The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

Operation safety at Ignalina NPP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zheltobriukh, G.

1999-01-01

An improvement of operational safety at Ignalina NPP covers: improvement of management structure and safety culture; symptom-based emergency operating procedures; staff training and full scope simulator; program of components ageing; metal inspection; improvement of fire safety. The first plan of Ignalina NPP Safety culture development for 1997 purposed to the SAR recommendation implementation was prepared and approved by the General Director

Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

Science.gov (United States)

Cotton, William B.; Hilb, Robert; Koczo, Stefan, Jr.; Wing, David J.

2016-01-01

A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

Safe operation of nuclear power plants - Is safety culture an adequate management method?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Piirto, A.

2012-01-01

One of the characteristics of a good safety culture is a definable commitment to the improvement of safety behaviours and attitudes at all organisational levels. A second characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is free and open communication. The general understanding has been that safety culture is a part of organisation culture. In addition to safety culture thinking, proactive programmes and displays of proactive work to improve safety are required. This work needs to include, qt a minimum, actions aiming at reducing human errors, the development of human error prevention tools, improvements in training, and the development of working methods and the organisation's activities. Safety depends not only on the technical systems, but also on the organisation. There is a need for better methods and tools for organisational assessment and development. Today there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management and organisational factors have over the safety significance of complex industrial installations such as nuclear power plants. Many events with significant economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to management deficiencies. The objective of this study is development of new methods to increase safety of nuclear power plant operation. The research has been limited to commercial nuclear power plants that are intended for electrical power generation in Finland. Their production activities, especially operation and maintenance, are primarily reviewed from a safety point of view, as well as human performance and organisational factors perspective. This defines the scope and focus of the study. The research includes studies related to knowledge management and tacit knowledge in the project management context and specific studies related to transfer of tacit knowledge in the maintenance organization and transfer of tacit knowledge between workers of old generation and young generation. The empirical results

Safe operation of nuclear power plants - Is safety culture an adequate management method?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Piirto, A.

2012-07-01

One of the characteristics of a good safety culture is a definable commitment to the improvement of safety behaviours and attitudes at all organisational levels. A second characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is free and open communication. The general understanding has been that safety culture is a part of organisation culture. In addition to safety culture thinking, proactive programmes and displays of proactive work to improve safety are required. This work needs to include, qt a minimum, actions aiming at reducing human errors, the development of human error prevention tools, improvements in training, and the development of working methods and the organisation's activities. Safety depends not only on the technical systems, but also on the organisation. There is a need for better methods and tools for organisational assessment and development. Today there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management and organisational factors have over the safety significance of complex industrial installations such as nuclear power plants. Many events with significant economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to management deficiencies. The objective of this study is development of new methods to increase safety of nuclear power plant operation. The research has been limited to commercial nuclear power plants that are intended for electrical power generation in Finland. Their production activities, especially operation and maintenance, are primarily reviewed from a safety point of view, as well as human performance and organisational factors perspective. This defines the scope and focus of the study. The research includes studies related to knowledge management and tacit knowledge in the project management context and specific studies related to transfer of tacit knowledge in the maintenance organization and transfer of tacit knowledge between workers of old generation and young generation. The empirical

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

Science.gov (United States)

Johnson, Teresa A.

2006-01-01

Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

Management of operational safety in nuclear power plants. INSAG-13. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. Engineering issues have received close attention from the nuclear community over many years. However, it is only in the last decade or so that organizational and cultural issues have been identified as vital to achieving safe operation. INSAG's publication No. 4 has been widely recognized as a milestone in advancing thinking about safety culture in the nuclear community and more widely. The present report deals with the framework for safety management that is necessary in organizations in order to promote safety culture. It deals with the general principles underlying the management of operational safety in a systematic way and provides guidance on good practices. It also draws on the results of audits and reviews to highlight how shortfalls in safety management have led to incidents at nuclear power plants. In addition, several specific issues are raised which are particularly topical in view of organizational changes that are taking place in the nuclear industry in various countries. Advice is given on how safety can be managed during organizational change, how safety

Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Paciga, J [New Brunswick Power, Point Lepreau NGS, PQ (Canada)

1997-12-01

Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau nuclear power plant is described, including technical issues (station aging, definition of the safe operating envelope, design configuration management, code validation, safety analysis and engineering standards); regulatory issues (action items, probabilistic safety assessment, event investigation, periodic safety review, prioritization of regulatory issues, cost benefit assessment); human performance issues (goals and measures, expectations and accountability, supervisory training, safety culture, configuration management, quality of operations and maintenance).

Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paciga, J.

1997-01-01

Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau nuclear power plant is described, including technical issues (station aging, definition of the safe operating envelope, design configuration management, code validation, safety analysis and engineering standards); regulatory issues (action items, probabilistic safety assessment, event investigation, periodic safety review, prioritization of regulatory issues, cost benefit assessment); human performance issues (goals and measures, expectations and accountability, supervisory training, safety culture, configuration management, quality of operations and maintenance)

Operation safety of complex industrial systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zwingelstein, G.

1999-01-01

Zero fault or zero risk is an unreachable goal in industrial activities like nuclear activities. However, methods and techniques exist to reduce the risks to the lowest possible and acceptable level. The operation safety consists in the recognition, evaluation, prediction, measurement and mastery of technological and human faults. This paper analyses each of these points successively: 1 - evolution of operation safety; 2 - definitions and basic concepts: failure, missions and functions of a system and of its components, basic concepts and operation safety; 3 - forecasting analysis of operation safety: reliability data, data-banks, precautions for the use of experience feedback data; realization of an operation safety study: management of operation safety, quality assurance, critical review and audit of operation safety studies; 6 - conclusions. (J.S.)

Operational safety of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tanguy, P.

1987-01-01

The operational safety of nuclear power plants has become an important safety issue since the Chernobyl accident. A description is given of the various aspects of operational safety, including the importance of human factors, responsibility, the role and training of the operator, the operator-machine interface, commissioning and operating procedures, experience feedback, and maintenance. The lessons to be learnt from Chernobyl are considered with respect to operator errors and the management of severe accidents. Training of personnel, operating experience feedback, actions to be taken in case of severe accidents, and international cooperation in the field of operational safety, are also discussed. (U.K.)

Operation of TRR-1/M1 for 25 years and lessons learned in management of safety and safety culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keinmeesuke, Sirichai

2002-01-01

The first Thai Research Reactor, TRR-1, was installed and put into operation in 1962. In 1975 the reactor was converted to a 2 MW TRIGA Mark III by replacing of the reactor core and the control system. The renamed TRR-1/M1 research reactor went critical again in November 1977. TRR-1/M1 has been operated safely for 25 years with its main utilization in research, isotope production and training. Safety management and safety culture have been implemented for 25 years both in the legislation level and the operation level. There was no nuclear incident and there were a few radiological incidents during the 25 years of operation of TRR-1/M1. The lessons learned from the incident events such as the release of N-16 and Ar-41, the release of radioactive Bromine gave valued opportunities to improve our operation procedure, safety procedure and safety culture. All type of activities with respect to safety culture such as individual awareness, commitment, motivation, supervision and responsibility have been seriously reviewed and being set as normal practices. (author)

TYPICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AN OPERATOR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alexander Michaylovich Lushkin

2017-01-01

Full Text Available In order to implement the concept of acceptable risk all airlines should have the Safety Management System (SMS from 01.01.2009 - at the request of ICAO and from 01.01.2010 - at the request of the Federal Air Transport Agen- cy. State requirements for SMS have not been formulated clearly. Leading airlines, in an effort to meet international stand- ards, develop and implement SMS on their own. So the implemented SMS differ in control settings (level of safety, proce- dures and methodological support of the processes of safety management. The summary of the best experience in develop- ment, implementation and improvement of SMS in leading airlines, allows to create a standard SMS to the airline, where the basic procedures required by the standards are systematized. The standard SMS is formed on experience in design, implementation and development of corporate SMS in three leading Russian airlines, in which the author worked in 2006-2015, and can be the basis of an SMS of the airlines operat- ing the planes and helicopters. Taken into account in a typical SMS requirements of international and national standards, research results, developed and implemented methodical maintenance of management procedures level of safety, contribut- ed to the successful passage of IATA periodic audits on developing standards of operational safety IOSA by the airline members and achieve the best level of safety not only in Russia but also in the world.

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of proper site selection, design, construction and commissioning, and the evaluation of these, followed by proper management, operation and maintenance of the plant. In a later phase, a proper transition to decommissioning is required. The organization and management of plant operations ensures that a high level of safety is achieved through the effective management and control of operational activities. This publication is a revision of the Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 2000 as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2. The purpose of this revision was to restructure Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 in the light of new operating experience and new trends in the nuclear industry; to introduce new requirements that were not included in Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 on the operation of nuclear power plants; and to reflect current practices, new concepts and technical developments. This update also reflects feedback on the use of the standards, both from Member States and from the IAEA's safety related activities. The publication is presented in the new format for Safety Requirements publications. The present publication reflects the safety principles of the Fundamental Safety Principles. It has been harmonized with IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3 on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Guidance on the fulfilment of the safety requirements is provided in supporting Safety Guides. The terminology used in this publication is defined and explained in the IAEA Safety Glossary. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. This

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

CloudSat Safety Operations at Vandenberg AFB

Science.gov (United States)

Greenberg, Steve

2006-01-01

CloudSat safety operations at Vendenberg AFB is given. The topics include: 1) CloudSat Project Overview; 2) Vandenberg Ground Operations; 3) Delta II Launch Vehicle; 4) The A-Train; 5) System Safety Management; 6) CALIPSO Hazards Assessment; 7) CALIPSO Supplemental Safeguards; 8) Joint System Safety Operations; 9) Extended Stand-down; 10) Launch Delay Safety Concerns; and 11) Lessons Learned.

Implementing process safety management in gas processing operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodman, D.L.

1992-01-01

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard entitled Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents was finalized February 24, 1992. The purpose of the standard is to prevent or minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals. OSHA believes that its rule will accomplish this goal by requiring a comprehensive management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. Gas Processors Association (GPA) member companies are significantly impacted by this major standard, the requirements of which are extensive and complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements of the standard and to discuss the elements to consider in developing and implementing a viable long term Process Safety Management Program

Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong NGS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bong-Seob, Han [Korea Electric Power Corp., Wolson NPP no. 1 and 2 (Korea, Republic of)

1997-12-01

Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong nuclear power plant is described, including the following issues: site selection; plant history; operational goals; operational guidelines; reactor safety; safety training; plant maintenance; management of plant equipment lifetime; future tasks.

Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong NGS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Han Bong-Seob

1997-01-01

Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong nuclear power plant is described, including the following issues: site selection; plant history; operational goals; operational guidelines; reactor safety; safety training; plant maintenance; management of plant equipment lifetime; future tasks

Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

Safety Evakuation Of Triga-2000 Reactor Operation Viewed From Safety Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Karliana, Itjeu

2001-01-01

The safety evaluation activities of TRIGA-2000 operation viewed from safety culture performed by questioners data collected from the operators and supervisor site of TRIGA-2000 P3TN, Bandung. There are 9 activity aspects surveyed, for instant to avail the policy of safety from their chairman, safety management, education and training, emergency aids planning, safety consultancy, accident information, safety analysis, safety devices, safety and occupational health. The surveying undertaken by filling the questioner that containing of 9 activity aspects and 20 samples of employees. The safety evaluation results' of the operation personnel in TRIGA-2000 P3TN are good implemented by both the operators and supervisors should be improve and attention need to provide the equipment's. The education and training especially for safety refreshment must be performing

Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants. INSAG-13. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (Russian Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. Engineering issues have received close attention from the nuclear community over many years. However, it is only in the last decade or so that organizational and cultural issues have been identified as vital to achieving safe operation. INSAG's publication No. 4 has been widely recognized as a milestone in advancing thinking about safety culture in the nuclear community and more widely. The present report deals with the framework for safety management that is necessary in organizations in order to promote safety culture. It deals with the general principles underlying the management of operational safety in a systematic way and provides guidance on good practices. It also draws on the results of audits and reviews to highlight how shortfalls in safety management have led to incidents at nuclear power plants. In addition, several specific issues are raised which are particularly topical in view of organizational changes that are taking place in the nuclear industry in various countries. Advice is given on how safety can be managed during organizational change, how

Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO Safety Management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

2008-01-01

Safety is the fundamental principal upon which the management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of the safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi-purpose research reactor and achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation like the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops, the development of safety culture indicators, the survey on the attitude of safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e-Learning program for safety education. (author)

Operating experience: safety perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Piplani, Vivek; Krishnamurthy, P.R.; Kumar, Neeraj; Upadhyay, Devendra

2015-01-01

Operating Experience (OE) provides valuable information for improving NPP safety. This may include events, precursors, deviations, deficiencies, problems, new insights to safety, good practices, lessons and corrective actions. As per INSAG-10, an OE program caters as a fundamental means for enhancing the defence-in-depth at NPPs and hence should be viewed as ‘Continuous Safety Performance Improvement Tool’. The ‘Convention on Nuclear Safety’ also recognizes the OE as a tool of high importance for enhancing the NPP safety and its Article 19 mandates each contracting party to establish an effective OE program at operating NPPs. The lessons drawn from major accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi NPPs had prompted nuclear stalwarts to change their safety perspective towards NPPs and to frame sound policies on issues like safety culture, severe accident prevention and mitigation. An effective OE program, besides correcting current/potential problems, help in proactively improving the NPP design, operating and maintenance procedures, practices, training, etc., and thus plays vital role in ensuring safe and efficient operation of NPPs. Further it enhances knowledge with regard to equipment operating characteristics, system performance trends and provides data for quantitative and qualitative safety analysis. Besides all above, an OE program inculcates a learning culture in the organisation and thus helps in continuously enhancing the expertise, technical competency and knowledge base of its staff. Nuclear and Radiation Facilities in India are regulated by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Operating Plants Safety Division (OPSD) of AERB is involved in managing operating experience activities. This paper provides insights about the operating experience program of OPSD, AERB (including its on-line data base namely OPSD STAR) and its utilisation in improving the regulations and safety at Indian NPPs/projects. (author)

Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2008-11-15

Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose.

Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

2008-01-01

Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose

Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richey, C.R.

1979-08-01

The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

Management systems in production operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walters, K.B.; Henderson, G.

1993-01-01

The Cullen Enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in the U.K. North Sea recommended that an operator should formally present it's company Management System and demonstrate how safety is achieved throughout the life cycle of a platform, from design through operation to abandonment. Brunei Shell Petroleum has prepared a corporate level Safety Management System. As part of Safety Case work, the corporate system is being extended to include the development of specific Management Systems with particular emphasis on offshore production operations involving integrated oil and gas facilities. This paper will describe the development of Management Systems, which includes an intensive Business Process Analysis and will comment upon it's applicability and relationship to ISO 9000. The paper will further describe the applicability and benefits of Management Systems and offer guidance on required effort. The paper will conclude that development of structured Management Systems for safety critical business processes is worthwhile but prioritization of effort will be necessary. As such the full adoption of Management Systems will be directional in nature

Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2008-11-15

Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose.

Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo

2008-01-01

Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose

Risk Assessment for Bridges Safety Management during Operation Based on Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xia Hanyu

2016-01-01

Full Text Available In recent years, large span and large sea-crossing bridges are built, bridges accidents caused by improper operational management occur frequently. In order to explore the better methods for risk assessment of the bridges operation departments, the method based on fuzzy clustering algorithm is selected. Then, the implementation steps of fuzzy clustering algorithm are described, the risk evaluation system is built, and Taizhou Bridge is selected as an example, the quantitation of risk factors is described. After that, the clustering algorithm based on fuzzy equivalence is calculated on MATLAB 2010a. In the last, Taizhou Bridge operation management departments are classified and sorted according to the degree of risk, and the safety situation of operation departments is analyzed.

Management of safety, safety culture and self assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carnino, A.

2000-01-01

Safety management is the term used for the measures required to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of an installation, including decommissioning. The safety culture concept and its implementation are described in part one of the paper. The principles of safety are now quite well known and are implemented worldwide. It leads to a situation where harmonization is being achieved as indicated by the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. To go beyond the present nuclear safety levels, management of safety and safety culture will be the means for achieving progress. Recent events which took place in major nuclear power countries have shown the importance of the management and the consequences on safety. At the same time, electricity deregulation is coming and will impact on safety through reductions in staffing and in operation and maintenance cost at nuclear installations. Management of safety as well as its control and monitoring by the safety authorities become a key to the future of nuclear energy.(author)

Crew resource management training adapted to nuclear power plant operators for enhancing safety attitude

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ishibashi, Akira; Kitamura, Masaharu; Takahashi, Makoto

2015-01-01

A conventional training program for nuclear power plant operators mainly focuses on the improvement of knowledge and skills of individual operators. Although it has certainly contributed to safety operation of nuclear power plants, some recent incidents have indicated the necessity of an additional training program aiming at the improvement of team performance. In the aviation domain, crew resource management (CRM) training has demonstrated the effectiveness in resolving team management issues of flight crews, aircraft maintenance crews, and so on. In the present research, we attempt to introduce the CRM concept into operator training in nuclear power plant for the training of conceptual skill (that is, non-technical skill). In this paper an adapted CRM training for nuclear power plant operators is proposed. The proposed training method has been practically utilized in the training course of the managers of nuclear power plants. (author)

Management of safety and safety culture at the NPPs of Ukraine

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koltakov, Vladimir

2002-01-01

The report contains general aspects of safety and safety culture. The brief description of operational characteristics and basic indexes of atomic power plants at the Ukraine are represented. The information referring to structure of NPPs of Operation organization license-holder, safety responsibility of both Regulatory and Utility Bodies also is given. The main part of the report include seven sections: 1. Practical application of safety management models; 2. erspective on the relationship between safety management and safety culture; 3. The role of leadership in achieving high standards of safety; 4. Current and future challengers that impact on safety culture and safety management (e.g. the impact of competition, changing, economic and political circumstances, workforce demographics, etc.); 5. Key lessons learned from major events; 6. Practical applications of safety culture concepts (e.g. learning organizations, training staff communications, etc.); 7. dvance in human performance. Some of the main pending safety and safety culture problems that are necessary to achieve in the near future are mentioned

Safety Management and Safety Culture Self Assessment of Kartini Research Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Syarip, S., E-mail: syarip@batan.go.id [Centre for Accelerator and Material Process Technology, National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), Yogyakarta (Indonesia)

2014-10-15

The self-assessment of safety culture and safety management status of Kartini research reactor is a step to foster safety culture and management by identifying good practices and areas for improvement, and also to improve reactor safety in a whole. The method used in this assessment is based on questionnaires provided by the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), then reviewed by experts. Based on the assessment and evaluation results, it can be concluded that there were several good practices in maintaining the safety status of Kartini reactor such as: reactor operators and radiation protection workers were aware and knowledgeable of the safety standards and policies that apply to their operation, readily accept constructive criticism from their management and from the inspectors of regulatory body that address safety performance. As a proof, for the last four years the number of inspection/audit findings from Regulatory Body (BAPETEN) tended to decrease while the reactor utilization and its operating hour increased. On the other hands there were also some comments and recommendations for improvement of reactor safety culture, such as that there should be more frequent open dialogues between employees and managers, to grow and attain a mutual support to achieve safety goals. (author)

The enhancement of Ignalina NPP in design and operational safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Negrivoda, G.

1999-01-01

Enhancement of Ignalina NPP design include: core design improvements; fuel channel integrity (multiple pressure tube rupture); improvements of shutdown systems; improvements of instrumentation and control devices; containment strength and tightness; design basis accident analysis; improvements of safety and support systems; seismic safety enhancement; Year 2000 project; cracks in pipes. Enhancement of operational safety includes: quality assurance; configuration management; safety management and safety culture; emergency operating procedures; training and full scope simulator; in-service inspection; fire protection and ageing monitoring and management

Analysis and design on airport safety information management system

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yan Lin

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Airport safety information management system is the foundation of implementing safety operation, risk control, safety performance monitor, and safety management decision for the airport. The paper puts forward the architecture of airport safety information management system based on B/S model, focuses on safety information processing flow, designs the functional modules and proposes the supporting conditions for system operation. The system construction is helpful to perfecting the long effect mechanism driven by safety information, continually increasing airport safety management level and control proficiency．

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (French Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Arabic Edition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-10-15

This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

Microbiological performance of a food safety management system in a food service operation.

Science.gov (United States)

Lahou, E; Jacxsens, L; Daelman, J; Van Landeghem, F; Uyttendaele, M

2012-04-01

The microbiological performance of a food safety management system in a food service operation was measured using a microbiological assessment scheme as a vertical sampling plan throughout the production process, from raw materials to final product. The assessment scheme can give insight into the microbiological contamination and the variability of a production process and pinpoint bottlenecks in the food safety management system. Three production processes were evaluated: a high-risk sandwich production process (involving raw meat preparation), a medium-risk hot meal production process (starting from undercooked raw materials), and a low-risk hot meal production process (reheating in a bag). Microbial quality parameters, hygiene indicators, and relevant pathogens (Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella, Bacillus cereus, and Escherichia coli O157) were in accordance with legal criteria and/or microbiological guidelines, suggesting that the food safety management system was effective. High levels of total aerobic bacteria (>3.9 log CFU/50 cm(2)) were noted occasionally on gloves of food handlers and on food contact surfaces, especially in high contamination areas (e.g., during handling of raw material, preparation room). Core control activities such as hand hygiene of personnel and cleaning and disinfection (especially in highly contaminated areas) were considered points of attention. The present sampling plan was used to produce an overall microbiological profile (snapshot) to validate the food safety management system in place.

Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

HFETR operation management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu Rong; Yang Shuchun; Peng Jun; Zhou Shoukang

2003-01-01

Experiences and work methods with High Flux Engineering Test Reactor (HFETR) operation are introduced, which have been accumulated in a long period of operation, in the aspects as reactor operation, test, maintenance, operator training and incident management. It's clear that the safety operation of HFETR has been ensured, and the methods are valid. (authors)

Study of industry safety management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Pil Su

1987-06-01

This book deals with general remarks, industrial accidents, statistics of industrial accidents, unsafe actions, making machinery and facilities safe, safe activities, having working environment safe, survey of industrial accidents and analysis of causes, system of safety management and operations, safety management planning, safety education, human engineering such as human-machines system, system safety, and costs of disaster losses. It lastly adds individual protective equipment and working clothes including protect equipment for eyes, face, hands, arms and feet.

The Patient Safety Attitudes among the Operating Room Personnel

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cherdsak Iramaneerat

2016-07-01

Full Text Available Background: The first step in cultivating the culture of safety in the operating room is the assessment of safety culture among operating room personnel. Objective: To assess the patient safety culture of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Faculty of Medicine Siriraj Hospital, and compare attitudes among different groups of personnel, and compare them with the international standards. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of safety attitudes among 396 operating room personnel, using a short form of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ. The SAQ employed 30 items to assess safety culture in six dimensions: teamwork climate, safety climate, stress recognition, perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction. The subscore of each dimension was calculated and converted to a scale score with a full score of 100, where higher scores indicated better safety attitudes. Results: The response rate was 66.4%. The overall safety culture score of the operating room personnel was 65.02, higher than an international average (61.80. Operating room personnel at Siriraj Hospital had safety attitudes in teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition lower than the international average, but had safety attitudes in the perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction higher than the international average. Conclusion: The safety culture attitudes of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Siriraj Hospital were comparable to international standards. The safety dimensions that Siriraj Hospital operating room should try to improve were teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition.

Nuclear safety culture and integrated risk management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joksimovich, V.; Orvis, D.D.

1993-01-01

A primary focus of nuclear safety is the prevention of large releases of radioactivity in the case of low-probability severe accidents. An analysis of the anatomy of nuclear (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island Unit 2) and nonnuclear (Challenger, Bhopal, Piper Alpha, etc.) severe accidents yields four broad categories of root causes: human (operating crew response), machine (design with its basic flaws), media (natural phenomena, operational considerations, political environment, commercial pressures, etc.)-providing triggering events, and management (basic organizational safety culture flaws). A strong management can minimize the contributions of humans, machines, and media to the risk arising from the operation of hazardous facilities. One way that management can have a powerful positive influence is through the establishment of a proper safety culture. The term safety culture is used as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency's International Safety Advisory Group

Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S.

