WorldWideScience

Sample records for operational safety management

  1. Managing Safety and Operations: The Effect of Joint Management System Practices on Safety and Operational Outcomes.

    Tompa, Emile; Robson, Lynda; Sarnocinska-Hart, Anna; Klassen, Robert; Shevchenko, Anton; Sharma, Sharvani; Hogg-Johnson, Sheilah; Amick, Benjamin C; Johnston, David A; Veltri, Anthony; Pagell, Mark

    2016-03-01

    The aim of this study was to determine whether management system practices directed at both occupational health and safety (OHS) and operations (joint management system [JMS] practices) result in better outcomes in both areas than in alternative practices. Separate regressions were estimated for OHS and operational outcomes using data from a survey along with administrative records on injuries and illnesses. Organizations with JMS practices had better operational and safety outcomes than organizations without these practices. They had similar OHS outcomes as those with operations-weak practices, and in some cases, better outcomes than organizations with safety-weak practices. They had similar operational outcomes as those with safety-weak practices, and better outcomes than those with operations-weak practices. Safety and operations appear complementary in organizations with JMS practices in that there is no penalty for either safety or operational outcomes.

  2. Operational Risk Management and Military Aviation Safety

    Ashley, Park

    1999-01-01

    .... The Army's Class A aviation mishap rate declined after it implemented risk management (RM) principles in 1987. This reduction caught the attention of Air Force leadership who have since stated that the application of operational risk management...

  3. Research on station management in subway operation safety

    Li, Yiman

    2017-10-01

    The management of subway station is an important part of the safe operation of urban subway. In order to ensure the safety of subway operation, it is necessary to study the relevant factors that affect station management. In the protection of subway safety operations on the basis of improving the quality of service, to promote the sustained and healthy development of subway stations. This paper discusses the influencing factors of subway operation accident and station management, and analyzes the specific contents of station management security for subway operation, and develops effective suppression measures. It is desirable to improve the operational quality and safety factor for subway operations.

  4. The Safety Prevention in the Theater Management and Operation

    WU Sheng

    2015-01-01

    Take the operation and management experience as examples, the author discussed how to formulate a set of complete and effective equipment management system, operating rules, procedures and standards, as well as the safety prevention and control measures, according to the national or trade related laws and regulations and combining the operation and performance characteristics of theatre management, in order to ensure the safe operation of theatre and stage equipment.

  5. Predicting safety culture: the roles of employer, operations manager and safety professional.

    Wu, Tsung-Chih; Lin, Chia-Hung; Shiau, Sen-Yu

    2010-10-01

    This study explores predictive factors in safety culture. In 2008, a sample 939 employees was drawn from 22 departments of a telecoms firm in five regions in central Taiwan. The sample completed a questionnaire containing four scales: the employer safety leadership scale, the operations manager safety leadership scale, the safety professional safety leadership scale, and the safety culture scale. The sample was then randomly split into two subsamples. One subsample was used for measures development, one for the empirical study. A stepwise regression analysis found four factors with a significant impact on safety culture (R²=0.337): safety informing by operations managers; safety caring by employers; and safety coordination and safety regulation by safety professionals. Safety informing by operations managers (ß=0.213) was by far the most significant predictive factor. The findings of this study provide a framework for promoting a positive safety culture at the group level. Crown Copyright © 2010. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  6. Research on Integration of NPP Operational Safety Management Performance Systems

    Chi, Miao; Shi, Liping

    2014-01-01

    The operational safety management of Nuclear Power Plants demands systematic planning and integrated control. NPPs are following the well-developed safety indicator systems proposed by IAEA Operational Safety Performance Indicator Programme, NRC Reactor Oversight Process or the other institutions. Integration of the systems is proposed to benefiting from the advantages of both systems and avoiding improper application into the real world. The authors analyzed the possibility and necessity for system integration, and propose an indicator system integrating method

  7. Research on asset management for safety and operations.

    2011-11-01

    The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) is challenged with managing a wide range of : transportation safety and operations assets in order to respond to public and other outside interests. These : assets include, but are not limited to pavemen...

  8. Asset Management Guidebook for Safety and Operations

    2012-09-01

    A primary product of this research was the Asset Management Guidebook that TxDOT division and district : personnel can use to help them define, develop, and implement asset management across all levels : particularly as it relates to establishing ...

  9. Regulatory safety aspects of nuclear waste management operations in India

    Sundararajan, A.R.

    2000-01-01

    The Department of Atomic Energy in India as part of its programme to harness the nuclear energy for generation of nuclear power has been operating a whole range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities including waste management plants for more than four decades. The waste management plants include three high level waste immobilisation plants, one in operation, one under commissioning and one more under construction. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is mandated to review and authorise from the safety angle the siting, the design, the construction and the operation of the waste management plants. The regulatory procedures, which involve multi-tier review adopted for ensuring the safety of these facilities, are described in this paper. (author)

  10. Safety management systems and their role in achieving high standards of operational safety

    Coulston, D.J.; Baylis, C.C.

    2000-01-01

    Achieving high standards of operational safety requires a robust management framework that is visible to all personnel with responsibility for its implementation. The structure of the management framework must ensure that all processes used to manage safety interlink in a logical and coherent manner, that is, they form a management system that leads to continuous improvement in safety performance. This Paper describes BNFL's safety management system (SMS). The SMS has management processes grouped within 5 main elements: 1. Policy, 2. Organisation, 3. Planning and Implementation, 4. Measuring and Reviewing Performance, 5. Audit. These elements reflect the overall process of setting safety objective (from Policy), measuring success and reviewing the performance. Effective implementation of the SMS requires senior managers to demonstrate leadership through their commitment and accountability. However, the SMS as a whole reflects that every employee at every level within BNFL is responsible for safety of operations under their control. The SMS therefore promotes a proactive safety culture and safe operations. The system is formally documented in the Company's Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Manual. Within in BNFL Group, the Company structures enables the Manual to provide overall SMS guidance and co-ordination to its range of nuclear businesses. Each business develops the SMS to be appropriate at all levels of its organisation, but ensuring that each level is consistent with the higher level. The Paper concludes with a summary of BNFL's safety performance. (author)

  11. Implementing process safety management in gas processing operations

    Rodman, D.L.

    1992-01-01

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard entitled Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents was finalized February 24, 1992. The purpose of the standard is to prevent or minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals. OSHA believes that its rule will accomplish this goal by requiring a comprehensive management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. Gas Processors Association (GPA) member companies are significantly impacted by this major standard, the requirements of which are extensive and complex. The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements of the standard and to discuss the elements to consider in developing and implementing a viable long term Process Safety Management Program

  12. Improving operational safety management through probabilistic safety assessment on personal computers

    1988-10-01

    The Technical Committee Meeting considered the current effort in the implementation and use of PSA information for day-to-day operational safety management on Personal Computers. Due to the very recent development of the necessary hardware and software for Personal Computers, the application of PSA information for day-to-day operational safety management on PCs is essentially still in a pioneering stage. There is at present only one such system for end users existing, the PRISIM (Plant Risk Status Information Management) program for which a limited practical application experience is available. Others are still in the development stage. The main aim of the Technical Committee Meeting was to discuss the present status of PSA based systems for operational safety management support on small computers, to consider practical aspects when implementing these systems into a nuclear installation and to address problems related to the further work in the area. A separate abstract was prepared for the summary of the Technical Committee Meeting and for the 8 papers presented by the participants. Refs, figs and tabs

  13. Emergency Management Operations Process Mapping: Public Safety Technical Program Study

    2011-02-01

    services Operational Activity Collect and Manage Cash Donations Once activated, refer cash donations to appropriate voluntary organizations...recovery operations. Operational Activity Conduct Euthanasia /Disposal Provide humane methods to euthanize affected animals to stop the spread of the...issue stop movement orders, and initiate animal vaccination and treatment programs, euthanasia efforts, or other protective measures designed to control

  14. Safety Culture Perspective. Managing the pre Managing the pre-operational phases of new NPPs and creating the safety culture

    Cowan, Pamela B.; Oh, Chaewoon; Dahlgren Persson, Kerstin; Carnino, Annick

    2008-01-01

    Nuclear safety is a key for the revival of nuclear energy future programmes. Lots of competent people will be needed worldwide for ensuring the safety of the installations both existing ones and future ones. Their expertise should range from design to operation, from regulatory role to operators, from fuel fabrication to waste disposal. The challenge in front of us will be to prepare for the right recruitment, the development of the needed expertise in order to face the demand in developed countries, in countries with economies in transition and in developing countries. Time allocated for the panel does not allow for covering all aspects but the panelists will cover some of the important aspects of the challenge in terms of needs, of new competencies, of learning from operation and licensing requirements including for new designs. The key objectives of the panel are: 1- Maintaining safe operation, learning from experience, licensing including aging management and re-licensing with safety improvements for existing installations: - Presentation by Junko Ogawa of the experience and lessons learned from the earthquake on Kashiwasaki Kariwa NPP: effects in terms of manpower involved in the investigation, effects on regulations and licensing, expertise used. - Presentation by Pamela Cowan of her experience in preparing licensing actions, regulatory compliance and interface with the Regulator for both operating plants and modern requirements for constructing new ones. 2 - Special training needed for the human aspect of safety: what are the challenges in areas of safety culture and management of safety: - Presentation by Chae Woon Oh of the Korean safety culture features developed nationally, at the regulator and at the operating organizations and their integration within the safety training programmes. - Presentation by Kerstin Dahlgren Person of the needs in terms of safety culture and safety management, in terms of expertise, practitioners and assessors. 3 - How to

  15. Safety Culture Perspective. Managing the pre Managing the pre-operational phases of new NPPs and creating the safety culture

    Cowan, Pamela B. [Exelon Generation, 200 Exelon Way, 19348 Kennett Square, PA 19348 (United States); Oh, Chaewoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 19 Gusung-Dong, Yuseong-Ku, 305-338 Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Dahlgren Persson, Kerstin [International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, PO BOX 100 A-1400 Vienna (Austria); Carnino, Annick [IAEA, Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, Wagramer Strasse 5, PO BOX 100 A-1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2008-07-01

    Nuclear safety is a key for the revival of nuclear energy future programmes. Lots of competent people will be needed worldwide for ensuring the safety of the installations both existing ones and future ones. Their expertise should range from design to operation, from regulatory role to operators, from fuel fabrication to waste disposal. The challenge in front of us will be to prepare for the right recruitment, the development of the needed expertise in order to face the demand in developed countries, in countries with economies in transition and in developing countries. Time allocated for the panel does not allow for covering all aspects but the panelists will cover some of the important aspects of the challenge in terms of needs, of new competencies, of learning from operation and licensing requirements including for new designs. The key objectives of the panel are: 1- Maintaining safe operation, learning from experience, licensing including aging management and re-licensing with safety improvements for existing installations: - Presentation by Junko Ogawa of the experience and lessons learned from the earthquake on Kashiwasaki Kariwa NPP: effects in terms of manpower involved in the investigation, effects on regulations and licensing, expertise used. - Presentation by Pamela Cowan of her experience in preparing licensing actions, regulatory compliance and interface with the Regulator for both operating plants and modern requirements for constructing new ones. 2 - Special training needed for the human aspect of safety: what are the challenges in areas of safety culture and management of safety: - Presentation by Chae Woon Oh of the Korean safety culture features developed nationally, at the regulator and at the operating organizations and their integration within the safety training programmes. - Presentation by Kerstin Dahlgren Person of the needs in terms of safety culture and safety management, in terms of expertise, practitioners and assessors. 3 - How to

  16. Role of management in the development of safety culture at the operating organization

    Zhong, W [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

    1997-09-01

    Role of management in the development of safety culture at the operating organization to offer practical suggestions to assist in the development or improvement of a progressive safety culture. 2 figs.

  17. Role of management in the development of safety culture at the operating organization

    Zhong, W.

    1997-01-01

    Role of management in the development of safety culture at the operating organization to offer practical suggestions to assist in the development or improvement of a progressive safety culture. 2 figs

  18. Safety management of a complex R and D ground operating system

    Connors, J. F.; Maurer, R. A.

    1975-01-01

    A perspective on safety program management was developed for a complex R&D operating system, such as the NASA-Lewis Research Center. Using a systems approach, hazardous operations are subjected to third-party reviews by designated-area safety committees and are maintained under safety permit controls. To insure personnel alertness, emergency containment forces and employees are trained in dry-run emergency simulation exercises. The keys to real safety effectiveness are top management support and visibility of residual risks.

  19. Approaches to the mathematical description of NPP operational safety management and oversight

    Bilej, D.V.; Berzhanskij, S.V.

    2014-01-01

    The paper presents analysis of features related to NPP operational safety management and oversight. According to analysis results, approaches are proposed to perform mathematical description of specific processes and to develop a scale for management to the current safety level as regards NPP power generation. Proposed approaches are making experimental equations and process approach of ISO-9001 quality system

  20. Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

    Johnson, Teresa A.

    2006-01-01

    Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

  1. Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

    Cotton, William B.; Hilb, Robert; Koczo, Stefan, Jr.; Wing, David J.

    2016-01-01

    A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

  2. Management of operational safety in nuclear power plants. INSAG-13. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. Engineering issues have received close attention from the nuclear community over many years. However, it is only in the last decade or so that organizational and cultural issues have been identified as vital to achieving safe operation. INSAG's publication No. 4 has been widely recognized as a milestone in advancing thinking about safety culture in the nuclear community and more widely. The present report deals with the framework for safety management that is necessary in organizations in order to promote safety culture. It deals with the general principles underlying the management of operational safety in a systematic way and provides guidance on good practices. It also draws on the results of audits and reviews to highlight how shortfalls in safety management have led to incidents at nuclear power plants. In addition, several specific issues are raised which are particularly topical in view of organizational changes that are taking place in the nuclear industry in various countries. Advice is given on how safety can be managed during organizational change, how safety

  3. Operational safety

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    The PNL Safety, Standards and Compliance Program contributed to the development and issuance of safety policies, standards, and criteria; for projects in the nuclear and nonnuclear areas. During 1976 the major emphasis was on developing criteria, instruments and methods to assure that radiation exposure to occupational personnel and to people in the environs of nuclear-related facilities is maintained at the lowest level technically and economically practicable. Progress in 1976 is reported on the preparation of guidelines for radiation exposure; Pu dosimetry studies; the preparation of an environmental monitoring handbook; and emergency instrumentation preparedness

  4. Safe operation of nuclear power plants - Is safety culture an adequate management method?

    Piirto, A.

    2012-01-01

    One of the characteristics of a good safety culture is a definable commitment to the improvement of safety behaviours and attitudes at all organisational levels. A second characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is free and open communication. The general understanding has been that safety culture is a part of organisation culture. In addition to safety culture thinking, proactive programmes and displays of proactive work to improve safety are required. This work needs to include, qt a minimum, actions aiming at reducing human errors, the development of human error prevention tools, improvements in training, and the development of working methods and the organisation's activities. Safety depends not only on the technical systems, but also on the organisation. There is a need for better methods and tools for organisational assessment and development. Today there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management and organisational factors have over the safety significance of complex industrial installations such as nuclear power plants. Many events with significant economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to management deficiencies. The objective of this study is development of new methods to increase safety of nuclear power plant operation. The research has been limited to commercial nuclear power plants that are intended for electrical power generation in Finland. Their production activities, especially operation and maintenance, are primarily reviewed from a safety point of view, as well as human performance and organisational factors perspective. This defines the scope and focus of the study. The research includes studies related to knowledge management and tacit knowledge in the project management context and specific studies related to transfer of tacit knowledge in the maintenance organization and transfer of tacit knowledge between workers of old generation and young generation. The empirical results

  5. Safe operation of nuclear power plants - Is safety culture an adequate management method?

    Piirto, A.

    2012-07-01

    One of the characteristics of a good safety culture is a definable commitment to the improvement of safety behaviours and attitudes at all organisational levels. A second characteristic of an organisation with excellent safety culture is free and open communication. The general understanding has been that safety culture is a part of organisation culture. In addition to safety culture thinking, proactive programmes and displays of proactive work to improve safety are required. This work needs to include, qt a minimum, actions aiming at reducing human errors, the development of human error prevention tools, improvements in training, and the development of working methods and the organisation's activities. Safety depends not only on the technical systems, but also on the organisation. There is a need for better methods and tools for organisational assessment and development. Today there is universal acceptance of the significant impact that management and organisational factors have over the safety significance of complex industrial installations such as nuclear power plants. Many events with significant economic and public impact had causes that have been traced to management deficiencies. The objective of this study is development of new methods to increase safety of nuclear power plant operation. The research has been limited to commercial nuclear power plants that are intended for electrical power generation in Finland. Their production activities, especially operation and maintenance, are primarily reviewed from a safety point of view, as well as human performance and organisational factors perspective. This defines the scope and focus of the study. The research includes studies related to knowledge management and tacit knowledge in the project management context and specific studies related to transfer of tacit knowledge in the maintenance organization and transfer of tacit knowledge between workers of old generation and young generation. The empirical

  6. Operation of TRR-1/M1 for 25 years and lessons learned in management of safety and safety culture

    Keinmeesuke, Sirichai

    2002-01-01

    The first Thai Research Reactor, TRR-1, was installed and put into operation in 1962. In 1975 the reactor was converted to a 2 MW TRIGA Mark III by replacing of the reactor core and the control system. The renamed TRR-1/M1 research reactor went critical again in November 1977. TRR-1/M1 has been operated safely for 25 years with its main utilization in research, isotope production and training. Safety management and safety culture have been implemented for 25 years both in the legislation level and the operation level. There was no nuclear incident and there were a few radiological incidents during the 25 years of operation of TRR-1/M1. The lessons learned from the incident events such as the release of N-16 and Ar-41, the release of radioactive Bromine gave valued opportunities to improve our operation procedure, safety procedure and safety culture. All type of activities with respect to safety culture such as individual awareness, commitment, motivation, supervision and responsibility have been seriously reviewed and being set as normal practices. (author)

  7. Operation safety at Ignalina NPP

    Zheltobriukh, G.

    1999-01-01

    An improvement of operational safety at Ignalina NPP covers: improvement of management structure and safety culture; symptom-based emergency operating procedures; staff training and full scope simulator; program of components ageing; metal inspection; improvement of fire safety. The first plan of Ignalina NPP Safety culture development for 1997 purposed to the SAR recommendation implementation was prepared and approved by the General Director

  8. Enhancing operational nuclear safety

    Sengoku, Katsuhisa

    2008-01-01

    Since Chernobyl, the dictum A n accident anywhere is an accident everywhere i s a globally shared perception. The paper presents challenges to the international nuclear community: globalization, sustainable and dynamic development, secure, safe and clean energy supply, nuclear r enaissance , public concern for nuclear safety, nuclear security, and technology and management. Strong national safety infrastructures and international cooperation are required to maintain a high level of nuclear safety and security worldwide. There is an increasing number of countries thinking of going nuclear: Morocco, Indonesia, Iran, Poland, Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Vietnam, Chile, Nigeria, Malaysia, Thailand, Uruguay, Tunisia, Algeria. Another serious incident will jeopardize the prospect of nuclear renaissance. Safety and security are preconditions for countries newly introducing NPP as well as for those with mature nuclear programmes. The Global Nuclear Safety Regime (GNSR) is referred to as the institutional, legal and technical framework to achieve worldwide implementation of the safety of nuclear installations. At the top of the framework is the Convention on Nuclear Safety which covers the nuclear power plants. The convention has 56 contracting parties which meet triennially where national reports are presented and subject to the review of peers. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) undertakes a programme to foster the GNSR through the establishment of IAEA safety standards and related publications. The programme provides for the application of standards for the (1) safety of nuclear installations, (2) safety of radioactive sources, (3) safe transport of radioactive material and (4) management of radioactive waste. It also provides for the security of nuclear installations, nuclear material and radioactive material. The safety standards hierarchy is as follows: safety fundamental, safety requirements and safety guides. The safety fundamentals are the bases for IAEA

  9. Safety management in multiemployer worksites in the manufacturing industry: opinions on co-operation and problems encountered.

    Nenonen, Sanna; Vasara, Juha

    2013-01-01

    Co-operation between different parties and effective safety management play an important role in ensuring safety in multiemployer worksites. This article reviews safety co-operation and factors complicating safety management in Finnish multiemployer manufacturing worksites. The paper focuses on the service providers' opinions; however, a comparison of the customers' views is also presented. The results show that safety-related co-operation between providers and customers is generally considered as successful but strongly dependent on the partner. Safety co-operation is provided through, e.g., training, orientation and risk analysis. Problems encountered include ensuring adequate communication, identifying hazards, co-ordinating work tasks and determining responsibilities. The providers and the customers encounter similar safety management problems. The results presented in this article can help companies to focus their efforts on the most problematic points of safety management and to avoid common pitfalls.

  10. Crew resource management training adapted to nuclear power plant operators for enhancing safety attitude

    Ishibashi, Akira; Kitamura, Masaharu; Takahashi, Makoto

    2015-01-01

    A conventional training program for nuclear power plant operators mainly focuses on the improvement of knowledge and skills of individual operators. Although it has certainly contributed to safety operation of nuclear power plants, some recent incidents have indicated the necessity of an additional training program aiming at the improvement of team performance. In the aviation domain, crew resource management (CRM) training has demonstrated the effectiveness in resolving team management issues of flight crews, aircraft maintenance crews, and so on. In the present research, we attempt to introduce the CRM concept into operator training in nuclear power plant for the training of conceptual skill (that is, non-technical skill). In this paper an adapted CRM training for nuclear power plant operators is proposed. The proposed training method has been practically utilized in the training course of the managers of nuclear power plants. (author)

  11. Operating experience: safety perspective

    Piplani, Vivek; Krishnamurthy, P.R.; Kumar, Neeraj; Upadhyay, Devendra

    2015-01-01

    Operating Experience (OE) provides valuable information for improving NPP safety. This may include events, precursors, deviations, deficiencies, problems, new insights to safety, good practices, lessons and corrective actions. As per INSAG-10, an OE program caters as a fundamental means for enhancing the defence-in-depth at NPPs and hence should be viewed as ‘Continuous Safety Performance Improvement Tool’. The ‘Convention on Nuclear Safety’ also recognizes the OE as a tool of high importance for enhancing the NPP safety and its Article 19 mandates each contracting party to establish an effective OE program at operating NPPs. The lessons drawn from major accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi NPPs had prompted nuclear stalwarts to change their safety perspective towards NPPs and to frame sound policies on issues like safety culture, severe accident prevention and mitigation. An effective OE program, besides correcting current/potential problems, help in proactively improving the NPP design, operating and maintenance procedures, practices, training, etc., and thus plays vital role in ensuring safe and efficient operation of NPPs. Further it enhances knowledge with regard to equipment operating characteristics, system performance trends and provides data for quantitative and qualitative safety analysis. Besides all above, an OE program inculcates a learning culture in the organisation and thus helps in continuously enhancing the expertise, technical competency and knowledge base of its staff. Nuclear and Radiation Facilities in India are regulated by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Operating Plants Safety Division (OPSD) of AERB is involved in managing operating experience activities. This paper provides insights about the operating experience program of OPSD, AERB (including its on-line data base namely OPSD STAR) and its utilisation in improving the regulations and safety at Indian NPPs/projects. (author)

  12. Preparing Safety Cases for Operating Outside Prescriptive Fatigue Risk Management Regulations.

    Gander, Philippa; Mangie, Jim; Wu, Lora; van den Berg, Margo; Signal, Leigh; Phillips, Adrienne

    2017-07-01

    Transport operators seeking to operate outside prescriptive fatigue management regulations are typically required to present a safety case justifying how they will manage the associated risk. This paper details a method for constructing a successful safety case. The method includes four elements: 1) scope (prescriptive rules and operations affected); 2) risk assessment; 3) risk mitigation strategies; and 4) monitoring ongoing risk. A successful safety case illustrates this method. It enables landing pilots in 3-pilot crews to choose the second or third in-flight rest break, rather than the regulatory requirement to take the third break. Scope was defined using a month of scheduled flights that would be covered (N = 4151). These were analyzed in the risk assessment using existing literature on factors affecting fatigue to estimate the maximum time awake at top of descent and sleep opportunities in each break. Additionally, limited data collected before the new regulations showed that pilots flying at landing chose the third break on only 6% of flights. A prospective survey comparing subjective reports (N = 280) of sleep in the second vs. third break and fatigue and sleepiness ratings at top of descent confirmed that the third break is not consistently superior. The safety case also summarized established systems for fatigue monitoring, risk assessment and hazard identification, and multiple fatigue mitigation strategies that are in place. Other successful safety cases have used this method. The evidence required depends on the expected level of risk and should evolve as experience with fatigue risk management systems builds.Gander P, Mangie J, Wu L, van den Berg M, Signal L, Phillips A. Preparing safety cases for operating outside prescriptive fatigue risk management regulations. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2017; 88(7):688-696.

  13. TYPICAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF AN OPERATOR IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

    Alexander Michaylovich Lushkin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In order to implement the concept of acceptable risk all airlines should have the Safety Management System (SMS from 01.01.2009 - at the request of ICAO and from 01.01.2010 - at the request of the Federal Air Transport Agen- cy. State requirements for SMS have not been formulated clearly. Leading airlines, in an effort to meet international stand- ards, develop and implement SMS on their own. So the implemented SMS differ in control settings (level of safety, proce- dures and methodological support of the processes of safety management. The summary of the best experience in develop- ment, implementation and improvement of SMS in leading airlines, allows to create a standard SMS to the airline, where the basic procedures required by the standards are systematized. The standard SMS is formed on experience in design, implementation and development of corporate SMS in three leading Russian airlines, in which the author worked in 2006-2015, and can be the basis of an SMS of the airlines operat- ing the planes and helicopters. Taken into account in a typical SMS requirements of international and national standards, research results, developed and implemented methodical maintenance of management procedures level of safety, contribut- ed to the successful passage of IATA periodic audits on developing standards of operational safety IOSA by the airline members and achieve the best level of safety not only in Russia but also in the world.

  14. Risk Assessment for Bridges Safety Management during Operation Based on Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm

    Xia Hanyu

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, large span and large sea-crossing bridges are built, bridges accidents caused by improper operational management occur frequently. In order to explore the better methods for risk assessment of the bridges operation departments, the method based on fuzzy clustering algorithm is selected. Then, the implementation steps of fuzzy clustering algorithm are described, the risk evaluation system is built, and Taizhou Bridge is selected as an example, the quantitation of risk factors is described. After that, the clustering algorithm based on fuzzy equivalence is calculated on MATLAB 2010a. In the last, Taizhou Bridge operation management departments are classified and sorted according to the degree of risk, and the safety situation of operation departments is analyzed.

  15. Operational safety performance indicator system - a management tool for the self assessment of safety and reliability of nuclear power plants

    Anil Kumar; Mandowara, S.L.; Mittal, S.

    2006-01-01

    Operational Safety Performance Indicator system is one of the self assessment tools for station management to monitor safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. It provides information to station management about the performance of various areas of the plants by means of different colours of relevant performance indicators. Such systems have been implemented at many nuclear power plants in the world and have been considered as strength during WANO Peer Review. IAEA had a Coordinated Research Programme (CRP) on this with several countries participating including India. In NPCIL this system has been implemented in KAPS about a year back and found very useful in identifying areas which needs to be given more attention. Based on the KAPS feedback Implementation of this system has been taken up in RAPS-3 and 4 and KGS-l and 2. (author)

  16. Microbiological performance of a food safety management system in a food service operation.

    Lahou, E; Jacxsens, L; Daelman, J; Van Landeghem, F; Uyttendaele, M

    2012-04-01

    The microbiological performance of a food safety management system in a food service operation was measured using a microbiological assessment scheme as a vertical sampling plan throughout the production process, from raw materials to final product. The assessment scheme can give insight into the microbiological contamination and the variability of a production process and pinpoint bottlenecks in the food safety management system. Three production processes were evaluated: a high-risk sandwich production process (involving raw meat preparation), a medium-risk hot meal production process (starting from undercooked raw materials), and a low-risk hot meal production process (reheating in a bag). Microbial quality parameters, hygiene indicators, and relevant pathogens (Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella, Bacillus cereus, and Escherichia coli O157) were in accordance with legal criteria and/or microbiological guidelines, suggesting that the food safety management system was effective. High levels of total aerobic bacteria (>3.9 log CFU/50 cm(2)) were noted occasionally on gloves of food handlers and on food contact surfaces, especially in high contamination areas (e.g., during handling of raw material, preparation room). Core control activities such as hand hygiene of personnel and cleaning and disinfection (especially in highly contaminated areas) were considered points of attention. The present sampling plan was used to produce an overall microbiological profile (snapshot) to validate the food safety management system in place.

  17. US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office Integrated Safety Management System Program Description

    SHOOP, D.S.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Program Description (PD) is to describe the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) ISMS as implemented through the RL Integrated Management System (RIMS). This PD does not impose additional requirements but rather provides an overview describing how various parts of the ISMS fit together. Specific requirements for each of the core functions and guiding principles are established in other implementing processes, procedures, and program descriptions that comprise RIMS. RL is organized to conduct work through operating contracts; therefore, it is extremely difficult to provide an adequate ISMS description that only addresses RL functions. Of necessity, this PD contains some information on contractor processes and procedures which then require RL approval or oversight

  18. Reactor physics computer code development for neutronic design, fuel-management, reactor operation and safety analysis of PHWRs

    Rastogi, B.P.

    1989-01-01

    This report discusses various reactor physics codes developed for neutronic design, fuel-management, reactor operation and safety analysis of PHWRs. These code packages have been utilized for nuclear design of 500 MWe and new 235 MWe PHWRs. (author)

  19. Improving operating room safety

    Garrett Jill

    2009-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Despite the introduction of the Universal Protocol, patient safety in surgery remains a daily challenge in the operating room. This present study describes one community health system's efforts to improve operating room safety through human factors training and ultimately the development of a surgical checklist. Using a combination of formal training, local studies documenting operating room safety issues and peer to peer mentoring we were able to substantially change the culture of our operating room. Our efforts have prepared us for successfully implementing a standardized checklist to improve operating room safety throughout our entire system. Based on these findings we recommend a multimodal approach to improving operating room safety.

