The US SO{sub 2} AUCTION: A policy recommendation for future auctions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Christensen, J.L.; Thinggaard Svendsen, G.

1998-12-31

An annual discriminative and revenue-neutral auction is linked to the new Acid Rain Program which allows electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 emission permits. This innovative SO2 auction distributes 2% of the permits in circulation and takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. Early results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since potentially severe downward biases in both seller price offers and buyer bids are due to the discriminative feature of the EPA auction. (au) 30 refs.

The USSO2 Auction

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, J.L.

1999-01-01

results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since...

Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Boom, Anette

for larger rms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A suffciently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.......This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only...

Price computation in electricity auctions with complex rules: An analysis of investment signals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vazquez, Carlos; Hallack, Michelle; Vazquez, Miguel

2017-01-01

This paper discusses the problem of defining marginal costs when integer variables are present, in the context of short-term power auctions. Most of the proposals for price computation existing in the literature are concerned with short-term competitive equilibrium (generators should not be willing to change the dispatch assigned to them by the auctioneer), which implies operational-cost recovery for all of the generators accepted in the auction. However, this is in general not enough to choose between the different pricing schemes. We propose to include an additional criterion in order to discriminate among different pricing schemes: prices have to be also signals for generation expansion. Using this condition, we arrive to a single solution to the problem of defining prices, where they are computed as the shadow prices of the balance equations in a linear version of the unit commitment problem. Importantly, not every linearization of the unit commitment is valid; we develop the conditions for this linear model to provide adequate investment signals. Compared to other proposals in the literature, our results provide a strong motivation for the pricing scheme and a simple method for price computation. - Highlights: • Pricing proposals in power markets often deal with just accounting-cost recovery. • Including opportunity costs is an additional property required for efficient pricing. • We develop a framework to analyze the pricing proposals found in the literature. • We propose a pricing mechanism to include the costs of short-run integer decisions. • As it includes short-run opportunity costs, it provides efficient long-term signals.

Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions

Science.gov (United States)

Mous, Lonneke; Robu, Valentin; La Poutré, Han

This paper studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face when participating in multiple, sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementary-valued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this model from a decision-theoretic perspective and we show, for a setting where the competition is formed by local bidders, that using options can increase the expected profit for both buyers and sellers. Furthermore, we derive the equations that provide minimum and maximum bounds between which a synergy buyer's bids should fall in order for both sides to have an incentive to use the options mechanism. Next, we perform an experimental analysis of a market in which multiple synergy bidders are active simultaneously.

Factors affecting the auction price of Veldram performance tested ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

The popularity of these auctions for performance tested rams (89.4 % of rams sold) indicate that Veld tested rams were sought after by buyers. The sale price of 296 Veld tested Dorper rams sold between 1994 and 2001, covering seven different tests, were compared with their measured and observed performances.

Auctions and energy networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Helm, D.

2003-01-01

This article compares and contrasts the traditional planning approach to network investment, the regulatory treatment of capital expenditure within RPI-X price-cap regulation, and the use of auctions. It shows why auctions may be helpful in allocating existing capacity, but can only play a limited role in identifying future investment needs. Auctions cannot determine optimal investment. The application of auctions in the 2001 Transco price review is criticised and an alternative approach proposed. (Author)

Auctioning incentive contracts: an experimental study

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Onderstal, S.; van de Meerendonk, A.

2009-01-01

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically

Horticultural auctions in The Netherlands: A transition from 'price discovery' institution to 'marketing' institution

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Meulenberg, M.T.G.

1989-01-01

This paper depicts the evolution of Dutch auctions during the past hundred years from a "price discovery" institution to a "marketing" institution, focusing on price discovery. A conceptual framework is proposed to assess the suitablility of marketing management by agricultural marketing

Encouraging information sharing to boost the name-your-own-price auction

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Yahong; Li, Jinlin; Huang, He; Ran, Lun; Hu, Yusheng

2017-08-01

During a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction, buyers can learn a lot of knowledge from their socially connected peers. Such social learning process makes them become more active to attend the auction and also helps them make decisions on what price to submit. Combining an information diffusion model and a belief decision model, we explore three effects of bidders' information sharing on the buyers' behaviors and the seller profit. The results indicate that information sharing significantly increases the NYOP popularity and the seller profit. When enlarging the quality or quantity of information sharing, or increasing the spreading efficiency of the network topology, the number of attenders and the seller profit are increased significantly. However, the spread of information may make bidders be more likely to bid higher and consequently lose surplus. In addition, the different but interdependent influence of the successful information and failure information are discussed in this work.

The US SO2 Auction: Analysis and Generalization

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, J.L.

1999-01-01

results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since...

Price setting under cost uncertainty and menu costs - the case of the Danish petrol market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stampe Christensen, M.

1994-01-01

This paper derives the optimal pricing policy for a firm facing menu costs and stochastic production cost. The pricing policy is a boundary pricing policy and numerical comparative static analysis shows how exogenous parameters - the drift and variance of the production cost, the discount factor and the menu costs - affect the boundaries. Analyzing daily data for the Danish petrol price illustrates that a boundary pricing policy indeed has been followed for the period 1988-1992, with occasional shifts in both the desired mark-up and more importantly in the width of the bounds. While the theoretical model can say nothing of the shifts in desired mark-up, changes in the width of the bounds are found to be consistent with the implications of the model. (au)

Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's

OpenAIRE

Ashenfelter, Orley C; Graddy, Kathryn

2004-01-01

The Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settl...

The influence of an online auction's product price and e-retailer reputation on consumers' perception, attitude, and behavioral intention.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Wann-Yih; Huang, Po-Ching; Fu, Chen-Su

2011-06-01

Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. In this study, a 2 (product price: high vs. low) × 2 (e-retailer reputation: high vs. low) experimental design was used to understand whether the product price and e-retailer reputation will influence consumers' perceived risk, attitude toward the website and purchase intention. The results of this study indicate that perceived risk negatively influences consumer attitude toward the website and online purchase intention, while consumer attitude toward the website positively influences purchase intention. Moreover, involvement moderates the influence of product price and e-retailer reputation only on social risk but does not have a significant effect on consumer attitude toward the website. This study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users' behavior. Finally, the managerial implications, limitations and future research directions are also provided. © 2011 The Authors. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology © 2011 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.

Auction-theoretic analyses of the first offshore wind energy auction in Germany

Science.gov (United States)

Kreiss, J.; Ehrhart, K.-M.; Hanke, A.-K.

2017-11-01

The first offshore wind energy auction in Germany led to a striking result. The average award price was 0.44 ct/kWh and even more interesting, 3 out of 4 awarded projects had a strike price of 0.0 ct/kWh. That implies that those projects will only receive the actual wholesale market price for electricity as revenue. Although there has been a strong decline in costs of offshore wind projects, such a result is still surprising. We analyzed this result auction-theoretically and showed how the auction design and the market environment can explain part of the outcome. However, another aspect of the explanation is the high risk that the awarded bidders take regarding the future development of both the project costs and the wholesale market price.

Essays on wholesale auctions in deregulated electricity markets

Science.gov (United States)

Baltaduonis, Rimvydas

2007-12-01

The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including price spikes, inefficiency, security, and the overall relationship of market clearing prices to generation costs. Unsatisfactory outcomes in these markets are thought to have resulted in part from strategic generator behaviors encouraged by inappropriate market design features. In this dissertation, I examine the performance of three auction mechanisms for wholesale power markets - Offer Cost Minimization auction, Payment Cost Minimization auction and Simple-Offer auction - when electricity suppliers act strategically. A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the traditional Offer Cost Minimization auction with the intention to solve the problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. Efficiency concerns for this proposal were voiced due to insights predicated on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using a game theoretic approach and an experimental method, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices that they are willing to sell at, but also the start-up fees, which are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that the complex structure of the offers leaves considerable room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti-competitive and inefficient market outcomes. In the last chapter of my dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to contrast the performance of two complex-offer auctions against the performance of a simple-offer auction, in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs - fixed and variable - through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that a simple-offer auction significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects

Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity system with a high penetration of renewable energy sources - A comparison of marginal pricing and pay-as-bid

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nielsen, Steffen; Sorknaes, Peter; Ostergaard, Poul Alberg

2011-01-01

The long-term goal for Danish energy policy is to be free of fossil fuels through the increasing use of renewable energy sources (RES) including fluctuating renewable electricity (FRE). The Danish electricity market is part of the Nordic power exchange, which uses a Marginal Price auction system (MPS) for the day-ahead auctions. The market price is thus equal to the bidding price of the most expensive auction winning unit. In the MPS, the FRE bid at prices of or close to zero resulting in reduced market prices during hours of FRE production. In turn, this reduces the FRE sources' income from market sales. As more FRE is implemented, this effect will only become greater, thereby reducing the income for FRE producers. Other auction settings could potentially help to reduce this problem. One candidate is the pay-as-bid auction setting (PAB), where winning units are paid their own bidding price. This article investigates the two auction settings, to find whether a change of auction setting would provide a more suitable frame for large shares of FRE. This has been done with two energy system scenarios with different shares of FRE. From the analysis, it is found that MPS is generally better for the FRE sources. The result is, however, very sensitive to the base assumptions used for the calculations. -- Highlights: → In this study two different auction settings for the Danish electricity market are compared. → Two scenarios are used in the analyses, one representing the present system and one representing a future 100% renewable energy system. → We find that marginal price auction system is most suitable for supporting fluctuating renewable energy in both scenarios. → The results are very sensitive to the assumptions about bidding prices for each technology.

Hybrid keyword search auctions

KAUST Repository

Goel, Ashish

2009-01-01

Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1. We show that risk-seeking advertisers will choose only a per-impression bid whereas risk-averse advertisers will choose only a per-click bid, and argue that both kind of advertisers arise naturally. Hence, the ability to bid in a hybrid fashion is important to account for the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2. For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, we show that having the extra information from the advertisers in the form of a per-impression bid can result in significantly higher revenue. 3. An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneer\\'s estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneer\\'s prior without incurring any extra cost. 4. The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies to deal with the uncertainty in the click-probability using the same basic auction. The per-click and per-impression bidding schemes can only be used to implement two extreme cases of these strategies. As Internet commerce matures, we need more sophisticated pricing models to exploit all the information held by each of the participants. We believe that hybrid auctions could be an important step in this direction. The

Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yoshikazu Ikeda

2011-09-01

Full Text Available The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending-bid auctions. The paper also presents experimental evidence broadly consistent with the model. In the complete information environment, lower value bidders overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not found in the incomplete information environment, consistent with the model.

Hybrid keyword search auctions

KAUST Repository

Goel, Ashish; Munagala, Kamesh

2009-01-01

Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1. We show that risk-seeking advertisers will choose only a per-impression bid whereas risk-averse advertisers will choose only a per-click bid, and argue that both kind of advertisers arise naturally. Hence, the ability to bid in a hybrid fashion is important to account for the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2. For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, we show that having the extra information from the advertisers in the form of a per-impression bid can result in significantly higher revenue. 3. An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneer's estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneer's prior without incurring any extra cost. 4. The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies to deal with the uncertainty in the click-probability using the same basic auction. The per-click and per-impression bidding schemes can only be used to implement two extreme cases of these strategies. As Internet commerce matures, we need more sophisticated pricing models to exploit all the information held by each of the participants. We believe that hybrid auctions could be an important step in this direction. The hybrid

Advantaged Bidders in Franchise Auctions

OpenAIRE

van den Berg, V.A.C.

2012-01-01

Consider a government that auctions a franchise for, e.g., an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. Consider an 'incumbent bidder' that owns a complement or substitute. With an auction on the transfer (i.e. payment) to the government, the incumbent is advantaged.If the government regulates the market with an auction on the price asked to consumers, it depends who is advantaged. With complements, the incumbent is advantaged: it can set a lower price on the new franchise, as this inc...

Comparison of Group-Buying Online Auction and Posted Pricing Mechanism in an Uncertain Market

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

CHEN Jian; LIU Yunhui; SONG Xiping

2004-01-01

Demand uncertainty is a key factor for the seller's decision making, especially in the e-business environment, for the website to sell products through the online auction. In this paper, two kinds of demand uncertainties are considered: the consumer regime uncertainty and the inherent randomness of the market environment. Then, how to use a novel business model and group-buying auction (GBA) is analyzed in such a market environment. Based on the comparison of the GBA and the posted price mechanism, some conditions that favor the GBA are provided.

The inherent inefficiency of simultaneously feasible financial transmission rights auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deng, Shi-Jie; Oren, Shmuel; Meliopoulos, A.P.

2010-01-01

Empirical evidence from the New York ISO shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue rights, also known as financial transmission rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to inherent inefficiencies in the auction structure. We show that even with perfect foresight of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depend on the bid quantity and therefore may not be priced correctly in the financial transmission right (FTR) auction. In particular, we prove that quantity limits on the FTR bids may cause the auction clearing prices to differ from the bid prices. This phenomenon which is inherent in the theoretical properties of the optimization algorithm used to clear the auction, is further illustrated through numerical simulations with test systems. We conclude that price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the realized values of the FTRs. Secondary markets or frequent reconfiguration auctions are necessary in order to achieve such convergence. (author)

Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Uniform Price Auction

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Boom, Anette

This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two seller...

Auction-based bandwidth allocation in the Internet

Science.gov (United States)

Wei, Jiaolong; Zhang, Chi

2002-07-01

It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this paper, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called uniform-price auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and it's incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.

Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Escamocher, Guillaume; Miltersen, Peter Bro; Santillan, Rocio

2009-01-01

We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealed-bid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case...

Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions

Science.gov (United States)

Schneider, Stefan; Shabalin, Pasha; Bichler, Martin

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favoring iterative combinatorial auction designs. Several promising ascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual and subgradient algorithms and linear programming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBundle( 3) (Parkes and Ungar 2000), dVSV (de Vries et al. 2007) and the Ascending Proxy auction (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) result in VCG payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies the buyer submodularity condition and bidders bid straightforward, which is an expost Nash equilibrium in that case. iBEA and CreditDebit auctions (Mishra and Parkes 2007) do not even require the buyer submodularity condition and achieve the same properties for general valuations. In many situations, however, one cannot assume bidders to bid straightforward and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavior is therefore a critical issue for any application. We have conducted a large number of computational experiments to analyze the performance of NLPPA designs with respect to different bidding strategies and different valuation models. We compare the results of NLPPAs to those of the VCG auction and those of iterative combinatorial auctions with approximate linear prices, such as ALPS (Bichler et al. 2009) and the Combinatorial Clock auction (Porter et al. 2003).

China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

Science.gov (United States)

Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

2013-01-01

This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003-2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a "two stage auction". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are "cold", which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.

Brazilian experience in electricity auctions: Comparing outcomes from new and old energy auctions as well as the application of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rego, Erik Eduardo; Parente, Virginia

2013-01-01

Since 2004, the Government of Brazil (GoB) has acted as an intermediary between distribution and generator companies in the energy procurement sector. The GoB procures energy from generator companies through auctions of long-term energy contracts. After an auction, the winning generator companies sign contracts directly with distribution companies. In particular, the GoB runs two different auctions: one for energy from existing power plants (i.e., old energy) and another for energy from power plants that have not yet been built (i.e., new energy). This paper describes these auctions and compares the outcomes from the old and new energy auctions from 2004 to 2010 using final auction prices. The Brazilian case is particularly interesting, not only because energy is predominantly supplied by hydropower plants but also because new energy auctions reach prices below those for old energy. Therefore, it is likely that it is not necessary to run the two different energy auctions. As a secondary objective, this article analyze whether the Anglo-Dutch hybrid auction model is a better design for electricity procurement in Brazil. - Highlights: ► We analyze the outcomes from the Brazilian old and new energy auctions. ► We evaluate the Anglo-Dutch auction design. ► Outcomes from both kind of auctions reveal that the prices are statistically similar. ► One kind of auction increase competition and minimize Eletrobras' market power

Competition in decentralized electricity markets: Three papers on electricity auctions

Science.gov (United States)

Harbord, David William Cameron

This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis of electricity auctions written over a period of twelve years. The first paper models price competition in a decentralized wholesale market for electricity as a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction. In both the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria of the model, above marginal cost pricing and inefficient despatch of generating units occur. An alternative regulatory pricing rule is considered and it is shown that offering to supply at marginal cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms. The second paper analyses strategic interaction between long-term contracts and price competition in the British electricity wholesale market, and confirms that forward contracts will tend to put downward pressure on spot market prices. A 'strategic commitment' motive for selling forward contracts is also identified: a generator may commit itself to bidding lower prices into the spot market in order to ensure that it will be despatched with its full capacity. The third paper characterizes bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids.

Development of modified rational buyer auction for procurement of ancillary services utilizing participation matrix

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jamalzadeh, R.; Ardehali, M.M.; Rashidinejad, M.

2008-01-01

The rational buyer auction is based on a simultaneous auction that is the redesigned auction mechanism for ancillary services by the California independent system operator (CAISO). The incentive for the rational buyer auction is CAISO's intent to adopt a common sense rule of substituting higher-quality lower-cost services for lower-quality higher-cost services, when it results in reduced total procurement cost. For the purposes of designing a desirable auction where the minimum cost for the objective function as well as prevention of price reversal are achieved, either the payment cost in marginal pricing auction must be lowered or price reversal in rational buyer auction must be avoided. The objectives of this study are (a) to develop a newly proposed 'modified rational buyer' auction that does not allow price reversal and (b) to propose and validate a solution procedure that is based on participation matrix and discrete programming. The validation of the proposed solution procedure is accomplished through examination of two case studies available in the literature. Based on the first case study data, it is shown that the newly developed modified rational buyer auction avoids price reversal occurrence, while the total payment of ISO is increased by 5.8%, as compared with rational buyer auction. Also in comparison with marginal pricing auction, the ISO payment is lowered by 38.8%, when the newly developed modified rational buyer auction is utilized. For future work, it is recommended that the application of the modified rational buyer auction to joint dispatch of energy and ancillary services is investigated

Network capacity auctions: promise and problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newbery, David M.

2003-01-01

Well-designed auctions work favorably for allocating idiosyncratic properties efficiently. Auctions are used to allocate entry capacity for United Kingdom gas and inter-connector capacity for electricity in several European Union countries and can work well for allocating existing capacity, though careful auction design is needed to mitigate potential market power. Using auction prices to guide investment decisions in networks is problematic if bidders fear that sub-optimal investment will be compensated by regulatory fiat, lowering future capacity values. (Author)

Static vs Dynamic Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Bidders

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Carvalho, M.

2012-01-01

Abstract: This paper presents the outcome of a dynamic price-descending auction when the distribution of the private values is uncertain and bidders exhibit ambiguity aversion. In contrast to sealed-bid auctions, in open auctions the bidders get information about the other bidders' private values

Efficient Double Auction Mechanisms in the Energy Grid with Connected and Islanded Microgrids

Science.gov (United States)

Faqiry, Mohammad Nazif

The future energy grid is expected to operate in a decentralized fashion as a network of autonomous microgrids that are coordinated by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), which should allocate energy to them in an efficient manner. Each microgrid operating in either islanded or grid-connected mode may be considered to manage its own resources. This can take place through auctions with individual units of the microgrid as the agents. This research proposes efficient auction mechanisms for the energy grid, with is-landed and connected microgrids. The microgrid level auction is carried out by means of an intermediate agent called an aggregator. The individual consumer and producer units are modeled as selfish agents. With the microgrid in islanded mode, two aggregator-level auction classes are analyzed: (i) price-heterogeneous, and (ii) price homogeneous. Under the price heterogeneity paradigm, this research extends earlier work on the well-known, single-sided Kelly mechanism to double auctions. As in Kelly auctions, the proposed algorithm implements the bidding without using any agent level private infor-mation (i.e. generation capacity and utility functions). The proposed auction is shown to be an efficient mechanism that maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the utilities of all the agents. Furthermore, the research considers the situation where a subset of agents act as a coalition to redistribute the allocated energy and price using any other specific fairness criterion. The price homogeneous double auction algorithm proposed in this research ad-dresses the problem of price-anticipation, where each agent tries to influence the equilibri-um price of energy by placing strategic bids. As a result of this behavior, the auction's efficiency is lowered. This research proposes a novel approach that is implemented by the aggregator, called virtual bidding, where the efficiency can be asymptotically maximized, even in the presence of price anticipatory bidders

How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ginsburgh, V.; van Ours, J.C.

2003-01-01

In empirical studies of sequential auctions of identical objects prices have been found to decline.We study auctions of ancient Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks.In these auctions there are very long sequences of lots of identical objects.We find that the average price decline is smaller

An assessment of the Danish-German cross-border auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kristiansen, Tarjei

2007-01-01

This paper presents an analysis of the auction prices at the cross-border auction between West Denmark and Germany and between East Denmark and Germany (the Kontek cable). Monthly and annual transmission capacities appear to be more highly valued than daily transmission capacity on average. The two cross-border auctions show different trends: the auctions between West Denmark and Germany exhibit a higher level of prices in the southbound direction, and between East Denmark and Germany, higher prices in the northbound direction. We find a relatively strong correspondence in the pricing of products over different time frames (daily, monthly and annual auctions) between West Denmark and Germany and a weak correspondence for the products between East Denmark and Germany. In the daily auctions, market players can decide whether to use their capacity after the clearing of the day-ahead market, while in the monthly and annual auctions they must decide whether to use their capacity prior to clearing. If they choose not to use their capacity, the use-it-or-lose-it principle applies. The capacity is then subsequently released to the daily market. Since the daily cross-border auctions are free of commitment, they should be valued as options. Likewise, in the monthly and annual auctions market players can choose not to nominate their capacity but as this must occur before the clearing of the day-ahead market, they will not know the directions of the power flows a priori. If they nominate the capacity they must use it; if the direction turns out to be ''wrong,'' it is then possible to purchase capacity in the opposite direction in the daily auctions. If market players can accurately predict the outcome of the spot markets day ahead, the value of monthly and annual capacity should more closely reflect the value of an option. Thus, one would expect the value of the monthly and annual capacity to be between the value of an option and an obligation. Although this suggests that the

China’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

Science.gov (United States)

Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

2013-01-01

This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities. PMID:25506125

Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game

OpenAIRE

Tibor Neugebauer; Sascha F llbrunn

2013-01-01

The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subject and betweensubjects variations. In line with the qualitative risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction, the data show that bids increase in the number of bidders. However, in auctions involving a small ...

Auction Mechanism of Micro-Grid Project Transfer

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yong Long

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Micro-grid project transfer is the primary issue of micro-grid development. The efficiency and quality of the micro-grid project transfer directly affect the quality of micro-grid project construction and development, which is very important for the sustainable development of micro-grid. This paper constructs a multi-attribute auction model of micro-grid project transfer, which reflects the characteristics of micro-grid system and the interests of stakeholders, calculates the optimal bidding strategy and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on auction equilibrium by multi-stage dynamic game with complete information, and makes a numerical simulation analysis. Results indicate that the optimal strategy of auction mechanism is positively related to power quality, energy storage quality, and carbon emissions. Different from the previous lowest price winning mechanism, the auction mechanism formed in this paper emphasizes that the energy suppliers which provide the comprehensive optimization of power quality, energy storage quality, carbon emissions, and price will win the auction, when both the project owners and energy suppliers maximize their benefits under this auction mechanism. The auction mechanism is effective because it is in line with the principle of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. In addition, the number of energy suppliers participating in the auction and the cost of the previous auction are positively related to the auction equilibrium, both of which are adjusting the equilibrium results of the auction. At the same time, the utilization rate of renewable energy and the comprehensive utilization of energy also have a positive impact on the auction equilibrium. In the end, this paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions about micro-grid project auction. The research in this paper is of great significance to improve the auction quality of micro-grid projects and promote the sustainable development of micro-grid.

Carbon allowance auction design of China's emissions trading scheme: A multi-agent-based approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tang, Ling; Wu, Jiaqian; Yu, Lean; Bao, Qin

2017-01-01

In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main markets: the commodity market, the primary carbon auction market and the secondary carbon trading market. Different popular auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price auction might generate a slightly higher market clearing price than the discriminative-price auction, and the prices under two auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon auction market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect. - Highlights: • A multi-agent-based model is proposed for China's emissions trading scheme (ETS). • Two main economic agents are included: government and firms in different sectors. • Auction-based allocation for initial carbon allowances is especially investigated. • Economic and environmental impacts of different auction designs are analyzed. • Results confirm the validity of the model and give helpful insights into ETS design.

Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yeon-Koo Che

2006-03-01

Full Text Available This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences.

Auctioned IPOs : The U.S. Evidence

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Degeorge, F.; Derrien, F.; Womack, K.L.

2009-01-01

Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht has completed 19 IPOs in the U.S. using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail)

Effects of scarcity, aesthetics and ecology on wildlife auction prices of large African mammals.

Science.gov (United States)

Dalerum, Fredrik; Miranda, María; Muñiz, Cristina; Rodríguez, Plácido

2018-02-01

For successful integration of biological conservation into economic markets, economic processes need to capture ecological values. South African wildlife ranching is a tourist-based activity that generates unique information on the economic value of wildlife species. We used public data from South African wildlife auctions to evaluate if annual prices 1991-2012 related to species characteristics associated with scarcity, aesthetics and ecology of South African carnivores and ungulates. While none of the species characteristics influenced carnivore prices, ungulate prices were related to characteristics associated with novelty and aesthetics, which relative importance had increased over time. We raise both ecological and economic concerns for this apparent focus. Our results also suggest a potential importance of non-species-related factors, such as market and buyer characteristics. We encourage further evaluation of the relative influences of species characteristics versus factors that are intrinsically linked to economic processes on price variations in South African wildlife.

Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting

OpenAIRE

Alvarez, Francisco; André, Francisco J.

2015-01-01

We analise emission permit auctions under leader-follower competition when the leader bids strategically and the follower acts as price-taker both at the auction and the secondary market. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is optimal ex-post for the leader. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auction always awards less permits to the leader than the cost-effective amount. Our central result i...

Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Břeský, Michal

-, č. 384 (2009), s. 1-39 ISSN 1211-3298 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : multi-unit auction * multiple-object auction * market efficiency * optimal selling mechanism Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp384.pdf

Appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support – Prequalifications and penalties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kreiss, Jan; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Haufe, Marie-Christin

2017-01-01

Auctions are a promising tool to accomplish renewable energy support (RES). However, they involve diverse risks for the auctioneer and the bidders. The major risk for the auctioneer – with respect to the expansion target and the acceptance of auctions for RES in general – is the risk of non-realization: awarded bidders do not realize their projects. The main reasons are bidders' uncertainties concerning their project costs. The auctioneer can reduce the non-realization risk by taking various measures. The most discussed and implemented measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties. An evaluation of these measures has relevant implications for an appropriate auctions design for RES. The non-realization option induces lower bids. A suitable combination of financial and physical prequalifications can reduce the non-realization risk significantly, however, involves sunk costs. Counterintuitively, first-price auction and second-price auction lead to different expected award prices and different realization probabilities. Penalties bear a high risk of inefficient auction outcomes. The appropriate parametrization and combination of the measures is challenging. Under consideration of all implications, we recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications to achieve a sufficiently high realization rate while maintaining efficiency. - Highlights: • The non-realization risk is a major problem of auctions for RES. • Designated measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties. • Prequalifications and penalties have different effects on auction outcome. • The non-realization option violates the revenue equivalence theorem. • We recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications.

Effect of management, marketing, and certified health programs on the sale price of beef calves sold through a livestock video auction service from 1995 through 2009.

Science.gov (United States)

Seeger, Jon T; King, Michael E; Grotelueschen, Dale M; Rogers, Glenn M; Stokka, Gerald S

2011-08-15

To evaluate and update the previously quantified effects of management, marketing, and certified health programs on the sale price of beef calves sold through a livestock video auction service. Longitudinal study. 41,657 lots representing 5,042,272 beef calves sold from 1995 through 2009. Data describing each lot of beef calves marketed from 1995 through 2009 by a livestock video auction service were obtained from sale catalogues. For each year of the study, multiple regression analysis was used to quantify the effect of management, marketing, and certified health programs on sale price. Sale date, base sale weight, quadratic effect of base weight, sex of calf, region of origin, breed description, inclusion in a certified health program, and number of calves in the lot significantly affected sale price for every year of the study. Variation in body weight, flesh score, and number of days between sale and delivery date had significant effects on price in most of the years; frame score and calves with horns affected price in 7 of 15 years; age and source verification influenced sale price in every year since source verification was introduced in 2005; and the auction service's progressive genetics program increased price during the 1 year that program was available. Some management, marketing, and certified health initiatives have consistently increased the sale price of beef calves, and producers can increase the price of their calves by implementing these practices.

Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Břeský, Michal

2013-01-01

Roč. 82, November (2013), s. 205-217 ISSN 0899-8256 R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GAP402/11/1531 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : multi-unit auction * multiple-object auction * market efficiency Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.025, year: 2013

The US SO2 Auction and Environmental Regulation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, J.L.

1999-01-01

The US Acid Rain Program (ARP) is now well-established. The ARP relies on tradable permits and includes an annual revenue-neutral SO2 auction. Has this auction been an important factor in establishing low transaction costs and a successful market? In answering this question, we first compare...... the price signals from the SO2 auction to those found in the market. Second, we try to explain empirical outcomes by analyzing strategic incentives and the number of buyers and sellers in the auction. The policy recommendation is that the non-discriminative SO2 auction is a very useful tool for kick...

Experimental comparison of impact of auction format on carbon allowance market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Cong, Ronggang; Wei, Yi-Ming

2012-01-01

auction and English clock auction) with heterogeneous bidders (coal power plants and gas power plants) from four perspectives (carbon price, auction efficiency, demand withholding and fluctuations in power supplies). Possibilities of collusion among bidders and impacts of allowance banking and penalty...

Keeping out Trojan horses: auctions and bankruptcy in the laboratory

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Onderstal, S.; van der Veen, A.

2011-01-01

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly

Electronic Reverse Auctions in the Federal Government

Science.gov (United States)

2007-12-01

notification e-mail to all vendors informing them that a solicitation was issued that matches their company profile. A notification will also be sent...auction design. According to Kambil and van Heck (2002) business-to-business ( B2B ) auctions should be conducted on the weekdays, with enough time...allowed for proper pricing and risk-assessment by the company . In contrast, sellers on eBay may decide to run their auctions for any length of time

Need and design of short-term auctions in the EU gas markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vazquez, Miguel; Hallack, Michelle

2013-01-01

In the EU, gas markets are based on socializing network flexibility services. However, shippers have different preferences on network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to allocate network services in the short run. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players′ preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed: (a) an auction based on bids for gas, which allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences; (b) an auction with explicit bids for line-pack, which allows shippers′ valuation of line-pack storage. - Highlights: • EU gas regulation faces serious difficulties in network resource allocation. • We propose two short-term auctions with implicit network allocation. • The difference between the two is the implicit or explicit allocation of line-pack. • The first auction considers line-pack as an instrument to arbitrage gas prices. • The second auction design considers line-pack as a tool to hedge volatility

From Walras’ auctioneer to continuous time double auctions: a general dynamic theory of supply and demand

Science.gov (United States)

Donier, J.; Bouchaud, J.-P.

2016-12-01

In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens after they occur? To answer the question, we develop a dynamic theory for supply and demand based on agents with heterogeneous beliefs. When the inter-auction time is infinitely long, the Walrasian mechanism is recovered. When transactions are allowed to happen in continuous time, a peculiar property emerges: close to the price, supply and demand vanish quadratically, which we empirically confirm on the Bitcoin. This explains why price impact in financial markets is universally observed to behave as the square root of the excess volume. The consequences are important, as they imply that the very fact of clearing the market makes prices hypersensitive to small fluctuations.

Potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Campidoglio, C.

2000-01-01

This paper analyses the potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy. This would both reduce the supply shortage and the prices on the eligible market, increase competition on the contract-for-difference market, indicate a clear price to which regulated energy charges could be indexed, thus extending the auction benefits to the franchise market to avoid the reintroduction of cross-subsidies [it

Auction game in electric power market place

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kumar, J.; Sheble, G.

1996-01-01

The power industry in the US is presently an evolving changing business environment. While planning to meet future peak demand is still a concern, the efficient utilization of existing generation and transmission resources is fast becoming a primary interest. This interest suggests a move from cost-based market operations to price based market operations. Auction market structure is one of the various ways to perform price based operation. Such a market place would be very new and challenging to all players of the electric power industry. This paper describes an overview of the new business environment. The paper presents a detailed description of the auction game. The trading objectives in the bidding game are defined. The framework of auction process is described by defining the rules to play the game. Finally, strategies for market players are discussed

Retailers and consumers in sequential auctions of collectibles

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Vincent Lyk-Jensen, Stéphanie; Chanel, Olivier

2007-01-01

We analyse an independent private-value model, where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second-price auctions. In this heterogeneous game, bidders may have differently distributed valuations, and some have multi-unit demand with decreasing marginal values (retailers......); others have a specific single-unit demand (consumers). By examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences, we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect....... The study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders...

The large-scale solar feed-in tariff reverse auction in the Australian Capital Territory, Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buckman, Greg; Sibley, Jon; Bourne, Richard

2014-01-01

Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) offer renewable energy developers significant investor certainty but sometimes at the cost of being misaligned with generation costs. Reverse FiT auctions, where the FiT rights for a predetermined capacity are auctioned, can overcome this problem but can be plagued by non-delivery risks, particularly of competitively priced proposals. In 2012 and 2013 the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government in Australia conducted a FiT reverse auction for 40 MW of large-scale solar generating capacity, the first such auction undertaken in the country. The auction was highly competitive in relation to price and demonstrating low delivery risks. Proposal capital costs, particularly engineering, procurement and construction costs, as well as internal rates of return, were lower than expected. The auction process revealed limited land availability for large-scale solar developments in the ACT as well as a significant perceived sovereign risk issue. The auction process was designed to mitigate non-delivery risk by requiring proposals to be pre-qualified on the basis of delivery risk, before considering FiT pricing. The scheme is likely to be used by the ACT Government to support further large-scale renewable energy development as part of its greenhouse gas reduction strategy which is underpinned by a 90-per cent-by-2020 renewable energy target. - Highlights: • Evolution of the reverse auction process in the Australian Capital Territory. • Analysis of the outcomes of the first Australian feed-in tariff reverse auction. • Identification of the major drivers of the low FiT prices achieved in the auction. • Identification of major issues that emerged in the auction

A Robust Open Ascending-price Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

Science.gov (United States)

Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Terada, Kenji

This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily in the Internet. This is the first protocol that has these two characteristics. We show that our new protocol outperforms an existing protocol, which satisfies (ii), with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue.

Multi-Attribute Vickrey Auctions when Utility Functions are Unknown

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Máhr, T.; De Weerdt, M.M.

2006-01-01

Multi-attribute auctions allow negotiations over multiple attributes besides price. For example in task allocation, service providers can define their service by means of multiple attributes, such as quality of service, deadlines, or delay penalties. Auction mechanisms assume that the players have

Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Füllbrunn, S.C.; Neugebauer, T.

2013-01-01

The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subjects and

Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions

OpenAIRE

Maris Goldmanis; Antonio Penta; Francesco Decarolis

2012-01-01

As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case...

A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick AuctionWithout Prior Scoring

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Leth Hougaard, Jens; Nielsen, Kurt; Papakonstantinou, Athanasios

2016-01-01

that following this type of equilibrium behavior often leads to winner’s curse. The simulations show that in auctions with more than 12 participants the chance of facing winner’s curse is around 95%. Truthful reporting, on the other hand, does not constitute a Nash equilibrium but it is ex post individually......We analyze a two-attribute single item procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. The auction simplifies the procurement process by reducing the principal’s articulation of preferences to simply choosing the most preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices...... rational. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that truthful bidding may indeed represent some kind of focal point....

Long-term contract auctions and market power in regulated power industries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Soledad Arellano, M.; Serra, Pablo

2010-01-01

A number of countries with oligopolistic power industries have used marginal cost pricing to set the price of energy for small customers. This course of action, however, does not necessarily ensure an efficient outcome when competition is imperfect. The purpose of this paper is to study how the auction of long-term contracts could reduce market power. We do so in a two-firm, two-technology, linear-cost, static model where demand is summarized by a price inelastic load curve. In this context we show that the larger the proportion of total demand auctioned in advance, the lower are both the contract and the average spot price of energy.