1995-05-01

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities

Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States). School of Engineering and Applied Science; Delicate, W.S. [KEVRIC Co., Inc., Silver Spring, MD (United States)

1995-05-01

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

Enhancing operational nuclear safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sengoku, Katsuhisa

2008-01-01

Since Chernobyl, the dictum A n accident anywhere is an accident everywhere i s a globally shared perception. The paper presents challenges to the international nuclear community: globalization, sustainable and dynamic development, secure, safe and clean energy supply, nuclear r enaissance , public concern for nuclear safety, nuclear security, and technology and management. Strong national safety infrastructures and international cooperation are required to maintain a high level of nuclear safety and security worldwide. There is an increasing number of countries thinking of going nuclear: Morocco, Indonesia, Iran, Poland, Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Vietnam, Chile, Nigeria, Malaysia, Thailand, Uruguay, Tunisia, Algeria. Another serious incident will jeopardize the prospect of nuclear renaissance. Safety and security are preconditions for countries newly introducing NPP as well as for those with mature nuclear programmes. The Global Nuclear Safety Regime (GNSR) is referred to as the institutional, legal and technical framework to achieve worldwide implementation of the safety of nuclear installations. At the top of the framework is the Convention on Nuclear Safety which covers the nuclear power plants. The convention has 56 contracting parties which meet triennially where national reports are presented and subject to the review of peers. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) undertakes a programme to foster the GNSR through the establishment of IAEA safety standards and related publications. The programme provides for the application of standards for the (1) safety of nuclear installations, (2) safety of radioactive sources, (3) safe transport of radioactive material and (4) management of radioactive waste. It also provides for the security of nuclear installations, nuclear material and radioactive material. The safety standards hierarchy is as follows: safety fundamental, safety requirements and safety guides. The safety fundamentals are the bases for IAEA

Aviation’s Normal Operations Safety Audit: a safety management and educational tool for health care? Results of a small-scale trial

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bennett SA

2017-08-01

Full Text Available Simon A Bennett Civil Safety and Security Unit, School of Business, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK Background: A National Health Service (NHS contingent liability for medical error claims of over £26 billion. Objectives: To evaluate the safety management and educational benefits of adapting aviation’s Normal Operations Safety Audit (NOSA to health care. Methods: In vivo research, a NOSA was performed by medical students at an English NHS Trust. After receiving training from the author, the students spent 6 days gathering data under his supervision. Results: The data revealed a threat-rich environment, where errors – some consequential – were made (359 threats and 86 errors were recorded over 2 weeks. The students claimed that the exercise improved their observational, investigative, communication, teamworking and other nontechnical skills. Conclusion: NOSA is potentially an effective safety management and educational tool for health care. It is suggested that 1 the UK General Medical Council mandates that all medical students perform a NOSA in fulfillment of their degree; 2 the participating NHS Trusts be encouraged to act on students’ findings; and 3 the UK Department of Health adopts NOSA as a cornerstone risk assessment and management tool. Keywords: aviation, safety audit, health care, management benefits, educational benefits

Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-01-01

This Guide identifies the main objectives and responsibilities of management with respect to safe operation of nuclear power plants. The Guide discusses the factors to be considered in structuring the operating organization to meet these objectives, to establish the management programmes that assure the safety tasks are performed, and to see that the services and facilities needed to accomplish the tasks are available. The Guide is primarily addressed to safety matters directly related to the operating phase. It assumes, in other words, that the safety aspects of siting, design, manufacturing and construction have been resolved. However, it also covers the interrelationships between operations and design, construction and commissioning, including the involvement of the operating organization in appropriate reviews of safety issues with reference to the future operating phase. The Guide is mainly restricted to matters of principle in relation to management-level decision making aimed at establishing safety policies. It is therefore not suitable for implementing such policies at the operational level. The IAEA Codes of Practice and Safety Guides provide detailed guidance for the latter purpose in those areas considered appropriate

On Safety Management. A Frame of Reference for Studies of Safety Management with Examples From Non-Nuclear Contexts of Relevance for Nuclear Safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Svensson, Ola; Salo, Ilkka; Allwin, Pernilla

2004-11-01

A good knowledge about safety management from risk technologies outside the area of nuclear power may contribute to both broaden the perspectives on safety management in general, and point at new opportunities for improving safety measures within the nuclear industry. First, a theoretical framework for the study of safety management in general is presented, followed by three case studies on safety management from different non-nuclear areas with potential relevance for nuclear safety. The chapters are written as separate reports and can be read independently of each other. The nuclear industry has a long experience about the management of risky activities, involving all the stages from planing to implementation, both on a more generalized level and in the specific branches of activities (management, administration, operation, maintenance, etc.). Here, safety management is a key concept related to these areas of activities. Outside the field of nuclear power there exist a number of different non-nuclear risk technologies, each one with their own specific needs and experiences about safety management. The differences between the areas consist partly of the different experiences caused by the different technologies. Besides using own experiences in safety practices within the own areas of activities, it may be profitable to take advantage in knowledge and experiences from one area and put it in practice in another area. In order to facilitate knowledge transfer from one technological area to another it may be possible to adapt a common theoretical model, for descriptions and explanations, to the different technologies. Such a model should admit that common denominators for safety management across the areas might be identified and described with common concepts. Systems theory gives the opportunity to not only create models that are descriptive for events within the limits of a given technology, but also to generate knowledge that can be transferred to other

Operational Safety Performance Indicators and Balanced Scorecard in HANARO

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu, Jong-Sup; Jung, Hoan-Sung; Ahn, Guk-Hoon; Lee, Kye-Hong; Lim, In-Cheol; Kim, Hark-Rho

2007-01-01

Research reactors need an extensive basis for ensuring their safety. The importance of a safety management in nuclear facilities and activities has been emphasized. The safety activities in HANARO have been continuously conducted to enhance its safe operation. Last year, HANARO prepared two indicator sets to measure and assess the safety status of the reactor's operation and utilization. One is Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) and the other is Balanced Scorecard (BSC). Through reviewing these indicators, we can obtain the following information; - Plant safety status - Safety parameter trends - Safety information, for example, reactor operation status and radiation safety HANARO will continuously pursue the trends of SPI and BSC

Food safety objective: an integral part of food chain management

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Gorris, L.G.M.

2005-01-01

The concept of food safety objective has been proposed to provide a target for operational food safety management, leaving flexibility in the way equivalent food safety levels are achieved by different food chains. The concept helps to better relate operational food safety management to public

US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office Integrated Safety Management System Program Description

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SHOOP, D.S.

2000-01-01

The purpose of this Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Program Description (PD) is to describe the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) ISMS as implemented through the RL Integrated Management System (RIMS). This PD does not impose additional requirements but rather provides an overview describing how various parts of the ISMS fit together. Specific requirements for each of the core functions and guiding principles are established in other implementing processes, procedures, and program descriptions that comprise RIMS. RL is organized to conduct work through operating contracts; therefore, it is extremely difficult to provide an adequate ISMS description that only addresses RL functions. Of necessity, this PD contains some information on contractor processes and procedures which then require RL approval or oversight

Safety management in a competitiveness context

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rousseau, J.M.

2013-01-01

This paper summarizes the first assessment performed by the IRSN related to the management of French power water reactors (PWR) safety. The conclusions of this assessment were submitted to the 'advisory committee' in April 2008. After an introduction reminding the French industrial and regulatory context as well as the way the assessment has been conducted, the relationship between safety and competitiveness is briefly discussed. Then the main issues and recommendations pointed out by the IRSN assessment are presented. These concern in particular: the balance between the shift operation team and the outage project team; the real-time decision-making capabilities of plant managers; the lessons learnt from the analyses of decision-making processes; the management of cultural changes. Finally, a conclusion presents a global diagnosis in terms of strengths and weaknesses of the EDF safety management system and proposes some ideas regarding the 'priority given to safety', the meaning of safety used by operative people and the continuous improvement approach. Lastly, methodological lessons are pointed out. The slides of the presentation have been added at the end of the paper. (author)

Safety evaluation by living probabilistic safety assessment. Procedures and applications for planning of operational activities and analysis of operating experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johanson, Gunnar; Holmberg, J.

1994-01-01

Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a daily safety management system and it is based on a plant-specific PSA and supporting information systems. In the living use of PSA, plant status knowledge is used to represent actual plant safety status in monitoring or follow-up perspective. The PSA model must be able to express the risk at a given time and plant configuration. The process, to update the PSA model to represent the current or planned configuration and to use the model to evaluate and direct the changes in the configuration, is called living PSA programme. The main purposes to develop and increase the usefulness of living PSA are: Long term safety planning: To continue the risk assessment process started with the basic PSA by extending and improving the basic models and data to provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of changes in plant design and procedures. Risk planning of operational activities: To support the operational management by providing means for searching optimal operational maintenance and testing strategies from the safety point of view. The results provide support for risk decision making in the short term or in a planning mode. The operational limits and conditions given by technical specifications can be analyzed by evaluating the risk effects of alternative requirements in order to balance the requirements with respect to operational flexibility and plant economy. Risk analysis of operating experience: To provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of incidents and plant status changes. The analyses are used to: identify possible high risk situations, rank the occurred events from safety point of view, and get feedback from operational events for the identification of risk contributors. This report describes the methods, models and applications required to continue the process towards a living use of PSA. 19 tabs, 20 figs

Life Management and Safety of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fabbri, S.; Diluch, A.; Vega, G., E-mail: fabbri@cnea.gov.ar [Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

2014-10-15

The nuclear programme in Argentina includes: nuclear power and related supplies, medical and industrial applications, waste management, research and development and human training. Nuclear facilities require life management programs that allow a safe operation. Safety is the first priority for designers and operators. This can be attained with defence in depth: regular inspections and maintenance procedures to minimize failure risks. CNEA objectives in this area are to possess the necessary capability to give safe and fast technical support. Within this scheme, one of the main activities undertaken by CNEA is to provide technological assistance to the nuclear plants and research reactors. As a consequence of an increasing concern about safety and ageing a Life Management Department for safe operation was created to take care of these subjects. The goal is to elaborate a Safety Evaluation Process for the critical components of nuclear plants and other facilities. The overall objectives of a safety process are to ensure a continuous safe, reliable and effective operation of nuclear facilities and it means the implementation of the defence in deep concept to enhance safety for the protection of the public, the workers and the environment. (author)

Evaluating North Carolina Food Pantry Food Safety-Related Operating Procedures.

Science.gov (United States)

Chaifetz, Ashley; Chapman, Benjamin

2015-11-01

Almost one in seven American households were food insecure in 2012, experiencing difficulty in providing enough food for all family members due to a lack of resources. Food pantries assist a food-insecure population through emergency food provision, but there is a paucity of information on the food safety-related operating procedures used in the pantries. Food pantries operate in a variable regulatory landscape; in some jurisdictions, they are treated equivalent to restaurants, while in others, they operate outside of inspection regimes. By using a mixed methods approach to catalog the standard operating procedures related to food in 105 food pantries from 12 North Carolina counties, we evaluated their potential impact on food safety. Data collected through interviews with pantry managers were supplemented with observed food safety practices scored against a modified version of the North Carolina Food Establishment Inspection Report. Pantries partnered with organized food bank networks were compared with those that operated independently. In this exploratory research, additional comparisons were examined for pantries in metropolitan areas versus nonmetropolitan areas and pantries with managers who had received food safety training versus managers who had not. The results provide a snapshot of how North Carolina food pantries operate and document risk mitigation strategies for foodborne illness for the vulnerable populations they serve. Data analysis reveals gaps in food safety knowledge and practice, indicating that pantries would benefit from more effective food safety training, especially focusing on formalizing risk management strategies. In addition, new tools, procedures, or policy interventions might improve information actualization by food pantry personnel.

33 CFR 96.220 - What makes up a safety management system?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... system? 96.220 Section 96.220 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.220 What makes up a safety management system? (a) The...

Safety managements of the linear IFMIF/EVEDA prototype accelerator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takahashi, Hiroki; Maebara, Sunao; Kojima, Toshiyuki; Narita, Takahiro; Tsutsumi, Kazuyoshi; Sakaki, Hironao; Suzuki, Hiromitsu; Sugimoto, Masayoshi

2014-01-01

Highlights: •Safety management is needed to secure the personnel safety from high dose rate. •The management of access to the accelerator vault is mainly performed by PPS. •The operation management is needed for safety during Injector and RFQ commissioning. •Pulse Duty Management system is newly developed for Injector commissioning for operation management. •PDM system is useful to reduce the radioactivation of equipment and the radiation exposure during and after beam operation. -- Abstract: On the Linear IFMIF/EVEDA Prototype Accelerator (LIPAc), the validation up to 9 MeV deuteron beam with 125 mA continuous wave is planned in Rokkasho, Aomori, Japan. Since the deuteron beam power exceeds 1 MW, safety issue related to γ-ray and neutron production is critical. To establish the safety management indispensable to reduce radiation exposure for personnel and activation of accelerator equipment, Personnel Protection System (PPS) of LIPAc control system, which works together with Radiation Monitoring System and Access Control System, was developed for LIPAc. The management of access to the accelerator vault by PPS and the beam duty management of PPS are presented in details

Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management in the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations to the regulatory body, focused on the operational aspects of radiation protection and radioactive waste management in nuclear power plants, and on how to ensure the fulfilment of the requirements established in the relevant Safety Requirements publications. It will also be useful for senior managers in licensee or contractor organizations who are responsible for establishing and managing programmes for radiation protection and for the management of radioactive waste. This Safety Guide gives general recommendations for the development of radiation protection programmes at nuclear power plants. The issues are then elaborated by defining the main elements of a radiation protection programme. Particular attention is paid to area classification, workplace monitoring and supervision, application of the principle of optimization of protection (also termed the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle), and facilities and equipment. This Safety Guide covers all the safety related aspects of a programme for the management of radioactive waste at a nuclear power plant. Emphasis is placed on the minimization of waste in terms of both activity and volume. The various steps in predisposal waste management are covered, namely processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Releases of effluents, the application of authorized limits and reference levels are discussed, together with the main elements of an environmental monitoring programme

Health and Safety Management for Small-scale Methane Fermentation Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

Yamaoka, Masaru; Yuyama, Yoshito; Nakamura, Masato; Oritate, Fumiko

In this study, we considered health and safety management for small-scale methane fermentation facilities that treat 2-5 ton of biomass daily based on several years operation experience with an approximate capacity of 5 t·d-1. We also took account of existing knowledge, related laws and regulations. There are no qualifications or licenses required for management and operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities, even though rural sewerage facilities with a relative similar function are required to obtain a legitimate license. Therefore, there are wide variations in health and safety consciousness of the operators of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. The industrial safety and health laws are not applied to the operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. However, in order to safely operate a small-scale methane fermentation facility, the occupational safety and health management system that the law recommends should be applied. The aims of this paper are to clarify the risk factors in small-scale methane fermentation facilities and encourage planning, design and operation of facilities based on health and safety management.

Safety management in nuclear technology. Proceedings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

At the symposium of TueV Sued AG (Munich, Federal Republic of Germany) held in Munich on 28 and 29 October 2008, the following lectures were held: (1) Fundamental requirements of the management system in nuclear technology - Experiences from the international developments at IAEA and WENRA (M. Herttrich); (2) Information from a comparison of requirements of safety management systems (B. Kallenbach-Herbert); (3) Requirements of a modern management system in German nuclear power plants from the view of nuclear safety (D. Majer); (4) Requirements on safety management in module 8 of the regulations project (M. Maqua); (5) Requirements on the management system in nuclear power plants according to GRS-229 and developments at the KTA 1402 ''Integrated management system for safe operation of nuclear power plants (in progress)'' (C. Verstegen); (6) Experiences from the development and implementation of safety management systems in connection with the works management of a nuclear power plant (K. Ramler); (7) Design of a safety management system of a nuclear power plant in consideration of existing management systems (U. Naumann); (8) Experiences in the utilization and evaluation of a safety management system (J. Ritter); (9) Aspects of leadership of safety management systems (S. Seitz); (10) Management of safety or safety management system? Prevailing or administration? (A. Frischknecht); (11) Change management - strategies for successful transfer of new projects: How can I motivate co-workers for a further development of the safety management system? (U. Schnabel); (12) Requirements concerning indicators in integrated management systems and safety management systems (J. Stiller); (13) Integration of proactive and reactive indicators in the safety management system (B. Fahlbruch); (14) What do indicators show? About the use of indicators by regulatory authorities (A. Kern); (15) Safety management and radiation protection in nuclear technology (K. Grantner); (16) Any more

Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BENECKE, M.W.

2000-01-01

The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kueffer, K.

1980-01-01

This lecture covers management aspects which have an immediate bearing on safety and identifies the objectives and tasks of management which are required for safe operation of a nuclear power plant and is based on the Codes of Practice and Safety Guides of the IAEA as well as arrangements in use at the Swiss Nuclear Power Station Beznau. This lecture - discusses the factors to be considered in structuring the operating organization, the support to be provided to plant management, the services and facilities needed and the management system for assuring the safety tasks are performed - describes the responsibilities of plant management and operating organization - outlines the requirements for recruitment, training and retraining as well as qualification and authorization of personnel - describes the programmes for maintenance, testing, examination, inspection, radiological protection, quality assurance, waste management, fuel management, emergency arrangement and security - describes the development of plant operating procedures including procedures to protect the personnel - outlines the requirements for initial and subsequent operation - describes the importance for evaluation and feedback of operating experience - describes the procedures for changes in hardware, procedures and set points - outlines the information flow and the requirements in reference to records and reports. (orig./RW)

Pedestrian safety management using the risk-based approach

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Romanowska Aleksandra

2017-01-01

Full Text Available The paper presents a concept of a multi-level pedestrian safety management system. Three management levels are distinguished: strategic, tactical and operational. The basis for the proposed approach to pedestrian safety management is a risk-based method. In the approach the elements of behavioural and systemic theories were used, allowing for the development of a formalised and repeatable procedure integrating the phases of risk assessment and response to the hazards of road crashes involving pedestrians. Key to the method are tools supporting pedestrian safety management. According to the risk management approach, the tools can be divided into two groups: tools supporting risk assessment and tools supporting risk response. In the paper attention is paid to selected tools supporting risk assessment, with particular emphasis on the methods for estimating forecasted pedestrian safety measures (at strategic, national and regional level and identification of particularly dangerous locations in terms of pedestrian safety at tactical (regional and local and operational level. The proposed pedestrian safety management methods and tools can support road administration in making rational decisions in terms of road safety, safety of road infrastructure, crash elimination measures or reducing the consequences suffered by road users (particularly pedestrians as a result of road crashes.

IAEA Operational Safety Team Reviews Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed operational safety at France's Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) noting a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of France to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of Cattenom NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in Vienna, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review of the plant from 14 November to 1 December 2011. The team was made up of experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the IAEA. The team at Cattenom conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which is largely under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. Cattenom is the first plant in Europe to voluntarily undertake a Severe Accident Management review during an OSART review. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: Sheets are displayed in storage areas where combustible material is present - these sheets are updated readily and accurately by the area owner to ensure that the fire limits are complied with; A simple container is attached to the neutron source handling device to ensure ease and safety of operations and reduce possible radiation exposure during use

Operational Risk Management and Military Aviation Safety

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Ashley, Park

1999-01-01

.... The Army's Class A aviation mishap rate declined after it implemented risk management (RM) principles in 1987. This reduction caught the attention of Air Force leadership who have since stated that the application of operational risk management...

Safety management: a few techniques and their application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Soundararajan, S.

2016-01-01

Industrial safety practice has grown in its stature tremendously since the age of industrial revolution. A number of modern techniques are available to strengthen design safety features, to review operational safety, and to critically appraise and upgrade practices of occupational safety and health management. This talk focuses on three prominent yet simple techniques and their usefulness in the overall safety management of a workplace. Any industrial set-up undergoes different stages in its life cycle-conceptual design, actual design, construction, fabrication and installation, commissioning, operation, shutdown/re-start up and decommissioning. Checklist procedure is a safety tool that can be applied at any of these stages. Thus it is a quite useful technique in safety management and accident prevention. It can serve as a form of approval from one step to another in the course of any routine or specific task. Safety Audit or Safety Review is a critical safety management appraisal tool. It gives a reasonable indication of how well a company's safety programme works, how hazards are recognised, how well employees are motivated and so on. It gives a clear picture about where a company stands as far as framing and implementation of its SHE policy is concerned. Each of the above tools is complementing each other and required to be applied at appropriate juncture in sustaining good safety management system at the workplace

IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency today concluded a review of the safety practices at the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Bern in Switzerland. The team noted a series of good practices and made recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the Operational Safety Review Team at the request of the Swiss government. The team, led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, performed an in-depth operational safety review from 8 to 25 October 2012. The team comprised experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as experts from the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Muehleberg NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry, Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Severe Accident Management and Long-Term Operation. The OSART team made 10 recommendations and 11 suggestions related to areas where operations of Muehleberg NPP could be further improved, for example: - Plant management could improve the operating experience program and methods throughout the plant to ensure corrective actions are taken in a timely manner; - In the area of Long-Term Operation, the ageing management review for some systems and components is not complete and the environmental qualification of originally installed safety cables has not yet been revalidated for long-term operation; and - The plant provisions for the protection of persons on the site during an emergency with radioactive release can be improved to minimize health risks to plant personnel. The team also identified 10 good

Operating room data management: improving efficiency and safety in a surgical block.

Science.gov (United States)

Agnoletti, Vanni; Buccioli, Matteo; Padovani, Emanuele; Corso, Ruggero M; Perger, Peter; Piraccini, Emanuele; Orelli, Rebecca Levy; Maitan, Stefano; Dell'amore, Davide; Garcea, Domenico; Vicini, Claudio; Montella, Teresa Maria; Gambale, Giorgio

2013-03-11

European Healthcare Systems are facing a difficult period characterized by increasing costs and spending cuts due to economic problems. There is the urgent need for new tools which sustain Hospitals decision makers work. This project aimed to develop a data recording system of the surgical process of every patient within the operating theatre. The primary goal was to create a practical and easy data processing tool to give hospital managers, anesthesiologists and surgeons the information basis to increase operating theaters efficiency and patient safety. The developed data analysis tool is embedded in an Oracle Business Intelligence Environment, which processes data to simple and understandable performance tachometers and tables. The underlying data analysis is based on scientific literature and the projects teams experience with tracked data. The system login is layered and different users have access to different data outputs depending on their professional needs. The system is divided in the tree profile types Manager, Anesthesiologist and Surgeon. Every profile includes subcategories where operators can access more detailed data analyses. The first data output screen shows general information and guides the user towards more detailed data analysis. The data recording system enabled the registration of 14.675 surgical operations performed from 2009 to 2011. Raw utilization increased from 44% in 2009 to 52% in 2011. The number of high complexity surgical procedures (≥120 minutes) has increased in certain units while decreased in others. The number of unscheduled procedures performed has been reduced (from 25% in 2009 to 14% in 2011) while maintaining the same percentage of surgical procedures. The number of overtime events decreased in 2010 (23%) and in 2011 (21%) compared to 2009 (28%) and the delays expressed in minutes are almost the same (mean 78 min). The direct link found between the complexity of surgical procedures, the number of unscheduled procedures

Upgraded safety analysis document including operations policies, operational safety limits and policy changes. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batchelor, K.

1996-03-01

The National Synchrotron Light Source Safety Analysis Reports (1), (2), (3), BNL reports number-sign 51584, number-sign 52205 and number-sign 52205 (addendum) describe the basic Environmental Safety and Health issues associated with the department's operations. They include the operating envelope for the Storage Rings and also the rest of the facility. These documents contain the operational limits as perceived prior or during construction of the facility, much of which still are appropriate for current operations. However, as the machine has matured, the experimental program has grown in size, requiring more supervision in that area. Also, machine studies have either verified or modified knowledge of beam loss modes and/or radiation loss patterns around the facility. This document is written to allow for these changes in procedure or standards resulting from their current mode of operation and shall be used in conjunction with the above reports. These changes have been reviewed by NSLS and BNL ES and H committee and approved by BNL management

Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from point of view of operational safety enhancement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

2000-01-01

Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing. (author)

Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

1995-01-01

These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

33 CFR 96.230 - What objectives must a safety management system meet?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... management system meet? 96.230 Section 96.230 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.230 What objectives must a safety...

Reactor physics computer code development for neutronic design, fuel-management, reactor operation and safety analysis of PHWRs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rastogi, B.P.

1989-01-01

This report discusses various reactor physics codes developed for neutronic design, fuel-management, reactor operation and safety analysis of PHWRs. These code packages have been utilized for nuclear design of 500 MWe and new 235 MWe PHWRs. (author)

Process management - critical safety issues with focus on risk management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanne, Johan M.

2005-12-01

Organizational changes focused on process orientation are taking place among Swedish nuclear power plants, aiming at improving the operation. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has identified a need for increased knowledge within the area for its regulatory activities. In order to analyze what process orientation imply for nuclear power plant safety a number of questions must be asked: 1. How is safety in nuclear power production created currently? What significance does the functional organization play? 2. How can organizational forms be analysed? What consequences does quality management have for work and for the enterprise? 3. Why should nuclear power plants be process oriented? Who are the customers and what are their customer values? Which customers are expected to contribute from process orientation? 4. What can one learn from process orientation in other safety critical systems? What is the effect on those features that currently create safety? 5. Could customer values increase for one customer without decreasing for other customers? What is the relationship between economic and safety interests from an increased process orientation? The deregulation of the electricity market have caused an interest in increased economic efficiency, which is the motivation for the interest in process orientation. among other means. It is the nuclear power plants' owners and the distributors (often the same corporations) that have the strongest interest in process orientation. If the functional organization and associated practices are decomposed, the prerequisites of the risk management regime changes, perhaps deteriorating its functionality. When nuclear power operators consider the introduction of process orientation, the Nuclear Power Inspectorate should require that 1. The operators perform a risk analysis beforehand concerning the potential consequences that process orientation might convey: the analysis should contain a model specifying how safety is currently

Human and organization factors: engineering operating safety into offshore structures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bea, Robert G.

1998-01-01

History indicates clearly that the safety of offshore structures is determined primarily by the humans and organizations responsible for these structures during their design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. If the safety of offshore structures is to be preserved and improved, then attention of engineers should focus on to how to improve the reliability of the offshore structure 'system,' including the people that come into contact with the structure during its life-cycle. This article reviews and discusss concepts and engineering approaches that can be used in such efforts. Two specific human factor issues are addressed: (1) real-time management of safety during operations, and (2) development of a Safety Management Assessment System to help improve the safety of offshore structures

Operational safety performance indicator system - a management tool for the self assessment of safety and reliability of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anil Kumar; Mandowara, S.L.; Mittal, S.

2006-01-01

Operational Safety Performance Indicator system is one of the self assessment tools for station management to monitor safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. It provides information to station management about the performance of various areas of the plants by means of different colours of relevant performance indicators. Such systems have been implemented at many nuclear power plants in the world and have been considered as strength during WANO Peer Review. IAEA had a Coordinated Research Programme (CRP) on this with several countries participating including India. In NPCIL this system has been implemented in KAPS about a year back and found very useful in identifying areas which needs to be given more attention. Based on the KAPS feedback Implementation of this system has been taken up in RAPS-3 and 4 and KGS-l and 2. (author)

46th Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2015). Key topic / Enhanced safety and operation excellence / Sustainable reactor operation management - safe, efficient, valuable

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, Erwin

2015-01-01

Summary report on the following Topical Session of the 46 th Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2015) held in Berlin, 5 to 7 May 2015: - Sustainable Reactor Operation Management - Safe, Efficient, Valuable (Erwin Fischer) The other Sessions of the Key Topics - ''Outstanding Know-How and Sustainable Innovations'', - ''Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence'' and - ''Decommissioning Experience and Waste Management Solutions'' have been covered in atw 7 (2015) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

Indicators for monitoring of safety operation and condition of nuclear power stations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Manova, D.

2001-01-01

A common goal of all employees in the nuclear power field is safety operation of nuclear power stations. The evaluation and control of NPP safety operation are a part of the elements of safety management. The present report is related only to a part of the total assessment and control of the plant safety operation, namely - the indicator system for monitoring of Kozloduy NPP operation and condition. (author)

New safety management method at Cominak

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kallam, A.