  20. Shortcomings in safety management: symptoms, examples and recovery processes. Omission of Operational Culture can be fatal for the power utility

    Hezoucky, F.; )

    2006-01-01

    During recent years, many utilities and their nuclear branches have undergone substantial change. The effectiveness of management in handling the change varies considerably from utility to utility. At the extreme, the way the change is managed and nuclear safety and operational performance aspects are integrated can either help lead a plant to operational excellence or destroy what was once an effective organisation. (author)

  1. Operating room data management: improving efficiency and safety in a surgical block.

    Agnoletti, Vanni; Buccioli, Matteo; Padovani, Emanuele; Corso, Ruggero M; Perger, Peter; Piraccini, Emanuele; Orelli, Rebecca Levy; Maitan, Stefano; Dell'amore, Davide; Garcea, Domenico; Vicini, Claudio; Montella, Teresa Maria; Gambale, Giorgio

    2013-03-11

    European Healthcare Systems are facing a difficult period characterized by increasing costs and spending cuts due to economic problems. There is the urgent need for new tools which sustain Hospitals decision makers work. This project aimed to develop a data recording system of the surgical process of every patient within the operating theatre. The primary goal was to create a practical and easy data processing tool to give hospital managers, anesthesiologists and surgeons the information basis to increase operating theaters efficiency and patient safety. The developed data analysis tool is embedded in an Oracle Business Intelligence Environment, which processes data to simple and understandable performance tachometers and tables. The underlying data analysis is based on scientific literature and the projects teams experience with tracked data. The system login is layered and different users have access to different data outputs depending on their professional needs. The system is divided in the tree profile types Manager, Anesthesiologist and Surgeon. Every profile includes subcategories where operators can access more detailed data analyses. The first data output screen shows general information and guides the user towards more detailed data analysis. The data recording system enabled the registration of 14.675 surgical operations performed from 2009 to 2011. Raw utilization increased from 44% in 2009 to 52% in 2011. The number of high complexity surgical procedures (≥120 minutes) has increased in certain units while decreased in others. The number of unscheduled procedures performed has been reduced (from 25% in 2009 to 14% in 2011) while maintaining the same percentage of surgical procedures. The number of overtime events decreased in 2010 (23%) and in 2011 (21%) compared to 2009 (28%) and the delays expressed in minutes are almost the same (mean 78 min). The direct link found between the complexity of surgical procedures, the number of unscheduled procedures

  2. HFETR operation management

    Liu Rong; Yang Shuchun; Peng Jun; Zhou Shoukang

    2003-01-01

    Experiences and work methods with High Flux Engineering Test Reactor (HFETR) operation are introduced, which have been accumulated in a long period of operation, in the aspects as reactor operation, test, maintenance, operator training and incident management. It's clear that the safety operation of HFETR has been ensured, and the methods are valid. (authors)

  3. Enhancing operational safety

    Wiebe, J S

    1997-09-01

    The presentation briefly considers the following aspects concerning enhancing operational safety of NPP: licensed control room supervision, reactivity changes, personnel access to control room, simulator training.

  4. Safety management of a complex R&D ground operating system

    Connors, J.; Mauer, R. A.

    1975-01-01

    Report discusses safety program implementation for large R&D operating system. Analytical techniques are defined and suggested as tools for identifying potential hazards and determining means to effectively control or eliminate hazards.

  5. Operational safety improvement in OPR 1000

    Jung, Y.-E.

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear power operating experience management might be an important factor for the operational safety improvement. KHNP's nuclear information management system, called KONIS receives, distributes and manages all nuclear information from domestic and foreign, especially operating experience. Ulchin 3 and 4, the first units of OPR 1000 series operates several organizations regarding management of operating experience e.g. specialist group program, various task forces, equipment specialist system for operator, etc. Peer review is another contribution for nuclear safety. (author)

  6. Airport Managers' Perspectives on Security and Safety Management Systems in Aviation Operations: A Multiple Case Study

    Brown, Willie L., Jr.

    Global terrorism continues to persist despite the great efforts of various countries to protect and safely secure their citizens. As airports form the entry and exit ports of a country, they are one of the most vulnerable locations to terror attacks. Managers of international airports constantly face similar challenges in developing and implementing airport security protocols. Consequently, the technological advances of today have brought both positive and negative impacts on security and terrorism of airports, which are mostly managed by the airport managers. The roles of the managers have greatly increased over the years due to technological advances. The developments in technology have had different roles in security, both in countering terrorism and, at the same time, increasing the communication methods of the terrorists. The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to investigate the perspectives of airport managers with regard to societal security and social interactions in the socio-technical systems of the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS). Through the data gained regarding managers' perception and experiences, the researcher hoped to enable the development of security measures and policies that are appropriate for airports as socio-technical systems. The researcher conducted interviews with airport managers to gather relevant data to fulfill the rationale of the study. Ten to twelve airport managers based in three commercial aviation airports in Maryland, United States participated in the study. The researcher used a qualitative thematic analysis procedure to analyze the data responses of participants in the interview sessions.

  7. Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong NGS

    Bong-Seob, Han [Korea Electric Power Corp., Wolson NPP no. 1 and 2 (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-12-01

    Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong nuclear power plant is described, including the following issues: site selection; plant history; operational goals; operational guidelines; reactor safety; safety training; plant maintenance; management of plant equipment lifetime; future tasks.

  8. Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong NGS

    Han Bong-Seob

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear safety management at the Wolsong nuclear power plant is described, including the following issues: site selection; plant history; operational goals; operational guidelines; reactor safety; safety training; plant maintenance; management of plant equipment lifetime; future tasks

  9. Measuring safety in aviation : empirical results about the relation between safety outcomes and safety management system processes, operational activities and demographic data

    Kaspers, Steffen; Karanikas, Nektarios; Piric, Selma; van Aalst, Robbert; de Boer, Robert Jan; Roelen, Alfred

    2017-01-01

    A literature review conducted as part of a research project named “Measuring Safety in Aviation – Developing Metrics for Safety Management Systems” revealed several challenges regarding the safety metrics used in aviation. One of the conclusions was that there is limited empirical evidence about the

  10. Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants. INSAG-13. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (Russian Edition)

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. Engineering issues have received close attention from the nuclear community over many years. However, it is only in the last decade or so that organizational and cultural issues have been identified as vital to achieving safe operation. INSAG's publication No. 4 has been widely recognized as a milestone in advancing thinking about safety culture in the nuclear community and more widely. The present report deals with the framework for safety management that is necessary in organizations in order to promote safety culture. It deals with the general principles underlying the management of operational safety in a systematic way and provides guidance on good practices. It also draws on the results of audits and reviews to highlight how shortfalls in safety management have led to incidents at nuclear power plants. In addition, several specific issues are raised which are particularly topical in view of organizational changes that are taking place in the nuclear industry in various countries. Advice is given on how safety can be managed during organizational change, how

  11. Safety Priorities and Underestimations in Recreational Scuba Diving Operations: A European Study Supporting the Implementation of New Risk Management Programmes

    Serena Lucrezi

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available Introduction: Scuba diving is an important marine tourism sector, but requires proper safety standards to reduce the risks and increase accessibility to its market. To achieve safety goals, safety awareness and positive safety attitudes in recreational scuba diving operations are essential. However, there is no published research exclusively focusing on scuba divers’ and dive centres’ perceptions toward safety. This study assessed safety perceptions in recreational scuba diving operations, with the aim to inform and enhance safety and risk management programmes within the scuba diving tourism industry.Materials and Methods: Two structured questionnaire surveys were prepared by the organisation Divers Alert Network and administered online to scuba diving operators in Italy and scuba divers in Europe, using a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. Questions in the survey included experience and safety offered at the dive centre; the buddy system; equipment and accessories for safe diving activities; safety issues in the certification of new scuba divers; incidents/accidents; and attitudes toward safety.Results: 91 scuba diving centres and 3,766 scuba divers participated in the study. Scuba divers gave importance to safety and the responsiveness of service providers, here represented by the dive centres. However, they underestimated the importance of a personal emergency action/assistance plan and, partly, of the buddy system alongside other safety procedures. Scuba divers agreed that some risks, such as those associated with running out of gas, deserve attention. Dive centres gave importance to aspects such as training and emergency action/assistance plans. However, they were limitedly involved in safety campaigning. Dive centres’ perceptions of safety in part aligned with those of scuba divers, with some exceptions.Conclusion: Greater responsibility is required in raising awareness and educating scuba divers, through participation in

  12. Safety Priorities and Underestimations in Recreational Scuba Diving Operations: A European Study Supporting the Implementation of New Risk Management Programmes

    Lucrezi, Serena; Egi, Salih Murat; Pieri, Massimo; Burman, Francois; Ozyigit, Tamer; Cialoni, Danilo; Thomas, Guy; Marroni, Alessandro; Saayman, Melville

    2018-01-01

    Introduction: Scuba diving is an important marine tourism sector, but requires proper safety standards to reduce the risks and increase accessibility to its market. To achieve safety goals, safety awareness and positive safety attitudes in recreational scuba diving operations are essential. However, there is no published research exclusively focusing on scuba divers’ and dive centres’ perceptions toward safety. This study assessed safety perceptions in recreational scuba diving operations, with the aim to inform and enhance safety and risk management programmes within the scuba diving tourism industry. Materials and Methods: Two structured questionnaire surveys were prepared by the organisation Divers Alert Network and administered online to scuba diving operators in Italy and scuba divers in Europe, using a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. Questions in the survey included experience and safety offered at the dive centre; the buddy system; equipment and accessories for safe diving activities; safety issues in the certification of new scuba divers; incidents/accidents; and attitudes toward safety. Results: 91 scuba diving centres and 3,766 scuba divers participated in the study. Scuba divers gave importance to safety and the responsiveness of service providers, here represented by the dive centres. However, they underestimated the importance of a personal emergency action/assistance plan and, partly, of the buddy system alongside other safety procedures. Scuba divers agreed that some risks, such as those associated with running out of gas, deserve attention. Dive centres gave importance to aspects such as training and emergency action/assistance plans. However, they were limitedly involved in safety campaigning. Dive centres’ perceptions of safety in part aligned with those of scuba divers, with some exceptions. Conclusion: Greater responsibility is required in raising awareness and educating scuba divers, through participation in prevention

  13. Safety Priorities and Underestimations in Recreational Scuba Diving Operations: A European Study Supporting the Implementation of New Risk Management Programmes.

    Lucrezi, Serena; Egi, Salih Murat; Pieri, Massimo; Burman, Francois; Ozyigit, Tamer; Cialoni, Danilo; Thomas, Guy; Marroni, Alessandro; Saayman, Melville

    2018-01-01

    Introduction: Scuba diving is an important marine tourism sector, but requires proper safety standards to reduce the risks and increase accessibility to its market. To achieve safety goals, safety awareness and positive safety attitudes in recreational scuba diving operations are essential. However, there is no published research exclusively focusing on scuba divers' and dive centres' perceptions toward safety. This study assessed safety perceptions in recreational scuba diving operations, with the aim to inform and enhance safety and risk management programmes within the scuba diving tourism industry. Materials and Methods: Two structured questionnaire surveys were prepared by the organisation Divers Alert Network and administered online to scuba diving operators in Italy and scuba divers in Europe, using a mixture of convenience and snowball sampling. Questions in the survey included experience and safety offered at the dive centre; the buddy system; equipment and accessories for safe diving activities; safety issues in the certification of new scuba divers; incidents/accidents; and attitudes toward safety. Results: 91 scuba diving centres and 3,766 scuba divers participated in the study. Scuba divers gave importance to safety and the responsiveness of service providers, here represented by the dive centres. However, they underestimated the importance of a personal emergency action/assistance plan and, partly, of the buddy system alongside other safety procedures. Scuba divers agreed that some risks, such as those associated with running out of gas, deserve attention. Dive centres gave importance to aspects such as training and emergency action/assistance plans. However, they were limitedly involved in safety campaigning. Dive centres' perceptions of safety in part aligned with those of scuba divers, with some exceptions. Conclusion: Greater responsibility is required in raising awareness and educating scuba divers, through participation in prevention campaigns

  14. Operational safety reliability research

    Hall, R.E.; Boccio, J.L.

    1986-01-01

    Operating reactor events such as the TMI accident and the Salem automatic-trip failures raised the concern that during a plant's operating lifetime the reliability of systems could degrade from the design level that was considered in the licensing process. To address this concern, NRC is sponsoring the Operational Safety Reliability Research project. The objectives of this project are to identify the essential tasks of a reliability program and to evaluate the effectiveness and attributes of such a reliability program applicable to maintaining an acceptable level of safety during the operating lifetime at the plant

  15. Operational and environmental safety

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The responsibility of the DOE Office of Operational and Environmental Safety is to assure that DOE-controlled activities are conducted in a manner that will minimize risks to the public and employees and will provide protection for property and the environment. The program supports the various energy technologies by identifying and resolving safety problems; developing and issuing safety policies, standards, and criteria; assuring compliance with DOE, Federal, and state safety regulations; and establishing procedures for reporting and investigating accidents in DOE operations. Guidelines for the radiation protection of personnel; radiation monitoring at nuclear facilities; an assessment of criticality accidents by fault tree analysis; and the preparation of environmental, safety, and health standards applicable to geothermal energy development are discussed

  16. Radiation Protection and Radioactive Waste Management in the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations to the regulatory body, focused on the operational aspects of radiation protection and radioactive waste management in nuclear power plants, and on how to ensure the fulfilment of the requirements established in the relevant Safety Requirements publications. It will also be useful for senior managers in licensee or contractor organizations who are responsible for establishing and managing programmes for radiation protection and for the management of radioactive waste. This Safety Guide gives general recommendations for the development of radiation protection programmes at nuclear power plants. The issues are then elaborated by defining the main elements of a radiation protection programme. Particular attention is paid to area classification, workplace monitoring and supervision, application of the principle of optimization of protection (also termed the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle), and facilities and equipment. This Safety Guide covers all the safety related aspects of a programme for the management of radioactive waste at a nuclear power plant. Emphasis is placed on the minimization of waste in terms of both activity and volume. The various steps in predisposal waste management are covered, namely processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Releases of effluents, the application of authorized limits and reference levels are discussed, together with the main elements of an environmental monitoring programme

  17. Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Automated Task Order Management System (ATOMS) Operation Manual

    Wallace, Shawn; Fikes, Lou A.

    2016-01-01

    This document describes operational aspects of the ATOMS system. The information provided is limited to the functionality provided by ATOMS and does not include information provided in the contractor's proprietary financial and task management system.

  18. Health, safety, and environmental management system operation in contracting companies: A case study.

    Nassiri, Parvin; Yarahmadi, Rasoul; Gholami, Pari Shafaei; Hamidi, Abdolamir; Mirkazemi, Roksana

    2016-05-03

    Systematic and cooperative interactions among parent industry and contractors are necessary for a successful health, safety, and environmental management system (HSE-MS). This study was conducted to evaluate the HSE-MS performance in contracting companies in one of the petrochemical industries in Iran during 2013. Managers of parent and contracting companies participated in this study. The data collection forms included 7 elements of an integrated HSE-MS (leadership and commitment; policy and strategic objectives; organization, resources, and documentation; evaluation and risk management; planning; implementation and monitoring; auditing and reviewing). The results showed that mean percentage of the total scores in seven elements of HSE-MS was 85.7% and 87.0% based on self-report and report of parent company, respectively. In conclusion, this study showed that HSE-MS was desirably functioning; however, improvement to ensure health and safety of workers is still required.

  19. Risk informed approach and its application in Daya Bay NPP operation safety management

    He Yu; Zhang Jinlong; Bao Yukun

    2004-01-01

    The paper presents a systematic risk assessment approach based on probabilistic theory, and discusses its significance and application process in safety management. Risk informed approach that uses deterministic engineering principles and probabilistic methods is the appropriate approach to decision making at nuclear power plants. The paper also studies an actual case taken place at Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station using PSA approach to equipment maintenance. (authors)

  20. Operational safety of nuclear power plants

    Tanguy, P.

    1987-01-01

    The operational safety of nuclear power plants has become an important safety issue since the Chernobyl accident. A description is given of the various aspects of operational safety, including the importance of human factors, responsibility, the role and training of the operator, the operator-machine interface, commissioning and operating procedures, experience feedback, and maintenance. The lessons to be learnt from Chernobyl are considered with respect to operator errors and the management of severe accidents. Training of personnel, operating experience feedback, actions to be taken in case of severe accidents, and international cooperation in the field of operational safety, are also discussed. (U.K.)

  1. Aviation’s Normal Operations Safety Audit: a safety management and educational tool for health care? Results of a small-scale trial

    Bennett SA

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available Simon A Bennett Civil Safety and Security Unit, School of Business, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK Background: A National Health Service (NHS contingent liability for medical error claims of over £26 billion. Objectives: To evaluate the safety management and educational benefits of adapting aviation’s Normal Operations Safety Audit (NOSA to health care. Methods: In vivo research, a NOSA was performed by medical students at an English NHS Trust. After receiving training from the author, the students spent 6 days gathering data under his supervision. Results: The data revealed a threat-rich environment, where errors – some consequential – were made (359 threats and 86 errors were recorded over 2 weeks. The students claimed that the exercise improved their observational, investigative, communication, teamworking and other nontechnical skills. Conclusion: NOSA is potentially an effective safety management and educational tool for health care. It is suggested that 1 the UK General Medical Council mandates that all medical students perform a NOSA in fulfillment of their degree; 2 the participating NHS Trusts be encouraged to act on students’ findings; and 3 the UK Department of Health adopts NOSA as a cornerstone risk assessment and management tool. Keywords: aviation, safety audit, health care, management benefits, educational benefits

  2. Study of industry safety management

    Park, Pil Su

    1987-06-01

    This book deals with general remarks, industrial accidents, statistics of industrial accidents, unsafe actions, making machinery and facilities safe, safe activities, having working environment safe, survey of industrial accidents and analysis of causes, system of safety management and operations, safety management planning, safety education, human engineering such as human-machines system, system safety, and costs of disaster losses. It lastly adds individual protective equipment and working clothes including protect equipment for eyes, face, hands, arms and feet.

  3. 46th Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2015). Key topic / Enhanced safety and operation excellence / Sustainable reactor operation management - safe, efficient, valuable

    Fischer, Erwin

    2015-01-01

    Summary report on the following Topical Session of the 46 th Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2015) held in Berlin, 5 to 7 May 2015: - Sustainable Reactor Operation Management - Safe, Efficient, Valuable (Erwin Fischer) The other Sessions of the Key Topics - ''Outstanding Know-How and Sustainable Innovations'', - ''Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence'' and - ''Decommissioning Experience and Waste Management Solutions'' have been covered in atw 7 (2015) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  4. 46{sup th} Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2015). Key topic / Enhanced safety and operation excellence / Sustainable reactor operation management - safe, efficient, valuable

    Fischer, Erwin [E.ON Kernkraft GmbH, Global Unit Next Generation, Hannover (Germany)

    2015-08-15

    Summary report on the following Topical Session of the 46{sup th} Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2015) held in Berlin, 5 to 7 May 2015: - Sustainable Reactor Operation Management - Safe, Efficient, Valuable (Erwin Fischer) The other Sessions of the Key Topics - ''Outstanding Know-How and Sustainable Innovations'', - ''Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence'' and - ''Decommissioning Experience and Waste Management Solutions'' have been covered in atw 7 (2015) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  5. Core management, operational limits and conditions and safety aspects of the Australian High Flux Reactor (HIFAR)

    Town, S.L.

    1997-01-01

    HIFAR is a DIDO class reactor which commenced routine operation at approximately 10 MW in 1960. It is principally used for production of medical radio-isotopes, scientific research using neutron scattering facilities and irradiation of silicon ingots for the electronics industry. A detailed description of the core, including fuel types, is presented. Details are given of the current fuel management program HIFUEL and the experimental measurements associated with reactor physics analysis of HIFAR are discussed. (author)

  6. Operation safety of complex industrial systems

    Zwingelstein, G.

    1999-01-01

    Zero fault or zero risk is an unreachable goal in industrial activities like nuclear activities. However, methods and techniques exist to reduce the risks to the lowest possible and acceptable level. The operation safety consists in the recognition, evaluation, prediction, measurement and mastery of technological and human faults. This paper analyses each of these points successively: 1 - evolution of operation safety; 2 - definitions and basic concepts: failure, missions and functions of a system and of its components, basic concepts and operation safety; 3 - forecasting analysis of operation safety: reliability data, data-banks, precautions for the use of experience feedback data; realization of an operation safety study: management of operation safety, quality assurance, critical review and audit of operation safety studies; 6 - conclusions. (J.S.)

  7. Crew resource management: using aviation techniques to improve operating room safety.

    Ricci, Michael A; Brumsted, John R

    2012-04-01

    Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine report estimating nearly 100,000 deaths per year from medical errors, hospitals and physicians have a renewed focus upon error reduction. We implemented a surgical crew resource management (CRM) program for all operating room (OR) personnel. In our academic medical center, 19,000 procedures per year are performed in 27 operating rooms. Mandatory CRM training was implemented for all peri-operative personnel. Aviation techniques introduced included a pre-operative checklist and brief, post-operative debrief, read and initial files, and various other aviation-based techniques. Compliance with conduct of the brief/debrief was monitored as well as wrong-site surgeries and retained foreign body events. The malpractice insurance database for claims was also queried for the period prior to and after training. Initial training was accomplished for 517 people, including all anesthesiologists, surgeons, nurses, technicians, and OR assistants. Pre-operative briefing increased from 6.7 to 99% within 4 mo. Wrong site surgeries and retained foreign bodies decreased from a high of seven in 2007 to none in 2008, but, after 14 mo without additional training, these rose to five in 2009. Malpractice expenses (payouts and legal fees) totaled $793,000 (2003-2007), but have been zero since 2008. CRM training and implementation had an impact on reducing the incidence of wrong site surgery and retained foreign bodies in our operating rooms. However, constant reinforcement and refresher training is necessary for sustained results. Though no one technique can prevent all errors, CRM can effect culture change, producing a safer environment.

  8. Operations management for construction

    March, Chris

    2009-01-01

    Students studying construction management and related subjects need to have a broad understanding of the major aspects of controlling the building processes. Operations Management for Construction is one of three textbooks (Business Organisation, Operations Management and Finance Control) written to systematically cover the field. Focusing on construction sites and operations which are challenging to run, Chris March explores issues such as the setting up of the site, the deciding of the methodology of construction, and the sequence of work and resourcing. As changing and increasing regulations affect the way sites are managed, he also considers the issues and methods of successful administering, safety, quality and environment. Finally, the contractor's responsibility to the environment, including relationships with third parties, selection of materials, waste management and sustainability is discussed. Chris March has a wealth of practical experience in the construction industry, as well as considerable exp...

  9. Dam safety operating guidelines

    Elsayed, E.; Leung, T.; Kirkham, A.; Lum, D.

    1990-01-01

    As part of Ontario Hydro's dam structure assessment program, the hydraulic design review of several river systems has revealed that many existing dam sites, under current operating procedures, would not have sufficient discharge capacity to pass the Inflow Design Flood (IDF) without compromising the integrity of the associated structures. Typical mitigative measures usually considered in dealing with these dam sites include structural alterations, emergency action plans and/or special operating procedures designed for extreme floods. A pilot study was carried out for the Madawaska River system in eastern Ontario, which has seven Ontario Hydro dam sites in series, to develop and evaluate the effectiveness of the Dam Safety Operating Guidelines (DSOG). The DSOG consist of two components: the flood routing schedules and the minimum discharge schedules, the former of which would apply in the case of severe spring flood conditions when the maximum observed snowpack water content and the forecast rainfall depth exceed threshold values. The flood routing schedules would identify to the operator the optimal timing and/or extent of utilizing the discharge facilities at each dam site to minimize the potential for dam failures cased by overtopping anywhere in the system. It was found that the DSOG reduced the number of structures overtopped during probable maximum flood from thirteen to four, while the number of structures that could fail would be reduced from seven to two. 8 refs., 4 figs., 3 tabs

  10. Operational safety at the FFTF

    Baird, Q.L.; Hagan, J.W.; Seeman, S.E.; Baker, S.M.

    1981-02-01

    An extensive operational nuclear safety program has been an integral part of the design, startup, and initial operating phases of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). During the design and construction of the facility, a program of independent safety overviews and analyses assured the provision of responsible safety margins within the plant, protective systems, and engineered safety features for protection of the public, operating staff, and the facility. The program is continuing through surveillance of operations to verify continued adherence to the established operating envelope and for timely identification of any trends potentially adverse to those margins. Experience from operation of FFTF is being utilized in the development of enhanced operational nuclear safety aids for application in follow-on breeder reactor power systems. The commendable plant and personnel safety experiences of FFTF through its startup and ascension to full power demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the FFTF operational nuclear safety program

  11. Operating plant safety analysis needs

    Young, M.Y.; Love, D.S.

    1992-01-01

    The primary objective for nuclear power station owners is to operate and manage their plants safely. However, there is also a need to provide economical electric power, which requires that the unit be operated as efficiently as possible, consistent with the safety requirements. The objectives cited above can be achieved through the identification and use of available margins inherent in the plant design. As a result of conservative licensing and analytical approaches taken in the past, many of these margins may be found in the safety analysis limits within which plants currently operate. Improvements in the accuracy of the safety analysis, and a more realistic treatment of plant initial and boundary conditions, can make this margin available for a variety of uses which enhance plant performance, help to reduce O and M costs, and may help to extend licensed operation. Opportunities for improvement exist in several areas in the accident analysis normally performed for Chapter 15 of the FSAR. For example, recent modifications to the ECCS rule, 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K, allow use of margins previously unavailable in the analysis of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). To take advantage of this regulatory change, new methods are being developed to analyze both the large and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As this margin is used, enhancements in the analysis of other transients will become necessary. The paper discusses accident analysis methods, future development needs, and analysis margin utilization in specific accident scenarios

  12. Life management and operational experience feedback - tools to enhance safety and reliability of the NPP

    Mach, P.

    1997-01-01

    Preparation has started of the Temelin power plant centralized equipment database. Principles of reliability centered maintenance are studied, and use of these activities will be made in the Plant Ageing Management Programme. The aims of the Programme are as follows: selection of important components subject to ageing, data collection, determination of dominant stressors, development, selection and validation of ageing evaluation methods, setup of experience feedback, determination of responsibilities, methodologies and strategy, elaboration of programme procedures and documentation, and maintenance of programme flexibility. Pilot studies of component ageing are under way: for the reactor pressure vessel, steam generator, pressurizer, piping, ECCS and cables. The organizational structure of the Operational Experience Feedback system is described, as are the responsibility of staff and sources of information. (M.D.)

  13. Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau

    Paciga, J [New Brunswick Power, Point Lepreau NGS, PQ (Canada)

    1997-12-01

    Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau nuclear power plant is described, including technical issues (station aging, definition of the safe operating envelope, design configuration management, code validation, safety analysis and engineering standards); regulatory issues (action items, probabilistic safety assessment, event investigation, periodic safety review, prioritization of regulatory issues, cost benefit assessment); human performance issues (goals and measures, expectations and accountability, supervisory training, safety culture, configuration management, quality of operations and maintenance).

  14. Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau

    Paciga, J.

    1997-01-01

    Managing nuclear safety at Point Lepreau nuclear power plant is described, including technical issues (station aging, definition of the safe operating envelope, design configuration management, code validation, safety analysis and engineering standards); regulatory issues (action items, probabilistic safety assessment, event investigation, periodic safety review, prioritization of regulatory issues, cost benefit assessment); human performance issues (goals and measures, expectations and accountability, supervisory training, safety culture, configuration management, quality of operations and maintenance)

  15. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  16. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  17. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  18. Items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures in Japan (concerning the examination, design and operation management) (excluding the items to be reflected to the standards)

    1980-10-01

    In connection with the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident in March, 1979, in the United States, in order to introduce the lessons from it in the nuclear power safety regulations in Japan, 52 items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures were chosen by the Nuclear Safety Commission. Of these, 16 items were examined by the Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety. It was decided that these results would be introduced in the nuclear safety regulations, by the Nuclear Safety Commission. The following 16 items are described. For the examination, four items concerning the automatic operation of safety systems and others; for the design, five items concerning a small rupture accident, the monitoring of the state of primary coolant, control room layout and others; for the operation management, seven items concerning the inspection at the time of repair, the prevention of faulty handlings by operators and others.

  19. Items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures in Japan (concerning the examination, design and operation management) (excluding the items to be reflected to the standards)

    1980-01-01

    In connection with the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident in March, 1979, in the United States, in order to introduce the lessons from it in the nuclear power safety regulations in Japan, 52 items to be reflected to the nuclear power safety measures were chosen by the Nuclear Safety Commission. Of these, 16 items were examined by the Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety. It was decided that these results would be introduced in the nuclear safety regulations, by the Nuclear Safety Commission. The following 16 items are described. For the examination, four items concerning the automatic operation of safety systems and others; for the design, five items concerning a small rupture accident, the monitoring of the state of primary coolant, control room layout and others; for the operation management, seven items concerning the inspection at the time of repair, the prevention of faulty handlings by operators and others. (J.P.N.)

  20. Track 6: safety and risk management. Plant operational risk management. Plant Configuration Risk Assessment Methodology Development for Periodic Maintenance

    Yang, Huichang; Chung, Chang Hyun; Sung, Key Yong

    2001-01-01

    As the operation experiences of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Korea accumulate and NPP safety functions become enhanced, the role of stable and optimal NPP operation within acceptable safety criteria becomes important at present. To accomplish the goal of safe and optimal operation, maintenance and its related activities should be regarded as the issues of most concern. Studies of methodologies for maintenance improvement and optimization have focused on system performance rather than on the hardware itself. From this point of view, the probabilistic methods are most useful. In terms of risk including core damage frequency and unavailability, the cause that might impact plant safety during normal maintenance activities can be identified and evaluated effectively. The results from these probabilistic analyses can provide insightful information for the reallocation of risk-contributing maintenance activity. This information can be utilized in a way that separates the significant risk-contributing maintenance activities from each other unless they are timely related. In Korea, the risk-monitoring program for operating NPPs is under development and will be implemented in 2003. To accomplish the risk-monitoring program objectives, suitable risk evaluation methods should be developed before the implementation of the risk-monitoring program. The plant configuration assessment methodology was developed for these reasons, and this method is to incorporate the field experiences into the risk calculation exactly within the limit of probabilistic methods. During normal plant operation, the plant operational risk changes frequently depending on the status of the plant system and the arrangement of the components. Specific plant systems or components are typically removed from service because of random equipment failure, planned preventive/predictive maintenance, corrective maintenance, surveillance testing, and operational bypass activities, and such events usually impact the

  1. Systems Engineering Management Plan for Tank Farm Restoration and Safety Operations, Project W-314

    MCGREW, D.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Systems Engineering Management Plan for Project W-314 has been prepared within the guidelines of HNF-SD-WM-SEMP-002, TWRS Systems Engineering Management Plan. The activities within this SEMP have been tailored, in accordance with the TWRS SEMP and DOE Order 430.1, Life Cycle Asset Management, to meet the needs of the project

  2. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    2017-01-01

    his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  3. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  4. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  5. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  6. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

  7. Quantitative Safety Impact of Severe Accident Management Systems for EU-APR during Low Power Shutdown Operation

    Lee, Keunsung; Hwang, Do Hun; Chang, Hyun-bin

    2016-01-01

    In order to enlarge and to diversify the export market of APR1400, the EU-APR design was developed based on the APR1400 design to comply with the latest version of the European Utility Requirements (EUR) revision D. The EU-APR design has the distinguished and advanced severe accident management systems taken from the APR1400 to obtain a containment integrity for the beyond design basis accident, such as the Passive Ex-vessel retaining and Cooling System (PECS), the Severe Accident Containment Spray System (SACSS) and the Containment Filtered Vent System (CFVS). The risk associated with the nuclear power plant can be identified through the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). In the EUR chapter 1 and 17 of volume 2, the Criteria for Limited Impact (CLI) should be applied to the Level 2 PSA as a risk metrics. The fraction of exceeding CLI for the EU-APR during LPSD operation was calculated as 4.52% of the CDF under the condition that all severe accident management systems are credited. The PECS, SACSS and CFVS are considered as the severe accident management system which is EU-APR dedicated system. The exemption of each system leads to increase the fraction of exceeding CLI to 54.18%, 89.74% and 21.32% respectively. In case if all these systems are unavailable, the fraction of exceeding CLI is increased to 100%. The most effective system is the SACSS that the system reduces containment pressure and temperature

  8. Quantitative Safety Impact of Severe Accident Management Systems for EU-APR during Low Power Shutdown Operation

    Lee, Keunsung; Hwang, Do Hun [KHNP CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Chang, Hyun-bin [Future and Challenge Technology Co., Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In order to enlarge and to diversify the export market of APR1400, the EU-APR design was developed based on the APR1400 design to comply with the latest version of the European Utility Requirements (EUR) revision D. The EU-APR design has the distinguished and advanced severe accident management systems taken from the APR1400 to obtain a containment integrity for the beyond design basis accident, such as the Passive Ex-vessel retaining and Cooling System (PECS), the Severe Accident Containment Spray System (SACSS) and the Containment Filtered Vent System (CFVS). The risk associated with the nuclear power plant can be identified through the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). In the EUR chapter 1 and 17 of volume 2, the Criteria for Limited Impact (CLI) should be applied to the Level 2 PSA as a risk metrics. The fraction of exceeding CLI for the EU-APR during LPSD operation was calculated as 4.52% of the CDF under the condition that all severe accident management systems are credited. The PECS, SACSS and CFVS are considered as the severe accident management system which is EU-APR dedicated system. The exemption of each system leads to increase the fraction of exceeding CLI to 54.18%, 89.74% and 21.32% respectively. In case if all these systems are unavailable, the fraction of exceeding CLI is increased to 100%. The most effective system is the SACSS that the system reduces containment pressure and temperature.