Combinatorial Auctions without Money

Science.gov (United States)

2014-05-01

istence of thresholds (a.k.a., critical prices) (for every set). The result in Theorem 3.4 relates to the characterization of truthful CAs with money and no...with money and no verification, each bidder optimizes her valu- ation minus the critical price over all her demanded sets; in the setting without money...auctions. ICALP, pp. 90-101, 2010. [2] P. Briest, P. Krysta, and B. Vöcking. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. STOC, pp. 39-48

Modelling of auctioning mechanism for solar photovoltaic capacity

Science.gov (United States)

Poullikkas, Andreas

2016-10-01

In this work, a modified optimisation model for the integration of renewable energy sources for power-generation (RES-E) technologies in power-generation systems on a unit commitment basis is developed. The purpose of the modified optimisation procedure is to account for RES-E capacity auctions for different solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity electricity prices. The optimisation model developed uses a genetic algorithm (GA) technique for the calculation of the required RES-E levy (or green tax) in the electricity bills. Also, the procedure enables the estimation of the level of the adequate (or eligible) feed-in-tariff to be offered to future RES-E systems, which do not participate in the capacity auctioning procedure. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the optimisation procedure developed the case of PV capacity auctioning for commercial systems is examined. The results indicated that the required green tax, in order to promote the use of RES-E technologies, which is charged to the electricity customers through their electricity bills, is reduced with the reduction in the final auctioning price. This has a significant effect related to the reduction of electricity bills.

Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dijkstra, B.R.; Haan, M

1999-01-01

Cason (1993) argued that the auction the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency in the USA) used in order to start the market for sulfur allowances, is not efficient. The set-up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance. In this paper, we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested. In particular, we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero, while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. It is not possible to derive the Nash equilibrium for this set-up. If such an equilibrium exists, sellers either set only a positive ask price, or an ask price equal to zero, and a positive bid as well. 14 refs

Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sunnevaag, K.J.

2003-01-01

To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two 'competing' ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy

78 FR 65982 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands Rescheduled for January...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-04

... Filing Requirements, Reserve Price, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for... procedures, reserve price, and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of H Block licenses (Auction 96... applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the auction. [[Page 65983

Market power in cap-and-trade auctions: A Monte Carlo approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dormady, Noah C.

2013-01-01

Recent greenhouse gas auctions have resulted in base level prices while remaining significantly concentrated. How do dominant firms receive such a large share of emissions allowances without bidding up the market price? This paper provides a Monte Carlo simulation analysis based on a contemporary regional greenhouse gas market in the United States. It introduces a C# simulation software environment, Oligopsony 1.0 that simulates uniform-price emissions auctions in repeated iterations. The results of these simulations indicate that there can be significant non-linearities between profit and market power as exercised through strategic demand reduction. This analysis finds the optimum point of strategic demand reduction that enables firms to exploit these non-linearities. The use of auctions to distribute tradeable pollution rights to firms in heavily concentrated markets can have significant unintended consequences, as it can exacerbate the problems of market power that exist within those markets. -- Highlights: •The theory of market power behavior in emissions auctions is furthered. •Monte Carlo simulation environment Oligopsony 1.0 is introduced. •Simulations provide analysis of optimum bids to exercise market power. •Significant non-linearities exist between profit and the exercise of market power

Game auction prices are not related to biodiversity contributions of southern African ungulates and large carnivores

Science.gov (United States)

Dalerum, Fredrik; Miranda, Maria

2016-02-01

There is an urgent need for human societies to become environmentally sustainable. Because public policy is largely driven by economic processes, quantifications of the relationship between market prices and environmental values can provide important information for developing strategies towards sustainability. Wildlife in southern Africa is often privately owned and traded at game auctions to be utilized for commercial purposes mostly related to tourism. This market offers an interesting opportunity to evaluate how market prices relate to biologically meaningful species characteristics. In this market, prices were not correlated with species contributions to either phylogenetic or functional diversity, and species contributions to phylogenetic or functional diversity did not influence the trends in prices over time for the past 20 years. Since this economic market did not seem to appreciate evolutionary or ecologically relevant characteristics, we question if the game tourism market may contribute towards biodiversity conservation in southern Africa. We suggest that market prices in general may have limited values as guides for directing conservation and environmental management. We further suggest that there is a need to evaluate what humans value in biological organisms, and how potentially necessary shifts in such values can be instigated.

The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holmberg, Paer; Newbery, David

2010-01-01

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry. Previous results and general recommendations for divisible-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions. (author)

Strategic Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions with Capacity Constrained Bidders

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Schwenen, Sebastian

2015-01-01

This article employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procurement auctions when firms are capacity constrained. Using data from the New York City procurement auctions for power generating capacity, I find that firms use simple bidding strategies to coordinate......'s capacities and its profits of undercutting increase....

Pure equilibrium strategies in multi-unit auctions with private value bidders

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Břeský, Michal

-, č. 376 (2008), s. 1-44 ISSN 1211-3298 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : multiple-unit auction * existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games * pay-your- bid and uniform-price auctions Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp376.pdf

Convergent Double Auction Mechanism for a Prosumers’ Decentralized Smart Grid

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tadahiro Taniguchi

2015-10-01

Full Text Available In this paper, we propose a novel automated double auction mechanism called convergent linear function submission-based double-auction (CLFS-DA for a prosumers’ decentralized smart grid. The target decentralized smart grid is a regional electricity network that consists of many prosumers that have a battery and a renewable energy-based generator, such as photovoltaic cells. In the proposed double-auction mechanism, each intelligent software agent representing each prosumer submits linear demand and supply functions to an automated regional electricity market where they are registered. It is proven that the CLFS-DA mechanism is guaranteed to obtain one of the global optimal price profiles in addition to it achieving an exact balance between demand and supply, even through the learning period. The proof of convergence is provided on the basis of the theory of LFS-DA, which gives a clear bridge between a function submission-based double auction and a dual decomposition (DD-based real-time pricing procedure. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated numerically through a simulation experiment.

Statistical Properties of Online Auctions

Science.gov (United States)

Namazi, Alireza; Schadschneider, Andreas

We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are studied. The analysis of the data reveals surprisingly simple distributions and relations, typically of power-law form. Based on these findings we introduce a simple method to identify suspicious auctions that could be influenced by a form of fraud known as shill bidding. Furthermore the influence of bidding strategies is discussed. The results indicate that the observed behavior is related to a mixture of agents using a variety of strategies.

A robust internet-based auction to procure electricity forwards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woo, C.K.; Lloyd, D.; Borden, M.; Warrington, R.; Baskette, C.

2004-01-01

Securing forward contracts to manage procurement-cost risk is an intuitively appealing and economically reasonable strategy for a load-serving local distribution company (LDC) in today's volatile electricity marketplace. However, knowing what to buy does not guarantee least-cost implementation. The forward-contract price quoted by a prospective seller may not be the 'best deal' that an LDC could have obtained, especially when the forward contract desired by the LDC is not actively traded. This paper reports the results from five internet-based auctions for electricity forward contracts with non-firm delivery and varying hourly quantities held monthly by a Florida municipal utility (MU) from September 2002 to January 2003. The results confirm that a multi-round auction design is robust in realizing competitive price offers made by credit-worthy sellers, time-efficient contracting, and consistent cost savings to the MU. Thus, the Anglo-Dutch auction described herein is a reasonable substitute for generation ownership by an LDC. (author)

Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

Science.gov (United States)

Deng, Xiaotie; Sun, Yang; Yin, Ming; Zhou, Yunhong

In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

Lessons from the Electricity Auctions in Brazil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dutra, Joisa; Menezes, Flavio

2005-01-01

The first lesson to emerge from the recent auctions falls within a category that might be described as 'higher costs of reforms in developing economies.' These range from bidders' fears of future government-imposed price caps to technical issues, such as the potential loss of efficiency resulting from bidders' lack of knowledge about ceiling prices, reference supply, and the demand reduction mechanism

Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

Science.gov (United States)

Ghosh, Gagan Pratap

In my dissertation, I investigate the effects of budget-constraints in multi-unit auctions. This is done in three parts. First, I analyze a case where all bidders have a common budget constraint. Precisely, I analyze an auction where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed bid, first-price auctions, to bidders who have demand for both units. Bidders differ with respect to their valuations for the units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint which binds their ability to spend in the auction. I show that if valuation distribution is atom-less, then their does not exist any symmetric equilibrium in this auction game. In the second and third parts of my thesis, I analyze the sale of licenses for the right to drill for oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the United States. These sales are conducted using simultaneous sealed-bid first-price auctions for multiple licenses, each representing a specific area (called a tract). Using aspects of observed bidding-behavior, I first make a prima facie case that bidders are budget-constrained in these auctions. In order to formalize this argument, I develop a simple extension of the standard model (where bidders differ in their valuations for the objects) by incorporating (random) budgets for the bidders. The auction-game then has a two-dimensional set of types for each player. I study the theoretical properties of this auction, assuming for simplicity that two units are being sold. I show that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies that is symmetric with respect to the players and with respect to the units. The strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a permutation) of his budget between the two auctions. I then characterize the equilibrium in terms of the bid-distribution and iso-bid curves in the value-budget space. I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild

An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gerard van der Laan

2016-12-01

Full Text Available Several heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potentially budget- constrained bidders. Every bidder has private knowledge of his own valuation of the items and his own budget. Due to budget constraints, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values and typically no Walrasian equilibrium exists. To deal with such markets, we propose the notion of 'equilibrium under allotment' and develop an ascending auction mechanism that always finds such an equilibrium assignment and a corresponding system of prices in finite time. The auction can be viewed as a novel generalization of the ascending auction of Demange et al. (1986 from settings without financial constraints to settings with financial constraints. We examine various strategic and efficiency properties of the auction and its outcome.

Effect of different children's menu labeling designs on family purchases.

Science.gov (United States)

Holmes, Ashley S; Serrano, Elena L; Machin, Jane E; Duetsch, Thomas; Davis, George C

2013-03-01

The majority of labeling studies at restaurants have focused on adults, not children, and utilized cross-sectional data with one menu labeling design, typically calorie information. The aim of this longitudinal study was to examine the effect of three different menu labeling designs for children's meals on total calories and fat selected by families. Each menu was implemented for 2months. Patrons' purchases were tracked from a control menu (with no nutrition information) through all three theoretically-based designs: calorie and fat information; followed by symbols denoting healthier choices; then nutrition bargain price. All menus were created specifically for the study. They featured six combination meals (pre-determined entrees and side items) and a la carte items (entrees and side items that could be ordered separately). Only combination meals contained labeling. Fixed effects models were estimated to detect changes in sales for each menu labeling design compared to the control. Overall, menu labeling did not result in a positive net effect on total calories or fat purchased by families, but resulted in significant shifts in purchases of combination and a la carte meals and healthy and unhealthy options. The most significant impact was seen for nutrition bargain price labeling, the last design. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Investor structure and the price-volume relationship in a continuous double auction market: An agent-based modeling perspective

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Wei; Bi, Zhengzheng; Shen, Dehua

2017-02-01

This paper investigates the impact of investor structure on the price-volume relationship by simulating a continuous double auction market. Connected with the underlying mechanisms of the price-volume relationship, i.e., the Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis (MDH) and the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH), the simulation results show that: (1) there exists a strong lead-lag relationship between the return volatility and trading volume when the number of informed investors is close to the number of uninformed investors in the market; (2) as more and more informed investors entering the market, the lead-lag relationship becomes weaker and weaker, while the contemporaneous relationship between the return volatility and trading volume becomes more prominent; (3) when the informed investors are in absolute majority, the market can achieve the new equilibrium immediately. Therefore, we can conclude that the investor structure is a key factor in affecting the price-volume relationship.

A JOINT EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR IN IPO PRICING METHODS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Vinicio de Souza e Almeida

2015-01-01

Full Text Available This article jointly examines the differences of laboratory versions of the Dutch clock open auction, a sealed-bid auction to represent book building, and a two-stage sealed bid auction to proxy for the “competitive IPO”, a recent innovation used in a few European equity initial public offerings. We investigate pricing, seller allocation, and buyer welfare allocation efficiency and conclude that the book building emulation seems to be as price efficient as the Dutch auction, even after investor learning, whereas the competitive IPO is not price efficient, regardless of learning. The competitive IPO is the most seller allocative efficient method because it maximizes offer proceeds. The Dutch auction emerges as the most buyer welfare allocative efficient method. Underwriters are probably seeking pricing efficiency rather than seller or buyer welfare allocative efficiency and their discretionary pricing and allocation must be important since book building is prominent worldwide.

Online Reverse Auctions: A Pricing Tool for Government Contracting

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Roll, Bruce

2000-01-01

Reverse Auctions (RA) are the next gene ration of procurement application software designed to link acquisition reform and common DoD procurement business processes with commercial best practices and advances in electronic commerce...

Green Auctions and Reduction of Information Rents in Payments for Environmental Services: An Experimental Investigation in Sunan County, Northwestern China

Science.gov (United States)

Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

2015-01-01

Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the “Grain for Green” Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. “Perfect information” in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions. PMID:25793263

Non-existence of Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions with a Common Budget-Constraint

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Ghosh, Gagan

2015-01-01

I analyze an auction environment where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed-bid, first-price auctions to bidders who have a one-dimensional type space, where a type represents the value a bidder places on each of the two units. All bidders have an identical budget constrain...

What’s a Cricketer’s Worth? Predicting Bid Prices for Indian Premier League Auctions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Siddhartha K. RASTOGI

2017-04-01

Full Text Available Indian Premier League is a twenty-over format cricket tournament of teams representing different Indian cities. Beginning 2008, it is established now as a grand annual affair. The team franchises are auctioned on long term basis, whereas cricketers are auctioned every season under certain conditions. Despite such wealth of information, studies on IPL auctions are rare barring four cited models. The present paper studies the results of year 2011 English-style auction of cricketers and recalibrates the old yet most accurate model by Rastogi and Deodhar (2009. Both models use ordinary least square method of regression albeit with different variable. The old models lack predictive power, whereas the recalibrated model presented displays better predictive capability as compared to earlier models. It also succeeds in reducing overall predictability gap and stands significantly parsimonious vis-à-vis previous models. Further, the final model presented is applied on 2013 and 2014 auction data to show superior results.

A Pareto Optimal Auction Mechanism for Carbon Emission Rights

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mingxi Wang

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The carbon emission rights do not fit well into the framework of existing multi-item auction mechanisms because of their own unique features. This paper proposes a new auction mechanism which converges to a unique Pareto optimal equilibrium in a finite number of periods. In the proposed auction mechanism, the assignment outcome is Pareto efficient and the carbon emission rights’ resources are efficiently used. For commercial application and theoretical completeness, both discrete and continuous markets—represented by discrete and continuous bid prices, respectively—are examined, and the results show the existence of a Pareto optimal equilibrium under the constraint of individual rationality. With no ties, the Pareto optimal equilibrium can be further proven to be unique.

A theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Gernot; Rammerstorfer, Margarethe

2008-01-01

As far as energy policy is concerned, the design of the regulatory framework for energy transmission and distribution is a key issue. Consequently, also the embodiment of balancing power markets drives mainly the effectiveness of political implications for the energy sector. Initially, tertiary control in Germany was solely offered by transmission system operators of the respective power control areas and their associated power plant. The recast of the Energy Industry Act of 2005 led in last consequence to a common procurement auction for the supply of tertiary control, which starts on December 1, 2006. Admittedly, the reform has fallen short of expectations so far, first concerning the intensification of market entry of tertiary control providers as well as the desired decline of the price level. Hence, this article examines the effects of the changeover on observable demand charges. In order to identify attributes of the common procurement auction for tertiary control hampering market entry of providers, giving stimuli to collusion and strategic behavior, reducing intensity of competition and encouraging an upswing of prices, we analyze the design under an auction theoretical approach and deduce empirically whether structural components of the auction design have to be touched up again

Analysis of a yearly multi-round, multi-period, multi-product transmission rights auction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ziogos, N.P.; Bakirtzis, A.G.

2008-01-01

A yearly multi-round, multi-period, multi-product transmission rights (TR) auction issuing both point-to-point Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) and Flow-Gate Rights (FGRs) is studied in this paper. In each round the TR market participants (buyers or sellers) submit their bid or offer prices based on past energy market performance. A Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) based energy market is assumed. The TR market participants' bid or offer prices reflect their expectation of the average annual LMP differences between withdrawal and injections points for FTRs and of the transmission link capacity prices for FGRs. The TR auction is performed in four rounds; in each round 25% of the entire system capability is awarded. TRs that are awarded in one round are modeled as fixed injections in subsequent rounds. Market participants that have acquired TRs in one round can sell them in subsequent rounds. A market participant can submit bids or offers for on-peak, off-peak or 24-h TRs. A three-area, nine-bus test system with six TR market participants is used for the analysis of the TR auction. (author)

On the economics of PURPA auctions. [Contracts between utilities and electricity producers in the USA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bolle, Friedel (Energiewirtschaftliches Inst. an der Univ. zu Koeln (Germany))

1991-04-01

It is shown that, under certain conditions, Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) auctions in the USA theoretically lead to efficient contracts between utilities and producers of electricity. In contrast to normal auctions bidders compete with (potentially non-linear) revenue functions and with non-price attributes. In practice, there are tremendous difficulties in the evaluation of bids which result from the long duration of contracts and from the necessity to evaluate risks and non-price attributes. (author).

Innovations in Defense Acquisition Auctions: Lessons Learned and Alternative Mechanism Designs

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Coughlan, Peter; Gates, William; Lamping, Jennifer

2008-01-01

.... In general, reverse auctions have been limited to procurement actions involving relatively standard price-driven commercial products-products typically purchased through traditional competitive markets...

Report of the work group on modalities of selling and putting up for auction CO2 emission permits in France. Elements related to phase 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The first part of this report shows that, despite recurring critics on the current emission permit price, the European market kept on maturing and proved its ability to reflect the evolution of fundamentals into prices. The second part shows that recent foreign experiences in putting up for auction CO 2 emission permits revealed convergencies as far as auction formats are concerned. The third part shows that the economic theory and these empirical experimental results support the idea of uniform auctions with a unique price accompanied with a reserved price. It discusses the evolution perspectives of these sales by auction, outlines that access to auctions should be opened to all industrial and financial actors, and the importance of the modalities of control and regulation of the emission permit market. It finally outlines and discusses the role France could play in the building up of a European platform and in the promotion of strictly harmonised rules

The institutionalization of treasury note and bond auctions, 1970-75

OpenAIRE

Kenneth D. Garbade

2004-01-01

The substitution of auctions for fixed-price offerings was expected to lower the U.S. Treasury's cost of financing the federal debt. Despite this and other potential benefits, the Treasury failed in both 1935 and 1963 in its attempts to introduce regular auction sales of coupon-bearing securities. This article examines the Treasury's third and successful attempt between 1970 and 1975. The author identifies three likely reasons why the Treasury succeeded in the early 1970s: it closely imitated...

A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values

Science.gov (United States)

Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto

We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the threshold price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.

A comparison of Candle Auctions and Hard Close Auctions with Common Values

OpenAIRE

Sascha Füllbrunn

2009-01-01

With this study, we contribute to the literature of auction design by presenting a new auction format: the Candle auction, a popular auction in the Middle Ages. Considering a common value framework, we theoretically and experimentally point out that the Candle auction, where bidding is allowed until a stochastic deadline, yields a better outcome to the seller than the Hard Close auction, the popular eBay online auction format.

Analysis of a monthly auction for financial transmission rights and flow-gate rights

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biskas, P.N.; Ziogos, N.P.; Bakirtzis, A.G.

2007-01-01

A monthly transmission rights (TR) auction issuing both point-to-point financial transmission rights (FTRs) and flow-gate rights (FGRs) is studied in this paper. Initially, a locational marginal pricing (LMP) based energy market is presented, in which the linear security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) problem is solved for each hour of system operation, determining the nodal prices, the transmission link capacity prices and the transmission congestion charges (TCCs) that should be collected by the ISO in case of congestion. A monthly auction is conducted in the TR market issuing FTR obligations, FTR options and FGRs to market players, building a link between all types of transmission rights under the same market structure. Combining the advantages of financial and physical rights, the market efficiency can be enhanced by offering a variety of choices for risk management to market players. The monthly TR auction is tested on several case studies using the IEEE three-area RTS96 and useful conclusions are drawn concerning the utility of the various types of transmission rights as compared to one another, in terms of the reimbursement they provide to their holders. (author)

A simplified multiattribute procurement auction with postponed scoring by a double revelation mechanism

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hougaard, Jens Leth; Nielsen, Kurt

of linear scoring functions, consistent with the principal’s choice given linear preferences. The resulting scoring functions are used to score the original bids. While the highest score wins the second highest score settle the compensation. If the auction results in more than one highest scoring bid......, the Principal ends the auction by selecting the most preferred. The auction provides almost ideal incentives for bidders to reveal prices less than or equal to true cost. In general bidding below true cost involves a risk of getting a oss, nevertheless it may also both increase the chance of winning and result...

PENERAPAN TEKNIK PENYUSUNAN MENI DI RESTORAN BENGAWAN SOLO HOTEL SAHID JAYA, JAKARTA [The Aplication of Menu Engineering at Bengawan Solo Restaurant, Sahid Jaya Hotel Jakarta

OpenAIRE

Musa Hubies 1); Sindi Astu Banuhapsari 2)

2001-01-01

Menu engineering (ME) is a step-by-step process wich is designed to help management in evaluating the current and future menu pricing, menu composition and to set decisions about price and menu. The main objectives of ME are tomake the next menu more profitable and to attract of guest’s attention. It has two critical aspect, that are contribution margin/CM (related to profit) and menu mix/MM (related to an item popularity rate amoing other item). The combination of CM and MM wll result in an ...

Sealed-Bid Auction of Dutch Mussels : Statistical Analysis

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kleijnen, J.P.C.; van Schaik, F.D.J.

2007-01-01

This article presents an econometric analysis of the many data on the sealed-bid auction that sells mussels in Yerseke town, the Netherlands. The goals of this analy- sis are obtaining insight into the important factors that determine the price of these mussels, and quantifying the performance of an

Sealed-bid auction of Netherlands mussels: statistical analysis

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kleijnen, J.P.C.; van Schaik, F.D.J.

2011-01-01

This article presents an econometric analysis of the many data on the sealed-bid auction that sells mussels in Yerseke town, the Netherlands. The goals of this analysis are obtaining insight into the important factors that determine the price of these mussels, and quantifying the performance of an

Comparisons of auction mechanisms in a multiple unit setting: A consideration for restructuring electric power markets

Science.gov (United States)

Bernard, John Charles

The objective of this study was to compare the performance of five single sided auctions that could be used in restructured electric power markets across different market sizes in a multiple unit setting. Auction selection would profoundly influence an industry over $200 billion in size in the United States, and the consequences of implementing an inappropriate mechanism would be great. Experimental methods were selected to analyze the auctions. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first testing the sealed offer last accepted offer (LAO) and first rejected offer (FRO), and the clock English (ENG) and sealed offer English (SOE) in markets of sizes two and six. The FRO, SOE, and ENG used the same pricing rule. Second round testing was on the LAO, FRO, and the nonuniform price multiple unit Vickrey (MUV) in markets of sizes two, four, and six. Experiments lasted 23 and 75 periods for rounds 1 and 2 respectively. Analysis of variance and contrast analysis were used to examine the data. The four performance measures used were price, efficiency, profits per unit, and supply revelation. Five basic principles were also assessed: no sales at losses, all low cost capacity should be offered and sold, no high cost capacity should sell, and the market should clear. It was expected group size and auction type would affect performance. For all performance measures, group size was a significant variable, with smaller groups showing poorer performance. Auction type was significant only for the efficiency performance measure, where clock auctions outperformed the others. Clock auctions also proved superior for the first four principles. The FRO performed poorly in almost all situations, and should not be a preferred mechanism in any market. The ENG was highly efficient, but expensive for the buyer. The SOE appeared superior to the FRO and ENG. The clock improves efficiency over the FRO while less information kept prices under the ENG. The MUV was superior in revealing costs

Essays on empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions: Impacts of financial transmission rights on the restructured electricity industry

Science.gov (United States)

Zang, Hailing

This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However, prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs. This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multi-unit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions. The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations. The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR auctions. I find that FTRs' strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is significant for large bidders---firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions. Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit

A novel inclusion of intermittent generation resources in long term energy auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marambio, Rodrigo; Rudnick, Hugh

2017-01-01

Long term energy auctions are positioning as a valuable tool in order to attract new investments into power systems, especially in Latin American countries where emergent economies characteristics and their correspondent risks are usually present. Even though the focus of these auctions is the long term, there are short term issues involved which actual auction designs fail to include, resulting in an energy allocation that is not necessarily optimal for the system, a condition which becomes more evident in the presence of intermittent renewable technologies. A novel mechanism is formulated to obtain the optimal allocation in long term energy auctions, considering short term generation profiles from both intermittent and conventional base load technologies, and also their risk aversions. The proposed mechanism is developed and simulations are made for some scenarios in the Chilean power market, with different levels of renewable penetration. Significant cost savings are achieved for the final consumers in relation to energy purchases, in comparison with a mechanism that follows the demand profile. As more renewable intermittent capacity enters the power system it is evident the need for changes in the energy auctions allocation mechanisms, including elements to exploit the synergies among participants in the short term. - Highlights: • Risk management consideration in technology neutral auctions allocation. • Allocation mechanism in technology neutral auctions with intermittent technologies. • Renewable and conventional technologies energy auction offer curves. • Increase bid prices in auctions as a consequence of solar technology support.

Sequential bidding in day-ahead auctions for spot energy and power systems reserve

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swider, Derk J.

2005-01-01

In this paper a novel approach for sequential bidding on day-ahead auction markets for spot energy and power systems reserve is presented. For the spot market a relatively simple method is considered as a competitive market is assumed. For the reserve market one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the competitors is summarized in a probability distribution of the market price. This results in a method for sequential bidding, where the bidding prices and capacities on the spot and reserve markets are calculated by maximizing a stochastic non-linear objective function of expected profit. With an exemplary application is shown that the trading sequence leads to increasing bidding capacities and prices in the reverse rank number of the markets. Hence, the consideration of a defined trading sequence greatly influences the mathematical representation of the optimal bidding behavior under price uncertainty in day-ahead auctions for spot energy and power systems reserve. (Author)

GROUP-BUYING ONLINE AUCTION AND OPTIMAL INVENTORY POLICY IN UNCERTAIN MARKET

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

Jian CHEN; Yunhui LIU; Xiping SONG

2004-01-01

In this paper we consider a group-buying online auction (GBA) model for a monopolistic manufacturer selling novel products in the uncertain market. Firstly, we introduce the bidder's dominant strategy, after which we optimize the GBA price curve and the production volume together.Finally, we compare the GBA with the traditional posted pricing mechanism and find that the GBA is highly probable to be advantageous over the posted pricing mechanism in some appropriate market environments.

Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Qinghua; Huang, Zi-Gang; Wang, Yougui; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2015-09-01

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in analyzing a variety of socio-economic phenomena using methods from statistical and nonlinear physics. We study a class of complex systems arising from economics, the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) systems, which is a recently emerged class of online auction game systems. Through analyzing large, empirical data sets of LUBA, we identify a general feature of the bid price distribution: an inverted J-shaped function with exponential decay in the large bid price region. To account for the distribution, we propose a multi-agent model in which each agent bids stochastically in the field of winner’s attractiveness, and develop a theoretical framework to obtain analytic solutions of the model based on mean field analysis. The theory produces bid-price distributions that are in excellent agreement with those from the real data. Our model and theory capture the essential features of human behaviors in the competitive environment as exemplified by LUBA, and may provide significant quantitative insights into complex socio-economic phenomena.

Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen, Qinghua; Wang, Yougui; Huang, Zi-Gang; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2015-01-01

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in analyzing a variety of socio-economic phenomena using methods from statistical and nonlinear physics. We study a class of complex systems arising from economics, the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) systems, which is a recently emerged class of online auction game systems. Through analyzing large, empirical data sets of LUBA, we identify a general feature of the bid price distribution: an inverted J-shaped function with exponential decay in the large bid price region. To account for the distribution, we propose a multi-agent model in which each agent bids stochastically in the field of winner’s attractiveness, and develop a theoretical framework to obtain analytic solutions of the model based on mean field analysis. The theory produces bid-price distributions that are in excellent agreement with those from the real data. Our model and theory capture the essential features of human behaviors in the competitive environment as exemplified by LUBA, and may provide significant quantitative insights into complex socio-economic phenomena. (paper)

Intelligent Continuous Double Auction method For Service Allocation in Cloud Computing

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Nima Farajian

2013-10-01

Full Text Available Market-oriented approach is an effective method for resource management because of its regulation of supply and demand and is suitable for cloud environment where the computing resources, either software or hardware, are virtualized and allocated as services from providers to users. In this paper a continuous double auction method for efficient cloud service allocation is presented in which i enables consumers to order various resources (services for workflows and coallocation, ii consumers and providers make bid and request prices based on deadline and workload time and in addition providers can tradeoff between utilization time and price of bids, iii auctioneers can intelligently find optimum matching by sharing and merging resources which result more trades. Experimental results show that proposed method is efficient in terms of successful allocation rate and resource utilization.

Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the Euro-zone: the role of the crisis

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Beetsma, R.; de Jong, F.; Giuliodori, M.; Widijanto, D.

2013-01-01

Exploring the period since the inception of the euro, we show that secondary-market yields on Italian public debt increase in anticipation of auctions of new issues and decrease after the auction, while no or a smaller such effect is present for German public debt. However, these yield movements on

On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

Science.gov (United States)

Constantin, Florin; Parkes, David C.

In a dynamic market, being able to update one's value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. This is nicely captured by the model of interdependent values (IDV): a bidder's value can explicitly depend on the private information of other bidders. In this paper we present preliminary results about the revenue properties of dynamic auctions for IDV bidders. We adopt a computational approach to design single-item revenue-optimal dynamic auctions with known arrivals and departures but (private) signals that arrive online. In leveraging a characterization of truthful auctions, we present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the design problem. Although a discretization is imposed on bidder signals the solution is a mechanism applicable to continuous signals. The formulation size grows exponentially in the dependence of bidders' values on other bidders' signals. We highlight general properties of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions in a simple parametrized example and study the sensitivity of prices and revenue to model parameters.

Point Climat no. 25 'Auction revenues in EU ETS Phase 3: a new public resource'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chevaleyre, Guillaume; Berghmans, Nicolas

2013-01-01

Among the publications of CDC Climat Research, 'Climate Briefs' presents, in a few pages, hot topics in climate change policy. This issue addresses the following points: As from 1 January 2013, auctions will become the main mode for distributing CO 2 allowances within the EU ETS. By 2020, almost one billion EUAs will be sold every year and generate income for Member States. Although sales of Phase 3 allowances have begun, uncertainty still surrounds the total amount of allowances to be auctioned. In particular, benchmark free allocations, the potential review of the auction timetable and the exemption of international flights from the EU ETS will impact the final amounts auctioned and the EUA price. These factors will affect the final auction revenues of each Member States differently. Government authorities will need to take account of the variability of this new financial resource

Pricing Electricity in Pools With Wind Producers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Morales González, Juan Miguel; Conejo, A. J.; Kai Liu

2012-01-01

This paper considers an electricity pool that includes a significant number of wind producers and is cleared through a network-constrained auction, one day in advance and on an hourly basis. The hourly auction is formulated as a two-stage stochastic programming problem, where the first stage...... represents the clearing of the market and the second stage models the system operation under a number of plausible wind production realizations. This formulation co-optimizes energy and reserve, and allows deriving both pool energy prices and balancing energy prices. These prices result in both cost recovery...... for producers and revenue reconciliation. A case study of realistic size is used to illustrate the functioning of the proposed pricing scheme....

Virtual power plant auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter

2010-01-01

Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets. (author)

Virtual power plant auctions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter [Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 (United States)

2010-12-15

Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets. (author)

Impact of Rainfall, Sales Method, and Time on Land Prices

OpenAIRE

Stephens, Steve; Schurle, Bryan

2013-01-01

Land prices in Western Kansas are analyzed using regression to estimate the influence of rainfall, sales method, and time of sale. The estimates from regression indicate that land prices decreased about $27 for each range that was farther west which can be converted to about $75 per inch of average rainfall. In addition, the influence of method of sale (private sale or auction) is estimated along with the impact of time of sale. Auction sales prices are approximately $100 higher per acre than...

Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions.

Science.gov (United States)

Gupta, Alok; Parente, Stephen T; Sanyal, Pallab

2012-12-01

Healthcare is an important social and economic component of modern society, and the effective use of information technology in this industry is critical to its success. As health insurance premiums continue to rise, competitive bidding may be useful in generating stronger price competition and lower premium costs for employers and possibly, government agencies. In this paper, we assess an endeavor by several Fortune 500 companies to reduce healthcare procurement costs for their employees by having HMOs compete in open electronic auctions. Although the auctions were successful in generating significant cost savings for the companies in the first year, i.e., 1999, they failed to replicate the success and were eventually discontinued after two more years. Over the past decade since the failed auction experiment, effective utilization of information technologies have led to significant advances in the design of complex electronic markets. Using this knowledge, and data from the auctions, we point out several shortcomings of the auction design that, we believe, led to the discontinuation of the market after three years. Based on our analysis, we propose several actionable recommendations that policy makers can use to design a sustainable electronic market for procuring health insurance.

Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

OpenAIRE

Susan Athey; Dominic Coey; Jonathan Levin

2011-01-01

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, alth...

Essays in auction theory

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Maasland, E.

2012-01-01

Auction theory is a branch of game theory that considers human behavior in auction markets and the ensuing market outcomes. It is also successfully used as a tool to design real-life auctions. This thesis contains five essays addressing a variety of topics within the realm of auction theory. The

Declarative Specification of Fault Tolerant Auction Protocols: The English Auction Case Study

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Dragoni, Nicola; Gaspari, Mauro

2012-01-01

Auction mechanisms are nowadays widely used in electronic commerce Web sites for buying and selling items among different users. The increasing importance of auction protocols in the negotiation phase is not limited to online marketplaces. In fact, the wide applicability of auctions as resource‐a...... about the specification of an English Auction protocol which tolerate crashes of bidding agents and we discuss its properties....

Comparison of auctions and alternative policy options for RES-E support

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kitzing, Lena; Islam, Marco; Fitch-Roy, Oscar

2016-01-01

benefits of RES, there may be valid reasons for policy makers not to employ auctions, since under particular circumstances it may be desirable not to control quantities but the price. As such, they raise the question whether pure support cost minimisation should be the only goal when implementing......This report concludes the work carried out in the course of Task 6.2 of the AURES project. It is its aim to compare auctions with alternative policy instruments and in particular, to examine under which circumstances auctions may be superior and inferior to achieve intended policy targets....... For that purpose, we identify a number of potential drivers that might affect an instrument’s effectiveness, its efficiency and further success criteria. Among this list of relevant drivers, the basis for our analysis is the factor risk, where our core focus is on risk for policy makers. Assuming a world...

Essays in financial transmission rights pricing

Science.gov (United States)

Posner, Barry

This work examines issues in the pricing of financial transmission rights in the PJM market region. The US federal government is advocating the creation of large-scale, not-for-profit regional transmission organizations to increase the efficiency of the transmission of electricity. As a non-profit entity, PJM needs to allocate excess revenues collected as congestion rents, and the participants in the transmission markets need to be able to hedge their exposure to congestion rents. For these purposes, PJM has developed an instrument known as the financial transmission right (FTR). This research, utilizing a new data set assembled by the author, looks at two aspects of the FTR market. The first chapter examines the problem of forecasting congestion in a transmission grid. In the PJM FTR system firms bid in a competitive auction for FTRs that cover a period of one month. The auctions take place in the middle of the previous month; therefore firms have to forecast congestion rents for the period two to six weeks after the auction. The common methods of forecasting congestion are either time-series models or full-information engineering studies. In this research, the author develops a forecasting system that is more economically grounded than a simple time-series model, but requires less information than an engineering model. This method is based upon the arbitrage-cost methodology, whereby congesting is calculated as the difference of two non-observable variables: the transmission price difference that would exist in the total absence of transmission capacity between two nodes, and the ability of the existing transmission to reduced that price difference. If the ability to reduce the price difference is greater than the price difference, then the cost of electricity at each node will be the same, and congestion rent will be zero. If transmission capacity limits are binding on the flow of power, then a price difference persists and congestion rents exist. Three

The effect of contingency analysis on the nodal prices in the day-ahead market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murphy, Frederic H.; Mudrageda, Murthy; Soyster, Allen L.; Saric, Andrija T.; Stankovic, Aleksandar M.