1993-01-01

Operations manager Mr. Kallam presents the new safety management system, its implementation and results in this underground uranium mine in northern Niger, where the rate of accidents increased dangerously during the eighties. 3 figs., 3 photos

On Safety Management. A Frame of Reference for Studies of Safety Management with Examples From Non-Nuclear Contexts of Relevance for Nuclear Safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Svensson, Ola; Salo, Ilkka; Allwin, Pernilla (Risk Analysis, Social and Decision Research Unit, Dept. of Psychology, Stockholm Univ., Stockholm (Sweden))

2004-11-15

A good knowledge about safety management from risk technologies outside the area of nuclear power may contribute to both broaden the perspectives on safety management in general, and point at new opportunities for improving safety measures within the nuclear industry. First, a theoretical framework for the study of safety management in general is presented, followed by three case studies on safety management from different non-nuclear areas with potential relevance for nuclear safety. The chapters are written as separate reports and can be read independently of each other. The nuclear industry has a long experience about the management of risky activities, involving all the stages from planing to implementation, both on a more generalized level and in the specific branches of activities (management, administration, operation, maintenance, etc.). Here, safety management is a key concept related to these areas of activities. Outside the field of nuclear power there exist a number of different non-nuclear risk technologies, each one with their own specific needs and experiences about safety management. The differences between the areas consist partly of the different experiences caused by the different technologies. Besides using own experiences in safety practices within the own areas of activities, it may be profitable to take advantage in knowledge and experiences from one area and put it in practice in another area. In order to facilitate knowledge transfer from one technological area to another it may be possible to adapt a common theoretical model, for descriptions and explanations, to the different technologies. Such a model should admit that common denominators for safety management across the areas might be identified and described with common concepts. Systems theory gives the opportunity to not only create models that are descriptive for events within the limits of a given technology, but also to generate knowledge that can be transferred to other

Operational risk management for a NPP

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Scott, C.K., E-mail: KScott@AtlanticNuclear.ca [Atlantic Nuclear Services Inc., Fredericton, New Brunswick (Canada)

2013-07-01

Organizational failures are a hazard to the successful operation of a nuclear power plant. Risk reduction strategies have been developed around two themes: using an understanding of the nature and mechanism of human failures to eliminate them by modifying work processes; or, modifying human behaviour by creating a strong safety culture that overrides the tendency to fail. This paper examines the problem from the perspective of operational risk management. It includes the internal management of operations and the influence of the external environment on the organization. A model is proposed that encompasses all the operational risk factors in the organization's decision making process. To prevent failure the organization must have the capability to adapt and the capacity to evolve. The hazards that would lead to an organizational failure are developed from this evolutionary model. The operational risk management program would include these hazards as well as the conventional nuclear safety hazards. (author)

Criticality Risk Management: Why Analysis of Operating Practices Matters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menuet, L.; Tasset, D.; Hebraud, C.

2016-01-01

The criticality risk is an unwanted neutron chain reaction that could lead, if not under control, to a criticality accident resulting in a high release of energy accompanied by an intense emission of neutron and gamma radiation. Thus, the management of criticality risk in Fuel Cycle Facilities relies mainly on a set of prescriptions and requirements established by the licencees for achieving safety objectives. This paper intends to show that, beyond prescriptions and requirements, a socio-technical approach is essential to define a relevant set of criticality safety rules favouring efficient and safe human activities. Indeed, a thorough knowledge of staff operating practices, beyond contributing significantly to the definition of appropriate technical and organizational provisions, enhances safety management combining “rule-based safety” and “managed safety”. Rule-based safety (top down definition of the rules) can be achieved by anticipating undesirable situations and defining provisions to avoid and manage them in daily practices. On the other hand, managed safety (integration of local characteristics) develops the sociotechnical system capacity to anticipate, recognise and formulate appropriate responses to unexpected scenarios that were not foreseen by the organization, or to rules that are not applicable to the operational realities. Thus, an effective safety management relies on human expertise, on the skills of individuals, on the quality of initiatives, and on the way teams and organizations perform the operations on a daily basis, interact and coordinate to integrate and regulate both ruled-based safety and managed safety.

Shortcomings in safety management: symptoms, examples and recovery processes. Omission of Operational Culture can be fatal for the power utility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hezoucky, F.; )

2006-01-01

During recent years, many utilities and their nuclear branches have undergone substantial change. The effectiveness of management in handling the change varies considerably from utility to utility. At the extreme, the way the change is managed and nuclear safety and operational performance aspects are integrated can either help lead a plant to operational excellence or destroy what was once an effective organisation. (author)

33 CFR 96.240 - What functional requirements must a safety management system meet?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... a safety management system meet? 96.240 Section 96.240 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.240 What functional...

Examination on establishment of safety culture for operating nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Taniguchi, Taketoshi

1997-01-01

For safely operating nuclear power facilities, in addition to the technical countermeasures, the performance of the organizations that operate and manage them is important. In this paper, the spontaneous cooperation type management system that supported the introduction and development of nuclear power generation in electric power business is analyzed from the viewpoints of organization science and behavioral psychology, and based on the results of the investigation of the sense of value and psychological characteristics of young organization members who bear future nuclear power generation, on how to foster and establish safety culture which is called second safety principle in organizations, the subjects for hereafter are discussed from the viewpoints of respect of individuals and their integration with organizations, upbringing of talents and systematic learning. The factors which compose the safety culture are shown. The form of operating and managing the organizations are seen in first generation nuclear power generation, the similarity to Japanese type enterprise operation system, the change of the prerequisite of spontaneous cooperation type management and the difference of conscience among the generations of organization members are discussed. The above subjects for hereafter are discussed. (K.I.)

Treatment system operation, management, and finance

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Truax, D.D. (Mississippi State Univ., Mississippi State (United States))

1990-06-01

This article deals with literature on operation, management, and financing of wastewater treatment plants. Some topics discussed are system hydraulics and flow monitoring, odor, reliability, equipment age, management philosophy, performance, reducing operating cost, planning and response to emergencies, preventative maintenance, inspection systems, mechanical vibrations, safety, privatization, municipal leasing, user and impact fees.

Regulatory Approach to Safety of Long Time Operating Research Reactors in Russia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sapozhnikov, Alexander [Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service, Moscow (Russian Federation)

2013-07-01

In the Russian Federation more than 60% of operating Nuclear Research Facilities (NRFs) are of age over 30 years old or their usage exceeds originally conceived continuous operation. In this regard, important areas of regulatory body activity are: 1) a systematic assessment of the actual state of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety, 2) control of implementation of organizational and technical measures to mitigate ageing impact on the basis of programmes to manage reliability (service life) of SSCs, and 3) issues of facility modification/reconstruction in line with up-to-day safety requirements. The practice of licensing NRFs with long operating times shows that the national regulations are generally in compliance with IAEA recommendations for ageing management of research reactors. In operating organizations, the ageing management is being effectively provided as a part of the integrated management system for NRFs, including the monitoring of the reliability of SSCs, a methodology to detect their ageing, reporting and investigation of events, analysis of their root causes, and measures to prevent and mitigate ageing effects to safety. The report outlines a good practice of safety regulation of NRFs with long operating times and based on lessons learned from experience, including challenges for future improvement of ageing management.

Regulatory Approach to Safety of Long Time Operating Research Reactors in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sapozhnikov, Alexander

2013-01-01

In the Russian Federation more than 60% of operating Nuclear Research Facilities (NRFs) are of age over 30 years old or their usage exceeds originally conceived continuous operation. In this regard, important areas of regulatory body activity are: 1) a systematic assessment of the actual state of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety, 2) control of implementation of organizational and technical measures to mitigate ageing impact on the basis of programmes to manage reliability (service life) of SSCs, and 3) issues of facility modification/reconstruction in line with up-to-day safety requirements. The practice of licensing NRFs with long operating times shows that the national regulations are generally in compliance with IAEA recommendations for ageing management of research reactors. In operating organizations, the ageing management is being effectively provided as a part of the integrated management system for NRFs, including the monitoring of the reliability of SSCs, a methodology to detect their ageing, reporting and investigation of events, analysis of their root causes, and measures to prevent and mitigate ageing effects to safety. The report outlines a good practice of safety regulation of NRFs with long operating times and based on lessons learned from experience, including challenges for future improvement of ageing management

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

CERN Document Server

Covey, L I

2000-01-01

The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

Improving operating room safety

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Garrett Jill

2009-11-01

Full Text Available Abstract Despite the introduction of the Universal Protocol, patient safety in surgery remains a daily challenge in the operating room. This present study describes one community health system's efforts to improve operating room safety through human factors training and ultimately the development of a surgical checklist. Using a combination of formal training, local studies documenting operating room safety issues and peer to peer mentoring we were able to substantially change the culture of our operating room. Our efforts have prepared us for successfully implementing a standardized checklist to improve operating room safety throughout our entire system. Based on these findings we recommend a multimodal approach to improving operating room safety.

46{sup th} Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2015). Key topic / Enhanced safety and operation excellence / Sustainable reactor operation management - safe, efficient, valuable

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fischer, Erwin [E.ON Kernkraft GmbH, Global Unit Next Generation, Hannover (Germany)

2015-08-15

Summary report on the following Topical Session of the 46{sup th} Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2015) held in Berlin, 5 to 7 May 2015: - Sustainable Reactor Operation Management - Safe, Efficient, Valuable (Erwin Fischer) The other Sessions of the Key Topics - ''Outstanding Know-How and Sustainable Innovations'', - ''Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence'' and - ''Decommissioning Experience and Waste Management Solutions'' have been covered in atw 7 (2015) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

Enhancing NPP Safety Through an Effective Dependability Management

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vieru, G., E-mail: g_vieru@yahoo.com [AREN, Bucharest (Romania)

2014-10-15

Taking into account the importance of the continuous improvement of the performance and reliability of a NPP and practical measures to strengthen nuclear safety and security, it is to be noted that a good management for a nuclear power reactor involves a ''good dependability management'' of the activities, such as: Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) and maintenance support. In order to evaluate certain safety assessment criteria intended to be applied at the level of the nuclear reactor unit management, equipment dependability indicators and their impact over the availability and reactor safety have to be evaluated. Reactor equipment dependability indicators provide a quantitative indication of equipment RAM performances (Reliability, Availability and Maintenance). One of the important benefits of maintenance and failure data gathering is that it can be used as a support of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). Also, a good dependability management implementation may be used to complement reactor level unit performance indicators in the field of safe operation, maintenance and improving operating parameters, as well as for Strengthening Safety and Improving Reliability of a NPP. This paper underlines the importance of nuclear safety and security as prerequisites for nuclear power. In addition, it demonstrates how different technical aspects, through implementation of a good dependability management, contribute to a strengthened safety and an improvement of availability of the NPP through dependability indicators determination and evaluation. (author)

IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Armenian Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has reviewed the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) near Metsamor for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices, as well as recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of the Republic of Armenia to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 16 May to 2 June 2011. The team was made up of experts from Finland, France, Lithuania, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK, USA, EC and the IAEA. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. Experts participating in the IAEA's June 2010 International Conference on Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) reviewed the experience of the OSART programme and concluded: In OSART missions NPPs are assessed against IAEA safety standards which reflect the current international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety; and OSART recommendations and suggestions are of utmost importance for operational safety improvement of NPPs. Armenia is commended for openness to the international nuclear community and for actively inviting IAEA safety review missions to submit their activities to international scrutiny. Examples of IAEA safety reviews include: Design Safety Review in 2003; Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in 2007; and Assessment of Seismic Safety Re-Evaluation in 2009. The team at ANPP conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the plant, which is largely under the control of the site management

FULCRUM - A dam safety management and alert system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Butt, Cameron; Greenaway, Graham [Knight Piesold Ltd., Vancouver, (Canada)

2010-07-01

Efficient management of instrumentation, monitoring and inspection data are the keys to safe performance and dam structure stability. This paper presented a data management system, FULCRUM, developed for dam safety management. FULCRUM is a secure web-based data management system which simplifies the process of data collection, processing and analysis of the information. The system was designed to organize and coordinate dam safety management requirements. Geotechnical instrumentation such as piezometers or inclinometers and operating data can be added to the database. Data from routine surveillance and engineering inspection can also be incorporated into the database. The system provides users with immediate access to historical and recent data. The integration of a GIS system allows for rapid assessment of the project site. Customisable alerting protocols can be set to identify and respond quickly to significant changes in operating conditions and potential impacts on dam safety.

Management and Operational Control of Criticality

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Daniels, J. T. [Authority Health and Safety Branch, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Risley, Lancs. (United Kingdom)

1966-05-15

The evidence of the six process criticality accidents that have been reported to date shows that, without exception, they have been due to the failure of operational controls. In no instance has a criticality accident in processing been due to the use of wrong data 01 inaccurate calculation. Criticality accidents are least likely to occur in the production stream and are more likely to be associated with ancillary equipment and operations. Important as correct criticality calculations are, there are many other considerations which require the exercise of judgement in establishing the operational environment. No operation involving fissile material should be permitted without a formal review resulting in a documented statement of (a) the environmental assessment, (b) the nuclear safety arguments which demonstrate safety under that environment, and (c) the operational requirements which will ensure the validity of (b) under the conditions of (a). To ensure the continued viability of the environmental assessment and the continued reliability of clearance conditions there should be close supervision by operating management, and periodic checks made by site nuclear safety staff. Additionally, there should be periodic and systematic examinations by competent persons who are not responsible to the overall management of the site. (author)

Operations management for construction

CERN Document Server

March, Chris

2009-01-01

Students studying construction management and related subjects need to have a broad understanding of the major aspects of controlling the building processes. Operations Management for Construction is one of three textbooks (Business Organisation, Operations Management and Finance Control) written to systematically cover the field. Focusing on construction sites and operations which are challenging to run, Chris March explores issues such as the setting up of the site, the deciding of the methodology of construction, and the sequence of work and resourcing. As changing and increasing regulations affect the way sites are managed, he also considers the issues and methods of successful administering, safety, quality and environment. Finally, the contractor's responsibility to the environment, including relationships with third parties, selection of materials, waste management and sustainability is discussed. Chris March has a wealth of practical experience in the construction industry, as well as considerable exp...

Enhancing Safety at Airline Operations Control Centre

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Lukáš Řasa

2015-04-01

Full Text Available In recent years a new term of Safety Management System (SMS has been introduced into aviation legislation. This system is being adopted by airline operators. One of the groundbased actors of everyday operations is Operations Control Centre (OCC. The goal of this article has been to identify and assess risks and dangers which occur at OCC and create a template for OCC implementation into SMS.

Management of National Nuclear Power Programs for assured safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Connolly, T.J. (ed.)

1985-01-01

Topics discussed in this report include: nuclear utility organization; before the Florida Public Service Commission in re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2 cost recovery; nuclear reliability improvement and safety operations; nuclear utility management; training of nuclear facility personnel; US experience in key areas of nuclear safety; the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission - function and process; regulatory considerations of the risk of nuclear power plants; overview of the processes of reliability and risk management; management significance of risk analysis; international and domestic institutional issues for peaceful nuclear uses; the role of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO); and nuclear safety activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Management of National Nuclear Power Programs for assured safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Connolly, T.J.

1985-01-01

Topics discussed in this report include: nuclear utility organization; before the Florida Public Service Commission in re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2 cost recovery; nuclear reliability improvement and safety operations; nuclear utility management; training of nuclear facility personnel; US experience in key areas of nuclear safety; the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission - function and process; regulatory considerations of the risk of nuclear power plants; overview of the processes of reliability and risk management; management significance of risk analysis; international and domestic institutional issues for peaceful nuclear uses; the role of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO); and nuclear safety activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Bowtie Risk Management methodology and Modern Nuclear Safety Reports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ilizastigui Pérez, F.

2016-01-01

The Safety Report (SR) plays a crucial role within the nuclear licensing regime as the principal means for demonstrating the adequacy of safety analysis for a nuclear facility to ensure that it can be constructed, operated, maintained, shut down, and decommissioned safely and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. It serves as the basis for granting authorizations for the commencement of the main stages of the facility’s life cycle as well as decision-making processes related to safety. Historically, the majority of nuclear safety reports have operated under rather prescriptive regimes, with emphasis placed on demonstrations of the robustness of the facility’s design (design safety) against prescriptive technical requirements set by the regulatory body, and less attention paid to demonstrating the adequacy and effectiveness of Operator’s management system for managing risks to daily operation.

Summary of the nuclear safety in operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

This summary is a collection of general information about nuclear safety of PWR type reactors exploited by EDF. Teaching aid, this work has been conceived by operators for operators, it must not be considered nor used as a doctrine document with a regulatory or prescriptive characteristic. it summarizes the great principles of nuclear safety, places them in a global approach and shows their coherence. It consists in 6 chapters and 6 annexes. The news of this edition are the chapter 2 devoted to the safety management and the annexe 6 devoted to the principal teaching coming from the feedback. At the end a glossary explains the signs and abbreviations and an index allows to find themes in the memento text from keywords. (N.C.)

Operating experience feedback from safety significant events at research reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shokr, A.M. [Atomic Energy Authority, Abouzabal (Egypt). Egypt Second Research Reactor; Rao, D. [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)

2015-05-15

Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism to provide lessons learned from the events and the associated corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events, resulting in improving safety in the nuclear installations. This paper analyzes the events of safety significance that have been occurred at research reactors and discusses the root causes and lessons learned from these events. Insights from literature on events at research reactors and feedback from events at nuclear power plants that are relevant to research reactors are also presented along with discussions. The results of the analysis showed the importance of communication of safety information and exchange of operating experience are vital to prevent reoccurrences of events. The analysis showed also the need for continued attention to human factors and training of operating personnel, and the need for establishing systematic ageing management programmes of reactor facilities, and programmes for safety management of handling of nuclear fuel, core components, and experimental devices.

Operating experience feedback from safety significant events at research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shokr, A.M.

2015-01-01

Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism to provide lessons learned from the events and the associated corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events, resulting in improving safety in the nuclear installations. This paper analyzes the events of safety significance that have been occurred at research reactors and discusses the root causes and lessons learned from these events. Insights from literature on events at research reactors and feedback from events at nuclear power plants that are relevant to research reactors are also presented along with discussions. The results of the analysis showed the importance of communication of safety information and exchange of operating experience are vital to prevent reoccurrences of events. The analysis showed also the need for continued attention to human factors and training of operating personnel, and the need for establishing systematic ageing management programmes of reactor facilities, and programmes for safety management of handling of nuclear fuel, core components, and experimental devices.

Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

2006-01-01

The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

33 CFR 96.250 - What documents and reports must a safety management system have?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... safety management system have? 96.250 Section 96.250 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.250 What documents and...

Safety culture and organizational issues during transition from operation to decommissioning of NPPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Slavcheva, K.; Mori, M.; D'Amico, N.; Sollima, C.

2005-01-01

The paper highlights the critical safety issues in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to be managed during the transition period from operation to decommissioning. Pre-shutdown is an important period of a NPP lifetime due to the changes and issues to be faced by the NPP management, which include safety culture issues, organizational issues, plant safety issues and nuclear waste issues. Preservation of staff competence and moral, management and organizational capability, preservation of knowledge and corporate memory, preservation of safety culture, surveillance and permanent control to maintain adequate level of nuclear and radiation safety, development of appropriate solutions for the new incoming issues are the key challenges to be timely faced. The uncertainty regarding the future of the site, the future of the workers and the incoming re-organization originate numerous additional issues including stress for the personnel. It is necessary to take appropriate actions to reduce the uncertainty. The regulatory regime continues with the same rules as during operation. Responsibility for safety remains with the licensee and the regulatory supervision continues and oversees the safe operation and security of the NPP, the safe management and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Anticipated attention from the Operator and the Regulator to key organizational and safety culture issues during the pre-shutdown phase has shown to be an effective preventive action. The Operator has to aim to preserve staff competence and motivation, preserve corporate memory, safety culture, reinforce monitoring and control on the health risk of workers and population, preserve the technical part of the organization from external disturb and distractions, ensure transparency and develop strategies to solve forthcoming issues. The Regulator has to aim to reorient its supervision, train its personnel and adapt its tools to the new situation, keep adequate presence onsite, keep dialogue

PSA analysis focused on Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from operational safety point of view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

2001-01-01

Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing.(author)

ASN guide project. Safety policy and management in INBs (base nuclear installations)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This guide presents the recommendations of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in the field of safety policy and management (PMS) for base nuclear installations (INBs). It gives an overview and comments of some prescriptions of the so-called INB order and PMS decision. These regulatory texts define a framework for provisions any INB operator must implement to establish his safety policy, to define and implement a system which allows the safety to be maintained, the improvement of his INB safety to be permanently looked for. The following issues are addressed: operator's safety policy, identification of elements important for safety, of activities pertaining to safety, and of associated requirements, safety management organization and system, management of activities pertaining to safety, documentation and archiving

The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

This Safety Guide is applicable throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, including any subsequent period of institutional control, until there is no significant residual radiation hazard. For a nuclear installation, the lifetime includes site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. These stages in the lifetime of a nuclear installation may overlap. This Safety Guide may be applied to nuclear installations in the following ways: (a)To support the development, implementation, assessment and improvement of the management system of those organizations responsible for research, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation; (b)As an aid in the assessment by the regulatory body of the adequacy of the management system of a nuclear installation; (c)To assist an organization in specifying to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any specific element that should be included within the supplier's management system for the supply of products. This Safety Guide follows the structure of the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities, whereby: (a)Section 2 provides recommendations on implementing the management system, including recommendations relating to safety culture, grading and documentation. (b)Section 3 provides recommendations on the responsibilities of senior management for the development and implementation of an effective management system. (c)Section 4 provides recommendations on resource management, including guidance on human resources, infrastructure and the working environment. (d)Section 5 provides recommendations on how the processes of the installation can be specified and developed, including recommendations on some generic processes of the management system. (e)Section 6 provides recommendations on the measurement, assessment and improvement of the management system of a nuclear installation. (f

76 FR 35130 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors

Science.gov (United States)

2011-06-16

...: Control Room Management/Human Factors AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration... the Control Room Management/Human Factors regulations in order to realize the safety benefits sooner... FR 5536). By this amendment to the Control Room Management/Human Factors (CRM) rule, an operator must...

Joint road safety operations in tunnels and open roads

Science.gov (United States)

Adesiyun, Adewole; Avenoso, Antonio; Dionelis, Kallistratos; Cela, Liljana; Nicodème, Christophe; Goger, Thierry; Polidori, Carlo

2017-09-01

The objective of the ECOROADS project is to overcome the barrier established by the formal interpretation of the two Directives 2008/96/EC and 2004/54/EC, which in practice do not allow the same Road Safety Audits/Inspections to be performed inside tunnels. The projects aims at the establishment of a common enhanced approach to road infrastructure and tunnel safety management by using the concepts and criteria of the Directive 2008/96/CE on road infrastructure safety management and the results of related European Commission (EC) funded projects. ECOROADS has already implemented an analysis of national practices regarding Road Safety Inspections (RSI), two Workshops with the stakeholders, and an exchange of best practices between European tunnel experts and road safety professionals, which led to the definition of common agreed safety procedures. In the second phase of the project, different groups of experts and observers applied the above common procedures by inspecting five European road sections featuring both open roads and tunnels in Belgium, Albania, Germany, Serbia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This paper shows the feedback of the 5 joint safety operations and how they are being used for a set of - recommendations and guidelines for the application of the RSA and RSI concepts within the tunnel safety operations.

Probabilistic safety assessment in nuclear power plant management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holloway, N.J.

1989-06-01

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques have been widely used over the past few years to assist in understanding how engineered systems respond to abnormal conditions, particularly during a severe accident. The use of PSAs in the design and operation of such systems thus contributes to the safety of nuclear power plants. Probabilistic safety assessments can be maintained to provide a continuous up-to-date assessment (Living PSA), supporting the management of plant operations and modifications

Operational safety at the FFTF

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baird, Q.L.; Hagan, J.W.; Seeman, S.E.; Baker, S.M.

1981-02-01

An extensive operational nuclear safety program has been an integral part of the design, startup, and initial operating phases of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). During the design and construction of the facility, a program of independent safety overviews and analyses assured the provision of responsible safety margins within the plant, protective systems, and engineered safety features for protection of the public, operating staff, and the facility. The program is continuing through surveillance of operations to verify continued adherence to the established operating envelope and for timely identification of any trends potentially adverse to those margins. Experience from operation of FFTF is being utilized in the development of enhanced operational nuclear safety aids for application in follow-on breeder reactor power systems. The commendable plant and personnel safety experiences of FFTF through its startup and ascension to full power demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the FFTF operational nuclear safety program

Application of grey theory in operator management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xu Hong

2013-01-01

Scientific and reasonable operator management is the basis of nuclear safety. It is paid more attention after the three-mile island accident. The prediction of operators' basic behavior parameters is the premise and foundation of scientific and reasonable operator management. Grey theory happened to solve the dilemma encountered in prediction and decision-making of operator behavior in operator management of nuclear power plant. The procedure was divided into two steps: 1) According to the historical record of operators' behavior parameters, a differential equation model using grey theory was set up to predict the future behavior of operators; 2) operator management decision-making was made based on grey theory. The calculation result is not only helpful for operator management but also useful for operators to find their shortcomings. Grey theory used in the study provides a new idea and method for future operator management in nuclear power plant. (author)

Safety culture in the gynecology robotics operating room.

Science.gov (United States)

Zullo, Melissa D; McCarroll, Michele L; Mendise, Thomas M; Ferris, Edward F; Roulette, G D; Zolton, Jessica; Andrews, Stephen J; von Gruenigen, Vivian E

2014-01-01

To measure the safety culture in the robotics surgery operating room before and after implementation of the Robotic Operating Room Computerized Checklist (RORCC). Prospective study. Gynecology surgical staff (n = 32). An urban community hospital. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire domains examined were teamwork, safety, job satisfaction, stress recognition, perceptions of management, and working conditions. Questions and domains were described using percent agreement and the Cronbach alpha. Paired t-tests were used to describe differences before and after implementation of the checklist. Mean (SD) staff age was 46.7 (9.5) years, and most were women (78%) and worked full-time (97%). Twenty respondents (83% of nurses, 80% of surgeons, 66% of surgical technicians, and 33% of certified registered nurse anesthetists) completed the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire; 6 were excluded because of non-matching identifiers. Before RORCC implementation, the highest quality of communication and collaboration was reported by surgeons and surgical technicians (100%). Certified registered nurse anesthetists reported only adequate levels of communication and collaboration with other positions. Most staff reported positive responses for teamwork (48%; α = 0.81), safety (47%; α = 0.75), working conditions (37%; α = 0.55), stress recognition (26%; α = 0.71), and perceptions of management (32%; α = 0.52). No differences were observed after RORCC implementation. Quality of communication and collaboration in the gynecology robotics operating room is high between most positions; however, safety attitude responses are low overall. No differences after RORCC implementation and low response rates may highlight lack of staff support. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Safety Culture in Pre-operational Phases of Nuclear Power Plant Projects

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2012-09-15

An abundance of information exists on safety culture related to the operational phases of nuclear power plants; however, pre-operational phases present unique challenges. This publication focuses on safety culture during pre-operational phases that span the interval from before a decision to launch a nuclear power programme to first fuel load. It provides safety culture insights and focuses on eight generic issues: safety culture understanding; multicultural aspects; leadership; competencies and resource competition; management systems; learning and feedback; cultural assessments; and communication. Each issue is discussed in terms of: specific challenges; desired state; approaches and methods; and examples and resources. This publication will be of interest to newcomers and experienced individuals faced with the opportunities and challenges inherent in safety culture programmes aimed at pre-operational activities.

Safety Culture in Pre-operational Phases of Nuclear Power Plant Projects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

An abundance of information exists on safety culture related to the operational phases of nuclear power plants; however, pre-operational phases present unique challenges. This publication focuses on safety culture during pre-operational phases that span the interval from before a decision to launch a nuclear power programme to first fuel load. It provides safety culture insights and focuses on eight generic issues: safety culture understanding; multicultural aspects; leadership; competencies and resource competition; management systems; learning and feedback; cultural assessments; and communication. Each issue is discussed in terms of: specific challenges; desired state; approaches and methods; and examples and resources. This publication will be of interest to newcomers and experienced individuals faced with the opportunities and challenges inherent in safety culture programmes aimed at pre-operational activities.