  9. CloudSat Safety Operations at Vandenberg AFB

    Greenberg, Steve

    2006-01-01

    CloudSat safety operations at Vendenberg AFB is given. The topics include: 1) CloudSat Project Overview; 2) Vandenberg Ground Operations; 3) Delta II Launch Vehicle; 4) The A-Train; 5) System Safety Management; 6) CALIPSO Hazards Assessment; 7) CALIPSO Supplemental Safeguards; 8) Joint System Safety Operations; 9) Extended Stand-down; 10) Launch Delay Safety Concerns; and 11) Lessons Learned.

  10. The enhancement of Ignalina NPP in design and operational safety

    Negrivoda, G.

    1999-01-01

    Enhancement of Ignalina NPP design include: core design improvements; fuel channel integrity (multiple pressure tube rupture); improvements of shutdown systems; improvements of instrumentation and control devices; containment strength and tightness; design basis accident analysis; improvements of safety and support systems; seismic safety enhancement; Year 2000 project; cracks in pipes. Enhancement of operational safety includes: quality assurance; configuration management; safety management and safety culture; emergency operating procedures; training and full scope simulator; in-service inspection; fire protection and ageing monitoring and management

  11. Risk management and safety

    Niehaus, F.; Novegno, A.

    1985-01-01

    Risk assessment, including probabilistic analyses, has made great progress over the past decade. In spite of the inherent uncertainties it has now become possible to utilize methods and results for decision making at various levels. This paper will, therefore, review risk management in industrial installations, risk management for energy safety policy and prospects of risk management in highly industrialized areas. (orig.) [de

  12. ITER safety and operational scenario

    Shimomura, Y.; Saji, G.

    1998-01-01

    The safety and environmental characteristics of ITER and its operational scenario are described. Fusion has built-in safety characteristics without depending on layers of safety protection systems. Safety considerations are integrated in the design by making use of the intrinsic safety characteristics of fusion adequate to the moderate hazard inventories. In addition to this, a systematic nuclear safety approach has been applied to the design of ITER. The safety assessment of the design shows how ITER will safely accommodate uncertainties, flexibility of plasma operations, and experimental components, which is fundamental in ITER, the first experimental fusion reactor. The operation of ITER will progress step by step from hydrogen plasma operation with low plasma current, low magnetic field, short pulse and low duty factor without fusion power to deuterium-tritium plasma operation with full plasma current, full magnetic field, long pulse and high duty factor with full fusion power. In each step, characteristics of plasma and optimization of plasma operation will be studied which will significantly reduce uncertainties and frequency/severity of plasma transient events in the next step. This approach enhances reliability of ITER operation. (orig.)

  13. Operational safety - the IAEA response

    Rosen, M.

    1984-01-01

    Nuclear safety is an international issue. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency is growing because it offers a centre for contact and exchange between East and West, North and South. New initiatives are under way to intensify international co-operative safety efforts through exchange of information on abnormal events at nuclear power plants, and through greater sharing of safety research results. Emergency preparedness also lends itself to international co-operation. A report has been prepared on the need for establishing mutual emergency assistance. By analysing possible constraints to bilateral or multinational efforts in advance, a basis for agreement at the time of an emergency is being worked out. Safety standards have been developed in several areas. The NUSS Codes and Guides, now almost complete, make available to countries starting a nuclear power programme a coherent set of nuclear safety standards. A revised set of Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection has been issued in 1982. (author)

  14. Managing electrical safety

    Wiggins, James H, Jr

    2001-01-01

    Managing Electrical Safety provides an overview of electric basics, hazards, and established standards that enables you to understand the hazards you are likely to encounter in your workplace. Focusing on typical industrial environments-which utilize voltages much higher than household or office circuits-the author identifies the eight key components of an electrical safety program and examines each using a model safety management process. You'll learn how to identify electrical hazards, how to prescribe necessary electrical Personal Protective Equipment, how to ensure that equipment is de-ene

  15. Reactor operation safety information document

    1990-01-01

    The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

  16. Operational Safety Performance Indicators and Balanced Scorecard in HANARO

    Wu, Jong-Sup; Jung, Hoan-Sung; Ahn, Guk-Hoon; Lee, Kye-Hong; Lim, In-Cheol; Kim, Hark-Rho

    2007-01-01

    Research reactors need an extensive basis for ensuring their safety. The importance of a safety management in nuclear facilities and activities has been emphasized. The safety activities in HANARO have been continuously conducted to enhance its safe operation. Last year, HANARO prepared two indicator sets to measure and assess the safety status of the reactor's operation and utilization. One is Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) and the other is Balanced Scorecard (BSC). Through reviewing these indicators, we can obtain the following information; - Plant safety status - Safety parameter trends - Safety information, for example, reactor operation status and radiation safety HANARO will continuously pursue the trends of SPI and BSC

  17. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose

  18. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jong Sup; Han, Gee Yang; Kim, Ik Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementation have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e Learning program for a safety education purpose.

  19. Management of safety culture

    Kavsek, D.

    2004-01-01

    The strengthening of safety culture in an organization has become an increasingly important issue for nuclear industry. A high level of safety performance is essential for business success in intensely competitive global environment. This presentation offers a discussion of some principles and activities used in enhancing safety performance and appropriate safety behaviour at the Krsko NPP. Over the years a number of events have occurred in nuclear industry that have involved problems in human performance. A review of these and other significant events has identified recurring weaknesses in plant safety culture and policy. Focusing attention on the strengthening of relevant processes can help plants avoid similar undesirable events. The policy of the Krsko NPP is that all employees concerned shall constantly be alert to opportunities to reduce risks to the lowest practicable level and to achieve excellence in plant safety. The most important objective is to protect individuals, society and the environment by establishing and maintaining an effective defense against radiological hazard in the nuclear power plant. It is achieved through the use of reliable structures, components, systems, and procedures, as well as plant personnel committed to a strong safety culture. The elements of safety culture include both organizational and individual aspects. Elements commonly included at the organizational level are senior management commitment to safety, organizational effectiveness, effective communication, organizational learning, and a culture that encourages identification and resolution of safety issues. Elements identified at the individual level include personal accountability, a questioning attitude, communication, procedural adherence, etc.(author)

  20. Enhancing Safety at Airline Operations Control Centre

    Lukáš Řasa

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available In recent years a new term of Safety Management System (SMS has been introduced into aviation legislation. This system is being adopted by airline operators. One of the groundbased actors of everyday operations is Operations Control Centre (OCC. The goal of this article has been to identify and assess risks and dangers which occur at OCC and create a template for OCC implementation into SMS.

  1. New safety management method at Cominak

    Kallam, A.

    1993-01-01

    Operations manager Mr. Kallam presents the new safety management system, its implementation and results in this underground uranium mine in northern Niger, where the rate of accidents increased dangerously during the eighties. 3 figs., 3 photos

  2. Waste management safety

    Boehm, H.

    1983-01-01

    All studies carried out by competent authors of the safety of a waste management concept on the basis of reprocessing of the spent fuel elements and storage in the deep underground of the radioactive waste show that only a minor technical risk is involved in this step. This also holds true when evaluating the accidents which have occurred in waste management facilities. To explain the risk, first the completely different safety aspects of nuclear power plants, reprocessing plants and repositories are outlined together with the safety related characteristics of these plants. Also this comparison indicates that the risk of waste management facilities is considerably lower than the, already very small, risk of nuclear power plants. For the final storage of waste from reprocessing and for the direct storage of fuel elements, the results of safety analyses show that the radiological exposure following an accident with radioactivity releases, even under conservative assumptions, is considerably below the natural radiation exposure. The very small danger to the environment arising from waste management by reprocessing clearly indicates that aspects of technical safety alone will hardly be a major criterion for the decision in favor of one or the other waste management approach. (orig.) [de

  3. Safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. INSAG-14. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

    2014-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. The present report by INSAG deals with a general approach to the safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. It responds to the concerns about maintaining adequate safety levels at ageing plants, even beyond their design lifetimes. Maintaining adequate safety levels implies first and foremost stringent control of equipment ageing, consistent with the design safety bases of the plants. However, as stated in the 75-INSAG-3 report, 'Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants', nuclear safety requires a continuing quest for excellence; this implies enhancinuest for excellence; this implies enhancing the safety levels of operating nuclear power plants as far as reasonably practicable, with due account taken of experience and advancement in knowledge. Moreover, in view of the present situation of the nuclear industry, it may become difficult to maintain adequate competences in many countries with nuclear power programmes. These topics are considered in this latest INSAG report and released to a wider audience

  4. Safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. INSAG-14. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. The present report by INSAG deals with a general approach to the safe management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants. It responds to the concerns about maintaining adequate safety levels at ageing plants, even beyond their design lifetimes. Maintaining adequate safety levels implies first and foremost stringent control of equipment ageing, consistent with the design safety bases of the plants. However, as stated in the 75-INSAG-3 report, 'Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants', nuclear safety requires a continuing quest for excellence; this implies enhancing the safety levels of operating nuclear power plants as far as reasonably practicable, with due account taken of experience and advancement in knowledge. Moreover, in view of the present situation of the nuclear industry, it may become difficult to maintain adequate competences in many countries with nuclear power programmes. These topics are considered in this latest INSAG report and released to a wider audience

  5. Operating procedures and safety culture

    Carnino, A.

    1993-01-01

    The development of new technologies in recent years has led to a tremendous increase in the information to be mastered by operators in industrial processes. The information at operators disposal both in routine situations and accidental ones needs to be well prepared and organized to ensure reliability and safety. The man-machine interface should give operators all the necessary and clear indications on the process status and evolution so that the operators can operate the installation through adequate procedures. Procedures represent the real interface and mode of action of the operators on the machine, and they are of prime importance. Although they are by essence quite different, the routine, accident, and emergency procedures have in common one attribute: They all require a good safety culture both in their development and their implementation. From the definition given by the members of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), open-quotes Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance,close quotes one can see that two aspects are embedded, a collective attitude that in fact is reflected in the managerial framework and an individual one that is linked to personnel behavior and work practices

  6. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO Safety Management

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which the management system is based. The IAEA INSAG(International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of the safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safety. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30 MW multi-purpose research reactor and achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation like the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops, the development of safety culture indicators, the survey on the attitude of safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of an e-Learning program for safety education. (author)

  7. Facilities management and industrial safety

    2003-06-01

    This book lists occupation safety and health acts with purpose, definition and management system of safety and health, enforcement ordinance of occupation safety and health acts and enforcement regulations such as general rules, safety and health cover, system of management on safety and health, regulation of management on safety and health, regulations of harmfulness and protection of danger, heath management for workers, supervisor and command and inspection of machine and equipment.

  8. Effect of a manager training and certification program on food safety and hygiene in food service operations.

    Kassa, Hailu; Silverman, Gary S; Baroudi, Karim

    2010-05-06

    Food safety is an important public health issue in the U.S. Eating at restaurants and other food service facilities increasingly has been associated with food borne disease outbreaks. Food safety training and certification of food mangers has been used as a method for reducing food safety violations at food service facilities. However, the literature is inconclusive about the effectiveness of such training programs for improving food safety and protecting consumer health. The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of food manger training on reducing food safety violations. We examined food inspection reports from the Toledo/Lucas County Health Department (Ohio) from March 2005 through February 2006 and compared food hygiene violations between food service facilities with certified and without certified food managers. We also examined the impact on food safety of a food service facility being part of a larger group of facilities.Restaurants with trained and certified food managers had significantly fewer critical food safety violations but more non-critical violations than restaurants without certified personnel. Institutional food service facilities had significantly fewer violations than restaurants, and the number of violations did not differ as a function of certification. Similarly, restaurants with many outlets had significantly fewer violations than restaurants with fewer outlets, and training was not associated with lower numbers of violations from restaurants with many outlets. The value of having certified personnel was only observed in independent restaurants and those with few branches. This information may be useful in indicating where food safety problems are most likely to occur. Furthermore, we recommend that those characteristics of institutional and chain restaurants that result in fewer violations should be identified in future research, and efforts made to apply this knowledge at the level of individual restaurants.

  9. Space station operations management

    Cannon, Kathleen V.

    1989-01-01

    Space Station Freedom operations management concepts must be responsive to the unique challenges presented by the permanently manned international laboratory. Space Station Freedom will be assembled over a three year period where the operational environment will change as significant capability plateaus are reached. First Element Launch, Man-Tended Capability, and Permanent Manned Capability, represent milestones in operational capability that is increasing toward mature operations capability. Operations management concepts are being developed to accomodate the varying operational capabilities during assembly, as well as the mature operational environment. This paper describes operations management concepts designed to accomodate the uniqueness of Space Station Freedoom, utilizing tools and processes that seek to control operations costs.

  10. Ranking Operations Management conferences

    Steenhuis, H.J.; de Bruijn, E.J.; Gupta, Sushil; Laptaned, U

    2007-01-01

    Several publications have appeared in the field of Operations Management which rank Operations Management related journals. Several ranking systems exist for journals based on , for example, perceived relevance and quality, citation, and author affiliation. Many academics also publish at conferences

  11. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo

    2008-01-01

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose

  12. Implementation of the safety culture for HANARO safety management

    Wu, Jongsup; Han, Geeyang; Kim, Iksoo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2008-11-15

    Safety is the fundamental principal upon which a management system is based. The IAEA INSAG (International Nuclear Safety Group) states the general aims of a safety management system. One of which is to foster and support a strong safety culture through the development and reinforcement of good safety attitudes and behavior in individuals and teams, so as to allow them to carry out their tasks safely. The safety culture activities have been implemented and the importance of a safety management in nuclear activities for a reactor application and utilization has also been emphasized for more than 10 years in HANARO which is a 30MW multi-purpose research reactor that achieved its first criticality in February 1995. The safety culture activities and implementations have been conducted continuously to enhance its safe operation such as the seminars and lectures related to safety matters, participation in international workshops and the development of safety culture indicators, a survey on the attitude of HANARO staff toward the safety culture, the development of operational safety performance indicators (SPIs), the preparation of a safety text book and the development of a e-learning program for a safety education purpose.

  13. Management systems in production operations

    Walters, K.B.; Henderson, G.

    1993-01-01

    The Cullen Enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster in the U.K. North Sea recommended that an operator should formally present it's company Management System and demonstrate how safety is achieved throughout the life cycle of a platform, from design through operation to abandonment. Brunei Shell Petroleum has prepared a corporate level Safety Management System. As part of Safety Case work, the corporate system is being extended to include the development of specific Management Systems with particular emphasis on offshore production operations involving integrated oil and gas facilities. This paper will describe the development of Management Systems, which includes an intensive Business Process Analysis and will comment upon it's applicability and relationship to ISO 9000. The paper will further describe the applicability and benefits of Management Systems and offer guidance on required effort. The paper will conclude that development of structured Management Systems for safety critical business processes is worthwhile but prioritization of effort will be necessary. As such the full adoption of Management Systems will be directional in nature

  14. The Patient Safety Attitudes among the Operating Room Personnel

    Cherdsak Iramaneerat

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Background: The first step in cultivating the culture of safety in the operating room is the assessment of safety culture among operating room personnel. Objective: To assess the patient safety culture of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Faculty of Medicine Siriraj Hospital, and compare attitudes among different groups of personnel, and compare them with the international standards. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of safety attitudes among 396 operating room personnel, using a short form of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ. The SAQ employed 30 items to assess safety culture in six dimensions: teamwork climate, safety climate, stress recognition, perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction. The subscore of each dimension was calculated and converted to a scale score with a full score of 100, where higher scores indicated better safety attitudes. Results: The response rate was 66.4%. The overall safety culture score of the operating room personnel was 65.02, higher than an international average (61.80. Operating room personnel at Siriraj Hospital had safety attitudes in teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition lower than the international average, but had safety attitudes in the perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction higher than the international average. Conclusion: The safety culture attitudes of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Siriraj Hospital were comparable to international standards. The safety dimensions that Siriraj Hospital operating room should try to improve were teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition.

  15. 47{sup th} Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2016). Key Topics / Enhanced safety and operation excellence and decommissioning experience and Waste management solutions

    Salnikova, Tatiana [AREVA GmbH, Erlangen (Germany); Schaffrath, Andreas [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, Garching (Germany)

    2016-10-15

    Summary report on the Key Topics ''Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence'' and ''Decommissioning Experience and Waste Management Solutions'' of the 47{sup th} Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2016) held in Hamburg, 10 to 12 May 2016. Other Sessions of AMNT 2016 have been and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  16. Management of safety, safety culture and self assessment

    Carnino, A.

    2000-01-01

    Safety management is the term used for the measures required to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of an installation, including decommissioning. The safety culture concept and its implementation are described in part one of the paper. The principles of safety are now quite well known and are implemented worldwide. It leads to a situation where harmonization is being achieved as indicated by the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. To go beyond the present nuclear safety levels, management of safety and safety culture will be the means for achieving progress. Recent events which took place in major nuclear power countries have shown the importance of the management and the consequences on safety. At the same time, electricity deregulation is coming and will impact on safety through reductions in staffing and in operation and maintenance cost at nuclear installations. Management of safety as well as its control and monitoring by the safety authorities become a key to the future of nuclear energy.(author)

  17. Safety management in nuclear technology. Proceedings

    2008-01-01

    At the symposium of TueV Sued AG (Munich, Federal Republic of Germany) held in Munich on 28 and 29 October 2008, the following lectures were held: (1) Fundamental requirements of the management system in nuclear technology - Experiences from the international developments at IAEA and WENRA (M. Herttrich); (2) Information from a comparison of requirements of safety management systems (B. Kallenbach-Herbert); (3) Requirements of a modern management system in German nuclear power plants from the view of nuclear safety (D. Majer); (4) Requirements on safety management in module 8 of the regulations project (M. Maqua); (5) Requirements on the management system in nuclear power plants according to GRS-229 and developments at the KTA 1402 ''Integrated management system for safe operation of nuclear power plants (in progress)'' (C. Verstegen); (6) Experiences from the development and implementation of safety management systems in connection with the works management of a nuclear power plant (K. Ramler); (7) Design of a safety management system of a nuclear power plant in consideration of existing management systems (U. Naumann); (8) Experiences in the utilization and evaluation of a safety management system (J. Ritter); (9) Aspects of leadership of safety management systems (S. Seitz); (10) Management of safety or safety management system? Prevailing or administration? (A. Frischknecht); (11) Change management - strategies for successful transfer of new projects: How can I motivate co-workers for a further development of the safety management system? (U. Schnabel); (12) Requirements concerning indicators in integrated management systems and safety management systems (J. Stiller); (13) Integration of proactive and reactive indicators in the safety management system (B. Fahlbruch); (14) What do indicators show? About the use of indicators by regulatory authorities (A. Kern); (15) Safety management and radiation protection in nuclear technology (K. Grantner); (16) Any more

  18. A systems perspective of managing error recovery and tactical re-planning of operating teams in safety critical domains.

    Kontogiannis, Tom

    2011-04-01

    Research in human error has provided useful tools for designing procedures, training, and intelligent interfaces that trap errors at an early stage. However, this "error prevention" policy may not be entirely successful because human errors will inevitably occur. This requires that the error management process (e.g., detection, diagnosis and correction) must also be supported. Research has focused almost exclusively on error detection; little is known about error recovery, especially in the context of safety critical systems. The aim of this paper is to develop a research framework that integrates error recovery strategies employed by experienced practitioners in handling their own errors. A control theoretic model of human performance was used to integrate error recovery strategies assembled from reviews of the literature, analyses of near misses from aviation and command & control domains, and observations of abnormal situations training at air traffic control facilities. The method of system dynamics has been used to analyze and compare error recovery strategies in terms of patterns of interaction, system affordances, and types of recovery plans. System dynamics offer a promising basis for studying the nature of error recovery management in the context of team interactions and system characteristics. The proposed taxonomy of error recovery strategies can help human factors and safety experts to develop resilient system designs and training solutions for managing human errors in unforeseen situations; it may also help incident investigators to explore why people's actions and assessments were not corrected at the time. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    2001-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  20. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  1. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  2. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  3. Summary of the nuclear safety in operation

    2004-01-01

    This summary is a collection of general information about nuclear safety of PWR type reactors exploited by EDF. Teaching aid, this work has been conceived by operators for operators, it must not be considered nor used as a doctrine document with a regulatory or prescriptive characteristic. it summarizes the great principles of nuclear safety, places them in a global approach and shows their coherence. It consists in 6 chapters and 6 annexes. The news of this edition are the chapter 2 devoted to the safety management and the annexe 6 devoted to the principal teaching coming from the feedback. At the end a glossary explains the signs and abbreviations and an index allows to find themes in the memento text from keywords. (N.C.)

  4. Food safety objective: an integral part of food chain management

    Gorris, L.G.M.

    2005-01-01

    The concept of food safety objective has been proposed to provide a target for operational food safety management, leaving flexibility in the way equivalent food safety levels are achieved by different food chains. The concept helps to better relate operational food safety management to public

  5. FLUOR HANFORD SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

    GARVIN, L. J.; JENSEN, M. A.

    2004-04-13

    This document summarizes safety management programs used within the scope of the ''Project Hanford Management Contract''. The document has been developed to meet the format and content requirements of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''. This document provides summary descriptions of Fluor Hanford safety management programs, which Fluor Hanford nuclear facilities may reference and incorporate into their safety basis when producing facility- or activity-specific documented safety analyses (DSA). Facility- or activity-specific DSAs will identify any variances to the safety management programs described in this document and any specific attributes of these safety management programs that are important for controlling potentially hazardous conditions. In addition, facility- or activity-specific DSAs may identify unique additions to the safety management programs that are needed to control potentially hazardous conditions.

  6. Safety status system for operating room devices.

    Guédon, Annetje C P; Wauben, Linda S G L; Overvelde, Marlies; Blok, Joleen H; van der Elst, Maarten; Dankelman, Jenny; van den Dobbelsteen, John J

    2014-01-01

    Since the increase of the number of technological aids in the operating room (OR), equipment-related incidents have come to be a common kind of adverse events. This underlines the importance of adequate equipment management to improve the safety in the OR. A system was developed to monitor the safety status (periodic maintenance and registered malfunctions) of OR devices and to facilitate the notification of malfunctions. The objective was to assess whether the system is suitable for use in an busy OR setting and to analyse its effect on the notification of malfunctions. The system checks automatically the safety status of OR devices through constant communication with the technical facility management system, informs the OR staff real-time and facilitates notification of malfunctions. The system was tested for a pilot period of six months in four ORs of a Dutch teaching hospital and 17 users were interviewed on the usability of the system. The users provided positive feedback on the usability. For 86.6% of total time, the localisation of OR devices was accurate. 62 malfunctions of OR devices were reported, an increase of 12 notifications compared to the previous year. The safety status system was suitable for an OR complex, both from a usability and technical point of view, and an increase of reported malfunctions was observed. The system eases monitoring the safety status of equipment and is a promising tool to improve the safety related to OR devices.

  7. Operating room manager game

    Hans, Elias W.; Nieberg, T.

    2007-01-01

    The operating room (OR) department of a hospital forms the heart of the organization, where the single largest cost is incurred. This document presents and reports on the “Operating Room Manager Game,” developed to give insight into managing a large hospital's OR department at various levels of

  8. Analysis and design on airport safety information management system

    Yan Lin

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Airport safety information management system is the foundation of implementing safety operation, risk control, safety performance monitor, and safety management decision for the airport. The paper puts forward the architecture of airport safety information management system based on B/S model, focuses on safety information processing flow, designs the functional modules and proposes the supporting conditions for system operation. The system construction is helpful to perfecting the long effect mechanism driven by safety information, continually increasing airport safety management level and control proficiency.

  9. Nuclear safety culture and integrated risk management

    Joksimovich, V.; Orvis, D.D.

    1993-01-01

    A primary focus of nuclear safety is the prevention of large releases of radioactivity in the case of low-probability severe accidents. An analysis of the anatomy of nuclear (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island Unit 2) and nonnuclear (Challenger, Bhopal, Piper Alpha, etc.) severe accidents yields four broad categories of root causes: human (operating crew response), machine (design with its basic flaws), media (natural phenomena, operational considerations, political environment, commercial pressures, etc.)-providing triggering events, and management (basic organizational safety culture flaws). A strong management can minimize the contributions of humans, machines, and media to the risk arising from the operation of hazardous facilities. One way that management can have a powerful positive influence is through the establishment of a proper safety culture. The term safety culture is used as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency's International Safety Advisory Group

  10. Operations management system

    Brandli, A. E.; Eckelkamp, R. E.; Kelly, C. M.; Mccandless, W.; Rue, D. L.

    1990-01-01

    The objective of an operations management system is to provide an orderly and efficient method to operate and maintain aerospace vehicles. Concepts are described for an operations management system and the key technologies are highlighted which will be required if this capability is brought to fruition. Without this automation and decision aiding capability, the growing complexity of avionics will result in an unmanageable workload for the operator, ultimately threatening mission success or survivability of the aircraft or space system. The key technologies include expert system application to operational tasks such as replanning, equipment diagnostics and checkout, global system management, and advanced man machine interfaces. The economical development of operations management systems, which are largely software, will require advancements in other technological areas such as software engineering and computer hardware.

  11. Control strategy for power management, efficiency-optimization and operating-safety of a 5-kW solid oxide fuel cell system

    Zhang, Lin; Jiang, Jianhua; Cheng, Huan; Deng, Zhonghua; Li, Xi

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Efficiency optimization associated with simultaneous power and thermal management. • Fast load tracing, fuel starvation, high efficiency and operating safety are considered. • Open loop pre-conditioning current strategy is proposed for load step-up transients. • Feedback control scheme is proposed for load step-up transients. - Abstract: The slow power tracking, operating safety, especially the fuel exhaustion, and high efficiency considerations are the key issues for integrated solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) systems during power step up transients, resulting in the relatively poor dynamic capabilities and make the transient load following very challenging and must be enhanced. To this end, this paper first focus on addressing the efficiency optimization associated with simultaneous power and thermal management of a 5-kW SOFC system. Particularly, a traverse optimization process including cubic convolution interpolation algorithm are proposed to obtain optimal operating points (OOPs) with the maximum efficiency. Then this paper investigate the current implications on system step-up transient performance, then a two stage pre-conditioning current strategy and a feedback power reference control scheme is proposed for load step-up transients to balance fast load following and fuel starvation, after that safe thermal transient is validated. Simulation results show the efficacy of the control design by demonstrating the fast load following ability while maintaining the safe operation, thus safe; efficient and fast load transition can be achieved

  12. Safety Evakuation Of Triga-2000 Reactor Operation Viewed From Safety Culture

    Karliana, Itjeu

    2001-01-01

    The safety evaluation activities of TRIGA-2000 operation viewed from safety culture performed by questioners data collected from the operators and supervisor site of TRIGA-2000 P3TN, Bandung. There are 9 activity aspects surveyed, for instant to avail the policy of safety from their chairman, safety management, education and training, emergency aids planning, safety consultancy, accident information, safety analysis, safety devices, safety and occupational health. The surveying undertaken by filling the questioner that containing of 9 activity aspects and 20 samples of employees. The safety evaluation results' of the operation personnel in TRIGA-2000 P3TN are good implemented by both the operators and supervisors should be improve and attention need to provide the equipment's. The education and training especially for safety refreshment must be performing

  13. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  14. Application of grey theory in operator management

    Xu Hong

    2013-01-01

    Scientific and reasonable operator management is the basis of nuclear safety. It is paid more attention after the three-mile island accident. The prediction of operators' basic behavior parameters is the premise and foundation of scientific and reasonable operator management. Grey theory happened to solve the dilemma encountered in prediction and decision-making of operator behavior in operator management of nuclear power plant. The procedure was divided into two steps: 1) According to the historical record of operators' behavior parameters, a differential equation model using grey theory was set up to predict the future behavior of operators; 2) operator management decision-making was made based on grey theory. The calculation result is not only helpful for operator management but also useful for operators to find their shortcomings. Grey theory used in the study provides a new idea and method for future operator management in nuclear power plant. (author)

  15. FOOD QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY

    Rizwana Khatoon; Debkumar Chakraborty; R.C. Chandni; Amar Sankar; A.V. Raghu

    2017-01-01

    Food safety system mainly focuses on identifying and preventing hazards that may lead product to deteriorate. The main important of manufacturing practice is a system that ensures that products meet food safety, quality and legal requirements. The hazard analysis and critical control point system, applies to food safety management, uses the approach of controlling critical points in food handling to prevent food safety problems. Besides enhancing food safety, other benefits of applying HACCP ...

  16. Aircraft operations management manual

    1992-01-01

    The NASA aircraft operations program is a multifaceted, highly diverse entity that directly supports the agency mission in aeronautical research and development, space science and applications, space flight, astronaut readiness training, and related activities through research and development, program support, and mission management aircraft operations flights. Users of the program are interagency, inter-government, international, and the business community. This manual provides guidelines to establish policy for the management of NASA aircraft resources, aircraft operations, and related matters. This policy is an integral part of and must be followed when establishing field installation policy and procedures covering the management of NASA aircraft operations. Each operating location will develop appropriate local procedures that conform with the requirements of this handbook. This manual should be used in conjunction with other governing instructions, handbooks, and manuals.