2010-01-01

We look at the effect of modeling branch-outage contingencies on locational marginal prices. To model contingencies in the day-ahead auction, we formulate a two-stage stochastic program. Rather than follow the current practice of including a list of possible contingencies that must be satisfied, we incorporate a larger set of contingencies in the model and allow contingencies to result in load reductions/outages at a cost. The model can be used and interpreted in two ways. One is to look at the tradeoff between reliability and outage costs. Another is to consider the load losses resulting from a contingency to be consumer offers of load reductions in response to line outages as part of the day-ahead auction. In analyzing the model structure, we find that the prices in the model closer in definition to those currently used in the day-ahead auction do not maximize expected surplus because the day-ahead auction produces prices that assume shortages will never occur. This raises issues with the design of auctions with important stochastic elements in the market. We present results for a 68-node grid with 86 branches (lines and transformers) to illustrate how prices and expected values change as the costs of outages are varied.

A New Hybrid Algorithm to Solve Winner Determination Problem in Multiunit Double Internet Auction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mourad Ykhlef

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Solving winner determination problem in multiunit double auction has become an important E-business task. The main issue in double auction is to improve the reward in order to match the ideal prices and quantity and make the best profit for sellers and buyers according to their bids and predefined quantities. There are many algorithms introduced for solving winner in multiunit double auction. Conventional algorithms can find the optimal solution but they take a long time, particularly when they are applied to large dataset. Nowadays, some evolutionary algorithms, such as particle swarm optimization and genetic algorithm, were proposed and have been applied. In order to improve the speed of evolutionary algorithms convergence, we will propose a new kind of hybrid evolutionary algorithm that combines genetic algorithm (GA with particle swarm optimization (PSO to solve winner determination problem in multiunit double auction; we will refer to this algorithm as AUC-GAPSO.

Electricity wholesale market prices in Europe: Convergence?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zachmann, Georg

2008-01-01

This paper tests the hypothesis that the ongoing restructuring process in the European electricity sector has led to a common European market for electricity. Based on a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of wholesale electricity prices in 2002-2006, we reject the assumption of full market integration. For several pairs of countries, the weaker hypothesis of (bilateral) convergence is accepted based on unit root tests (KPSS and ADF) and a convergence test based on filtered pairwise price relations. This indicates that the efforts to develop a single European market for electricity were so far only partially successful. We show that the daily auction prices of scarce cross-border transmission capacities are insufficient to explain the persistence of international price differentials. Empirically, our findings confirm the insufficiency of explicit capacity auctions as stated in the theoretical literature. (author)

Papers in auction theory

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Onderstal, A.M.

2002-01-01

This thesis is a collection of six papers in auction theory, with several economic applications, both to real life auctions and to other economic phenomena. In the introduction to the thesis, Onderstal argues why auction theory is an important branch of economic theory, and discusses several

Web Auctions in Europe

NARCIS (Netherlands)

A. Pouloudi; J. Paarlberg; H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric)

2001-01-01

textabstractThis paper argues that a better understanding of the business model of web auctions can be reached if we adopt a broader view and provide empirical research from different sites. In this paper the business model of web auctions is refined into four dimensions. These are auction model,

Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ying Yu

2015-12-01

Full Text Available This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO and multiple power generating companies (GenCos. Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.

Auction Sale Data

Data.gov (United States)

General Services Administration — This dataset contains sale data information for Agency reported items sold via GSA Auctions® Sales. The data is for closed sales during FY2009. GSA Auctions® offers...

Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zou Xiaoyan

2009-01-01

An efficient electricity double-sided auction mechanism should control market power and enhance the social welfare of the electricity market. Based on this goal, the paper designs a new double-sided auction mechanism. In the new mechanism, the social welfare contribution of each participant plays a pivotal role, because this contribution is the critical factor in market clearing, payment settling, and transaction matching rules. In particular, each winner of the auction can gain transfer payments according to his contribution to social welfare in the electricity market, and this gives the mechanism the ability to control the market power of some participants. At the same time, this mechanism ensures that the market organizer balances his budget. We then conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis based on the Spanish electricity market. Both of the results show that compared to the uniform-pricing mechanism, the new mechanism can reduce market power of participants and enhance the social welfare of the electricity market.

Price increase

CERN Multimedia

2006-01-01

Please take note that after five years of stable prices at Restaurant No 1 a price increase will come into force on 1st January 2006. This increase has been agreed after discussions between the CSR (Comité de Surveillance des Restaurants) and the catering company Novae and will reflect the inflation rate of the last few years. In addition, a new children's menu will be introduced, as well as 'Max Havelaar' fair-trade coffee at a price of 1.70 CHF.

Price increase

CERN Multimedia

2005-01-01

Please take note that after five years of stable prices at Restaurant No 1 a price increase will come into force on 1st January 2006. This increase has been agreed after discussions between the CSR (Comité de Surveillance des Restaurants) and the catering company Novae and will reflect the inflation rate of the last few years. In addition, a new children's menu will be introduced as well as 'Max Havelaar' fair-trade coffee at a price of 1.70 CHF.

Dynamic spectrum auction in wireless communication

CERN Document Server

Chen, Yanjiao

2015-01-01

This brief explores current research on dynamic spectrum auctions, focusing on fundamental auction theory, characteristics of the spectrum market, spectrum auction architecture and possible auction mechanisms. The brief explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which enable new users to gain spectrum access and existing spectrum owners to obtain financial benefits, can greatly improve spectrum efficiency by resolving the artificial spectrum shortage. It examines why operators and users face significant challenges due to specialty of the spectrum market and the related requirements imposed on the auction mechanism design. Concise and up-to-date, Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication is designed for researchers and professionals in computer science or electrical engineering. Students studying networking will also find this brief a valuable resource.

Investing EU ETS auction revenues into energy savings

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sijm, J.P.M.; Boonekamp, P.G.M. [ECN Policy Studies, Petten (Netherlands); Summerton, P.; Pollitt, H.; Billington, S. [Cambridge Econometrics CE, Cambridge (United Kingdom)

2013-05-15

The overall objective of this study is to analyse the effects of using EU ETS auction revenues to stimulate investments in energy savings in three key target sectors, i.e. Households, Tertiary and Industry (including both ETS and non-ETS industrial installations). The scenarios used refer basically to the situation before the recent agreement on the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) and include (a mixture of) different policy options to enhance energy savings in the target sectors, in particular (1) reducing the ETS cap, (2) introducing an Energy Efficiency Obligation (EEO) for energy suppliers or distributors, and/or (3) using ETS auction revenues to support additional (private) investments in raising energy efficiency. In order to meet this objective a variety of different policy scenarios have been defined and analysed by means of the 'Energy-Environment-Economy Model for Europe (E3ME)'. The study presents and discusses a large variety of scenario modelling results by the year 2020 at the EU27 level. These results refer to, among others, energy savings, GHG emissions, the ETS carbon price, household electricity bills and to changes in some macro- or socio-economic outcomes such as GDP, inflation, employment or international trade. Finally, the study discusses some policy findings and implications, including options to enhance the effectiveness of some EE policies, in particular those having a potential adverse effect on the ETS carbon price.

Discovering the game in auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kaisers, M.; Tuyls, K.P.; Thuijsman, F.; Parsons, S.; Nijholt, A.; Pantic, M.

2008-01-01

Auctions are pervasive in today’s society. They provide a variety of markets, ranging from consumer-toconsumer online auctions to government-to-business auctions for telecommunications spectrum licenses. Starting from a set of trading strategies, this article enables a strategic choice by

Benford’s Law and Naturally Occurring Prices in Certain ebaY Auctions

OpenAIRE

David E. Giles

2005-01-01

We show that certain the winning bids for certain ebaY auctions obey Benford’s Law. One implication of this is that it is unlikely that these bids are subject to collusion among bidders, or “shilling” on the part of sellers. Parenthetically, we also show that numbers from the naturally occurring Fibonacci and Lucas sequences also obey Benford’s Law.

PENERAPAN TEKNIK PENYUSUNAN MENI DI RESTORAN BENGAWAN SOLO HOTEL SAHID JAYA, JAKARTA [The Aplication of Menu Engineering at Bengawan Solo Restaurant, Sahid Jaya Hotel Jakarta

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Musa Hubies 1

2001-08-01

Full Text Available Menu engineering (ME is a step-by-step process wich is designed to help management in evaluating the current and future menu pricing, menu composition and to set decisions about price and menu. The main objectives of ME are tomake the next menu more profitable and to attract of guest’s attention. It has two critical aspect, that are contribution margin/CM (related to profit and menu mix/MM (related to an item popularity rate amoing other item. The combination of CM and MM wll result in an item classification (star, plowhorse, question and dog, so that management can design the decision alternatives related to menu item.From the ME application for four months, Bengawan Solo Restaurant has 10 star item menu, 13 qustion items, 2 plowhorse items and 9 dog items. In this case, selling technique performed by waiters and waitresses also influence the ME result. The menegement concerns about the physical presentation and kitchen location. The quality handling should not only be conducted physically, but also pay more attention to halal aspect and food safety or HACCP (hazard analysis and certical control point, in order to produce high quality product that are safe to be consumed.

Environmental and Individual Factors Affecting Menu Labeling Utilization: A Qualitative Research Study

Science.gov (United States)

Schindler, Jennifer; Kiszko, Kamila; Abrams, Courtney; Islam, Nadia; Elbel, Brian

2013-01-01

Obesity is a significant public health concern that disproportionally affects low-income and minority populations. Recent policies mandating the posting of calories on menus in fast food chain restaurants have not proven to uniformly influence food choice. This qualitative research study uses focus groups to study individual and environmental factors affecting the usage of these menu labels among low-income, minority populations. Ten focus groups targeting low-income residents (n=105) were conducted at various community organizations throughout NYC in Spanish, English, or a combination of both languages, over a nine-month period in 2011. In late 2011 and early 2012, transcripts were coded through the process of thematic analysis using Atlas.ti for naturally emerging themes, influences, and determinants of food choice. Few used menu labels, despite awareness. Among the themes pertaining to menu label usage, price and time constraints, confusion and lack of understanding of caloric values, as well as the priority of preference, hunger, and habitual ordering habits were most frequently cited as barriers to menu label usage. Based on the individual and external influences on food choice that often take priority over calorie consideration, a modified approach may be necessary to make menu labels more effective and user-friendly. PMID:23402695

An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT.

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Xin; Xing, Lei; Qiu, Tie; Li, Zhuo

2017-02-16

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP) and femtocell holders (FHs) as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0-1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing.

An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xin Chen

2017-02-01

Full Text Available The Internet of Things (IoT is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP and femtocell holders (FHs as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0–1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing.

40 CFR 73.73 - Delegation of auctions and sales and termination of auctions and sales.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 16 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Delegation of auctions and sales and termination of auctions and sales. 73.73 Section 73.73 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION... Independent Power Producers Written Guarantee § 73.73 Delegation of auctions and sales and termination of...

A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Henry Schellhorn

2005-01-01

of this problem, where orders are aggregated and integrality constraints are relaxed. It was proved that this problem could be solved efficiently in two steps by calculating two fixed points, first the fixed point of a contraction mapping, and then of a set-valued function. In this paper, we generalize the problem to incorporate constraints on maximum price changes between two auction rounds. This generalized problem cannot be solved by the aforementioned methods and necessitates reverse convex programming techniques.

Improving the secrecy rate by turning foes to allies: An auction scheme

Science.gov (United States)

Ma, Ya-Yan; Wang, Bao-Yun

2015-09-01

Security against eavesdroppers is a critical issue in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, a scenario consisting of one primary pair and multiple secondary pairs is considered. The secondary transmitters (STs) work in half-duplex mode and they are potential eavesdroppers on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to simultaneously transmit with the primary transmitter (PT). A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is employed to model the interaction between the PT and STs. With the proposed auction scheme, the hostile relationship between the PT and STs is transformed into a cooperative relationship. An iterative algorithm based on the max-min criteria is proposed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs for an access chance in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Numerical results show that the proposed auction scheme not only improves the PT’s security but also increases the access opportunities of the STs. Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61271232 and 61372126) and the University Postgraduate Research and Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. CXZZ12-0472).

77 FR 69933 - Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

Science.gov (United States)

2012-11-21

... (MVPDs) so that MVPDs can make the necessary changes to their channel lineups. The NPRM adopts the... design elements: (1) Bid collection procedures that determine how bids in the auction are gathered, (2) assignment procedures that determine which bids are accepted, and (3) pricing procedures that determine what...

Industrial Structure, Menu Costs and the Non-Neutrality of Money

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Dixon, Huw David; Hansen, Claus Thustrup

by perfect competition. The mixed industrial structure implies that there is a misallocation of the input (labour) between sectors. Following a 5% monetary expansion, the menu costs required for price rigidity in the monopolistic sector can be 50 times smaller than in the symmetric case, while the ratio......New Keynesian literature assumes symmetric industrial structure when analysing explanations of monetary non-neutrality. We analyse the impact of modifying this assumption by allowing for a mixed industrial structure; some industries are characterized by monopolistic competition, and others...... of welfare gain to private loss can be as large as 200 times the corresponding symmetric case. This implies that in real world economies, menu costs may be even more significant than previously thought...

40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 16 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Auctions. 73.70 Section 73.70... ALLOWANCE SYSTEM Auctions, Direct Sales, and Independent Power Producers Written Guarantee § 73.70 Auctions... allowances pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section and § 73.72(q) in the amounts and at the times provided...

Allocation decisions in network industries

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bolle, Friedel [Europa-Universitaet Viadrina Frankfurt, Lehrstuhl Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie (Mikrooekonomie), Postfach 1786 15207 Frankfurt (Germany)

2008-01-15

In this paper, I want to propagate a new analytical tool: The usage of Menu Auctions for modelling complicated auctions, negotiations, rent seeking, etc. is advocated, because, contrary to 'normal' auctions and bargaining models, an arbitrary number of additional aspects can be taken into account. After concentrating on 'Truthful Equilibria' [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1-31.] a certain broad class of Menu Auctions show unique and efficient allocations. Under an additional concavity condition even the equilibrium bids are unique. Two examples are discussed: the privatisation of a state-owned industry and the buying of wholesale electricity (concluding contracts with a number of producers) by a utility. These examples also serve to trace the sources of 'non-concavities' which can prevent the uniqueness of bids and can provide the auctioneer with incentives to exclude bidders from the competition. (author)

Relationship between performance measurements and sale price of ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Unknown

Abstract. The sale prices of 1 609 Dorper rams sold between 1990 and 1999 were compared with their measured performances. An analysis of variance was carried out in order to determine which variables influenced sale price. The most importance factors were classification (stud vs. commercial), auction weight and coat ...

Real-time Pricing in Power Markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Boom, Anette; Schwenen, Sebastian

We examine welfare e ects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with nal consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction...... to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power...

Real-time Pricing in Power Markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Boom, Anette; Schwenen, Sebastian

We examine welfare eects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with nal consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction...... to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power...

Auctions with competing sellers and behavioral bidders

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Delnoij, J.M.J.

2016-01-01

With the rise of the Internet, the use of auctions has become increasingly prevalent. Nowadays, consumers can buy a myriad of goods by means of online auctions – cars, holidays, clothing, sports items, electronics and even lab equipment are auctioned on the Internet. Economists have studied auctions

A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile

Science.gov (United States)

Reyes H., Gonzalo

As part of the pension reform recently approved in Chile, the government introduced a centralized auction mechanism to provide the Disability and Survivors (D&S) Insurance that covers recent contributors among the more than 8 million participants in the mandatory private pension system. This paper is intended as a case study presenting the main distortions found in the decentralized operation of the system that led to this reform and the challenges faced when designing a competitive auction mechanism to be implemented jointly by the Pension Fund Managers (AFP). In a typical bilateral contract the AFP retained much of the risk and the Insurance Company acted in practice as a reinsurer. The process to hire this contract was not competitive and colligated companies ended up providing the service. Several distortions affected competition in the market through incentives to cream-skim members by AFPs (since they bear most of the risk) or efforts to block disability claims. Since the price of this insurance is hidden in the fees charged by AFPs for the administration of individual accounts and pension funds there was lack of price transparency. Since new AFPs have no history of members’ disability and mortality profile the insurance contract acted as a barrier to entry in the market of AFP services, especially when D&S insurance costs reached 50% of total costs. Cross-subsidies between members of the same AFP, inefficient risk pooling (due to pooling occurring at the AFP rather than at the system level) and regulatory arbitrage, since AFPs provided insurance not being regulated as an insurance company, were also present. A centralized auction mechanism solves these market failures, but also gives raise to new challenges, such as how to design a competitive auction that attracts participation and deters collusion. Design features that were incorporated in the regulation to tackle these issues, such as dividing coverage into predefined percentage blocks, are presented

Evolving impact of the auction houses in Turkish contemporary art market

OpenAIRE

Kaya, Güldehen

2017-01-01

There are vital institutions serving theproduction, distrubution and consumption of the contemporary art works andconstituting the value of art. One of those institutions, an Auction House, asbeing solely a commercial entity, directly affects the perception of the artvalue via pricing. However, market value is not necessarily a fair andsufficient indicator and does not necessarily correspond to the artist’s careerpath. According to the artists, the perception of value attributed by thatprice ...

Efficiency of financial transmission rights markets in centrally coordinated periodic auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Adamson, Seabron; Noe, Thomas; Parker, Geoffrey

2010-01-01

Electricity market design in the United States is increasingly dominated by locational marginal pricing (LMP) of energy and transmission. LMP markets are typically coupled with periodic auctions of financial transmission rights (FTRs) to hedge transmission price risks. While LMP designs offer considerable advantages, forward price discovery in these markets requires participants to form efficient expectations on spot congestion price differences. In this paper, we examine trends in the efficiency of one of the early LMP markets, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), analyzing a panel data set of over 9000 contracts over a six-year period beginning September 2000. We show that NYISO FTR markets were inefficient in their early years, but that market participants learned to predict forward prices and thus efficiency improved for FTRs not solely within the New York City/Long Island sub-region. FTRs within this sub-region, which has a number of special characteristics, remain relatively inefficient. (author)

Bidding behavior in a symmetric Chinese auction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mauricio Benegas

2015-01-01

Full Text Available This paper purposes a symmetric all-pay auction where the bidders compete neither for an object nor the object itself but for a lottery on receive. That lottery is determined endogenously through the bids. This auction is known as chance auction or more popularly as Chinese auction. The model considers the possibility that for some bidders the optimal strategy is to bid zero and to rely on luck. It showed that bidders become less aggressive when the lottery satisfies a variational condition. It was also shown that luck factor is decisive to determine if the expected payoff in Chinese auction is bigger or smaller than expected payoff in standard all-pay auction.

Auctioneers vs. commissaires-priseurs: The carnival mirror of profession regulation in the international art market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elisabetta Lazzaro

2013-06-01

Full Text Available This paper is a comparative analysis of the recent evolution of the French and the Anglo-Saxon profession regulations of auctioneers in terms of entry barriers and exercise of the profession. Firstly, following Stephen and Love's (1999 framework of the regulation of legal profession, we highlight the differences between regulations focussing on different levels (entry restrictions, advertising, fees, fee contracts, and organisational form. We show that French commissaire-priseurs and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers are bounded to quite opposed rules, relating to both the level of regulation (licensing against registration or certification and the scope of this regulation. Secondly, we try to assess the success of these regulations in terms of economic efficiency by comparing the international markets shares of French and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers. We further highlight how a weak regulation can disturb prices mechanisms and, in some cases, favour speculation. The discussion of some emblematic scandals highlights distortions provoked by a strong, as well as a weak regulation

7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... complexity of the sale. When the services of a professional auctioneer are advisable, the services will be... 7 Agriculture 14 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales...

Exploring Online Auction Behaviors and Motivations

Science.gov (United States)

Jeon, Sua; Crutsinger, Christy; Kim, Haejung

2008-01-01

The availability and convenience of the Internet, combined with the variety of products available at any given time, have contributed to the success of online auctions.This exploratory study examined online auction behaviors among college students in an attempt to identify underlying dimensions of auction motivations. Questionnaires completed by…

Healthier food choices for children through menu pricing

OpenAIRE

Kellershohn, J.; Walley, K.; Vriesekoop, F.

2017-01-01

Purpose\\ud The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of pricing (incentive and deterrent) to shift the purchase decision intent of parents when they order food for their child in a fast food restaurant.\\ud Design/methodology/approach\\ud A financial incentive and a deterrent pricing tactic was tested using an online quantitative approach with a sample of 400 Canadian parents, representative of the Canadian population based on geography, household income and education level.\\ud Findin...

77 FR 38803 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated Data For Auction 901

Science.gov (United States)

2012-06-29

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-990] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... files of census blocks eligible for the Mobility Fund Phase I support to be offered in Auction 901... 32092, May 31, 2012, the Bureaus described how they identified census blocks eligible for the Mobility...

An Agent-Based Auction Protocol on Mobile Devices

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yu-Fang Chung

2014-01-01

Full Text Available This paper proposes an English auction protocol to preserve a secure, fair, and effective online auction environment, where the operations are integrated with mobile agent technology for bidders participating in online auctions. The protocol consists of four participants, namely, registration manager, agent house, auction house, and bidder.

78 FR 24404 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Band Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Notice of Filing...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-04-25

... impermissible subject matters because they may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Compliance... communicating with each other about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless such applicants have... strategy. In some instances, this prohibition extends to communications regarding the post-auction market...

Calorie changes in chain restaurant menu items: implications for obesity and evaluations of menu labeling.

Science.gov (United States)

Bleich, Sara N; Wolfson, Julia A; Jarlenski, Marian P

2015-01-01

Supply-side reductions to the calories in chain restaurants are a possible benefit of upcoming menu labeling requirements. To describe trends in calories available in large U.S. restaurants. Data were obtained from the MenuStat project, a census of menu items in 66 of the 100 largest U.S. restaurant chains, for 2012 and 2013 (N=19,417 items). Generalized linear models were used to calculate (1) the mean change in calories from 2012 to 2013, among items on the menu in both years; and (2) the difference in mean calories, comparing newly introduced items to those on the menu in 2012 only (overall and between core versus non-core items). Data were analyzed in 2014. Mean calories among items on menus in both 2012 and 2013 did not change. Large restaurant chains in the U.S. have recently had overall declines in calories in newly introduced menu items (-56 calories, 12% decline). These declines were concentrated mainly in new main course items (-67 calories, 10% decline). New beverage (-26 calories, 8% decline) and children's (-46 calories, 20% decline) items also had fewer mean calories. Among chain restaurants with a specific focus (e.g., burgers), average calories in new menu items not core to the business declined more than calories in core menu items. Large chain restaurants significantly reduced the number of calories in newly introduced menu items. Supply-side changes to the calories in chain restaurants may have a significant impact on obesity prevention. Copyright © 2015 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Experiences with auctions for renewable energy support

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Mora Alvarez, David Fernando; Islam, Marco; Soysal, Emilie Rosenlund

2017-01-01

Auctions is an increasingly popular instrument for introducing competitiveness in the support schemes for renewable energy, however, designing successful auctions appears to be a challenge. Policy makers seeking to introduce auctions are faced with a range of design choices, which may affect...

Auctions of capacity in network industries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stern, J.; Turvey, R.

2003-01-01

This paper provides an introduction to the key issues arising for auctions of network capacity including (i) the ability of auctions to handle long-run capacity expansion issues as well as short run capacity allocation; (ii) the definition of 'capacity' on networks; (iii) auction revenues and revenue reallocation to regulated network operators; and (iv) alternative market-based mechanisms to provide signals for capacity expansion. The paper covers some simple analytics before introducing various complications such as the use of auctions in complex networks. The paper discusses implications and provides a context within which to consider the other papers in this issue of Utilities Policy. (Author)

Potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy; Effetti della vendita tramite asta dell'energia CIP 6

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Campidoglio, C. [Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale, Milan (Italy). Osservatorio Energia

2000-12-01

This paper analyses the potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy. This would both reduce the supply shortage and the prices on the eligible market, increase competition on the contract-for-difference market, indicate a clear price to which regulated energy charges could be indexed, thus extending the auction benefits to the franchise market to avoid the reintroduction of cross-subsidies. [Italian] L'articolo analizza i possibili benefici della vendita tramita asta dell'energia CIP 6. In particolare, l'asta ridurrebbe la scarsita' d'offerta e quindi i pressi sul mercato libero, aumenterebbe la concorrenza nel mercato dei contratti per differenza, fornirebbe un prezzo chiaro a cui indicizzare il prezzo dell'energia in tariffa, estendendo i benefici dell'asta sul mercato vincolato ed evitando la reintroduzione di sussidi incrociati.

Auction design for the wireless spectrum market

CERN Document Server

Lin, Peng; Zhang, Qian

2014-01-01

This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems.Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of c

Modelling the Asymmetric Volatility in Hog Prices in Taiwan : The Impact of Joining the WTO

NARCIS (Netherlands)

C-L. Chang (Chia-Lin); B-W. Huang (Bing-Wen); M-G. Chen (Meng-Gu)

2010-01-01

textabstractPrices in the hog industry in Taiwan are determined according to an auction system. There are significant differences in hog prices before, during and after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). The paper models growth rates and volatility in daily hog prices in Taiwan from 23

Internet Auction Sellers: Does Size Really Matter?

Science.gov (United States)

Halstead, Diane; Becherer, Richard C.

2003-01-01

Examines the Internet auction phenomenon as it relates to the marketing mix of online auction sellers. The data indicate that, while there is great diversity among businesses that utilize online auctions, distinct cost leadership and differentiation marketing strategies are both evident. These two approaches are further distinguished in terms of…

Premium Auctions and Risk Preferences

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hu, A.; Offerman, T.J.S.; Zou, L.

2010-01-01

In a premium auction, the seller offers some "pay back", called premium, to the highest bidders. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactic is related to the participant's risk preferences. By developing an English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values,

Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the euro-zone: the role of the crisis

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Beetsma, R.; Giuliodori, M.; de Jong, F.; Widijanto, D.

2016-01-01

We show that new public debt issues cause an auction cycle for Italian secondary-market debt, but not for German debt. The cycle is mainly observed for the crisis period since mid-2007 and is larger when the crisis, as measured by yield volatility and CDS spreads of primary dealers, is more intense.

Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the Euro-zone : The role of the crisis

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Beetsma, R.M.W.J.; Giuliodori, M.; de Jong, F.C.J.M.; Widijanto, D.

We show that new public debt issues cause an auction cycle for Italian secondary-market debt, but not for German debt. The cycle is mainly observed for the crisis period since mid-2007 and is larger when the crisis, as measured by yield volatility and CDS spreads of primary dealers, is more intense.

A multi-attribute yardstick auction without prior scoring

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hougaard, Jens Leth; Nielsen, Kurt; Papakonstantinou, Athanasios

by reducing the principal’s articulation of his preferences to simply choosing the most preferred oer as if it was a market with posted prices. Although truthful reporting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, we demonstrate by simulations that truth-telling may indeed be some kind of focal point....... By focusing on the initial winner in case everyone tells the truth, we show that even if the other bidders are allowed to misreport by as much as 20% of their true cost, the initial winner remains the winner in 80% of all simulated auctions in the case of 3 competing bidders. Furthermore, as it takes...

Current price guided use of combined cycle power plants with heat extraction using the example of the combined cycle Tiefstack

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sieck, Jan; Hagen, Ralf

2015-01-01

The sale of electricity at the European Power Exchange in the DayAhead auction contains a certain economic risk, if the electricity is produced with gas fired CHP plants. This risk is due to a low price level connected with a relatively high price volatility. An auction strategy, using block orders, including the use of smart blocks is a possible way to minimize economic risk. Such a strategy is presented in this paper, using the example of the auction strategy for the CCGT Tiefstack. As the CCGT Tiefstack is part of the district heating system of the city Hamburg, this system is described as well as the technical constraints of the CCGT.

The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, Jan; Viehmann, Johannes

2014-01-01

We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of cross-border capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced with a demand function reflecting the relationship between electricity transmitted between the markets and the spot price difference. Therefore, traders act like Bayesian–Cournot oligopolists in exercising their transmission rights when presented with incomplete information about the competitors’ capacities. Our analysis breaks down the welfare effect into three different components: Cournot behavior, capacity constraints, and incomplete information. We find that social welfare increases with the level of information with which traders are endowed. - Highlights: • We regard the utilization of explicitly auctioned cross-border capacities in electricity markets as a Bayesian Cournot game. • We analyze social welfare and find three forces diminishing it, (1) firms play a cournot game, (2) the presence of capacity constraints, (3) incomplete information. • We derive information regimes from “real world” examples and analyze their effect on social welfare

Investigation by CRE into record high electricity prices on Powernext Day-ahead Auction in October and November 2007. Analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

In October and November 2007, electricity prices hit record highs on the Powernext Day-Ahead Auction trading platform. While, during the first nine months of the year, prices for delivery between 6 pm and 8 pm averaged euros 36 /MWh, rising to a maximum of euros 118 /MWh, they spiked at: - euros 1,236 /MWh for delivery on Monday, 29 October 2007 between 6 pm and 7 pm; - euros 2,500 /MWh for delivery on Monday, 12 November 2007 between 8 pm and 9 pm; - euros 1,762 /MWh for delivery on Thursday, 15 November 2007 between 6 pm and 7 pm. Day ahead prices of electricity have a major effect on the procurement costs of suppliers, and consequently on the formation of selling prices to end consumers. Article 28 of French Act No.2000-108 of 10 February 2000 stipulates that CRE 'shall monitor, for electricity and natural gas, all transactions made between suppliers, brokers and producers, all transactions made on the organised markets and cross-border trading. It shall ensure that bids made by suppliers, brokers and producers are consistent with their financial and technical requirements'. Article 33 of the same Act specifies that, 'In performing the tasks entrusted to it, the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) may gather any information it requires from the Ministers for the Economy and for Energy, from public electricity transmission and distribution system operators, from operators of infrastructures for the natural gas transmission and distribution networks and operators of liquefied natural gas facilities, as well as from any other company involved in the electricity and natural gas market. It may also call upon any person whose evidence it deems necessary for the purposes of its investigations'. In this context, and in application of its duty to monitor the electricity wholesale markets, CRE has undertaken an investigation to analyse the mechanisms underlying the formation of such high prices. To this end, CRE gathered information relative to decisions taken by

Auctions API

Data.gov (United States)

General Services Administration — GSA Auctions offers Federal personal property assets ranging from common place items (such as office equipment and furniture) to more select products like scientific...

Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance

NARCIS (Netherlands)

U.L. Radkevitch (Uladzimir); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric); O.R. Koppius (Otto)

2008-01-01

textabstractThe choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer’s choice between reverse auctions and

CO2 price dynamics. The implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sijm, J.P.M.; Bakker, S.J.A.; Harmsen, H.W.; Lise, W.; Chen, Y.

2005-09-01

The present study analyses the relationship between EU emissions trading and power prices, notably the implications of free allocation of emissions allowances for the price of electricity in countries of North-western Europe. To study this impact, it uses a variety of analytical approaches, including interviews with stakeholders, empirical and statistical analyses, theoretical explorations, and analyses by means of the COMPETES model. The study shows that a significant part of the costs of freely allocated allowances is passed through to power price and discusses its implications in terms of higher electricity prices for consumers and windfall profits for producers. It concludes that free allocation of emission allowances is a highly questionable policy option for a variety of reasons and suggests that auctioning might offer a better perspective

The US SO2 Auction

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, Jan Lien

1998-01-01

An annual discriminative and revenue-neutral auction is linked to the new Acid Rain Program which allows electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 emission permits. This innovative SO2 auction distributes 2% of the permits in circulation and takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. Early...

License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

OpenAIRE

Wolfstetter, Elmar; Giebe, Thomas

2007-01-01

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to si...

Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction.

Science.gov (United States)

Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, G H

2015-01-01

One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer's utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.

Prices need no preferences: social trends determine decisions in experimental markets for pain relief.

Science.gov (United States)

Vlaev, Ivo; Seymour, Ben; Chater, Nick; Winston, Joel S; Yoshida, Wako; Wright, Nicholas; Symmonds, Mkael; Dolan, Ray

2014-01-01

A standard view in health economics is that, although there is no market that determines the "prices" for health states, people can nonetheless associate health states with monetary values (or other scales, such as quality adjusted life year [QALYs] and disability adjusted life year [DALYs]). Such valuations can be used to shape health policy, and a major research challenge is to elicit such values from people; creating experimental "markets" for health states is a theoretically attractive way to address this. We explore the possibility that this framework may be fundamentally flawed-because there may not be any stable values to be revealed. Instead, perhaps people construct ad hoc values, influenced by contextual factors, such as the observed decisions of others. The participants bid to buy relief from equally painful electrical shocks to the leg and arm in an experimental health market based on an interactive second-price auction. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions where the bids by "others" were manipulated to follow increasing or decreasing price trends for one, but not the other, pain. After the auction, a preference test asked the participants to choose which pain they prefer to experience for a longer duration. Players remained indifferent between the two pain-types throughout the auction. However, their bids were differentially attracted toward what others bid for each pain, with overbidding during decreasing prices and underbidding during increasing prices. Health preferences are dissociated from market prices, which are strongly referenced to others' choices. This suggests that the price of health care in a free-market has the capacity to become critically detached from people's underlying preferences. 2014 APA, all rights reserved

The Role of Signals in Online Auction Purchase Decisions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cypryjański Jacek

2015-06-01

Full Text Available There is a growing interest in behavioural economics contradicting the empirical prediction of rational choice theory once applied to online auctions. The issue is of particular relevance due to the large use of online auctions and the anticipated growth in the future. Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. The research investigates online consumers’ behaviour. The Authors suggest that due to the high perceived risk of the online buying process consumers are prompted to use cues of seller’ reputation. In a series of six experiments conducted via the auction site Allegro.pl in Poland a number of signals from auction web pages has been manipulated to influence purchase intention. The results suggest that several signals can be used to stimulate online customers’ behaviour. The results of these experiments indicate that buyers are more susceptible to the influence of “visual” signals than signals that require greater involvement of the buyer (to read information. The conducted experiments contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users’ behaviour. And finally it provides some managerial implications to increase online auction effectiveness from the seller’s perspective.

Price floors for emissions trading

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wood, Peter John; Jotzo, Frank

2011-01-01

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can guarantee minimum abatement efforts if prices are lower than expected, and they can help manage cost uncertainty, possibly as complements to price ceilings. Provisions for price floors are found in several recent legislative proposals for emissions trading. Implementation however has potential pitfalls. Possible mechanisms are government commitments to buy back permits, a reserve price at auction, or an extra fee or tax on acquittal of emissions permits. Our analysis of these alternatives shows that the fee approach has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than the alternatives. It can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing. - Research highlights: → Price floors for emissions trading schemes guarantee a minimum carbon price. → Price floors mean that emissions can be less than specified by the ETS cap. → We examine how price floors can relate to different policy objectives. → We compare different mechanisms for implementing a price floor. → We find that a mechanism where there is an extra tax or fee has advantages.

Auctions for Renewable Support in Denmark:Instruments and lessons learnt

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kitzing, Lena; Wendring, Paul; Wigan, Fabian

This report deals with all past and ongoing auctions for renewable support in Denmark. Since 2004, five single-item, technology-specific offshore wind auctions were held, with one more currently ongoing. One multi-item, multi-site nearshore wind auction is currently ongoing.......This report deals with all past and ongoing auctions for renewable support in Denmark. Since 2004, five single-item, technology-specific offshore wind auctions were held, with one more currently ongoing. One multi-item, multi-site nearshore wind auction is currently ongoing....

Strategic Generation with Conjectured Transmission Price Responses in a Mixed Transmission Pricing System. Part 2. Application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wals, A.F.; Hobbs, B.F.; Rijkers, F.A.M.

2004-05-01

The conjectured transmission price response model presented in the first of this two-paper series considers the expectations of oligopolistic generators regarding how demands for transmission services affect the prices of those services. Here, the model is applied to northwest Europe, simulating a mixed transmission pricing system including export fees, a path-based auction system for between-country interfaces, and implicit congestion-based pricing of internal country constraints. The path-based system does not give credit for counterflows when calculating export capability. The application shows that this no-netting policy can exacerbate the economic inefficiencies caused by oligopolistic pricing by generators. The application also illustrates the effects of different generator conjectures regarding rival supply responses and transmission prices. If generators anticipate that their increased demand for transmission services will increase transmission prices, then competitive intensity diminishes and energy prices rise. In the example here, the effect of this anticipation is to double the price increase that results from oligopolistic (Cournot) competition among generators

Carbon auctions, energy markets and market power: An experimental analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dormady, Noah C.

2014-01-01

This paper provides an experimental analysis of a simultaneous energy-emissions market under conditions of market power. The experimental design employs real-world institutional features; including stochastic demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and resale. The results suggest that dominant firms can utilize energy-emissions market linkages to simultaneously inflate the price of energy and suppress the price of emissions allowances. Whereas under prior market designs, regulators were concerned with dominant firms exercising their market power over the emissions market to exclude rivals and manipulate the permit market by hoarding permits; the results of this paper suggest that this strategy is less profitable to dominant firms in contemporary auction-based markets than strategic capacity withholding in the energy market and associated demand reduction in the emissions market. - Highlights: • Laboratory simulation of joint energy-emissions market. • Evaluates market power under collusion and real-world institutional features. • Dominant firms can exercise market power to inflate energy prices. • Dominant firms can exercise market power to suppress emissions prices. • Supply withholding is an implicit demand reduction in the emissions market

Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

Science.gov (United States)

Yim, Kyubin; Oh, Gabjin; Kim, Seunghwan

2016-01-01

The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85.

Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kyubin Yim

Full Text Available The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85.

Price Tails in the Smith and Farmer's Model

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Šmíd, Martin

2008-01-01

Roč. 15, č. 25 (2008), s. 31-40 ISSN 1212-074X R&D Projects: GA ČR GA402/07/1113; GA ČR(CZ) GA402/06/1417 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z10750506 Keywords : limit order market * continuous double auction * price increments * fat tails * tail exponent Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2008/E/smid-price tails in the smith and farmer's model.pdf

Making uncompetitive auctions competitive: a survey of experiments

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Offerman, T.; Onderstal, S.; Hinloopen, J.; Normann, H.-T.

2009-01-01

In the past 15 years, governments around the world have often used auctions to sell scarce licenses to operate in markets. In many of these auctions, the number of interested competitors is relatively small compared to the number of available licenses. Auction design is crucial in such uncompetitive

To be or not to be an auctioneer: Some thoughts on the legal nature of online eBay auctions and the protection of consumers

OpenAIRE

Riefa, C

2008-01-01

This paper discusses the legal classification of online “eBay” auctions. The discussion has key implications on the scope of consumer protection law as sale by auctions are, for example, excluded from the scope of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000. The paper uncovers that online “eBay” auctions cannot always be considered as traditional auctions and that eBay, as an intermediary, is not to be considered as an auctioneer. This creates difficulties associated with a di...

Do producers apply a capacity cutting strategy to increase prices? The case of the England and Wales electricity market

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Lízal, L. M.; Tashpulatov, Sherzod N.

2014-01-01

Roč. 43, May (2014), s. 114-124 ISSN 0140-9883 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : capacity bids * electricity prices * uniform price auction Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.708, year: 2014

Trigger Menu in 2017

CERN Document Server

The ATLAS collaboration

2018-01-01

This document summarises the trigger menu deployed by the ATLAS experiment during 2017 data taking at proton-proton collision centre-of-mass energies of $\\sqrt{s}=13$ TeV and $\\sqrt{s}=5$ TeV at the LHC and describes the improvements with respect to the trigger system and menu used in 2016 data taking.

Do producers apply a capacity cutting strategy to increase prices? The case of the England and Wales electricity market

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Lízal, L. M.; Tashpulatov, Sherzod N.

2014-01-01

Roč. 43, May (2014), s. 114-124 ISSN 0140-9883 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : capacity bids * electricity prices * uniform price auction Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.708, year: 2014

Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

Science.gov (United States)

Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo

This paper presents a new multi-unit auction protocol (IR protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called LDS has been developed for combinatorial auctions of multiple different items and has proven to be robust against false-name bids. Although we can modify the LDS protocol to handle multi-unit auctions, in which multiple units of an identical item are auctioned, the protocol is complicated and requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine the combination of bundles to obtain a high social surplus or revenue. For the auctioneer, our newly developed IR protocol is easier to use than the LDS, since the combination of bundles is automatically determined in a flexible manner according to the declared evaluation values of agents. The evaluation results show that the IR protocol can obtain a better social surplus than that obtained by the LDS protocol.

Amuse Restaurant Lunch Menu 2017

OpenAIRE

Amuse Restaurant

2017-01-01

Since opening, Amuse Restaurant has garnered rave reviews from the Country’s most trusted and renowned food critics. Praise has flowed for Conor’s individual style of cooking, which brings Asian flavours, namely Japanese, to modern French cuisine. The menu focuses mainly on tasting menus as it is the best way to experience this kind of food, however there is a three course set menu available Tuesday to Thursday for mid week dining. The lunch menu is a three course affair with the option of a ...

Amuse Restaurant Spring Menu 2017

OpenAIRE

Amuse Restaurant

2017-01-01

Since opening, Amuse Restaurant has garnered rave reviews from the Country’s most trusted and renowned food critics. Praise has flowed for Conor’s individual style of cooking, which brings Asian flavours, namely Japanese, to modern French cuisine. The menu focuses mainly on tasting menus as it is the best way to experience this kind of food, however there is a three course set menu available Tuesday to Thursday for mid week dining. The lunch menu is a three course affair with the option of a ...

7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by the...

Auctions for coastal energy resources

Science.gov (United States)

Griffin, Robert M.

It is becoming increasingly common to allocate public resources to the private sector for the purpose of developing these resources. One of the earliest uses of auctions in the U.S. for allocating rights to public resources was in the offshore oil and gas industry. The U.S. Federal government, through the Department of Interior (DOI), has used auctions to allocate development rights to offshore oil and gas resources to the private sector since the 1950's. Since then many things have changed. Oil and gas markets have gone through boom and bust cycles, giant technological advances in extraction and assessment have taken place, and alternative energy based in the coastal zone is now in demand in markets as well. There has been an enormous amount of research into the drivers of bidder behavior in auctions and optimal auction design in the last 60 years as well. Throughout all of this, the DOI has continued to use basically the same exact auction design to allocate oil and gas leases. The U.S. offshore oil and gas resources sold by the Department of Interior have accounted for more than $65 billion in revenue since the program started. These offshore resources are an important source of government revenue and national wealth. Additionally, the expansion of the energy sector offshore has enormous potential for electricity generation in the U.S., estimated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory as approaching 54 gigawatts by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Taken together, the DOI controls access to a large part of the future of energy in the U.S. The research herein assesses the auction formats used to allocate both fossil fuels and renewable resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The first manuscript looks at the current method used by the DOI to allocate oil and gas leases on the OCS, and is primarily interested in how bidders behave in this environment. Using latent class estimation techniques to separate distinct bidding behavior in a laboratory

Auctioning access to networks: evidence and expectations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McDaniel, T.

2003-01-01

Under very strict assumptions the outcomes that make common auction designs theoretically attractive can be expected to emerge: goods will go to those who value them most and the allocation will maximize revenue for the auctioneer. In network industries such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, rail, and airlines where agents are of different sizes and incumbency these assumptions do not always apply for a number of reasons. For example, the auctioned product may be an intermediate good, bidders are not symmetric with respect to values and information, markets are mixed, and property rights are hard to define. We discuss why it is not straightforward to make theoretical predictions about expected outcomes for these industries and use the British gas industry to discuss the importance of competition and scarcity for auctions of network capacity. (Author)

Menu labeling as a potential strategy for combating the obesity epidemic: a health impact assessment.

Science.gov (United States)

Kuo, Tony; Jarosz, Christopher J; Simon, Paul; Fielding, Jonathan E

2009-09-01

We conducted a health impact assessment to quantify the potential impact of a state menu-labeling law on population weight gain in Los Angeles County, California. We utilized published and unpublished data to model consumer response to point-of-purchase calorie postings at large chain restaurants in Los Angeles County. We conducted sensitivity analyses to account for uncertainty in consumer response and in the total annual revenue, market share, and average meal price of large chain restaurants in the county. Assuming that 10% of the restaurant patrons would order reduced-calorie meals in response to calorie postings, resulting in an average reduction of 100 calories per meal, we estimated that menu labeling would avert 40.6% of the 6.75 million pound average annual weight gain in the county population aged 5 years and older. Substantially larger impacts would be realized if higher percentages of patrons ordered reduced-calorie meals or if average per-meal calorie reductions increased. Our findings suggest that mandated menu labeling could have a sizable salutary impact on the obesity epidemic, even with only modest changes in consumer behavior.

Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions.

Science.gov (United States)

Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A N

2012-01-01

Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions--lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.

Healthy meals on the menu

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Thunström, Linda; Nordström, Leif Jonas; Shogren, Jason

2016-01-01

Menu labelling of meals prepared away from home is a policy designed to help consumers make healthier food choices. In this paper we use a field experiment in Sweden to examine if a restaurant benefits from introducing a meal labelled as healthy on its menu by experiencing an overall increase...... in sales. We cannot reject the hypothesis that sales are the same before and after the introduction of a meal labelled as healthy on the menu, i.e. our data does not support the idea that restaurants increase their sales from supplying a meal labelled as healthy....

Design of sustainable food chains: Measuring consumers' willingness-to-pay through the performance of experimental auctions

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Costa, Ana I.A.

Today's EU animal production systems face a major challenge. On one hand, they must deal with society's demand for production strategies that are safer, more environmental-friendly and ensure better animal welfare. On the other hand, they have to address food suppliers' aspirations for economic....... Moreover, the ability to quantify consumers' willingness-to-pay for new, ethically-improved foods is vital for the economic sustainability of the animal production sector, as well as for the generation of addedvalue products. This abstract presents the outcome of a pilot study of Dutch consumers...... conducted previously3,4. The type of auction employed was the second-price, sealed bid auction. The results obtained give some indication that Dutch consumers' might be willing to pay more for ethical benefits, namely those perceived to be associated with safety. Nevertheless, our findings also indicate...

Effect of firm variables on patent price

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Shyam Sreekumaran Nair

2012-03-01

Full Text Available In this study, using singleton patent auction price data from Ocean Tomo, LLC, we analyse the effect of firm variables on patent price. Patents owned by small firms attract higher price than patents owned by large firms, if they engage in multi-country filings. The patents owned by small firms get cited more than the patents owned by large firms. The patents owned by individual inventors attract a higher price than the patents owned by organisations when multi-country filings are not included. We believe that the lack of resources is preventing individual inventors from engaging in multi-country filings and maximising the revenue from their invention. A larger representative data should be used to replicate the results before generalising it.

Carbon pricing in the EU: Evaluation of different EU ETS reform options

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brink, Corjan; Vollebergh, Herman R.J.; Werf, Edwin van der

2016-01-01

This paper studies various options to support allowance prices in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), such as adjusting the cap, an auction reserve price, and fixed and variable carbon taxes in addition to the EU ETS. We use a dynamic computable general equilibrium model that explicitly allows for allowance banking and for a detailed cost-effectiveness analysis at the EU Member State level. We find that tightening the cap provides an ad hoc solution to the fundamental issue of the robustness of the effective carbon price, while introducing a price component to the ETS brings structural carbon price support in times of negative demand shocks for emission allowances. These price-based policies still benefit from the intertemporal flexibility through the banking provision in the EU ETS by re-allocating emissions over time with stronger emission reductions in early years and emission increases in later years. A higher emission price has a larger negative impact on the new Member States' economies than on other Member States. Furthermore, introducing a carbon tax in addition to the EU ETS decreases the price of allowances, resulting in welfare gains for net buyers of allowances while net sellers are worse off. - Highlights: • We analyse reform options for European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) with a CGE model. • Variable carbon tax and auction reserve price support carbon price at least cost. • Price-based reforms decrease early emissions but increase later emissions through banking. • New Member States' economies are affected more than others by higher CO_2 prices. • Lower allowance prices due to a carbon tax are unfavourable to net sellers of allowances.

Intelligent Personalized Trading Agents that facilitate Real-time Decisionmaking for Auctioneers and Buyers in the Dutch Flower Auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

W. Ketter (Wolfgang); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric); R.A. Zuidwijk (Rob)

2010-01-01

textabstractIn this case the Dutch Flower Auctions (DFA) are discussed. The DFA are part of the supply network in which flowers are produced, stocked, and then sold through either mediation or auctioning. This case focuses on the buyers’ and auctioneers’ positions when flowers are traded through

An Investigation of Value Updating Bidders in Simultaneous Online Art Auctions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mayukh Dass

2010-01-01

Full Text Available Simultaneous online auctions, in which the auction of all items being sold starts at the same time and ends at the same time, are becoming popular especially in selling items such as collectables and art pieces. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of bidders (Reactors in simultaneous auctions who update their preauction value of an item in the presence of influencing bidders (Influencers. We represent an auction as a network of bidders where the nodes represent the bidders participating in the auction and the ties between them represent an Influencer-Reactor relationship. We further develop a random effects bilinear model that is capable of handling covariates of both bidder types at the same time and account for higher-order dependence among the bidders during the auction. Using the model and data from a Modern Indian Art auction, we find that Reactors tend to update their values on items that have high preauction estimates, bid on items created by high investment risk artists, bid selectively only on certain items, and are more active in the second half of the auction. Implications for the auction house managers are discussed.

Online Reverse Auctions for Procurement of Services

NARCIS (Netherlands)

U.L. Radkevitch (Uladzimir)

2008-01-01

textabstractOnline reverse auctions, in which a buyer seeks to select a supplier and suppliers compete for contracts by bidding online, revolutionized corporate procurement early this century. Shortly after they had been pioneered by General Electric, many companies rushed to adopt reverse auctions

Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Filippo Radicchi

Full Text Available Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions--lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.

Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

Science.gov (United States)

Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A. N.

2012-01-01

Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets. PMID:22279553

Online learning in repeated auctions

OpenAIRE

Weed, Jonathan; Perchet, Vianney; Rigollet, Philippe

2015-01-01

Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is purchased. We adopt an online learning approach with bandit feedback to model this problem and derive bidding strategies for two models: stochastic and adversarial. In the stochastic model, the observed values of the goods are random variables centered around the true value of t...

Menu labeling: the unintended consequences to the consumer.

Science.gov (United States)

Black, Ellen A

2014-01-01

The Affordable Care Act requires certain restaurants to provide nutritional information on their menus and menu boards, which is referred to as menu labeling. Menu labeling presupposes that providing consumers with the nutritional information about their food will cause them to reconsider their food choices by picking healthier food options over less healthy options, thereby reducing the nation's high obesity rate. However, several studies have shown that consumers do not make healthier food choices even when armed with menu labeling. The issue then becomes whether menu labeling provides a correlative benefit to consumers or whether there are unintended consequences that ultimately harm consumers.

Implementation of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in Poland: a Case Study

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kitzing, Lena; Wendring, Paul

This report deals with the planned implementation of auctions for Renewable Energy support in Poland from 2016 onwards. The report focuses on the implementation process and provides the necessary background information. Furthermore the planned auction design is described and discussed both from...... criteria, of appropriate auction formats and suitable design elements for RES auctions, as well as the analysis of past auction implementations....

Amuse Restaurant Set Dinner Menu 2017

OpenAIRE

Amuse Restaurant

2017-01-01

Since opening, Amuse Restaurant has garnered rave reviews from the Country’s most trusted and renowned food critics. Praise has flowed for Conor’s individual style of cooking, which brings Asian flavours, namely Japanese, to modern French cuisine. The menu focuses mainly on tasting menus as it is the best way to experience this kind of food, however there is a three course set menu available Tuesday to Thursday for mid week dining. The lunch menu is a three course affair with the option of a ...

Effects of calorie labeling and value size pricing on fast food meal choices: results from an experimental trial.

Science.gov (United States)

Harnack, Lisa J; French, Simone A; Oakes, J Michael; Story, Mary T; Jeffery, Robert W; Rydell, Sarah A

2008-12-05

Although point-of-purchase calorie labeling at restaurants has been proposed as a strategy for improving consumer food choices, a limited number of studies have evaluated this approach. Likewise, little research has been conducted to evaluate the influence of value size pricing on restaurant meal choices. To examine the effect of point-of-purchase calorie information and value size pricing on fast food meal choices a randomized 2 x 2 factorial experiment was conducted in which participants ordered a fast food meal from one of four menus that varied with respect to whether calorie information was provided and whether value size pricing was used. Study participants included 594 adolescents and adults who regularly ate at fast food restaurants. Study staff recorded the foods ordered and consumed by each participant. Participants also completed surveys to assess attitudes, beliefs and practices related to fast food and nutrition. No significant differences in the energy composition of meals ordered or eaten were found between menu conditions. The average energy content of meals ordered by those randomized to a menu that included calorie information and did not include value size pricing was 842 kcals compared with 827 kcals for those who ordered their meal from a menu that did not include calorie information but had value size pricing (control menu). Results were similar in most analyses conducted stratified by factors such as age, race and education level. Additional research is needed to better evaluate the effects of calorie labeling and value size pricing on fast food meal choices. Studies in which participants are repeatedly exposed to these factors are needed since long term exposure may be required for behavior change.

Optimize-and-Dispatch Architecture for Expressive Ad Auctions

OpenAIRE

Parkes, David C.; Sandholm, Tuomas

2005-01-01

Ad auctions are generating massive amounts of revenue for online search engines such as Google. Yet, the level of expressiveness provided to participants in ad auctions could be significantly enhanced. An advantage of this could be improved competition and thus improved revenue to a seller of the right to advertise to a stream of search queries. In this paper, we outline the kinds of expressiveness that one might expect to be useful for ad auctions and introduce a high-level “optimize-and-...

77 FR 57085 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction; Release of Files with Recalculated Road Miles for Auction 901...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-09-17

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-1446] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... Mobility Fund Phase I support to be offered in Auction 901, which is to be held on September 27, 2012, and..., 77 FR 32092, May 31, 2012, the Bureaus identified census blocks eligible for the Mobility Fund Phase...

Sociological Factors Affecting Agricultural Price Risk Management in Australia

Science.gov (United States)

Jackson, Elizabeth; Quaddus, Mohammed; Islam, Nazrul; Stanton, John

2009-01-01

The highly volatile auction system in Australia accounts for 85 percent of ex-farm wool sales, with the remainder sold by forward contract, futures, and other hedging methods. In this article, against the background of an extensive literature on price risk strategies, we investigate the behavioral factors associated with producers' adoption of…

A Dynamic Economy with Costly Price Adjustment

OpenAIRE

Leif Danziger

1998-01-01

This paper studies a general-equilibrium model of a dynamic economy with menu costs. Each firm's productivity is exposed to idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shocks around a trend, and the money supply to monetary shocks around a trend. All consumption, pricing, and production decisions are based on optimizing behavior. There exists a staggered Markov perfect equilibrium with prices determined by a two-sided (s,S) markup strategy. The paper analyzes the optimal markup strategy and inve...

Pricing Unmetered Irrigation Water under Asymmetric Information and Full Cost Recovery

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alban Lika

2016-12-01

Full Text Available The objective of this study is to define an efficient pricing scheme for irrigation water in conditions of unmetered water use. The study is based on a principal-agent model and identifies a menu of contracts, defined as a set of payments and share of irrigated area, able to provide incentives for an efficient use of the resource by maximizing social welfare. The model is applied in the case study of the Çukas region (Albania where irrigation water is not metered. The results demonstrate that using a menu of contracts makes it possible to define a second best solution that may improve the overall social welfare derived from irrigation water use compared with the existing pricing structure, though, in the specific case study, the improvement is small. Furthermore, the results also suggest that irrigation water pricing policy needs to take into account different farm types, and that appropriate contract-type pricing schemes have a potential role in providing incentives to farmers to make irrigation choices to the social optimum.

Selling pictures: the illustrated auction catalogue

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elizabeth Pergam

2014-12-01

Full Text Available This essay is based upon a survey of reproductions in auction catalogues – from their first appearance in the early eighteenth century until their more consistent use in the second decade of the twentieth century. Examining the role of these illustrations sheds light on how auctions functioned; it was not just the works of art that were traded, but knowledge about those works of art became currency to be exchanged. In contrast to the high end engravings and photographs of luxury illustrated art books, reproductions in auction catalogues – publications produced as ephemeral marketing tools – were of noticeably lower quality. This study of the status of reproductions, therefore, investigates the evolving understanding of art knowledge, both aesthetic and economic, and the interdependence of the market and connoisseurship.

Financial Constraints and Nominal Price Rigidities

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Menno, Dominik Francesco; Balleer, Almut; Hristov, Nikolay

This paper investigates how financial market imperfections and the frequency of price adjustment interact. Based on new firm-level evidence for Germany, we document that financially constrained firms adjust prices more often than their unconstrained counterparts, both upwards and downwards. We show...... that these empirical patterns are consistent with a partial equilibrium menu-cost model with a working capital constraint. We then use the model to show how the presence of financial frictions changes profits and the price distribution of firms compared to a model without financial frictions. Our results suggest...... that tighter financial constraints are associated with higher nominal rigidities, higher prices and lower output. Moreover, in response to aggregate shocks, aggregate price rigidity moves substantially, the response of inflation is dampened, while output reacts more in the presence of financial frictions...

BSEA: A Blind Sealed-Bid E-Auction Scheme for E-Commerce Applications

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rohit Kumar Das

2016-12-01

Full Text Available Due to an increase in the number of internet users, electronic commerce has grown significantly during the last decade. Electronic auction (e-auction is one of the famous e-commerce applications. Even so, security and robustness of e-auction schemes still remain a challenge. Requirements like anonymity and privacy of the b i d value are under threat from the attackers. Any auction protocol must not leak the anonymity and the privacy of the b i d value of an honest Bidder. Keeping these requirements in mind, we have firstly proposed a controlled traceable blind signature scheme (CTBSS because e-auction schemes should be able to trace the Bidders. Using CTBSS, a blind sealed-bid electronic auction scheme is proposed (BSEA. We have incorporated the notion of blind signature to e-auction schemes. Moreover, both the schemes are based upon elliptic curve cryptography (ECC, which provides a similar level of security with a comparatively smaller key size than the discrete logarithm problem (DLP based e-auction protocols. The analysis shows that BSEA fulfills all the requirements of e-auction protocol, and the total computation overhead is lower than the existing schemes.

Approximating the Qualitative Vickrey Auction by a Negotiation Protocol

Science.gov (United States)

Hindriks, Koen V.; Tykhonov, Dmytro; de Weerdt, Mathijs

A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose this constraint but still approximate the outcome of the auction. In this paper we show that a multi-round multi-party negotiation protocol may be used to this end if the negotiating agents are capable of learning opponent preferences. The latter condition can be met by current state of the art negotiation technology. We show that this protocol approximates the theoretical outcome predicted by a so-called Qualitative Vickrey auction mechanism (even) on a complex multi-issue domain.

Accounting in the Social Menu

Science.gov (United States)

González, José Villacís

2010-01-01

This paper was born out of combinatorics. It defines a level of utility which, though it cannot be measured, can be preferred to another in each specific combination of goods. In turn, each combination defines a menu, meaning that there will be as many menus as there are combinations of goods. In this manner, we have a menu and a utility for each…

Clean air, clear market. Making emissions trading work: The role of a computer-assisted auction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bartels, C.W.; Marron, D.B.; Lipsky, M.I.

1993-01-01

Creating a new commodity presents the chance to develop new markets in which to trade it. In many cases, existing markets can be adapted easily; in other cases it proves worthwhile to develop new forms that reflect special characteristics of the commodity and those who trade it. In the case of the sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emission allowances created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, a number of standard market forms already have been adopted. While these will prove useful for handling some transactions, a new Market Clearing Auction (MCA) offers buyers and sellers a centralized marketplace for trading SO 2 emission allowances. The MCA, which was developed by the brokerage firm Cantor Fitzgerald, is a computer-assisted open-quotes smartclose quotes auction designed to replicate the outcome of an efficient market in emission allowances, and accepts bids and offers for any possible combination of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances covering more than one year. The auction then determines the combination of bids and offers that maximizes the gains from trades in the market, and establishes uniform market clearing prices for each allowance issue (1995, 1996, and so on). Once executed, trades are settled on a cash-forward basis; that is, allowances are delivered and payments are made at future dates

Effective Spend Management Through Electronic Reverse Auction Configurations

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mojmír Prídavok

2013-07-01

Full Text Available The purpose of the paper is to analyz wide range of possible auction strategies and configurations of eRA, with respect to the ever changing market conditions. Electronic reverse auction (eRA represents an electronic sourcing method of competitive bidding among a number of qualified suppliers. Theory assumes that eRA represents pure market environment with information perfectly distributed between both buyers and suppliers. Although initial eRA cost savings in B2B could be as high as 40%, without deeper knowledge of different auctions strategies and configurations, additional cost reductions are not possible. To identify crucial determinant, the statistical (correlation analysis on the data set of more than 18.000 auction items with different configuration parameters was conducted. Findings suggest that the more bidders are invited to the eRA, the better results could be expected. Additionally, the complexity of the eRA parameterization does not seem to influent the success of the eRA. These results can influence usage and SW development of eRA application in real environment. This research extends already realized studies in the field of electronic auctions for the B2B processes

Effect of price and information on the food choices of women university students in Saudi Arabia: An experimental study.

Science.gov (United States)

Halimic, Aida; Gage, Heather; Raats, Monique; Williams, Peter

2018-04-01

To explore the impact of price manipulation and healthy eating information on intended food choices. Health information was provided to a random half of subjects (vs. information on Saudi agriculture). Each subject chose from the same lunch menu, containing two healthy and two unhealthy entrees, deserts and beverages, on five occasions. Reference case prices were 5, 3 and 2 Saudi Arabian Reals (SARs). Prices of healthy and unhealthy items were manipulated up (taxed) and down (subsidized) by 1 SAR in four menu variations (random order); subjects were given a budget enabling full choice within any menu. The number of healthy food choices were compared with different price combinations, and between information groups. Linear regression modelling explored the effect of relative prices of healthy/unhealthy options and information on number of healthy choices controlling for dietary behaviours and hunger levels. University campus, Saudi Arabia, 2013. 99 women students. In the reference case, 49.5% of choices were for healthy items. When the price of healthy items was reduced, 58.5% of selections were healthy; 57.2% when the price of unhealthy items rose. In regression modelling, reducing the price of healthy items and increasing the price of unhealthy items increased the number of healthy choices by 5% and 6% respectively. Students reporting a less healthy usual diet selected significantly fewer healthy items. Providing healthy eating information was not a significant influence. Price manipulation offers potential for altering behaviours to combat rising youth obesity in Saudi Arabia. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Auction fever: exploring informational social influences on bidder choices.

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Yi-Fen

2011-01-01

Previous investigations of herd behavior have identified the importance of informational social influences in consumer decision making. This research presents three studies examining herd behavior in online auctions. The three studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including bid number, feedback ratings, and number of questions and answers. This research also investigated the effect of different levels of herd cues on bidder online choices under high and low brand awareness in online auctions. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, different levels of herd cues influence bidder online choices in both high and low brand awareness product situations.

Menu Planning Guide for School Food Service. Revised.

Science.gov (United States)

VanEgmont-Pannell, Dorothy; And Others

This menu planning guide for school lunches and breakfasts contains: (1) lunch requirements, recommendations, and policies; (2) the basics of menu planning; (3) how to vary portions for various age/grade groups; (4) planning breakfasts; (5) merchandising school lunches and breakfasts; and (6) nutrition education and menu planning; Appendixes…

Agora Energiewende (2017). Future cost of onshore wind. Recent auction results, long-term outlook and implications for upcoming German auctions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thomassen, Georg; Deutsch, Matthias

2017-04-15

The costs for electricity from renewable generation have been falling significantly in recent years, and record low bids at auctions around the world have grasped the attention of the public. Solar photovoltaics and offshore wind auctions, in particular, have attracted a lot of interest. The results for onshore wind, however, are just as impressive. The future cost development of onshore wind is of great relevance, since it is a key pillar of the energy system transformation in many parts of the world. However, the estimated long-term cost reductions vary significantly, as different studies value the cost drivers of wind differently. In Germany, the opaque and complex cost structure of onshore wind is the root of much controversy. International auction results with winning bids of less than half of the typical German pay rate left people questioning the costs of domestic wind power. However this discussion often fails to account adequately for differences in the quality of wind resources. In light of the upcoming, and first, German onshore wind auctions, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion by providing the necessary context for international auction results, a general outlook on the future cost of onshore wind, and by illustrating the existing potential and hindrances for cost reductions in the German market.

Agora Energiewende (2017). Future cost of onshore wind. Recent auction results, long-term outlook and implications for upcoming German auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomassen, Georg; Deutsch, Matthias

2017-01-01

The costs for electricity from renewable generation have been falling significantly in recent years, and record low bids at auctions around the world have grasped the attention of the public. Solar photovoltaics and offshore wind auctions, in particular, have attracted a lot of interest. The results for onshore wind, however, are just as impressive. The future cost development of onshore wind is of great relevance, since it is a key pillar of the energy system transformation in many parts of the world. However, the estimated long-term cost reductions vary significantly, as different studies value the cost drivers of wind differently. In Germany, the opaque and complex cost structure of onshore wind is the root of much controversy. International auction results with winning bids of less than half of the typical German pay rate left people questioning the costs of domestic wind power. However this discussion often fails to account adequately for differences in the quality of wind resources. In light of the upcoming, and first, German onshore wind auctions, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion by providing the necessary context for international auction results, a general outlook on the future cost of onshore wind, and by illustrating the existing potential and hindrances for cost reductions in the German market.

Bidding strategies in Brazilian electricity auctions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Azevedo, Erick M.; Correia, Paulo B.

2006-01-01

Double bilateral contract auctions for electric energy purchase and sale occur in Brazil. These auctions present incomplete information and possess some subjectivity in relation to the future scenario of the Brazilian electric system, inserted in the agent's bids. In this work, a model using Bayes' rule and the game theory is proposed to aid the agent in its bid definition. Through the existing relations between the Conditional probabilities of Bayes' Rule, the model transforms beliefs into information. In this way, the absence of information is supplied and the problem is transformed into a game with complete information. The present study has no worries in terms of transmission constraints, since they are not usually considered in the bilateral contract auctions in Brazil. At the end, Nash equilibrium (NE) can be found through the expected payoff matrix of each agent. (author)

Experiments with the auction algorithm for the shortest path problem

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Larsen, Jesper; Pedersen, Ib

1999-01-01

The auction approach for the shortest path problem (SPP) as introduced by Bertsekas is tested experimentally. Parallel algorithms using the auction approach are developed and tested. Both the sequential and parallel auction algorithms perform significantly worse than a state-of-the-art Dijkstra-l......-like reference algorithm. Experiments are run on a distributed-memory MIMD class Meiko parallel computer....

Effects of calorie labeling and value size pricing on fast food meal choices: Results from an experimental trial

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jeffery Robert W

2008-12-01

Full Text Available Abstract Background Although point-of-purchase calorie labeling at restaurants has been proposed as a strategy for improving consumer food choices, a limited number of studies have evaluated this approach. Likewise, little research has been conducted to evaluate the influence of value size pricing on restaurant meal choices. Methods To examine the effect of point-of-purchase calorie information and value size pricing on fast food meal choices a randomized 2 × 2 factorial experiment was conducted in which participants ordered a fast food meal from one of four menus that varied with respect to whether calorie information was provided and whether value size pricing was used. Study participants included 594 adolescents and adults who regularly ate at fast food restaurants. Study staff recorded the foods ordered and consumed by each participant. Participants also completed surveys to assess attitudes, beliefs and practices related to fast food and nutrition. Results No significant differences in the energy composition of meals ordered or eaten were found between menu conditions. The average energy content of meals ordered by those randomized to a menu that included calorie information and did not include value size pricing was 842 kcals compared with 827 kcals for those who ordered their meal from a menu that did not include calorie information but had value size pricing (control menu. Results were similar in most analyses conducted stratified by factors such as age, race and education level. Conclusion Additional research is needed to better evaluate the effects of calorie labeling and value size pricing on fast food meal choices. Studies in which participants are repeatedly exposed to these factors are needed since long term exposure may be required for behavior change.

Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India

OpenAIRE

Singh, Bhupal; Dhal, Sarat C.

1998-01-01

The treasury securities repo-auction is an important instrument for central banks in managing liquidity and sending interest rate signal to the money market. In the Indian context, the repo-auctions have been used actively in the post-reform period. The present study illustrates the money market reaction to repo-auctions and points out whether such reaction is consistent with applied auction rules. The policy implications are analysed in the light of alternative rules pertaining to discrimina...

Simulating the Effectiveness of an Alternative Salary Auction Mechanism

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Tan, Pei Yin

2006-01-01

... the incentive of bidders to submit a truthful valuation of the jobs. An alternative auction mechanism that combined elements of both auction theory and matching was proposed to overcome these complications...

A Trustworthy Internet Auction Model with Verifiable Fairness.

Science.gov (United States)

Liao, Gen-Yih; Hwang, Jing-Jang

2001-01-01

Describes an Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed. (Author/AEF)

Marketing a Menu.

Science.gov (United States)

1987-10-31

Patients contemplating the relative nutritional values of mixed macedoine of vegetables and pea puree will soon be finding their hospital menu cards enlivened by supermarkets, travel services and other adverts.

Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce

OpenAIRE

David Lucking-Reiley

2000-01-01

William Vickrey (1961) proposed an auction mechanism in which bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount. For decades, economists have credited Vickrey with inventing this auction format, and have believed that the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice. This paper presents evidence that Vickrey auctions have long been the predominant auction format for mail sales of collectible postage stamps. Stamp auctioneers ...

Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kammueller, Florian; Kerber, Manfred; Probst, Christian W.

2016-01-01

is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use...

Bidding Strategies in Agent-based Continuous Double Auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

H. Ma (Huiye); H.-F. Leung

2008-01-01

htmlabstractOnline auctions are a platform to trade goods on the Internet. In this context, negotiation capabilities for software agents in continuous double auctions (CDAs) are a central concern. Agents need to be able to prepare bids for and evaluate offers on behalf of the users they represent

Multidimensional procurement auctions with unknown weights

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Greve, Thomas

This paper studies the consequences of holding a procurement auction when the principal chooses not to show its preferences. My paper extends the procurement auction model of Che (1993) to a situation where both the principal and the agents have private information. Thus, unknown parameters of bo...... gives rise to an analysis of a principal that can not fully commit to the outcome induced by the scoring rule. Therefore, my result apply to contract theory and it’s problems with imperfect commitment....

Current price guided use of combined cycle power plants with heat extraction using the example of the combined cycle Tiefstack; Strompreisgefuehrter Einsatz von GuD-Kraftwerken mit Waermeauskopplung am Beispiel der GuD Tiefstack

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sieck, Jan; Hagen, Ralf [Vattenfall Waerme Hamburg GmbH, Hamburg (Germany)

2015-07-01

The sale of electricity at the European Power Exchange in the DayAhead auction contains a certain economic risk, if the electricity is produced with gas fired CHP plants. This risk is due to a low price level connected with a relatively high price volatility. An auction strategy, using block orders, including the use of smart blocks is a possible way to minimize economic risk. Such a strategy is presented in this paper, using the example of the auction strategy for the CCGT Tiefstack. As the CCGT Tiefstack is part of the district heating system of the city Hamburg, this system is described as well as the technical constraints of the CCGT.

Influence of individual rationality on continuous double auction markets with networked traders

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Junhuan

2018-04-01

This paper investigates the influence of individual rationality of buyers and sellers on continuous double auction market outcomes in terms of the proportion of boundedly-rational buyers and sellers. The individual rationality is discussed in a social network artificial stock market model by embedding network formation and information set. Traders automatically select the most profitable trading strategy based on individual and social learning of the profits and trading strategies of themselves and their neighbors, and submit orders to markets. The results show that (i) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a higher market price, higher sellers' profits and a higher market efficiency; (ii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a lower number of trades and lower buyers' profits; (iii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces a lower market price, a lower number of trades, and lower sellers' profits; (iv) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces higher buyers' profits and a higher market efficiency.

Auctions for renewable energy support - Taming the beast of competitive bidding

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Mora Alvarez, David Fernando; Kitzing, Lena; Soysal, Emilie Rosenlund

countries. These insights are based on theoretical and empirical analysis (energy auctions in 12 European countries and 8 non-European countries), the use of state of the art simulation models and experiments, and through cooperation cases with some Member States providing tailor-made policy support...... in the implementation of auctions. AURES contributed to a strong knowledge-sharing with workshops, webinars, bi- and multilateral meetings, an interactive website and dedicated auction tools (AURES cash flow model and AURES auction designer). This final report covers a discussion of major findings and insights...

Risk analysis of bidding strategies in an electricity pay as bid auction: A new theorem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rahimiyan, Morteza; Rajabi Mashhadi, Habib

2007-01-01

Considering the uncertainties in the power market, the bidding problem has an important role for the power supplier to reach his goals, and using risk management methods to protect against the market risk is unavoidable. Thus, in this paper, the bidding decision making problem is formulated from a supplier's viewpoint in a spot market. The spot market works based on a pay as bid auction or a discriminatory price auction. The market clearing price (MCP) is uncertain, and we consider a probabilistic model for it. Regarding the literature of the bidding problem and forecasting methods of MCP, a normal probability density function, pdf (N(μ m , σ m )), is a proper distribution for the MCP. The statistical parameters of MCP vary on different times (peak and off peak), and considering the concept of supplier risk, their effects on the supplier expected benefit and expected sell from selling energy will be discussed analytically. An important section of this research work concerns the optimal bidding strategy when μ m and σ m vary in different conditions of the power market. Thus, the coefficient of variation index (CV), as a proper measure, mathematically defined as σ m divided by μ m , is introduced to measure the market risk index. In this paper, the CV index is used to analyze and manage the supplier risk and introduce the optimal strategy. Then, for a constant amount of the CV as a theorem, it is proved that: (1) the maximum of the expected sell occurs at a constant level of the supplier risk and (2) the optimal bid price linearly depends on the standard deviation of the MCP. This theorem is generalized for the case that the expected value of the supplier benefit is considered as an objective function in the bidding process. Some numerical examples are presented, and application of the proposed theorem is discussed

Endogenous Market-Clearing Prices and Reference Point Adaptation

Science.gov (United States)

Dragicevic, Arnaud Z.