Managing health and safety risks: Implications for tailoring health and safety management system practices.

Science.gov (United States)

Willmer, D R; Haas, E J

2016-01-01

As national and international health and safety management system (HSMS) standards are voluntarily accepted or regulated into practice, organizations are making an effort to modify and integrate strategic elements of a connected management system into their daily risk management practices. In high-risk industries such as mining, that effort takes on added importance. The mining industry has long recognized the importance of a more integrated approach to recognizing and responding to site-specific risks, encouraging the adoption of a risk-based management framework. Recently, the U.S. National Mining Association led the development of an industry-specific HSMS built on the strategic frameworks of ANSI: Z10, OHSAS 18001, The American Chemistry Council's Responsible Care, and ILO-OSH 2001. All of these standards provide strategic guidance and focus on how to incorporate a plan-do-check-act cycle into the identification, management and evaluation of worksite risks. This paper details an exploratory study into whether practices associated with executing a risk-based management framework are visible through the actions of an organization's site-level management of health and safety risks. The results of this study show ways that site-level leaders manage day-to-day risk at their operations that can be characterized according to practices associated with a risk-based management framework. Having tangible operational examples of day-to-day risk management can serve as a starting point for evaluating field-level risk assessment efforts and their alignment to overall company efforts at effective risk mitigation through a HSMS or other processes.

Operating plant safety analysis needs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Young, M.Y.; Love, D.S.

1992-01-01

The primary objective for nuclear power station owners is to operate and manage their plants safely. However, there is also a need to provide economical electric power, which requires that the unit be operated as efficiently as possible, consistent with the safety requirements. The objectives cited above can be achieved through the identification and use of available margins inherent in the plant design. As a result of conservative licensing and analytical approaches taken in the past, many of these margins may be found in the safety analysis limits within which plants currently operate. Improvements in the accuracy of the safety analysis, and a more realistic treatment of plant initial and boundary conditions, can make this margin available for a variety of uses which enhance plant performance, help to reduce O and M costs, and may help to extend licensed operation. Opportunities for improvement exist in several areas in the accident analysis normally performed for Chapter 15 of the FSAR. For example, recent modifications to the ECCS rule, 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K, allow use of margins previously unavailable in the analysis of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). To take advantage of this regulatory change, new methods are being developed to analyze both the large and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As this margin is used, enhancements in the analysis of other transients will become necessary. The paper discusses accident analysis methods, future development needs, and analysis margin utilization in specific accident scenarios

KIT safety management. Annual report 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frank, Gerhard

2013-01-01

The KIT Safety Management Service Unit (KSM) guarantees radiological and conventional technical safety and security of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and controls the implementation and observation of legal environmental protection requirements. KSM is responsible for - licensing procedures, - industrial safety organization, - control of environmental protection measures, - planning and implementation of emergency preparedness and response, - operation of radiological laboratories and measurement stations, - extensive radiation protection support and the - the execution of security tasks in and for all organizational units of KIT. Moreover, KSM is in charge of wastewater and environmental monitoring for all facilities and nuclear installations all over the KIT campus. KSM is headed by the Safety Commissioner of KIT, who is appointed by the Presidential Committee. Within his scope of procedure for KIT, the Safety Commissioner controls the implementation of and compliance with safety-relevant requirements. The KIT Safety Management is certified according to DIN EN ISO 9001, its industrial safety management is certified by the VBG as ''AMS-Arbeitsschutz mit System'' and, hence, fulfills the requirements of NLF / ISO-OSH 2001. KSM laboratories are accredited according to DIN EN ISO/IEC 17025. To the extent possible, KSM is committed to maintaining competence in radiation protection and to supporting research and teaching activities. The present reports lists the individual tasks of the KIT Safety Management and informs about the results achieved in 2012. Status figures in principle reflect the status at the end of the year 2012. The processes described cover the areas of competence of KSM.

Tianwan nuclear power plant operation and management practices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gu Yingbing

2010-01-01

Tianwan Nuclear Power Station is a high-tech cooperation project in nuclear sector in the spirit of promoting the political relationship, economic trading and international strategic partnership between China and Russia. It was listed as one of the key nuclear projects to be constructed during the 'Ninth Five-Year' Plan. In this article the author summarizes and feedbacks the practices of operation management in Tianwan Nuclear Power Station in 7 aspects of safety culture construction, operation team building, daily operation management, operation document management, plant chemistry control and management, solid, liquid and gaseous waste management and control of operation performance indicators. (author)

Safety Priorities and Underestimations in Recreational Scuba Diving Operations: A European Study Supporting the Implementation of New Risk Management Programmes

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Serena Lucrezi

2018-03-01

Full Text Available Introduction: Scuba diving is an important marine tourism sector, but requires proper safety standards to reduce the risks and increase accessibility to its market. To achieve safety goals, safety awareness and positive safety attitudes in recreational scuba diving operations are essential. However, there is no published research exclusively focusing on scuba divers’ and dive centres’ perceptions toward safety. This study assessed safety perceptions in recreational scuba diving operations, with the aim to inform and enhance safety and risk management programmes within the scuba diving tourism industry.Materials and Methods: Two structured questionnaire surveys were prepared by the organisation Divers Alert Network and administered online to scuba diving operators in Italy and scuba divers in Europe, using a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. Questions in the survey included experience and safety offered at the dive centre; the buddy system; equipment and accessories for safe diving activities; safety issues in the certification of new scuba divers; incidents/accidents; and attitudes toward safety.Results: 91 scuba diving centres and 3,766 scuba divers participated in the study. Scuba divers gave importance to safety and the responsiveness of service providers, here represented by the dive centres. However, they underestimated the importance of a personal emergency action/assistance plan and, partly, of the buddy system alongside other safety procedures. Scuba divers agreed that some risks, such as those associated with running out of gas, deserve attention. Dive centres gave importance to aspects such as training and emergency action/assistance plans. However, they were limitedly involved in safety campaigning. Dive centres’ perceptions of safety in part aligned with those of scuba divers, with some exceptions.Conclusion: Greater responsibility is required in raising awareness and educating scuba divers, through participation in

Safety Priorities and Underestimations in Recreational Scuba Diving Operations: A European Study Supporting the Implementation of New Risk Management Programmes

Science.gov (United States)

Lucrezi, Serena; Egi, Salih Murat; Pieri, Massimo; Burman, Francois; Ozyigit, Tamer; Cialoni, Danilo; Thomas, Guy; Marroni, Alessandro; Saayman, Melville

2018-01-01

Introduction: Scuba diving is an important marine tourism sector, but requires proper safety standards to reduce the risks and increase accessibility to its market. To achieve safety goals, safety awareness and positive safety attitudes in recreational scuba diving operations are essential. However, there is no published research exclusively focusing on scuba divers’ and dive centres’ perceptions toward safety. This study assessed safety perceptions in recreational scuba diving operations, with the aim to inform and enhance safety and risk management programmes within the scuba diving tourism industry. Materials and Methods: Two structured questionnaire surveys were prepared by the organisation Divers Alert Network and administered online to scuba diving operators in Italy and scuba divers in Europe, using a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. Questions in the survey included experience and safety offered at the dive centre; the buddy system; equipment and accessories for safe diving activities; safety issues in the certification of new scuba divers; incidents/accidents; and attitudes toward safety. Results: 91 scuba diving centres and 3,766 scuba divers participated in the study. Scuba divers gave importance to safety and the responsiveness of service providers, here represented by the dive centres. However, they underestimated the importance of a personal emergency action/assistance plan and, partly, of the buddy system alongside other safety procedures. Scuba divers agreed that some risks, such as those associated with running out of gas, deserve attention. Dive centres gave importance to aspects such as training and emergency action/assistance plans. However, they were limitedly involved in safety campaigning. Dive centres’ perceptions of safety in part aligned with those of scuba divers, with some exceptions. Conclusion: Greater responsibility is required in raising awareness and educating scuba divers, through participation in prevention

Safety Priorities and Underestimations in Recreational Scuba Diving Operations: A European Study Supporting the Implementation of New Risk Management Programmes.

Science.gov (United States)

Lucrezi, Serena; Egi, Salih Murat; Pieri, Massimo; Burman, Francois; Ozyigit, Tamer; Cialoni, Danilo; Thomas, Guy; Marroni, Alessandro; Saayman, Melville

2018-01-01

Introduction: Scuba diving is an important marine tourism sector, but requires proper safety standards to reduce the risks and increase accessibility to its market. To achieve safety goals, safety awareness and positive safety attitudes in recreational scuba diving operations are essential. However, there is no published research exclusively focusing on scuba divers' and dive centres' perceptions toward safety. This study assessed safety perceptions in recreational scuba diving operations, with the aim to inform and enhance safety and risk management programmes within the scuba diving tourism industry. Materials and Methods: Two structured questionnaire surveys were prepared by the organisation Divers Alert Network and administered online to scuba diving operators in Italy and scuba divers in Europe, using a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. Questions in the survey included experience and safety offered at the dive centre; the buddy system; equipment and accessories for safe diving activities; safety issues in the certification of new scuba divers; incidents/accidents; and attitudes toward safety. Results: 91 scuba diving centres and 3,766 scuba divers participated in the study. Scuba divers gave importance to safety and the responsiveness of service providers, here represented by the dive centres. However, they underestimated the importance of a personal emergency action/assistance plan and, partly, of the buddy system alongside other safety procedures. Scuba divers agreed that some risks, such as those associated with running out of gas, deserve attention. Dive centres gave importance to aspects such as training and emergency action/assistance plans. However, they were limitedly involved in safety campaigning. Dive centres' perceptions of safety in part aligned with those of scuba divers, with some exceptions. Conclusion: Greater responsibility is required in raising awareness and educating scuba divers, through participation in prevention campaigns

IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission To Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant, France

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

Full text: An IAEA-led international team of experts today began an in-depth operational safety review of the Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant in France. The review, conducted at the invitation of the French government, focuses on programmes and activities essential to the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. The three-week review will cover the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. The conclusions of the review will be based on the IAEA Safety Standards and on well-established international good practices. The mission is not a regulatory inspection, a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. The team, led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, comprises experts from Bulgaria, China, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain and Ukraine. The Gravelines mission is the 173rd conducted as part of the IAEA's Operational Safety Review Team programme, which began in 1982. France participates actively in the programme and the Gravelines mission is the 24th hosted by the country. General information about OSART missions can be found on the IAEA Website: OSART Missions. (IAEA)

Mastery of risks and operating safety, risks and efficiencies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

A proper management of ones risks consists in acting to exert prevention and protection capacities against the negative consequences of an event, but also by committing oneself into an offensive approach allowing to improve efficiency, quality and availability. Safety and efficiencies are mutual reinforcing goals aiming at ensuring the perenniality of industries and services. The implementation of a risk management approach in an industrial environment allows to reach a better reactiveness and to increase the efficiency of a system by the mastery of organization and processes. The activities in concern are those of industries and services: transports, energy and environment, automotive industry, petrochemistry, chemistry, food, space, health, defense industries, telecommunication, mining industry, information systems, textile industry, finances.. The topics approached during this meeting treat of: the relevance of risk-abatement resources with respect to risks criticality; the consistent management of uncertainties with respect to stakes; the mastery of components aging and the expression of aging-dependent availability, maintenance and safety policies; the expression of obsolescence-related renewing policies; the operating safety tools and methods applied to complex and computerized-controlled systems; the integration of social, organizational and human factors in technical decisions and companies management; transverse and global risk analysis and decision-aid approaches; the vigilance culture; crisis anticipation and management; the experience feedback on technical and organisational aspects; efficiency and risk mastery indicators; cost/benefit approach in risk management, and economic intelligence approaches. Nineteen presentations have been selected which deal with the mastery of risks and the operating safety at nuclear facilities. (J.S.)

Management of safety and risk at the HFIR [High-Flux Isotope Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glovier, H.A.

1990-01-01

This paper discusses the management of safety and risk at the High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), a category A research reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The HFIR went critical in 1966 and operated at its designed 100 MW for 20 yr until it was shut down on November 14, 1986. It operated at a >90% availability and without significant event during this period. The result was a complacent management program lacking rigor. This complacency came to an end with the Chernobyl accident, which led to the appointment of an internal committee to assess the safety of ORNL reactor operations. This committee found that HFIR pressure vessel material specimens removed several years earlier had not been analyzed. This issue led to a general review of management practices that were found lacking in quality assurance, safety documentation, training process, and emergency planning, among others. Management accountability was lacking, as shown by design basis and safety analyses that were not up to data and by the fact that reactor operators whose requalification examinations had not been graded were allowed to continue operating the reactor over a long period of time. Between shutdown in 1986 and restart in April 1989, significant management changes and initiatives were made in the area of risk and safety management of ORNL reactors. These are presented briefly in this paper

Use of safety analysis results to support process operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Karvonen, I.; Heino, P.

1990-01-01

Safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase of a process plant produces useful knowledge about the behavior and the disturbances of the system. This knowledge, however, often remains to the designer though it would be of benefit to the operators and supervisors of the process plant, too. In Technical Research Centre of Finland a project has been started to plan and construct a prototype of an information system to make use of the analysis knowledge during the operation phase. The project belongs to a Nordic KRM project (Knowledge Based Risk Management System). The information system is planned to base on safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase and completed with operational experience. The safety analysis includes knowledge about potential disturbances, their causes and consequences in the form of Hazard and Operability Study, faut trees and/or event trees. During the operation disturbances can however, occur, which are not included in the safety analysis, or the causes or consequences of which have been incompletely identified. Thus the information system must also have an interface for the documentation of the operational knowledge missing from the analysis results. The main tasks off the system when supporting the management of a disturbance are to identify it (or the most important of the coexistent ones) from the stored knowledge and to present it in a proper form (for example as a deviation graph). The information system may also be used to transfer knowledge from one shift to another and to train process personnel

Core management and fuel handling for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

This Safety Guide supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for core management and fuel handling that are presented in Section 5 of the Safety Requirements publication on the operation of nuclear power plants. The present publication supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Aspects of Core Management and Fuel Handling, issued in 1985 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-010. It is also related to the Safety Guide on the Operating Organization for Nuclear Power Plants, which identifies fuel management as one of the various functions to be performed by the operating organization. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for core management and fuel handling at nuclear power plants on the basis of current international good practice. The present Safety Guide addresses those aspects of fuel management activities that are necessary in order to allow optimum reactor core operation without compromising the limits imposed by the design safety considerations relating to the nuclear fuel and the plant as a whole. In this publication, 'core management' refers to those activities that are associated with fuel management in the core and reactivity control, and 'fuel handling' refers to the movement, storage and control of fresh and irradiated fuel. Fuel management comprises both core management and fuel handling. This Safety Guide deals with fuel management for all types of land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. It describes the safety objectives of core management, the tasks that have to be accomplished to meet these objectives and the activities undertaken to perform those tasks. It also deals with the receipt of fresh fuel, storage and handling of fuel and other core components, the loading and unloading of fuel and core components, and the insertion and removal of other reactor materials. In addition, it deals with loading a transport container with irradiated fuel and its preparation for transport off the site. Transport

Core management and fuel handling for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This Safety Guide supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for core management and fuel handling that are presented in Section 5 of the Safety Requirements publication on the operation of nuclear power plants. The present publication supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Aspects of Core Management and Fuel Handling, issued in 1985 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-010. It is also related to the Safety Guide on the Operating Organization for Nuclear Power Plants, which identifies fuel management as one of the various functions to be performed by the operating organization. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for core management and fuel handling at nuclear power plants on the basis of current international good practice. The present Safety Guide addresses those aspects of fuel management activities that are necessary in order to allow optimum reactor core operation without compromising the limits imposed by the design safety considerations relating to the nuclear fuel and the plant as a whole. In this publication, 'core management' refers to those activities that are associated with fuel management in the core and reactivity control, and 'fuel handling' refers to the movement, storage and control of fresh and irradiated fuel. Fuel management comprises both core management and fuel handling. This Safety Guide deals with fuel management for all types of land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. It describes the safety objectives of core management, the tasks that have to be accomplished to meet these objectives and the activities undertaken to perform those tasks. It also deals with the receipt of fresh fuel, storage and handling of fuel and other core components, the loading and unloading of fuel and core components, and the insertion and removal of other reactor materials. In addition, it deals with loading a transport container with irradiated fuel and its preparation for transport off the site. Transport

Research nuclear reactor operation management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Preda, M.; Carabulea, A.

2008-01-01

Some aspects of reactor operation management are highlighted. The main mission of the operational staff at a testing reactor is to operate it safely and efficiently, to ensure proper conditions for different research programs implying the use of the reactor. For reaching this aim, there were settled down operating plans for every objective, and procedure and working instructions for staff training were established, both for the start-up and for the safe operation of the reactor. Damages during operation or special situations which can arise, at stop, start-up, maintenance procedures were thoroughly considered. While the technical skill is considered to be the most important quality of the staff, the organising capacity is a must in the operation of any nuclear facility. Staff training aims at gaining both theoretical and practical experience based on standards about staff quality at each work level. 'Plow' sheet has to be carefully done, setting clear the decision responsibility for each person so that everyone's own technical level to be coupled to the problems which implies his responsibility. Possible events which may arise in operation, e.g., criticality, irradiation, contamination, and which do not arise in other fields, have to be carefully studied. One stresses that the management based on technical and scientific arguments have to cover through technical, economical and nuclear safety requirements a series of interlinked subprograms. Every such subprograms is subject to some peculiar demands by the help of which the entire activity field is coordinated. Hence for any subprogram there are established the objectives to be achieved, the applicable regulations, well-defined responsibilities, training of the personnel involved, the material and documentation basis required and activity planning. The following up of positive or negative responses generated by experiments and the information synthesis close the management scope. Important management aspects

Safety management of a high energy accelerator used in the production of tritium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stark, R.M.; Brown, N.W.; Allen C.L.

1997-01-01

Interest in a high energy accelerator for producing tritium raises considerations regarding facility Safety Management. Accelerator facility hazards require safety analysis to consider factors such as: safe management of a large flux of very high energy neutrons, sustained operation in a very high energy proton and neutron field, neutron irradiation of a variety of materials, and handling and processing of significant quantities of tritium. Safety considerations of support systems and potential effects of magnetic fields must also be included. Existing Safety Management techniques, safety standards, and criteria for operation of high energy accelerators provide considerable guidance. These must, however, be reviewed to determine their appropriate use for safe operation of a very large, tritium-producing accelerator. New or revised safety standards may be required to establish and maintain the safe operating-envelope. The goal will be to develop a set of tailored standards and criteria that provide a reasonable operational envelope and assure adequate public, worker, and environmental safety. The generation of an appropriate set of safety standards and criteria will include several activities. One activity will involve evaluation of proposed facility designs to determine possible hazards. Another activity will involve a detailed review of existing accelerator safety management systems. A third activity will involve the review of operating histories of existing facilities. Facilities approximating the characteristics of the anticipated tritium production facility will be considered. Following completion of these activities a proposed Safety Management System and criteria for application to these facilities will be drafted. The need for new analytical methods and for additional safety standards will be identified. The draft document will then be reviewed and revised to establish the standards and criteria within the appropriate Department of Energy framework

Safety management of a complex R&D ground operating system

Science.gov (United States)

Connors, J.; Mauer, R. A.

1975-01-01

Report discusses safety program implementation for large R&D operating system. Analytical techniques are defined and suggested as tools for identifying potential hazards and determining means to effectively control or eliminate hazards.

Applying Sensor-Based Technology to Improve Construction Safety Management.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Mingyuan; Cao, Tianzhuo; Zhao, Xuefeng

2017-08-11

Construction sites are dynamic and complicated systems. The movement and interaction of people, goods and energy make construction safety management extremely difficult. Due to the ever-increasing amount of information, traditional construction safety management has operated under difficult circumstances. As an effective way to collect, identify and process information, sensor-based technology is deemed to provide new generation of methods for advancing construction safety management. It makes the real-time construction safety management with high efficiency and accuracy a reality and provides a solid foundation for facilitating its modernization, and informatization. Nowadays, various sensor-based technologies have been adopted for construction safety management, including locating sensor-based technology, vision-based sensing and wireless sensor networks. This paper provides a systematic and comprehensive review of previous studies in this field to acknowledge useful findings, identify the research gaps and point out future research directions.

Safety management procedures and practices at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rodriguez, P.; Lee, S.M.; Kapoor, R.P.; Raghunath, V.M.; Karthikeyan, S.V. [Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam 603 102 (India)]. E-mail: kapoor@igcar.ernet.in

2004-07-01

The Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) operates FBTR (Fast Breeder Test Reactor), KAMINI (neutron source reactor), radiometallurgical laboratory, radiochemical laboratory, reprocessing plant, industrial scale sodium loops, advanced research laboratories, workshops, etc. Codified safety management procedures with systematic surveillance are essential for safe and reliable operations and these are described under the classifications of radiation safety, industrial safety and reactor operations with special emphasis on the human factor. Health physics teams, independent of the plant facility, supervise the radioactive facilities of the centre. Industrial safety standards are maintained by another independent section. Safety management for the reactors include a clear organisational structure, adequate documentation, compulsory training and licencing, safe working methods taking into account human factors and review by independent safety authorities. (author)

Safety management procedures and practices at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, P.; Lee, S.M.; Kapoor, R.P.; Raghunath, V.M.; Karthikeyan, S.V.

2004-01-01

The Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) operates FBTR (Fast Breeder Test Reactor), KAMINI (neutron source reactor), radiometallurgical laboratory, radiochemical laboratory, reprocessing plant, industrial scale sodium loops, advanced research laboratories, workshops, etc. Codified safety management procedures with systematic surveillance are essential for safe and reliable operations and these are described under the classifications of radiation safety, industrial safety and reactor operations with special emphasis on the human factor. Health physics teams, independent of the plant facility, supervise the radioactive facilities of the centre. Industrial safety standards are maintained by another independent section. Safety management for the reactors include a clear organisational structure, adequate documentation, compulsory training and licencing, safe working methods taking into account human factors and review by independent safety authorities. (author)

Safety Management in Non-Nuclear Contexts. Examples from Swedish Railway Regulatory and Company Perspectives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Salo, Ilkka; Svensson, Ola (Risk Analysis, Social and Decision Research Unit, Dept. of Psychology, Stockholm Univ., Stockholm (Sweden))

2005-06-15

Nuclear power operations demand safe procedures. In the context of this report, safety management is considered as a key instrument to achieve safety in technology, organization and operations. Outside the area of nuclear operations there exist a number of other technological areas that also demand safe operations. From the perspective of knowledge management, there exists an enormous pool of safety experiences that may be possible to shear or reformulate from one context to another. From this point of view, it seems highly relevant to make efforts to utilize, and try to understand how safety in general is managed in other contexts. There is much to gain from such an approach, not at least from economical, societal, and systems points of views. Because of the vast diversity between technological areas and their operations, a common framework that allow elaboration with common concepts for understanding, must be generated. In preceding studies a number of steps have been taken towards finding such a general framework for modeling safety management. In an initial step a system theoretical framework was outlined. In subsequent steps central concepts from this framework has been applied and evaluated in relation to a number of non-nuclear organizations. The present report brings this intention one step further, and for the first time, a complete analysis of a system consisting of both the regulator and the licensee was carried out, in the above respects. This report focused the Swedish railway system, and the organizations studied were the Swedish Rail Agency (SRA) and SJ (the main rail traffic operator). The data used for this report consisted of various documents about the organizations, and interview data. This report is basically structured around three, more or less, independent studies that are presented in separate chapters. They are: the system theoretical framework that in the following chapters is applied to the two organizations, and one chapter each for the

International conference on the operational safety performance in nuclear installations. Contributed papers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

In 2001, the IAEA organized an 'International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety'. The issues discussed during the conference were: (1) risk- informed decision-making; (2) influence of external factors on safety; (3) safety of fuel cycle facilities; (4) safety of research reactors; and (5) safety performance indicators. Senior nuclear safety decision makers reviewed the issues and formulated recommendations for future actions by national and international organizations. In 2004, the IAEA organized an 'International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety' in Beijing China. The issues discussed during the conference were: (1) changing environment - coping with diversity and globalization; (2) operating experience - managing changes effectively; (3) regulatory management systems - adapting to changes in the environment; and (4) long term operations - maintaining safety margins while extending plant lifetimes. The results of this conference confirmed the importance of operators and regulators of nuclear facilities meeting periodically to share experience and opinion on emerging issues and future challenges of the nuclear industry. Substantial progress has been made, and continues to be made by Member States in enhancing the safety of nuclear installations worldwide. At the same time, more attention is being given to other areas of nuclear safety. The safety standards for research reactors are being updated and new standards are planned on the safety of other facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. The Agency has taken a lead role in this effort and is receiving much support from its Member States to gain international consensus in these areas. The objective of the conference is to foster the exchange of information on operational safety performance and operating experience in nuclear installations, with the aim of consolidating an international consensus on: - the present status of these issues; - emerging issues with international implications

Safety Management in Non-Nuclear Contexts. Examples from Swedish Railway Regulatory and Company Perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Salo, Ilkka; Svensson, Ola

2005-06-01

Nuclear power operations demand safe procedures. In the context of this report, safety management is considered as a key instrument to achieve safety in technology, organization and operations. Outside the area of nuclear operations there exist a number of other technological areas that also demand safe operations. From the perspective of knowledge management, there exists an enormous pool of safety experiences that may be possible to shear or reformulate from one context to another. From this point of view, it seems highly relevant to make efforts to utilize, and try to understand how safety in general is managed in other contexts. There is much to gain from such an approach, not at least from economical, societal, and systems points of views. Because of the vast diversity between technological areas and their operations, a common framework that allow elaboration with common concepts for understanding, must be generated. In preceding studies a number of steps have been taken towards finding such a general framework for modeling safety management. In an initial step a system theoretical framework was outlined. In subsequent steps central concepts from this framework has been applied and evaluated in relation to a number of non-nuclear organizations. The present report brings this intention one step further, and for the first time, a complete analysis of a system consisting of both the regulator and the licensee was carried out, in the above respects. This report focused the Swedish railway system, and the organizations studied were the Swedish Rail Agency (SRA) and SJ (the main rail traffic operator). The data used for this report consisted of various documents about the organizations, and interview data. This report is basically structured around three, more or less, independent studies that are presented in separate chapters. They are: the system theoretical framework that in the following chapters is applied to the two organizations, and one chapter each for the

The safety experience of New Zealand adventure tourism operators.