  17. Treasury operations management

    Laurențiu Dumitru ANDREI; Petre BREZEANU

    2014-01-01

    Amid the globalization and centralization of treasury operations, establishing the principles for their optimal management is the instrument by means of which economic stability, market dynamics and standards of living can be ensured. The directions of these principles, as well as their flexibility, depend on correctly identifying the objectives of the financial management planning of treasury operations, in compliance with European and international policies related to this area.

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

    2011-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (French Edition)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Arabic Edition

    2011-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (Spanish Edition)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  2. Health care operations management

    Carter, M.W.; Hans, Elias W.; Kolisch, R.

    2012-01-01

    Health care operations management has become a major topic for health care service providers and society. Operations research already has and further will make considerable contributions for the effective and efficient delivery of health care services. This special issue collects seven carefully

  3. Management of Port Operations

    Gheorghe BASANU; Georgiana NUKINA

    2011-01-01

    The Management of port operation requires the proper and efficient use of port facility, equipment for cargo handling, berth facilities, waterways and roads. It also entails the use of effective communications system, storage facilities, and dockworkers. The whole activities mentioned above form the bulk of port operations. The aspiration of port operator is to get cargo through the gateway of ports as fast as possible on to other modes of transport (rail or road) with a minimal cost to them ...

  4. Strategic Psychological Operations management

    Sokoloski, Joseph A.

    2005-01-01

    United States Military Psychological Operations are engaged in a type of mass marketing of ideas. To accomplish this The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) employs active and reserve PSYOP units to conduct PSYOP campaigns. However the methodology used to manage these campaigns often hinders the effective employment of timely and effective Psychological Operations. PSYOP has a difficult job to accomplish but PSYOP does not have the proper managemen...

  5. Operator Actions Within a Safety Instrumented Function

    Suttinger, L.T.

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the factors that should be considered when crediting operator action for performing a safety function or being a part of the process of enabling a safety function. Criteria for evaluating operator action, such as required time response and operator training among others, are discussed. The paper will address these and other factors that should be considered when determining the reliability of the operator to respond and perform his/her part of the safety function. The entire safety function includes the operator and the reliability of the instrumented system that provides the alarm or indication, the final control element, and support systems. The integration of the operator performance with the hardware safety availability, including the effects of the supporting systems is discussed. The analysis of these factors will provide the justification for the amount of risk reduction or safety integrity level that can be credited for the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), including operator action

  6. Safety aspects of cryochamber operation

    Chorowski, M.; Piotrowska, A.; Sieron, A.; Stanek, A.

    2014-01-01

    Local and whole body cryotherapy is well recognized, developed and appreciated both from medical and technical point of view. Poland is a country with a highest number of medical cryochambers in operation (above 200) and more than 3 millions of whole body cryotherapeutic sessions have been performed since 1989. Cryogenic temperatures applied for whole-body apart from medical effects have also significant influence on patient's psyche. A number of cryochambers is constantly increasing in hospitals, sport centers and spas. A temperature inside a cryochamber should be below 150 K. To achieve and stabilize such low temperature, either cascade compressor unit or liquid cryogens evaporation (N2 or synthetic air) are used. This paper presents safety oriented review of cryochamber design and constructions.

  7. Safety aspects of cryochamber operation

    Chorowski, M.; Piotrowska, A. [Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Aviation, Processing and Power Machines Engineering, Process Control and Cryogenics Group, Wybrzeze Wyspianskiego 27, 50-370 Wroclaw (Poland); Sieron, A.; Stanek, A. [Medical University of Silesia, Department and Clinic of Internal Diseases, Angiology and Physiacal Medicine in Bytom (Poland)

    2014-01-29

    Local and whole body cryotherapy is well recognized, developed and appreciated both from medical and technical point of view. Poland is a country with a highest number of medical cryochambers in operation (above 200) and more than 3 millions of whole body cryotherapeutic sessions have been performed since 1989. Cryogenic temperatures applied for whole-body apart from medical effects have also significant influence on patient's psyche. A number of cryochambers is constantly increasing in hospitals, sport centers and spas. A temperature inside a cryochamber should be below 150 K. To achieve and stabilize such low temperature, either cascade compressor unit or liquid cryogens evaporation (N{sub 2} or synthetic air) are used. This paper presents safety oriented review of cryochamber design and constructions.

  8. Safety aspects of cryochamber operation

    Chorowski, M.; Piotrowska, A.; Sieron, A.; Stanek, A.

    2014-01-01

    Local and whole body cryotherapy is well recognized, developed and appreciated both from medical and technical point of view. Poland is a country with a highest number of medical cryochambers in operation (above 200) and more than 3 millions of whole body cryotherapeutic sessions have been performed since 1989. Cryogenic temperatures applied for whole-body apart from medical effects have also significant influence on patient's psyche. A number of cryochambers is constantly increasing in hospitals, sport centers and spas. A temperature inside a cryochamber should be below 150 K. To achieve and stabilize such low temperature, either cascade compressor unit or liquid cryogens evaporation (N 2 or synthetic air) are used. This paper presents safety oriented review of cryochamber design and constructions

  9. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

    2011-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of proper site selection, design, construction and commissioning, and the evaluation of these, followed by proper management, operation and maintenance of the plant. In a later phase, a proper transition to decommissioning is required. The organization and management of plant operations ensures that a high level of safety is achieved through the effective management and control of operational activities. This publication is a revision of the Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 2000 as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2. The purpose of this revision was to restructure Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 in the light of new operating experience and new trends in the nuclear industry; to introduce new requirements that were not included in Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 on the operation of nuclear power plants; and to reflect current practices, new concepts and technical developments. This update also reflects feedback on the use of the standards, both from Member States and from the IAEA's safety related activities. The publication is presented in the new format for Safety Requirements publications. The present publication reflects the safety principles of the Fundamental Safety Principles. It has been harmonized with IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3 on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Guidance on the fulfilment of the safety requirements is provided in supporting Safety Guides. The terminology used in this publication is defined and explained in the IAEA Safety Glossary. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. This

  10. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  11. Evaluating safety management system implementation

    Preuss, M.

    2009-01-01

    Canada is committed to not only maintaining, but also improving upon our record of having one of the safest aviation systems in the world. The development, implementation and maintenance of safety management systems is a significant step towards improving safety performance. Canada is considered a world leader in this area and we are fully engaged in implementation. By integrating risk management systems and business practices, the aviation industry stands to gain better safety performance with less regulatory intervention. These are important steps towards improving safety and enhancing the public's confidence in the safety of Canada's aviation system. (author)

  12. Treatment system operation, management, and finance

    Truax, D.D. (Mississippi State Univ., Mississippi State (United States))

    1990-06-01

    This article deals with literature on operation, management, and financing of wastewater treatment plants. Some topics discussed are system hydraulics and flow monitoring, odor, reliability, equipment age, management philosophy, performance, reducing operating cost, planning and response to emergencies, preventative maintenance, inspection systems, mechanical vibrations, safety, privatization, municipal leasing, user and impact fees.

  13. Safety in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Operations

    Buhrow, C. [Technische Univ. Bergakademie, Freiberg (Germany). Lehrstuhl Bergbau/Tiefbau; Niemann-Delius, C.; Okafor, E. [Technische Hochschule Aachen (Germany). Lehrstuhl und Inst. fuer Bergbaukunde 3

    2005-07-01

    Germany needs an LNG receiving terminal to import LNG and supplement expected future gas supply shortages. Enormous economic benefits also abound if Germany is to install an LNG receiving terminal. Jobs will be created for several hundred people. New tax revenues will be generated for state and local governments and this will further enhance the economic competitiveness of Germany. Additionally, it will provide Germany with a reliable source of clean-burning energy. Any proposed LNG receiving terminal should incorporate safety right from the start. These safety requirements will: ensure that certain public land uses, people, and structures outside the LNG facility boundaries are protected in the event of LNG fire, prevent vapour clouds associated with an LNG spill from reaching a property line that can be built upon, prevent severe burns resulting from thermal radiation, specify requirements for design, construction and use of LNG facilities and other equipments, and promote safe, secure and reliable LNG operations. The German future LNG business will not be complete without the evolution of both local and international standards that can apply to LNG operations. Currently existing European standards also appear inadequate. With an OHSAS 18001 management system integrated with other existing standards we can better control our LNG occupational health and safety risks, and improve performance in the process. Additionally, an OHSAS 18001 System will help future German LNG contractors and operators safeguard their most important assets - their employees. (orig.)

  14. Measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management. Nuclear safety review for the year 2003

    2004-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2003 presents an overview of the current issues and trends in nuclear, radiation, transport and radioactive waste safety during 2003. As in 2002 the overview is supported by more detailed Notes by the Secretariat: Safety Related Events and Issues Worldwide during 2003 (document 2004/Note 6), The Agency's Safety Standards: Activities during 2003 (document 2004/Note 7) and Providing for the Application of the Safety Standards (document 2004/Note 8). In January 2003, the Agency implemented an organization change and developed an integrated approach to reflect a broader assignment of nuclear safety and nuclear security and to better exploit synergy between them. The Office of Physical Protection and Material Security renamed to Office of Nuclear Security was transferred from the Department of Safeguards to the Department of Nuclear Safety, which became the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security to reflect the change. This Review provides information primarily on nuclear safety, and nuclear security will be addressed in a separate report

  15. Operations Acceptance Management

    Suchá, Ivana

    2010-01-01

    This paper examines the process of Operations Acceptance Management, whose main task is to control Operations Acceptance Tests (OAT). In the first part the author focuses on the theoretical ground for the problem in the context of ITSM best practices framework ITIL. Benefits, process pitfalls and possibilities for automation are discussed in this part. The second part contains a case study of DHL IT Services (Prague), where a solution optimizing the overall workflow was implemented using simp...

  16. Integration of health physics, safety and operational processes for management and disposition of recycled uranium wastes at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP)

    Barber, James; Buckley, James

    2003-01-01

    Fluor Fernald, Inc. (Fluor Fernald), the contractor for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP), recently submitted a new baseline plan for achieving site closure by the end of calendar year 2006. This plan was submitted at DOE's request, as the FEMP was selected as one of the sites for their accelerated closure initiative. In accordance with the accelerated baseline, the FEMP Waste Management Project (WMP) is actively evaluating innovative processes for the management and disposition of low-level uranium, fissile material, and thorium, all of which have been classified as waste. These activities are being conducted by the Low Level Waste (LLW) and Uranium Waste Disposition (UWD) projects. Alternatives associated with operational processing of individual waste streams, each of which poses potentially unique health physics, industrial hygiene and industrial hazards, are being evaluated for determination of the most cost effective and safe met hod for handling and disposition. Low-level Mixed Waste (LLMW) projects are not addressed in this paper. This paper summarizes historical uranium recycling programs and resultant trace quantity contamination of uranium waste streams with radionuclides, other than uranium. The presentation then describes how waste characterization data is reviewed for radiological and/or chemical hazards and exposure mitigation techniques, in conjunction with proposed operations for handling and disposition. The final part of the presentation consists of an overview of recent operations within LLW and UWD project dispositions, which have been safely completed, and a description of several current operations

  17. KIT safety management. Annual report 2012

    Frank, Gerhard

    2013-01-01

    The KIT Safety Management Service Unit (KSM) guarantees radiological and conventional technical safety and security of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and controls the implementation and observation of legal environmental protection requirements. KSM is responsible for - licensing procedures, - industrial safety organization, - control of environmental protection measures, - planning and implementation of emergency preparedness and response, - operation of radiological laboratories and measurement stations, - extensive radiation protection support and the - the execution of security tasks in and for all organizational units of KIT. Moreover, KSM is in charge of wastewater and environmental monitoring for all facilities and nuclear installations all over the KIT campus. KSM is headed by the Safety Commissioner of KIT, who is appointed by the Presidential Committee. Within his scope of procedure for KIT, the Safety Commissioner controls the implementation of and compliance with safety-relevant requirements. The KIT Safety Management is certified according to DIN EN ISO 9001, its industrial safety management is certified by the VBG as ''AMS-Arbeitsschutz mit System'' and, hence, fulfills the requirements of NLF / ISO-OSH 2001. KSM laboratories are accredited according to DIN EN ISO/IEC 17025. To the extent possible, KSM is committed to maintaining competence in radiation protection and to supporting research and teaching activities. The present reports lists the individual tasks of the KIT Safety Management and informs about the results achieved in 2012. Status figures in principle reflect the status at the end of the year 2012. The processes described cover the areas of competence of KSM.

  18. Operations and maintenance - Safety challenges

    Nielsen, Liv [Oljedirektoratet, Stavanger (Norway)

    1999-07-01

    With the unsteady oil prices and the possible consequences of the deregulation of the European energy markets one may expect further optimization of operating and maintenance costs. One may also expect extended use of various risk-based optimization techniques such as RCM (Reliability Centered Maintenance) and RBI (Risk Based Inspection). This presentation addresses the need for further research and development in this area. Maintenance work is necessary, but it can also create risk. The accident statistics show many examples of this. The Norwegian petroleum industry's ability to learn from previous incidents is questioned. Maintenance staff must be well trained and possess the necessary routines. Technical documentation must be updated. Uncertainties with respect to future oil and gas prices combined with the effect of the deregulation of the European energy markets will lead to even more focus on cost-effective operations and maintenance. The need for long-term research and development is stressed. Risk based techniques such as RCM and RBI are extensively used in the defence industry and the nuclear industry, but applying them to the petroleum industry requires improved risk models. Ageing effects such as corrosion, erosion, fatigue etc. can be expected, but the capability to predict, monitor and control them should be improved. At present, not even the most sophisticated risk analysis can model ageing effects. The importance of efficient use of information technology (IT) is stressed. Improving the product quality and safety often requires new technology and so research and development is important. Close cooperation with the industry is required.

  19. Research nuclear reactor operation management

    Preda, M.; Carabulea, A.

    2008-01-01

    Some aspects of reactor operation management are highlighted. The main mission of the operational staff at a testing reactor is to operate it safely and efficiently, to ensure proper conditions for different research programs implying the use of the reactor. For reaching this aim, there were settled down operating plans for every objective, and procedure and working instructions for staff training were established, both for the start-up and for the safe operation of the reactor. Damages during operation or special situations which can arise, at stop, start-up, maintenance procedures were thoroughly considered. While the technical skill is considered to be the most important quality of the staff, the organising capacity is a must in the operation of any nuclear facility. Staff training aims at gaining both theoretical and practical experience based on standards about staff quality at each work level. 'Plow' sheet has to be carefully done, setting clear the decision responsibility for each person so that everyone's own technical level to be coupled to the problems which implies his responsibility. Possible events which may arise in operation, e.g., criticality, irradiation, contamination, and which do not arise in other fields, have to be carefully studied. One stresses that the management based on technical and scientific arguments have to cover through technical, economical and nuclear safety requirements a series of interlinked subprograms. Every such subprograms is subject to some peculiar demands by the help of which the entire activity field is coordinated. Hence for any subprogram there are established the objectives to be achieved, the applicable regulations, well-defined responsibilities, training of the personnel involved, the material and documentation basis required and activity planning. The following up of positive or negative responses generated by experiments and the information synthesis close the management scope. Important management aspects

  20. Mission operations management

    Rocco, David A.

    1994-01-01

    Redefining the approach and philosophy that operations management uses to define, develop, and implement space missions will be a central element in achieving high efficiency mission operations for the future. The goal of a cost effective space operations program cannot be realized if the attitudes and methodologies we currently employ to plan, develop, and manage space missions do not change. A management philosophy that is in synch with the environment in terms of budget, technology, and science objectives must be developed. Changing our basic perception of mission operations will require a shift in the way we view the mission. This requires a transition from current practices of viewing the mission as a unique end product, to a 'mission development concept' built on the visualization of the end-to-end mission. To achieve this change we must define realistic mission success criteria and develop pragmatic approaches to achieve our goals. Custom mission development for all but the largest and most unique programs is not practical in the current budget environment, and we simply do not have the resources to implement all of our planned science programs. We need to shift our management focus to allow us the opportunity make use of methodologies and approaches which are based on common building blocks that can be utilized in the space, ground, and mission unique segments of all missions.

  1. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  2. A total safety management model

    Obadia, I.J.; Vidal, M.C.R.; Melo, P.F.F.F.

    2002-01-01

    In nuclear organizations, quality and safety are inextricably linked. Therefore, the search for excellence means reaching excellence in nuclear safety. The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, developed, after the Chernobyl accident, the organizational approach for improving nuclear safety based on the safety culture, which requires a framework necessary to provide modifications in personnel attitudes and behaviors in situations related to safety. This work presents a Total Safety Management Model, based on the Model of Excellence of the Brazilian Quality Award and on the safety culture approach, which represents an alternative to this framework. The Model is currently under validation at the Nuclear Engineering Institute, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the results of its initial safety culture self assessment are also presented and discussed. (author)

  3. Safety Climate, Perceived Risk, and Involvement in Safety Management

    Kouabenan , Dongo Rémi; Ngueutsa , Robert ,; Safiétou , Mbaye

    2015-01-01

    International audience; This article examines the relationship between safety climate, risk perception and involvement in safety management by first-line managers (FLM). Sixty-three FLMs from two French nuclear plants answered a questionnaire measuring perceived workplace safety climate, perceived risk, and involvement in safety management. We hypothesized that a positive perception of safety climate would promote substantial involvement in safety management, and that this effect would be str...

  4. Computer managed emergency operating procedures

    Salamun, I.; Mavko, B.; Stritar, A.

    1994-01-01

    New computer technology is a very effective tool for developing a new design of nuclear power plant control room. It allows designer possibility to create a tool for managing with large database of power plant parameters and displaying them in different graphic forms and possibility of automated execution of well known task. The structure of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) is very suitable for programming and for creating expert system. The Computerized Emergency Operating Procedures (CEOP) described in this paper can be considered as an upgrading of standard EOP approach. EmDiSY (Emergency Display System - computer code name for CEOP) main purpose is to supply the operator with necessary information, to document all operator actions and to execute well known tasks. It is a function oriented CEOP that gives operator guidance on how to verify the critical safety functions and how to restore and maintain these functions where they are degraded. All knowledge is coded and stored in database files. The knowledge base consists from stepping order for verifying plant parameters, desired values of parameters, conditions for comparison and links between procedures and actions. Graphical shell allows users to read database, to follow instruction and to find out correct task. The desired information is concentrated in one screen and allows users to focus on a task. User is supported in two ways: desired parameter values are displayed on the process picture and automated monitoring critical safety function status trees are all time in progress and available to the user. (author). 4 refs, 4 figs

  5. 78 FR 54510 - New Entrant Safety Assurance Program Operational Test

    2013-09-04

    ... safety management controls; (2) consider their effects on small businesses; and (3) consider establishing alternate locations where such reviews may be conducted for the convenience of small businesses. In response... safety review within 18 months of starting interstate operations. [49 U.S.C. 31144(g)]. In issuing these...

  6. Criteria for safety-related operator actions

    Gray, L.H.; Haas, P.M.

    1983-01-01

    The Safety-Related Operator Actions (SROA) Program was designed to provide information and data for use by NRC in assessing the performance of nuclear power plant (NPP) control room operators in responding to abnormal/emergency events. The primary effort involved collection and assessment of data from simulator training exercises and from historical records of abnormal/emergency events that have occurred in operating plants (field data). These data can be used to develop criteria for acceptability of the use of manual operator action for safety-related functions. Development of criteria for safety-related operator actions are considered

  7. [The institutional promotion of good practices in the operational management of health and safety: the experience of Italy Crown Aerosols on the monitoring of behavior].

    de Merich, D; Pellicci, M; Serignoli, R

    2010-01-01

    Within the intelligence support and training to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and promoting a culture of health and safety at work, ISPESL is engaged on two fundamental pillars of activity: Consolidation of the national surveillance system of injuries through the promotion of methods and tools for the reconstruction of the dynamics incidental identification of causal determinants, with the aim of improving the capabilities of risk assessment of systems to prevent corporate. The promotion of good working practices, as Focal Point of the European Health and Safety at Work in Bilbao, the goal is to support prevention activities by providing business application examples of measures for improvement (technical, organizational, procedural) made in the proposing firms and validated by a technical appraisal conducted by ISPESL. Among the methodologies and tools that can be made available to companies in the operational management of health and safety in work activities, the approach to analyze and evaluate the behavior implemented by all persons within the company (managers, employees, workers) is a the most innovative preventive strategies that can be implemented to correct any improper practices behavioral wrongly tolerated in everyday work practice. The experience of Crown Aerosol Italy, the program "STOP TO ACCIDENTS, 2009 Best Practices award in the competition on the theme" Risk Assessment ", aims to demonstrate how the application of a method for monitoring behavior at work, shared in its planning with all those business, has not only reached but would assist the organization has developed at an individual level greater awareness and sense of responsibility also to their colleagues, by promoting good working practices.

  8. The operator's role and safety functions

    Corcoran, W.R.; Finnicum, D.J.; Hubbard, F.R.; Musick, C.R.; Walzer, R.F.

    1980-01-01

    A nuclear power plant can be thought of as a single system with two major subsystems: equipment and people. Both play important roles in nuclear safety. Whereas, in the past, the role of equipment had been emphasized in nuclear safety, the accident at Three Mile Island and its subsequent investigations point out the vital role of the operator. This paper outlines the operator's roles in nuclear safety and suggests how the concept of safety functions can be used to reduce economic losses and increase safety margins. (auth)

  9. The critical safety functions and plant operation

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.; Porter, N.J.

    1981-01-01

    The operator's role in nuclear safety is outlined and the concept of ''safety functions'' introduced. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. The plant safety evaluation uses four inputs in predicting the results of an event: the event initiator, the plant design, the initial plant conditions and setup, and the operator actions. If any of these inputs are not as assumed in the evaluation, confidence that the consequences will be as predicted is reduced. Based on the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results: Maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond. Operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events. Monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of safety functions introduces this systematic approach and presents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows accomplishing the overall path of mitigating consequences. Ten functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions are identified

  10. Safety culture and quality management

    Edmondson, B.

    1992-01-01

    The concept of Safety Culture is defined along with its general attributes. The characteristics of a satisfactory level of Safety Culture, as it applies to an operating organisation are then presented in two ways, descriptive and as sets of questions against which an organisation's provision may be judged. (author) 1 fig

  11. Nuclear safety: an operational constraint or necessity

    Gauvenet, A.

    1983-01-01

    Different aspects of the nuclear safety in the operation of power stations are analysed. There is always a danger that safety is considered as a constraint at operator level, but it is essential that human factors and working conditions be taken into consideration [fr

  12. Managing operational paradoxes

    Olson, J.; Baker, K.; Thurber, J.

    1992-01-01

    The economic, regulatory, and social environment of commercial nuclear power has changed dramatically in the last 10 yr. In addition to the increased regulatory pressure resulting from the Three Mile Island incident and other factors, nuclear utilities have experienced increasing financial pressure from state public utility commissions and investors. To successfully manage nuclear power plants in today's environment requires different skills and strategies than were required 10 yr ago. External pressures on the utility and plant organization have created a series of operational paradoxes unmatched in the history of commercial nuclear power. This paper is based on a synthesis of findings and observations from a series of studies conducted by the authors over the past 10 yr. The authors identify a series of specific paradoxes facing managers of nuclear power plants and suggest several strategies for managing these paradoxes

  13. International cooperation for operating safety

    Dupuis, M.C.

    1989-03-01

    The international-cooperation organization in nuclear safety domain is discussed. The nuclear energy Direction Committee is helped by the Security Committee for Nuclear Power Plants in the cooperation between security organizations of member countries and in the safety and nuclear activity regulations. The importance of the cooperation between experts in human being and engine problems is underlined. The applied methods, exchange activities and activity analysis, and the cooperation of the Nuclear Energy Agency and international organizations is analysed [fr

  14. Life Management and Safety of Nuclear Facilities

    Fabbri, S.; Diluch, A.; Vega, G., E-mail: fabbri@cnea.gov.ar [Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2014-10-15

    The nuclear programme in Argentina includes: nuclear power and related supplies, medical and industrial applications, waste management, research and development and human training. Nuclear facilities require life management programs that allow a safe operation. Safety is the first priority for designers and operators. This can be attained with defence in depth: regular inspections and maintenance procedures to minimize failure risks. CNEA objectives in this area are to possess the necessary capability to give safe and fast technical support. Within this scheme, one of the main activities undertaken by CNEA is to provide technological assistance to the nuclear plants and research reactors. As a consequence of an increasing concern about safety and ageing a Life Management Department for safe operation was created to take care of these subjects. The goal is to elaborate a Safety Evaluation Process for the critical components of nuclear plants and other facilities. The overall objectives of a safety process are to ensure a continuous safe, reliable and effective operation of nuclear facilities and it means the implementation of the defence in deep concept to enhance safety for the protection of the public, the workers and the environment. (author)

  15. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    2010-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  16. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    2009-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  17. The critical safety functions and plant operation

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Porter, N.J.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.

    1981-01-01

    The paper outlines the operator's role in nuclear safety and introduces the concept of ''safety functions''. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. ''An accident identical to that at Three Mile Island is not going to happen again'', said the Rogovin investigators. The concepts put forward in this paper are intended to help the operator avoid serious consequence from the next unexpected threat. On the basis of the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results. These three operator roles are: first, maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond; second, operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events; third, the operator needs to monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of ''safety function'' introduces that systematic approach and prevents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty in identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows ones to accomplish the overall path of mitigating consequences. There are ten identified functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions. The paper describes in detail the operator's role and the safety functions, and provides many examples of the use of alternative success paths to accomplish the safety function

  18. Indicators to monitor NPP operational safety performance

    Gomez-Cobo, Ana

    2002-01-01

    Since December 1995 the IAEA activities on safety performance indicators focused on the elaboration of a framework for the establishment of an operational safety performance indicator programme. The development of this framework began with the consideration of the concept of NPP operational safety performance and the identification of operational safety attributes. For each operational safety attribute, overall indicators, envisioned as providing an overall evaluation of relevant aspects of safety performance, were established. Associated with each overall indicator is a level of strategic indicators intended to provide a bridge from overall to specific indicators. Finally each strategic indicator was supported by a set of specific indicators, which represent quantifiable measures of performance. The programme development was enhanced by pilot plant studies, conducted over a 15 month period from January 1998 to March 1999. The result of all this work is compiled in the IAEA-TECDOC-1141, to be published shortly. This paper presents a summary of this IAEA TECDOC. It describes the operational safety performance indicator framework proposed and discusses the results of and lessons learned from the pilot studies. Despite the efforts described, it is clear that additional research is still necessary in areas such as plant-specific adaptation of proposed frameworks in order to suit individual data collection systems and plant characteristics, indicator selection, indicator definition, goal setting, action thresholds, analysis of trends, indicator display systems, analysis of overall safety performance (i.e., aggregation or combination of indicators), safety culture indicators, qualitative indicators, and use of additional indicators to address issues such as industrial safety attitude and performance, staff welfare, and environmental compliance. This is the rationale for a new IAEA Coordinated Research Project on 'Development and application of indicators to monitor NPP

  19. Management of operational events in research reactor

    Zhong Heping; Yang Shuchun; Peng Xueming

    2001-01-01

    The author describes the tracing management process post-operational event in a research reactor based on nuclear safety code, under the background of the research reactor in Nuclear Power Institute of China. It presorts the definite measures to the event tracing and it up its management factors

  20. Operational and safety status of Krsko NPP

    Sirola, P.; Kavsek, D.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plants Krsko (NEK) is producing electricity with the high level of reliability, safety and at acceptable price for 17 years. Energy is shared between both Slovenian and Croatian grid. The specifics of sharing the initial investment costs, later covering the operations costs and energy supply between Croatia and Slovenia is causing specific decision making problems about energy cost and future investments, however not influencing the plant safety, by now. NEK is continuously following the international nuclear technology practices, standards' changes and improvements and introducing them into the processes and equipment upgrades. As the member of the most important international integration, NEK is having the possibility of sharing its experience with others. Slovenian Energy Consumption and Supply Strategy is recognizing the NEK as a long term supply of energy in Slovenia being a strong decision making base for the future. According to the above mentioned Slovenian Energy Consumption and Supply Strategy the plant is obliged to keep all the radioactive waste, produced during the plant life, on site. The extensive efforts are taking place to reduce the radioactive waste production and save the area available for temporary waste deposition. The plant is licensed for the period of 40 years of commercial operation which started in 1983, so the Life Time Management is getting more and more important, including the performance tracing of the essential components, their maintenance and surveillance programs and also replacement plans of critical equipment. The major problems the NEK is confronted with at the moment are the Steam Generators which are reaching their and of life, and a very limited radioactive waste storage area. They are excerting influence on the plant availability and operations and maintenance costs. At the moment the process of Modernization is in progress, covering the Steam Generators replacement and a Plant Specific Simulators supply

  1. Psychology of NPP operation safety

    Tret'yakov, V.P.

    1993-01-01

    The book is devoted to psychologic investigations into different aspects of NPP operative personnel activities. The whole set of conditions on which successful and accident-free personnel operation depends, is analysed. Based on original engineering and socio-psychologic investigations complex psychologic support for NPP personnel and a system of training and upkeep of operative personnel skills are developed. The methods proposed have undergone a practical examination and proved their efficiency. 154 refs., 12 figs., 9 tabs

  2. Playing in Operations Management

    Laura Guitart-Tarrés

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The current model of competency-based learning requires new tools that allow students to develop these competencies and become active subjects of their learning (rather than passive receivers of a contents. Gamification or ludification is becoming an innovative trend in many areas, also in higher education. Games can provide a useful environment for students to acquire professional skills, a fact that is much more difficult to acquire through traditional learning methods. In that sense, this paper presents the experience of designing a game for Operations Management students.

  3. Human and organization factors: engineering operating safety into offshore structures

    Bea, Robert G.

    1998-01-01

    History indicates clearly that the safety of offshore structures is determined primarily by the humans and organizations responsible for these structures during their design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. If the safety of offshore structures is to be preserved and improved, then attention of engineers should focus on to how to improve the reliability of the offshore structure 'system,' including the people that come into contact with the structure during its life-cycle. This article reviews and discusss concepts and engineering approaches that can be used in such efforts. Two specific human factor issues are addressed: (1) real-time management of safety during operations, and (2) development of a Safety Management Assessment System to help improve the safety of offshore structures

  4. Safety management in a competitiveness context

    Rousseau, J.M.