When prices depend on the submitted bids, i.e. with endogenous market-clearing prices in repeated-round auction mechanisms, the assumption of independent private values that underlines the property of incentive-compatibility is to be brought into question; even if these mechanisms provide active involvement and market learning. In its orthodox view, adaptive bidding behavior imperils incentive-compatibility. We relax the assumption of private values' independence in the repeated-round auctions, when the market-clearing prices are made public at the end of each round. Instead of using game-theory learning models, we introduce a behavioral model that shows that bidders bid according to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, which neither ignores the rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints, nor rejects the posted prices issued from others' bids. Bidders simply weight information at their disposal and adjust their discovered value using reference points encoded in the sequential price weighting function. Our model says that bidders and offerers are sincere boundedly rational utility maximizers. It lies between evolutionary dynamics and adaptive heuristics and we model the concept of inertia as high weighting of the anchor, which stands for truthful bidding and high regard to freshly discovered preferences. Adjustment means adaptive rule based on adaptation of the reference point in the direction of the posted price. It helps a bidder to maximize her expected payoff, which is after all the only purpose that matters to rationality. The two components simply suggest that sincere bidders are boundedly rational. Furthermore, by deviating from their anchor in the direction of the public signal, bidders operate in a correlated equilibrium. The correlation between bids comes from the commonly observed history of play and each bidder's actions are determined by the history. Bidders are sincere if they have limited memory and confine their reference point adaptation

The pricing of trees: A study of hold-ups, holdouts, buy-outs and sell-offs

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

WD Reekie

2004-11-01

Full Text Available This paper draws on transactions cost analysis, price and auction theory, and competition authority findings in order to answer some questions on the structure and trading patterns of the South African forestry industry. Does a forestry firm linked contractually to supply an adjacent sawmill customer, form part of a bilateral monopoly?  For competition policy what are the relevant markets each party sells into or buys from?  Can either firm opportunistically hold-up the other in price revisions?  Or, where contracts have no effective terminal date, can one party hold out against offers of contract buyout?  If one party is a state agency are there rights of eminent domain?  If the state agency is due to be privatised can the method of sale, for example a simultaneous ascending auction, resolve some of the dilemmas?

Strategic Generation with Conjectured Transmission Price Responses in a Mixed Transmission Pricing System. Part 1. Formulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hobbs, B.F.; Rijkers, F.A.M.

2004-05-01

The conjectured supply function (CSF) model calculates an oligopolistic equilibrium among competing generating companies (GenCos), presuming that GenCos anticipate that rival firms will react to price increases by expanding their sales at an assumed rate. The CSF model is generalized here to include each generator's conjectures concerning how the price of transmission services (point-to-point service and constrained interfaces) will be affected by the amount of those services that the generator demands. This generalization reflects the market reality that large producers will anticipate that they can favorably affect transmission prices by their actions. The model simulates oligopolistic competition among generators while simultaneously representing a mixed transmission pricing system. This mixed system includes fixed transmission tariffs, congestion-based pricing of physical transmission constraints (represented as a linearized dc load flow), and auctions of interface capacity in a path-based pricing system. Pricing inefficiencies, such as export fees and no credit for counterflows, can be simulated. The model is formulated as a linear mixed complementarity problem, which enables very large market models to be solved. In the second paper of this two-paper series, the capabilities of the model are illustrated with an application to northwest Europe, where transmission pricing is based on such a mixture of approaches

Team Organization Method Using Salary Auction Game for Sustainable Motivation

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sangkyun Kim

2015-10-01

Full Text Available In performing team-based projects in engineering class, students usually face many problems, such as free-riding, lack of responsibility, boredom, and insufficient initiative. This papers proposes a new method for performing team-based projects in engineering class—specifically, a gamified method for team organization using a salary auction game. On the description of the design and use of a salary auction game in engineering class, a case study conducted using a survey method is reported to validate the practical value of the proposed auction game. The salary auction game proposed in this paper demonstrates that a gamified team organization method in engineering class could be used as an effective tool to enhance motivation and to improve learning outcomes of engineering students.

6 essays about auctions: a theoretical and empirical analysis. Application to power markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lamy, L.

2007-06-01

This thesis is devoted to a theoretical and empirical analysis of auction mechanisms. Motivated by allocation issues in network industries, in particular by the liberalization of the electricity sector, it focus on auctions with externalities (either allocative or informational) and on multi-objects auctions. After an introduction which provides a survey of the use and the analysis of auctions in power markets, six chapters make this thesis. The first one considers standard auctions in Milgrom-Weber's model with interdependent valuations when the seller can not commit not to participate in the auction. The second and third chapters study the combinatorial auction mechanism proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom. The first of these two studies proposes a modification of this format with a final discount stage and clarifies the theoretical status of those formats, in particular the conditions such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. Motivated by the robustness issues of the generalizations of the Ausubel-Milgrom and the Vickrey combinatorial auctions to environments with allocative externalities between joint-purchasers, the second one characterizes the buyer-sub-modularity condition in a general model with allocative identity-dependent externalities between purchasers. In a complete information setup, the fourth chapter analyses the optimal design problem when the commitment abilities of the principal are reduced, namely she can not commit to a simultaneous participation game. The fifth chapter is devoted to the structural analysis of the private value auction model for a single-unit when the econometrician can not observe bidders' identities. The asymmetric independent private value (IPV) model is identified. A multi-step kernel-based estimator is proposed and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Using auctions data for the anglo-french electric Interconnector, the last chapter analyses a multi-unit ascending auctions through reduced forms. (author)

Food and Beverage Selection Patterns among Menu Label Users and Nonusers: Results from a Cross-Sectional Study.

Science.gov (United States)

Gruner, Jessie; Ohri-Vachaspati, Punam

2017-06-01

By May 5, 2017, restaurants with 20 or more locations nationwide will be required to post calorie information on menus and menu boards. Previous research shows that those who use menu labels purchase fewer calories, but how users are saving calories is unknown. To assess food and beverage selection patterns among menu label users and nonusers. Secondary, cross-sectional analysis using data from a study examining sociodemographic disparities in menu label usage at a national fast-food restaurant chain. Participants were recruited outside restaurant locations, using street-intercept survey methodology. Consenting customers submitted receipts and completed a brief oral survey. Receipt data were used to categorize food and beverage purchases. Side, beverage, and entrée purchases. Sides and beverages were classified as healthier and less-healthy options consistent with the 2015 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. Healthier options contained items promoted in the guidelines, such as whole fruits, vegetables, low-fat dairy, and 100% fruit juice; less-healthy options contained solid fat or added sugar. Entrées were categorized as lower-, medium-, and higher-calorie options, based on quartile cutoffs. Multinomial logistic regression models were used to estimate prevalence ratios (PRs) for purchases among menu label users and nonusers, controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and total price paid. Healthier sides were selected by 7.5% of users vs 2.5% of nonusers; healthier beverages were selected by 34.0% of users vs 11.6% of nonusers; and lowest-calorie entrées were selected by 28.3% of users vs 30.1% of nonusers. Compared with nonusers (n=276), users (n=53) had a higher probability of purchasing healthier sides (PR=5.44; P=0.034), and healthier beverages (PR=3.37; P=0.005). No significant differences were seen in the purchasing patterns of entrées. Targeting educational campaigns to side and beverage purchasing behaviors may increase the effectiveness of menu

Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets

Science.gov (United States)

Toft, I. E.; Bagnall, A. J.

This paper introduces a new adaptive sniping agent for the Continuous Double Auction. We begin by analysing the performance of the well known Kaplan sniper in two extremes of market conditions. We generate volatile and stable market conditions using the well known Zero Intelligence-Constrained agent and a new zero-intelligence agent Small Increment (SI). ZI-C agents submit random but profitable bids/offers and cause high volatility in prices and individual trader performance. Our new zero-intelligence agent, SI, makes small random adjustments to the outstanding bid/offer and hence is more cautious than ZI-C. We present results for SI in self-play and then analyse Kaplan in volatile and stable markets. We demonstrate that the non-adaptive Kaplan sniper can be configured to suit either market conditions, but no single configuration is performs well across both market types. We believe that in a dynamic auction environment where current or future market conditions cannot be predicted a viable sniping strategy should adapt its behaviour to suit prevailing market conditions. To this end, we propose the Adaptive Sniper (AS) agent for the CDA. AS traders classify sniping opportunities using a statistical model of market activity and adjust their classification thresholds using a Widrow-Hoff adapted search. Our AS agent requires little configuration, and outperforms the original Kaplan sniper in volatile and stable markets, and in a mixed trader type scenario that includes adaptive strategies from the literature.

Cross-border electricity market effects due to price caps in an emission trading system: An agent-based approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richstein, Jörn C.; Chappin, Emile J.L.; Vries, Laurens J. de

2014-01-01

The recent low CO 2 prices in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) have triggered a discussion whether the EU ETS needs to be adjusted. We study the effects of CO 2 price floors and a price ceiling on the dynamic investment pathway of two interlinked electricity markets (loosely based on Great Britain, which already has introduced a price floor, and on Central Western Europe). Using an agent-based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a CO 2 market (including banking), we analyse the cross-border effects of national policies as well as system-wide policy options. A common, moderate CO 2 auction reserve price results in a more continuous decarbonisation pathway. This reduces CO 2 price volatility and the occurrence of carbon shortage price periods, as well as the average cost to consumers. A price ceiling can shield consumers from extreme price shocks. These price restrictions do not cause a large risk of an overall emissions overshoot in the long run. A national price floor lowers the cost to consumers in the other zone; the larger the zone with the price floor, the stronger the effect. Price floors that are too high lead to inefficiencies in investment choices and to higher consumer costs. - Highlights: • Cross-border effects of CO 2 policies were investigated with an agent-based model. • The current EU ETS might cause CO 2 price shocks and CO 2 price volatility. • A CO 2 auction reserve price does not lower welfare, but lowers CO 2 price volatility. • A national CO 2 price floor lowers consumer cost in the other countries. • A CO 2 price ceiling does not lead to an overshoot of emissions

Price formation and market mechanisms

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neff, T.L.

1991-01-01

World markets for nuclear fuel have changed greatly since the 1970s. In earlier days, firms specializing in mining, conversion, enrichment and fabrication negotiated directly with end users, primarily under long term contracts at specified prices. This old model is gone. Market structure has been transformed: traditional suppliers now compete with traders, some of whom can offer a much larger menu of products and terms than primary suppliers. Utilities act as traders, converters as brokers, brokers as traders, producers as buyers, and so on. De-enrichment, de-conversion, loans, swaps, interchanges and other new kinds of transactions have proliferated. These changes in market structure and market mechanisms have been accompanied by substantial changes in price formation, that is the process by which market price is set. Today, the level and direction of price are set in a trading dominated spot market environment, fuelled by inventory liquidation and Soviet and other non-traditional supply. (author)

Bandwidth auction for SVC streaming in dynamic multi-overlay

Science.gov (United States)

Xiong, Yanting; Zou, Junni; Xiong, Hongkai

2010-07-01

In this paper, we study the optimal bandwidth allocation for scalable video coding (SVC) streaming in multiple overlays. We model the whole bandwidth request and distribution process as a set of decentralized auction games between the competing peers. For the upstream peer, a bandwidth allocation mechanism is introduced to maximize the aggregate revenue. For the downstream peer, a dynamic bidding strategy is proposed. It achieves maximum utility and efficient resource usage by collaborating with a content-aware layer dropping/adding strategy. Also, the convergence of the proposed auction games is theoretically proved. Experimental results show that the auction strategies can adapt to dynamic join of competing peers and video layers.

Auction approaches of long-term contracts to ensure generation investment in electricity markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean experiences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moreno, R.; Barroso, L.A.; Rudnick, H.; Mocarquer, S.; Bezerra, B.

2010-01-01

The implementation of auctions of long-term electricity contracts is arising as an alternative to ensure generation investment and therefore achieve a reliable electricity supply. The aim is to reconcile generation adequacy with efficient energy purchase, correct risk allocation among investors and consumers, and the politico-economic environment of the country. In this paper, a generic proposal for a long-term electricity contracts approach is made, including practical design concepts for implementation. This proposal is empirically derived from the auctions implemented in Brazil and Chile during the last 6 years. The study is focused on practices and lessons which are especially useful for regulators and policy makers that want to facilitate the financing of new desirable power plants in risky environments and also efficiently allocate supply contracts among investors at competitive prices. Although this mechanism is generally seen as a significant improvement in market regulation, there are questions and concerns on auction performance that require careful design and which are identified in this paper. In addition, the experiences and proposal described can serve to derive further mechanisms in order to promote the entrance of particular generation technologies, e.g. renewables, in the developed world and therefore achieve a clean electricity supply.

Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

OpenAIRE

Tukiainen, Janne

2008-01-01

A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize ...

Strategic Bidding in Hybrid CPC/CPM Auctions

OpenAIRE

Yi Zhu; Kenneth C. Wilbur

2008-01-01

Websites increasingly allow advertisers to choose whether to bid for advertising on a per-impression or per-click basis. We present the first analysis of this new hybrid auction market. The conventional wisdom in this industry is that brand advertisers (e.g., Coca-Cola) will bid for impressions, while direct response advertisers (e.g., Amazon.com) will bid for clicks. We find that in an auction setting similar to that used by Facebook and Google, brand advertisers may have an incentive to bid...

Economic analysis of price premiums in the presence of non-convexities. Evidence from German electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Paschmann, Martin

2017-11-15

Analyzing price data from sequential German electricity markets, namely the day-ahead and intraday auction, a puzzling but apparently systematic pattern of price premiums can be identified. The price premiums are highly correlated with the underlying demand profile. As there is evidence that widespread models for electricity forward premiums are not applicable to the market dynamics under analysis, a theoretical model is developed within this article which reveals that non-convexities in only a subset of sequential markets with differing product granularity may cause systematic price premiums at equilibrium. These price premiums may be bidirectional and reflect a value for additional short-term power supply system flexibility.

Economic analysis of price premiums in the presence of non-convexities. Evidence from German electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paschmann, Martin

2017-01-01

Analyzing price data from sequential German electricity markets, namely the day-ahead and intraday auction, a puzzling but apparently systematic pattern of price premiums can be identified. The price premiums are highly correlated with the underlying demand profile. As there is evidence that widespread models for electricity forward premiums are not applicable to the market dynamics under analysis, a theoretical model is developed within this article which reveals that non-convexities in only a subset of sequential markets with differing product granularity may cause systematic price premiums at equilibrium. These price premiums may be bidirectional and reflect a value for additional short-term power supply system flexibility.

Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity-The case of Nabucco and its open season

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pickl, Matthias; Wirl, Franz

2011-01-01

As a response to the Russian dominance of the EU's natural gas supplies and the EU's increasing gas demands, major gas pipeline projects are currently under way to enhance the EU's energy supply security. Oftentimes to raise financing and to allocate gas transportation capacities, auctions are carried out to allow gas shippers to book transportation rights. In recent years, auctions have emerged as one of the most successful allocation mechanisms in the microeconomic theory. However, different auction designs can lead to different outcomes making the choice of auction design a decisive one, especially for divisible-good auctions. This paper seeks to give a formulation of an optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. Specifically three different mechanisms are tested: (i) NPV allocation; (ii) pro rata allocation; and (iii) optimization. In addition, Nabucco is taken as a case study to empirically show results of such auction designs. Results show that a trade-off between revenue optimization and fair allocation can be observed: allocation per optimization is the favorable auction design when revenue maximization is more important than fair allocation. On the other hand, pro rata allocation is the auction design to be chosen when fairness of allocation is considered most central. - Research highlights: → Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. → Empirical market-survey of Nabucco pipeline project auction as input data. → Testing of three different allocation mechanisms: (i) NPV allocation; (ii) pro rata allocation; and (iii) optimization. → Results show a trade-off between revenue optimization and fair allocation. → Allocation per optimization is the favorable auction design when revenue maximization is more important than fair allocation. → On the other hand, pro rata allocation is the auction design to be chosen when fairness of allocation is considered most central.

Development of a user interface and evaluation of an ontology for menu-based retrieval; Soho menu ni tekishita interface no kaihatsu to yogo bunrui no hyoka

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ito, Y.; Shinohara, Y.

2000-06-01

We have proposed the 'complementary menu system' as an easy-to-build and easy-to-use menu system. It has two component menu systems, one is based on a word taxonomy and the other is based on the document structure (e.g., the table of contents of the target document). By the user's selection of an item on a menu, the positions and relevance of related items are shown on the other menu, which makes users easier to select proper menu items. We have also shown the combination of context-sensitive menus reduces user's errors of selection of menu items by several experiments. In this report, we investigate the choice of word taxonomies effective for novice users and the design of structure and interface of menus to reduce overlooked related items. 1. Comparative experiment among a complementary menu using a general-purpose word taxonomy used in a thesaurus and the ones using domain-specific taxonomies based on quick references used in the target document, shows that even novice users prefer domain-specific word taxonomies and exhibit higher performance in retrieval significantly. 2. Comparison between a domain-specific word taxonomy that arranges different categories in a line and another domain-specific word taxonomy which reorganizes the categories under one parent category, suggests users relatively prefer the latter taxonomy but the preference depends on the amount of user's domain specific knowledge. 3. Component menu system which has only one menu showing the whole taxonomic hierarchy with scrollbars on which the positions and relevance of related items are shown is effective to reduce the number of overlooked items. (author)

Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why Book-Building is Dominating Auctions

OpenAIRE

Degeorge, François; Derrien, Francois; Womack, Kent L

2004-01-01

The book-building procedure for selling initial public offerings to investors has captured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing when using the auction mechanism. This paper shows that in the French market, where the frequency of book-building and auctions was about equal in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages to the issuer using book-building were advertising-related quid pro quo ben...

78 FR 28265 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing and...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-05-14

... (2) a non-price specific commitment to auto-match all Auction responses received during the Auction... enhance competition in the Auctions and provide customers with additional opportunities for price... Auction processing, and specify (i) a single price at which it seeks to cross the Agency Order (with...

How descriptive menu labels influence attitudes and repatronage

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Wansink, B.; Painter, J.; Ittersum, van K.

2002-01-01

How do descriptive menu labels influence customers? In a six-week field experiment involving 140 customers, descriptive menu labels (such as "Grandma's zucchini cookies" or "succulent Italian seafood filet") increased sales by 27% and improved attitudes towards the food, attitudes towards the

Implementation of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in the Netherlands and Denmark: A cooperation case study

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Gephart, Malte; Kitzing, Lena; Tiedeman, Silvana

This report deals with the potential implementation of opened auctions for Renewable Energy support in the Netherlands from 2017 on. The report focuses on the implementation process and provides the necessary background information. Furthermore the planned auction design is described and discussed...... of success criteria, of appropriate auction formats and suitable design elements for RES auctions, as well as the analysis of past auction implementations....

Effects of an icon-based menu labelling initiative on consumer food choice.

Science.gov (United States)

Kerins, Claire; Cunningham, Katie; Finucane, Francis M; Gibson, Irene; Jones, Jenni; Kelly, Colette

2017-01-01

The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of an icon-based menu labelling initiative on consumer buying behaviour. This quasi-experimental study recruited a convenience sample of eight food service establishments, all with at least one menu item meeting the heart healthy criteria. Data from sales of all menu items sold over an 8-week period were collated 4 weeks prior to and 4 weeks during the display of information icons related to healthy food choices on menus. The absolute change in menu item sales showed a non-significant trend towards an increase in healthier menu item selections. Furthermore, there was no association between the type of food service establishment and the percentage change in labelled menu item sales. The study did not find a statistically significant influence of the icon-based menu labels on consumer food choice. Given the limited amount of research that examines alternative menu labelling formats in real-world settings, more studies are necessary to confirm these results. Further research is needed to identify the optimal format, content and impact of menu labels on consumer behaviour.

Franchise Bidding in the Water Industry- Auction Schemes and Investment Incentives

OpenAIRE

Urs Meister

2004-01-01

The periodical re-auction of a water monopoly concession causes the danger of underinvestment. If the life-time of specific assets such as water pipes exceeds the contract length and transferring the ownership of assets is difficult, the incumbent franchisee faces a hold-up problem. Using a simple auction model that considers the specifics of the piped water sector this paper shows that investment incentives may vary depending on the applied auction scheme. The model is designed as a two stag...

Eliciting the Dutch loan phoneme /g/ with the Menu Task

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hamann, S.; de Jonge, A.

2015-01-01

This article introduces the menu task, which can be used to elicit infrequent sounds such as loan phonemes that only occur in a restricted set of words. The menu task is similar to the well-known map task and involves the interaction of two participants to create a menu on the basis of a list of

Parallel imports of hospital pharmaceuticals: An empirical analysis of price effects from parallel imports and the design of procurement procedures in the Danish hospital sector

OpenAIRE

Hostenkamp, Gisela; Kronborg, Christian; Arendt, Jacob Nielsen

2012-01-01

We analyse pharmaceutical imports in the Danish hospital sector. In this market medicines are publicly tendered using first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions. We analyse whether parallel imports have an effect on pharmaceutical prices and whether the way tenders were organised matters for the competitive effect of parallel imports on prices. Our theoretical analysis shows that the design of the procurement rules affects both market structure and pharmaceutical prices. Parallel imports may...

Impact of Menu Sequencing on Internet-Based Educational Module Selection

Science.gov (United States)

Bensley, Robert; Brusk, John J.; Rivas, Jason; Anderson, Judith V.

2006-01-01

Patterns of Internet-based menu item selection can occur for a number of reasons, many of which may not be based on interest in topic. It then becomes important to ensure menu order is devised in a way that ensures the greatest accuracy in matching user need with selection. This study examined the impact of menu rotation on the selection of…

Asset price and trade volume relation in artificial market impacted by value investors

Science.gov (United States)

Tangmongkollert, K.; Suwanna, S.

2016-05-01

The relationship between return and trade volume has been of great interests in a financial market. The appearance of asymmetry in the price-volume relation in the bull and bear market is still unsettled. We present a model of the value investor traders (VIs) in the double auction system, in which agents make trading decision based on the pseudo fundamental price modelled by sawtooth oscillations. We investigate the system by two different time series for the asset fundamental price: one corresponds to the fundamental price in a growing phase; and the other corresponds to that in a declining phase. The simulation results show that the trade volume is proportional to the difference between the market price and the fundamental price, and that there is asymmetry between the buying and selling phases. Furthermore, the selling phase has more significant impact of price on the trade volume than the buying phase.

Menu Proposal to Use Powdered Agar

OpenAIRE

土屋, ひろ子; 嶋村, 桃子; 小松, 沙霧

2015-01-01

The author was involved in the development of the menu items that might be sold at “Taisho Village”, a theme park. Requirements in the menu development were that cooking should be simple as it starts cooking after receiving orders and it should have attractive appearances. Powdered agar has advantages over rod-shaped or string-shaped agar, with easiness of handling such as its ready solubility in water and no need to wash, rehydrate or strain. Because powdered agar is easy to use in cooking,...

29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption is...

Menu variations for diabetes mellitus patients using Goal Programming model

Science.gov (United States)

Dhoruri, Atmini; Lestari, Dwi; Ratnasari, Eminugroho

2017-08-01

Diabetes mellitus (DM) was a chronic metabolic disease characterized by higher than normal blood glucose level (normal blood glucose level = = 80 -120 mg/dl). In this study, type 2 DM which mostly caused by unhealthy eating habits would be investigated. Related to eating habit, DM patients needed dietary menu planning with an extracare regarding their nutrients intake (energy, protein, fat and carbohydrate). Therefore, the measures taken were by organizing nutritious dietary menu for diabetes mellitus patients. Dietary menu with appropriate amount of nutrients was organized by considering the amount of calories, proteins, fats and carbohydrates. In this study, Goal Programming model was employed to determine optimal dietary menu variations for diabetes mellitus patients by paying attention to optimal expenses. According to the data obtained from hospitals in Yogyakarta, optimal menu variations would be analyzed by using Goal Programming model and would be completed by using LINGO computer program.

Trigger Menu-aware Monitoring for the ATLAS experiment

Science.gov (United States)

Hoad, Xanthe; ATLAS Collaboration

2017-10-01

We present a“trigger menu-aware” monitoring system designed for the Run-2 data-taking of the ATLAS experiment at the LHC. Unlike Run-1, where a change in the trigger menu had to be matched by the installation of a new software release at Tier-0, the new monitoring system aims to simplify the ATLAS operational workflows. This is achieved by integrating monitoring updates in a quick and flexible manner via an Oracle DB interface. We present the design and the implementation of the menu-aware monitoring, along with lessons from the operational experience of the new system with the 2016 collision data.

Discontinuation of the Bulletin's menu page

CERN Document Server

Publications Section

2005-01-01

The menus of the various CERN restaurants will no longer be published in the Bulletin as of Monday 4 April (issue No. 14/2005). The menu pages are being discontinued both as a savings measure and due to the low level of interest in this section of the Bulletin. The most recent survey of Bulletin readers showed that only 13% of the people questioned regularly read the menu section, compared to between 40% and 85% in the case of the other sections. Publications Section SG/CO Tel. 79971

Discontinuation of the Bulletin's menu page

CERN Multimedia

Publications Section

2005-01-01

The menus of the various CERN restaurants will no longer be published in the Bulletin as of Monday 4 April (issue No. 14/2005). The menu pages are being discontinued both as a savings measure and due to the low level of interest in this section of the Bulletin. The most recent survey of Bulletin readers showed that only 13% of the people questioned regularly read the menu section, compared to between 40% and 85% in the case of the other sections. Publications Section DSU-CO Tel. 79971

Supplier bidding strategy based on non-cooperative game theory concepts in single auction power pools

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kang, Dong-Joo; Kim, Balho H.; Hur, Don

2007-01-01

In single auction power pools, only generators bid several energy price segments depending on the amount of energy supply, at individual generating companies' (GENCO) own discretion, for every trading interval. Then all selected bidders are paid a uniform Market Clearing Price (MCP). In this paper, it is realized that each GENCO has the complete information on its own payoff as well as the other parties' payoffs, corresponding to each potential combination of choices of strategies by all the players. Specifically, all the suppliers attempt to estimate the others' bids using the concept of Nash equilibrium in the general sense of profit maximization. Under some simplified assumptions, this problem can be modeled as a simultaneous-move game confronted by the bidders. Here, the system demand forecast by competitive sellers is captured for the purpose of constructing the optimal bidding strategy. Finally, a numerical example is presented demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed solution scheme. (author)

AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE NETWORK PERMIT MARKETS

Science.gov (United States)

Wada, Kentaro; Akamatsu, Takashi

This paper proposes a new auction mechanism for implementing the tradable network permit markets. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a specific time period, we design an auction mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links in the user's preferred path. The objective of the proposed mechanism is to achieve a socially optimal state with minimal revelation of users' private information. In order to achieve this, the mechanism employs an evolutionary approach that has an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user and (2) the proposed mechanism converges to an approximate socially optimal state in the sense that the achieved value of the social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.

Design and Promotion Strategy of Marketing Platform of Aquatic Auction based on Internet

Science.gov (United States)

Peng, Jianliang

For the online trade and promotion of aquatic products and related materials through the network between supply and demand, the design content and effective promotional strategies of aquatic auctions online marketing platform is proposed in this paper. Design elements involve the location of customer service, the basic function of the platform including the purchase of general orders, online auctions, information dissemination, and recommendation of fine products, human services, and payment preferences. Based on network and mobile e-commerce transaction support, the auction platform makes the transaction of aquatic products well in advance. The results are important practical value for the design and application of online marketing platform of aquatic auction.

Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay-auction

NARCIS (Netherlands)

M.R. Baye (Michael); D. Kovenock (Dan); C.G. de Vries (Casper)

1993-01-01

textabstractIn a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder, the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior. The justice system, however, precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder. Thus politicians

A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions

Science.gov (United States)

Meister, J. Patrick; Anderson, Kyle J.

2007-01-01

The authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is…

Restaurant Menu Labeling Policy: Review of Evidence and Controversies

Science.gov (United States)

VanEpps, Eric M.; Roberto, Christina A.; Park, Sara; Economos, Christina D.; Bleich, Sara N.

2016-01-01

In response to high rates of obesity in the USA, several American cities, counties, and states have passed laws requiring restaurant chains to post labels identifying the energy content of items on menus, and nationwide implementation of menu labeling is expected in late 2016. In this review, we identify and summarize the results of 16 studies that have assessed the impact of real-world numeric calorie posting. We also discuss several controversies surrounding the US Food and Drug Administration's implementation of federally mandated menu labeling. Overall, the evidence regarding menu labeling is mixed, showing that labels may reduce the energy content of food purchased in some contexts, but have little effect in other contexts. However, more data on a range of ong-term consumption habits and restaurant responses is needed to fully understand the impact menu labeling laws will have on the US population's diet. PMID:26877095

Agent Based Trust Management Model Based on Weight Value Model for Online Auctions

OpenAIRE

Sathiyamoorthy, E.; Iyenger, N. Ch. Sriman Narayana; Ramachandran, V.

2010-01-01

This paper is aimed at the stipulations which arise in the traditional online auctions as a result of various anomalies in the reputation and trust calculation mechanism. We try to improve the scalability andefficiency of the online auctions by providing efficient trust management methodology considering several factors into consideration. A comparison between the performance of the auctions system with and without the agent methodology is done with good results.

Price, promotion, and availability of nutrition information: a descriptive study of a popular fast food chain in New York City.

Science.gov (United States)

Basch, Corey Hannah; Ethan, Danna; Rajan, Sonali

2013-08-25

Legislation in NYC requires chain restaurants to post calorie information on menu boards in an effort to help consumers make more informed decisions about food and beverage items they are purchasing. While this is a step in the right direction in light of the current obesity epidemic, there are other issues that warrant attention in a fast food setting, namely the pricing of healthy food options, promotional strategies, and access to comprehensive nutrition information. This study focused on a popular fast-food chain in NYC. The study's aims were threefold: (1) to determine the cost differential between the healthiest meal item on the chain's general menu and meal items available specifically on a reduced cost menu for one dollar (US$1.00); (2) to identify and describe the promotions advertised in the windows of these restaurants, as well as the nutrition content of promoted items; and (3) to ascertain availability of comprehensive nutrition information to consumers within the restaurants. We found the healthiest meal item to be significantly higher in price than less nutritious meal items available for $1.00 (t=146.9, phealthful menu items, which may aid in priming customers to purchase these versus more healthful options. Comprehensive nutrition information beyond calorie counts was not readily accessible prior to purchasing. In addition to improving access to comprehensive nutrition information, advertising more of and lowering the prices of nutritious options may encourage consumers to purchase healthier foods in a fast food setting. Additional research in this area is needed in other geographic locations and restaurant chains. 

Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

R. Narasimhan (Krishtel eMaging) 1461 1996 Oct 15 13:05:22

(6) Information feedback: An auction protocol may be a direct mechanism or an .... transparency of allocation decisions arise in resolving these ties. .... bidding, however more recently, combinatorial bids are allowed [50] making ...... Also, truth revelation and other game theoretic considerations are not taken into account.

Auctionable fixed transmission rights for congestion management

Science.gov (United States)

Alomoush, Muwaffaq Irsheid

Electric power deregulation has proposed a major change to the regulated utility monopoly. The change manifests the main part of engineers' efforts to reshape three components of today's regulated monopoly: generation, distribution and transmission. In this open access deregulated power market, transmission network plays a major role, and transmission congestion is a major problem that requires further consideration especially when inter-zonal/intra-zonal scheme is implemented. Declaring that engineering studies and experience are the criteria to define zonal boundaries or defining a zone based on the fact that a zone is a densely interconnected area (lake) and paths connecting these densely interconnected areas are inter-zonal lines will render insufficient and fuzzy definitions. Moreover, a congestion problem formulation should take into consideration interactions between intra-zonal and inter-zonal flows and their effects on power systems. In this thesis, we introduce a procedure for minimizing the number of adjustments of preferred schedules to alleviate congestion and apply control schemes to minimize interactions between zones. In addition, we give the zone definition a certain criterion based on the Locational Marginal Price (LMP). This concept will be used to define congestion zonal boundaries and to decide whether any zone should be merged with another zone or split into new zones. The thesis presents a unified scheme that combines zonal and FTR schemes to manage congestion. This combined scheme is utilized with LMPs to define zonal boundaries more appropriately. The presented scheme gains the best features of the FTR scheme, which are providing financial certainty, maximizing the efficient use of the system and making users pay for the actual use of congested paths. LMPs may give an indication of the impact of wheeling transactions, and calculations of and comparisons of LMPs with and without wheeling transactions should be adequate criteria to approve

The ATLAS Trigger Menu Design for Higher Luminosities in Run-2

CERN Document Server

Wiglesworth, Craig; The ATLAS collaboration

2018-01-01

In this presentation we describe the design criteria for the trigger menu for Run-2. We discuss several aspects of the process of planning the trigger menu, starting from how ATLAS physics goals and the need for detector performance measurements enter the menu design, and how rate, bandwidth, and CPU constraints are folded in during the compilation of the menu. We present the tools that allow us to predict and optimize the trigger rates and CPU consumption for the anticipated LHC luminosities. We outline the online system that we implemented to monitor deviations from the individual trigger target rates and to quickly react to changing LHC conditions and data taking scenarios. Finally we give an overview of the updated 2E34 Trigger Menu, allowing the listener to get a taste of the vast physics program that the trigger is supporting.

Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Andersson, T.D.; Andersson, C.; Talman, A.J.J.

2010-01-01

This paper analyzes the problem of selling a number of indivisible items to a set of unitdemand bidders. An ascending auction mechanism called the Excess Demand Ascending Auction (EDAA) is defined. The main results demonstrate that EDAA terminates in a finite number of iterations and that the exact

Causal Relationship Between Relative Price Variability and Inflation in Turkey:

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Nebiye Yamak

2016-09-01

Full Text Available This study investigates the causal relationship between inflation and relative price variability in Turkey for the period of January 2003-January 2014, by using panel data. In the study, a Granger (1969 non-causality test in heterogeneous panel data models developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012 is utilized to determine the causal relations between inflation rate relative price variability. The panel data consists of 4123 observations: 133 time observations and 31 cross-section observations. The results of panel causality test indicate that there is a bidirectional causality between inflation rate and relative price variability by not supporting the imperfection information model of Lucas and the menu cost model of Ball and Mankiw.

Former Auctioneer Finds Voice After Aphasia

Science.gov (United States)

... Aphasia Follow us Former Auctioneer Finds Voice After Aphasia Speech impairment changed his life One unremarkable September ... 10 Tips for Communicating with Someone who has Aphasia Talk to them in a quiet, calm, relaxed ...

Identification of shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects.

Science.gov (United States)

Hatipkarasulu, Yilmaz; Gill, James H

2004-04-01

The increasing number of companies providing internet services and auction tools helped popularize the online reverse auction trend for purchasing commodities and services in the last decade. As a result, a number of owners, both public and private, accepted the online reverse auctions as the bidding technique for their construction projects. Owners, while trying to minimize their costs for construction projects, are also required to address their ethical responsibilities to the shareholders. In the case of online reverse auctions for construction projects, the ethical issues involved in the bidding technique directly reflects on the owner's ethical and social responsibilities to their shareholders. The goal of this paper is to identify the shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects by analyzing the ethical issues for the parties involved in the process. The identification of the ethical issues and responsibilities requires clear definition and understanding of professional ethics and the roles of the involved parties. In this paper, first, the concept of professional ethics and social responsibility is described in a general form. To illustrate the ethical issues and responsibilities, a sample case of bidding for a construction project using online reverse auction techniques is presented in which the shareholders were actively involved in questioning the ethical issues. The issues involved in the bidding process and their reflection on the shareholder responsibilities are described and analyzed for each stage of the process. A brief discussion of the overall process is also included to address the general ethical issues involved in online reverse auctions.