Science.gov (United States)

Bentley, Tim A; Page, Stephen; Walker, Linda

2004-01-01

This survey examined parameters of the New Zealand adventure tourism industry client injury risk. The research also sought to establish priorities for intervention to reduce adventure tourism risk, and identify client injury control measures currently in place (or absent) in the New Zealand adventure tourism industry, with a view to establishing guidelines for the development of effective adventure tourism safety management systems. This 2003 survey builds upon an exploratory study of New Zealand adventure tourism safety conducted by us during 1999. A postal questionnaire was used to survey all identifiable New Zealand adventure tourism operators. The questionnaire asked respondents about their recorded client injury experience, perceptions of client injury risk factors, safety management practices, and barriers to safety. Some 27 adventure tourism activities were represented among the responding sample (n=96). The highest client injury risk was reported in the snow sports, bungee jumping and horse riding sectors, although serious underreporting of minor injuries was evident across the industry. Slips, trips and falls (STF) were the major client injury mechanisms, and a range of risk factors for client injuries were identified. Safety management measures were inconsistently applied across the industry. The industry should consider the implications of poor injury reporting standards and safety management practices generally. Specifically, the industry should consider risk management that focuses on minor (e.g., STF) as well as catastrophic events.

ITER safety and operational scenario

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shimomura, Y.; Saji, G.

1998-01-01

The safety and environmental characteristics of ITER and its operational scenario are described. Fusion has built-in safety characteristics without depending on layers of safety protection systems. Safety considerations are integrated in the design by making use of the intrinsic safety characteristics of fusion adequate to the moderate hazard inventories. In addition to this, a systematic nuclear safety approach has been applied to the design of ITER. The safety assessment of the design shows how ITER will safely accommodate uncertainties, flexibility of plasma operations, and experimental components, which is fundamental in ITER, the first experimental fusion reactor. The operation of ITER will progress step by step from hydrogen plasma operation with low plasma current, low magnetic field, short pulse and low duty factor without fusion power to deuterium-tritium plasma operation with full plasma current, full magnetic field, long pulse and high duty factor with full fusion power. In each step, characteristics of plasma and optimization of plasma operation will be studied which will significantly reduce uncertainties and frequency/severity of plasma transient events in the next step. This approach enhances reliability of ITER operation. (orig.)

78 FR 54510 - New Entrant Safety Assurance Program Operational Test

Science.gov (United States)

2013-09-04

... safety management controls; (2) consider their effects on small businesses; and (3) consider establishing alternate locations where such reviews may be conducted for the convenience of small businesses. In response... safety review within 18 months of starting interstate operations. [49 U.S.C. 31144(g)]. In issuing these...

Management for nuclear power plants for safe operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kueffer, K.

1981-01-01

This lecture covers management aspects which have an immediate bearing on safety and identifies the objectives and tasks of management which are required for safe operation of a nuclear power plant and is based on the Codes of Practice and Safety Guides of the IAEA as well as arrangements in use at the Swiss Nuclear Power Station Beznau. (orig./RW)

Comparison of Plant Life Management Approaches for Long Term Operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kang, Kisig

2012-01-01

Plant life management can be defined as the integration of ageing and economic planning to maintain a high level of safety and optimize operations. Many Member States have given high priority to long term operation of nuclear power plants beyond the time frame originally anticipated (e. g. 30 or 40 years). Out of a total of 445 (369 GWe) operating nuclear power plants, 349 units (297 GWe) have been in operation for more than 20 years (as of November 2011). The need for engineering support to operation, maintenance, safety review and life management for long term operation as well as education and training in the field is increasingly evident. In addition the Fukushima accident has rendered all stake holders even more attentive to safety concerns and to the provision of beyond safety measures in the preparation and scrutiny of applications for operational design life extensions. In many countries, the safety performance of NPPs is periodically followed and characterized via the periodic safety review (PSR) approach. The regulatory The regulatory review and acceptance of the PSR gives the licensee the permission to operate the plant for up to the end of the next PSR cycle (usually 10 years). In the USA and other countries operating US designed plants, the license renewal application is based on the five pre-requisite requirements and ageing management programme for passive long life system structure and components(SSCs) and active systems is adequately addressed by the maintenance rule (MR) requirements and other established regulatory processes. Other Member States have adopted a combined approach that incorporates elements of both PSR and additional LRA specific requirements primarily focused on time limited ageing analysis. Taking into account this variety of approaches, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) initiated work for collecting and sharing information among Member States about good practices on plant life management for long term operation in

Institutional failure: are safety management systems the answer?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Waddington, J.G.; Lafortune, J.F. [International Safety Research, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Duffey, R.B. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada)

2009-07-01

In spite of an overwhelming number of safety management programs, incidents and accidents that could seemingly, in hindsight, have been prevented, still occur. Institutional failure is seen as a major contributor in almost all cases. With the anticipated significant increase in the number of nuclear plants around the world, a drastic step in the way we manage safety is deemed essential to further reduce the currently already very low rate of accidents to levels that will not cause undue public concern and threaten the success of the nuclear 'renaissance'. To achieve this, many industries have already started implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) approach, aimed at harmonizing, rationalizing and integrating management processes, safety culture and operational risk assessment. This paper discusses the origins and the nature of SMS based in part on the experience of the aviation industry, and shows how SMS is poised to be the next generation in the way the nuclear industry manages safety. It also discusses the need for better direct measures of risk to demonstrate the success of SMS implementation. (author)

Institutional failure: are safety management systems the answer?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waddington, J.G.; Lafortune, J.F.; Duffey, R.B.

2009-01-01

In spite of an overwhelming number of safety management programs, incidents and accidents that could seemingly, in hindsight, have been prevented, still occur. Institutional failure is seen as a major contributor in almost all cases. With the anticipated significant increase in the number of nuclear plants around the world, a drastic step in the way we manage safety is deemed essential to further reduce the currently already very low rate of accidents to levels that will not cause undue public concern and threaten the success of the nuclear 'renaissance'. To achieve this, many industries have already started implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) approach, aimed at harmonizing, rationalizing and integrating management processes, safety culture and operational risk assessment. This paper discusses the origins and the nature of SMS based in part on the experience of the aviation industry, and shows how SMS is poised to be the next generation in the way the nuclear industry manages safety. It also discusses the need for better direct measures of risk to demonstrate the success of SMS implementation. (author)

Systems engineering applied to integrated safety management for high consequence facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barter, R; Morais, B.

1998-01-01

Integrated Safety Management is a concept that is being actively promoted by the U.S. Department of Energy as a means of assuring safe operation of its facilities. The concept involves the integration of safety precepts into work planning rather than adjusting for safe operations after defining the work activity. The system engineering techniques used to design an integrated safety management system for a high consequence research facility are described. An example is given to show how the concepts evolved with the system design

An introduction to a new IAEA safety guide: 'ageing management for nuclear power plants'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pachner, J.; Inagaki, T.; Kang, K.S.

2008-01-01

This paper reports on a new IAEA Safety Guide entitled 'Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants' which is currently in an advanced draft form, awaiting approval of publication. The new Safety Guide will be an umbrella document for a comprehensive set of guidance documents on ageing management which have been issued by the IAEA. The Safety Guide first presents basic concepts of ageing management as a common basis for the recommendations on: proactive management of ageing throughout the life cycle of a nuclear power plant (NPP); systematic approach to managing ageing in the operation of NPPs; managing obsolescence; and review of ageing management for long term operation (life extension). The Safety Guide is intended to assist operators in establishing, implementing and improving systematic ageing management programs in NPPs and may be used by regulators in preparing regulatory standards and guides, and in verifying that ageing in nuclear power plants is being effectively managed. (author)

Safety culture and quality management of Kartini research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Syarip; Hauptmanns, Ulrich

1999-01-01

The evaluation for assessing the safety culture and quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is presented. The method is based on the concept of management control of safety (audit) as well as by using the developed method i.e. the questionnaires concerning areas of relevance which have to be answered with value statements. There are seven statements or qualifiers in answering the questions. Since such statements are vague, they are represented by fuzzy numbers. The weaknesses can be identified from the different areas contemplated. The evaluation result show that the quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is globally rated as 'Average'. The operator behavior in the implementation of 'safety culture' concept is found as a weakness, therefore this area should be improved. (author)

OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS FOR REDUCING NOISE AND THE SAFETY OF AIR OPERATIONS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Anna KWASIBORSKA

2017-03-01

Full Text Available Many European airports are located in close proximity to residential or protected areas. Aircraft noise emissions caused by the landing and taking off of aircraft are a big problem in these areas. From an operational point of view, the method for reducing noise is to reduce traffic volume or change its organization, especially during the night. Some procedures and tools have been developed to support air traffic management in the implementation of operational constraints necessary to maintain noise at an acceptable level. The objective of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of these tools. For this purpose, we have analysed existing methods of operational noise reduction, taking into account their influence on the structure, smoothness, punctuality and, especially, the safety of air traffic. As a result, existing risks have been identified, while methods have been proposed to combine two important air traffic service tasks: ensuring safety, while taking into account the environmental constraints, especially in relation to the acoustic climate.

IAEA Operational Safety Team Reviews Saint-Alban Nuclear Power Plant, France

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has reviewed safety practices at France's Saint-Alban Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and has highlighted a set of strong practices as well as a series of recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the team at the request of the Government of France to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the Saint-Alban NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in Vienna, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 20 September to 6 October 2010. The team was made up of experts from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the USA. An OSART mission is designed to review programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. The team at Saint-Alban conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which largely are under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; and Emergency Planning and Preparedness. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: A safety guideline for outages; The use of remote video surveillance of fuel inspection and handling activities; A motivational tool for plant staff regarding the benefits of operating experience and associated corrective actions; and Use of a sophisticated key control system

IAEA Operational Safety Team Review Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant, Slovak Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has reviewed Slovakia's Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices as well as recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of Slovak Republic to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of Bohunice NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 1 to 18 November 2010. The team was made up of experts from Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the IAEA. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. The team at BNPP conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which largely is under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry and Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Long Term Operation assessment has been requested by the plant in addition to the standard OSART program. The OSART team has identified good plant practices which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: BNPP has implemented a comprehensive set of technical and organizational measures which have significantly reduced the production of liquid radioactive waste; BNPP has developed an automatic transfer of dosimetry data

Application of the management system for facilities and activities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

This Safety Guide supports the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. It provides generic guidance to aid in establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a management system that complies with the requirements established. In addition to this Safety Guide, there are a number of Safety Guides for specific technical areas. Together these provide all the guidance necessary for implementing these requirements. This publication supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-Q1-Q7 (1996). The guidance provided here may be used by organizations in the following ways: - To assist in the development of the management systems of organizations directly responsible for operating facilities and activities and providing services for: Nuclear facilities; Activities using sources of ionizing radiation; Radioactive waste management; The transport of radioactive material; Radiation protection activities; Any other practices or circumstances in which people may be exposed to radiation from naturally occurring or artificial sources; The regulation of such facilities and activities; - To assist in the development of the management systems of the relevant regulatory bodies; - By the operator, to specify to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any guidance of this Safety Guide that should be included in the supplier's management system for the supply and delivery of products

Measuring safety in aviation : empirical results about the relation between safety outcomes and safety management system processes, operational activities and demographic data

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kaspers, Steffen; Karanikas, Nektarios; Piric, Selma; van Aalst, Robbert; de Boer, Robert Jan; Roelen, Alfred

2017-01-01

A literature review conducted as part of a research project named “Measuring Safety in Aviation – Developing Metrics for Safety Management Systems” revealed several challenges regarding the safety metrics used in aviation. One of the conclusions was that there is limited empirical evidence about the

Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

Managing the early termination of operation of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the statutory mandate to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. However, it has become more and more apparent that many States are facing the decision of closing nuclear power plants (NPPs) before expiration of their operating licences. Some NPPs have already closed and the owners are evaluating the effects on their staffs, the local economies and safety at the sites. It is evident that safety aspects and management strategies are important factors to be reviewed and monitored throughout the process of early termination and closure.The owners and employees of the NPPs are realizing that they are entering into very difficult phases of the plant life cycle with significant safety concerns. Although a great deal of work has been done to review and process information on technical aspects of early termination prior to decommissioning, far less attention has been given to the management and organizational issues involved in maintaining the required safety level in such nuclear installations. It is important that when decisions are made to terminate operation early, the same safety measures are applied to management concerns for strategic planning as are applied to technical reviews. These management and organizational issues are fundamental to any future decommissioning process. Managers at sites that decided to close early may be working to cope with management of change issues arising during the transition from operation to decommissioning as they monitor resource and competence needs, as well as staff morale and technical issues. If these issues are not treated satisfactorily they can have significant safety consequences. The organization often must address all these challenges with little guidance or experience and with reduced resources. This Safety Report has been developed with the support of experts from regulatory, operating and

Best Practices in the Management of an Operating Experience Programme at Nuclear Power Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-08-01

The IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1) state the need for operating organizations to establish a programme for the feedback and analysis of operating experience in nuclear power plants. Such a programme ensures that operating experience is analysed, events important to safety are reviewed in depth, lessons learned are disseminated to the staff of the organization and to the relevant national and international organizations and corrective actions are effectively implemented. In IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and Peer Review of the effectiveness of the Operational Safety Performance Experience Review (PROSPER) missions, weaknesses in the management of operating experience (OE) programmes have been identified as one of the root causes of the recurrence of events. This publication has been developed to provide advice and assistance to nuclear installation managers and related institutions, including contractors and support organizations, to strengthen and enhance the management of their OE processes. In this publication, a number of barriers to the successful management of an OE programme have been identified. Managers are encouraged to review and evaluate these barriers with a view to identifying and eliminating them within their own organizations

Evaluation of food safety management systems in Serbian dairy industry

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Igor Tomašević

2016-01-01

Full Text Available This paper reports incentives, costs, difficulties and benefits of food safety management systems implementation in the Serbian dairy industry. The survey involved 27 food business operators with the national milk and dairy market share of 65 %. Almost two thirds of the assessed dairy producers (70.4 % claimed that they had a fully operational and certified HACCP system in place, while 29.6 % implemented HACCP, but had no third party certification. ISO 22000 was implemented and certified in 29.6 % of the companies, while only 11.1 % had implemented and certified IFS standard. The most important incentive for implementing food safety management systems for Serbian dairy producers was to increase and improve safety and quality of dairy products. The cost of product investigation/analysis and hiring external consultants were related to the initial set-up of food safety management system with the greatest importance. Serbian dairy industry was not greatly concerned by the financial side of implementing food safety management systems due to the fact that majority of prerequisite programmes were in place and regularly used by almost 100 % of the producers surveyed. The presence of competency gap between the generic knowledge for manufacturing food products and the knowledge necessary to develop and implement food safety management systems was confirmed, despite the fact that 58.8 % of Serbian dairy managers had university level of education. Our study brings about the innovation emphasizing the attitudes and the motivation of the food production staff as the most important barrier for the development and implementation of HACCP. The most important identified benefit was increased safety of dairy products with the mean rank scores of 6.85. The increased customer confidence and working discipline of staff employed in food processing were also found as important benefits of implementing/operating HACCP. The study shows that the level of HACCP

Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2017-06-15

To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper.

Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak

2017-01-01

To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper

Safety culture and quality management of Kartini research reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Syarip [Yogyakarta Nuclear Research Centre, Yogyakarta (Indonesia); Hauptmanns, Ulrich [Department of Plant Design and Safety, Otto-Von-Guericke-University, Magdeburg (Germany)

1999-10-01

The evaluation for assessing the safety culture and quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is presented. The method is based on the concept of management control of safety (audit) as well as by using the developed method i.e. the questionnaires concerning areas of relevance which have to be answered with value statements. There are seven statements or qualifiers in answering the questions. Since such statements are vague, they are represented by fuzzy numbers. The weaknesses can be identified from the different areas contemplated. The evaluation result show that the quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is globally rated as 'Average'. The operator behavior in the implementation of 'safety culture' concept is found as a weakness, therefore this area should be improved. (author)

Non-operative management versus operative management in high-grade blunt hepatic injury.

Science.gov (United States)

Cirocchi, Roberto; Trastulli, Stefano; Pressi, Eleonora; Farinella, Eriberto; Avenia, Stefano; Morales Uribe, Carlos Hernando; Botero, Ana Maria; Barrera, Luis M

2015-08-24

Surgery used to be the treatment of choice in cases of blunt hepatic injury, but this approach gradually changed over the last two decades as increasing non-operative management (NOM) of splenic injury led to its use for hepatic injury. The improvement in critical care monitoring and computed tomographic scanning, as well as the more frequent use of interventional radiology techniques, has helped to bring about this change to non-operative management. Liver trauma ranges from a small capsular tear, without parenchymal laceration, to massive parenchymal injury with major hepatic vein/retrohepatic vena cava lesions. In 1994, the Organ Injury Scaling Committee of the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma (AAST) revised the Hepatic Injury Scale to have a range from grade I to VI. Minor injuries (grade I or II) are the most frequent liver injuries (80% to 90% of all cases); severe injuries are grade III-V lesions; grade VI lesions are frequently incompatible with survival. In the medical literature, the majority of patients who have undergone NOM have low-grade liver injuries. The safety of NOM in high-grade liver lesions, AAST grade IV and V, remains a subject of debate as a high incidence of liver and collateral extra-abdominal complications are still described. To assess the effects of non-operative management compared to operative management in high-grade (grade III-V) blunt hepatic injury. The search for studies was run on 14 April 2014. We searched the Cochrane Injuries Group's Specialised Register, The Cochrane Library, Ovid MEDLINE(R), Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE(R) Daily and Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R), Embase Classic+Embase (Ovid), PubMed, ISI WOS (SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S & CPSI-SSH), clinical trials registries, conference proceedings, and we screened reference lists. All randomised trials that compare non-operative management versus operative management in high-grade blunt hepatic injury. Two authors independently

Automatic road traffic safety management system in urban areas

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Oskarbski Jacek

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Traffic incidents and accidents contribute to decreasing levels of transport system reliability and safety. Traffic management and emergency systems on the road, using, among others, automatic detection, video surveillance, communication technologies and institutional solutions improve the organization of the work of various departments involved in traffic and safety management. Automation of incident management helps to reduce the time of a rescue operation as well as of the normalization of the flow of traffic after completion of a rescue operation, which also affects the reduction of the risk of secondary accidents and contributes to reducing their severity. The paper presents the possibility of including city traffic departments in the process of incident management. The results of research on the automatic incident detection in cities are also presented.

Pilot In Command: A Feasibility Assessment of Autonomous Flight Management Operations

Science.gov (United States)

Wing, David J.; Ballin, Mark G.; Krishnamurthy, Karthik

2004-01-01

Several years of NASA research have produced the air traffic management operational concept of Autonomous Flight Management with high potential for operational feasibility, significant system and user benefits, and safety. Among the chief potential benefits are demand-adaptive or scalable capacity, user flexibility and autonomy that may finally enable truly successful business strategies, and compatibility with current-day operations such that the implementation rate can be driven from within the user community. A concept summary of Autonomous Flight Management is provided, including a description of how these operations would integrate in shared airspace with existing ground-controlled flight operations. The mechanisms enabling the primary benefits are discussed, and key findings of a feasibility assessment of airborne autonomous operations are summarized. Concept characteristics that impact safety are presented, and the potential for initially implementing Autonomous Flight Management is discussed.

Management of operational events in research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhong Heping; Yang Shuchun; Peng Xueming

2001-01-01

The author describes the tracing management process post-operational event in a research reactor based on nuclear safety code, under the background of the research reactor in Nuclear Power Institute of China. It presorts the definite measures to the event tracing and it up its management factors

The Management System for Nuclear Installations. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

This Safety Guide is applicable throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, including any subsequent period of institutional control, until there is no significant residual radiation hazard. For a nuclear installation, the lifetime includes site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. These stages in the lifetime of a nuclear installation may overlap. This Safety Guide may be applied to nuclear installations in the following ways: (a) To support the development, implementation, assessment and improvement of the management system of those organizations responsible for research, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation; (b) As an aid in the assessment by the regulatory body of the adequacy of the management system of a nuclear installation; (c) To assist an organization in specifying to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any specific element that should be included within the supplier's management system for the supply of products. This Safety Guide follows the structure of the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities, whereby: (a) Section 2 provides recommendations on implementing the management system, including recommendations relating to safety culture, grading and documentation. (b) Section 3 provides recommendations on the responsibilities of senior management for the development and implementation of an effective management system. (c) Section 4 provides recommendations on resource management, including guidance on human resources, infrastructure and the working environment. (d) Section 5 provides recommendations on how the processes of the installation can be specified and developed, including recommendations on some generic processes of the management system. (e) Section 6 provides recommendations on the measurement, assessment and improvement of the management system of a nuclear

Annual report on nuclear power station operational management, 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-09-01

As of the end of fiscal year 1984, 28 nuclear power plants were in operation in Japan, the total power output of which was 20.56 million kW, equivalent to 22.9 % of the total generated electric power in Japan. Now nuclear power generation bears a very important role in the stable supply and cost stabilization of electric power. The result of the capacity factor in fiscal year 1984 was 73.9 %, which showed that the nuclear power generation and safety management technologies in Japan are at the top level in the world. However, in order that nuclear power generation accomplishes the role as main power source sufficiently hereafter by increasing the number of plants, the reliability and economical efficiency must be further improved, and especially the safety management and operational management become important. For the purpose, the operational experience accumulated so far must be effectively utilized. In this book, the outline of the administration on the safety regulation of nuclear power generation, the state of operation of nuclear power plants, the state of accidents and failures, the state of regular inspections and so on are summarized. Also the state of radioactive waste management and the radiation control for workers are reported. (Kako, I.)

Conduct of Operations at Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This Safety Guide identifies the main responsibilities and practices of nuclear power plant (NPP) operations departments in relation to their responsibility for the safe functioning of the plant. The guide presents the factors to be considered in structuring the operations department of an NPP; setting high standards of performance; making safety related decisions in an effective manner; conducting control room and field activities in a thorough and professional manner; and maintaining an NPP within established operational limits and conditions. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management and organization of plant operations; 3. Shift complement and functions; 4. Shift routines and operating practices; 5. Control of equipment and plant status; 6. Operations equipment and operator aids; 7. Work control and authorization.

Operational and environmental safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

The responsibility of the DOE Office of Operational and Environmental Safety is to assure that DOE-controlled activities are conducted in a manner that will minimize risks to the public and employees and will provide protection for property and the environment. The program supports the various energy technologies by identifying and resolving safety problems; developing and issuing safety policies, standards, and criteria; assuring compliance with DOE, Federal, and state safety regulations; and establishing procedures for reporting and investigating accidents in DOE operations. Guidelines for the radiation protection of personnel; radiation monitoring at nuclear facilities; an assessment of criticality accidents by fault tree analysis; and the preparation of environmental, safety, and health standards applicable to geothermal energy development are discussed

Study Of Safety Management By Using Gis In Coimbatore

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

S. Kanchana

2015-08-01

Full Text Available The safety management is very important in the process of construction .The traditional methods of construction safety control cannot meet the construction of big project. To ensure the safety of construction and reduce accidents in the process of construction the current situation and problems we face in construction safety management should be studied first. And then the project risk warning mechanism based on the GIS is constructed according to the problems we faced to achieve visual monitoring and warning of construction safety risk management and to provide decision support for construction. This project aims to develop a web-based spatial decision support system model for proactive health and safety management in linear construction projects. 5 Currently health and safety management is usually performed reactively instead of proactive management since hazard identification and risk assessment is mostly performed on paper based documents that are not effectively used at site. An information system relates to a chain of operations lead to planning the observation and collection of data to storage and analysis of data to the use of derived information in decision-making processes. To create a web-based free and open sourced GIS that can work with different data formats by exchanging and presenting data as a real-time map on web.

Safety Climate, Perceived Risk, and Involvement in Safety Management

OpenAIRE

Kouabenan , Dongo Rémi; Ngueutsa , Robert ,; Safiétou , Mbaye

2015-01-01

International audience; This article examines the relationship between safety climate, risk perception and involvement in safety management by first-line managers (FLM). Sixty-three FLMs from two French nuclear plants answered a questionnaire measuring perceived workplace safety climate, perceived risk, and involvement in safety management. We hypothesized that a positive perception of safety climate would promote substantial involvement in safety management, and that this effect would be str...

Safety in waste management plants: An Indian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shekhar, P.; Ozarde, P.D.; Gandhi, P.M.

2000-01-01

Assurance of safety of public and plant workers and protection of the environment are prime objectives in the design and construction of Waste Management Plants. In India, waste management principles and strategies have been evolved in accordance with national and international regulations and standards for radiation protection. The regulations governing radiation protection have a far-reaching impact on the management of the radioactive waste. The wastes arise at each stages of the fuel cycle with varying chemical nature, generation rate and specific activity levels depending upon the type of the facility. Segregation of waste based on its chemical nature and specific activity levels is an essential feature, as its aids in selection of treatment and conditioning process. Selection of the process, equipment and materials in the plant, are governed by safety consideration alongside factors like efficiency and simplicity. The plant design considerations like physical separation, general arrangement, ventilation zoning, access control, remote handling, process piping routing, decontamination etc. have major role in realizing waste safety. Stringent quality control measures during all stages of construction have helped in achieving the design intended safety. These aspects together with operating experience gained form basis for the improved safety features in the design and construction of waste management plants. The comprehensive safety is derived from adoption of waste management strategies and appropriate plant design considerations. The paper briefly brings safety in waste management programme in India, in its current perspective. (author)

Risk and Work Configuration Management as a Function of Integrated Safety Management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lana Buehrer; Michele Kelly; Fran Lemieux; Fred Williams

2007-01-01

National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), has established a work management program and corresponding electronic Facilities and Operations Management Information System (e-FOM) to implement Integrated Safety Management (ISM). The management of work scopes, the identification of hazards, and the establishment of implementing controls are reviewed and approved through electronic signatures. Through the execution of the program and the implementation of the electronic system, NSTec staff work within controls and utilize feedback and improvement process. The Integrated Work Control Manual further implements the five functions of ISM at the Activity level. By adding the Risk and Work Configuration Management program, NSTec establishes risk acceptance (business and physical) for liabilities within the performance direction and work management processes. Requirements, roles, and responsibilities are specifically identified in the program while e-FOM provides the interface and establishes the flowdown from the Safety Chain to work and facilities management processes to company work-related directives, and finally to Subject Matter Expert concurrence. The Program establishes, within the defined management structure, management levels for risk identification, risk mitigation (controls), and risk acceptance (business and physical) within the Safety Chain of Responsibility. The Program also implements Integrated Safeguards and Security Management within the NSTec Safety Chain of Responsibility. Once all information has been entered into e-FOM, approved, and captured as data, the information becomes searchable and sortable by hazard, location, organization, mitigating controls, etc

[Post-marketing drug safety-risk management plan(RMP)].

Science.gov (United States)

Ezaki, Asami; Hori, Akiko

2013-03-01

The Guidance for Risk Management Plan(RMP)was released by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in April 2012. The RMP consists of safety specifications, pharmacovigilance plans and risk minimization action plans. In this paper, we outline post-marketing drug safety operations in PMDA and the RMP, with examples of some anticancer drugs.

Attitudes to teamwork and safety among Italian surgeons and operating room nurses.