    2013-01-01

    This paper summarizes the first assessment performed by the IRSN related to the management of French power water reactors (PWR) safety. The conclusions of this assessment were submitted to the 'advisory committee' in April 2008. After an introduction reminding the French industrial and regulatory context as well as the way the assessment has been conducted, the relationship between safety and competitiveness is briefly discussed. Then the main issues and recommendations pointed out by the IRSN assessment are presented. These concern in particular: the balance between the shift operation team and the outage project team; the real-time decision-making capabilities of plant managers; the lessons learnt from the analyses of decision-making processes; the management of cultural changes. Finally, a conclusion presents a global diagnosis in terms of strengths and weaknesses of the EDF safety management system and proposes some ideas regarding the 'priority given to safety', the meaning of safety used by operative people and the continuous improvement approach. Lastly, methodological lessons are pointed out. The slides of the presentation have been added at the end of the paper. (author)

  5. Regulatory Practices on Ageing Management and Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants in the Ibero-American Region. Results of the FORO/IAEA Programme on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Ibero-America

    2014-09-01

    Although the operating lifetime of a nuclear power plant was originally anticipated to be in the range of 30-40 years, 200 of the 434 currently in operation are over 30 years old. In this context, Member States have assigned high priority to continuing the operation of nuclear power plants beyond the lifetime initially planned - while also maintaining the highest safety conditions possible. It is thus essential to encourage international cooperative efforts in the development of safety regulatory practices on ageing management and long term operation. Established in 1997, the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies (FORO) aims to strengthen its members' radiological and nuclear safety regulatory organizations. Through a regional network of radiological and nuclear safety regulators, States in the Ibero-American region have worked together to strengthen radiation protection for patients, to improve safety at radiation installations, to tightten controls on radioactive sources used in medicine, agriculture and industry, and to improve safety and security at nuclear power plants. Since FORO's creation, it has cooperated with the IAEA in areas of mututal interest, and a technical programme administered by the IAEA was established in 2003 and formalized in Practical Arrangements signed in 2010. This publication presents the results of the 2009-2010 FORO/IAEA project on regulatory practices on ageing management and safety considerations for extending the operating lifetime of nuclear power plants. The purpose of the project was to provide nuclear regulators in the region with guidance on regulatory criteria, assessment, regulatory inspection and periodic safety reviews relating to ageing management and long term operation of nuclear power plants. The results are presented in a set of four reports, with guidelines for FORO members and a summary report of the project. These reports contain valuable information for the development of future

  6. Operating experience feedback from safety significant events at research reactors

    Shokr, A.M. [Atomic Energy Authority, Abouzabal (Egypt). Egypt Second Research Reactor; Rao, D. [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)

    2015-05-15

    Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism to provide lessons learned from the events and the associated corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events, resulting in improving safety in the nuclear installations. This paper analyzes the events of safety significance that have been occurred at research reactors and discusses the root causes and lessons learned from these events. Insights from literature on events at research reactors and feedback from events at nuclear power plants that are relevant to research reactors are also presented along with discussions. The results of the analysis showed the importance of communication of safety information and exchange of operating experience are vital to prevent reoccurrences of events. The analysis showed also the need for continued attention to human factors and training of operating personnel, and the need for establishing systematic ageing management programmes of reactor facilities, and programmes for safety management of handling of nuclear fuel, core components, and experimental devices.

  7. Operating experience feedback from safety significant events at research reactors

    Shokr, A.M.

    2015-01-01

    Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism to provide lessons learned from the events and the associated corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events, resulting in improving safety in the nuclear installations. This paper analyzes the events of safety significance that have been occurred at research reactors and discusses the root causes and lessons learned from these events. Insights from literature on events at research reactors and feedback from events at nuclear power plants that are relevant to research reactors are also presented along with discussions. The results of the analysis showed the importance of communication of safety information and exchange of operating experience are vital to prevent reoccurrences of events. The analysis showed also the need for continued attention to human factors and training of operating personnel, and the need for establishing systematic ageing management programmes of reactor facilities, and programmes for safety management of handling of nuclear fuel, core components, and experimental devices.

  8. Operational risk management for a NPP

    Scott, C.K., E-mail: KScott@AtlanticNuclear.ca [Atlantic Nuclear Services Inc., Fredericton, New Brunswick (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    Organizational failures are a hazard to the successful operation of a nuclear power plant. Risk reduction strategies have been developed around two themes: using an understanding of the nature and mechanism of human failures to eliminate them by modifying work processes; or, modifying human behaviour by creating a strong safety culture that overrides the tendency to fail. This paper examines the problem from the perspective of operational risk management. It includes the internal management of operations and the influence of the external environment on the organization. A model is proposed that encompasses all the operational risk factors in the organization's decision making process. To prevent failure the organization must have the capability to adapt and the capacity to evolve. The hazards that would lead to an organizational failure are developed from this evolutionary model. The operational risk management program would include these hazards as well as the conventional nuclear safety hazards. (author)

  9. 1. Safety in operation: The challenges and the fields of action. 2. Incident and accident management in PWR plants ''The French approach''

    Debes, M.

    1992-01-01

    The French standardization pressurized water reactor facilities currently consist of 51 standardized units, 34 of 900 MW and 17 of 1300 MW. For EDF, safety and quality in operation constitute a unique challenge: An economic challenge: the nuclear facilities account for 75% of the power generated in France and ensure the competitiveness of its price, both for domestic consumers and on the international markets, an environmental challenge: both to limit actual and potential radioactive releases associated with operation of the nuclear facilities, and to avoid releases of combustion gases associated with the use of fossil fuels, a public relations challenge: to improve the image and the confidence of the public associated with nuclear generation. Safety in operation dependence primarily on the quality of the design and construction of the nuclear units. But it also depends on technical, human and organizational factors specific to the operation of the units, which play an essential role in maintaining and increasing operating safety. After a brief review of the safety results of the facilities and of the main themes which contribute to safety in operation, a description is given of the principal fields involved and of the main current orientations

  10. Safety valve opening and closing operation monitor

    Kodama, Kunio; Takeshima, Ikuo; Takahashi, Kiyokazu.

    1981-01-01

    Purpose: To enable the detection of the closing of a safety valve when the internal pressure in a BWR type reactor is a value which will close the safety valve, by inputting signals from a pressure detecting device mounted directly at a reactor vessel and a safety valve discharge pressure detecting device to an AND logic circuit. Constitution: A safety valve monitor is formed of a pressure switch mounted at a reactor pressure vessel, a pressure switch mounted at the exhaust pipe of the escape safety valve and a logic circuit and the lide. When the input pressure of the safety valve is raised so that the valve and the pressure switch mounted at the exhaust pipe are operated, an alarm is indicated, and the operation of the pressure switch mounted at a pressure vessel is eliminated. If the safety valve is not reclosed when the vessel pressure is decreased lower than the pressure at which it is to be reclosed after the safety valve is operated, an alarm is generated by the logic circuit since both the pressure switches are operated. (Sekiya, K.)

  11. Upgraded safety analysis document including operations policies, operational safety limits and policy changes. Revision 2

    Batchelor, K.

    1996-03-01

    The National Synchrotron Light Source Safety Analysis Reports (1), (2), (3), BNL reports number-sign 51584, number-sign 52205 and number-sign 52205 (addendum) describe the basic Environmental Safety and Health issues associated with the department's operations. They include the operating envelope for the Storage Rings and also the rest of the facility. These documents contain the operational limits as perceived prior or during construction of the facility, much of which still are appropriate for current operations. However, as the machine has matured, the experimental program has grown in size, requiring more supervision in that area. Also, machine studies have either verified or modified knowledge of beam loss modes and/or radiation loss patterns around the facility. This document is written to allow for these changes in procedure or standards resulting from their current mode of operation and shall be used in conjunction with the above reports. These changes have been reviewed by NSLS and BNL ES and H committee and approved by BNL management

  12. Supply chain management - safety aspects

    2010-12-01

    Full Text Available Developing economy, growing customer requirements and competition make the service level higher. Delivery safety - as the highest priority - has to be maintained at the same time. Customers more and more often require transport to be very flexible, fast, and complex in terms of carrying every quantity of goods of different sizes, from and to different countries, through customs clearance, storing and distribution of shipments. Meeting these requirements depends on complex information on transport processes and their safety. The article presents safety foundations and institution Authorized Economic Operator - AEO in supply chains.

  13. [Management for the operating room].

    Tschudi, O; Schüpfer, G

    2015-03-01

    Business companies, which in the current times also includes hospitals, must create customer benefits and as a prerequisite for this must sustainably generate profits. Management in the world of business means the formation and directing of a company or parts of a company on a permanent basis, whereby management in this context is not exercising power but function. This concept of management is exemplary developed in this article for the important services sector of the operating room (OR) and individual functions, such as resource control, capacity planning and materials administration are presented in detail. Some OR-specific management challenges are worked out. From this it becomes clear that the economic logic of the most efficient implementation possible is not a contradiction of medical ethics, enabling the most effective treatment possible for patients while safeguarding the highest possible levels of safety and quality. The article aims to build a bridge for medical specialists to the language and world of commerce, emphasizing the profession-based competence and hopefully to arouse interest to go into more detail.

  14. Evaluation of operating experience with safety values

    Bung, W.; Hoemke, P.; Oberender, W.; Paul, H.; Rueter, W.

    1985-01-01

    This report describes statistical investigations of 2076 functional tests carried out on power operated safety valves in conventional power plants in 1972 until 1983 with special regard to Common Mode-Failures. The results clearly show that Common Mode-Failures play an important part of non-availability for the controlled safety valves, especially in the control system. The 'Deutsche Risikostudie' does not consider any Common Mode-Failures of the primary safety valves. However there is no significant increase of the risk resulted by the primary safety valves in the 'Referenzanlage' if the calculated Common Mode-Failures probabilities are considered. (orig.) [de

  15. Reactor core operation management system

    Sato, Tomomi.

    1992-05-28

    Among operations of periodical inspection for a nuclear power plant, sequence, time and safety rule, as well as necessary equipments and the number thereof required for each of the operation are determined previously for given operation plannings, relevant to the reactor core operations. Operation items relative to each of coordinates of the reactor core are retrieved and arranged based on specified conditions, to use the operation equipments effectively. Further, a combination of operations, relative to the reactor core coordinates with no physical interference and shortest in accordance with safety rules is judged, and the order and the step of the operation relevant to the entire reactor core operations are planned. After the start of the operation, the necessity for changing the operation sequence is judged depending on the judgement as to whether it is conducted according to the safety rule and the deviation between the plan and the result, based on the information for the progress of each of the operations. Alternatively, the operation sequence and the step to be changed are planned again in accordance with the requirement for the change of the operation planning. Then, the shortest operation time can be planned depending on the simultaneous operation impossible condition and the condition for the operation time zone determined by labor conditions. (N.H.).

  16. Reactor core operation management system

    Sato, Tomomi.

    1992-01-01

    Among operations of periodical inspection for a nuclear power plant, sequence, time and safety rule, as well as necessary equipments and the number thereof required for each of the operation are determined previously for given operation plannings, relevant to the reactor core operations. Operation items relative to each of coordinates of the reactor core are retrieved and arranged based on specified conditions, to use the operation equipments effectively. Further, a combination of operations, relative to the reactor core coordinates with no physical interference and shortest in accordance with safety rules is judged, and the order and the step of the operation relevant to the entire reactor core operations are planned. After the start of the operation, the necessity for changing the operation sequence is judged depending on the judgement as to whether it is conducted according to the safety rule and the deviation between the plan and the result, based on the information for the progress of each of the operations. Alternatively, the operation sequence and the step to be changed are planned again in accordance with the requirement for the change of the operation planning. Then, the shortest operation time can be planned depending on the simultaneous operation impossible condition and the condition for the operation time zone determined by labor conditions. (N.H.)

  17. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    NONE

    2010-10-15

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  18. Ageing Management for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide was developed under the IAEA programme for safety standards for research reactors, which covers all the important areas of research reactor safety. It supplements and elaborates upon the safety requirements for ageing management of research reactors that are established in paras 6.68-6.70 and 7.109 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication, Safety of Research Reactors. The safety of a research reactor requires that provisions be made in its design to facilitate ageing management. Throughout the lifetime of a research reactor, including its decommissioning, ageing management of its structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety is required, to ensure continued adequacy of the safety level, reliable operation of the reactor, and compliance with the operational limits and conditions. Managing the safety aspects of research reactor ageing requires implementation of an effective programme for the monitoring, prediction, and timely detection and mitigation of degradation of SSCs important to safety, and for maintaining their integrity and functional capability throughout their service lives. Ageing management is defined as engineering, operation, and maintenance strategy and actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing degradation of SSCs. Ageing management includes activities such as repair, refurbishment and replacement of SSCs, which are similar to other activities carried out at a research reactor in maintenance and testing or when a modification project takes place. However, it is important to recognize that effective management of ageing requires the use of a methodology that will detect and evaluate ageing degradation as a consequence of the service conditions, and involves the application of countermeasures for prevention and mitigation of ageing degradation. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on managing ageing of SSCs important to safety at research reactors on the basis of international

  19. Safety management in the industry

    Jaecklin, A.

    1996-01-01

    The safety management in the industry is characterised by the large number of processes and the materials used in them. Correspondingly large are the legal regulations. Through the thickets of today's controls, the industry moves inside a relatively tight network of technical regulations. The experience of environmental audits and industrial damage, however, shows that the greatest deficit lies in the organisational methods and less on the technical side. For the overcoming of risks one needs to recognise the weaknesses of a careful analysis. To this belongs the estimation of how far a possible scenario can be taken. The estimation of the possibilities of occurrence, however, comes up against particular problems in the industry, as the human factor in relationship with danger potentialities is very difficult to evaluate. Actual basic data or statistics are missing. This lack can only be made good with the building up of a safety management. The fundamental principles of such a management can be taken from the environmental management and especially from the standard for environmental management ISO 14001. Here it is important that safety management is integrated into the process-oriented business processes and thus becomes a part of the company culture. (author) 11 figs., tabs., 11 refs

  20. Food quality and safety management

    Agnieszka Bilska

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available Ensuring quality and safety of food are nowadays the most important goals set by companies who produce and distribute it. As a result, regulations have been introduced in the European Union countries concerning the production and distribution of food as well as norms which oblige companies to implement and execute several quality management systems.

  1. Relation between water chemistry and operational safety

    Oliveira, M.F. de.

    1991-01-01

    This report describes the relation between chemistry/radiochemistry and operational safety, the technics bases for chemical and radiochemical parameters and an analysis of the Annual Report of Angra I Operation and OSRAT Mission report to 1989 in this area too. Furthermore it contains the transcription of the technical Specifications related to the chemistry and radiochemistry for Angra I. (author)

  2. A BWR Safety and Operability Improvements

    Sawyer, Craig D.

    1993-01-01

    The A BWR is the culmination of 30 years of design, development and operating experience of BWRs around the world. It represents across the board improvements is safety, operation and maintenance practices (O and M), economics, radiation exposure and rad waste generation. More than ten years and $20m5 went into the design and development of its new features, and it is now under construction in Japan. This paper concentrates on the safety and operability improvements. In the safety area, more than a decade improvement in core damage frequency (CDFR) has been assessed by formal PIRA techniques, with CDFR less than 10 -6 /year. Severe accident mitigation has also been formally addressed in the design. Plant operations were simplified by incorporation of better materials, optimum use of redundancy in mechanical and electrical equipment so that on-line maintenance can be performed, by better arrangements which account for required maintenance practices, and by an advanced control room

  3. Operational characteristics of nuclear power plants - modelling of operational safety

    Studovic, M.

    1984-01-01

    By operational experience of nuclear power plants and realize dlevel of availability of plant, systems and componenst reliabiliuty, operational safety and public protection, as a source on nature of distrurbances in power plant systems and lessons drawn by the TMI-2, in th epaper are discussed: examination of design safety for ultimate ensuring of safe operational conditions of the nuclear power plant; significance of the adequate action for keeping proess parameters in prescribed limits and reactor cooling rquirements; developed systems for measurements detection and monitoring all critical parameters in the nuclear steam supply system; contents of theoretical investigation and mathematical modeling of the physical phenomena and process in nuclear power plant system and components as software, supporting for ensuring of operational safety and new access in staff education process; program and progress of the investigation of some physical phenomena and mathematical modeling of nuclear plant transients, prepared at faculty of mechanical Engineering in Belgrade. (author)

  4. Integrated therapy safety management system.

    Podtschaske, Beatrice; Fuchs, Daniela; Friesdorf, Wolfgang

    2013-09-01

    The aim is to demonstrate the benefit of the medico-ergonomic approach for the redesign of clinical work systems. Based on the six layer model, a concept for an 'integrated therapy safety management' is drafted. This concept could serve as a basis to improve resilience. The concept is developed through a concept-based approach. The state of the art of safety and complexity research in human factors and ergonomics forms the basis. The findings are synthesized to a concept for 'integrated therapy safety management'. The concept is applied by way of example for the 'medication process' to demonstrate its practical implementation. The 'integrated therapy safety management' is drafted in accordance with the six layer model. This model supports a detailed description of specific work tasks, the corresponding responsibilities and related workflows at different layers by using the concept of 'bridge managers'. 'Bridge managers' anticipate potential errors and monitor the controlled system continuously. If disruptions or disturbances occur, they respond with corrective actions which ensure that no harm results and they initiate preventive measures for future procedures. The concept demonstrates that in a complex work system, the human factor is the key element and final authority to cope with the residual complexity. The expertise of the 'bridge managers' and the recursive hierarchical structure results in highly adaptive clinical work systems and increases their resilience. The medico-ergonomic approach is a highly promising way of coping with two complexities. It offers a systematic framework for comprehensive analyses of clinical work systems and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration. © 2013 The Authors. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology © 2013 The British Pharmacological Society.

  5. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant

    2012-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency today concluded a review of the safety practices at the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Bern in Switzerland. The team noted a series of good practices and made recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the Operational Safety Review Team at the request of the Swiss government. The team, led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, performed an in-depth operational safety review from 8 to 25 October 2012. The team comprised experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as experts from the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Muehleberg NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry, Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Severe Accident Management and Long-Term Operation. The OSART team made 10 recommendations and 11 suggestions related to areas where operations of Muehleberg NPP could be further improved, for example: - Plant management could improve the operating experience program and methods throughout the plant to ensure corrective actions are taken in a timely manner; - In the area of Long-Term Operation, the ageing management review for some systems and components is not complete and the environmental qualification of originally installed safety cables has not yet been revalidated for long-term operation; and - The plant provisions for the protection of persons on the site during an emergency with radioactive release can be improved to minimize health risks to plant personnel. The team also identified 10 good

  6. Joint road safety operations in tunnels and open roads

    Adesiyun, Adewole; Avenoso, Antonio; Dionelis, Kallistratos; Cela, Liljana; Nicodème, Christophe; Goger, Thierry; Polidori, Carlo

    2017-09-01

    The objective of the ECOROADS project is to overcome the barrier established by the formal interpretation of the two Directives 2008/96/EC and 2004/54/EC, which in practice do not allow the same Road Safety Audits/Inspections to be performed inside tunnels. The projects aims at the establishment of a common enhanced approach to road infrastructure and tunnel safety management by using the concepts and criteria of the Directive 2008/96/CE on road infrastructure safety management and the results of related European Commission (EC) funded projects. ECOROADS has already implemented an analysis of national practices regarding Road Safety Inspections (RSI), two Workshops with the stakeholders, and an exchange of best practices between European tunnel experts and road safety professionals, which led to the definition of common agreed safety procedures. In the second phase of the project, different groups of experts and observers applied the above common procedures by inspecting five European road sections featuring both open roads and tunnels in Belgium, Albania, Germany, Serbia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This paper shows the feedback of the 5 joint safety operations and how they are being used for a set of - recommendations and guidelines for the application of the RSA and RSI concepts within the tunnel safety operations.

  7. Indicators for monitoring of safety operation and condition of nuclear power stations

    Manova, D.

    2001-01-01

    A common goal of all employees in the nuclear power field is safety operation of nuclear power stations. The evaluation and control of NPP safety operation are a part of the elements of safety management. The present report is related only to a part of the total assessment and control of the plant safety operation, namely - the indicator system for monitoring of Kozloduy NPP operation and condition. (author)

  8. International co-operation in the field of operational safety

    Dupuis, M.C.

    1988-10-01

    Operational safety in nuclear power plants is without doubt a field where international co-operation is in constant progress. Accounting for over 80 per cent of the 400 reactors in service throughout the world, the menber countries of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) are constantly striving to improve the exchange and use of the wealth of information to be gained not just from power plant accidents and incidents but from the routine operation of these facilities. The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) helps the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy to meet the NEA's objectives in the safety field, namely: - to promote co-operation between the safety bodies of member countries - to contribute to the safety and regulation of nuclear activities. The CSNI relies on the technical back-up of several different working groups made up of experts appointed by the member countries. For the past three years I have had the honour of chairing Principal Working Group 1 (PWG 1), which deals with operating experience and human factor. It is in this capacity that I will attempt to outline the group's various activities and its findings illustrated by a few examples

  9. Safety evaluation by living probabilistic safety assessment. Procedures and applications for planning of operational activities and analysis of operating experience

    Johanson, Gunnar; Holmberg, J.

    1994-01-01

    Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a daily safety management system and it is based on a plant-specific PSA and supporting information systems. In the living use of PSA, plant status knowledge is used to represent actual plant safety status in monitoring or follow-up perspective. The PSA model must be able to express the risk at a given time and plant configuration. The process, to update the PSA model to represent the current or planned configuration and to use the model to evaluate and direct the changes in the configuration, is called living PSA programme. The main purposes to develop and increase the usefulness of living PSA are: Long term safety planning: To continue the risk assessment process started with the basic PSA by extending and improving the basic models and data to provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of changes in plant design and procedures. Risk planning of operational activities: To support the operational management by providing means for searching optimal operational maintenance and testing strategies from the safety point of view. The results provide support for risk decision making in the short term or in a planning mode. The operational limits and conditions given by technical specifications can be analyzed by evaluating the risk effects of alternative requirements in order to balance the requirements with respect to operational flexibility and plant economy. Risk analysis of operating experience: To provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of incidents and plant status changes. The analyses are used to: identify possible high risk situations, rank the occurred events from safety point of view, and get feedback from operational events for the identification of risk contributors. This report describes the methods, models and applications required to continue the process towards a living use of PSA. 19 tabs, 20 figs

  10. Forest operations for ecosystem management

    Robert B. Rummer; John Baumgras; Joe McNeel

    1997-01-01

    The evolution of modern forest resource management is focusing on ecologically sensitive forest operations. This shift in management strategies is producing a new set of functional requirements for forest operations. Systems to implement ecosystem management prescriptions may need to be economically viable over a wider range of piece sizes, for example. Increasing...

  11. Safety implications of diesel generator aging management

    Hoopingarner, K.R.

    1989-01-01

    Significant safety improvements can be achieved in diesel-generator management related to aging, testing, and other important regulatory concerns. This paper reports on the progress of aging research related to nuclear service diesel generators, which developed data and information supporting the recommended safety improvements. The key to diesel-generator safety improvements is the development of a new balanced approach where testing, inspections, monitoring and trending, training, and maintenance all have appropriate importance. Safety improvement is projected in a management program that concurrently achieves three goals: first, the reduction of the fast-start stressor by regulatory and utility actions; second, the establishment of more appropriate testing and trending procedures; third, the adoption and use of reliability-centered maintenance activities. This paper describes the recommended safety improvements and the positive role of utility management in the process and outlines a new recommended regulatory approach. Diesel generator aging and wear is the subject of research sponsored by the Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program under the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The research was conducted by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), which is operated for the US Department of Energy by Battelle Memorial Institute. 4 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab

  12. Human factors in safety and business management.

    Vogt, Joachim; Leonhardt, Jorg; Koper, Birgit; Pennig, Stefan

    2010-02-01

    facilitating or obstructing success. A significant need for research and development is seen here because human factors are of increasing importance for organisational success. This paper suggests integrating human factors in safety management of aviation businesses - a top-ranking partner of technology and finance - and managing it with professional tools. The tools HPM and BSC were identified as potentially useful for this purpose. They were successfully applied in case studies briefly presented in this paper. In terms of specific safety-steering tools in the aviation industry, further elaboration and empirical study is crucial. Statement of Relevance: The importance of human factors is recognised by operators at the sharp end of aviation, where flights are conducted or coordinated. At the blunt end, measurement tools are needed to manage operational resources.

  13. Operational safety evaluation for minor reactor accidents

    Wang, O.S.

    1981-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to address a concern of applying conservatism in analysing minor reactor incidents. A so-called ''conservative'' safety analysis may exaggerate the system responses and result in a reactor scram tripped by the reactor protective system (RPS). In reality, a minor incident may lead the reactor to a new thermal hydraulic steady-state without scram, and the mitigation or termination of the incident may entirely depend on operator actions. An example on a small steamline break evaluation for a pressurized water reactor recently investigated by the staff at the Washington Public Power Supply System is presented to illustrate this point. A safety evaluation using mainly the safety-related systems to be consistent with the conservative assumptions used in the Safety Analysis Report was conducted. For comparison, a realistic analysis was also performed using both the safety- and control-related systems. The analyses were performed using the RETRAN plant simulation computer code. The ''conservative'' safety analysis predicts that the incident can be turned over by the RPS scram trips without operator intervention. However, the realistic analysis concludes that the reactor will reach a new steady-state at a different plant thermal hydraulic condition. As a result, the termination of the incident at this stage depends entirely on proper operator action. On the basis of this investigation it is concluded that, for minor incidents, ''conservative'' assumptions are not necessary, sometimes not justifiable. A realistic investigation from the operational safety point of view is more appropriate. It is essential to highlight the key transient indications for specific incident recognition in the operator training program

  14. Safety assessment for TA-48 radiochemical operations

    1994-08-01

    The purpose of this report is to document an assessment performed to evaluate the safety of the radiochemical operations conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory operations area designated as TA-48. This Safety Assessment for the TA-48 radiochemical operations was prepared to fulfill the requirements of US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System.'' The area designated as TA-48 is operated by the Chemical Science and Technology (CST) Division and is involved with radiochemical operations associated with nuclear weapons testing, evaluation of samples collected from a variety of environmental sources, and nuclear medicine activities. This report documents a systematic evaluation of the hazards associated with the radiochemical operations that are conducted at TA-48. The accident analyses are limited to evaluation of the expected consequences associated with a few bounding accident scenarios that are selected as part of the hazard analysis. Section 2 of this report presents an executive summary and conclusions, Section 3 presents pertinent information concerning the TA-48 site and surrounding area, Section 4 presents a description of the TA-48 radiochemical operations, and Section 5 presents a description of the individual facilities. Section 6 of the report presents an evaluation of the hazards that are associated with the TA-48 operations and Section 7 presents a detailed analysis of selected accident scenarios

  15. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-01-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

  16. Survey by senior NRC management to obtain veiwpoints on the safety impact of regulatory activities from representative utilities operating and constructing nuclear power plants

    1981-08-01

    A survey of licensee staff members representing the several organizational elements in different licensee corporate and plant staffs was conducted by senior NRC management to obtain licensee views on the potential safety consequences and impact of NRC regulatory activities. The comments received addressed the full scope of NRC activities and the negative impact of agency actions on licensee resources, staff performance, planning and scheduling, and organizational effectiveness. The findings of the survey is that the pace and nature of regulatory actions have created a potential safety problem which deserves further evaluation by the agency

  17. The safety experience of New Zealand adventure tourism operators.

    Bentley, Tim A; Page, Stephen; Walker, Linda

    2004-01-01

    This survey examined parameters of the New Zealand adventure tourism industry client injury risk. The research also sought to establish priorities for intervention to reduce adventure tourism risk, and identify client injury control measures currently in place (or absent) in the New Zealand adventure tourism industry, with a view to establishing guidelines for the development of effective adventure tourism safety management systems. This 2003 survey builds upon an exploratory study of New Zealand adventure tourism safety conducted by us during 1999. A postal questionnaire was used to survey all identifiable New Zealand adventure tourism operators. The questionnaire asked respondents about their recorded client injury experience, perceptions of client injury risk factors, safety management practices, and barriers to safety. Some 27 adventure tourism activities were represented among the responding sample (n=96). The highest client injury risk was reported in the snow sports, bungee jumping and horse riding sectors, although serious underreporting of minor injuries was evident across the industry. Slips, trips and falls (STF) were the major client injury mechanisms, and a range of risk factors for client injuries were identified. Safety management measures were inconsistently applied across the industry. The industry should consider the implications of poor injury reporting standards and safety management practices generally. Specifically, the industry should consider risk management that focuses on minor (e.g., STF) as well as catastrophic events.

  18. Reducing the risk, managing safety.

    Aldridge, Peter

    2016-02-01

    Fire safety in healthcare premises has always been a challenge to those that discharge this duty. Statutory compliance should be a matter of course, but in an ever increasingly challenged NHS, even this is not a given. While the NHS is driven by managing very complex risk to deliver cutting edge healthcare, providers cannot be risk averse. Which risk, however, takes priority? Here Peter Aldridge, fire and corporate services manager at Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, and Secretary to the National Association of Healthcare Fire Officers (NAHFO)--which will this month and next jointly stage fire safety seminars with IHEEM; see page 8--considers the key issues, with input from a fire officer at a leading mental health and community Trust.

  19. Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

    Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S.

    1995-05-01

    This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities

  20. Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

    Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States). School of Engineering and Applied Science; Delicate, W.S. [KEVRIC Co., Inc., Silver Spring, MD (United States)

    1995-05-01

    This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

  1. The role of PSA in safety management

    Szikszai, T.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation discusses the following issues: defence in depth principle (the role of the barriers, how does PSA represents the barriers?); the safety management and nuclear power plants; the probabilistic and deterministic approaches; the PSA applications and safety management

  2. Bayesian approach and application to operation safety

    Procaccia, H.; Suhner, M.Ch.

    2003-01-01

    The management of industrial risks requires the development of statistical and probabilistic analyses which use all the available convenient information in order to compensate the insufficient experience feedback in a domain where accidents and incidents remain too scarce to perform a classical statistical frequency analysis. The Bayesian decision approach is well adapted to this problem because it integrates both the expertise and the experience feedback. The domain of knowledge is widen, the forecasting study becomes possible and the decisions-remedial actions are strengthen thanks to risk-cost-benefit optimization analyzes. This book presents the bases of the Bayesian approach and its concrete applications in various industrial domains. After a mathematical presentation of the industrial operation safety concepts and of the Bayesian approach principles, this book treats of some of the problems that can be solved thanks to this approach: softwares reliability, controls linked with the equipments warranty, dynamical updating of databases, expertise modeling and weighting, Bayesian optimization in the domains of maintenance, quality control, tests and design of new equipments. A synthesis of the mathematical formulae used in this approach is given in conclusion. (J.S.)

  3. Safety management: a few techniques and their application

    Soundararajan, S.