Cryptographically Secure Multiparty Computation and Distributed Auctions Using Homomorphic Encryption

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Anunay Kulshrestha

2017-12-01

Full Text Available We introduce a robust framework that allows for cryptographically secure multiparty computations, such as distributed private value auctions. The security is guaranteed by two-sided authentication of all network connections, homomorphically encrypted bids, and the publication of zero-knowledge proofs of every computation. This also allows a non-participant verifier to verify the result of any such computation using only the information broadcasted on the network by each individual bidder. Building on previous work on such systems, we design and implement an extensible framework that puts the described ideas to practice. Apart from the actual implementation of the framework, our biggest contribution is the level of protection we are able to guarantee from attacks described in previous work. In order to provide guidance to users of the library, we analyze the use of zero knowledge proofs in ensuring the correct behavior of each node in a computation. We also describe the usage of the library to perform a private-value distributed auction, as well as the other challenges in implementing the protocol, such as auction registration and certificate distribution. Finally, we provide performance statistics on our implementation of the auction.

Application of the Health Belief Model to customers' use of menu labels in restaurants.

Science.gov (United States)

Jeong, Jin-Yi; Ham, Sunny

2018-04-01

Some countries require the provision of menu labels on restaurant menus to fight the increasing prevalence of obesity and related chronic diseases. This study views customers' use of menu labels as a preventive health behavior and applies the Health Belief Model (HBM) with the aim of determining the health belief factors that influence customers' use of menu labels. A self-administered survey was distributed for data collection. Responses were collected from 335 restaurant customers who experienced menu labels in restaurants within three months prior to the survey. The results of a structural equation model showed that all the HBM variables (perceived threats, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers of using menu labels) positively affected the customers' use of menu labels. Perceived threats were influenced by cues to action and cues to action had an indirect influence on menu label use through perceived threats. In conclusion, health beliefs were good predictors of menu label use on restaurant menus. This study validated the application of the HBM to menu labeling in restaurants, and its findings could offer guidelines for the industry and government in developing strategies to expand the use of menu labels among the public. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Do auctions and forced divestitures increase competition? Evidence for retail gasoline markets

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Soetevent, A.R.; Haan, M.A.; Heijnen, P.

2008-01-01

Where markets are insufficiently competitive, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate or by forcing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and forcing the divestiture of outlets of

Report on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Commission on: the bill project (accelerated procedure) authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of common bid platforms, and the bill project (accelerated procedure) authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of an auction monitor. Nr 171

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boulaud, Didier

2011-01-01

This document first presents the currently operating greenhouse gas emission quota trading scheme and its evolution according to which quotas will be put up for auction. Then, it more precisely describes different aspects of this arrangement: general economy of the auction system, common auction platforms, auction monitor, and market procedures. Consequences on the French law are presented. The ratification procedure is discussed

77 FR 9655 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

Science.gov (United States)

2012-02-17

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-187] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction.... DATES: Pursuant to the Auction 901 (Mobility Fund Phase I) Comment Public Notice, 77 FR 7152, February... 9, 2012. ADDRESSES: Pursuant to the Auction 901 (Mobility Fund Phase I) Comment Public Notice, 77 FR...

76 FR 82336 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-12-30

... (2) a non-price specific commitment to auto- match all Auction responses achieved during the Auction... price responses, leading to more robust competition in AIM. \\16\\ See supra note 3; see also Securities... enhance competition in the AIM Auctions and provide customers with additional opportunities for price...

Trigger Menu-aware Monitoring for the ATLAS experiment

CERN Document Server

AUTHOR|(INSPIRE)INSPIRE-00441925; The ATLAS collaboration

2017-01-01

Changes in the trigger menu, the online algorithmic event-selection of the ATLAS experiment at the LHC, are followed by adjustments to the ATLAS trigger monitoring systems. During Run 1, and so far in Run 2, ATLAS has deployed monitoring updates with the installation of new software releases at Tier-0, the first level of the ATLAS computing grid. Having to wait for a new software release to be installed at Tier-0, in order to update ATLAS offline trigger monitoring configurations, results in a lag with respect to the modification of the trigger menu. We present the design and implementation of a `trigger menu-aware' monitoring system that aims to simplify the ATLAS operational workflows by allowing monitoring configuration changes to be made at the Tier-0 site by utilising an Oracle SQL database.

Do auctions and forced divestitures increase competition? Evidence for retail gasoline markets

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Soetevent, A.R.; Haan, M.A.; Heijnen, P.

2014-01-01

To foster competition, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate, or by imposing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and imposing divestitures of such stations on the four major

Understanding overbidding: using the neural circuitry of reward to design economic auctions.

Science.gov (United States)

Delgado, Mauricio R; Schotter, Andrew; Ozbay, Erkut Y; Phelps, Elizabeth A

2008-09-26

We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed that the social competition inherent in an auction results in a more pronounced blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response to loss in the striatum, with greater overbidding correlated with the magnitude of this response. Leveraging these neuroimaging results, we design a behavioral experiment that demonstrates that framing an experimental auction to emphasize loss increases overbidding. These results highlight a role for the contemplation of loss in understanding the tendency to bid "too high." Current economic theories suggest overbidding may result from either "joy of winning" or risk aversion. By combining neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques, we find that another factor, namely loss contemplation in a social context, may mediate overbidding in auctions.

Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising

OpenAIRE

Eduardo M.R.A. Engel; Ronald D. Fischer; Alexander Galetovic

1998-01-01

In recent years several countries have started massive highway franchising programs auctioned to private firms. In these auctions, the regulator typically sets the franchise term and firms bid on tolls, or, alternatively, the regulator sets tolls and the winner is the firm that asks for the shortest franchise term. In this paper we argue that many of the problems that highway franchises have encountered are due to the fact that the franchise term cannot adjust to demand realizations. We propo...

Environmental Intervention in Carryout Restaurants Increases Sales of Healthy Menu Items in a Low-Income Urban Setting.

Science.gov (United States)

Lee-Kwan, Seung Hee; Bleich, Sara N; Kim, Hyunju; Colantuoni, Elizabeth; Gittelsohn, Joel

2015-01-01

To investigate how a pilot environmental intervention changed food sales patterns in carryout restaurants. Quasi-experimental. Low-income neighborhoods of Baltimore, Maryland. Seven carryouts (three intervention, four comparison). Phase 1, menu board revision and healthy menu labeling; phase 2, increase of healthy sides and beverages; and phase 3, promotion of cheaper and healthier combination meals. Weekly handwritten menu orders collected to assess changes in the proportion of units sold and revenue of healthy items (entrée, sides and beverages, and combined). Logistic and Poisson regression models with generalized estimating equations. In the intervention group, odds for healthy entrée units and odds for healthy side and beverage units sold significantly increased in phases 2 and 3; odds for healthy entrée revenue significantly increased in phase 1 (odds ratio [OR] 1.16, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.08-1.26), phase 2 (OR 1.32, 95% CI 1.25-1.41), and phase 3 (OR 1.39, 95% CI 1.14-1.70); and odds for healthy side and beverage revenues increased significantly in phase 2 (OR 1.62, 95% CI 1.33-1.97) and phase 3 (OR 2.73, 95% CI 2.15-3.47) compared to baseline. Total revenue in the intervention group was significantly higher in all phases than in the comparison group (p selection, and competitive pricing can increase availability and sales of healthy items in carryouts.

Combining auctions and performance-based payments in a forest enrichment field trial in Western Kenya.

Science.gov (United States)

Khalumba, Mercelyne; Wünscher, Tobias; Wunder, Sven; Büdenbender, Mirjam; Holm-Müller, Karin

2014-06-01

Cost-effectiveness is an important aspect in the assessment of payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives. In participatory field trials with communities in Western Kenya, we combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with performance-based payments and compared the outcomes with a baseline scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. Procurement auctions were the most cost-effective. The competitive nature of the auction reduced contracting expenses (provision costs), and the result-oriented payments provided additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings, resulting in their improved survival rates (service quantity). These gains clearly exceeded increases in transaction costs associated with conducting an auction. The number of income-poor auction participants and winners was disproportionately high and local institutional buy-in was remarkably strong. Our participatory approach may, however, require adaptations when conducted at a larger scale. Although the number of contracts we monitored was limited and prohibited the use of statistical tests, our study is one of the first to reveal the benefits of using auctions for PES in developing countries. © 2014 Society for Conservation Biology.

The use of importance and performance analysis (IPA) to evaluate effectiveness of the forward auction market agro commodities: A case study

Science.gov (United States)

Wulansari, Dwi Ratna; Sutopo, Wahyudi; Hisjam, Muh.

2018-02-01

The empowering auction market for commodities in East Java Province is one of five auction market revitalization programs conducted by the Republic of Indonesia c.q. Ministry of Trading started in 2014. One of the districts in East Java Province, namely Magetan District utilizes the commodity auction market to improve the competitiveness of their agricultural industry by shortening the supply chain. The Magetan District needs to evaluate their support for farmers or farmer groups to participate in the forward auction market (FAM). Implementation of the FAM commodities is divided into three main processes, namely pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The auction market is organized to shorten the trading chain. Implementation of the FAM requires good planning, among Seller (namely Farmer or Farmer Group), organizer of Auction (namely Commodity Auction Company), Buyer, and Local Government (namely the farmer facilitator). This article is aimed to develop the instrument of a Performance Measurement Model Using Important and Performance Analysis (IPA) for Improving the FAM Effectiveness of Agro Commodity from Magetan District with Supply Chain Management approach. IPA is implemented at pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The IPA model results in the diagram to decide the strategies in improving the FAM effectiveness, and then it can encourage farmers to improve welfare and realize the competitiveness of the auctioneer.

EVT in electricity price modeling : extreme value theory not only on the extreme events

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marossy, Z.

2007-01-01

The extreme value theory (EVT) is commonly used in electricity and financial risk modeling. In this study, EVT was used to model the distribution of electricity prices. The model was built on the price formation in electricity auction markets. This paper reviewed the 3 main modeling approaches used to describe the distribution of electricity prices. The first approach is based on a stochastic model of the electricity price time series and uses this stochastic model to generate the given distribution. The second approach involves electricity supply and demand factors that determine the price distribution. The third approach involves agent-based models which use simulation techniques to write down the price distribution. A fourth modeling approach was then proposed to describe the distribution of electricity prices. The new approach determines the distribution of electricity prices directly without knowing anything about the data generating process or market driving forces. Empirical data confirmed that the distribution of electricity prices have a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. 8 refs., 2 tabs., 5 figs

7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing Practices), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES REGULATIONS (OTHER...

Recommendations on the role of auctions in a new renewable energy directive

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kitzing, Lena; Islam, Marco; Soysal, Emilie Rosenlund

During the work in the AURES project, we have found evidence that auctions can be a suitable instrument for allocating support under budget and volume limitations and can achieve significant short-term efficiency gains, but it has not been proven that auctions in general are better suited to supp...

Multi-Dimensional Customer Data Analysis in Online Auctions

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

LAO Guoling; XIONG Kuan; QIN Zheng

2007-01-01

In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects: listing, bidding, transaction,accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example,analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types: impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.

Mechanism design of reverse auction on concession period and generalized quality for PPP projects

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

Xianjia WANG; Shiwei WU

2017-01-01

Reverse auctions of PPP projects usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of quality and the concession period to be fulfilled.This paper sets up a summary function of generalized quality,which contributes to reducing the dimensions of information.Thus,the multidimensional reverse auction model of a PPP project can be replaced by a two-dimensional direct mechanism based on the concession period and the generalized quality.Based on the theory of the revelation principle,the feasibility conditions,equilibrium solution and generalized quality requirements of such a mechanism,considering the influence of a variable investment structure are described.Moreover,two feasible multidimensional reverse auctions for implementing such a direct mechanism:Adjusting the scoring function and establishing a special reverse auction rule are built.The analysis shows that in these types of reverse auctions,optimal allocation can be achieved,the social benefit under the incomplete information will be maximized,and the private sector with the highest integrated management level wins the bid.In such a direct mechanism,the investment and financial pressure of the public sector can be reduced.

Emission allowances -- Long-term price trend

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lennox, F.H.

1994-01-01

Estimated trends in emission allowance (EA) values have been of interest to all those affected by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 since it became law in 1990. The authors published estimates of the values of EAs in December 1991, and revised their estimate in November 1992. The summary trends of the 1992 estimate is shown here. General estimates such as these are no longer useful. Everyone directly involved in complying with the Act or in buying and selling allowances has developed their own outlook on EA values. Many recent trades have been publicized. The prices from the first auction are also well known. Therefore this article is concerned only with what might happening the long-run. Once Phase 2 compliance is essentially complete and emissions roughly match Emission Allowance allocations of some 9.8 million tons annually, what pressures will there be on prices? What will be the direction of values after Phase 2 is in balance?

A Cluster Randomized Trial to Promote Healthy Menu Items for Children: The Kids’ Choice Restaurant Program

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Guadalupe X. Ayala

2017-12-01

Full Text Available Evidence indicates that restaurant-based interventions have the potential to promote healthier purchasing and improve the nutrients consumed. This study adds to this body of research by reporting the results of a trial focused on promoting the sale of healthy child menu items in independently owned restaurants. Eight pair-matched restaurants that met the eligibility criteria were randomized to a menu-only versus a menu-plus intervention condition. Both of the conditions implemented new healthy child menu items and received support for implementation for eight weeks. The menu-plus condition also conducted a marketing campaign involving employee trainings and promotional materials. Process evaluation data captured intervention implementation. Sales of new and existing child menu items were tracked for 16 weeks. Results indicated that the interventions were implemented with moderate to high fidelity depending on the component. Sales of new healthy child menu items occurred immediately, but decreased during the post-intervention period in both conditions. Sales of existing child menu items demonstrated a time by condition effect with restaurants in the menu-plus condition observing significant decreases and menu-only restaurants observing significant increases in sales of existing child menu items. Additional efforts are needed to inform sustainable methods for improving access to healthy foods and beverages in restaurants.

A Cluster Randomized Trial to Promote Healthy Menu Items for Children: The Kids' Choice Restaurant Program.

Science.gov (United States)

Ayala, Guadalupe X; Castro, Iana A; Pickrel, Julie L; Lin, Shih-Fan; Williams, Christine B; Madanat, Hala; Jun, Hee-Jin; Zive, Michelle

2017-12-01

Evidence indicates that restaurant-based interventions have the potential to promote healthier purchasing and improve the nutrients consumed. This study adds to this body of research by reporting the results of a trial focused on promoting the sale of healthy child menu items in independently owned restaurants. Eight pair-matched restaurants that met the eligibility criteria were randomized to a menu-only versus a menu-plus intervention condition. Both of the conditions implemented new healthy child menu items and received support for implementation for eight weeks. The menu-plus condition also conducted a marketing campaign involving employee trainings and promotional materials. Process evaluation data captured intervention implementation. Sales of new and existing child menu items were tracked for 16 weeks. Results indicated that the interventions were implemented with moderate to high fidelity depending on the component. Sales of new healthy child menu items occurred immediately, but decreased during the post-intervention period in both conditions. Sales of existing child menu items demonstrated a time by condition effect with restaurants in the menu-plus condition observing significant decreases and menu-only restaurants observing significant increases in sales of existing child menu items. Additional efforts are needed to inform sustainable methods for improving access to healthy foods and beverages in restaurants.

A Cluster Randomized Trial to Promote Healthy Menu Items for Children: The Kids’ Choice Restaurant Program

Science.gov (United States)

Ayala, Guadalupe X.; Castro, Iana A.; Pickrel, Julie L.; Lin, Shih-Fan; Williams, Christine B.; Madanat, Hala; Jun, Hee-Jin; Zive, Michelle

2017-01-01

Evidence indicates that restaurant-based interventions have the potential to promote healthier purchasing and improve the nutrients consumed. This study adds to this body of research by reporting the results of a trial focused on promoting the sale of healthy child menu items in independently owned restaurants. Eight pair-matched restaurants that met the eligibility criteria were randomized to a menu-only versus a menu-plus intervention condition. Both of the conditions implemented new healthy child menu items and received support for implementation for eight weeks. The menu-plus condition also conducted a marketing campaign involving employee trainings and promotional materials. Process evaluation data captured intervention implementation. Sales of new and existing child menu items were tracked for 16 weeks. Results indicated that the interventions were implemented with moderate to high fidelity depending on the component. Sales of new healthy child menu items occurred immediately, but decreased during the post-intervention period in both conditions. Sales of existing child menu items demonstrated a time by condition effect with restaurants in the menu-plus condition observing significant decreases and menu-only restaurants observing significant increases in sales of existing child menu items. Additional efforts are needed to inform sustainable methods for improving access to healthy foods and beverages in restaurants. PMID:29194392

An Auction Market for Journal Articles

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Prüfer, J.; Zetland, D.

2007-01-01

Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current, push system for submitting papers and demonstrate that our proposed market has a stable, Pareto-improving equilibrium. Besides the

An Auction Market for Journal Articles

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Prüfer, J.; Zetland, D.

2007-01-01

Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this

Multiparty Quantum English Auction Scheme Using Single Photons as Message Carrier

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Ge; Zhang, Jian-Zhong; Xie, Shu-Cui

2018-03-01

In this paper, a secure and economic multiparty english auction protocol using the single photons as message carrier of bids is proposed. In order to achieve unconditional security, fairness, undeniability and so on, we adopt the decoy photon checking technique and quantum encryption algorithm. Analysis result shows that our protocol satisfies all the characteristics of traditional english auction, meanwhile, it can resist malicious attacks.

The impact of China's carbon allowance allocation rules on the product prices and emission reduction behaviors of ETS-covered enterprises

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang, Yue-Jun; Wang, Ao-Dong; Tan, Weiping

2015-01-01

It is an important task for China to allocate carbon emission allowance to realize its carbon reduction target and establish carbon trading market. China has designed several allocation rules within seven pilot regions. What influence those rules may cause is closely related with the enthusiasm of emission trading scheme (ETS) covered enterprises' participation in carbon market, and more importantly, with the mechanism design and sustainable development of carbon market. For this purpose, the multi-stage profit model is developed to analyze the ETS-covered enterprises' product prices and emission reduction behaviors under different allocation rules. The results show that, first, under the rules of grandfathering, self-declaration and auctioning, when deciding the optimal product price and optimal carbon emission reduction, those enterprises may focus on maximizing current stage profit; however, under the rule of benchmarking, those enterprises may care more about the impact of current decisions on the profit in next stage. Second, the optimal product price policy is positively correlated with the price of the same kind products, consumers' low-carbon awareness and government subsidy. Finally, along with the increase of carbon price, consumers' low-carbon awareness and government subsidy and the decrease of carbon emission cap, those enterprises tend to reduce carbon emissions. - Highlights: • Analyze the impact of carbon allowance allocation rules on ETS-covered enterprises. • For grandfather, self-declaration and auction, they may maximize current profits. • For benchmark, they care the effect of current decisions on the coming profits. • The optimal product price positively relates to low-carbon awareness and subsidy. • Carbon price, low-carbon awareness and subsidy rise leads their emission reduction.

Second best efficiency and the English auction

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Hernando-Veciana, Á.; Michelucci, Fabio

2011-01-01

Roč. 73, č. 2 (2011), s. 496-506 ISSN 0899-8256 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : auctions * efficiency * mechanism design Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.829, year: 2011

Trigger Menu-aware Monitoring for the ATLAS experiment

CERN Document Server

Hoad, Xanthe; The ATLAS collaboration

2016-01-01

Changes in the trigger menu, the online algorithmic event-selection of the ATLAS experiment at the LHC in response to luminosity and detector changes are followed by adjustments in their monitoring system. This is done to ensure that the collected data is useful, and can be properly reconstructed at Tier-0, the first level of the computing grid. During Run 1, ATLAS deployed monitoring updates with the installation of new software releases at Tier-0. This created unnecessary overhead for developers and operators, and unavoidably led to different releases for the data-taking and the monitoring setup. We present a "trigger menu-aware" monitoring system designed for the ATLAS Run 2 data-taking. The new monitoring system aims to simplify the ATLAS operational workflows, and allows for easy and flexible monitoring configuration changes at the Tier-0 site via an Oracle DB interface. We present the design and the implementation of the menu-aware monitoring, along with lessons from the operational experience of the ne...

Privacy-Enhancing Auctions Using Rational Cryptography

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Miltersen, Peter Bro; Nielsen, Jesper Buus; Triandopoulos, Nikolaos

2009-01-01

show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement any given ex interim individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By “ex interim...

The Pollution Effect: Optimizing Keyword Auctions by Favoring Relevant Advertising

OpenAIRE

Linden, Greg; Meek, Christopher; Chickering, Max

2011-01-01

Most search engines sell slots to place advertisements on the search results page through keyword auctions. Advertisers offer bids for how much they are willing to pay when someone enters a search query, sees the search results, and then clicks on one of their ads. Search engines typically order the advertisements for a query by a combination of the bids and expected clickthrough rates for each advertisement. In this paper, we extend a model of Yahoo's and Google's advertising auctions to inc...

Captivate MenuBuilder: Creating an Online Tutorial for Teaching Software

Science.gov (United States)

Yelinek, Kathryn; Tarnowski, Lynn; Hannon, Patricia; Oliver, Susan

2008-01-01

In this article, the authors, students in an instructional technology graduate course, describe a process to create an online tutorial for teaching software. They created the tutorial for a cyber school's use. Five tutorial modules were linked together through one menu screen using the MenuBuilder feature in the Adobe Captivate program. The…

Uncertain Reasoning for Detection of Selling Stolen Goods in Online Auctions Using Contextual Information

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ladislav Beranek

2014-01-01

Full Text Available This work describes the design of a decision support system for detection of fraudulent behavior of selling stolen goods in online auctions. In this system, each seller is associated with a type of certification, namely “proper seller,” “suspect seller,” and “selling stolen goods.” The certification level is determined on the basis of a seller’s behaviors and especially on the basis of contextual information whose origin is outside online auctions portals. In this paper, we focus on representing knowledge about sellers in online auctions, the influence of additional information available from other Internet source, and reasoning on bidders’ trustworthiness under uncertainties using Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. To demonstrate the practicability of our approach, we performed a case study using real auction data from Czech auction portal Aukro. The analysis results show that our approach can be used to detect selling stolen goods. By applying Dempster-Shafer theory to combine multiple sources of evidence for the detection of this fraudulent behavior, the proposed approach can reduce the number of false positive results in comparison to approaches using a single source of evidence.

Potential effect of physical activity based menu labels on the calorie content of selected fast food meals.

Science.gov (United States)

Dowray, Sunaina; Swartz, Jonas J; Braxton, Danielle; Viera, Anthony J

2013-03-01

In this study we examined the effect of physical activity based labels on the calorie content of meals selected from a sample fast food menu. Using a web-based survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of four menus which differed only in their labeling schemes (n=802): (1) a menu with no nutritional information, (2) a menu with calorie information, (3) a menu with calorie information and minutes to walk to burn those calories, or (4) a menu with calorie information and miles to walk to burn those calories. There was a significant difference in the mean number of calories ordered based on menu type (p=0.02), with an average of 1020 calories ordered from a menu with no nutritional information, 927 calories ordered from a menu with only calorie information, 916 calories ordered from a menu with both calorie information and minutes to walk to burn those calories, and 826 calories ordered from the menu with calorie information and the number of miles to walk to burn those calories. The menu with calories and the number of miles to walk to burn those calories appeared the most effective in influencing the selection of lower calorie meals (p=0.0007) when compared to the menu with no nutritional information provided. The majority of participants (82%) reported a preference for physical activity based menu labels over labels with calorie information alone and no nutritional information. Whether these labels are effective in real-life scenarios remains to be tested. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Pengaruh Keragaman Menu, Kualitas Produk, Citra Merek, dan Iklan terhadap Keputusan Pemebelian

OpenAIRE

Ali, Muhammad Wahyu; Waluyo, Handoyo Djoko; Listyorini, Sari

2013-01-01

In the restaurant business, which is the key to success is the diversity of menu and the quality of products offered. Consumers will compare the suitability of the sacrifices made by the quality of products and the diversity of the menu offered by the restaurant, other attributes inherent in a product such as brand image and advertising needs to be developed to influence customer purchase. This study aims to determine effect of the diversity of menu, product quality, brand image, and adverti...

Pengaruh Terpaan Komunikasi Pemasaran Menu Breakfast Mcdonald"s Keputusan Pembelian

OpenAIRE

Tasuki, Martia Mutiara; Pradekso, Tandiyo; Ulfa, Nurist Surayya

2013-01-01

PENGARUH TERPAAN KOMUNIKASI PEMASARAN MENU BREAKFAST MCDONALD'S DAN CITRA PRODUK TERHADAP KEPUTUSAN PEMBELIANSkripsiDisusun untuk memenuhi persyaratan menyelesaikanPendidikan Strata IJurusan Ilmu Komunikasi Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu PolitikUniversitas DiponegoroPenyusunNama : Martia Mutiara TasukiNIM : D2C 005 183JURUSAN ILMU KOMUNIKASIFAKULTAS ILMU SOSIAL DAN ILMU POLITIKUNIVERSITAS DIPONEGOROSEMARANG2013PENGARUH TERPAAN KOMUNIKASI PEMASARAN MENU BREAKFAST MCDONALD'S DAN CITRA PRODUK TER...

Relationships among grocery nutrition label users and consumers' attitudes and behavior toward restaurant menu labeling.

Science.gov (United States)

Roseman, Mary G; Mathe-Soulek, Kimberly; Higgins, Joseph A

2013-12-01

In the United States (US), based on the 2010 Affordable Care Act, restaurant chains and similar retail food establishments with 20 or more locations are required to begin implementing calorie information on their menus. As enacting of the law begins, it is important to understand its potential for improving consumers' healthful behaviors. Therefore, the objective of this study was to explore relationships among users of grocery nutrition labels and attitudes toward restaurant menu labeling, along with the caloric content of their restaurant menu selection. Study participants were surveyed and then provided identical mock restaurant menus with or without calories. Results found that participants who used grocery nutrition labels and believed they would make healthy menu selections with nutrition labels on restaurant menus made healthier menu selections, regardless of whether the menu displayed calories or not. Consumers' nutrition knowledge and behaviors gained from using grocery nutrition labels and consumers' desire for restaurants to provide nutrition menu labels have a positive effect on their choosing healthful restaurant menu items. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Show me the goods: The warranting effect of user-generated photographs in online auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Johnson, B.K.; Vang, M.H.; van der Heide, B.

2015-01-01

Consumers using online auction websites face the challenge of appraising products at a distance. Sellers and buyers in online auctions navigate this challenge by displaying and evaluating various cues, a critical one being use of photographs. Warranting theory predicts that cues less subject to

Sociodemographic disparities among fast-food restaurant customers who notice and use calorie menu labels.

Science.gov (United States)

Green, Jessie E; Brown, Alan G; Ohri-Vachaspati, Punam

2015-07-01

As part of the recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, chain restaurants with 20 or more locations nationwide will soon be required to post calorie information on menus with the aim of helping customers make healthier food choices. To be effective, this policy must affect all customers, especially those most at risk for poor health and diet outcomes. To determine whether noticing or using calorie menu labels was associated with demographic characteristics of customers at a national fast-food chain currently implementing calorie menu labeling. Cross-sectional analysis. Customer receipts and survey data were collected from 329 participants using street-intercept survey methodology at 29 McDonald's restaurant locations in low- and high-income neighborhoods throughout the Phoenix, AZ, metropolitan area. Calorie menu labeling awareness and use were assessed. The total number of calories purchased was evaluated using participants' itemized receipts. Multivariate logistic regression analyses were used to calculate the odds of customers noticing or using calorie menu labels. Approximately 60% of participants noticed calorie menu labels, whereas only 16% reported using the information for food or beverage purchases. Higher-income individuals had twice the odds of noticing calorie labels (P=0.029) and three times the odds of using them (P=0.004). Significant positive associations were found between individuals with a bachelor's degree or higher and use of calorie menu labels (odds ratio 3.25; P=0.023). Noticing calorie menu labels was not associated with purchasing fewer calories; however, those who reported using calorie information purchased 146 fewer calories than those who did not (P=0.001). Using calorie menu labels is associated with purchasing fewer calories. However, there are significant socioeconomic disparities among customers who notice and use calorie menu labels. Targeted education campaigns are needed to improve the use of menu labeling

27 CFR 31.63 - Agents, auctioneers, brokers, etc., acting on behalf of others.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

..., brokers, etc., acting on behalf of others. 31.63 Section 31.63 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms... Exemptions and Exceptions Persons Who Are Not Dealers in Liquors Or Beer § 31.63 Agents, auctioneers, brokers... auction on behalf of others; (b) Agents or brokers who solicit orders for liquors in the name of a...

Warranty menu design for a two-dimensional warranty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ye, Zhi-Sheng; Murthy, D.N. Pra

2016-01-01

Fierce competitions in the commercial product market have forced manufacturers to provide customer-friendly warranties with a view to achieving higher customer satisfaction and increasing the market share. This study proposes a strategy that offers customers a two-dimensional warranty menu with a number of warranty choices, called a flexible warranty policy. We investigate the design of a flexible two-dimensional warranty policy that contains a number of rectangular regions. This warranty policy is obtained by dividing customers into several groups according to their use rates and providing each group a germane warranty region. Consumers choose a favorable one from the menu according to their usage behaviors. Evidently, this flexible warranty policy is attractive to users of different usage behaviors, and thus, it gives the manufacturer a good position in advertising the product. When consumers are unaware about their use rates upon purchase, we consider a fixed two-dimensional warranty policy with a stair-case warranty region and show that it is equivalent to the flexible policy. Such an equivalence reveals the inherent relationship between the rectangular warranty policy, the L-shape warranty policy, the step-stair warranty policy and the iso-probability of failure warranty policy that were extensively discussed in the literature. - Highlights: • We design a two-dimensional warranty menu with a number of warranty choices. • Consumers can choose a favorable one from the menu as per their usage behavior. • We further consider a fixed 2D warranty policy with a stair-case warranty region. • We show the equivalence of the two warranty policies.

Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chen-Kun Tsung

2013-01-01

Full Text Available To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices. The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding. However, some strategic bidding behaviors will result in negative effects, such as the elimination of the equilibrium and the payment increase for some advertisers. The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding. We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies. In this paper, we study the relationship between the effects resulted by the vindictive bidding and the valuations of the vindictive advertisers. In our experiments, the search engine provider (SEP is benefited by all vindictive bidding behaviors, and the increment of the SEP's revenue is proportional to the degree of the vindictiveness. Bidding vindictively without sacrificing the own utility improves the advertiser's utility with high probability. Moreover, we observe that the SEP's revenue is improved by the following situations. First, the vindictive advertiser with low valuation in the keywords with high market value results in more SEP's revenue than that in the keywords with low market value. The second case is to raise the bidding competition between advertisers.

DietPal: a Web-based dietary menu-generating and management system.

Science.gov (United States)

Noah, Shahrul A; Abdullah, Siti Norulhuda; Shahar, Suzana; Abdul-Hamid, Helmi; Khairudin, Nurkahirizan; Yusoff, Mohamed; Ghazali, Rafidah; Mohd-Yusoff, Nooraini; Shafii, Nik Shanita; Abdul-Manaf, Zaharah

2004-01-30

Attempts in current health care practice to make health care more accessible, effective, and efficient through the use of information technology could include implementation of computer-based dietary menu generation. While several of such systems already exist, their focus is mainly to assist healthy individuals calculate their calorie intake and to help monitor the selection of menus based upon a prespecified calorie value. Although these prove to be helpful in some ways, they are not suitable for monitoring, planning, and managing patients' dietary needs and requirements. This paper presents a Web-based application that simulates the process of menu suggestions according to a standard practice employed by dietitians. To model the workflow of dietitians and to develop, based on this workflow, a Web-based system for dietary menu generation and management. The system is aimed to be used by dietitians or by medical professionals of health centers in rural areas where there are no designated qualified dietitians. First, a user-needs study was conducted among dietitians in Malaysia. The first survey of 93 dietitians (with 52 responding) was an assessment of information needed for dietary management and evaluation of compliance towards a dietary regime. The second study consisted of ethnographic observation and semi-structured interviews with 14 dietitians in order to identify the workflow of a menu-suggestion process. We subsequently designed and developed a Web-based dietary menu generation and management system called DietPal. DietPal has the capability of automatically calculating the nutrient and calorie intake of each patient based on the dietary recall as well as generating suitable diet and menu plans according to the calorie and nutrient requirement of the patient, calculated from anthropometric measurements. The system also allows reusing stored or predefined menus for other patients with similar health and nutrient requirements. We modeled the workflow of

Technological requirements on refrigeration as seen by a frozen menu manufacturer; Technologische Anforderungen an die Kaeltetechnik aus der Sicht eines Tiefkuehl-Menue-Herstellers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Konietzko, M. [Apetito AG, Rheine (Germany)

1995-12-31

The present paper examines hour refrigeration in future will need to contribute to production pactices of frozen food manufacturers. This is exemplified for the practical everyday use of a froster. The paper also points out the limitations of present-day frozen menu manufacture. Finally, it discusses future demands on refrigeration regarding ecology and economy. Optimization tasks for the future are to increase freezing speed and render it controllable and to improve capacity control. (HW) [Deutsch] Es wird der Beitrag untersucht, den die Kaeltetechnik in der Produktionspraxis eines TK-Menue-Herstellers in Zukunft leisten muss. Hierzu werden der praktische, taegliche Einsatz am Beispiel eines TK-Frosters dargestellt. Ferner werden die heutigen Grenzen einer TK-Menue-Herstellung aufgezeigt. Abschliessend werden zukuenftige Anforderungen an die Kaeltetechnik unter den Aspekten Oekologie und Oekonomie beleuchtet. Zukuenftige Optimierungsansaetze liegen in einer besseren und angepassten Gefriergeschwindigkeit sowie in einer besser regulierbaren Leistung. (HW)

Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Ettinger, D.; Michelucci, Fabio

2016-01-01

Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502 ISSN 0013-0133 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : hiding information * open auctions * jump bids Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.608, year: 2016

Menu hind on valu? / Jaak Allik

Index Scriptorium Estoniae

Allik, Jaak, 1946-

2004-01-01

Mõtisklusi "Mosfilmis" 1984 valminud mängufilmi "Menu" ainetel, mis kujutab teatri köögipoolt. Sellega seoses arutleb autor lavastaja- ja näitejatöö üle, kunstinõukogude koosolekute osast lavastuse vastuvõtul, teatritöö eetikast

Empirical analysis of the spot market implications of price-responsive demand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Siddiqui, A.S.

2006-01-01

Although electricity is theoretically an inelastic good in the short term, the steep slope of the supply stack implies that even modest response by demand could translate into reduced capacity requirements and significant price decreases. This article examined the effect of price-responsive demand strategies in an actual deregulated electricity industry. Auction data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) day-ahead electricity market were used to form supply stacks for various zones. A simple linear demand function was used to determine the effect of price responsiveness on equilibrium spot market price and consumption. The aim was to quantify the benefits from the pricing protocol and to determine whether modest levels of price elasticity can significantly lower prices and consumption. Market-clearing prices and quantities were estimated using various supply curves in order to quantify the responsiveness necessary to achieve given price reductions. Price response was induced in the demand curve by varying its slope. Estimates were then used to estimate the average level of slope needed to reduce the average market-clearing price during the year by a certain percentage. Results showed that an average slope of -50.04 was necessary for prices to be reduced by 25 per cent. Results also showed that necessary price responses can be ascertained for any desired reduction in the market-clearing price or quantity. Although price responsiveness unambiguously reduces the spot market price and quantity, its effect on the forward price is not yet clear. It was concluded that a separate analysis of peak hours may reveal the effectiveness of enhanced price response. 8 refs., 1 tab., 8 figs

Causal Relationship Between Relative Price Variability and Inflation in Turkey: Evidence from Panel Data

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Nebiye Yamak

2016-06-01

Full Text Available This study investigates the causal relationship between inflation and relative price variability in Turkey for the period of January 2003-January 2014, by using panel data. In the study, a Granger (1969 non-causality test in heterogeneous panel data models developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012 is utilized to determine the causal relations between inflation rate relative price variability. The panel data consists of 4123 observations: 133 time observations and 31 cross-section observations. The results of panel causality test indicate that there is a bidirectional causality between inflation rate and relative price variability by not supporting the imperfection information model of Lucas and the menu cost model of Ball and Mankiw.

Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Ettinger, D.; Michelucci, Fabio

2016-01-01

Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502 ISSN 0013-0133 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : hiding information * open auctions * jump bids Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.608, year: 2016

Trends in Sodium Content of Menu Items in Large Chain Restaurants in the U.S.