Science.gov (United States)

Prati, Gabriele; Pietrantoni, Luca

2014-01-01

Previous studies have shown that surgical team members' attitudes about safety and teamwork in the operating theatre may play a role in patient safety. The aim of this study was to assess attitudes about teamwork and safety among Italian surgeons and operating room nurses. Fifty-five surgeons and 48 operating room nurses working in operating theatres at one hospital in Italy completed the Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ). Results showed several discrepancies in attitudes about teamwork and safety between surgeons and operating room nurses. Surgeons had more positive views on the quality of surgical leadership, communication, teamwork, and organizational climate in the theatre than operating room nurses. Operating room nurses reported that safety rules and procedures were more frequently disregarded than the surgeons. The results are only partially aligned with previous ORMAQ surveys of surgical teams in other countries. The differences emphasize the influence of national culture, as well as the particular healthcare system. This study shows discrepancies on many aspects in attitudes to teamwork and safety between surgeons and operating room nurses. The findings support implementation and use of team interventions and human factor training. Finally, attitude surveys provide a method for assessing safety culture in surgery, for evaluating the effectiveness of training initiatives, and for collecting data for a hospital's quality assurance programme.

Swedish REGULATORY APPROACH TO SAFETY Assessment AND SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frid, W.; Sandervaag, O.

1997-01-01

The Swedish regulatory approach to safety assessment and severe accident management is briefly described. The safety assessment program, which focuses on prevention of incidents and accidents, has three main components: periodic safety reviews, probabilistic safety analysis, and analysis of postulated disturbances and accident progression sequences. Management and man-technology-organisation issues, as well as inspections, play a key role in safety assessment. Basis for severe accident management were established by the Government decisions in 1981 and 1986. By the end of 1988, the severe accident mitigation systems and emergency operating procedures were implemented at all Swedish reactors. The severe accident research has continued after 1988 for further verification of the protection provided by the systems and reduction of remaining uncertainties in risk dominant phenomena

Safety risk management of underground engineering in China: Progress, challenges and strategies

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Qihu Qian

2016-08-01

Full Text Available Underground construction in China is featured by large scale, high speed, long construction period, complex operation and frustrating situations regarding project safety. Various accidents have been reported from time to time, resulting in serious social impact and huge economic loss. This paper presents the main progress in the safety risk management of underground engineering in China over the last decade, i.e. (1 establishment of laws and regulations for safety risk management of underground engineering, (2 implementation of the safety risk management plan, (3 establishment of decision support system for risk management and early-warning based on information technology, and (4 strengthening the study on safety risk management, prediction and prevention. Based on the analysis of the typical accidents in China in the last decade, the new challenges in the safety risk management for underground engineering are identified as follows: (1 control of unsafe human behaviors; (2 technological innovation in safety risk management; and (3 design of safety risk management regulations. Finally, the strategies for safety risk management of underground engineering in China are proposed in six aspects, i.e. the safety risk management system and policy, law, administration, economy, education and technology.

Operational safety reliability research

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hall, R.E.; Boccio, J.L.

1986-01-01

Operating reactor events such as the TMI accident and the Salem automatic-trip failures raised the concern that during a plant's operating lifetime the reliability of systems could degrade from the design level that was considered in the licensing process. To address this concern, NRC is sponsoring the Operational Safety Reliability Research project. The objectives of this project are to identify the essential tasks of a reliability program and to evaluate the effectiveness and attributes of such a reliability program applicable to maintaining an acceptable level of safety during the operating lifetime at the plant

OSART Guidelines. 2015 Edition. Reference Report for IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The IAEA works to provide a global nuclear safety and security framework for the protection of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, the minimization of the likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property, and effective mitigation of the effects of any such events, should they occur. The strategic approach to achieving such a framework involves continual improvement in four areas: national and international safety infrastructures; the establishment and global acceptance of IAEA safety standards; an integrated approach to the provision for the application of the safety standards; and a global network of knowledge and experience. The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation. Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for the safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant also depends ultimately on: sound management, policies, procedures, processes and practices; the capability and reliability of commissioning and operating personnel; comprehensive instructions; sound accident management and emergency preparedness; and adequate resources. Finally, a positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of all staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. The OSART programme is based on the safety standards applicable to nuclear power plants. IAEA safety standards reflect the consensus of Member States on nuclear safety matters. The reports of the International Nuclear Safety Group identify important current nuclear safety issues and also serve as references during an OSART review. The publication OSART Guidelines provides overall guidance on the conduct of OSART

Developments in safety and operations culture in BNFL's thorp reprocessing plant, Sellafield, Cumbria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kett, P.J.

2000-01-01

One of the best descriptions of Culture is 'how we do things around here'. In a stable organisation it is extremely difficult to change any type of culture, whether it is an operations, customer service or safety culture. To change culture one of two elements are essential. There must be either a significant external pressure felt by all in the organisation or a change in senior management, with authority to set a new direction for the organisation. BNFL had a unique opportunity through the commissioning and operation of the Thorp Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield to shape a new Safety and Operations Culture. Both the key elements for change were present. Thorp was a high profile flagship plant that had attracted multinational investment. It incorporated new technology. The workforce had volunteered to operate the plant. A strong senior management team was specially selected. The plant was being commissioned in an environment where there was significant opposition by 'anti nuclear' groups. It was essential to both BNFL and the wider international nuclear community that Thorp was commissioned and operated safely. A strong operating culture was developed with safety as the corner stone. The culture comprises three key components. Rigorous plant safety case and risk assessments before work commences and modifications to the plant occur; A high level of involvement by all levels of the workforce in both operations and safety matters; Strong supportive leadership which does not allow safety standards to be compromised and encourages open debate on how to improve. During commissioning and early operation of Thorp the robustness of the Safety and Operations Culture was demonstrated. On several occasions, despite intense commercial pressure, operations were halted until the situation was resolved both technically and procedurally. This paper describes how the Safety and Operations Culture was developed. The key factors for success include recruitment, team selection

International comparison of safety criteria applied to radwaste repositories. Safety aspects of the post-operational phase

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baltes, B.

1994-01-01

There is a generally accepted system of framework safety conditions governing the construction, operation, and post-operational monitoring of radwaste repositories. Although the development of these framework conditions may vary from country to country, the resulting criteria are based on the commonly accepted system of priciples and purposes established for ultimate radioactive waste disposal. The experience accumulated by GRS in the course of the plan approval procedure for the Konrad mine site and the safety-relevant studies performed for the planned Morsleben repository clearly show demand for further development of the safety criteria. In Germany, it is especially the safety criteria and detailed requirements filling the framework safety conditions that need revision and in-depth definition, as well as comparison and harmonisation with internationally applied criteria. These activities will particularly consider the international convention on radioactive waste management currently in preparation under the auspieces of the IAEA. (orig.) [de

Joint FAM/Line Management Assessment Report on LLNL Machine Guarding Safety Program

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Armstrong, J. J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2016-07-19

The LLNL Safety Program for Machine Guarding is implemented to comply with requirements in the ES&H Manual Document 11.2, "Hazards-General and Miscellaneous," Section 13 Machine Guarding (Rev 18, issued Dec. 15, 2015). The primary goal of this LLNL Safety Program is to ensure that LLNL operations involving machine guarding are managed so that workers, equipment and government property are adequately protected. This means that all such operations are planned and approved using the Integrated Safety Management System to provide the most cost effective and safest means available to support the LLNL mission.

Facilities management and industrial safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-06-01

This book lists occupation safety and health acts with purpose, definition and management system of safety and health, enforcement ordinance of occupation safety and health acts and enforcement regulations such as general rules, safety and health cover, system of management on safety and health, regulation of management on safety and health, regulations of harmfulness and protection of danger, heath management for workers, supervisor and command and inspection of machine and equipment.

Predisposal management of high level radioactive waste. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

Radioactive waste is generated in the generation of electricity in nuclear power plants and in the use of radioactive material in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized. The principles and requirements that govern the safety of the management of radioactive waste are presented in 'The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management', 'Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety' and 'Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Including Decommissioning'. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established in Refs for the predisposal management of HLW. This Safety Guide applies to the predisposal management of HLW. For liquid HLW arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel the recommendations of this Safety Guide apply from when liquid waste from the first extraction process is collected for storage and subsequent processing. Recommendations and guidance on the storage of spent fuel, whether or not declared as waste, subsequent to its removal from the storage facility of a reactor are provided in Refs. For spent fuel declared as waste this Safety Guide applies to all activities subsequent to its removal from the storage facility of a reactor and prior to its disposal. Requirements pertaining to the transport of spent fuel, whether or not declared as waste, and of all forms of HLW are established. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the safety aspects of managing HLW, including the planning, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of equipment or facilities for the predisposal management of HLW. It addresses the following elements: (a) The characterization and processing (i.e. pretreatment

Advances in the operational safety of nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an international symposium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

The main purpose of the Conference was to provide a forum for exchange of information among around 200 attending experts from 46 Member States and five international organizations, who altogether presented around 80 papers and posters. The Conference presentations were divided into four main topics: Managing and Regulating Safe Operation; Safety Performance and Lessons Learned; Improving Operational Safety Using PSA; Enhancing Safety. Refs, figs, tabs

49 CFR 192.909 - How can an operator change its integrity management program?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... (Continued) PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) PIPELINE SAFETY TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL AND OTHER GAS BY PIPELINE: MINIMUM FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Gas Transmission Pipeline Integrity Management § 192.909 How can an operator change its integrity management...

Safety status system for operating room devices.

Science.gov (United States)

Guédon, Annetje C P; Wauben, Linda S G L; Overvelde, Marlies; Blok, Joleen H; van der Elst, Maarten; Dankelman, Jenny; van den Dobbelsteen, John J

2014-01-01

Since the increase of the number of technological aids in the operating room (OR), equipment-related incidents have come to be a common kind of adverse events. This underlines the importance of adequate equipment management to improve the safety in the OR. A system was developed to monitor the safety status (periodic maintenance and registered malfunctions) of OR devices and to facilitate the notification of malfunctions. The objective was to assess whether the system is suitable for use in an busy OR setting and to analyse its effect on the notification of malfunctions. The system checks automatically the safety status of OR devices through constant communication with the technical facility management system, informs the OR staff real-time and facilitates notification of malfunctions. The system was tested for a pilot period of six months in four ORs of a Dutch teaching hospital and 17 users were interviewed on the usability of the system. The users provided positive feedback on the usability. For 86.6% of total time, the localisation of OR devices was accurate. 62 malfunctions of OR devices were reported, an increase of 12 notifications compared to the previous year. The safety status system was suitable for an OR complex, both from a usability and technical point of view, and an increase of reported malfunctions was observed. The system eases monitoring the safety status of equipment and is a promising tool to improve the safety related to OR devices.

Intranet-based safety documentation in management of major hazards and occupational health and safety.

Science.gov (United States)

Leino, Antti

2002-01-01

In the European Union, Council Directive 96/82/EC requires operators producing, using, or handling significant amounts of dangerous substances to improve their safety management systems in order to better manage the major accident potentials deriving from human error. A new safety management system for the Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant in Helsinki, Finland, was implemented in this study. The system was designed to comply with both the new safety liabilities and the requirements of OHSAS 18001 (British Standards Institute, 1999). During the implementation phase experiences were gathered from the development processes in this small organisation. The complete documentation was placed in the intranet of the plant. Hyperlinks between documents were created to ensure convenience of use. Documentation was made accessible for all workers from every workstation.

Human factors in safety and business management.

Science.gov (United States)

Vogt, Joachim; Leonhardt, Jorg; Koper, Birgit; Pennig, Stefan

2010-02-01

facilitating or obstructing success. A significant need for research and development is seen here because human factors are of increasing importance for organisational success. This paper suggests integrating human factors in safety management of aviation businesses - a top-ranking partner of technology and finance - and managing it with professional tools. The tools HPM and BSC were identified as potentially useful for this purpose. They were successfully applied in case studies briefly presented in this paper. In terms of specific safety-steering tools in the aviation industry, further elaboration and empirical study is crucial. Statement of Relevance: The importance of human factors is recognised by operators at the sharp end of aviation, where flights are conducted or coordinated. At the blunt end, measurement tools are needed to manage operational resources.

Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Upgrade Lessons Learned Relative to Design Basis Verification and Safety Basis Management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

G. L. Sharp; R. T. McCracken

2004-01-01

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a pressurized light-water reactor with a design thermal power of 250 MW. The principal function of the ATR is to provide a high neutron flux for testing reactor fuels and other materials. The reactor also provides other irradiation services such as radioisotope production. The ATR and its support facilities are located at the Test Reactor Area of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). An audit conducted by the Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (DOE OA) raised concerns that design conditions at the ATR were not adequately analyzed in the safety analysis and that legacy design basis management practices had the potential to further impact safe operation of the facility.1 The concerns identified by the audit team, and issues raised during additional reviews performed by ATR safety analysts, were evaluated through the unreviewed safety question process resulting in shutdown of the ATR for more than three months while these concerns were resolved. Past management of the ATR safety basis, relative to facility design basis management and change control, led to concerns that discrepancies in the safety basis may have developed. Although not required by DOE orders or regulations, not performing design basis verification in conjunction with development of the 10 CFR 830 Subpart B upgraded safety basis allowed these potential weaknesses to be carried forward. Configuration management and a clear definition of the existing facility design basis have a direct relation to developing and maintaining a high quality safety basis which properly identifies and mitigates all hazards and postulated accident conditions. These relations and the impact of past safety basis management practices have been reviewed in order to identify lessons learned from the safety basis upgrade process and appropriate actions to resolve possible concerns with respect to the current ATR safety

Safety culture in nuclear installations. Management of safety and safety culture in Indian NPPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rawal, S.C.

2002-01-01

Nuclear Power Corporation Of India Ltd. (NPCIL) is a company owned by Government of India and is responsible for Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decommissioning of Nuclear Power plants in India. Presently, a total of 13 Nuclear power Stations are in operation with an installed capacity of 2620 MWe and 2 VVR type PWR Units of 1000 MWe capacity each, 2 PHWR type units of 500 MWe capacity each and 4 PHWR type 220 MWe capacity each are under construction. NPPs generation capacity has been increased from 70% to 85% in the span Of last 7 years with high level of safety standards. This could be achieved through Management commitment towards building a strong Safety Culture. Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisation and individuals which establishes that as an overriding priority nuclear plant safety issues receives the attention warranted by their significance. This definition of safety culture brings out two major components in its manifestation. The framework within which individuals within the organisation works.The attitude and response of individual towards the safety issues over productivity and economics in the organisational work practices. The two attributes of safety culture are built in and upgraded in each individuals through special training at the time of entry in the organisation and later through in built procedures in the work practices, motivation and encouragement for free participation of each individuals. Individuals are encouraged to participate in Quality circle teams at the sectional level and review of safety proposal originated by individuals in Station operation Review Committee at Station level, in addition to this to continuously enhance the safety culture, refresher training courses are being organised at regular intervals. The safety related proposals are categorised in to two namely: Proposals from Operating Plants, and Proposals from projects and Design. The concept of safety

Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

Development of a Novel Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation Method for an Operating Team Using Probabilistic Safety Analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Han, Sangmin; Lee, Seung Min; Seong, Poong Hyun [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

IAEA defined safety culture as follows: 'Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance'. Also, celebrated behavioral scientist, Cooper, defined safety culture as,'safety culture is that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis' with his internal psychological, situational, and behavioral context model. With these various definitions and criteria of safety culture, several safety culture assessment methods have been developed to improve and manage safety culture. To develop a new quantitative safety culture evaluation method for an operating team, we unified and redefined safety culture assessment items. Then we modeled a new safety culture evaluation by adopting level 1 PSA concept. Finally, we suggested the criteria to obtain nominal success probabilities of assessment items by using 'operational definition'. To validate the suggested evaluation method, we analyzed the collected audio-visual recording data collected from a full scope main control room simulator of a NPP in Korea.

Development of a Novel Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation Method for an Operating Team Using Probabilistic Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Han, Sangmin; Lee, Seung Min; Seong, Poong Hyun

2015-01-01

IAEA defined safety culture as follows: 'Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance'. Also, celebrated behavioral scientist, Cooper, defined safety culture as,'safety culture is that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis' with his internal psychological, situational, and behavioral context model. With these various definitions and criteria of safety culture, several safety culture assessment methods have been developed to improve and manage safety culture. To develop a new quantitative safety culture evaluation method for an operating team, we unified and redefined safety culture assessment items. Then we modeled a new safety culture evaluation by adopting level 1 PSA concept. Finally, we suggested the criteria to obtain nominal success probabilities of assessment items by using 'operational definition'. To validate the suggested evaluation method, we analyzed the collected audio-visual recording data collected from a full scope main control room simulator of a NPP in Korea

Refurbishment and safety management of JMTR in extended showdown

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ide, Hiroshi; Hori, Naohiko; Gorai, Shigeru; Kusunoki, Tsuyoshi

2011-06-01

Japan Materials Testing Reactor (JMTR) is a testing reactor dedicated to the irradiation tests of materials and fuels. The reactor type of the JMTR is light water moderated and cooled tank type. It achieved first criticality in 1968. Operation was started in 1970. The JMTR had been being operated for 38 years from first criticality to the JMTR No.165 cycle finished. Periodic Safety Review (PSR) was carried out with confirming the integrity inspection of the JMTR reactor facilities. And the 10 years maintenance plan was made in 2004. After that, the restart of the JMTR has been strongly requested from various users as the only irradiation testing reactor in Japan. Finally, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) decided the refurbishment and restart of the JMTR in December 2006, and the refurbishment works was started from FY 2007. The equipment to remain in use and that which needs replacing before the restart of the JMTR was selected after having been evaluated on its damage and wear due to aging significance in safety functions, past safety-related maintenance date, and the enhancement of facility operation. The renewal work of power supply system, boiler, radioactive waste facility, etc. was already carried out as scheduled. The renewal work of reactor control system, nuclear instrumentation system and so on is being carried out. As for the safety management during reactor operation, the facility periodical own inspection and daily inspection is carried out for the purpose of maintaining soundness and reliability of facilities and equipments. And it is confirmed that the performance of facilities and equipments is maintained. As for the radiation control, irradiation dose limit determined by the law is obeyed. Based on the Concept of radiation protection of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP), reduction of dose is endeavored. The safety management during reactor shutdown is also carried out as well as it of reactor operation term. However, the

Operating procedures and safety culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carnino, A.

1993-01-01

The development of new technologies in recent years has led to a tremendous increase in the information to be mastered by operators in industrial processes. The information at operators disposal both in routine situations and accidental ones needs to be well prepared and organized to ensure reliability and safety. The man-machine interface should give operators all the necessary and clear indications on the process status and evolution so that the operators can operate the installation through adequate procedures. Procedures represent the real interface and mode of action of the operators on the machine, and they are of prime importance. Although they are by essence quite different, the routine, accident, and emergency procedures have in common one attribute: They all require a good safety culture both in their development and their implementation. From the definition given by the members of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), open-quotes Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance,close quotes one can see that two aspects are embedded, a collective attitude that in fact is reflected in the managerial framework and an individual one that is linked to personnel behavior and work practices

Emergency Management Operations Process Mapping: Public Safety Technical Program Study

Science.gov (United States)

2011-02-01

services Operational Activity Collect and Manage Cash Donations Once activated, refer cash donations to appropriate voluntary organizations...recovery operations. Operational Activity Conduct Euthanasia /Disposal Provide humane methods to euthanize affected animals to stop the spread of the...issue stop movement orders, and initiate animal vaccination and treatment programs, euthanasia efforts, or other protective measures designed to control

Three essential management processes of nuclear power plant operators

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qi Tunfeng

2010-01-01

The paper takes the operation and management of Qinshan NPP Phase II as an example, focusing on the implementation of the essential process from the following three aspects the NPP production organization, training, examination and authorization for safety-related personnel, and financing budge management. A better understanding and implementation of the essential process will enable nuclear power plants to effectively control the nuclear safety from the most fundamental managerial level. (author)

FLUOR HANFORD SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

GARVIN, L. J.; JENSEN, M. A.

2004-04-13

This document summarizes safety management programs used within the scope of the ''Project Hanford Management Contract''. The document has been developed to meet the format and content requirements of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''. This document provides summary descriptions of Fluor Hanford safety management programs, which Fluor Hanford nuclear facilities may reference and incorporate into their safety basis when producing facility- or activity-specific documented safety analyses (DSA). Facility- or activity-specific DSAs will identify any variances to the safety management programs described in this document and any specific attributes of these safety management programs that are important for controlling potentially hazardous conditions. In addition, facility- or activity-specific DSAs may identify unique additions to the safety management programs that are needed to control potentially hazardous conditions.

75 FR 5244 - Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Program for Gas Distribution Pipelines; Correction

Science.gov (United States)

2010-02-02

... Management Program for Gas Distribution Pipelines; Correction AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... Regulations to require operators of gas distribution pipelines to develop and implement integrity management...

Control strategy for power management, efficiency-optimization and operating-safety of a 5-kW solid oxide fuel cell system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang, Lin; Jiang, Jianhua; Cheng, Huan; Deng, Zhonghua; Li, Xi

2015-01-01

Highlights: • Efficiency optimization associated with simultaneous power and thermal management. • Fast load tracing, fuel starvation, high efficiency and operating safety are considered. • Open loop pre-conditioning current strategy is proposed for load step-up transients. • Feedback control scheme is proposed for load step-up transients. - Abstract: The slow power tracking, operating safety, especially the fuel exhaustion, and high efficiency considerations are the key issues for integrated solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) systems during power step up transients, resulting in the relatively poor dynamic capabilities and make the transient load following very challenging and must be enhanced. To this end, this paper first focus on addressing the efficiency optimization associated with simultaneous power and thermal management of a 5-kW SOFC system. Particularly, a traverse optimization process including cubic convolution interpolation algorithm are proposed to obtain optimal operating points (OOPs) with the maximum efficiency. Then this paper investigate the current implications on system step-up transient performance, then a two stage pre-conditioning current strategy and a feedback power reference control scheme is proposed for load step-up transients to balance fast load following and fuel starvation, after that safe thermal transient is validated. Simulation results show the efficacy of the control design by demonstrating the fast load following ability while maintaining the safe operation, thus safe; efficient and fast load transition can be achieved

FLIGHT SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND EVALUATION OF FLIGHT SAFETY LEVEL OF AN AVIATION ENTERPRISE

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

B. V. Zubkov

2017-01-01

Full Text Available This article is devoted to studying the problem of safety management system (SMS and evaluating safety level of an aviation enterprise.This article discusses the problems of SMS, presented at the 41st meeting of the Russian Aviation Production Commanders Club in June 2014 in St. Petersburg in connection with the verification of the status of the CA of the Russian Federation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO in the same year, a set of urgent measures to eliminate the deficiencies identified in the current safety management system by participants of this meeting were proposed.In addition, the problems of evaluating flight safety level based on operation data of an aviation enterprise were analyzed. This analysis made it possible to take into account the problems listed in this article as a tool for a comprehensive study of SMS parameters and allows to analyze the quantitative indicators of the flights safety level.The concepts of Acceptable Safety Level (ASL indicators are interpreted differently depending on the available/applicable methods of their evaluation and how to implement them in SMS. However, the indicators for assessing ASL under operational condition at the aviation enterprise should become universal. Currently, defined safety levels and safety indicators are not yet established functionally and often with distorted underrepresented models describing their contextual contents, as well as ways of integrating them into SMS aviation enterprise.The results obtained can be used for better implementation of SMS and solving problems determining the aviation enterprise technical level of flight safety.

Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

2008-04-21

The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable

Safety implications of diesel generator aging management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoopingarner, K.R.

1989-01-01

Significant safety improvements can be achieved in diesel-generator management related to aging, testing, and other important regulatory concerns. This paper reports on the progress of aging research related to nuclear service diesel generators, which developed data and information supporting the recommended safety improvements. The key to diesel-generator safety improvements is the development of a new balanced approach where testing, inspections, monitoring and trending, training, and maintenance all have appropriate importance. Safety improvement is projected in a management program that concurrently achieves three goals: first, the reduction of the fast-start stressor by regulatory and utility actions; second, the establishment of more appropriate testing and trending procedures; third, the adoption and use of reliability-centered maintenance activities. This paper describes the recommended safety improvements and the positive role of utility management in the process and outlines a new recommended regulatory approach. Diesel generator aging and wear is the subject of research sponsored by the Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program under the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The research was conducted by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), which is operated for the US Department of Energy by Battelle Memorial Institute. 4 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab

Predisposal management of low and intermediate level radioactive waste. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

Radioactive waste is generated in the generation of electricity in nuclear power reactors and in the use of radioactive material in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized. The principles and requirements that govern the safety of the management of radioactive waste are presented in 'The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management', 'Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety' and 'Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Including Decommissioning'. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established in Refs for the predisposal management of LLW. This Safety Guide deals with the safety issues associated with the predisposal management of LLW from nuclear fuel cycle facilities, large research and development installations and radioisotope production facilities. This includes all steps and activities in the management of waste, from its initial generation to its final acceptance at a waste disposal facility or the removal of regulatory control. The predisposal management of radioactive waste includes decommissioning. The term 'decommissioning' encompasses both the process of decommissioning a facility and the management of the waste that results (prior to its disposal). Recommendations on the process of decommissioning are provided in Refs. Recommendations on the management of the waste resulting from decommissioning are included in this Safety Guide. Although the mining and milling of uranium and thorium ores is part of the nuclear fuel cycle, the management of the operational waste (e.g. waste rock, tailings and effluent treatment waste) from these activities is not within the scope of this Safety Guide. The LLW that is

Design and implementation of an integrated safety management system for compressed natural gas stations using ubiquitous sensor network

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Jae Mo; Ko, Byung Seok; Park, Chulhwan; Ko, Jae Wook; Yoo, Byungtae; Shin, Dongil

2014-01-01

To increase awareness of safety in facilities where hazards may exist, operators, managers, and executive officers on the site should be able to monitor such facilities. However, most compressed natural gas (CNG) service stations in Korea use only local-mode monitoring, with only on-site operators to monitor the facility. To complement this local-mode monitoring, an online safety management system called Ubiquitous-gas safety management system (U-GSMS) was developed. The U-GSMS consists largely of software and hardware. The software consists of systems that can manage safety and operations, while the hardware consists of sensors installed in the gas facility and wireless communication systems using a ubiquitous sensor network (USN) technology that facilitates communication between sensors as well as between sensors and other devices. As these systems are web-based, on-site operators as well as managers and executive officers at the headquarters can more effectively and efficiently perform monitoring and safety management

Design and implementation of an integrated safety management system for compressed natural gas stations using ubiquitous sensor network

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yang, Jae Mo; Ko, Byung Seok; Park, Chulhwan; Ko, Jae Wook [Kwangwoon University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Yoo, Byungtae [National Disaster Management Institute, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Shin, Dongil [Myongji University, Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

2014-03-15

To increase awareness of safety in facilities where hazards may exist, operators, managers, and executive officers on the site should be able to monitor such facilities. However, most compressed natural gas (CNG) service stations in Korea use only local-mode monitoring, with only on-site operators to monitor the facility. To complement this local-mode monitoring, an online safety management system called Ubiquitous-gas safety management system (U-GSMS) was developed. The U-GSMS consists largely of software and hardware. The software consists of systems that can manage safety and operations, while the hardware consists of sensors installed in the gas facility and wireless communication systems using a ubiquitous sensor network (USN) technology that facilitates communication between sensors as well as between sensors and other devices. As these systems are web-based, on-site operators as well as managers and executive officers at the headquarters can more effectively and efficiently perform monitoring and safety management.