    2016-01-01

    Industrial safety practice has grown in its stature tremendously since the age of industrial revolution. A number of modern techniques are available to strengthen design safety features, to review operational safety, and to critically appraise and upgrade practices of occupational safety and health management. This talk focuses on three prominent yet simple techniques and their usefulness in the overall safety management of a workplace. Any industrial set-up undergoes different stages in its life cycle-conceptual design, actual design, construction, fabrication and installation, commissioning, operation, shutdown/re-start up and decommissioning. Checklist procedure is a safety tool that can be applied at any of these stages. Thus it is a quite useful technique in safety management and accident prevention. It can serve as a form of approval from one step to another in the course of any routine or specific task. Safety Audit or Safety Review is a critical safety management appraisal tool. It gives a reasonable indication of how well a company's safety programme works, how hazards are recognised, how well employees are motivated and so on. It gives a clear picture about where a company stands as far as framing and implementation of its SHE policy is concerned. Each of the above tools is complementing each other and required to be applied at appropriate juncture in sustaining good safety management system at the workplace

  4. Use of safety analysis results to support process operation

    Karvonen, I.; Heino, P.

    1990-01-01

    Safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase of a process plant produces useful knowledge about the behavior and the disturbances of the system. This knowledge, however, often remains to the designer though it would be of benefit to the operators and supervisors of the process plant, too. In Technical Research Centre of Finland a project has been started to plan and construct a prototype of an information system to make use of the analysis knowledge during the operation phase. The project belongs to a Nordic KRM project (Knowledge Based Risk Management System). The information system is planned to base on safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase and completed with operational experience. The safety analysis includes knowledge about potential disturbances, their causes and consequences in the form of Hazard and Operability Study, faut trees and/or event trees. During the operation disturbances can however, occur, which are not included in the safety analysis, or the causes or consequences of which have been incompletely identified. Thus the information system must also have an interface for the documentation of the operational knowledge missing from the analysis results. The main tasks off the system when supporting the management of a disturbance are to identify it (or the most important of the coexistent ones) from the stored knowledge and to present it in a proper form (for example as a deviation graph). The information system may also be used to transfer knowledge from one shift to another and to train process personnel

  5. Using objectives for managing safety and health

    Shoemaker, D.R.

    1990-01-01

    This morning I am going to talk about the International Mine Safety Rating System of the International Loss Control Institute. At the Questa mine we simply call it the ILCI System. The ILCI System has been in effect at Questa since 1982. Today, I want to offer you an outline of the system and a little bit of our experience with the system at Molycorp. In 1965, Molycorp started large-scale open-pit mining at Questa, New Mexico. In 1978 the decision was made to phase out surface mining and develop a large underground mine. Construction started in 1979, and production commenced in 1983. In 1982, with a work force approaching 900, and a 15-man safety department, we had an accident frequency rate twice the national average. At that point, as we were preparing to start underground production, we decided to become part of the International Safety Rating System. The International Safety Rating System (ISRS) is a modern safety program evaluation system. It provides the means for a systematic analysis of each element of the safety program to determine the extent and quality of management control. Auditing has long been an accepted management practice to ensure that critical business operations are performed in an efficient and profitable manner. Likewise, management has inadequate verification of the effectiveness of a safety program without the kind of audit this rating system provides. Today, largely because of the ILCI system our accident/incident rate has dropped to almost half the national average. Our production costs are nearly half of their historical high. A significant part of the savings has come from decreased expenditures for total accident losses as a result of our lower accident rates

  6. Evaluation of BOR-60 operation safety

    Minakov, A.A.; Antipin, G.K.; Efimov, V.N.; Kuzin, G.G.; Eschenko, L.V.; Eschenko, S.N.

    1987-12-01

    In this communication, BOR-60 reactor operation anomalies capable to produce a dangerous overheating of the core (SDC) is examined. On bases of calculations and reactor operation experience an event tree for SDC is built. Evaluations of probable anomalies entering in the event tree and reactor parameters modifications in case of anomalies are presented. In conclusion BOR-60 agree with the sovietic nuclear safety [fr

  7. Probabilistic safety assessment in nuclear power plant management

    Holloway, N.J.

    1989-06-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques have been widely used over the past few years to assist in understanding how engineered systems respond to abnormal conditions, particularly during a severe accident. The use of PSAs in the design and operation of such systems thus contributes to the safety of nuclear power plants. Probabilistic safety assessments can be maintained to provide a continuous up-to-date assessment (Living PSA), supporting the management of plant operations and modifications

  8. Science Operations Management

    Squibb, Gael F.

    1984-10-01

    The operation teams for the Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS) included scientists from the IRAS International Science Team. The scientific decisions on an hour-to-hour basis, as well as the long-term strategic decisions, were made by science team members. The IRAS scientists were involved in the analysis of the instrument performance, the analysis of the quality of the data, the decision to reacquire data that was contaminated by radiation effects, the strategy for acquiring the survey data, and the process for using the telescope for additional observations, as well as the processing decisions required to ensure the publication of the final scientific products by end of flight operations plus one year. Early in the project, two science team members were selected to be responsible for the scientific operational decisions. One, located at the operations control center in England, was responsible for the scientific aspects of the satellite operations; the other, located at the scientific processing center in Pasadena, was responsible for the scientific aspects of the processing. These science team members were then responsible for approving the design and test of the tools to support their responsibilities and then, after launch, for using these tools in making their decisions. The ability of the project to generate the final science data products one year after the end of flight operations is due in a large measure to the active participation of the science team members in the operations. This paper presents a summary of the operational experiences gained from this scientific involvement.

  9. Evolution of the future plants operation for a better safety

    Papin, B.; Malvache, P.

    1994-01-01

    This paper describes a coordinated research project of the french CEA, addressing to the evolutions in plant operation apt to bring perceptible and assessable improvement in the operational safety. This program has been scheduled for the 1992-1996 period, with a global 40 men/year effort. The present status of the two main parts of the project is presented: ESCRIME (program aiming at defining the optimal share of tasks between humans and computers in plant operation), IMAGIN (research in the domain of plant information management, in order to ensure the global coherence of the image of the plant, used by the different actors in plant operation). (authors). 3 refs., 4 figs

  10. Regulatory Safety Requirements for Operating Nuclear Installations

    Gubela, W.

    2017-01-01

    The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (Act No 47 of 1999) and its mandate and authority are conferred through sections 5 and 7 of this Act, setting out the NNR's objectives and functions, which include exercising regulatory control over siting, design, construction etc of nuclear installations through the granting of nuclear authorisations. The NNR's responsibilities embrace all those actions aimed at providing the public with confidence and assurance that the risks arising from the production of nuclear energy remain within acceptable safety limits -> Therefore: Set fundamental safety standards, conducting pro-active safety assessments, determining licence conditions and obtaining assurance of compliance. The promotional aspects of nuclear activities in South Africa are legislated by the Nuclear Energy Act (Act No 46 of 1999). The NNR approach to regulations of nuclear safety and security take into consideration, amongst others, the potential hazards associated with the facility or activity, safety related programmes, the importance of the authorisation holder's safety related processes as well as the need to exercise regulatory control over the technical aspects such as of the design and operation of a nuclear facility in ensuring nuclear safety and security. South Africa does not have national nuclear industry codes and standards. The NNR is therefore non-prescriptive as it comes to the use of industry codes and standards. Regulatory framework (current) provide for the protection of persons, property, and environment against nuclear damage, through Licensing Process: Safety standards; Safety assessment; Authorisation and conditions of authorisation; Public participation process; Compliance assurance; Enforcement

  11. A reliability program approach to operational safety

    Mueller, C.J.; Bezella, W.A.

    1985-01-01

    A Reliability Program (RP) model based on proven reliability techniques is being formulated for potential application in the nuclear power industry. Methods employed under NASA and military direction, commercial airline and related FAA programs were surveyed and a review of current nuclear risk-dominant issues conducted. The need for a reliability approach to address dependent system failures, operating and emergency procedures and human performance, and develop a plant-specific performance data base for safety decision making is demonstrated. Current research has concentrated on developing a Reliability Program approach for the operating phase of a nuclear plant's lifecycle. The approach incorporates performance monitoring and evaluation activities with dedicated tasks that integrate these activities with operation, surveillance, and maintenance of the plant. The detection, root-cause evaluation and before-the-fact correction of incipient or actual systems failures as a mechanism for maintaining plant safety is a major objective of the Reliability Program. (orig./HP)

  12. IAEA Safety Standards on Management Systems and Safety Culture

    Persson, Kerstin Dahlgren

    2007-01-01

    The IAEA has developed a new set of Safety Standard for applying an integrated Management System for facilities and activities. The objective of the new Safety Standards is to define requirements and provide guidance for establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a Management System that integrates safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic related elements to ensure that safety is properly taken into account in all the activities of an organization. With an integrated approach to management system it is also necessary to include the aspect of culture, where the organizational culture and safety culture is seen as crucial elements of the successful implementation of this management system and the attainment of all the goals and particularly the safety goals of the organization. The IAEA has developed a set of service aimed at assisting it's Member States in establishing. Implementing, assessing and continually improving an integrated management system. (author)

  13. Safety of research reactors (Design and Operation)

    Dirar, H. M.

    2012-06-01

    The primary objective of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive up-to-date literature review on the current status of safety of research reactor both in design and operation providing the future trends in safety of research reactors. Data and technical information of variety selected historical research reactors were thoroughly reviewed and evaluated, furthermore illustrations of the material of fuel, control rods, shielding, moderators and coolants used were discussed. Insight study of some historical research reactors was carried with considering sample cases such as Chicago Pile-1, F-1 reactor, Chalk River Laboratories,. The National Research Experimental Reactor and others. The current status of research reactors and their geographical distribution, reactor category and utilization is also covered. Examples of some recent advanced reactors were studied like safety barriers of HANARO of Korea including safety doors of the hall and building entrance and finger print identification which prevent the reactor from sabotage. On the basis of the results of this research, it is apparent that a high quality of safety of nuclear reactors can be attained by achieving enough robust construction, designing components of high levels of efficiency, replacing the compounds of the reactor in order to avoid corrosion and degradation with age, coupled with experienced scientists and technical staffs to operate nuclear research facilities.(Author)

  14. Examination on establishment of safety culture for operating nuclear facilities

    Taniguchi, Taketoshi

    1997-01-01

    For safely operating nuclear power facilities, in addition to the technical countermeasures, the performance of the organizations that operate and manage them is important. In this paper, the spontaneous cooperation type management system that supported the introduction and development of nuclear power generation in electric power business is analyzed from the viewpoints of organization science and behavioral psychology, and based on the results of the investigation of the sense of value and psychological characteristics of young organization members who bear future nuclear power generation, on how to foster and establish safety culture which is called second safety principle in organizations, the subjects for hereafter are discussed from the viewpoints of respect of individuals and their integration with organizations, upbringing of talents and systematic learning. The factors which compose the safety culture are shown. The form of operating and managing the organizations are seen in first generation nuclear power generation, the similarity to Japanese type enterprise operation system, the change of the prerequisite of spontaneous cooperation type management and the difference of conscience among the generations of organization members are discussed. The above subjects for hereafter are discussed. (K.I.)

  15. Management of National Nuclear Power Programs for assured safety

    Connolly, T.J.

    1985-01-01

    Topics discussed in this report include: nuclear utility organization; before the Florida Public Service Commission in re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2 cost recovery; nuclear reliability improvement and safety operations; nuclear utility management; training of nuclear facility personnel; US experience in key areas of nuclear safety; the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission - function and process; regulatory considerations of the risk of nuclear power plants; overview of the processes of reliability and risk management; management significance of risk analysis; international and domestic institutional issues for peaceful nuclear uses; the role of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO); and nuclear safety activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

  16. Management of National Nuclear Power Programs for assured safety

    Connolly, T.J. (ed.)

    1985-01-01

    Topics discussed in this report include: nuclear utility organization; before the Florida Public Service Commission in re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2 cost recovery; nuclear reliability improvement and safety operations; nuclear utility management; training of nuclear facility personnel; US experience in key areas of nuclear safety; the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission - function and process; regulatory considerations of the risk of nuclear power plants; overview of the processes of reliability and risk management; management significance of risk analysis; international and domestic institutional issues for peaceful nuclear uses; the role of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO); and nuclear safety activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

  17. Management and Operational Control of Criticality

    Daniels, J. T. [Authority Health and Safety Branch, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Risley, Lancs. (United Kingdom)

    1966-05-15

    The evidence of the six process criticality accidents that have been reported to date shows that, without exception, they have been due to the failure of operational controls. In no instance has a criticality accident in processing been due to the use of wrong data 01 inaccurate calculation. Criticality accidents are least likely to occur in the production stream and are more likely to be associated with ancillary equipment and operations. Important as correct criticality calculations are, there are many other considerations which require the exercise of judgement in establishing the operational environment. No operation involving fissile material should be permitted without a formal review resulting in a documented statement of (a) the environmental assessment, (b) the nuclear safety arguments which demonstrate safety under that environment, and (c) the operational requirements which will ensure the validity of (b) under the conditions of (a). To ensure the continued viability of the environmental assessment and the continued reliability of clearance conditions there should be close supervision by operating management, and periodic checks made by site nuclear safety staff. Additionally, there should be periodic and systematic examinations by competent persons who are not responsible to the overall management of the site. (author)

  18. Accelerator operation management using objects

    Nishimura, H.; Timossi, C.; Valdez, M.

    1995-04-01

    Conflicts over control of shared devices or resources in an accelerator control system, and problems that can occur due to applications performing conflicting operations, are usually resolved by accelerator operators. For these conflicts to be detected by the control system, a model of accelerator operation must be available to the system. The authors present a design for an operation management system addressing the issues of operations management using the language of Object-Oriented Design (OOD). A possible implementation using commercially available software tools is also presented.

  19. Accelerator operation management using objects

    Nishimura, H.; Timossi, C.; Valdez, M.

    1995-01-01

    Conflicts over control of shared devices or resources in an accelerator control system, and problems that can occur due to applications performing conflicting operations, are usually resolved by accelerator operators. For these conflicts to be detected by the control system, a model of accelerator operation must be available to the system. The authors present a design for an operation management system addressing the issues of operations management using the language of Object-Oriented Design (OOD). A possible implementation using commercially available software tools is also presented

  20. Process management - critical safety issues with focus on risk management

    Sanne, Johan M.

    2005-12-01

    Organizational changes focused on process orientation are taking place among Swedish nuclear power plants, aiming at improving the operation. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has identified a need for increased knowledge within the area for its regulatory activities. In order to analyze what process orientation imply for nuclear power plant safety a number of questions must be asked: 1. How is safety in nuclear power production created currently? What significance does the functional organization play? 2. How can organizational forms be analysed? What consequences does quality management have for work and for the enterprise? 3. Why should nuclear power plants be process oriented? Who are the customers and what are their customer values? Which customers are expected to contribute from process orientation? 4. What can one learn from process orientation in other safety critical systems? What is the effect on those features that currently create safety? 5. Could customer values increase for one customer without decreasing for other customers? What is the relationship between economic and safety interests from an increased process orientation? The deregulation of the electricity market have caused an interest in increased economic efficiency, which is the motivation for the interest in process orientation. among other means. It is the nuclear power plants' owners and the distributors (often the same corporations) that have the strongest interest in process orientation. If the functional organization and associated practices are decomposed, the prerequisites of the risk management regime changes, perhaps deteriorating its functionality. When nuclear power operators consider the introduction of process orientation, the Nuclear Power Inspectorate should require that 1. The operators perform a risk analysis beforehand concerning the potential consequences that process orientation might convey: the analysis should contain a model specifying how safety is currently

  1. Safety Management System in Croatia Control Ltd.

    Pavlin, Stanislav; Sorić, Vedran; Bilać, Dragan; Dimnik, Igor; Galić, Daniel

    2009-01-01

    International Civil Aviation Organization and other international aviation organizations regulate the safety in civil aviation. In the recent years the International Civil Aviation Organization has introduced the concept of the safety management system through several documents among which the most important is the 2006 Safety Management Manual. It treats the safety management system in all the segments of civil aviation, from carriers, aerodromes and air traffic control to design, constructi...

  2. Is road safety management linked to road safety performance?

    Papadimitriou, Eleonora; Yannis, George

    2013-10-01

    This research aims to explore the relationship between road safety management and road safety performance at country level. For that purpose, an appropriate theoretical framework is selected, namely the 'SUNflower' pyramid, which describes road safety management systems in terms of a five-level hierarchy: (i) structure and culture, (ii) programmes and measures, (iii) 'intermediate' outcomes'--safety performance indicators (SPIs), (iv) final outcomes--fatalities and injuries, and (v) social costs. For each layer of the pyramid, a composite indicator is implemented, on the basis of data for 30 European countries. Especially as regards road safety management indicators, these are estimated on the basis of Categorical Principal Component Analysis upon the responses of a dedicated road safety management questionnaire, jointly created and dispatched by the ETSC/PIN group and the 'DaCoTA' research project. Then, quasi-Poisson models and Beta regression models are developed for linking road safety management indicators and other indicators (i.e. background characteristics, SPIs) with road safety performance. In this context, different indicators of road safety performance are explored: mortality and fatality rates, percentage reduction in fatalities over a given period, a composite indicator of road safety final outcomes, and a composite indicator of 'intermediate' outcomes (SPIs). The results of the analyses suggest that road safety management can be described on the basis of three composite indicators: "vision and strategy", "budget, evaluation and reporting", and "measurement of road user attitudes and behaviours". Moreover, no direct statistical relationship could be established between road safety management indicators and final outcomes. However, a statistical relationship was found between road safety management and 'intermediate' outcomes, which were in turn found to affect 'final' outcomes, confirming the SUNflower approach on the consecutive effect of each layer

  3. Safety-barrier diagrams as a safety management tool

    Duijm, Nijs Jan

    2009-01-01

    Safety-barrier diagrams and “bow-tie” diagrams have become popular methods in risk analysis and safety management. This paper describes the syntax and principles for constructing consistent and valid safety-barrier diagrams. The latter's relation to other methods such as fault trees and Bayesian...

  4. 33 CFR 96.220 - What makes up a safety management system?

    2010-07-01

    ... system? 96.220 Section 96.220 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.220 What makes up a safety management system? (a) The...

  5. 33 CFR 96.230 - What objectives must a safety management system meet?

    2010-07-01

    ... management system meet? 96.230 Section 96.230 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.230 What objectives must a safety...

  6. 33 CFR 96.250 - What documents and reports must a safety management system have?

    2010-07-01

    ... safety management system have? 96.250 Section 96.250 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.250 What documents and...

  7. 33 CFR 96.240 - What functional requirements must a safety management system meet?

    2010-07-01

    ... a safety management system meet? 96.240 Section 96.240 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.240 What functional...

  8. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Armenian Nuclear Power Plant

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has reviewed the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) near Metsamor for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices, as well as recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of the Republic of Armenia to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 16 May to 2 June 2011. The team was made up of experts from Finland, France, Lithuania, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK, USA, EC and the IAEA. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. Experts participating in the IAEA's June 2010 International Conference on Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) reviewed the experience of the OSART programme and concluded: In OSART missions NPPs are assessed against IAEA safety standards which reflect the current international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety; and OSART recommendations and suggestions are of utmost importance for operational safety improvement of NPPs. Armenia is commended for openness to the international nuclear community and for actively inviting IAEA safety review missions to submit their activities to international scrutiny. Examples of IAEA safety reviews include: Design Safety Review in 2003; Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in 2007; and Assessment of Seismic Safety Re-Evaluation in 2009. The team at ANPP conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the plant, which is largely under the control of the site management

  9. Risk management for industrial safety

    Novogno, A.

    1989-01-01

    The catastrophic accidents which have occurred in the last decade, in both developed and developing countries, have drawn the attention of decision-makers in the safety area to the urgent necessity to assess and manage risks from hazardous industrial activities which are concentrated in large industrialized areas. The aim of this paper is to review experience gained in conducting studies in the area of 'comparisons of risks in energy systems' and on the practical application of 'cost effectiveness of risk reduction analysis among different energy systems' (case studies). It is also the aim of the paper to discuss and propose a general framework for defining an 'integrated approach' to risk assessment and management in highly industrialized regions within a country. (author)

  10. Waste Management Operations Program

    Sease, J.D.

    1983-01-01

    The major function of the Program is to operate the Laboratory's systems and facilities for collecting and disposing of radioactive gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes. This includes collection and shallow land burial of about 2000 m 3 of β-γ contaminated waste and retrievable storage of about 60 m 3 of transuranium contaminated waste annually; ion-exchange treatment and release to the environment of about 450 x 10 3 m 3 of slightly contaminated water; volume reduction by evaporation of about 5000 m 3 of intermediate-level liquid waste followed by hydrofracture injection of the concentrate; and scrubbing and/or filtration of the gases from radioactive operations prior to release to the atmosphere. In addition, this year disposal of about 350,000 gal of radioactive sludge from the old (no longer in service) gunite tanks began. Operations are in conformance with rules and regulations presently applicable to ORNL. This Program is responsible for planning and for development activities for upgrading the facilities, equipment, and procedures for waste disposal to ensure ORNL work incorporates the latest technology. Major (line-item) new facilities are provided as well as substantial (GPP) upgrading of old facilities. These activities as well as the technical and engineering support to handle them are discussed

  11. Managing for safety at nuclear installations

    1996-01-01

    This publication, by the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE's) Nuclear Safety Division (NSD), provides a statement of the criteria the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) uses to judge the adequacy of any proposed or existing system for managing a nuclear installation in so far as it affects safety. These criteria have been developed from the basic HSE model, described in the publication Successful health and safety management that applies to industry generally, in order to meet the additional needs for managing nuclear safety. In addition, the publication identifies earlier studies upon which this work was based together with the key management activities and outputs. (Author)

  12. Inspirations from Dupont Safety Management System

    Ma Yong

    2009-01-01

    @@ Dupont,with its 200 years of safety management experience,tells us:all safety accidents can be prevented. Dupont has a history of more than 200 years,the concept of "safety is priority"has never changed.Dupont is just another word for safety.

  13. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  14. Developing a strong safety culture - a safety management challenge

    Low, M.; Gipson, G. P.; Williams, M.

    1995-01-01

    The approach is presented adapted by Nuclear Electric to build a strong safety culture through the development of its safety management system. Two features regarded as critical to a strong safety culture are: provision of effective communications to promote an awareness and ownership of safety among craft, and commitment to continuous improvement with a genuine willingness to learn from own experiences and those from others. (N.T.) 5 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab

  15. Management for nuclear power plants for safe operation

    Kueffer, K.

    1981-01-01

    This lecture covers management aspects which have an immediate bearing on safety and identifies the objectives and tasks of management which are required for safe operation of a nuclear power plant and is based on the Codes of Practice and Safety Guides of the IAEA as well as arrangements in use at the Swiss Nuclear Power Station Beznau. (orig./RW)

  16. 75 FR 5244 - Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management Program for Gas Distribution Pipelines; Correction

    2010-02-02

    ... Management Program for Gas Distribution Pipelines; Correction AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... Regulations to require operators of gas distribution pipelines to develop and implement integrity management...

  17. Management of safety and safety culture at the NPPs of Ukraine

    Koltakov, Vladimir

    2002-01-01

    The report contains general aspects of safety and safety culture. The brief description of operational characteristics and basic indexes of atomic power plants at the Ukraine are represented. The information referring to structure of NPPs of Operation organization license-holder, safety responsibility of both Regulatory and Utility Bodies also is given. The main part of the report include seven sections: 1. Practical application of safety management models; 2. erspective on the relationship between safety management and safety culture; 3. The role of leadership in achieving high standards of safety; 4. Current and future challengers that impact on safety culture and safety management (e.g. the impact of competition, changing, economic and political circumstances, workforce demographics, etc.); 5. Key lessons learned from major events; 6. Practical applications of safety culture concepts (e.g. learning organizations, training staff communications, etc.); 7. dvance in human performance. Some of the main pending safety and safety culture problems that are necessary to achieve in the near future are mentioned

  18. Safety Management at PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP)

    Ligam, A.S.; Zarina Masood; Ahmad Nabil Abdul Rahim

    2011-01-01

    Adequate safety measures and precautions, which follow relevant safety standards and procedures, should be in place so that personnel safety is assured. Nevertheless, the public, visitor, contractor or anyone who wishes to enter or be in the reactor building should be well informed with the safety measures applied. Furthermore, these same elements of safety are also applied to other irradiation facilities within the premises of Nuclear Malaysia. This paper will describes and explains current safety management system being enforced especially in the TRIGA PUSPATI Reactor (RTP) namely radiation monitoring system, safety equipment, safe work instruction, and interconnected internal and external health, safety and security related departments. (author)

  19. Operations management in health care.

    Henderson, M D

    1995-01-01

    Health care operations encompass the totality of those health care functions that allow those who practice health care delivery to do so. As the health care industry undergoes dramatic reform, so will the jobs of those who manage health care delivery systems. Although health care operations managers play one of the most vital and substantial roles in the new delivery system, the criteria for their success (or failure) are being defined now. Yet, the new and vital role of the operations manager has been stunted in its development, which is primarily because of old and outdated antipathy between hospital administrators and physicians. This article defines the skills and characteristics of today's health care operations managers.

  20. Applying Sensor-Based Technology to Improve Construction Safety Management.

    Zhang, Mingyuan; Cao, Tianzhuo; Zhao, Xuefeng

    2017-08-11

    Construction sites are dynamic and complicated systems. The movement and interaction of people, goods and energy make construction safety management extremely difficult. Due to the ever-increasing amount of information, traditional construction safety management has operated under difficult circumstances. As an effective way to collect, identify and process information, sensor-based technology is deemed to provide new generation of methods for advancing construction safety management. It makes the real-time construction safety management with high efficiency and accuracy a reality and provides a solid foundation for facilitating its modernization, and informatization. Nowadays, various sensor-based technologies have been adopted for construction safety management, including locating sensor-based technology, vision-based sensing and wireless sensor networks. This paper provides a systematic and comprehensive review of previous studies in this field to acknowledge useful findings, identify the research gaps and point out future research directions.

  1. Approaches to construction of systems of safety management in airlines

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available The article presents three approaches of building a safety management system (SMS in airlines in the framework of implementation of ICAO SARPs that apply methods of risk assessment based on use of operational activity of airline taking into account existing and implementing "protections" or "safety barriers".

  2. Adequacy features of Nucleoelectrica Argentina Safety Management

    Rapoport, H [Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A., Buenso Aires (Argentina)

    1997-12-01

    The Argentine Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) ATUCHA I (357 Mw, SIEMENS) and EMBALSE (648 Mw, CANDU), both of PHWR type, were owned and operated until August 94 by the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA). Until that date, CNEA, the national agency for nuclear R and D, concentrated three activities or roles: Research, Nuclear Regulations and NPP Operation. Since August 1994 NPP`s are owned and operated by a state electrical company (Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A.) the nuclear utility supplying 15% of the national electrical generation demand. NASA is going to be privatized according to a recent national law regulating nuclear activities. The transition from a research agency to a commercial company requires the introduction of changes in the management of activities. Mention of these changes is limited to those relating to Safety.

  3. Adequacy features of Nucleoelectrica Argentina Safety Management

    Rapoport, H.

    1997-01-01

    The Argentine Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) ATUCHA I (357 Mw, SIEMENS) and EMBALSE (648 Mw, CANDU), both of PHWR type, were owned and operated until August 94 by the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA). Until that date, CNEA, the national agency for nuclear R and D, concentrated three activities or roles: Research, Nuclear Regulations and NPP Operation. Since August 1994 NPP's are owned and operated by a state electrical company (Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A.) the nuclear utility supplying 15% of the national electrical generation demand. NASA is going to be privatized according to a recent national law regulating nuclear activities. The transition from a research agency to a commercial company requires the introduction of changes in the management of activities. Mention of these changes is limited to those relating to Safety

  4. Administrative Management Competencies for Safety Professionals.

    Blair, Earl H.; Logan, Joyce P.

    1999-01-01

    In a 1997 study, 245 safety professionals and educators identified and prioritized management competencies that are important for safety professionals. Results show that the most important competencies are communication, listening, motivating others, creative thinking, and flexibility. (JOW)

  5. Industrial safety management with emphasis on construction safety

    Bhattacharya, R.

    2016-01-01

    Safety professionals, line managers, team leaders and concerned workers today eagerly discuss to find out the best safety approach for their workplace. Some research suggested that behaviour based and comprehensive ergonomics approaches lead in average reduction of injuries. This article discusses 'the science and engineering' behind improvement in industrial safety aspects particularly at construction sites through various safety approaches. A high degree of commitment to safety by the project management and rigorous and proactive measures are essential to prevent accidents at construction sites particularly in DAE units because of its sensitivity. Persistent efforts by the project management are needed for sustainable and committed safety at work place. The number of fatalities occurring from construction work in DAE units is sometimes disturbing and fall of person from height and through openings are the major causes for serious accidents

  6. Safety Management and Safety Culture Self Assessment of Kartini Research Reactor

    Syarip, S., E-mail: syarip@batan.go.id [Centre for Accelerator and Material Process Technology, National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), Yogyakarta (Indonesia)

    2014-10-15

    The self-assessment of safety culture and safety management status of Kartini research reactor is a step to foster safety culture and management by identifying good practices and areas for improvement, and also to improve reactor safety in a whole. The method used in this assessment is based on questionnaires provided by the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), then reviewed by experts. Based on the assessment and evaluation results, it can be concluded that there were several good practices in maintaining the safety status of Kartini reactor such as: reactor operators and radiation protection workers were aware and knowledgeable of the safety standards and policies that apply to their operation, readily accept constructive criticism from their management and from the inspectors of regulatory body that address safety performance. As a proof, for the last four years the number of inspection/audit findings from Regulatory Body (BAPETEN) tended to decrease while the reactor utilization and its operating hour increased. On the other hands there were also some comments and recommendations for improvement of reactor safety culture, such as that there should be more frequent open dialogues between employees and managers, to grow and attain a mutual support to achieve safety goals. (author)

  7. Tianwan nuclear power plant operation and management practices

    Gu Yingbing

    2010-01-01

    Tianwan Nuclear Power Station is a high-tech cooperation project in nuclear sector in the spirit of promoting the political relationship, economic trading and international strategic partnership between China and Russia. It was listed as one of the key nuclear projects to be constructed during the 'Ninth Five-Year' Plan. In this article the author summarizes and feedbacks the practices of operation management in Tianwan Nuclear Power Station in 7 aspects of safety culture construction, operation team building, daily operation management, operation document management, plant chemistry control and management, solid, liquid and gaseous waste management and control of operation performance indicators. (author)

  8. Safety culture in nuclear installations. Management of safety and safety culture in Indian NPPs

    Rawal, S.C.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear Power Corporation Of India Ltd. (NPCIL) is a company owned by Government of India and is responsible for Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decommissioning of Nuclear Power plants in India. Presently, a total of 13 Nuclear power Stations are in operation with an installed capacity of 2620 MWe and 2 VVR type PWR Units of 1000 MWe capacity each, 2 PHWR type units of 500 MWe capacity each and 4 PHWR type 220 MWe capacity each are under construction. NPPs generation capacity has been increased from 70% to 85% in the span Of last 7 years with high level of safety standards. This could be achieved through Management commitment towards building a strong Safety Culture. Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisation and individuals which establishes that as an overriding priority nuclear plant safety issues receives the attention warranted by their significance. This definition of safety culture brings out two major components in its manifestation. The framework within which individuals within the organisation works.The attitude and response of individual towards the safety issues over productivity and economics in the organisational work practices. The two attributes of safety culture are built in and upgraded in each individuals through special training at the time of entry in the organisation and later through in built procedures in the work practices, motivation and encouragement for free participation of each individuals. Individuals are encouraged to participate in Quality circle teams at the sectional level and review of safety proposal originated by individuals in Station operation Review Committee at Station level, in addition to this to continuously enhance the safety culture, refresher training courses are being organised at regular intervals. The safety related proposals are categorised in to two namely: Proposals from Operating Plants, and Proposals from projects and Design. The concept of safety

  9. Applications to waste management operations

    Paine, D.; Uresk, V.; Schreckhise, R.G.