Science.gov (United States)

Wolfson, Julia A; Moran, Alyssa J; Jarlenski, Marian P; Bleich, Sara N

2018-01-01

Consuming too much sodium is associated with increased risk for cardiovascular disease, and restaurant foods are a primary source of sodium. This study assessed recent trends in sodium content of menu items in U.S. chain restaurants. Data from 21,557 menu items in 66 top-earning chain restaurants available from 2012 to 2016 were obtained from the MenuStat project and analyzed in 2017. Generalized linear models were used to examine changes in calorie-adjusted, per-item sodium content of menu items offered in all years (2012-2016) and items offered in 2012 only compared with items newly introduced in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. Overall, calorie-adjusted sodium content in newly introduced menu items declined by 104 mg from 2012 to 2016 (prestaurant type; sodium content, particularly for main course items, was high. Sodium declined by 83 mg in fast food restaurants, 19 mg in fast casual restaurants, and 163 mg in full service restaurants. Sodium in appetizer and side items newly introduced in 2016 increased by 266 mg compared with items on the menu in 2012 only (prestaurants. However, sodium content of core and new menu items remain high, and reductions are inconsistent across menu categories and restaurant types. Copyright © 2018 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A preliminary assessment of the market coupling arrangement on the Kontek cable

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kristiansen, Tarjei

2007-01-01

This paper presents a preliminary assessment of the market coupling arrangement on the Kontek (KT) cable between East Denmark and Germany and an assessment of the original auction mechanism. KT, the new spot price area, was introduced in Germany on October 5, 2005 to facilitate a market coupling arrangement on the KT cable between East Denmark and Germany. We would expect the KT price to correlate more with the European Energy Exchange (EEX) price because arbitrage normally levelizes the price. However, spot prices in late 2005 were both high and volatile because congestion management practices in Sweden transferred internal bottlenecks to the cable between Sweden and East Denmark. Since spot prices were equal in East Denmark and the KT area for a substantial time, it implies that some hours had no congestion on the KT cable. Market players valued the previous monthly auctions for transmission capacity more than the daily auctions. Compared to the daily auctions, market players received smaller payoffs on average for the market coupling arrangement, and the smallest payoffs for the monthly auctions

The impact of the EU emissions trading scheme on the price of electricity in the Netherlands

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sijm, J.P.M.

2004-02-01

In this paper a specific aspect of the proposed EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is discussed, namely the potential impact of the EU ETS on the price of electricity in the Netherlands and, hence, the potential implications for Dutch power producers and consumers. It shows that the EU ETS may lead to a significant increase in the price of electricity in the Netherlands (and other EU Member States), depending on the marginal costs of emissions trading (i.e. the price of an emission allowance), the emission factor of the marginal production technology to generate electricity, and the extent to which the costs of emissions trading will be passed on to the end-users of electricity. If, for one reason or another, these costs will not be passed on to power consumers, it will have an adverse impact on overall efficiency from both an energy and economic point of view. On the other hand, if - as expected - these costs are indeed passed on to end-users of electricity, it will benefit power producers (mainly owing to the economic rent of allocating emission allowances for free), while it will harm those energy-intensive industries that, in turn, are not able to pass the higher electricity costs to their customers (resulting in a loss of economic production and income). To some degree, these effects can be best avoided by auctioning emission allowances mandatory throughout the EU ETS and using the auction revenues to reduce the overall level of taxation and social premiums in order to improve the overall competitiveness of domestic industries and to (partly) compensate power consumers for the ET-induced increase in the price of electricity

An auction game model for pool-based electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gan, Deqiang; Wang, Jianquan; Bourcier, Donald V.

2005-01-01

A single-period auction game model for analyzing strategic behavior in pool-based electricity markets is introduced in the paper. We study the Nash equilibrium in a pure strategy sense of such games. First an equilibrium existence lemma is proved. Equilibrium characterization under tight capacity constraints is provided. Then it is demonstrated that an auction game does not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under a wide range of market conditions. The paper provides a characterization of equilibrium under weak capacity constraints. We apply the introduced results to analyze market power indices presented in our earlier work and in related reports. Applications to actual market analysis, as well as limitations of the introduced model are provided. (author)

The Reinforcing Event (RE) Menu

Science.gov (United States)

Addison, Roger M.; Homme, Lloyd E.

1973-01-01

A motivational system, the Contingency Management System, uses contracts in which some amount of defined task behavior is demanded for some interval of reinforcing event. The Reinforcing Event Menu, a list of high probability reinforcing behaviors, is used in the system as a prompting device for the learner and as an aid for the administrator in…

Ready for policy? Stakeholder attitudes toward menu labelling in Toronto, Canada.

Science.gov (United States)

Mah, Catherine L; Vanderlinden, Loren; Mamatis, Dia; Ansara, Donna L; Levy, Jennifer; Swimmer, Lisa

2013-04-18

The purpose of this research was to assess key stakeholder attitudes regarding menu labelling in Toronto, the largest municipality in Canada. Menu labelling is a population health intervention where food-labelling principles are applied to the eating-out environment through disclosure of nutrient content of food items on restaurant menus at the point of sale. Menu-labelling legislation has been implemented in the United States, but has yet to be adopted in Canada. As provincial voluntary programs and federal analyses progress, municipal jurisdictions will need to assess the feasibility of moving forward with parallel interventions. Data were collected and analyzed in late 2011 to early 2012, including: a consumer eating-out module incorporated into a public health surveillance telephone survey (n=1,699); an online survey of independent restaurant operators (n=256); in-depth key informant interviews with executives and decision makers at chain restaurants (n=9); and a policy consultation with local restaurant associations. Toronto residents, particularly men, younger adults, and those with higher income or education, frequently eat out. A majority indicated that nutrition information is important to them; 69% note that they currently use it and 78% reported they would use it if it were readily available. Resistance to menu-labelling requirements at the municipal level was articulated by franchise/chain restaurant executives and industry associations. Despite overall low interest among independent restaurant operators, 57% reported feeling some responsibility to provide nutrition information and 50% believed it could be good for business. This research supports earlier literature that indicates strong public support for menu labelling alongside perceived barriers among the restaurant and foodservices sector. Leverage points for effective operator engagement for menu-labelling adoption were identified, nonetheless, highlighting the need for public health support.

29 CFR 516.13 - Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay....13 Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the... employee is employed both in agriculture and in connection with livestock auction operations: (a) The total...

Market-wide price co-movement around crashes in the Tokyo Stock Exchange

OpenAIRE

Jun-ichi Maskawa; Joshin Murai; Koji Kuroda

2013-01-01

As described in this paper, we study market-wide price co-movements around crashes by analyzing a dataset of high-frequency stock returns of the constituent issues of Nikkei 225 Index listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for the three years during 2007--2009. Results of day-to-day principal component analysis of the time series sampled at the 1 min time interval during the continuous auction of the daytime reveal the long range up to a couple of months significant auto-correlation of the maximu...

I saw the sign: the new federal menu-labeling law and lessons from local experience.

Science.gov (United States)

Banker, Michelle I

2010-01-01

Following the lead of several state and local governments, Congress recently imposed menu-labeling requirements on chain restaurants as part of the federal health care reform bill signed into law in March 2010. Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires restaurant chains with 20 or more locations nationwide to display calorie information for standard menu items on menus, menu boards, and drive-thru displays. This paper examines the new federal law in light of existing state and local regulations and considers the arguments for and against mandatory calorie labeling at restaurants as a federal tool for preventing obesity. Specifically, this paper examines the provisions of the new federal law, highlights how it differs from the municipal and state menu-labeling laws already in effect, reviews early studies of the effectiveness of these state and local laws, and considers the propriety of requiring restaurants to disclose calorie information on menus by discussing arguments for and against menu labeling generally and calorie labeling in particular. This paper finds that based on initial studies of state and local menu-labeling regulations, the efficacy of compulsory menu labeling as a tool to combat obesity remains uncertain. Finally, this paper raises practical considerations associated with the new federal law, including implementation issues, potential collateral effects of the law, a survey of legal challenges that may arise, and a discussion of the Food and Drug Administration's competence to enforce a menu-labeling requirement against restaurants.

Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: an experimental study

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Chen, Y.; Katuščák, Peter; Ozdenoren, E.

-, č. 269 (2005), s. 1-75 ISSN 1211-3298 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : sealed bid auctions * ambiguity * experiment Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp269.pdf

The Cost Effectiveness of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program Bonus Allocation Mechanism

OpenAIRE

Humei Wang; Richard J. Sexton

2004-01-01

The U.S. Export Enhancement Program is evaluated from the perspective of the cost effectiveness of its bonus allocation mechanism. The current mechanism resembles a discriminatory-price, common-value auction. However, auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction may not be optimal in this setting for several reasons. This article evaluates the current format relative to an alternative, uniform-price auction. Estimation results reveal evidence of strategic bidder behavior under the cu...

Mediators as the Walrasian Auctioneers of Exchange Theory

OpenAIRE

Dickenson, David

2003-01-01

This article opens up mediation to systematic economic analysis by considering mediators as analogous to the Walrasian auctioneers of exchange theory. By altering trade-off rates among bargaining issues, mediators facilitate a process leading towards Pareto efficient voluntary settlements.

Insider patent holder licensing in an oligopoly market with different cost structures: Fixed-fee, royalty, and auction

OpenAIRE

Ming-Chung Chang

2010-01-01

The issue of the optimal licensing contract in firms having different cost structures is studied when the innovator is a producing patent holder who has three alternative licensing strategies, namely, the fixed-fee, royalty rate, and auction strategies. We conclude that the auction licensing strategy is not the best strategy when the innovator is a producing patent holder. This finding differs from that of Kabiraj (2004) where the auction licensing method is the optimal licensing strategy whe...

The Role Of Product Quality Information, Market State Information And Transaction Costs In Electronic Auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

O.R. Koppius (Otto); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric)

2002-01-01

textabstractElectronic auctions have rapidly increased in popularity, but the consequences of switching to an electronic auction are unclear. In part this is because multiple changes occur at the same time so one can only observe the combined effect of these changes and not the effect of each

Revaluasi Inventory dengan Menu Standard pada SAP-B1 Sesuaikah dengan IFRS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Eka Novianti

2011-05-01

Full Text Available Some available standard modules in SAP-B1 can be adapted for changes in accounting rules and regulations. One is the Inventory Revaluation menu of Inventory module. Users can use the menu to make Inventory value adjustments of value in SAP-B1, to be consistent with the values that must be presented in the financial statements. Based on the flexibility provided by SAP-B1menu, should not be too difficult for users of SAP-B1 to manage accounting transactions based on accounting rules that apply today, IFRS. IFRS requirements on inventory adjustment transactions with a value of SAP-B1 could be done more easily.

7 CFR 220.8 - Nutrition standards and menu planning approaches for breakfasts.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

...: (A) Grains/breads; and/or (B) Meat/meat alternate. (2) Quantities for the traditional food-based menu... potatoes to meet the grain/bread requirement. (h) What are the requirements for alternate menu planning... versus serve; (C) How such procedures will reduce plate waste; and (D) How a reasonable level of calories...

Three essays on corruption and auctions

OpenAIRE

PAPIOTI, Katerina Chara

2014-01-01

Defence date: 1 December 2014 Examining Board: Professor Massimo Morelli, Bocconi University, Supervisor; Professor Andrea Mattozzi, EUI; Professor Marco Celentani, Universidad Carlos III; Professor Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham. This thesis contributes to the understanding of corruption and auctions. It consists of three chapters focusing on diverse aspects of these two general topics as well as their combinations, from an applied microeconomic theory perspective: (i) the eff...

Balloon popping with applications to ascending auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

N.S. Immorlica (Nicole Simone); A. Karlin; M. Mahdian (Mohammad); K. Talwar; A. Sinclair

2007-01-01

textabstractWe study the power of ascending auctions in a scenario in which a seller is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. We show that even with full knowledge of the set of bidders' private valuations for the items, if the bidders are ex-ante identical, no

75 FR 67978 - Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Restaurant Menu...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-11-04

...] Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Restaurant Menu Labeling... appropriate, and other forms of information technology. Restaurant Menu Labeling: Registration for Small... restaurants and similar retail food establishments (SRFE) with 20 or more locations, as well as operators of...

75 FR 68361 - Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Restaurant Menu...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-11-05

...] Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Restaurant Menu and... appropriate, and other forms of information technology. Restaurant Menu and Vending Machine Labeling... restaurants and similar retail food establishments (SRFE) with 20 or more locations doing business under the...

Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Chen, Y.; Katuščák, Peter; Ozdenoren, E.

2007-01-01

Roč. 136, č. 1 (2007), s. 513-535 ISSN 0022-0531 R&D Projects: GA MŠk LC542 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : sealed bid auctions * ambiguity * experiment Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.353, year: 2007

AEP Ohio gridSMART Demonstration Project Real-Time Pricing Demonstration Analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Widergren, Steven E.; Subbarao, Krishnappa; Fuller, Jason C.; Chassin, David P.; Somani, Abhishek; Marinovici, Maria C.; Hammerstrom, Janelle L.

2014-02-01

This report contributes initial findings from an analysis of significant aspects of the gridSMART® Real-Time Pricing (RTP) – Double Auction demonstration project. Over the course of four years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) worked with American Electric Power (AEP), Ohio and Battelle Memorial Institute to design, build, and operate an innovative system to engage residential consumers and their end-use resources in a participatory approach to electric system operations, an incentive-based approach that has the promise of providing greater efficiency under normal operating conditions and greater flexibility to react under situations of system stress. The material contained in this report supplements the findings documented by AEP Ohio in the main body of the gridSMART report. It delves into three main areas: impacts on system operations, impacts on households, and observations about the sensitivity of load to price changes.

Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu, Zhen; Zhang, Xiliang; Lieu, Jenny

2010-01-01

At present, designing a proper bidding mechanism to decrease the generators' market power is considered to be one of the key approaches to deepen the reform of the electricity market. Based on the signaling game theory, the paper analyzes the main electricity bidding mechanisms in the electricity auction markets and considers the degree of information disturbance as an important factor for evaluating bidding mechanisms. Under the above studies, an incentive electricity bidding mechanism defined as the Generator Semi-randomized Matching (GSM) mechanism is proposed. In order to verify the new bidding mechanism, this paper uses the Swarm platform to develop a simulation model based on the multi-agents. In the simulation model, the generators and purchasers use the partly superior study strategy to adjust their price and their electricity quantity. Then, the paper examines a simulation experiment of the GSM bidding mechanism and compares it to a simulation of the High-Low Matching (HLM) bidding mechanism. According to the simulation results, several conclusions can be drawn when comparing the proposed GSM bidding mechanism to the equilibrium state of HLM: the clearing price decreases, the total transaction volume increases, the profits of electricity generators decreases, and the overall benefits of purchasers increases. Index Terms - signaling game; semi-randomized matching; high-low match. (author)

Calorie Changes in Large Chain Restaurants: Declines in New Menu Items but Room for Improvement.

Science.gov (United States)

Bleich, Sara N; Wolfson, Julia A; Jarlenski, Marian P

2016-01-01

Large chain restaurants reduced the number of calories in newly introduced menu items in 2013 by about 60 calories (or 12%) relative to 2012. This paper describes trends in calories available in large U.S. chain restaurants to understand whether previously documented patterns persist. Data (a census of items for included restaurants) were obtained from the MenuStat project. This analysis included 66 of the 100 largest U.S. restaurants that are available in all three of the data years (2012-2014; N=23,066 items). Generalized linear models were used to examine: (1) per-item calorie changes from 2012 to 2014 among items on the menu in all years; and (2) mean calories in new items in 2013 and 2014 compared with items on the menu in 2012 only. Data were analyzed in 2014. Overall, calories in newly introduced menu items declined by 71 (or 15%) from 2012 to 2013 (p=0.001) and by 69 (or 14%) from 2012 to 2014 (p=0.03). These declines were concentrated mainly in new main course items (85 fewer calories in 2013 and 55 fewer calories in 2014; p=0.01). Although average calories in newly introduced menu items are declining, they are higher than items common to the menu in all 3 years. No differences in mean calories among items on menus in 2012, 2013, or 2014 were found. The previously observed declines in newly introduced menu items among large restaurant chains have been maintained, which suggests the beginning of a trend toward reducing calories. Copyright © 2016 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The effects of restaurant menu calorie labeling on hypothetical meal choices of females with disordered eating.

Science.gov (United States)

Haynos, Ann F; Roberto, Christina A

2017-03-01

Concerns have been raised that obesity public policy measures may have harmful effects on individuals with eating disorders. However, little research has investigated this topic. We examined the impact of a popular obesity public policy, menu calorie labeling, on hypothetical food choices of women with disordered eating. Seven hundred sixteen adult females completed an online survey in which they were randomly assigned to receive a restaurant menu with or without calorie information listed. Participants selected foods representative of a meal they would choose to consume and answered questions on restaurant ordering and menu labeling. Participants completed the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (Fairburn & Beglin, ) to assess global eating pathology. Diagnoses of anorexia nervosa (AN), bulimia nervosa (BN), and binge-eating disorder (BED) were also derived from this measure. Generalized linear modeling examined the impact of menu label condition, disordered eating, and the menu label by disordered eating interaction on hypothetical food selection and related variables. When disordered eating was examined continuously, menu labeling did not differentially affect food selections of those with elevated disordered eating (p = .45). However, when examined by eating disorder diagnosis, participants with AN or BN ordered significantly fewer (p < .001) and participants with BED ordered significantly more (p = .001) calories in the menu label versus no label condition. Menu labeling may decrease the calories ordered among individuals with AN or BN and increase calories ordered among individuals with BED. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The impact of menu energy labelling across socioeconomic groups: A systematic review.

Science.gov (United States)

Sarink, Danja; Peeters, Anna; Freak-Poli, Rosanne; Beauchamp, Alison; Woods, Julie; Ball, Kylie; Backholer, Kathryn

2016-04-01

Menu energy labelling at point of purchase is gaining traction worldwide, yet the potential impact for different socioeconomic groups is unclear. We aimed to summarise evidence on the effectiveness of menu energy labelling by socioeconomic position (SEP). A systematic search for papers published to September 2015 was conducted using terms for labelling, food outlets, and SEP. Quality of studies was assessed. Results were summarised across stages of an intervention logic pathway. Eighteen papers were identified. Of twelve studies reporting the effect of menu energy labelling in low SEP populations, six reported on purchase outcomes. All but one of these reported no positive effect of the policy for this population. Two of the five studies that compared purchase outcomes of menu labelling across SEP groups reported that the policy was effective overall. These two studies reported either a significant decline in fast food calories purchased from consumers in high (but not low) SEP neighbourhoods or a significantly greater decline in calories purchased among consumers visiting stores in higher SEP neighbourhoods post policy implementation. None of the included papers reached the highest quality score. The current evidence describing the impact of menu energy labelling within or across SEP is limited in quantity and quality. Of the two studies that reported a positive benefit of menu energy labelling overall, both identified a greater effect on fast food purchases among consumers visiting stores in high compared to low SEP neighbourhoods. It is difficult to know whether the absence of effectiveness reported in low SEP populations represents a true lack of effectiveness or is a result of a more general lack of policy effectiveness or the limited quality of the reviewed studies. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Fourteen-year trends in sodium content of menu offerings at eight leading fast-food restaurants in the USA.

Science.gov (United States)

Rudelt, Amanda; French, Simone; Harnack, Lisa

2014-08-01

To examine changes in the Na content of lunch/dinner menu offerings at eight of the leading fast-food restaurants in the USA between 1997/1998 and 2009/2010. Menu offerings and nutrient composition information for the menu items were obtained from archival versions of the University of Minnesota Nutrition Coordinating Center (NCC) Food and Nutrient Database. Nutrient composition information for lunch/dinner menu items sold by the fast-food restaurants included in the present study was updated in the database biannually. Menus were analysed for changes in mean Na content of all menu offerings (except beverages) and specific categories of menu items among all restaurants and for each individual restaurant. Lunch/dinner food menu of eight leading US fast-food restaurants. Between 1997/1998 and 2009/2010 the mean Na content of menu offerings across the eight restaurants increased by 23·4 %. Examining specific food categories, mean Na content of entrées by increased 17·2 % and that of condiments increased by 26·1 %. Only side dishes showed a decrease of 6·6 %. None of the restaurants examined had a decrease in Na across the lunch/dinner menu offerings over the 14 years examined. Results suggest that over the time period studied there has been no meaningful reduction in the Na content of lunch/dinner menu offerings at the leading fast-food restaurants examined in the present study.

Exploring consumers’ perception and willingness to pay for “Non-Added Sulphite” wines through experimental auctions: A case study in Italy and Spain

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mario Amato

2017-12-01

Full Text Available Although scientific literature is still uncertain towards the real causes that can link headache episodes with moderate wine consumption, a growing proportion of consumers seems to address sulphites as possible culprits. Hence, the objective of this study is to assess consumers` willingness to pay for wine bearing a sulphites-free label in two traditional wine producing countries, Italy and Spain. The methodological framework is based on the specification of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM type of auction applied to consumers purchasing wine in the supermarket stores of both countries. A left censored Tobit model is used to analyse the bidding behaviour for conventional and 'Non-Added Sulphite' (NAS wine. Results in both countries show that consumers who link the headaches with the consumption of sulphite are willing to exchange the habitually consumed bottle of wine with a NAS wine and pay extra premium prices. Keywords: Experimental auctions, Non-added sulphite wines, Consumer behavior

Electricity prices and generator behaviour in gross pool electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

O'Mahoney, Amy; Denny, Eleanor

2013-01-01

Electricity market liberalisation has become common practice internationally. The justification for this process has been to enhance competition in a market traditionally characterised by statutory monopolies in an attempt to reduce costs to end-users. This paper endeavours to see whether a pool market achieves this goal of increasing competition and reducing electricity prices. Here the electricity market is set up as a sealed bid second price auction. Theory predicts that such markets should result with firms bidding their marginal cost, thereby resulting in an efficient outcome and lower costs to consumers. The Irish electricity system with a gross pool market experiences among the highest electricity prices in Europe. Thus, we analyse the Irish pool system econometrically in order to test if the high electricity prices seen there are due to participants bidding outside of market rules or out of line with theory. Overall we do not find any evidence that the interaction between generator and the pool in the Irish electricity market is not efficient. Thus, the pool element of the market structure does not explain the high electricity prices experienced in Ireland. - Highlights: • We consider whether a gross pool achieves competitive behaviour. • We analyse the Irish pool system econometrically. • Results indicate the Irish pool system appears to work efficiently. • Generators appear to be bidding appropriately

The history and impact of the New York City menu labeling law.

Science.gov (United States)

Bernell, Brent

2010-01-01

As a result of the recent federal health care legislation, all restaurants in the United States that are part of a chain with twenty or more locations serving substantially the same menu items will be required to post the calorie information of the food they serve directly on menus and menu boards. This development represents the culmination of a regulatory initiative to combat the growth of obesity that only began in 2006 with the decision by the New York City Board of Health to require calorie posting in New York City chain restaurants. That initiative, Regulation 81.50, was the first of its kind in the United States; and yet, less than four years later, the idea has become a national standard. This paper tracks the history of New York City's landmark regulation, detailing the drafting of the law, the initial legal victory for the restaurant association challenging it, and the ultimate triumph of the City in winning legal validation of its calorie posting mandate. In doing so, this paper will also use the New York City regulation as a launching point to discuss the rationale behind menu labeling, to examine the potential legal pitfalls of menu labeling laws, to track the development of the initiative from New York City to a national standard, and finally, to evaluate the preliminary data on whether or not menu labeling is actually effective in achieving its ultimate goal: changing consumer eating habits and reducing obesity.

The effects of restaurant nutrition menu labelling on college students' healthy eating behaviours.

Science.gov (United States)

Roseman, Mary G; Joung, Hyun-Woo; Choi, Eun-Kyong Cindy; Kim, Hak-Seon

2017-04-01

According to the US Affordable Care Act, restaurant chains are required to provide energy (calorie) and other nutrition information on their menu. The current study examined the impact of menu labelling containing calorie information and recommended daily calorie intake, along with subjective nutrition knowledge, on intention to select lower-calorie foods prior to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act. Full factorial experimental design with participants exposed to four variants of a sample menu in a 2 (presence v. absence of calorie information) ×2 (presence v. absence of recommended daily calorie intake). Large, public university in the Southwest USA. Primarily undergraduate college students. Majority of participants were 19-23 years of age (mean 21·8 (sd 3·6) years). Menu information about calorie content and respondents' subjective nutrition knowledge had a significantly positive impact on students' intention to select lower-calorie foods (β=0·24, Prestaurant menus as a way to easily and expediently obtain nutrition information.

Allocating multiple units

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Tranæs, Torben; Krishna, Kala

2002-01-01

This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his...... auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points...

Bounded Rationality at Large: Technological Standards in Airwaves Auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Bruggeman, J.P.; Visser, Hendrik Jan; Visser, H.J.; van Rossum, Wouter

2003-01-01

In industries characterized by several technological standards, each with positive network externalities, competition is different from industries with technologically "loosely coupled" organizations. We therefore expected that in airwaves auctions for mobile telephony in the U.S., network

Macronutrient Composition of Menu Offerings in Fast Food Restaurants in the U.S.

Science.gov (United States)

Jarlenski, Marian P; Wolfson, Julia A; Bleich, Sara N

2016-10-01

A high intake of fast food is associated with increased obesity risk. This study assessed recent changes in caloric content and macronutrient composition in large U.S. fast food restaurants. Data from the MenuStat project included 11,737 menu items in 37 fast food restaurants from 2012 to 2014. Generalized linear models were used to examine changes in the caloric content and corresponding changes in the macronutrient composition (non-sugar carbohydrates, sugar, unsaturated fat, saturated fat, and protein) of menu items over time. Additionally, macronutrient composition was compared in menu items newly introduced in 2013 and 2014, relative to 2012. Analyses, conducted in January 2016, controlled for restaurant and were stratified by menu categories. Overall, there was a 22-calorie reduction in food items from 2012 to 2014. Beverages had a 46-calorie increase, explained by an increase in calories from sugar (12 calories) and saturated fat (16 calories). Newly introduced main courses in 2014 had 59 calories fewer than those on 2012 menus, explained by a 54-calorie reduction in unsaturated fat, while other macronutrient content remained fairly constant. Newly introduced dessert items in 2014 had 90 calories more than those on 2012 menus, explained primarily by an increase of 57 calories of sugar. Overall, there were relatively minor changes in menu items' caloric and macronutrient composition. Although declines in caloric content among newly introduced fast food main courses may improve the public's caloric intake, it appears that the macronutrient composition of newly introduced items did not shift to a healthier profile. Copyright © 2016 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Tendances Carbone no. 73 'Reforming the EU ETS, Act I: pushing back the allowance auction timetable'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alberola, Emilie

2012-01-01

Among the publications of CDC Climat Research, 'Tendances Carbone' bulletin specifically studies the developments of the European market for CO 2 allowances. This issue addresses the following points: On July 25 2012, the European Commission presented its first reform to re-calibrate the supply of allowances in EU ETS, via two proposals aimed at amending the ETS Directive and reviewing the auction regulations, in order to alter the auctioning timetable during the period between 2013 and 2020, with no legal risk. The aim is to withdraw a certain amount of the allowances auctioned in 2013, 2014 and 2015, in order to reintroduce that amount after 2018

Efficient and secure comparison for on-line auctions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Damgard, Ivan; Geisler, M.; Kroigaard, M.; Pieprzyk, J.; Ghodosi, H.; Dawson, E.

2007-01-01

We propose a protocol for secure comparison of integers based on homomorphic encryption. We also propose a homomorphic encryption scheme that can be used in our protocol and makes it more efficient than previous solutions. Our protocol is well-suited for application in on-line auctions, both with

Hipster Racism and Sexism in Charity Date Auctions: Individualism, Privilege Blindness and Irony in the Academy

Science.gov (United States)

Current, Cheris Brewer; Tillotson, Emily

2018-01-01

This paper follows one small, Christian university's five-year experience with student charity date auctions. The contemporary re-emergence of date auctions represents a backlash against gender and racial progress. Student leaders believe that in a post-racial and post-sexist society, race and gender are decontextualised neutral elements of…

Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

OpenAIRE

Altarelli, F.; Braunstein, A.; Realpe-Gomez, J.; Zecchina, R.

2009-01-01

Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). Based on the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution,...

A lesson from Argentina: Setting transmission tolls in a competitive auction is much better than regulating them

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Galetovic, Alexander [Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales, Av. San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200, Santiago (Chile); Inostroza, Juan Ricardo [AES Gener S.A., Sanchez Fontecilla 310, piso 3, Santiago (Chile)

2008-07-15

There are at least two procedures for setting the tolls paid by power line users. One consists of regulating them in a standard process. The other, which is used in Argentina, involves auctioning the lines to the lowest toll. In this paper we show that an auction yields higher expected social welfare if n {>=} 2 bid. Expected social welfare is even higher if, as in Argentina, those who benefit from the line can also bid and build. Moreover, when the social welfare is utilitarian, an auction beats regulation even when the regulator can perfectly audit costs ex post. We describe and examine the auction of the fourth Comahue transmission line in Argentina. Assuming that the regulator's information about costs is similar to the information held by the industry, the model suggests that had tolls been regulated, they would have been at least 61% higher. (author)

Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Design Based on Fuzzy Data Envelopment Analysis Approach

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Deyan Chen

2017-08-01

Full Text Available Multi-attribute reverse auction is widely used for the procurements of enterprises or governments. To overcome the difficulty of identifying bidding attribute weight and score function of the buyer, the multi-round auction and bidding models with multiple winners are established based on fuzzy data envelopment analysis. The winner determination model of the buyer considers the integrated input-output efficiency of k winners. The bidding strategy of seller is divided into two parts: the first one estimates the weight of the ideal supplier that is thought to be the buyer’s preference; the second one is to calculate the weight of the test supplier which reflects the change trend of current weights and the seller’s weakness. The final predicted weight is the weighted sum of both. On the basis of known weight, the test supplier can improve his efficiency to increase the winning chance in the next round auction. Our models comprise crisp numbers and fuzzy numbers. Finally, a numerical example verifies the validity of the proposed models.

Restaurant menu labelling: Is it worth adding sodium to the label?

Science.gov (United States)

Scourboutakos, Mary J; Corey, Paul N; Mendoza, Julio; Henson, Spencer J; L'Abbe, Mary R

2014-07-31

Several provincial and federal bills have recommended various forms of menu labelling that would require information beyond just calories; however, the additional benefit of including sodium information is unknown. The objective of this study was to determine whether sodium information on menus helps consumers make lower-sodium choices and to understand what other factors influence the effect of menu labelling on consumers' meal choices. A total of 3,080 Canadian consumers completed an online survey that included a repeated measures experiment in which consumers were asked to select what they would typically order from four mock-restaurant menus. Subsequently, consumers were randomly allocated to see one of three menu-labelling treatments (calories; calories and sodium; or calories, sodium and serving size) and were given the option to change their order. There was a significant difference in the proportion of consumers who changed their order, varying from 17% to 30%, depending on the restaurant type. After participants had seen menu labelling, sodium levels decreased in all treatments (p<0.0001). However, in three of the four restaurant types, consumers who saw calorie and sodium information ordered meals with significantly less sodium than consumers who saw only calorie information (p<0.01). Consumers who saw sodium labelling decreased the sodium level of their meal by an average of 171-384 mg, depending on the restaurant. In the subset of consumers who saw sodium information and chose to change their order, sodium levels decreased by an average of 681-1,360 mg, depending on the restaurant. Sex, intent to lose weight and the amount of calories ordered at baseline were the most important predictors of who used menu labelling. Eighty percent of survey panelists wanted to see nutrition information when dining out. Including sodium information alongside calorie information may result in a larger decrease in the amount of sodium ordered by restaurant-goers.

Effects of information on young consumers' willingness to pay for genetically modified food: experimental auction analysis.

Science.gov (United States)

Kajale, Dilip B; Becker, T C

2014-01-01

This study examines the effects of information on consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for genetically modified food (GMF). We used Vickrey second price experimental auction method for elicitation of consumer WTP for GM potato chips and GM soya-chocolate bar. The sample used in this study was university students from Delhi, India. Four information formats (positive, negative, no information, and combined information about GM technology) were used for the examination. The results show that, when students received the combine information they were willing to pay around 17%-20% premium for GMF and when received the negative information they demanded around 22% discount for GMF. While the positive- and the no-information formats alone have no considerable effect on consumers' WTP for GMF. Overall, our findings suggest that while doing marketing of GMF in India, the best strategy is to provide combined information about GM technology.

Electronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating an E-Sourcing Tool into a Sales and Purchasing Cross-Course Negotiation Project

Science.gov (United States)

Williams, Jacqueline A.; Dobie, Kathryn

2011-01-01

Electronic reverse auctions are increasingly being used by firms to improve firm financial and operational performance. The described teaching innovation serves as a model for introducing electronic reverse auctions as a central element in a comprehensive negotiation exercise involving sales management and purchasing management students. Results…

76 FR 76174 - Request for Information on the State of the Offshore Renewable Energy Industry-Auction Format...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-12-06

... ``Multiple Factor Auctions,'' in which non- financial considerations are taken into account at the outset. If... tends to award leases to developers with good financial backing. Because the winning bidders would need... variations of the package auction format merit consideration for leasing packages of lots for offshore...

Security analysis with improved design of post-confirmation mechanism for quantum sealed-bid auction with single photons

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Ke-Jia; Kwek, Leong-Chuan; Ma, Chun-Guang; Zhang, Long; Sun, Hong-Wei

2018-02-01

Quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA) has been widely studied in quantum cryptography. For a successful auction, post-confirmation is regarded as an important mechanism to make every bidder verify the identity of the winner after the auctioneer has announced the result. However, since the auctioneer may be dishonest and collude with malicious bidders in practice, some potential loopholes could exist. In this paper, we point out two types of collusion attacks for a particular post-confirmation technique with EPR pairs. And it is not difficult to see that there exists no unconditionally secure post-confirmation mechanism in the existing QSA model, if the dishonest participants have the ability to control multiparticle entanglement. In the view of this, we note that some secure implementation could exist if the participants are supposed to be semi-quantum, i.e., they can only control single photons. Finally, two potential methods to design post-confirmation mechanism are presented in this restricted scenario.

CO2 price dynamics. A follow-up analysis of the implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sijm, J.P.M.; Ten Donkelaar, M.; Hers, J.S.; Scheepers, M.J.J.; Chen, Y.

2006-03-01

The present study discusses the results of some follow-up analyses on the relationship between EU emissions trading and power prices, notably the implications of free allocations of CO2 emissions allowances for the price of electricity in Germany and the Netherlands. These analyses include: An update of the empirical and statistical analyses of the price trends and pass through rates of CO2 costs in the power sector of Germany and the Netherlands; An analysis by means of the model COMPETES of the potential effects of CO2 emissions trading on the wholesale market shares of the major power producers in the Netherlands; An analysis of two policy options to cope with certain adverse effects of passing through the opportunity costs of freely allocated CO2 emission allowances, i.e. less grandfathering to the major power producers - in favour of major electricity users - by either a more stringent allocation to the power generators or auctioning part of the allowances to these generators. A major finding of the present study is that dark/spark spreads of power production in Germany and the Netherlands have improved substantially in 2005, especially during the period August-December. Whereas valid CO2 pass through rates of 40 to 70 percent have been estimated for the first period of 2005 (January- July), estimates for the year 2005 as a whole - and particularly for the latter period August-December - seem to be less or not valid since other factors, such as market power or scarcity, seem also (or even more) responsible for the improvement of dark/spark spreads in the latter period of 2005 (while data are lacking to abstract for these other factors). Regarding the policy options to address adverse effects of CO2 cost pass through, the report concludes that a small degree of less grandfathering to the power producers (i.e. 10-20 percent of the allowances needed) will reduce their windfall profits accordingly, without a major, decisive impact on the operational and investment

Lower costs as a result of auctioning of emission rights

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

De Bruyn, S.; Davidson, M.; Korteland, M.

2008-01-01

According to economic theory auctioning of emission allowances is not more efficient than free allocation. Free allocation of emission allowances in Europe involves product subsidy, thus removing the incentive for emission reduction. [mk] [nl

Penyusunan Dan Penyelenggaran A La Carte Menu Pada Hotel Sinabung Dan Resort

OpenAIRE

Nasution, Rahmawaty

2011-01-01

Dalam operasional hotel, hotel memiliki beberapa departemen yang mempunyai peranan yang sangat penting dalam penjualan jasa dan pelayanan, dan salah satunya adalah departemen Food & Beverage. Food & Beverage mempunyai peran yang sangat besar dalam sebuah hotel, karena pendapatan sebuah hotel yang terbesar ada pada Food & Beverage terutama pada restoran. Adapun salah satu nama jenis restoran yang ada di Hotel Sinabung. Hotel Sinabung menyediakan jenis menu antara lain A La Carte Menu. M...

75 FR 56533 - Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Postpones Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-09-16

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 10-107; DA 10-1630] Wireless Telecommunications... Auction 89. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum... by the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau pursuant to authority delegated by 47 CFR 0.131...