Waste management safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boehm, H.

1983-01-01

All studies carried out by competent authors of the safety of a waste management concept on the basis of reprocessing of the spent fuel elements and storage in the deep underground of the radioactive waste show that only a minor technical risk is involved in this step. This also holds true when evaluating the accidents which have occurred in waste management facilities. To explain the risk, first the completely different safety aspects of nuclear power plants, reprocessing plants and repositories are outlined together with the safety related characteristics of these plants. Also this comparison indicates that the risk of waste management facilities is considerably lower than the, already very small, risk of nuclear power plants. For the final storage of waste from reprocessing and for the direct storage of fuel elements, the results of safety analyses show that the radiological exposure following an accident with radioactivity releases, even under conservative assumptions, is considerably below the natural radiation exposure. The very small danger to the environment arising from waste management by reprocessing clearly indicates that aspects of technical safety alone will hardly be a major criterion for the decision in favor of one or the other waste management approach. (orig.) [de

Operator Actions Within a Safety Instrumented Function

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suttinger, L.T.

2002-01-01

This paper presents an overview of the factors that should be considered when crediting operator action for performing a safety function or being a part of the process of enabling a safety function. Criteria for evaluating operator action, such as required time response and operator training among others, are discussed. The paper will address these and other factors that should be considered when determining the reliability of the operator to respond and perform his/her part of the safety function. The entire safety function includes the operator and the reliability of the instrumented system that provides the alarm or indication, the final control element, and support systems. The integration of the operator performance with the hardware safety availability, including the effects of the supporting systems is discussed. The analysis of these factors will provide the justification for the amount of risk reduction or safety integrity level that can be credited for the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), including operator action

Is road safety management linked to road safety performance?

Science.gov (United States)

Papadimitriou, Eleonora; Yannis, George

2013-10-01

This research aims to explore the relationship between road safety management and road safety performance at country level. For that purpose, an appropriate theoretical framework is selected, namely the 'SUNflower' pyramid, which describes road safety management systems in terms of a five-level hierarchy: (i) structure and culture, (ii) programmes and measures, (iii) 'intermediate' outcomes'--safety performance indicators (SPIs), (iv) final outcomes--fatalities and injuries, and (v) social costs. For each layer of the pyramid, a composite indicator is implemented, on the basis of data for 30 European countries. Especially as regards road safety management indicators, these are estimated on the basis of Categorical Principal Component Analysis upon the responses of a dedicated road safety management questionnaire, jointly created and dispatched by the ETSC/PIN group and the 'DaCoTA' research project. Then, quasi-Poisson models and Beta regression models are developed for linking road safety management indicators and other indicators (i.e. background characteristics, SPIs) with road safety performance. In this context, different indicators of road safety performance are explored: mortality and fatality rates, percentage reduction in fatalities over a given period, a composite indicator of road safety final outcomes, and a composite indicator of 'intermediate' outcomes (SPIs). The results of the analyses suggest that road safety management can be described on the basis of three composite indicators: "vision and strategy", "budget, evaluation and reporting", and "measurement of road user attitudes and behaviours". Moreover, no direct statistical relationship could be established between road safety management indicators and final outcomes. However, a statistical relationship was found between road safety management and 'intermediate' outcomes, which were in turn found to affect 'final' outcomes, confirming the SUNflower approach on the consecutive effect of each layer

Advances in operational safety and severe accident research

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Simola, K. [VTT Automation (Finland)

2002-02-01

A project on reactor safety was carried out as a part of the NKS programme during 1999-2001. The objective of the project was to obtain a shared Nordic view of certain key safety issues related to the operating nuclear power plants in Finland and Sweden. The focus of the project was on selected central aspects of nuclear reactor safety that are of common interest for the Nordic nuclear authorities, utilities and research bodies. The project consisted of three sub-projects. One of them concentrated on the problems related to risk-informed deci- sion making, especially on the uncertainties and incompleteness of probabilistic safety assessments and their impact on the possibilities to use the PSA results in decision making. Another sub-project dealt with questions related to maintenance, such as human and organisational factors in maintenance and maintenance management. The focus of the third sub-project was on severe accidents. This sub-project concentrated on phenomenological studies of hydrogen combustion, formation of organic iodine, and core re-criticality due to molten core coolant interaction in the lower head of reactor vessel. Moreover, the current status of severe accident research and management was reviewed. (au)

Research reactor utilization, safety, decommissioning, fuel and waste management. Posters of an international conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

For more than 50 years research reactors have played an important role in the development of nuclear science and technology. They have made significant contributions to a large number of disciplines as well as to the educational and research programmes of about 70 countries world wide. About 675 research reactors have been built to date, of which some 278 are now operating in 59 countries (86 of them in 38 developing Member States). Altogether over 13,000 reactor-years of cumulative operational experience has been gained during this remarkable period. The objective of this conference was to foster the exchange of information on current research reactor concerns related to safety, operation, utilization, decommissioning and to provide a forum for reactor operators, designers, managers, users and regulators to share experience, exchange opinions and to discuss options and priorities. The topical areas covered were: a) Utilization, including new trends and directions for utilization of research reactors. Effective management of research reactors and associated facilities. Engineering considerations and experience related to refurbishment and modifications. Strategic planning and marketing. Classical applications (nuclear activation analysis, isotope production, neutron beam applications, industrial irradiations, medical applications). Training for operators. Educational programmes using a reactor. Current developments in design and fabrication of experimental facilities. Irradiation facilities. Projects for regional uses of facilities. Core management and calculation tools. Future trends for reactors. Use of simulators for training and educational programmes. b) Safety, including experience with the preparation and review of safety analysis reports. Human factors in safety analysis. Management of extended shutdown periods. Modifications: safety analysis, regulatory aspects, commissioning programmes. Engineering safety features. Safety culture. Safety peer reviews and

Risk-based configuration control: Application of PSA in improving technical specifications and operational safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Samanta, P.K.; Kim, I.S.; Vesely, W.E.

1992-01-01

Risk-based configuration control is the management of component configurations using a risk perspective to control risk and assure safety. A configuration, as used here, is a set of component operability statuses that define the state of a nuclear power plant. If the component configurations that have high risk implications do not occur, then the risk from the operation of nuclear power plants would be minimal. The control of component configurations, i.e., the management of component statuses, to minimize the risk from components being unavailable, becomes difficult, because the status of a standby safety system component is often not apparent unless it is tested. Controlling plant configuration from a risk-perspective can provide more direct risk control and also more operational flexibility by allowing looser controls in areas unimportant to risk. Risk-based configuration control approaches can be used to replace parts of nuclear power plant Technical Specifications. With the advances in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) technology, such approaches to improve Technical Specifications and operational safety are feasible. In this paper, we present an analysis of configuration risks, and a framework for risk-based configuration control to achieve the desired control of risk-significant configurations during plant operation

International co-operation in the field of operational safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dupuis, M.C.

1988-10-01

Operational safety in nuclear power plants is without doubt a field where international co-operation is in constant progress. Accounting for over 80 per cent of the 400 reactors in service throughout the world, the menber countries of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) are constantly striving to improve the exchange and use of the wealth of information to be gained not just from power plant accidents and incidents but from the routine operation of these facilities. The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) helps the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy to meet the NEA's objectives in the safety field, namely: - to promote co-operation between the safety bodies of member countries - to contribute to the safety and regulation of nuclear activities. The CSNI relies on the technical back-up of several different working groups made up of experts appointed by the member countries. For the past three years I have had the honour of chairing Principal Working Group 1 (PWG 1), which deals with operating experience and human factor. It is in this capacity that I will attempt to outline the group's various activities and its findings illustrated by a few examples

Knowledge management and safety compliance in a high-risk distributed organizational system.

Science.gov (United States)

Gressgård, Leif Jarle

2014-06-01

In a safety perspective, efficient knowledge management is important for learning purposes and thus to prevent errors from occurring repeatedly. The relationship between knowledge exchange among employees and safety behavior may be of particular importance in distributed organizational systems where similar high-risk activities take place at several locations. This study develops and tests hypotheses concerning the relationship between knowledge exchange systems usage, knowledge exchange in the organizational system, and safety compliance. The operational context of the study is petroleum drilling and well operations involving distributed high-risk activities. The hypotheses are tested by use of survey data collected from a large petroleum operator company and eight of its main contractors. The results show that safety compliance is influenced by use of knowledge exchange systems and degree of knowledge exchange in the organizational system, both within and between units. System usage is the most important predictor, and safety compliance seems to be more strongly related to knowledge exchange within units than knowledge exchange between units. Overall, the study shows that knowledge management is central for safety behavior.

Research on integrated managing system based on CIMS for nuclear power plant safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhou Gang

2006-01-01

In order to improve safety, economy and reliability of operation for nuclear power plant (NPP), a novel integrated managing method was proposed based on the ideas of computer and contemporary integrated manufacturing system (CIMS). The application of CIMS to nuclear power plant safety management was researched. In order to design an integrated managing system to meet the needs of NPP safety management, all work related to nuclear safety is divided into different category according to its characters. On basis of this work, general integrated managing system was designed at first. Then subsystems were designed and every subsystem implements a category of nuclear safety management work. All subsystems are independent relatively on the one hand and are interrelated on other hand by global information system. (authors)

Safety Culture for Regulator Competence Management in Embarking States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kandil, M.

2016-01-01

Full text: Safety is based on preventive actions where the ability of a regulatory body to fulfill its responsibilities depends largely on the competence of its staff. Building employees’ skills and knowledge is an investment for each employee and in the future of the organization. This building must be the competence of its staff integration with their safety culture, the essential to ensure competent human resources as required in the IAEA safety standards and other documents, in which the need and importance of ensuring regulatory competence is emphasized. As it involves both operational and management issues, safety culture is a sensitive topic for regulators whose role is to ensure compliance with safety requirements and not to intervene in management decisions. A number of embarking States are aspiring to develop nuclear power generation and this means that, among other things, regulatory bodies have to be established and rapidly expanded. This paper reports major considerations on the integration of safety culture with an adequate competence management system for regulators in embarking states. (author

OSART mission highlights 2001-2003. Operational safety practices in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-05-01

; Part III lists the good practices that were identified in the period covered. At the end of Part III is a summary of the good practices that were observed in the different review areas and of the contributions of individual NPPs to good practices for the period covered. Each part of the report is intended for different levels of management in the operating and regulatory organizations, but not exclusively so. Part I is primarily directed at the executive management level; Part II at middle managers and Part III at those involved in operational experience feedback. Individual findings varied considerably in scope and significance. However, the findings do reflect some common strengths and opportunities for improvement. Appendix I presents information on the database which collects the results of OSART missions (OSMIR), which can be valuable for user programmes that deal with operational experience feedback. Appendix II reviews the IAEA programme on education and training in nuclear safety. Appendix III covers the IAEA programme on education and training in radiation protection, transport and waste safety. Finally, Appendix IV presents the IAEA programme on ageing and long term operation which aim to increase the qualification of NPP specialists in different areas of nuclear and radiation safety and needs for long term operation

A basis for sound management-plant-operator interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oak, H.D.

1983-01-01

Sound management-plant-operator interface is based on the application of suitable quality assurance principles. Quality assurance can aptly be termed ''putting priority and emphasis where such are due''. Accordingly, the application of suitable quality assurance principles achieves the all-important combination of both safety and production. Neither of these is mutually exclusive of the other, and both together establish the prime foundation for long-term nuclear power plant operation. This paper presents the application of suitable quality assurance principles to the management, the plant, the operators, and the interface between them. (author)

IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Desnogorsk, in Russia's Smolensk region, for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the team at the request of the Government of the Russian Federation to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 5 to 22 September 2011. The team was made up of experts from China, India, Lithuania, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA, the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Smolensk NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; and Chemistry. Throughout the review, the exchange of information between the OSART experts and plant personnel was very open, professional and productive. The plant's staff were found to be motivated, well trained, knowledgeable and experienced. The OSART team has identified good plant practices which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include the following: Illuminated hot-spot wire to identify higher radiation levels is used in the radiation-controlled area to reduce exposures when working in the controlled area; Modern and state-of-the-art training infrastructure and facilities are available at the plant. These include: maintenance training centre; multimedia simulator for the refueling machine; and safety

Visual operations management tools in oil pipelines and terminals standardization processes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

De Ludovico Almeida, Maria Fatima [Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil); Santiago, Adilson; Senra Ribeiro, Kassandra; Mendonca Arruda, Daniela [Petrobras Transporte (Brazil)

2010-07-01

Visual operations management (VOM) takes advantage of visual cues to communicate information, simplify processes and improve the quality and safety of operations. Because of heightened competition, the importance of standardization and quality management processes has become more evident for pipeline companies. Petrobras Transporte's marine terminal units has been working over the last years to be recognized as a reference in the activities it pursues. This is based on the Petrobras Transporte's strategic plan 2020, which foresees amongst others, the specialization of technical workforce, operational safety excellence, capital discipline, customer satisfaction, the search for new technologies and markets and the rendering of new services. To achieve these goals, the Marine Terminals standardization program must be adhered to. Focusing on communication and adoption of standards and procedures, this paper describes how visual guides were conceived and implemented within Petrobras Transporte to enable operators and technicians to meet operational, environmental and occupational health and safety requirements.

Forest management practices and the occupational safety and health administration logging standard

Science.gov (United States)

John R. Myers; David Elton Fosbroke

1995-01-01

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has established safety and health regulations for the logging industry. These new regulations move beyond the prior OSHA pulpwood harvesting standard by including sawtimber harvesting operations. Because logging is a major tool used by forest managers to meet silvicultural goals, managers must be aware of what...

Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-02-01

DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

Safety assessment for Area 5 radioactive-waste-management site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hunter, P.H.; Card, D.H.; Horton, K.

1982-09-01

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Safety Assessment Document contains evaluations of site characteristics, facilities, and operating practices that contribute to the safe handling, storage, and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes at the Nevada Test Site. Physical geography, cultural factors, climate and meteorology, geology, hydrology (with emphasis on radionuclide migration), ecology, natural phenomena, and natural resources are discussed and determined to be suitable for effective containment of radionuclides. A separate section considers facilities and operating practices such as monitoring, storage/disposal criteria, site maintenance, equipment, and support. The section also considers the transportation and waste handling requirements supporting the new Greater Confinement Disposal Facility (GCDF), GCDF demonstration project, and other requirements for the safe handling, storage, and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. Finally, the document provides an analysis of releases and an assessment of the near-term operational impacts and dose commitments to operating personnel and the general public from normal operations and anticipated accidental occurrences. The conclusion of this report is that the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site is suitable for low-level radioactive waste handling, storage, and disposal. Also, the new GCDF demonstration project will not affect the overall safety of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Criteria for safety-related operator actions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gray, L.H.; Haas, P.M.

1983-01-01

The Safety-Related Operator Actions (SROA) Program was designed to provide information and data for use by NRC in assessing the performance of nuclear power plant (NPP) control room operators in responding to abnormal/emergency events. The primary effort involved collection and assessment of data from simulator training exercises and from historical records of abnormal/emergency events that have occurred in operating plants (field data). These data can be used to develop criteria for acceptability of the use of manual operator action for safety-related functions. Development of criteria for safety-related operator actions are considered

Predisposal Management of Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste. Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established for the predisposal management of low and intermediate level waste. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Roles and responsibilities; 4. General safety considerations; 5. Safety features for the predisposal management of LILW; 6. Record keeping and reporting; 7. Safety assessment; 8. Quality assurance; Annex I: Nature and sources of LILW from nuclear facilities; Annex II: Development of specifications for waste packages; Annex III: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external natural phenomena); Annex IV: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external human induced phenomena); Annex V: Postulated initiating events for consideration in a safety assessment (internal phenomena).

Approaches to construction of systems of safety management in airlines

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

2015-01-01

Full Text Available The article presents three approaches of building a safety management system (SMS in airlines in the framework of implementation of ICAO SARPs that apply methods of risk assessment based on use of operational activity of airline taking into account existing and implementing "protections" or "safety barriers".

IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Rajasthan Atomic Power Station 3 and 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today completed a review of safety practices at Units 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station in Rawatbhata. The team noted a series of good practices and made recommendations and suggestions to reinforce safety practices. The IAEA assembled the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) at the request of the Government of India. Led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 29 October to 14 November 2012. The team was comprised of experts from Canada, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Power Plant. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. The OSART team identified a number of good practices of the plant. These will be shared in due course by the IAEA with the global nuclear industry for consideration. Examples include the following: - The Power Plant's safety culture cultivates a constructive work environment and a sense of accountability among the Power Plant personnel, and gives its staff the opportunity to expand skills and training; - The Power Plant's Public Awareness Programme provides educational opportunities to the local community about nuclear and radiation safety; - The Power Plant has a Management of Training and Authorization system for effective management of training activities; and - The Power Plant uses testing facilities and mockups to improve the quality of maintenance work and to reduce radiation doses. The OSART

Process management - critical safety issues with focus on risk management; Processtyrning - kritiska saekerhetsfraagor med inriktning paa riskhantering

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sanne, Johan M. [Linkoeping Univ. (Sweden). The Tema Inst. - Technology and Social Change

2005-12-15

Organizational changes focused on process orientation are taking place among Swedish nuclear power plants, aiming at improving the operation. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has identified a need for increased knowledge within the area for its regulatory activities. In order to analyze what process orientation imply for nuclear power plant safety a number of questions must be asked: 1. How is safety in nuclear power production created currently? What significance does the functional organization play? 2. How can organizational forms be analysed? What consequences does quality management have for work and for the enterprise? 3. Why should nuclear power plants be process oriented? Who are the customers and what are their customer values? Which customers are expected to contribute from process orientation? 4. What can one learn from process orientation in other safety critical systems? What is the effect on those features that currently create safety? 5. Could customer values increase for one customer without decreasing for other customers? What is the relationship between economic and safety interests from an increased process orientation? The deregulation of the electricity market have caused an interest in increased economic efficiency, which is the motivation for the interest in process orientation. among other means. It is the nuclear power plants' owners and the distributors (often the same corporations) that have the strongest interest in process orientation. If the functional organization and associated practices are decomposed, the prerequisites of the risk management regime changes, perhaps deteriorating its functionality. When nuclear power operators consider the introduction of process orientation, the Nuclear Power Inspectorate should require that 1. The operators perform a risk analysis beforehand concerning the potential consequences that process orientation might convey: the analysis should contain a model specifying how safety is currently

The critical safety functions and plant operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Porter, N.J.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.

1981-01-01

The paper outlines the operator's role in nuclear safety and introduces the concept of ''safety functions''. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. ''An accident identical to that at Three Mile Island is not going to happen again'', said the Rogovin investigators. The concepts put forward in this paper are intended to help the operator avoid serious consequence from the next unexpected threat. On the basis of the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results. These three operator roles are: first, maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond; second, operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events; third, the operator needs to monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of ''safety function'' introduces that systematic approach and prevents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty in identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows ones to accomplish the overall path of mitigating consequences. There are ten identified functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions. The paper describes in detail the operator's role and the safety functions, and provides many examples of the use of alternative success paths to accomplish the safety function

Application of life-cycle information for advancement in safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Application of safety information to advanced safety management support system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, Kazuhiko; Ishida, Michihiko

2005-08-01

Risk management is major concern to nuclear energy reprocessing plants to improve plant and process reliability and ensure their safety. This is because we are required to predict potential risks before any accident or disaster occurs. The advancement of safety design and safety systems technologies showed large amount of useful safety-related knowledge that can be of great importance to plant operation to reduce operation risks and ensure safety. This research proposes safety knowledge modeling framework on the basis of ontology technologies to systematically construct plant knowledge model, which includes plant structure, operation, and the associated behaviors. In such plant knowledge model safety related information is defined and linked to the different elements of plant knowledge model. Ontology editor is employed to define the basic concepts and their inter-relations, which are used to capture and construct plant safety knowledge. In order to provide detailed safety knowledgebase, HAZOP results are analyzed and structured so that safety-related knowledge are identified and structured within the plant knowledgebase. The target safety knowledgebase includes: failures, deviations, causes, consequences, and fault propagation as mapped to plant knowledge. The proposed ontology-based safety framework is applied on case study nuclear plant to structure failures, causes, consequences, and fault propagation, which are used to support plant operation. (author)

Study on the operational safety performance indicator of nuclear power plants in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhou Shirong

2005-01-01

The operational Safety Performance Indicator system (SPI) has been more and more regarded recently for their clear and effective characteristic in safety assessment for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). A large developing plan for NPPs construction is being discussed and considered in P.R. China. As one of important nuclear country, China expects to ensure the normal operation of NPPs and improve the safety level. National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), National Nuclear Regulatory Agency of China, has put high attention on safety and SPI area, and many endeavours and attempts have been done or being carried out for an establishment of SPI system in China. NNSA intends to build an integrated SPI system to monitor all of the NPPs operation in China, based on the SPI system currently used in the world. NNSA believes that the SPI system will help to more effectively enforce the function of surveillance and management. The paper will introduces the status of study on the operational safety performance indicator of Nuclear Power Plants in China. (author)

IAEA Safety Standards on Management Systems and Safety Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persson, Kerstin Dahlgren

2007-01-01

The IAEA has developed a new set of Safety Standard for applying an integrated Management System for facilities and activities. The objective of the new Safety Standards is to define requirements and provide guidance for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a Management System that integrates safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic related elements to ensure that safety is properly taken into account in all the activities of an organization. With an integrated approach to management system it is also necessary to include the aspect of culture, where the organizational culture and safety culture is seen as crucial elements of the successful implementation of this management system and the attainment of all the goals and particularly the safety goals of the organization. The IAEA has developed a set of service aimed at assisting it's Member States in establishing. Implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system. (author)

Enhancing operational safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wiebe, J S

1997-09-01

The presentation briefly considers the following aspects concerning enhancing operational safety of NPP: licensed control room supervision, reactivity changes, personnel access to control room, simulator training.

The Alternative Design Features for Safety Enhancement in Shutdown Operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oh, Hae Cheol; Kim, Myung Ki; Chung, Bag Soon; Seo, Mi Ro

2009-01-01

PSA can be used to confirm that the new plant design is complied with the applicable safety goals, and to select among the alternate design options. A shutdown PSA provides insight for outage planning schedule, outage management practices, and design modifications. Considering the results of both LPSD PSA studies and operating experiences for low power and shutdown, the improvements can be proposed to reduce the high risk contribution. The improvements/enhancements during shutdown operation may be divided into categories such as hardware, administrative management, and operational procedure. This paper presents on an example how the risk related to an accidental situation can be reduced, focusing the hardware design changes for the newly designed NPPs

Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

2012-01-01

In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

Items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures in Japan (concerning the examination, design and operation management) (excluding the items to be reflected to the standards)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1980-10-01

In connection with the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident in March, 1979, in the United States, in order to introduce the lessons from it in the nuclear power safety regulations in Japan, 52 items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures were chosen by the Nuclear Safety Commission. Of these, 16 items were examined by the Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety. It was decided that these results would be introduced in the nuclear safety regulations, by the Nuclear Safety Commission. The following 16 items are described. For the examination, four items concerning the automatic operation of safety systems and others; for the design, five items concerning a small rupture accident, the monitoring of the state of primary coolant, control room layout and others; for the operation management, seven items concerning the inspection at the time of repair, the prevention of faulty handlings by operators and others.

Radiation safety management system in a radioactive facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amador, Zayda H.

2008-01-01

Full text: This paper illustrates the Cuban experience in implementing and promoting an effective radiation safety system for the Centre of Isotopes, the biggest radioactive facility of our country. Current management practice demands that an organization inculcate culture of safety in preventing radiation hazard. The aforementioned objectives of radiation protection can only be met when it is implemented and evaluated continuously. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important to implement radiation safety policy efficiently. Maintaining and improving safety culture is a continuous process. There is a need to establish a program to measure, review and audit health and safety performance against predetermined standards. All those areas of the radiation protection program are considered (e.g. licensing and training of the staff, occupational exposure, authorization of the practices, control of the radioactive material, radiological occurrences, monitoring equipment, radioactive waste management, public exposure due to airborne effluents, audits and safety costs). A set of indicators designed to monitor key aspects of operational safety performance are used. Their trends over a period of time are analyzed with the modern information technologies, because this can provide an early warning to plant management for searching causes behind the observed changes. In addition to analyze the changes and trends, these indicators are compared against identified targets and goals to evaluate performance strengths and weaknesses. A structured and proper radiation self-auditing system is seen as a basic requirement to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety. The integrated safety management system establishment has been identified as a goal and way for the continuous improvement. (author)

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

The operator's role and safety functions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Corcoran, W.R.; Finnicum, D.J.; Hubbard, F.R.; Musick, C.R.; Walzer, R.F.

1980-01-01

A nuclear power plant can be thought of as a single system with two major subsystems: equipment and people. Both play important roles in nuclear safety. Whereas, in the past, the role of equipment had been emphasized in nuclear safety, the accident at Three Mile Island and its subsequent investigations point out the vital role of the operator. This paper outlines the operator's roles in nuclear safety and suggests how the concept of safety functions can be used to reduce economic losses and increase safety margins. (auth)

Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM) technology to improve outage safety and economics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kalra, S.P.

2004-01-01

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has undertaken an aggressive program, called ORAM (Outage Risk Assessment and Management), to provide utilities with tools and technology to assist in managing risk during the planning and conduct of outages. The ORAM program consists of the following 6 steps: i) Perform utility surveys and visits on shutdown risk management needs, ii) Perform probabilistic shutdown safety assessments (PSSAs) to identify generic insights that can be incorporated into risk management guidelines and identify selected areas for the development of contingency actions, iii) Develop risk management guidelines (RMG's) that provide a systematic approach to the planning and conduct of outages from a safety perspective. Incorporate insights from the shutdown safety assessments and other operating experience into the RMG's. iv) Develop selected contingency actions including a thermalhydraulic tool kit to address higher risk time periods and activities identified in the shutdown safety assessments, v) Develop computer software that integrates all of the above capability into an easy to use tool for effective shutdown operation management for utilities, vi) Provide assistance in the transfer of this technology and the application of these tools. This paper briefly describes the technical approach and tools developed under EPRI's ORAM program and its applications for improving outage safety and economics. (author)

Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Specific Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This Safety Guide provides guidance on the predisposal management of all types of radioactive waste (including spent nuclear fuel declared as waste and high level waste) generated at nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These waste management facilities may be located within larger facilities or may be separate, dedicated waste management facilities (including centralized waste management facilities). The Safety Guide covers all stages in the lifetime of these facilities, including their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and shutdown and decommissioning. It covers all steps carried out in the management of radioactive waste following its generation up to (but not including) disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning). Radioactive waste generated both during normal operation and in accident conditions is considered

Industrial safety management with emphasis on construction safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bhattacharya, R.