    1977-01-01

    Ecological studies of the 200 Area plateau waste management environs have provided preliminary answers to questions concerning the environmental health of associated biota, potential for radionuclide transport through the biotic system and risk to man. More importantly creation of this ecological data base provides visible evidence of environmental expertise so essential for maintenance of continued public confidence in waste management operations

  10. Managing for nuclear operational effectiveness

    Nevins, P.A.; Kasperski, D.C.

    1990-01-01

    The nuclear energy industry worldwide is changing, with significant implications for nuclear utility managers. While the UK and US nuclear industries have many differences, a number of the lessons learned in the US have direct applicability to the UK. Just as the physics behind nuclear power transcends political boundaries, so do many of the management techniques that are necessary to run an efficient and sound operation. The US nuclear industry is no longer a construction-based industry, as it has been for years. As nuclear construction slows or stops in many parts of the world and nuclear power comes under increased scrutiny everywhere, the industry is shifting away from a construction emphasis and towards an operations and maintenance emphasis. In North America more than one-half of nuclear executives believe that plant operating and maintenance costs, and not construction-related problems, are their number one concern. Furthermore, when asked what actions they would expect to take as a result of this concern, the majority indicated that the actions would be management-related for the most part, and included items such as: emphasize operating improvements, emphasize management improvements, upgrade outage management and maintenance management programs, increase senior management involvement and set management performance criteria. (author)

  11. Operations Management and Curriculum Design.

    Slack, Nigel

    1983-01-01

    The last few years have seen developments in the academic treatment of operations management which both broaden the subject to include a much wider range of industries in the nonmanufacturing sectors and place the operations function in a more strategic context. (MEAD Subscriptions, CSML, University of Lancaster, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England) (SSH)

  12. Bowtie Risk Management methodology and Modern Nuclear Safety Reports

    Ilizastigui Pérez, F.

    2016-01-01

    The Safety Report (SR) plays a crucial role within the nuclear licensing regime as the principal means for demonstrating the adequacy of safety analysis for a nuclear facility to ensure that it can be constructed, operated, maintained, shut down, and decommissioned safely and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. It serves as the basis for granting authorizations for the commencement of the main stages of the facility’s life cycle as well as decision-making processes related to safety. Historically, the majority of nuclear safety reports have operated under rather prescriptive regimes, with emphasis placed on demonstrations of the robustness of the facility’s design (design safety) against prescriptive technical requirements set by the regulatory body, and less attention paid to demonstrating the adequacy and effectiveness of Operator’s management system for managing risks to daily operation.

  13. Pedestrian safety management using the risk-based approach

    Romanowska Aleksandra

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The paper presents a concept of a multi-level pedestrian safety management system. Three management levels are distinguished: strategic, tactical and operational. The basis for the proposed approach to pedestrian safety management is a risk-based method. In the approach the elements of behavioural and systemic theories were used, allowing for the development of a formalised and repeatable procedure integrating the phases of risk assessment and response to the hazards of road crashes involving pedestrians. Key to the method are tools supporting pedestrian safety management. According to the risk management approach, the tools can be divided into two groups: tools supporting risk assessment and tools supporting risk response. In the paper attention is paid to selected tools supporting risk assessment, with particular emphasis on the methods for estimating forecasted pedestrian safety measures (at strategic, national and regional level and identification of particularly dangerous locations in terms of pedestrian safety at tactical (regional and local and operational level. The proposed pedestrian safety management methods and tools can support road administration in making rational decisions in terms of road safety, safety of road infrastructure, crash elimination measures or reducing the consequences suffered by road users (particularly pedestrians as a result of road crashes.

  14. The advancement of a new human factors report--'The Unique Report'--facilitating flight crew auditing of performance/operations as part of an airline's safety management system.

    Leva, M C; Cahill, J; Kay, A M; Losa, G; McDonald, N

    2010-02-01

    This paper presents the findings of research relating to the specification of a new human factors report, conducted as part of the work requirements for the Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems project, sponsored by the European Commission. Specifically, it describes the proposed concept for a unique report, which will form the basis for all operational and safety reports completed by flight crew. This includes all mandatory and optional reports. Critically, this form is central to the advancement of improved processes and technology tools, supporting airline performance management, safety management, organisational learning and knowledge integration/information-sharing activities. Specifically, this paper describes the background to the development of this reporting form, the logic and contents of this form and how reporting data will be made use of by airline personnel. This includes a description of the proposed intelligent planning process and the associated intelligent flight plan concept, which makes use of airline operational and safety analyses information. Primarily, this new reporting form has been developed in collaboration with a major Spanish airline. In addition, it has involved research with five other airlines. Overall, this has involved extensive field research, collaborative prototyping and evaluation of new reports/flight plan concepts and a number of evaluation activities. Participants have included both operational and management personnel, across different airline flight operations processes. Statement of Relevance: This paper presents the development of a reporting concept outlined through field research and collaborative prototyping within an airline. The resulting reporting function, embedded in the journey log compiled at the end of each flight, aims at enabling employees to audit the operations of the company they work for.

  15. Monitoring System For Improving Radiation Safety Management

    Osovizky, A.; Paran, J.; Tal, N.; Ankry, N.; Ashkenazi, B.; Tirosh, D.; Marziano, R.; Chisin, R.

    1999-01-01

    Medi SMARTS (Medical Survey Mapping Automatic Radiation Tracing System), a gamma radiation monitoring system, was installed in a nuclear medicine department. In this paper the evaluation of the system's ability to improve radiation safety management is presented. The system is based on a state of the art software that continuously collects on line radiation measurements for display, analysis and logging. Radiation is measured by GM tubes; the signal is transferred to a data processing unit and then via an RS-485 communication line to a computer. The system automatically identifies the detector type and its calibration factor, thus providing compatibility, maintainability and versatility when changing detectors. Radiation levels are displayed on the nuclear medicine department map at six locations. The system has been operating continuously for more than one year, documenting abnormal events caused by routine operation or failure incidents. In cases where abnormal working conditions were encountered, an alarm message was sent automatically to the supervisor via his tele-pager. An interesting issue observed during the system evaluation, was the inability to distinguish between high radiation levels caused by proper routine operation and those caused by safety failure incidents. The solution included examination of two parameters, radiation levels as well as their duration period. A careful analysis of the historical data, applying the appropriated combined parameters determined for each location, verified that such a system can identify abnormal events, provide alarms to warn in case of incidents and improve standard operating procedures

  16. Oswer integrated health and safety standard operating practices. Directive

    1993-02-01

    The directive implements the OSWER (Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response) Integrated Health and Safety Standards Operating Practices in conjunction with the OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Act) Worker Protection Standards, replacing the OSWER Integrated Health and Safety Policy

  17. Mastery of risks and operating safety, risks and efficiencies

    2006-01-01

    A proper management of ones risks consists in acting to exert prevention and protection capacities against the negative consequences of an event, but also by committing oneself into an offensive approach allowing to improve efficiency, quality and availability. Safety and efficiencies are mutual reinforcing goals aiming at ensuring the perenniality of industries and services. The implementation of a risk management approach in an industrial environment allows to reach a better reactiveness and to increase the efficiency of a system by the mastery of organization and processes. The activities in concern are those of industries and services: transports, energy and environment, automotive industry, petrochemistry, chemistry, food, space, health, defense industries, telecommunication, mining industry, information systems, textile industry, finances.. The topics approached during this meeting treat of: the relevance of risk-abatement resources with respect to risks criticality; the consistent management of uncertainties with respect to stakes; the mastery of components aging and the expression of aging-dependent availability, maintenance and safety policies; the expression of obsolescence-related renewing policies; the operating safety tools and methods applied to complex and computerized-controlled systems; the integration of social, organizational and human factors in technical decisions and companies management; transverse and global risk analysis and decision-aid approaches; the vigilance culture; crisis anticipation and management; the experience feedback on technical and organisational aspects; efficiency and risk mastery indicators; cost/benefit approach in risk management, and economic intelligence approaches. Nineteen presentations have been selected which deal with the mastery of risks and the operating safety at nuclear facilities. (J.S.)

  18. Safety of nuclear operation and maintenance

    Mori, M.; Nitta, T.; Sakai, K.

    1994-01-01

    The Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc.(Kansai EPC) aims to pursue a high quality and highly reliable operation in nuclear power generation in order to ensure safety by reducing the risk of accidents and win the confidence from the society and the public. It is emphasised that in order to realize this aim manufacturers and contractors cooperate with each other in performing high quality maintenance through plant lifetime maintenance system. TQC (Total Quality Control) activity enhances the motivation for each individual to have a quality-oriented mind and cultivate the safety culture. Under the lifetime employment practice, Kansai EPC and maintenance contractors can conduct systematic education and training, and the Maintenance Training Center helps to make it effective. 6 figs

  19. Safety management - policy, analysis and implementation

    Allen, F.R.

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear industry is moving towards a period of ever increasing emphasis on business performance and profitability. Safety has, of course, always been a major concern of management in the nuclear industry and elsewhere. The civil aviation industry , for example, has had a similar concern for safety. Other industry sectors are also developing safety management as a response to events within and outside their sectors. In this paper the way that the risk management process as a whole is being addressed is looked at. Can we use risk management, initially a safety-orientated tool, to improve business performance? (author)

  20. Safety culture in the gynecology robotics operating room.

    Zullo, Melissa D; McCarroll, Michele L; Mendise, Thomas M; Ferris, Edward F; Roulette, G D; Zolton, Jessica; Andrews, Stephen J; von Gruenigen, Vivian E

    2014-01-01

    To measure the safety culture in the robotics surgery operating room before and after implementation of the Robotic Operating Room Computerized Checklist (RORCC). Prospective study. Gynecology surgical staff (n = 32). An urban community hospital. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire domains examined were teamwork, safety, job satisfaction, stress recognition, perceptions of management, and working conditions. Questions and domains were described using percent agreement and the Cronbach alpha. Paired t-tests were used to describe differences before and after implementation of the checklist. Mean (SD) staff age was 46.7 (9.5) years, and most were women (78%) and worked full-time (97%). Twenty respondents (83% of nurses, 80% of surgeons, 66% of surgical technicians, and 33% of certified registered nurse anesthetists) completed the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire; 6 were excluded because of non-matching identifiers. Before RORCC implementation, the highest quality of communication and collaboration was reported by surgeons and surgical technicians (100%). Certified registered nurse anesthetists reported only adequate levels of communication and collaboration with other positions. Most staff reported positive responses for teamwork (48%; α = 0.81), safety (47%; α = 0.75), working conditions (37%; α = 0.55), stress recognition (26%; α = 0.71), and perceptions of management (32%; α = 0.52). No differences were observed after RORCC implementation. Quality of communication and collaboration in the gynecology robotics operating room is high between most positions; however, safety attitude responses are low overall. No differences after RORCC implementation and low response rates may highlight lack of staff support. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  1. Management of construction safety at KKNPP site

    Khare, P.K.

    2016-01-01

    Construction is considered as one of the most hazardous activities owing to the number of accidents and injuries. At KKNPP, management of industrial safety has been envisaged since the preliminary stage of construction planning, including design aspects. The governing principles of safety management are evolved from the Factories Act, 1948, the Atomic Energy(Factories) Rules, 1996, AERB safety guidelines on Control of works (2011) and Corporate HSE policy of NPCIL (2014). Numerous risk assessment and hazard control measures are adopted consistently to ensure a safe work environment during the construction, which includes Job Hazard Analysis, work permit through Computerized Maintenance Management System, safety procedures, exclusive safety training facility for the contractor's workmen, safety motivational measures, safety surveillance and reporting through Safety Related Deficiencies Management System. Assessment of efficacy of safety management system is continuously done through safety audits and observations are being circulated and discussed in committee meetings. Fire safety is also being taken care of since inception of project work. Well-equipped fire station with trained fire fighters was made available since the beginning as per AERB safety standard on fire protection system for Nuclear facilities. Fire prevention measures specific to the work are implemented during all activities. (author)

  2. Safety goals for nuclear power plant operation

    1983-05-01

    This report presents and discusses the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's, Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. The safety goals have been formulated in terms of qualitative goals and quantitative design objectives. The qualitative goals state that the risk to any individual member of the public from nuclear power plant operation should not be a significant contributor to that individual's risk of accidental death or injury and that the societal risks should be comparable to or less than those of viable competing technologies. The quantitative design objectives state that the average risks to individual and the societal risks of nuclear power plant operation should not exceed 0.1% of certain other risks to which members of the US population are exposed. A subsidiary quantitative design objective is established for the frequency of large-scale core melt. The significance of the goals and objectives, their bases and rationale, and the plan to evaluate the goals are provided. In addition, public comments on the 1982 proposed policy statement and responses to a series of questions that accompanied the 1982 statement are summarized

  3. Effective Safety Management in Construction Project

    Othman, I.; Shafiq, Nasir; Nuruddin, M. F.

    2017-12-01

    Effective safety management is one of the serious problems in the construction industry worldwide, especially in large-scale construction projects. There have been significant reductions in the number and the rate of injury over the last 20 years. Nevertheless, construction remains as one of the high risk industry. The purpose of this study is to examine safety management in the Malaysian construction industry, as well as to highlight the importance of construction safety management. The industry has contributed significantly to the economic growth of the country. However, when construction safety management is not implemented systematically, accidents will happen and this can affect the economic growth of the country. This study put the safety management in construction project as one of the important elements to project performance and success. The study emphasize on awareness and the factors that lead to the safety cases in construction project.

  4. Safety management in research and development organisation

    Nivedha, T.

    2016-01-01

    Health and safety is one of the most important aspects of an organizations smooth and effective functioning. It depends on the safety management, health management, motivation, leadership and training, welfare facilities, accident statistics, policy, organization and administration, hazard control and risk analysis, monitoring, statistics and reporting. Workplace accidents are increasingly common, main causes are untidiness, noise, too hot or cold environments, old or poorly maintained machines, and lack of training or carelessness of employees. One of the biggest issues facing employers today is the safety of their employees. This study aims at analyzing the occupational health and safety of Research organization in Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research by gathering information on health management, safety management, motivation, leadership and training, welfare facilities, accident statistics, organization and administration, hazard control and risk analysis, monitoring, statistics and reporting. Data were collected by using questionnaires which were developed on health and safety management system. (author)

  5. Safety of Nonoperative Management After Acute Diverticulitis

    Amoza Pais, Sonia; Batlle Marin, Xavi; Oronoz Martinez, Begoña; Balen Ribera, Enrique; Yarnoz Irazabal, Concepción

    2014-01-01

    Purpose The role of surgery in the management of diverticular disease after an episode of acute diverticulitis (AD) managed in a conservative form is evolving. Age, number of episodes of AD, type of episode, and symptoms after the episodes are factors related to the need for elective surgery. The aim of this study is to evaluate the safety of conservative management and the risk factors for emergency surgery after a first episode of AD managed without surgery. Methods We retrospectively evaluated 405 patients diagnosed as having had a first episode of AD. Sixty-nine patients underwent emergency surgery on the first admission, and 69 patients had an elective operation in the follow-up (group A). The remaining 267 patients were managed initially without surgery (group B). Thirteen of these 267 patients needed a further urgent surgical procedure. Factors involved in the decision of elective surgery and the probability of emergency surgery after the first episode of AD managed without surgery were evaluated in relation to demographic factors, risk factors, presence of recurrences, and type of the first episode. Results Patients, mean age was 62.7 years, 71 were aged less than 51, and 151 were males. The mean follow-up for patients with nonoperative management was 91.2 months. An elective operation was performed in 69 patients. Compared to patients in group B, those in group A more frequently had a first episode of complicated acute diverticulitis (CAD) (37.1% vs. 16.4%; P = 0.000) and were more likely to be smokers (46.3% vs. 19.3%; P = 0.000) and to suffer more than one episode of AD (42% vs. 26.9%; P = 0.027). Nonoperative management was chosen for 267 patients, but 13 patients needed an emergency operation later. In the multivariate analysis, we found a significant relation between the presence of CAD in the first episode and the need for emergency surgery. There were no differences in surgical mortality between the patients in the two groups, but patients treated

  6. Criticality Risk Management: Why Analysis of Operating Practices Matters

    Menuet, L.; Tasset, D.; Hebraud, C.

    2016-01-01

    The criticality risk is an unwanted neutron chain reaction that could lead, if not under control, to a criticality accident resulting in a high release of energy accompanied by an intense emission of neutron and gamma radiation. Thus, the management of criticality risk in Fuel Cycle Facilities relies mainly on a set of prescriptions and requirements established by the licencees for achieving safety objectives. This paper intends to show that, beyond prescriptions and requirements, a socio-technical approach is essential to define a relevant set of criticality safety rules favouring efficient and safe human activities. Indeed, a thorough knowledge of staff operating practices, beyond contributing significantly to the definition of appropriate technical and organizational provisions, enhances safety management combining “rule-based safety” and “managed safety”. Rule-based safety (top down definition of the rules) can be achieved by anticipating undesirable situations and defining provisions to avoid and manage them in daily practices. On the other hand, managed safety (integration of local characteristics) develops the sociotechnical system capacity to anticipate, recognise and formulate appropriate responses to unexpected scenarios that were not foreseen by the organization, or to rules that are not applicable to the operational realities. Thus, an effective safety management relies on human expertise, on the skills of individuals, on the quality of initiatives, and on the way teams and organizations perform the operations on a daily basis, interact and coordinate to integrate and regulate both ruled-based safety and managed safety.

  7. Aviation safety and operation problems research and technology

    Enders, J. H.; Strickle, J. W.

    1977-01-01

    Aircraft operating problems are described for aviation safety. It is shown that as aircraft technology improves, the knowledge and understanding of operating problems must also improve for economics, reliability and safety.

  8. Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from point of view of operational safety enhancement

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2000-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing. (author)

  9. PSA analysis focused on Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from operational safety point of view

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2001-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing.(author)

  10. IAEA Operational Safety Team Reviews Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed operational safety at France's Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) noting a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of France to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of Cattenom NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in Vienna, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review of the plant from 14 November to 1 December 2011. The team was made up of experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the IAEA. The team at Cattenom conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which is largely under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. Cattenom is the first plant in Europe to voluntarily undertake a Severe Accident Management review during an OSART review. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: Sheets are displayed in storage areas where combustible material is present - these sheets are updated readily and accurately by the area owner to ensure that the fire limits are complied with; A simple container is attached to the neutron source handling device to ensure ease and safety of operations and reduce possible radiation exposure during use

  11. Safety managements of the linear IFMIF/EVEDA prototype accelerator

    Takahashi, Hiroki; Maebara, Sunao; Kojima, Toshiyuki; Narita, Takahiro; Tsutsumi, Kazuyoshi; Sakaki, Hironao; Suzuki, Hiromitsu; Sugimoto, Masayoshi

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: •Safety management is needed to secure the personnel safety from high dose rate. •The management of access to the accelerator vault is mainly performed by PPS. •The operation management is needed for safety during Injector and RFQ commissioning. •Pulse Duty Management system is newly developed for Injector commissioning for operation management. •PDM system is useful to reduce the radioactivation of equipment and the radiation exposure during and after beam operation. -- Abstract: On the Linear IFMIF/EVEDA Prototype Accelerator (LIPAc), the validation up to 9 MeV deuteron beam with 125 mA continuous wave is planned in Rokkasho, Aomori, Japan. Since the deuteron beam power exceeds 1 MW, safety issue related to γ-ray and neutron production is critical. To establish the safety management indispensable to reduce radiation exposure for personnel and activation of accelerator equipment, Personnel Protection System (PPS) of LIPAc control system, which works together with Radiation Monitoring System and Access Control System, was developed for LIPAc. The management of access to the accelerator vault by PPS and the beam duty management of PPS are presented in details

  12. Editorial safety science special issue road safety management.

    Wegman, F.C.M. & Hagezieker, M.P.

    2014-01-01

    The articles presented in this Special Issue on Road Safety Management represent an illustration of the growing interest in policy-related research in the area of road safety. The complex nature of this type of research combined with the observation that scientific journals pay limited attention to

  13. Operational Management System for Regulated Water Systems

    van Loenen, A.; van Dijk, M.; van Verseveld, W.; Berger, H.

    2012-04-01

    Most of the Dutch large rivers, canals and lakes are controlled by the Dutch water authorities. The main reasons concern safety, navigation and fresh water supply. Historically the separate water bodies have been controlled locally. For optimizating management of these water systems an integrated approach was required. Presented is a platform which integrates data from all control objects for monitoring and control purposes. The Operational Management System for Regulated Water Systems (IWP) is an implementation of Delft-FEWS which supports operational control of water systems and actively gives advice. One of the main characteristics of IWP is that is real-time collects, transforms and presents different types of data, which all add to the operational water management. Next to that, hydrodynamic models and intelligent decision support tools are added to support the water managers during their daily control activities. An important advantage of IWP is that it uses the Delft-FEWS framework, therefore processes like central data collection, transformations, data processing and presentation are simply configured. At all control locations the same information is readily available. The operational water management itself gains from this information, but it can also contribute to cost efficiency (no unnecessary pumping), better use of available storage and advise during (water polution) calamities.

  14. The Alternative Design Features for Safety Enhancement in Shutdown Operation

    Oh, Hae Cheol; Kim, Myung Ki; Chung, Bag Soon; Seo, Mi Ro

    2009-01-01

    PSA can be used to confirm that the new plant design is complied with the applicable safety goals, and to select among the alternate design options. A shutdown PSA provides insight for outage planning schedule, outage management practices, and design modifications. Considering the results of both LPSD PSA studies and operating experiences for low power and shutdown, the improvements can be proposed to reduce the high risk contribution. The improvements/enhancements during shutdown operation may be divided into categories such as hardware, administrative management, and operational procedure. This paper presents on an example how the risk related to an accidental situation can be reduced, focusing the hardware design changes for the newly designed NPPs

  15. Managing health and safety risks: Implications for tailoring health and safety management system practices.

    Willmer, D R; Haas, E J

    2016-01-01

    As national and international health and safety management system (HSMS) standards are voluntarily accepted or regulated into practice, organizations are making an effort to modify and integrate strategic elements of a connected management system into their daily risk management practices. In high-risk industries such as mining, that effort takes on added importance. The mining industry has long recognized the importance of a more integrated approach to recognizing and responding to site-specific risks, encouraging the adoption of a risk-based management framework. Recently, the U.S. National Mining Association led the development of an industry-specific HSMS built on the strategic frameworks of ANSI: Z10, OHSAS 18001, The American Chemistry Council's Responsible Care, and ILO-OSH 2001. All of these standards provide strategic guidance and focus on how to incorporate a plan-do-check-act cycle into the identification, management and evaluation of worksite risks. This paper details an exploratory study into whether practices associated with executing a risk-based management framework are visible through the actions of an organization's site-level management of health and safety risks. The results of this study show ways that site-level leaders manage day-to-day risk at their operations that can be characterized according to practices associated with a risk-based management framework. Having tangible operational examples of day-to-day risk management can serve as a starting point for evaluating field-level risk assessment efforts and their alignment to overall company efforts at effective risk mitigation through a HSMS or other processes.

  16. FULCRUM - A dam safety management and alert system

    Butt, Cameron; Greenaway, Graham [Knight Piesold Ltd., Vancouver, (Canada)

    2010-07-01

    Efficient management of instrumentation, monitoring and inspection data are the keys to safe performance and dam structure stability. This paper presented a data management system, FULCRUM, developed for dam safety management. FULCRUM is a secure web-based data management system which simplifies the process of data collection, processing and analysis of the information. The system was designed to organize and coordinate dam safety management requirements. Geotechnical instrumentation such as piezometers or inclinometers and operating data can be added to the database. Data from routine surveillance and engineering inspection can also be incorporated into the database. The system provides users with immediate access to historical and recent data. The integration of a GIS system allows for rapid assessment of the project site. Customisable alerting protocols can be set to identify and respond quickly to significant changes in operating conditions and potential impacts on dam safety.

  17. Operations and supply chain management

    Coughlan, Paul; Draaijer, Domien; Godsell, Janet

    2016-01-01

    these competences for young faculty in relation to their ambitions and career choices. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based upon the contributions made at European Operations Management Association 2014 Young Scholars Workshop (YSW). The theme and programme of the workshop was “Operations management...... – research and practice”. Findings – The paper outlines first the concept of the YSW, the evolution of themes and the specific focus of the 2014 workshop. It concludes with a reflection on the career development of O&SCM scholars, their potential role, as academics or practitioners, in the development of O...

  18. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations

    2012-03-20

    promulgate command-specific policy and guidance for EMS use, the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) process, the joint communications–electronics...joint communications–electronics operating instructions (JCEOI) and joint restricted frequency list (JRFL). Examples of FM include providing the...joint restricted frequency list Figure III-4. Joint Frequency Management Office Spectrum Management Process Chapter III III-10 JP 6-01 assignments

  19. Increased importance of humanware in Operations Management

    Christiansen, Thomas Bøhm

    Eksamens-paper til doctoral seminar in Operations Management på School of Management, Boston University......Eksamens-paper til doctoral seminar in Operations Management på School of Management, Boston University...

  20. Rolls-Royce I and C long term support a dedicated solution to manage plant condition, optimize operating life and maximize plant value while improving safety

    Baillonmartos, F.

    2010-01-01

    Rolls-Royce supplied safety I and C equipment as Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for 200 reactors in operation from 1970', including various technological steps (analog to digital hardware). The hardware scope covers various systems, either more than 500 hardware references, either more than 150000 parts in operation. Rolls-Royce contributes to life time extension ensuring system availability and reliability on long term basis by determining the optimum solution between different maintenance approaches: maintenance and repair with limited retrofit or major system retrofit. Based on Long Term Support (LTS) agreement with customers, Rolls-Royce commits to maintain the capability to manufacture, modify, repair, test, at board, rack and systems level over a long time period. This means finding solution to hardware ageing, technology evolution, skills and tools maintenance. This paper describes how Rolls-Royce has built a global process based on delivering a package of services and developing long term support engineering solutions and tools. Our main experience on EDF partnership will serve to illustrate Rolls-Royce I and C Long Term Support activity. (authors)

  1. Investigating road safety management processes in Europe.

    Jähi, H. Muhlrad, N. Buttler, I. Gitelman, V. Bax, C. Dupont, E. Giustiniani, G. Machata, K. Martensen, H. Papadimitriou, E. Persia, L. Talbot, R. Vallet, G. & Yannis, G.

    2012-01-01

    The work package 1 of the EC FP7 project DaCoTA investigates road safety management processes in Europe. It has drafted a model to investigate the state of the art of road safety policy-making and management at the national level and to define “good practice”. The DaCoTA “good practice”

  2. Risk management and safety culture

    Takano, K.

    2007-01-01

    Paper informs on the efforts to elaborate a feedback system for risk comprehensive evaluation and a system to improve structure safety foreseeing the possibility to control the latent risk, ensuring the qualitative evaluation of the safety level and improvement of safety culture in various branches of industry, first and foremost, in the electricity producing sector including the nuclear power industry [ru

  3. Road Infrastructure Safety Management in Poland

    Budzynski, Marcin; Jamroz, Kazimierz; Kustra, Wojciech; Michalski, Lech; Gaca, Stanislaw

    2017-10-01

    The objective of road safety infrastructure management is to ensure that when roads are planned, designed, built and used road risks can be identified, assessed and mitigated. Road transport safety is significantly less developed than that of rail, water and air transport. The average individual risk of being a fatality in relation to the distance covered is thirty times higher in road transport that in the other modes. This is mainly because the different modes have a different approach to safety management and to the use of risk management methods and tools. In recent years Poland has had one of the European Union’s highest road death numbers. In 2016 there were 3026 fatalities on Polish roads with 40,766 injuries. Protecting road users from the risk of injury and death should be given top priority. While Poland’s national and regional road safety programmes address this problem and are instrumental in systematically reducing the number of casualties, the effects are far from the expectations. Modern approaches to safety focus on three integrated elements: infrastructure measures, safety management and safety culture. Due to its complexity, the process of road safety management requires modern tools to help with identifying road user risks, assess and evaluate the safety of road infrastructure and select effective measures to improve road safety. One possible tool for tackling this problem is the risk-based method for road infrastructure safety management. European Union Directive 2008/96/EC regulates and proposes a list of tools for managing road infrastructure safety. Road safety tools look at two criteria: the life cycle of a road structure and the process of risk management. Risk can be minimized through the application of the proposed interventions during design process as reasonable. The proposed methods of risk management bring together two stages: risk assessment and risk response occurring within the analyzed road structure (road network, road

  4. Performance standards of road safety management

    Čabarkapa Milenko R.

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Road safety management controlling means the process of finding out the information whether the road safety is improving in a measure to achieve the objectives. The process of control consists of three basic elements: definition of performances and standards, measurement of current performances and comparison with the set standards, and improvement of current performances, if they deviate from the set standards. The performance standards of road safety management system are focused on a performances measurement, in terms of their design and characteristics, in order to support the performances improvement of road safety system and thus, ultimately, improve the road safety. Defining the performance standards of road safety management system, except that determines the design of the system for performances measurement, directly sets requirements whose fulfillment will produce a road safety improvement. The road safety management system, based on the performance standards of road safety, with a focus on results, will produce the continuous improvement of road safety, achieving the long-term 'vision zero', the philosophy of road safety, that human life and health take priority over mobility and other traffic objectives of the road traffic.

