij aan verduurzaming belangrijk te vinden en ook dat de overheid maatregelen moet nemen. Een veel gehoorde verklaring is het sociaal dilemma waarin iedereen beter af is als allen duurzamer gaan consumeren, maar het voor elk individu nóg beter is om dat zelf niet te doen. De vraag is: Willen consumenten wel echt verduurzamen? Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden, is het draagvlak voor de verduurzaming van consumptie en de bijbehorende dilemma's met behulp van een economisch gedragsexperiment nader

  17. The dilemma of a practice: experiences of abortion in a public maternity hospital in the city of Salvador, Bahia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCallum, Cecilia; Menezes, Greice; Reis, Ana Paula Dos

    2016-01-01

    The article discusses abortion and miscarriage from the perspective of women admitted to a public maternity hospital in Salvador (BA), Brazil. Based on qualitative and quantitative research, it draws on participant observation of everyday hospital life. Taking an ethnographic approach, it addresses the hospital experiences of women who had miscarriages or induced abortions, also presenting the views of health professionals. It argues that the way the institution structures care for abortion and miscarriage involves symbolic processes that profoundly affect women's experiences. The discrimination against women who have had abortions/miscarriages is an integral part of the structure, organization and culture of these institutions, and does not derive solely from the individual actions of healthcare personnel.

  18. Internationalization of higher education in Albania - Dilemmas and challenges: Albanian public and private universities in the new globalization era

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dr.Sc. Teuta Dobi

    2011-12-01

    Full Text Available Internationalization of higher education in Albania although an emerging necessity is still in very low figures not only as a connection between institutions but even as mobility between students. This paper sheds lights on internationalization at the regional and at the global level. It analyzes how the globalization and European integration processes are affecting public and private higher education institutions in Albania, their study programs and universities internal management structures. Firstly, it examines the overall changes in the Albanian HE sector since the beginning of 1990s. Then it explores the differences in internationalization between public and private universities and the ultimate changes on the Albanian labor market. My main thesis is that Albanian HE institutions increasingly need to put more efforts to internationalize their internal management structures and to put in practice international study programs. The paper analyzes more the advantages of the international study programs and the difficulties in a development country like Albania to implement them. The paper is based on the case study of the European University of Tirana and explores the difficulties of the faculties of this university to find financial support for international programs, research and travelling abroad, to develop courses with one international perspective, support for its students to study abroad, support to students from other countries and on other indicators such as grants, contracts and linkages in international areas. However the paper deals also with the academic requirements the issue of quality of universities in general. At the end the paper makes a prognosis of some strategies and gives some recommendations how to integrate the Albanian higher education institutions at a regional or global level.

  19. Defining a Good Death (Successful Dying): Literature Review and a Call for Research and Public Dialogue.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meier, Emily A; Gallegos, Jarred V; Thomas, Lori P Montross; Depp, Colin A; Irwin, Scott A; Jeste, Dilip V

    2016-04-01

    There is little agreement about what constitutes good death or successful dying. The authors conducted a literature search for published, English-language, peer-reviewed reports of qualitative and quantitative studies that provided a definition of a good death. Stakeholders in these articles included patients, prebereaved and bereaved family members, and healthcare providers (HCPs). Definitions found were categorized into core themes and subthemes, and the frequency of each theme was determined by stakeholder (patients, family, HCPs) perspectives. Thirty-six studies met eligibility criteria, with 50% of patient perspective articles including individuals over age 60 years. We identified 11 core themes of good death: preferences for a specific dying process, pain-free status, religiosity/spirituality, emotional well-being, life completion, treatment preferences, dignity, family, quality of life, relationship with HCP, and other. The top three themes across all stakeholder groups were preferences for dying process (94% of reports), pain-free status (81%), and emotional well-being (64%). However, some discrepancies among the respondent groups were noted in the core themes: Family perspectives included life completion (80%), quality of life (70%), dignity (70%), and presence of family (70%) more frequently than did patient perspectives regarding those items (35%-55% each). In contrast, religiosity/spirituality was reported somewhat more often in patient perspectives (65%) than in family perspectives (50%). Taking into account the limitations of the literature, further research is needed on the impact of divergent perspectives on end-of-life care. Dialogues among the stakeholders for each individual must occur to ensure a good death from the most critical viewpoint-the patient's. Copyright © 2016 American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  20. Painful dilemmas

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lund, Thomas Bøker

    A study of public opinion on how to balance the costs and benefits of medical interventions and research with a specific focus on animal use and obesity health care......A study of public opinion on how to balance the costs and benefits of medical interventions and research with a specific focus on animal use and obesity health care...