2016-01-01

Safety professionals, line managers, team leaders and concerned workers today eagerly discuss to find out the best safety approach for their workplace. Some research suggested that behaviour based and comprehensive ergonomics approaches lead in average reduction of injuries. This article discusses 'the science and engineering' behind improvement in industrial safety aspects particularly at construction sites through various safety approaches. A high degree of commitment to safety by the project management and rigorous and proactive measures are essential to prevent accidents at construction sites particularly in DAE units because of its sensitivity. Persistent efforts by the project management are needed for sustainable and committed safety at work place. The number of fatalities occurring from construction work in DAE units is sometimes disturbing and fall of person from height and through openings are the major causes for serious accidents

Perspectives on managing nuclear safety at Cernavoda NPP past, present and future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Serban, M.

1997-01-01

The presentation considers the following issues: background of Romanian nuclear programme; 1990 management issues involved in Cernavoda project, nuclear safety perspectives; Cernavoda U1 operating organization today (safety related issues); good practices at Cernavoda NPP

Perspectives on managing nuclear safety at Cernavoda NPP past, present and future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Serban, M [Technical Safety Directorate, Unit 1., Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (Romania)

1997-12-01

The presentation considers the following issues: background of Romanian nuclear programme; 1990 management issues involved in Cernavoda project, nuclear safety perspectives; Cernavoda U1 operating organization today (safety related issues); good practices at Cernavoda NPP.

Safety in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Operations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Buhrow, C. [Technische Univ. Bergakademie, Freiberg (Germany). Lehrstuhl Bergbau/Tiefbau; Niemann-Delius, C.; Okafor, E. [Technische Hochschule Aachen (Germany). Lehrstuhl und Inst. fuer Bergbaukunde 3

2005-07-01

Germany needs an LNG receiving terminal to import LNG and supplement expected future gas supply shortages. Enormous economic benefits also abound if Germany is to install an LNG receiving terminal. Jobs will be created for several hundred people. New tax revenues will be generated for state and local governments and this will further enhance the economic competitiveness of Germany. Additionally, it will provide Germany with a reliable source of clean-burning energy. Any proposed LNG receiving terminal should incorporate safety right from the start. These safety requirements will: ensure that certain public land uses, people, and structures outside the LNG facility boundaries are protected in the event of LNG fire, prevent vapour clouds associated with an LNG spill from reaching a property line that can be built upon, prevent severe burns resulting from thermal radiation, specify requirements for design, construction and use of LNG facilities and other equipments, and promote safe, secure and reliable LNG operations. The German future LNG business will not be complete without the evolution of both local and international standards that can apply to LNG operations. Currently existing European standards also appear inadequate. With an OHSAS 18001 management system integrated with other existing standards we can better control our LNG occupational health and safety risks, and improve performance in the process. Additionally, an OHSAS 18001 System will help future German LNG contractors and operators safeguard their most important assets - their employees. (orig.)

Operational safety review programmes for nuclear power plants. Guidelines for assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The IAEA has been offering the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme to provide advice and assistance to Member States in enhancing the operational safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Simultaneously, the IAEA has encouraged self-assessment and review by Member States of their own nuclear power plants to continuously improve nuclear safety. Currently, some utilities have been implementing safety review programmes to independently review their own plants. Corporate or national operational safety review programmes may be compliance or performance based. Successful utilities have found that both techniques are necessary to provide assurance that (i) as a minimum the NPP meets specific corporate and legal requirements and (ii) management at the NPP is encouraged to pursue continuous improvement principles. These programmes can bring nuclear safety benefits to the plants and utilities. The IAEA has conducted two pilot missions to assess the effectiveness of the operational review programme. Based on these missions and on the experience gained during OSART missions, this document has been developed to provide guidance on and broaden national/corporate safety review programmes in Member States, and to assist in maximizing their benefits. These guidelines are intended primarily for the IAEA team to conduct assessment of a national/corporate safety review programme. However, this report may also be used by a country or utility to establish its own national/corporate safety review programme. The guidelines may likewise be used for self-assessment or for establishing a baseline when benchmarking other safety review programmes. This report consists of four parts. Section 2 addresses the planning and preparation of an IAEA assessment mission and Sections 3 and 4 deal with specific guidelines for conducting the assessment mission itself

Managing electrical safety

CERN Document Server

Wiggins, James H, Jr

2001-01-01

Managing Electrical Safety provides an overview of electric basics, hazards, and established standards that enables you to understand the hazards you are likely to encounter in your workplace. Focusing on typical industrial environments-which utilize voltages much higher than household or office circuits-the author identifies the eight key components of an electrical safety program and examines each using a model safety management process. You'll learn how to identify electrical hazards, how to prescribe necessary electrical Personal Protective Equipment, how to ensure that equipment is de-ene

Development of safety function assessment trees for pressurized heavy water reactor LP/SD operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Hui Chang; Chung, Chang Hyun; Kim, Ki Yong; Jee, Moon Hak; Sung, Chang Kyoung

2003-01-01

The objective of Configuration Risk Management Program(CRMP) is to maintain the safety level by assuring the defense-in-depth of nuclear power plant while the configurations are changed during plant operations, especially for the LP/SD. Such a safety purpose can be achieved by establishing the risk monitoring programs with both quantitative and qualitative features. Generally, the quantitative risk evaluation models, i.e., PRA models are used for the risk evaluation during full power operation, and the qualitative risk evaluation models such as safety function assessment trees are used. Through this study, safety function assessment trees were developed

Safety Aspects of Ageing Management throughout the Full Life Cycle of NPPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dou, Yikang

2012-01-01

Most component failures stem from effects of one or multiple ageing mechanism(s). Ageing management is one of the most robust measures to prevent failure and to maintain and increase safety of nuclear power plants. Based on Nuclear Safety Guideline on Ageing Management (NS-G-2.12) published by IAEA in 2009, the paper summarizes main ageing management activities required for all stages of life cycle of NPPs, including design, construction/manufacture, commissioning, operation, life extension for long-term operation and decommissioning. Interactive relations of ageing management in successive stages are analyzed. Implementation of the IAEA Guideline in comprehensive way will bring new challenges to design conception, modes of construction, manufacture, commissioning, equipment qualification, O and M, licensing, life extension and decommissioning for NPPs, however, it will be beneficial to enhance nuclear safety level, especially to promote development of nuclear power in China in a safe, reliable, profitable and sustainable way. (author)

Health, safety, and environmental management system operation in contracting companies: A case study.

Science.gov (United States)

Nassiri, Parvin; Yarahmadi, Rasoul; Gholami, Pari Shafaei; Hamidi, Abdolamir; Mirkazemi, Roksana

2016-05-03

Systematic and cooperative interactions among parent industry and contractors are necessary for a successful health, safety, and environmental management system (HSE-MS). This study was conducted to evaluate the HSE-MS performance in contracting companies in one of the petrochemical industries in Iran during 2013. Managers of parent and contracting companies participated in this study. The data collection forms included 7 elements of an integrated HSE-MS (leadership and commitment; policy and strategic objectives; organization, resources, and documentation; evaluation and risk management; planning; implementation and monitoring; auditing and reviewing). The results showed that mean percentage of the total scores in seven elements of HSE-MS was 85.7% and 87.0% based on self-report and report of parent company, respectively. In conclusion, this study showed that HSE-MS was desirably functioning; however, improvement to ensure health and safety of workers is still required.

Regulatory Practices on Ageing Management and Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants in the Ibero-American Region. Results of the FORO/IAEA Programme on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Ibero-America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-09-01

Although the operating lifetime of a nuclear power plant was originally anticipated to be in the range of 30-40 years, 200 of the 434 currently in operation are over 30 years old. In this context, Member States have assigned high priority to continuing the operation of nuclear power plants beyond the lifetime initially planned - while also maintaining the highest safety conditions possible. It is thus essential to encourage international cooperative efforts in the development of safety regulatory practices on ageing management and long term operation. Established in 1997, the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies (FORO) aims to strengthen its members' radiological and nuclear safety regulatory organizations. Through a regional network of radiological and nuclear safety regulators, States in the Ibero-American region have worked together to strengthen radiation protection for patients, to improve safety at radiation installations, to tightten controls on radioactive sources used in medicine, agriculture and industry, and to improve safety and security at nuclear power plants. Since FORO's creation, it has cooperated with the IAEA in areas of mututal interest, and a technical programme administered by the IAEA was established in 2003 and formalized in Practical Arrangements signed in 2010. This publication presents the results of the 2009-2010 FORO/IAEA project on regulatory practices on ageing management and safety considerations for extending the operating lifetime of nuclear power plants. The purpose of the project was to provide nuclear regulators in the region with guidance on regulatory criteria, assessment, regulatory inspection and periodic safety reviews relating to ageing management and long term operation of nuclear power plants. The results are presented in a set of four reports, with guidelines for FORO members and a summary report of the project. These reports contain valuable information for the development of future

Management by process based systems and safety focus

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rydnert, Bo; Groenlund, Bjoern

2005-12-01

An initiative from The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate led to this study carried out in the late autumn of 2005. The objective was to understand in more detail how an increasing use of process management affects organisations, on the one hand regarding risks and security, on the other hand regarding management by objectives and other management and operative effects. The main method was interviewing representatives of companies and independent experts. More than 20 interviews were carried out. In addition a literature study was made. All participating companies are using Management Systems based on processes. However, the methods chosen, and the results achieved, vary extensively. Thus, there are surprisingly few examples of complete and effective management by processes. Yet there is no doubt that management by processes is effective and efficient. Overall goals are reached, business results are achieved in more reliable ways and customers are more satisfied. The weaknesses found can be translated into a few comprehensive recommendations. A clear, structured and acknowledged model should be used and the processes should be described unambiguously. The changed management roles should be described and obeyed extremely legibly. New types of process objectives need to be formulated. In addition one fact needs to be observed and effectively fended off. Changes are often met by mental opposition on management level, as well as among co-workers. This fact needs attention and leadership. Safety development is closely related to the design and operation of a business management system and its continual improvement. A deep understanding of what constitutes an efficient and effective management system affects the understanding of safety. safety culture and abilities to achieve safety goals. Concerning risk, the opinions were unambiguous. Management by processes as such does not result in any further risks. On the contrary. Processes give a clear view of production and

Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goicea, Lucian

2012-01-01

Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

Process hazards analysis (PrHA) program, bridging accident analyses and operational safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richardson, J.A.; McKernan, S.A.; Vigil, M.J.

2003-01-01

Recently the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Technical Area 55 (TA-55) was revised and submitted to the US. Department of Energy (DOE). As a part of this effort, over seventy Process Hazards Analyses (PrHAs) were written and/or revised over the six years prior to the FSAR revision. TA-55 is a research, development, and production nuclear facility that primarily supports US. defense and space programs. Nuclear fuels and material research; material recovery, refining and analyses; and the casting, machining and fabrication of plutonium components are some of the activities conducted at TA-35. These operations involve a wide variety of industrial, chemical and nuclear hazards. Operational personnel along with safety analysts work as a team to prepare the PrHA. PrHAs describe the process; identi fy the hazards; and analyze hazards including determining hazard scenarios, their likelihood, and consequences. In addition, the interaction of the process to facility systems, structures and operational specific protective features are part of the PrHA. This information is rolled-up to determine bounding accidents and mitigating systems and structures. Further detailed accident analysis is performed for the bounding accidents and included in the FSAR. The FSAR is part of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) that defines the safety envelope for all facility operations in order to protect the worker, the public, and the environment. The DSA is in compliance with the US. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management and is approved by DOE. The DSA sets forth the bounding conditions necessary for the safe operation for the facility and is essentially a 'license to operate.' Safely of day-to-day operations is based on Hazard Control Plans (HCPs). Hazards are initially identified in the PrI-IA for the specific operation and act as input to the HCP. Specific protective features important to worker

How Can Every Organization Manage the Operational Risk?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ferry Jie

2002-03-01

Full Text Available This article describe how every organization (generally and Australian Organizations (specifically can manage the operational risks.  Recently, the operational risks are the significant issues in every organization because every organization will suffer from poor operational performance due to risks, failure, and problems such as a number of losses which are likely to be made worse. Basically, the operational risk management process has five steps, identification, analysis, treatment, controlling, and communication/consulting. Generally, many organizations (in particularly in Australia and New Zealand have already used AS/NZS 4360-Risk Management System, AS/NZS 4801-Occupational Health and Safety Management System, ISO 14001: Effective Environmental Management System, ISO 9001: Quality Management System, AS/NZS 7799: Information Security Management, AS/NZS 3806: Compliance Management System for reducing/mitigating/managing the operational risks. Based on the SAI Certification Register, the number of Australian Organizations got the AS/NZS ISO 9000 series, AS/NZS 14000 series, AS/NZS 4801 and AS/NZS 7799.2:2000 Certifications are 3338, 30, 20 and 5 respectively. It can conclude that Australian Organizations prefer used AS/NZS ISO 9000 series rather than AS/NZS ISO 14000 series, AS/NZS 4801 and AS/NZS 7799.2:2000.

Items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures in Japan (concerning the examination, design and operation management) (excluding the items to be reflected to the standards)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

In connection with the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident in March, 1979, in the United States, in order to introduce the lessons from it in the nuclear power safety regulations in Japan, 52 items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures were chosen by the Nuclear Safety Commission. Of these, 16 items were examined by the Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety. It was decided that these results would be introduced in the nuclear safety regulations, by the Nuclear Safety Commission. The following 16 items are described. For the examination, four items concerning the automatic operation of safety systems and others; for the design, five items concerning a small rupture accident, the monitoring of the state of primary coolant, control room layout and others; for the operation management, seven items concerning the inspection at the time of repair, the prevention of faulty handlings by operators and others. (J.P.N.)

Operational safety performance indicator system at the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant - Experience with indicator aggregation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mandula, J.

2001-01-01

The operational safety performance indicators serve as an important tool of performance monitoring and management at the Dukovany NPP. A software-supported system has been developed, which has included: data collection, central data storage, graphic output production and periodical report generation. Analyses of performance indicator trends together with evaluation in respect of annually updated target values and acceptance criteria are used for operational safety reviews forming an integral part of continual self-assessment process. This contribution has been focused on experience obtained during development of the operational safety assessment model using indicator aggregation. It summarises problems that had to be paid specific attention in the development process. Thanks to their solution, the model has become a synoptic monitor and a useful tool for operational safety assessment. (author)

Safety margins of operating reactors. Analysis of uncertainties and implications for decision making

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

Maintaining safety in the design and operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is a very important task under the conditions of a challenging environment, affected by the deregulated electricity market and implementation of risk informed regulations. In Member States, advanced computer codes are widely used as safety analysis tools in the framework of licensing of new NPP projects, safety upgrading programmes of existing NPPs, periodic safety reviews, renewal of operating licences, use of the safety margins for reactor power uprating, better utilization of nuclear fuel and higher operational flexibility, for justification of lifetime extensions, development of new emergency operating procedures, analysis of operational events, and development of accident management programmes. The issue of inadequate quality of safety analysis is becoming important due to a general tendency to use advanced tools for better establishment and utilization of safety margins, while the existence of such margins assure that NPPs operate safely in all modes of operation and at all times. The most important safety margins relate to physical barriers against release of radioactive material, such as fuel matrix and fuel cladding, reactor coolant system boundary, and the containment. Typically, safety margins are determined with use of computational tools for safety analysis. Advanced best estimate computer codes are suggested e.g. in the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants to be used for current safety analysis. Such computer codes require their careful application to avoid unjustified reduction in robustness of the reactor safety. The issue of uncertainties in safety analyses and their impact on evaluation of safety margins is addressed in a number of IAEA guidance documents, in particular in the Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. It is also discussed in various technical meetings and workshops devoted to this area. The

IAEA-led Operational Safety Team Reviews Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant, Czech Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has commended the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in the Czech Republic for its safety practices and has also made a series of recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of the Czech Republic to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of Dukovany NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in Vienna, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review of the plant from 6 to 23 June 2011. The team was made up of experts from Armenia, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK and the USA. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. The team at Dukovany conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which is largely under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; and Emergency Planning and Preparedness. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: The plant uses an integrated approach to recruit, select, psychologically assess and train new employees. This approach has resulted in consistently high success rates for licensed operator examinations and the identification of potential candidates for various plant departments; The performance

The critical safety functions and plant operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.; Porter, N.J.

1981-01-01

The operator's role in nuclear safety is outlined and the concept of ''safety functions'' introduced. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. The plant safety evaluation uses four inputs in predicting the results of an event: the event initiator, the plant design, the initial plant conditions and setup, and the operator actions. If any of these inputs are not as assumed in the evaluation, confidence that the consequences will be as predicted is reduced. Based on the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results: Maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond. Operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events. Monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of safety functions introduces this systematic approach and presents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows accomplishing the overall path of mitigating consequences. Ten functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions are identified

Management Systems of Gdynia Maritime University’s the Training Ships Operation

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Katarzyna Muszynska

2017-12-01

Full Text Available The aim of this elaboration is to present management systems working in Gdynia Maritime University. Compliance with the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code, the International Safety Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code and with the Quality Management System complies with ISO 9001 standard, allows to ensure safe operations of ships and to meet requirements of regulations. In the theoretical parts of this elaboration it has been described the definition of the quality, according to different authors, as well as Quality Management Systems. Whole activity of the Gdynia Maritime University’s ships and Shipowner Brunch is covered by ISM and ISPS Code. The International Safety Management, it is a system of the training ships’ safe operation and prevention of pollution, elaborated by International Maritime Organization (IMO. ISPS system consists of detailed Ship Security Plan, is divided into unclassified part and the part which is classified and owned to shipowner. The Quality Management System refers to The University’s activity, and only the part of the procedures, which covers student’s trainings refers to the ships and Shipowner Branch. In view of very specific operational activity of the training ships: “Dar M?odzie?y” and “Horyzont II”, only the principle conventions, acts and regulations, which the Shipowner and the ships are obliged to obey, has been expressed.

Safety management of an underground-based gravitational wave telescope: KAGRA

Science.gov (United States)

Ohishi, Naoko; Miyoki, Shinji; Uchiyama, Takashi; Miyakawa, Osamu; Ohashi, Masatake

2014-08-01

KAGRA is a unique gravitational wave telescope with its location underground and use of cryogenic mirrors. Safety management plays an important role for secure development and operation of such a unique and large facility. Based on relevant law in Japan, Labor Standard Act and Industrial Safety and Health Law, various countermeasures are mandated to avoid foreseeable accidents and diseases. In addition to the usual safety management of hazardous materials, such as cranes, organic solvents, lasers, there are specific safety issues in the tunnel. Prevention of collapse, flood, and fire accidents are the most critical issues for the underground facility. Ventilation is also important for prevention of air pollution by carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, organic solvents and radon. Oxygen deficiency should also be prevented.

Development of a Safety Assessment Information System for the Management of Periodic Safety Assessment Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Tae Young

2007-01-01

At present, the 10-year Periodic Safety Review(PSR) has been performing to confirm all the aspects of safety issues for all the operating plants in compliance with domestic nuclear law of article 23, subarticle 3. For each plant, in addition, Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) and Severe Accident Management Guideline(SAMG) are being implemented and revised periodically to reflect the latest safety level according to principle fulfillment of severe accident policy statement. The assessment reports, as one of outcomes from these activities, are submitted into and reviewed by domestic regulatory body. During reviewing (in-office duty) and licensing (regulatory duty) process, a large number of outcomes of which most are the formal technical reports and licensing materials, are inevitably produced. Moreover, repeated review process over the plants can make them accumulated and produce a variety of documents additionally. This circumstance motivates to develop effective tool or system for the management of these reports and related technical documents for the future use in licensing process and for subsequent plant assessments. This paper presents the development status of Safety Assessment Information System(SAIS) which manages safety-related documents of PSR, PSA and SAMG for practical use for experienced engineers in charge of these areas

Development of a Safety Assessment Information System for the Management of Periodic Safety Assessment Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Song, Tae Young [Nuclear Engineering and Technology Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2007-07-01

At present, the 10-year Periodic Safety Review(PSR) has been performing to confirm all the aspects of safety issues for all the operating plants in compliance with domestic nuclear law of article 23, subarticle 3. For each plant, in addition, Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) and Severe Accident Management Guideline(SAMG) are being implemented and revised periodically to reflect the latest safety level according to principle fulfillment of severe accident policy statement. The assessment reports, as one of outcomes from these activities, are submitted into and reviewed by domestic regulatory body. During reviewing (in-office duty) and licensing (regulatory duty) process, a large number of outcomes of which most are the formal technical reports and licensing materials, are inevitably produced. Moreover, repeated review process over the plants can make them accumulated and produce a variety of documents additionally. This circumstance motivates to develop effective tool or system for the management of these reports and related technical documents for the future use in licensing process and for subsequent plant assessments. This paper presents the development status of Safety Assessment Information System(SAIS) which manages safety-related documents of PSR, PSA and SAMG for practical use for experienced engineers in charge of these areas.

Safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. INSAG-14. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. The present report by INSAG deals with a general approach to the safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. It responds to the concerns about maintaining adequate safety levels at ageing plants, even beyond their design lifetimes. Maintaining adequate safety levels implies first and foremost stringent control of equipment ageing, consistent with the design safety bases of the plants. However, as stated in the 75-INSAG-3 report, 'Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants', nuclear safety requires a continuing quest for excellence; this implies enhancinuest for excellence; this implies enhancing the safety levels of operating nuclear power plants as far as reasonably practicable, with due account taken of experience and advancement in knowledge. Moreover, in view of the present situation of the nuclear industry, it may become difficult to maintain adequate competences in many countries with nuclear power programmes. These topics are considered in this latest INSAG report and released to a wider audience

Safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. INSAG-14. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. The present report by INSAG deals with a general approach to the safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. It responds to the concerns about maintaining adequate safety levels at ageing plants, even beyond their design lifetimes. Maintaining adequate safety levels implies first and foremost stringent control of equipment ageing, consistent with the design safety bases of the plants. However, as stated in the 75-INSAG-3 report, 'Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants', nuclear safety requires a continuing quest for excellence; this implies enhancing the safety levels of operating nuclear power plants as far as reasonably practicable, with due account taken of experience and advancement in knowledge. Moreover, in view of the present situation of the nuclear industry, it may become difficult to maintain adequate competences in many countries with nuclear power programmes. These topics are considered in this latest INSAG report and released to a wider audience

Operational safety - the IAEA response

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosen, M.

1984-01-01

Nuclear safety is an international issue. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency is growing because it offers a centre for contact and exchange between East and West, North and South. New initiatives are under way to intensify international co-operative safety efforts through exchange of information on abnormal events at nuclear power plants, and through greater sharing of safety research results. Emergency preparedness also lends itself to international co-operation. A report has been prepared on the need for establishing mutual emergency assistance. By analysing possible constraints to bilateral or multinational efforts in advance, a basis for agreement at the time of an emergency is being worked out. Safety standards have been developed in several areas. The NUSS Codes and Guides, now almost complete, make available to countries starting a nuclear power programme a coherent set of nuclear safety standards. A revised set of Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection has been issued in 1982. (author)

Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se

2016-01-01

During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

Indicators to monitor NPP operational safety performance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gomez-Cobo, Ana

2002-01-01

Since December 1995 the IAEA activities on safety performance indicators focused on the elaboration of a framework for the establishment of an operational safety performance indicator programme. The development of this framework began with the consideration of the concept of NPP operational safety performance and the identification of operational safety attributes. For each operational safety attribute, overall indicators, envisioned as providing an overall evaluation of relevant aspects of safety performance, were established. Associated with each overall indicator is a level of strategic indicators intended to provide a bridge from overall to specific indicators. Finally each strategic indicator was supported by a set of specific indicators, which represent quantifiable measures of performance. The programme development was enhanced by pilot plant studies, conducted over a 15 month period from January 1998 to March 1999. The result of all this work is compiled in the IAEA-TECDOC-1141, to be published shortly. This paper presents a summary of this IAEA TECDOC. It describes the operational safety performance indicator framework proposed and discusses the results of and lessons learned from the pilot studies. Despite the efforts described, it is clear that additional research is still necessary in areas such as plant-specific adaptation of proposed frameworks in order to suit individual data collection systems and plant characteristics, indicator selection, indicator definition, goal setting, action thresholds, analysis of trends, indicator display systems, analysis of overall safety performance (i.e., aggregation or combination of indicators), safety culture indicators, qualitative indicators, and use of additional indicators to address issues such as industrial safety attitude and performance, staff welfare, and environmental compliance. This is the rationale for a new IAEA Coordinated Research Project on 'Development and application of indicators to monitor NPP

Running scenarios using the Waste Tank Safety and Operations Hanford Site model

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stahlman, E.J.

1995-11-01

Management of the Waste Tank Safety and Operations (WTS ampersand O) at Hanford is a large and complex task encompassing 177 tanks and having a budget of over $500 million per year. To assist managers in this task, a model based on system dynamics was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The model simulates the WTS ampersand O at the Hanford Tank Farms by modeling the planning, control, and flow of work conducted by Managers, Engineers, and Crafts. The model is described in Policy Analysis of Hanford Tank Farm Operations with System Dynamics Approach (Kwak 1995b) and Management Simulator for Hanford Tank Farm Operations (Kwak 1995a). This document provides guidance for users of the model in developing, running, and analyzing results of management scenarios. The reader is assumed to have an understanding of the model and its operation. Important parameters and variables in the model are described, and two scenarios are formulated as examples

Crew Factors in Flight Operations XIV: Alertness Management in Regional Flight Operations Education Module

Science.gov (United States)

Rosekind, Mark R.; Co, Elizabeth L.; Neri, David F.; Oyung, Raymond L.; Mallis, Melissa M.

2002-01-01

Regional operations encompass a broad range of pilots and equipment. This module is intended to help all those involved in regional aviation, including pilots, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians, policy makers, and others, to understand the physiological factors underlying fatigue, how flight operations affect fatigue, and what can be done to counteract fatigue and maximize alertness and performance in their operations. The overall purpose of this module is to promote aviation safety, performance, and productivity. It is intended to meet three specific objectives: (1) to explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue; (2) to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to improving flight crew sleep, performance, and alertness; and (3) to offer strategies for alertness management. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NISH) reports are used throughout this module to demonstrate that fatigue is a safety issue in the regional operations community. The appendices at the end of this module include the ASRS reports used for the examples contained in this publication, brief introductions to sleep disorders and relaxation techniques, summaries of relevant NASA publications, and a list of general readings on sleep, sleep disorders, and circadian rhythms.