Analysis on trust influencing factors and trust model from multiple perspectives of online Auction

Science.gov (United States)

Yu, Wang

2017-10-01

Current reputation models lack the research on online auction trading completely so they cannot entirely reflect the reputation status of users and may cause problems on operability. To evaluate the user trust in online auction correctly, a trust computing model based on multiple influencing factors is established. It aims at overcoming the efficiency of current trust computing methods and the limitations of traditional theoretical trust models. The improved model comprehensively considers the trust degree evaluation factors of three types of participants according to different participation modes of online auctioneers, to improve the accuracy, effectiveness and robustness of the trust degree. The experiments test the efficiency and the performance of our model under different scale of malicious user, under environment like eBay and Sporas model. The experimental results analysis show the model proposed in this paper makes up the deficiency of existing model and it also has better feasibility.

The Menu for Every Young Mathematician's Appetite

Science.gov (United States)

Legnard, Danielle S.; Austin, Susan L.

2012-01-01

Math Workshop offers differentiated instruction to foster a deep understanding of rich, rigorous mathematics that is attainable by all learners. The inquiry-based model provides a menu of multilevel math tasks, within the daily math block, that focus on similar mathematical content. Math Workshop promotes a culture of engagement and…

Preferences for menu labelling formats of young adults in Brazil and in the United Kingdom

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Renata Carvalho de OLIVEIRA

Full Text Available ABSTRACT Objective This pilot study was aimed at exploring preferences of young adults in two different contexts on restaurant menu labelling formats. Methods Five focus groups were conducted with 36 participants, two focus groups with 11 participants in Brazil and three focus groups with 25 in the United Kingdom. Themes originating from the content analysis of the transcriptions were organised around four possible menu labelling formats: 1 numerical information on calories; 2 numerical information on calories and nutrients; 3 traffic light system plus Guideline Daily Amounts; 4 food information with ingredients list plus highlighted symbols. Results In both countries, participants preferred the ingredients list plus symbols format, considered more comprehensive and useful to make an informed food choice. Organic food and vegetarian symbols were the ones considered most important to appear on restaurant menu labels with ingredients list. However, most participants in Brazil and in the United Kingdom rejected the information restricted to calories and calories plus nutrients formats, saying that these would not influence their own choices. Conclusion This is the first multicultural qualitative study exploring preferences of people living in different countries with different eating habits, but where menu labelling is voluntary. Results evidenced similarities in participants’ likes and dislikes for menu labelling formats in these two different contexts. Discussions showed participants in both countries prefer qualitative information than numerical information, suggesting that ingredients list and symbols provide information that people want to see on the menu.

The price of healthy and unhealthy foods in Australian primary school canteens.

Science.gov (United States)

Wyse, Rebecca; Wiggers, John; Delaney, Tessa; Ooi, Jia Ying; Marshall, Josephine; Clinton-McHarg, Tara; Wolfenden, Luke

2017-02-01

To describe the price of Australian school canteen foods according to their nutritional value. Primary school canteen menus were collected as part of a policy compliance randomised trial. For each menu item, dietitians classified its nutritional value; 'green' ('good sources of nutrients'), 'amber' ('some nutritional value'), 'red' ('lack adequate nutritional value') and assigned a food category (e.g. 'Drinks', 'Snacks'). Pricing information was extracted. Within each food category, ANOVAs assessed differences between the mean price of 'green', 'amber' and 'red' items, and post-hoc tests were conducted. Seventy of the 124 invited schools participated. There were significant differences in the mean price of 'green', 'amber' and 'red foods' across categories, with 'green' items more expensive than 'amber' items in main-meal categories ('Sandwiches' +$0.43, 'Hot Foods' +$0.71), and the reverse true for non-meal categories ('Drinks' -$0.13, 'Snacks' -$0.18, 'Frozen Snacks' -$0.25^). Current pricing may not encourage the purchasing of healthy main-meal items by and for students. Further investigation of pricing strategies that enhance the public health benefit of existing school canteen policies and practices are warranted. Implications for Public Health: Providing support to canteen managers regarding healthy canteen policies may have a positive impact on public health nutrition. © 2016 The Authors.

PRICE RIGIDITY AND MONETARY NON-NEUTRALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Nathaniel E. Urama

2013-04-01

Full Text Available In an attempt to find out the degree of monetary non-neutrality in Nigeria we started from finding out the size of price rigidity in the country. Computation with Ball and Romer method showed that price rigidity is optimal decision for firms in Nigeria only when the menu cost is well above 2.28% of the firm’s revenue which is on the high side, showing the likelihood of weak price rigidity in the country. Confirming this, the IRFs of the SVAR shows that the response of inflation to nominal shock has only one period lag. These combined results led to a small though persistent response of output to the nominal shock. The result of the study therefore points towards large nominal and small real effect of monetary policy in Nigeria and conclude that monetary policy will be a better option for contractionary plan but not for an expansionary plan.

The availability and accessibility of nutrition information in fast food outlets in five states post-menu labelling legislation in New South Wales.

Science.gov (United States)

Wellard, Lyndal; Havill, Michelle; Hughes, Clare; Watson, Wendy L; Chapman, Kathy

2015-12-01

1) Explore the availability and accessibility of fast food energy and nutrient information post-NSW menu labelling legislation in states with and without menu labelling legislation. 2) Determine whether availability and accessibility differed compared with pre-menu labelling legislation in NSW. We visited 210 outlets of the five largest fast food chains in five Australian states to observe the availability and accessibility of energy and nutrient information. Results were compared with 197 outlets surveyed pre-menu labelling. Most outlets (95%) provided energy values, half provided nutrient values and 3% provided information for all menu items. The total amount of information available increased post-NSW menu labelling implementation (473 versus 178 pre-implementation, pFast food chains surveyed had voluntarily introduced menu labelling nationally. However, more nutrient information was available in-store in 2010, showing that fast food chains are able to provide comprehensive nutrition information, yet they have stopped doing so. Menu labelling legislation should compel fast food chains to provide accessible nutrition information including nutrient values in addition to energy for all menu items in-store. Additionally, public education campaigns are needed to ensure customers can use menu labelling. © 2015 Public Health Association of Australia.

African electricity market liberalization, competition and structuring: Should double bid markets be set up?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Founanou, M.

2011-01-01

In this paper, we analyse the possibility of using double auction mechanisms in the organization of the electricity markets in African countries. Today's electricity markets around the world are de-regulated and going through a restructuring process. In a context marked by the opening up to competition, a double auction for electricity supply is henceforth used to set prices in wholesale and retail electricity markets. Game theory analysis useful for studying the double auction prices proprieties. The double auction is a non-cooperative game, which is strategically equivalent to the auctions theory. The price formed, depending on the buyers and sellers' strategies, is a competitive price, which tends to the ideal price when competition operates intensely on both sides of market. For Africa, the presence of congestion costs and a chronic lack of capacity require the search for other solutions. We investigate optimal strategic behaviour when buyers and sellers are separated by a possibly constrained transmission line and show that bidders' strategies converge to truth-telling behaviour as the number of market participants increases. In the congestion case, this fails to occur. We also investigate how participants in wholesale electricity markets modify their bidding strategies as a function of the influence and behaviour of a transmission line owner. (author)

Does a grill menu redesign influence sales, nutrients purchased, and consumer acceptance in a worksite cafeteria?

OpenAIRE

Maya K. Vadiveloo; Vasanti S. Malik; Donna Spiegelman; Walter C. Willett; Josiemer Mattei

2017-01-01

Worksite cafeterias are compelling venues to improve diet quality through environmental changes.We conducted a pre-post study to evaluate how a cafeteria-initiated grill menu redesign influenced sales, revenue, and nutrient content of foods purchased. Secondly, we evaluated consumer opinions about menu changes to inform practices for worksite environment interventions. Monthly sales data (2012–2015) were used to compute gross sales and revenue of entrées and side dishes pre-post menu changes....

Bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions – an experimental investigation

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, V.

2009-01-01

Roč. 119, č. 537 (2009), s. 855-882 ISSN 0013-0133 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : multi-unit auctions * bidding behavior * laboratory experiments Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.902, year: 2009

Reputation mechanism: From resolution for truthful online auctions to the model of optimal one-gambler problem

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bradonjic, Milan [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

In this paper we study reputation mechanisms, and show how the notion of reputation can help us in building truthful online auction mechanisms. From the mechanism design prospective, we derive the conditions on and design a truthful online auction mechanism. Moreover, in the case when some agents may lay or cannot have the real knowledge about the other agents reputations, we derive the resolution of the auction, such that the mechanism is truthful. Consequently, we move forward to the optimal one-gambler/one-seller problem, and explain how that problem is refinement of the previously discussed online auction design in the presence of reputation mechanism. In the setting of the optimal one-gambler problem, we naturally rise and solve the specific question: What is an agent's optimal strategy, in order to maximize his revenue? We would like to stress that our analysis goes beyond the scope, which game theory usually discusses under the notion of reputation. We model one-player games, by introducing a new parameter (reputation), which helps us in predicting the agent's behavior, in real-world situations, such as, behavior of a gambler, real-estate dealer, etc.

77 FR 11115 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Limited Extension of Deadlines for Comments and Reply Comments on...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-02-24

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-236] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... the Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Limited Extension of Comment Deadlines Public Notice (Public Notice... respect to the potential eligibility of specific census blocks for Mobility Fund Phase I support by March...

49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation... SAVE ACT PROGRAM Disposal of Trade-in Vehicle § 599.402 Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. (a) The salvage auction must: (1...

78 FR 21355 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for October 24, 2013; Comment Sought on...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-04-10

... unit is the basic unit that will be used to determine the winners in Auction 902 and to measure... Bureaus will measure coverage based on population rather than road miles. Under the auction design options...: EV-DO, EV-DO Rev A, UMTS/HSPA, HSPA+, WiMAX, and LTE. If the Mosaik data did not show such coverage...

Using Cascading Style Sheets to Design a Fly-Out Menu with Microsoft Visual Studio

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Chang; Downing, Charles

2010-01-01

The menu has become an integrated component within nearly all professionally designed websites. This teaching tip presents a no-code way to design either a vertical or a horizontal fly-out menu by using Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) within Microsoft Visual Studio 2008. The approach described in this tip helps students fully understand how to…

The CMS experiment puts physics onto the menu

CERN Document Server

Leonidopoulos, Christos

2011-01-01

CMS has addressed the challenge of identifying in real time different kinds of 
physics at the LHC – from the "bread and butter" of Standard Model processes to 
signals of new particles – with triggers served up according to a carefully designed menu.

Reducing calories, fat, saturated fat, and sodium in restaurant menu items: Effects on consumer acceptance.

Science.gov (United States)

Patel, Anjali A; Lopez, Nanette V; Lawless, Harry T; Njike, Valentine; Beleche, Mariana; Katz, David L

2016-12-01

To assess consumer acceptance of reductions of calories, fat, saturated fat, and sodium to current restaurant recipes. Twenty-four menu items, from six restaurant chains, were slightly modified and moderately modified by reducing targeted ingredients. Restaurant customers (n = 1,838) were recruited for a taste test and were blinded to the recipe version as well as the purpose of the study. Overall consumer acceptance was measured using a 9-point hedonic (like/dislike) scale, likelihood to purchase scale, Just-About-Right (JAR) 5-point scale, penalty analysis, and alienation analysis. Overall, modified recipes of 19 menu items were scored similar to (or better than) their respective current versions. Eleven menu items were found to be acceptable in the slightly modified recipe version, and eight menu items were found to be acceptable in the moderately modified recipe version. Acceptable ingredient modifications resulted in a reduction of up to 26% in calories and a reduction of up to 31% in sodium per serving. The majority of restaurant menu items with small reductions of calories, fat, saturated fat, and sodium were acceptable. Given the frequency of eating foods away from home, these reductions could be effective in creating dietary improvements for restaurant diners. © 2016 The Obesity Society.

Nudge to nobesity II: Menu positions influence food orders

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Eran Dayan

2011-06-01

Full Text Available ``Very small but cumulated decreases in food intake may be sufficient to have significant effects, even erasing obesity over a period of years'' (Rozin et al., 2011. In two studies, one a lab study and the other a real-world study, we examine the effect of manipulating the position of different foods on a restaurant menu. Items placed at the beginning or the end of the list of their category options were up to twice as popular as when they were placed in the center of the list. Given this effect, placing healthier menu items at the top or bottom of item lists and less healthy ones in their center (e.g., sugared drinks vs. calorie-free drinks should result in some increase in favor of healthier food choices.

Learning by investing: evidence from a naturally occurring auction

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Hanousek, Jan; Kočenda, Evžen

2011-01-01

Roč. 19, č. 1 (2011), s. 125-149 ISSN 0967-0750 R&D Projects: GA ČR GA402/09/1595; GA MŠk LC542 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : learning * naturally occurring auction * stock market Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.679, year: 2011

Customer responses to mandatory menu labeling at full-service restaurants.

Science.gov (United States)

Auchincloss, Amy H; Mallya, Giridhar G; Leonberg, Beth L; Ricchezza, Andrew; Glanz, Karen; Schwarz, Donald F

2013-12-01

In 2010, Philadelphia enacted a menu-labeling law requiring full-service restaurant chains to list values for calories, sodium, fat, and carbohydrates for each item on all printed menus. The goal of the study was to determine whether purchase decisions at full-service restaurants varied depending on the presence of labeling. In August 2011, this cross-sectional study collected 648 customer surveys and transaction receipts at seven restaurant outlets of one large full-service restaurant chain. Two outlets had menu labeling (case sites); five outlets did not (control sites). Outcomes included differences in calories and nutrients purchased and customers' reported use of nutrition information when ordering. Data were analyzed in 2012. Mean age was 37 years; 60% were female; 50% were black/African-American and reported incomes ≥$60,000. Customers purchased food with approximately 1600 kcal (food plus beverage, 1800 kcal); 3200 mg sodium; and 35 g saturated fat. After adjustment for confounders, customers at labeled restaurants purchased food with 151 fewer kilocalories (95% CI=-270, -33); 224 mg less sodium (95% CI=-457, +8); and 3.7 g less saturated fat (95% CI=-7.4, -0.1) compared to customers at unlabeled restaurants (or 155 less kilocalories from food plus beverage, 95% CI=-284, -27). Those reporting that nutrition information affected their order purchased 400 fewer food calories, 370 mg less sodium, and 10 g less saturated fat. Mandatory menu labeling was associated with better food choices among a segment of the public dining at full-service restaurants. Consumer education on the availability and use of nutrition information may extend the impact of menu labeling. © 2013 American Journal of Preventive Medicine Published by American Journal of Preventive Medicine All rights reserved.

78 FR 68839 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-15

... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 13-53; DA 13-2057] Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to Auction 902 Schedule Following Resumption... up to $50 million in one-time Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I support, will be conducted on February 25...

An Efficient Electronic English Auction System with a Secure On-Shelf Mechanism and Privacy Preserving

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Hong Zhong

2016-01-01

Full Text Available With the rapid development of the Internet, electronic commerce has become more and more popular. As an important element of e-commerce, many Internet companies such as Yahoo! and eBay have launched electronic auction systems. However, like most electronic commerce products, safety is an important issue that should be addressed. Many researchers have proposed secure electronic auction mechanisms, but we found that some of them do not exhibit the property of unlinkability, which leads to the leakage of users’ privacy. Considering the importance of privacy preservation, we have designed a new auction mechanism. Through symmetrical key establishment in the registration phase, all messages transmitted over the Internet would be protected and, meanwhile, achieve the property of unlinkability. The security analysis and performance analysis show that our protocol fulfills more security properties and is more efficient for implementation compared with recent works.

Translation of the Chinese Menu from the Perspective of Food Culture

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

汪平心

2015-01-01

Chinese food culture is similar to a pearl shinning in this era of globalization.Due to a higher frequency of cross-cultural communication than ever before,people from western countries show increasing interests in Chinese cuisine.Therefore,a standardized translation of the Chinese menu plays a more indispensible role in grasping the precise understanding of Chinese food names for foreign diners.From a cultural perspective,this paper primarily discusses various differences between Chinese and Western food cultures,and provides major translation principles and tips of the Chinese menu so as to arrive at a standardized translation as clearly and accessibly as possible.

Translation of the Chinese Menu from the Perspective of Food Culture

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

汪平心

2015-01-01

Chinese food culture is similar to a pearl shinning in this era of globalization. Due to a higher frequency of cross-cultural communication than ever before, people from western countries show increasing interests in Chinese cuisine. Therefore, a standardized translation of the Chinese menu plays a more indispensible role in grasping the precise understanding of Chinese food names for foreign diners. From a cultural perspective, this paper primarily discusses various differences between Chinese and Western food cultures, and provides major translation principles and tips of the Chinese menu so as to arrive at a standardized translation as clearly and accessibly as possible.

Does a grill menu redesign influence sales, nutrients purchased, and consumer acceptance in a worksite cafeteria?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Maya K. Vadiveloo

2017-12-01

Full Text Available Worksite cafeterias are compelling venues to improve diet quality through environmental changes.We conducted a pre-post study to evaluate how a cafeteria-initiated grill menu redesign influenced sales, revenue, and nutrient content of foods purchased. Secondly, we evaluated consumer opinions about menu changes to inform practices for worksite environment interventions. Monthly sales data (2012–2015 were used to compute gross sales and revenue of entrées and side dishes pre-post menu changes. Alternative protein sources replaced red meat; nutrient composition and nutrients purchased were compared using Food Pro software. Consumer responses were queried using online surveys; open-ended responses were analyzed using NVivo. Differences in sales and nutrient content pre-post menu redesign were tested with Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests. Gross sales of entrées (61 vs. 222servings/month; p=0.01 and side dishes (120 vs. 365servings/month; p=0.001 increased more than three-fold post-menu changes. Revenue from entrées (312 vs. 1144USD/month; p=0.01 and side dishes (238 vs. 914USD/month; p=0.001 also increased; per entrée, consumers purchased significantly more unsaturated fat (5g, and less saturated fat (3g and sodium (100mg. For side dishes, they purchased fewer calories (48kcal and unsaturated fat (2.9g, but more fiber (1.8g, and sodium (260mg. Four themes emerged from consumer responses: the importance of 1 variety, novelty, choice; 2 cost, affordability, value; 3 health; and 4 food quality, taste. Menu redesign can improve nutrient content, while also increasing sales and revenue. Multi-dimensional assessment of the nutritional, consumer, and retailer implications is desirable practice for enacting similar environmental changes. Keywords: Worksite health promotion, Food environment change, Consumer satisfaction, Menu redesign, Sales and revenue

Causas de variação nos preços de bovinos nelore elite no Brasil Causes of variation in the prices of nelore elite cattle in Brazil

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

João Cláudio do Carmo Paneto

2009-02-01

Full Text Available Este trabalho teve por objetivo estudar as causas de variação nos preços de bovinos da raça nelore pertencentes a rebanhos de seleção, os quais foram comercializados em leilões, para verificar as influências das avaliações genéticas e dos julgamentos de exterior sobre esses preços. Para tanto, foram computados os preços de venda de 426 bovinos da referida raça em 12 leilões ocorridos em diversas localidades brasileiras (regiões Centro-Oeste, Norte e Sudeste, entre os anos de 2002 e 2005. O valor médio foi de R$ 3.325,49, sendo o mínimo de R$ 1.400,00 e o máximo de R$ 10.500,00. Esses dados foram digitados juntamente com outras informações que eram apresentadas nos catálogos dos leilões. As informações registradas incluíram o sexo de cada animal, o nome do leilão e as DEPs informadas nos catálogos. Além da avaliação da influência das informações dos catálogos, também foi avaliada a influência das informações dos reprodutores, pais dos animais vendidos nos leilões, envolvendo suas DEPs publicadas em um sumário de reprodutores da raça e as pontuações de suas progênies em julgamentos. Os métodos estatísticos aplicados foram análises de variâncias e análises de agrupamento (método K-médias. Como resultado, foi observado que animais com superioridade genética em características relacionadas a desempenho ponderal, considerando-se os efeitos diretos e maternos, foram valorizados ao serem comercializados nos leilões. Em contra-partida, a pontuação dos reprodutores nos julgamentos não teve influência significativa sobre os preços médios de venda de suas progênies nos leilões.This study aimed to understand the causes of variation in the marketing prices of elite flock nelore cattle commercialized by auction, especially to verify the influences of EPDs and visual assessment. The selling prices of 426 animals from the nelore breed commercialized during 12 auctions held in various Brazilian

Price-capping in partially monopolistic electricity markets with an application to Italy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bosco, Bruno; Parisio, Lucia; Pelagatti, Matteo

2013-01-01

In many electricity markets the production capacity of a single supplier may be necessary to satisfy the total demand even when its competitors offer their total capacity. These pivotal suppliers are expected to sell at monopolistic prices on their portions of the market demand. In this paper, we show that these market conditions may imply the non-concavity in prices of the pivotal supply function, which in turn means that there can be situations in which a pivotal operator's supply has virtually no price limits. We also show that this monopolistic market power can be significantly reduced by vertical integration and/or regulatory policies such as virtual power plants. Based on these results, we propose a simple price-capping rule that induces the pivotal operator to compete for quantity instead of taking advantage of its monopoly. Then, we infer the profit function of the Italian pivotal operator (Enel) for the sample period 2007–2010 using real auction data and cost curves employed by engineers. We discuss the bidding behaviour of Enel and show how its profit function varies over time and in response to pro-competitive measures introduced during our sample period. We examine the existing price-cap and propose an alternative mechanism. - Highlights: ► We show the profit function of pivotal operators to be non-concave and unbounded. ► We propose a price-cap policy that foster pivotal operators to compete for quantity.► We apply our methodology to Enel and derive a price-cap for Italy. ► We find that vertical integration can be beneficial for moderating wholesale prices

A Note on the impact on sales from introducing healthy labeled meals on the lunch menu

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Thunström, Linda; Nordström, Leif Jonas

Menu labeling of prepared meals away from home is a policy designed to help consumers make healthier food choices. In this paper, we use a field experiment to analyze if a restaurant benefits from introducing a healthy labeled meal on its menu by experiencing an overall increase in sales. We cann...... reject the hypothesis that sales are the same before and after the introduction of a healthy labeled meal on the menu, i.e., our data does not support the idea that restaurants increase their sales from supplying a healthy labeled meal....

Forward and Spot Prices in Multi-Settlement Wholesale Electricity Markets

Science.gov (United States)

Larrieu, Jeremy

In organized wholesale electricity markets, power is sold competitively in a multi-unit multi-settlement single-price auction comprised of a forward and a spot market. This dissertation attempts to understand the structure of the forward premium in these markets, and to identify the factors that may lead forward and spot prices to converge or diverge. These markets are unique in that the forward demand is price-sensitive, while spot residual demand is perfectly inelastic and must be met in full, a crucial design feature the literature often glosses over. An important contribution of this dissertation is the explicit modeling of each market separately in order to understand how generation and load choose to act in each one, and the consequences of these actions on equilibrium prices and quantities given that firms maximize joint profits over both markets. In the first essay, I construct a two-settlement model of electricity prices in which firms that own asymmetric capacity-constrained units facing convex costs compete to meet demand from consumers, first in quantities, then in prices. I show that the forward premium depends on the costliness of spot production relative to firms' ability to exercise market power by setting quantities in the forward market. In the second essay, I test the model from the first essay with unit-level capacity and marginal cost data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). I show that the model closely replicates observed price formation in the CAISO. In the third essay, I estimate a time series model of the CAISO forward premium in order to measure the impact that virtual bidding has had on forward and spot price convergence in California between April 2009 and March 2014. I find virtual bidding to have caused forward and spot prices to diverge due to the large number of market participants looking to hedge against - or speculate on - the occurrence of infrequent but large spot price spikes by placing virtual demand bids.

Probabilistic properties of the continuous double auction

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Šmíd, Martin

2012-01-01

Roč. 48, č. 1 (2012), s. 50-82 ISSN 0023-5954 R&D Projects: GA ČR GAP402/10/1610; GA ČR GAP402/10/0956; GA ČR(CZ) GA402/06/1417 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z10750506 Keywords : continuous double auction * limit order market * distribution Subject RIV: BB - Applied Statistics, Operational Research Impact factor: 0.619, year: 2012 http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2012/E/smid-0372702.pdf

Restaurant menu labeling use among adults--17 states, 2012.

Science.gov (United States)

Lee-Kwan, Seung Hee; Pan, Liping; Maynard, Leah; Kumar, Gayathri; Park, Sohyun

2014-07-11

Many persons underestimate the calories in restaurant foods. Increased attention has been given to menu labeling (ML) as a way to provide consumers with point-of-purchase information that can help them reduce calorie intake and make healthier dietary choices. In 2010, a federal law was passed requiring restaurants with 20 or more establishments to display calorie information on menus and menu boards.* The regulations to implement this federal law have not been finalized, but some states and local jurisdictions have implemented their own ML policies, and many restaurants have already begun providing ML. To assess fast food and chain restaurant ML use by state and by demographic subgroup, CDC examined self-reported ML use by adults in 17 states that used the Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Menu Labeling optional module in the 2012 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey. Based on approximately 97% of adult BRFSS respondents who noticed ML information at restaurants, the estimated overall proportion of ML users in the 17 states was 57.3% (range = 48.7% in Montana to 61.3% in New York). The prevalence of ML use was higher among women than men for all states; the patterns varied by age group and race/ethnicity across states. States and public health professionals can use these findings to track the use of ML and to develop targeted interventions to increase awareness and use of ML among nonusers.

A new quantum sealed-bid auction protocol with secret order in post-confirmation

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Jing-Tao; Chen, Xiu-Bo; Xu, Gang; Meng, Xiang-Hua; Yang, Yi-Xian

2015-10-01

A new security protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction is proposed to resist the collusion attack from some malicious bidders. The most significant feature of this protocol is that bidders prepare their particles with secret order in post-confirmation for encoding bids. In addition, a new theorem and its proof are given based on the theory of combinatorial mathematics, which can be used as evaluation criteria for the collusion attack. It is shown that the new protocol is immune to the collusion attack and meets the demand for a secure auction. Compared with those previous protocols, the security, efficiency and availability of the proposed protocol are largely improved.

Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ying-jing Gu

2017-01-01

Full Text Available This paper attempts to establish a framework to help airline alliances effectively allocate their seat capacity with the purpose of maximizing alliances’ revenue. By assuming the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, the combinatorial auction model is constructed to optimize the allocation of the seat, and the revenue sharing method is established to share revenue between partners by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG mechanism. The result of the numerical study shows that the seat capacity allocation is effective even without information exchanging completely and the twofold revenue shares method shows more excitation for the airlines.

Efficiency Intra-Cluster Device-to-Device Relay Selection for Multicast Services Based on Combinatorial Auction

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yong Zhang

2015-12-01

Full Text Available In Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A networks, Device-to-device (D2D communications can be utilized to enhance the performance of multicast services by leveraging D2D relays to serve nodes with worse channel conditions within a cluster. For traditional D2D relay schemes, D2D links with poor channel condition may be the bottleneck of system sum data rate. In this paper, to optimize the throughput of D2D communications, we introduce an iterative combinatorial auction algorithm for efficient D2D relay selection. In combinatorial auctions, the User Equipments (UEs that fails to correctly receive multicast data from eNodeB (eNB are viewed as bidders that compete for D2D relays, while the eNB is treated as the auctioneer. We also give properties of convergency and low-complexity and present numerical simulations to verify the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.

The implications of free allocation versus auctioning of EU ETS allowances for the power sector in the Netherlands

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sijm, J.P.M.; Hers, J.S.; Lise, W.

2008-12-01

The main objective of the present study is to analyse the implications of shifting from free allocation to auctioning of EU ETS allowances (EUAs) for the power sector in the Netherlands. In order to achieve this objective, this study has used three methodological approaches, including theoretical, empirical and model analyses of the impact of free allocations versus auctioning of EUAs on the power sector, notably in the Netherlands. In addition, as Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plays a major role in the electricity sector of the Netherlands, the present study also pays some particular attention to the implications of shifting from free allocation to EUA auctioning for the CHP sector in the Netherlands

What's on the menu? A review of the energy and nutritional content of US chain restaurant menus.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Helen W; Sturm, Roland

2013-01-01

The present study aimed to (i) describe the availability of nutrition information in major chain restaurants, (ii) document the energy and nutrient levels of menu items, (iii) evaluate relationships with restaurant characteristics, menu labelling and trans fat laws, and nutrition information accessibility, and (iv) compare energy and nutrient levels against industry-sponsored and government-issued nutrition criteria. Descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis of the energy, total fat, saturated fat, trans fat, sodium, carbohydrate and protein levels of 29 531 regular and 1392 children's menu items [corrected]. Energy and nutrition information provided on restaurant websites or upon request, and secondary databases on restaurant characteristics. The top 400 US chain restaurants by sales, based on the 2009 list of the Restaurants & Institutions magazine. Complete nutrition information was reported for 245 (61 %) restaurants. Appetizers had more energy, fat and sodium than all other item types. Children's menu specialty beverages had more fat, saturated fat and carbohydrates than comparable regular menu beverages. The majority of main entrées fell below one-third of the US Department of Agriculture's estimated daily energy needs, but as few as 3 % were also within limits for sodium, fat and saturated fat. Main entrées had significantly more energy, fat and saturated fat in family-style restaurants than in fast-food restaurants. Restaurants that made nutrition information easily accessible on websites had significantly lower energy, fat and sodium contents across menu offerings than those providing information only upon request. The paper provides a comprehensive view of chain restaurant menu nutrition prior to nationwide labelling laws. It offers baseline data to evaluate how restaurants respond after laws are implemented.

Surveying Libraries to Identify Best Practices for a Menu Approach for Library Instruction Requests

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Candice Benjes-Small

2009-11-01

Full Text Available A challenging situation has developed in regards to library instruction. With increases in both the quantity of information and the variety of information technologies being made available to researchers, the information literacy landscape is getting more complex. Simultaneously, the time allotted for library instruction is remaining essentially the same. In order to market the breadth of content available for library instruction sessions and to promote collaboration between librarians and teaching faculty in order to create optimal instruction sessions an 'a la carte menu' approach to library instruction requests was adopted by Radford University in 2004. Since the late 1990s a number of community colleges and universities have included some type of menu in their instruction request forms or documentation and the authors desired to understand what approach these institutions had taken and whether they were effective in marketing instruction and improving communication between library instructors and teaching faculty. They analyzed forty-seven adaptations of the menu available on the web and surveyed the librarians who created them. In this article the authors present the findings of the web analysis and the survey, and recommendations are given for using the menu approach to library instruction requests.

9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and...

Relationship Between Timing of Multiple Retention Bonuses and the Quality of Officers Retained on the Cost Savings for the Navy

Science.gov (United States)

2016-12-01

psychologically anchor an item’s value at a high price before lowering it until one bidder accepts, earning its name from the way cut flowers are sold...Using the standard bonus system compared to the uniform price auction, the Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) auction, and Combinatorial Retention...NUMBER OF PAGES 85 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified 19

Can we restrict the health care menu?

Science.gov (United States)

Klein, R

1994-02-01

The case of Britain's National Health Service is used to illuminate the cross-national debate about whether the availability of health care should be restricted and, if so, how this should be done. Traditionally, the NHS relied on implicit rationing by clinicians within budgetary constraints set by government. However, the logic of the 1989 reforms appeared to require explicit decisions about the packages of health care to be provided to local populations. In practice, purchasers have refused to define such packages. Explicit rationing remains very much the exception. Exploring the reasons for this suggests that defining a restricted menu of health care, by adopting a cost-utility approach and excluding specific procedures or forms of treatment on the Oregon model, is only one of many policy options. There is a large repertory of policy tools for balancing demands and resources, ranging from diluting the intensity of treatment to its earlier termination. Given that health care is characterised by uncertainty, lack of information about outcomes and patient heterogeneity, it may therefore be more 'rational' to diffuse decision-making among clinicians and managers than to try to move towards a centrally determined menu of entitlements.

The History and Impact of the New York City Menu-Labeling Law

OpenAIRE

Bernell, Brent

2010-01-01

As a result of the recent federal health care legislation, all restaurants in the United States that are part of a chain with twenty or more locations will be required to post the calorie information of the food they serve directly on the menu or menu board. This development represents the culmination of a regulatory initiative to combat the growth of obesity that only began in 2006 with the decision by the New York City Board of Health to require calorie posting in New York City chain resta...

Auction-Based Cloud Service Pricing and Penalty with Availability on Demand

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xiaohong Wu

2018-04-01

Full Text Available Availability is one of the main concerns of cloud users, and cloud providers always try to provide higher availability to improve user satisfaction. However, higher availability results in higher provider costs and lower social welfare. In this paper, taking into account both the users’ valuation and desired availability, we design resource allocation, pricing and penalty mechanisms with availability on demand. Considering two scenarios: public availability in which the desired availabilities of all users are public information, and private availability in which the desired availabilities are private information of users, and, analyzing the possible behaviours of users, we design a truthful deterministic mechanism with 2-approximation in public availability scenario and a universal truthful mechanism with 1 1 + γ approximation in private availability scenario, where γ is the backup ratio of resources with the highest availability. The experiment results show that our mechanisms significantly improve the social welfare compared to the mechanism without considering availability demand of users.

Making Marketing Principles Tangible: Online Auctions as Living Case Studies

Science.gov (United States)

Wood, Charles M.; Suter, Tracy A.

2004-01-01

This article presents an effective course supplement for Principles of Marketing classes. An experiential project involving online auctions is offered to instructors seeking to create a more participatory student environment and an interactive teaching style. A number of learning points are illustrated that allow instructors to use an auction…

An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Talman, A.J.J.; Yang, Z.F.

2011-01-01

An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to

How (not) to design procurement mechanisms: A laboratory experiment

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Onderstal, S.; van de Meerendonk, A.

2008-01-01

In this paper, we examine the relative performance of three commonly used procurement mechanisms: price-only auctions, scoring auctions, and benchmarking. We do so both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. We find that the auctions yield the same level of welfare, and welfare dominate

78 FR 79030 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-12-27

... Volatility Closing Auction price is based on rational and based on current market conditions. The Exchange... only differences between the processing of a Halt Auction and a Volatility Closing Auction are that: (1... rational and based on current market conditions. Finally, the Exchange reiterates that it retains...

Preemption and the obesity epidemic: state and local menu labeling laws and the nutrition labeling and education act.

Science.gov (United States)

Rutkow, Lainie; Vernick, Jon S; Hodge, James G; Teret, Stephen P

2008-01-01

Obesity is widely recognized as a preventable cause of death and disease. Reducing obesity among adults and children has become a national health goal in the United States. As one approach to the obesity epidemic, public health practitioners and others have asserted the need to provide consumers with information about the foods they eat. Some state and local governments across the United States have introduced menu labeling bills and regulations that require restaurants to post information, such as calorie content, for foods offered on their menus or menu boards. A major dilemma is whether state and local menu labeling laws are preempted by the federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA). While few courts have addressed this issue, ongoing litigation in New York City provides an early glimpse of judicial interpretation in this area. This article explores these preemption issues, arguing that appropriately written and implemented menu labeling laws should not be preempted by the NLEA. We offer guidance for states and localities that wish to develop and implement menu labeling laws.

6 essays about auctions: a theoretical and empirical analysis. Application to power markets; 6 Essais sur les encheres: approches theorique et empirique. Application aux marches de l'electricite

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lamy, L

2007-06-15

This thesis is devoted to a theoretical and empirical analysis of auction mechanisms. Motivated by allocation issues in network industries, in particular by the liberalization of the electricity sector, it focus on auctions with externalities (either allocative or informational) and on multi-objects auctions. After an introduction which provides a survey of the use and the analysis of auctions in power markets, six chapters make this thesis. The first one considers standard auctions in Milgrom-Weber's model with interdependent valuations when the seller can not commit not to participate in the auction. The second and third chapters study the combinatorial auction mechanism proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom. The first of these two studies proposes a modification of this format with a final discount stage and clarifies the theoretical status of those formats, in particular the conditions such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. Motivated by the robustness issues of the generalizations of the Ausubel-Milgrom and the Vickrey combinatorial auctions to environments with allocative externalities between joint-purchasers, the second one characterizes the buyer-sub-modularity condition in a general model with allocative identity-dependent externalities between purchasers. In a complete information setup, the fourth chapter analyses the optimal design problem when the commitment abilities of the principal are reduced, namely she can not commit to a simultaneous participation game. The fifth chapter is devoted to the structural analysis of the private value auction model for a single-unit when the econometrician can not observe bidders' identities. The asymmetric independent private value (IPV) model is identified. A multi-step kernel-based estimator is proposed and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Using auctions data for the anglo-french electric Interconnector, the last chapter analyses a multi-unit ascending auctions through reduced forms. (author)