  5. Enhancing NPP Safety Through an Effective Dependability Management

    Vieru, G., E-mail: g_vieru@yahoo.com [AREN, Bucharest (Romania)

    2014-10-15

    Taking into account the importance of the continuous improvement of the performance and reliability of a NPP and practical measures to strengthen nuclear safety and security, it is to be noted that a good management for a nuclear power reactor involves a ''good dependability management'' of the activities, such as: Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) and maintenance support. In order to evaluate certain safety assessment criteria intended to be applied at the level of the nuclear reactor unit management, equipment dependability indicators and their impact over the availability and reactor safety have to be evaluated. Reactor equipment dependability indicators provide a quantitative indication of equipment RAM performances (Reliability, Availability and Maintenance). One of the important benefits of maintenance and failure data gathering is that it can be used as a support of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). Also, a good dependability management implementation may be used to complement reactor level unit performance indicators in the field of safe operation, maintenance and improving operating parameters, as well as for Strengthening Safety and Improving Reliability of a NPP. This paper underlines the importance of nuclear safety and security as prerequisites for nuclear power. In addition, it demonstrates how different technical aspects, through implementation of a good dependability management, contribute to a strengthened safety and an improvement of availability of the NPP through dependability indicators determination and evaluation. (author)

  6. Safety culture and quality management of Kartini research reactor

    Syarip [Yogyakarta Nuclear Research Centre, Yogyakarta (Indonesia); Hauptmanns, Ulrich [Department of Plant Design and Safety, Otto-Von-Guericke-University, Magdeburg (Germany)

    1999-10-01

    The evaluation for assessing the safety culture and quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is presented. The method is based on the concept of management control of safety (audit) as well as by using the developed method i.e. the questionnaires concerning areas of relevance which have to be answered with value statements. There are seven statements or qualifiers in answering the questions. Since such statements are vague, they are represented by fuzzy numbers. The weaknesses can be identified from the different areas contemplated. The evaluation result show that the quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is globally rated as 'Average'. The operator behavior in the implementation of 'safety culture' concept is found as a weakness, therefore this area should be improved. (author)

  7. Safety culture and quality management of Kartini research reactor

    Syarip; Hauptmanns, Ulrich

    1999-01-01

    The evaluation for assessing the safety culture and quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is presented. The method is based on the concept of management control of safety (audit) as well as by using the developed method i.e. the questionnaires concerning areas of relevance which have to be answered with value statements. There are seven statements or qualifiers in answering the questions. Since such statements are vague, they are represented by fuzzy numbers. The weaknesses can be identified from the different areas contemplated. The evaluation result show that the quality of safety management of Kartini research reactor is globally rated as 'Average'. The operator behavior in the implementation of 'safety culture' concept is found as a weakness, therefore this area should be improved. (author)

  8. Swedish REGULATORY APPROACH TO SAFETY Assessment AND SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT

    Frid, W.; Sandervaag, O.

    1997-01-01

    The Swedish regulatory approach to safety assessment and severe accident management is briefly described. The safety assessment program, which focuses on prevention of incidents and accidents, has three main components: periodic safety reviews, probabilistic safety analysis, and analysis of postulated disturbances and accident progression sequences. Management and man-technology-organisation issues, as well as inspections, play a key role in safety assessment. Basis for severe accident management were established by the Government decisions in 1981 and 1986. By the end of 1988, the severe accident mitigation systems and emergency operating procedures were implemented at all Swedish reactors. The severe accident research has continued after 1988 for further verification of the protection provided by the systems and reduction of remaining uncertainties in risk dominant phenomena

  9. Safety Climate of Commercial Vehicle Operation

    2010-03-01

    Enhancing the safety culture within trucking and motor coach industries has become a key area of concern given the potential impact it has on crashes and overall safety. Many organizations recognize that safety is compromised if the culture within th...

  10. [Operating Room Nurses' Experiences of Securing for Patient Safety].

    Park, Kwang Ok; Kim, Jong Kyung; Kim, Myoung Sook

    2015-10-01

    This study was done to evaluate the experience of securing patient safety in hospital operating rooms. Experiential data were collected from 15 operating room nurses through in-depth interviews. The main question was "Could you describe your experience with patient safety in the operating room?". Qualitative data from the field and transcribed notes were analyzed using Strauss and Corbin's grounded theory methodology. The core category of experience with patient safety in the operating room was 'trying to maintain principles of patient safety during high-risk surgical procedures'. The participants used two interactional strategies: 'attempt continuous improvement', 'immersion in operation with sharing issues of patient safety'. The results indicate that the important factors for ensuring the safety of patients in the operating room are manpower, education, and a system for patient safety. Successful and safe surgery requires communication, teamwork and recognition of the importance of patient safety by the surgical team.

  11. Operations management approach to hospitals.

    Harvey, J; Duguay, C R

    1988-06-01

    An operations management systems approach can be a useful tool for coordinating and planning in a complex organization. The authors argue for adapting such an approach to health care from the manufacturing industries in order to facilitate strategy formulation, communication and implementation.

  12. Safety Aspects in Radioactive Waste Management

    Peter W. Brennecke

    2007-01-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, within the framework of national as well as international programmes, notable advances and considerable experience have been reached, particularly in minimising of the production of radioactive wastes, conditioning and disposal of short-lived, low and intermediate level waste, vitrification of fission product solutions on an industrial scale and engineered storage of long-lived high level wastes, i.e. vitrified waste and spent nuclear fuel. Based on such results, near-surface repositories have successfully been operated in many countries. In contrast to that, the disposal of high level radioactive waste is still a scientific and technical challenge in many countries using the nuclear power for the electricity generation. Siting, planning and construction of repositories for the high level wastes in geological formations are gradually advancing. The site selection, the evaluation of feasible sites as well as the development of safety cases and performance of site-specific safety assessments are essential in preparing the realization of such a repository. In addition to the scientific-technical areas, issues regarding economical, environmental, ethical and political aspects have been considered increasingly during the last years. Taking differences in the national approaches, practices and the constraints into account, it is to be recognised that future developments and decisions will have to be extended in order to include further important aspects and, finally, to enhance the acceptance and confidence in the safety-related planning work as well as in the proposed radioactive waste management and disposal solutions.

  13. Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

    1997-02-01

    DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

  14. Risk management model of winter navigation operations

    Valdez Banda, Osiris A.; Goerlandt, Floris; Kuzmin, Vladimir; Kujala, Pentti; Montewka, Jakub

    2016-01-01

    The wintertime maritime traffic operations in the Gulf of Finland are managed through the Finnish–Swedish Winter Navigation System. This establishes the requirements and limitations for the vessels navigating when ice covers this area. During winter navigation in the Gulf of Finland, the largest risk stems from accidental ship collisions which may also trigger oil spills. In this article, a model for managing the risk of winter navigation operations is presented. The model analyses the probability of oil spills derived from collisions involving oil tanker vessels and other vessel types. The model structure is based on the steps provided in the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and adapted into a Bayesian Network model. The results indicate that ship independent navigation and convoys are the operations with higher probability of oil spills. Minor spills are most probable, while major oil spills found very unlikely but possible. - Highlights: •A model to assess and manage the risk of winter navigation operations is proposed. •The risks of oil spills in winter navigation in the Gulf of Finland are analysed. •The model assesses and prioritizes actions to control the risk of the operations. •The model suggests navigational training as the most efficient risk control option.

  15. Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

    Zulkafli Ghazali

    2007-01-01

    Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

  16. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Desnogorsk, in Russia's Smolensk region, for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the team at the request of the Government of the Russian Federation to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 5 to 22 September 2011. The team was made up of experts from China, India, Lithuania, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA, the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Smolensk NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; and Chemistry. Throughout the review, the exchange of information between the OSART experts and plant personnel was very open, professional and productive. The plant's staff were found to be motivated, well trained, knowledgeable and experienced. The OSART team has identified good plant practices which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include the following: Illuminated hot-spot wire to identify higher radiation levels is used in the radiation-controlled area to reduce exposures when working in the controlled area; Modern and state-of-the-art training infrastructure and facilities are available at the plant. These include: maintenance training centre; multimedia simulator for the refueling machine; and safety

  17. Advancement on safety management system of nuclear power for safety and non-anxiety of society

    Yoshikawa, Hidekazu

    2004-01-01

    Advancement on safety management system is investigated to improve safety and non-anxiety of society for nuclear power, from the standpoint of human machine system research. First, the recent progress of R and D works of human machine interface technologies since 1980 s are reviewed and then the necessity of introducing a new approach to promote technical risk communication activity to foster safety culture in nuclear industries. Finally, a new concept of Offsite Operation and Maintenance Support Center (OMSC) is proposed as the core facility to assemble human resources and their expertise in all organizations of nuclear power, for enhancing safety and non-anxiety of society for nuclear power. (author)

  18. Advances in operational safety and severe accident research

    Simola, K. [VTT Automation (Finland)

    2002-02-01

    A project on reactor safety was carried out as a part of the NKS programme during 1999-2001. The objective of the project was to obtain a shared Nordic view of certain key safety issues related to the operating nuclear power plants in Finland and Sweden. The focus of the project was on selected central aspects of nuclear reactor safety that are of common interest for the Nordic nuclear authorities, utilities and research bodies. The project consisted of three sub-projects. One of them concentrated on the problems related to risk-informed deci- sion making, especially on the uncertainties and incompleteness of probabilistic safety assessments and their impact on the possibilities to use the PSA results in decision making. Another sub-project dealt with questions related to maintenance, such as human and organisational factors in maintenance and maintenance management. The focus of the third sub-project was on severe accidents. This sub-project concentrated on phenomenological studies of hydrogen combustion, formation of organic iodine, and core re-criticality due to molten core coolant interaction in the lower head of reactor vessel. Moreover, the current status of severe accident research and management was reviewed. (au)

  19. Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

    Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-06-15

    To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper.

  20. Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

    Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak

    2017-01-01

    To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper

  1. Safety in waste management plants: An Indian perspective

    Shekhar, P.; Ozarde, P.D.; Gandhi, P.M.

    2000-01-01

    Assurance of safety of public and plant workers and protection of the environment are prime objectives in the design and construction of Waste Management Plants. In India, waste management principles and strategies have been evolved in accordance with national and international regulations and standards for radiation protection. The regulations governing radiation protection have a far-reaching impact on the management of the radioactive waste. The wastes arise at each stages of the fuel cycle with varying chemical nature, generation rate and specific activity levels depending upon the type of the facility. Segregation of waste based on its chemical nature and specific activity levels is an essential feature, as its aids in selection of treatment and conditioning process. Selection of the process, equipment and materials in the plant, are governed by safety consideration alongside factors like efficiency and simplicity. The plant design considerations like physical separation, general arrangement, ventilation zoning, access control, remote handling, process piping routing, decontamination etc. have major role in realizing waste safety. Stringent quality control measures during all stages of construction have helped in achieving the design intended safety. These aspects together with operating experience gained form basis for the improved safety features in the design and construction of waste management plants. The comprehensive safety is derived from adoption of waste management strategies and appropriate plant design considerations. The paper briefly brings safety in waste management programme in India, in its current perspective. (author)

  2. Study Of Safety Management By Using Gis In Coimbatore

    S. Kanchana

    2015-08-01

    Full Text Available The safety management is very important in the process of construction .The traditional methods of construction safety control cannot meet the construction of big project. To ensure the safety of construction and reduce accidents in the process of construction the current situation and problems we face in construction safety management should be studied first. And then the project risk warning mechanism based on the GIS is constructed according to the problems we faced to achieve visual monitoring and warning of construction safety risk management and to provide decision support for construction. This project aims to develop a web-based spatial decision support system model for proactive health and safety management in linear construction projects. 5 Currently health and safety management is usually performed reactively instead of proactive management since hazard identification and risk assessment is mostly performed on paper based documents that are not effectively used at site. An information system relates to a chain of operations lead to planning the observation and collection of data to storage and analysis of data to the use of derived information in decision-making processes. To create a web-based free and open sourced GIS that can work with different data formats by exchanging and presenting data as a real-time map on web.

  3. Advances in the operational safety of nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an international symposium

    1996-01-01

    The main purpose of the Conference was to provide a forum for exchange of information among around 200 attending experts from 46 Member States and five international organizations, who altogether presented around 80 papers and posters. The Conference presentations were divided into four main topics: Managing and Regulating Safe Operation; Safety Performance and Lessons Learned; Improving Operational Safety Using PSA; Enhancing Safety. Refs, figs, tabs

  4. Safety evaluation of the Dalat research reactor operation

    Long, V.H.; Lam, P.V.; An, T.K.

    1989-01-01

    After an introduction presenting the essential characteristics of the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor, the document presents i) The safety assurance condition of the reactor, ii) Its safety behaviour after 5 years of operation, iii) Safety research being realized on the reactor. Following is questionnaire of safety evaluation and a list of attachments, which concern the reactor

  5. Safety control and risk management

    Rasmussen, J.

    1987-01-01

    The acceptable probability of major accidents in nuclear power is very small, and can not be determined from direct empirical evidence. Therefore, control of the level of safety is a complex problem. The difficulty is related to the fact that a variable, 'safety', which is not accessible to direct measurement, is to be tightly controlled. Control, therefore, depends on a systematic, analytical prediction of the target state, i.e., the level of safety, from indirect evidence. From a control theoretic point of view this means that safety is controlled by a system which includes openloop as well as closed loop control paths. The aim of the paper is to take a general systems view on the complex mechanisms involved in the control of safety of industrial installations like nuclear power. From this, the role of probabilistic risk analysis is evaluated and needs for further development discussed. (author)

  6. Clinical operations management in radiology.

    Ondategui-Parra, Silvia; Gill, Ileana E; Bhagwat, Jui G; Intrieri, Lisa A; Gogate, Adheet; Zou, Kelly H; Nathanson, Eric; Seltzer, Steven E; Ros, Pablo R

    2004-09-01

    Providing radiology services is a complex and technically demanding enterprise in which the application of operations management (OM) tools can play a substantial role in process management and improvement. This paper considers the benefits of an OM process in a radiology setting. Available techniques and concepts of OM are addressed, along with gains and benefits that can be derived from these processes. A reference framework for the radiology processes is described, distinguishing two phases in the initial assessment of a unit: the diagnostic phase and the redesign phase.

  7. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  8. Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation

    1984-01-01

    This Guide identifies the main objectives and responsibilities of management with respect to safe operation of nuclear power plants. The Guide discusses the factors to be considered in structuring the operating organization to meet these objectives, to establish the management programmes that assure the safety tasks are performed, and to see that the services and facilities needed to accomplish the tasks are available. The Guide is primarily addressed to safety matters directly related to the operating phase. It assumes, in other words, that the safety aspects of siting, design, manufacturing and construction have been resolved. However, it also covers the interrelationships between operations and design, construction and commissioning, including the involvement of the operating organization in appropriate reviews of safety issues with reference to the future operating phase. The Guide is mainly restricted to matters of principle in relation to management-level decision making aimed at establishing safety policies. It is therefore not suitable for implementing such policies at the operational level. The IAEA Codes of Practice and Safety Guides provide detailed guidance for the latter purpose in those areas considered appropriate

  9. Perspectives on managing nuclear safety at Cernavoda NPP past, present and future

    Serban, M.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation considers the following issues: background of Romanian nuclear programme; 1990 management issues involved in Cernavoda project, nuclear safety perspectives; Cernavoda U1 operating organization today (safety related issues); good practices at Cernavoda NPP

  10. Perspectives on managing nuclear safety at Cernavoda NPP past, present and future

    Serban, M [Technical Safety Directorate, Unit 1., Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant (Romania)

    1997-12-01

    The presentation considers the following issues: background of Romanian nuclear programme; 1990 management issues involved in Cernavoda project, nuclear safety perspectives; Cernavoda U1 operating organization today (safety related issues); good practices at Cernavoda NPP.

  11. Managerial competencies in Operations Management

    Carmen Gonzalez-Zapatero

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The main objective of this paper is to develop a method of self-assessment of managerial competencies in Operations Management. Specifically we work the following skills: Analytical Consideration, Planification and organization, Consciousness and teamwork, Adaptability, Assertiveness, Leadership. The empirical evidence shows how some of these abilities are related to the results of the course while no relation was found with the results obtained with the results the rest of the degree.

  12. National Waste Repository Novi Han operational safety analysis report. Safety assessment methodology

    2003-01-01

    The scope of the safety assessment (SA), presented includes: waste management functions (acceptance, conditioning, storage, disposal), inventory (current and expected in the future), hazards (radiological and non-radiological) and normal and accidental modes. The stages in the development of the SA are: criteria selection, information collection, safety analysis and safety assessment documentation. After the review the facilities functions and the national and international requirements, the criteria for safety level assessment are set. As a result from the 2nd stage actual parameters of the facility, necessary for safety analysis are obtained.The methodology is selected on the base of the comparability of the results with the results of previous safety assessments and existing standards and requirements. The procedure and requirements for scenarios selection are described. A radiological hazard categorisation of the facilities is presented. Qualitative hazards and operability analysis is applied. The resulting list of events are subjected to procedure for prioritization by method of 'criticality analysis', so the estimation of the risk is given for each event. The events that fall into category of risk on the boundary of acceptability or are unacceptable are subjected to the next steps of the analysis. As a result the lists with scenarios for PSA and possible design scenarios are established. PSA logical modeling and quantitative calculations of accident sequences are presented

  13. Safety standards of IAEA for management systems

    Vincze, P.

    2005-01-01

    IAEA has developed a new series of safety standards which are assigned for constitution of the conditions and which give the instruction for setting up the management systems that integrate the aims of safety, health, life environment and quality. The new standard shall replace IAEA 50-C-Q - Requirements for security of the quality for safety in nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities as well as 14 related safety instructions mentioned in the Safety series No. 50-C/SG-Q (1996). When developing of this complex, integrated set of requirements for management systems, the IAEA requirements 50-C-Q (1996) were taken into consideration as well as the publications developed within the International organisation for standardization (ISO) ISO 9001:2000 and ISO14001: 1996. The experience of European Union member states during the development, implementation and improvement of the management systems were also taken into consideration

  14. Three essential management processes of nuclear power plant operators

    Qi Tunfeng

    2010-01-01

    The paper takes the operation and management of Qinshan NPP Phase II as an example, focusing on the implementation of the essential process from the following three aspects the NPP production organization, training, examination and authorization for safety-related personnel, and financing budge management. A better understanding and implementation of the essential process will enable nuclear power plants to effectively control the nuclear safety from the most fundamental managerial level. (author)

  15. Cesium legacy safety project management work plan

    Durham, J.S.

    1998-01-01

    This Management Work Plan (MWP) describes the process flow, quality assurance controls, and the Environment, Safety, and Health requirements of the Cesium Legacy Safety Project. This MWP provides an overview of the project goals and methods for repackaging the non-conforming Type W overpacks and packaging the CsCl powder and pellets. This MWP is not intended to apply to other activities associated with the CsCl Legacy Safety Program (i.e., clean out of South Cell)

  16. [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), Safety Management

    Hasan, S M [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), Karachi (Pakistan)

    1997-12-01

    The present regime for CANDU safety management in Pakistan has evolved in line with contemporary international practice, and is essential adequate to ensure the continued safety of KANUPP and other future CANDU reactors, as confirmed by international reviews as well. But the small size of Pakistan nuclear power program poses limitations in developing - expert judgment in analysis of in-service inspection data; and own methodology for CANDU safety analysis.

  17. [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), Safety Management

    Hasan, S.M.

    1997-01-01

    The present regime for CANDU safety management in Pakistan has evolved in line with contemporary international practice, and is essential adequate to ensure the continued safety of KANUPP and other future CANDU reactors, as confirmed by international reviews as well. But the small size of Pakistan nuclear power program poses limitations in developing - expert judgment in analysis of in-service inspection data; and own methodology for CANDU safety analysis

  18. Road safety issues for bus transport management.

    Cafiso, Salvatore; Di Graziano, Alessandro; Pappalardo, Giuseppina

    2013-11-01

    Because of the low percentage of crashes involving buses and the assumption that public transport improves road safety by reducing vehicular traffic, public interest in bus safety is not as great as that in the safety of other types of vehicles. It is possible that less attention is paid to the significance of crashes involving buses because the safety level of bus systems is considered to be adequate. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the knowledge and perceptions of bus managers with respect to safety issues and the potential effectiveness of various technologies in achieving higher safety standards. Bus managers were asked to give their opinions on safety issues related to drivers (training, skills, performance evaluation and behaviour), vehicles (maintenance and advanced devices) and roads (road and traffic safety issues) in response to a research survey. Kendall's algorithm was used to evaluate the level of concordance. The results showed that the majority of the proposed items were considered to have great potential for improving bus safety. The data indicated that in the experience of the participants, passenger unloading and pedestrians crossing near bus stops are the most dangerous actions with respect to vulnerable users. The final results of the investigation showed that start inhibition, automatic door opening, and the materials and internal architecture of buses were considered the items most strongly related to bus passenger safety. Brake assistance and vehicle monitoring systems were also considered to be very effective. With the exception of driver assistance systems for passenger and pedestrian safety, the perceptions of the importance of other driver assistance systems for vehicle monitoring and bus safety were not unanimous among the bus company managers who participated in this survey. The study results showed that the introduction of new technologies is perceived as an important factor in improving bus safety, but a better understanding

  19. Transient management using the safety function approach

    Corcoran, W.R.; Barrow, J.H.; Bischoff, G.C.; Callaghan, V.M.; Pearce, R.T.

    1984-01-01

    The safety function approach is described. Its use in the development of a transient management procedures system includes optimal recovery procedures tailored to specific, anticipated symptom sets and a functional recovery procedure which is more general. Simulator evaluations are described

  20. Managing knowledge and information on nuclear safety

    Hahn, L.

    2005-01-01

    Described is the management of nuclear safety knowledge through education networks, knowledge pool, sharing, archiving and distributing the knowledge information. Demonstrated is the system used at Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherheit

  1. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Safety Management Plan

    Garvin, L.J.

    1996-02-01

    The Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Safety Management Plan describes the new nuclear facility regulatory requirements basis for the Spemt Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project and establishes the plan to achieve compliance with this basis at the new SNF Project facilities

  2. Development of a Novel Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation Method for an Operating Team Using Probabilistic Safety Analysis

    Han, Sangmin; Lee, Seung Min; Seong, Poong Hyun [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    IAEA defined safety culture as follows: 'Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance'. Also, celebrated behavioral scientist, Cooper, defined safety culture as,'safety culture is that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis' with his internal psychological, situational, and behavioral context model. With these various definitions and criteria of safety culture, several safety culture assessment methods have been developed to improve and manage safety culture. To develop a new quantitative safety culture evaluation method for an operating team, we unified and redefined safety culture assessment items. Then we modeled a new safety culture evaluation by adopting level 1 PSA concept. Finally, we suggested the criteria to obtain nominal success probabilities of assessment items by using 'operational definition'. To validate the suggested evaluation method, we analyzed the collected audio-visual recording data collected from a full scope main control room simulator of a NPP in Korea.

  3. Development of a Novel Nuclear Safety Culture Evaluation Method for an Operating Team Using Probabilistic Safety Analysis

    Han, Sangmin; Lee, Seung Min; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2015-01-01

    IAEA defined safety culture as follows: 'Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance'. Also, celebrated behavioral scientist, Cooper, defined safety culture as,'safety culture is that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members direct their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis' with his internal psychological, situational, and behavioral context model. With these various definitions and criteria of safety culture, several safety culture assessment methods have been developed to improve and manage safety culture. To develop a new quantitative safety culture evaluation method for an operating team, we unified and redefined safety culture assessment items. Then we modeled a new safety culture evaluation by adopting level 1 PSA concept. Finally, we suggested the criteria to obtain nominal success probabilities of assessment items by using 'operational definition'. To validate the suggested evaluation method, we analyzed the collected audio-visual recording data collected from a full scope main control room simulator of a NPP in Korea

  4. NIF Operations Management Plan, August 2011

    Van Wonterghem, Bruno M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States). National Ignition Facility (NIF)

    2014-01-30

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL) National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program, whose purpose is to maintain the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our nation’s nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear testing. The NIF is crucial to the Stockpile Stewardship Program because it is the only facility that can create the conditions of extreme temperature and pressure—conditions that exist only in stars or in exploding nuclear weapons—that are relevant to understanding how our modern nuclear weapons operate. As such, the NIF’s primary mission is to attain fusion ignition in the laboratory. Fusion ignition not only supports Stockpile Stewardship needs, but also provides the basis for future decisions about fusion’s potential as a long-term energy source. Additionally, NIF provides scientists with access to high-energy-density regimes that can yield new insight and understanding in the areas of astrophysics, hydrodynamics, material properties, plasma physics, and radiative properties. The use of the NIF to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the advancement of basic high-energy-density science understanding is planned and managed through program-level execution plans and NIF directorate-level management teams. An example of a plan is the National Ignition Campaign Execution Plan. The NIF Operations Management Plan provides an overview of the NIF Operations organization and describes how the NIF is supported by the LLNL infrastructure and how it is safely and responsibly managed and operated. Detailed information on NIF management of the organization is found in a series of supporting plans, policies, and procedures. A list of related acronyms can be found in Appendix A of this document. The purpose of this document is to provide a roadmap of how the NIF Operations organization functions. It provides a guide to understanding the

  5. Operation safety of complex industrial systems. Main concepts

    Zwingelstein, G.

    2009-01-01

    Operation safety consists in knowing, evaluating, foreseeing, measuring and mastering the technological system and human failures in order to avoid their impacts on health and people's safety, on productivity, and on the environment, and to preserve the Earth's resources. This article recalls the main concepts of operation safety: 1 - evolutions in the domain; 2 - failures, missions and functions of a system and of its components: functional failure, missions and functions, industrial processes, notions of probability; 3 - basic concepts and operation safety: reliability, unreliability, failure density, failure rate, relations between them, availability, maintainability, safety. (J.S.)

  6. Leadership style and patient safety: implications for nurse managers.

    Merrill, Katreena Collette

    2015-06-01

    The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between nurse manager (NM) leadership style and safety climate. Nursing leaders are needed who will change the environment and increase patient safety. Hospital NMs are positioned to impact day-to-day operations. Therefore, it is essential to inform nurse executives regarding the impact of leadership style on patient safety. A descriptive correlational study was conducted in 41 nursing departments across 9 hospitals. The hospital unit safety climate survey and multifactorial leadership questionnaire were completed by 466 staff nurses. Bivariate and regression analyses were conducted to determine how well leadership style predicted safety climate. Transformational leadership style was demonstrated as a positive contributor to safety climate, whereas laissez-faire leadership style was shown to negatively contribute to unit socialization and a culture of blame. Nursing leaders must concentrate on developing transformational leadership skills while also diminishing negative leadership styles.

  7. Management implementation plan for a safety analysis and review system

    Hulburt, D.A.; Berkey, B.D.

    1981-04-01

    The US Department of Energy has issued an Order, DOE 5481.1, which establishes uniform requirements for the preparation and review of Safety Analysis for DOE Operations. The Management Implementation Plan specified herein establishes the administrative procedures and technical requirements for implementing DOE 5481.1 to Operations under the cognizance of the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. This Implementation Plan is applicable to all present and future Operations under the cognizance of PETC. The Plan identifies those Operations for which DOE 5481.1 is applicable and those Operations for which no further analysis is required because the initial determination and review has concluded that DOE 5481.1 does not apply

  8. Managing Safety in Small and Medium Enterprises

    Stephen, legg; Olsen, Kirsten Bendix; Ian S., laird

    2015-01-01

    on safety in SMEs, showing how most current policy and legislation on occupational health and safety (OSH) and the work environment is based on large enterprises and that there is a relative paucity of research on OSH in SMEs. In a summary of current knowledge, it is argued that modern OHS legislation......This paper presents a conceptual model for increasing acceptable working environments for SMEs. It also acts as an editorial for the special issue of Safety Science on ‘Managing safety in small and medium enterprises (SMEs)’. It describes how seven of the ten papers in the special issue originate...

  9. Training for operators and plant management

    Laverge, J.; Moroni, J.M.

    1992-01-01

    For many years, EDF has been making a lot of efforts to develop and to provide appropriate training to each of the different categories of personnel who participate in nuclear power plants operation and maintenance. With regard to training related to incidents and accidents management, if is important, among others, to make the difference between training of personnel on shift (plant operating teams and safety engineers) and training of personnel who makes up the emergency response teams that would be called upon in the event of a nuclear accident. Because of different origins, different backgrounds and especially different functions if an accident occurs on a unit, these two populations need completely different trainings. The training that EDF provides to these two categories of personnel is presented separately in the following pages. In both cases, links between functions to be sustained and characteristics of the training are tried to be shown. In conclusion, general perspectives on training evolution in EDF are given. 8 refs

  10. OSART Guidelines. 2015 Edition. Reference Report for IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs)

    2016-01-01

    The IAEA works to provide a global nuclear safety and security framework for the protection of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, the minimization of the likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property, and effective mitigation of the effects of any such events, should they occur. The strategic approach to achieving such a framework involves continual improvement in four areas: national and international safety infrastructures; the establishment and global acceptance of IAEA safety standards; an integrated approach to the provision for the application of the safety standards; and a global network of knowledge and experience. The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation. Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for the safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant also depends ultimately on: sound management, policies, procedures, processes and practices; the capability and reliability of commissioning and operating personnel; comprehensive instructions; sound accident management and emergency preparedness; and adequate resources. Finally, a positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of all staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. The OSART programme is based on the safety standards applicable to nuclear power plants. IAEA safety standards reflect the consensus of Member States on nuclear safety matters. The reports of the International Nuclear Safety Group identify important current nuclear safety issues and also serve as references during an OSART review. The publication OSART Guidelines provides overall guidance on the conduct of OSART

  11. Comparison of Plant Life Management Approaches for Long Term Operations

    Kang, Kisig

    2012-01-01

    Plant life management can be defined as the integration of ageing and economic planning to maintain a high level of safety and optimize operations. Many Member States have given high priority to long term operation of nuclear power plants beyond the time frame originally anticipated (e. g. 30 or 40 years). Out of a total of 445 (369 GWe) operating nuclear power plants, 349 units (297 GWe) have been in operation for more than 20 years (as of November 2011). The need for engineering support to operation, maintenance, safety review and life management for long term operation as well as education and training in the field is increasingly evident. In addition the Fukushima accident has rendered all stake holders even more attentive to safety concerns and to the provision of beyond safety measures in the preparation and scrutiny of applications for operational design life extensions. In many countries, the safety performance of NPPs is periodically followed and characterized via the periodic safety review (PSR) approach. The regulatory The regulatory review and acceptance of the PSR gives the licensee the permission to operate the plant for up to the end of the next PSR cycle (usually 10 years). In the USA and other countries operating US designed plants, the license renewal application is based on the five pre-requisite requirements and ageing management programme for passive long life system structure and components(SSCs) and active systems is adequately addressed by the maintenance rule (MR) requirements and other established regulatory processes. Other Member States have adopted a combined approach that incorporates elements of both PSR and additional LRA specific requirements primarily focused on time limited ageing analysis. Taking into account this variety of approaches, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) initiated work for collecting and sharing information among Member States about good practices on plant life management for long term operation in

  12. Space Station overall management approach for operations

    Paules, G.

    1986-01-01

    An Operations Management Concept developed by NASA for its Space Station Program is discussed. The operational goals, themes, and design principles established during program development are summarized. The major operations functions are described, including: space systems operations, user support operations, prelaunch/postlanding operations, logistics support operations, market research, and cost/financial management. Strategic, tactical, and execution levels of operational decision-making are defined.

  13. Safety management system needs assessment.

    2016-04-01

    The safety of the traveling public is critical as each year there are approximately 200 highway fatalities in Nebraska and numerous crash injuries. The objective of this research was to conduct a needs assessment to identify the requirements of a sta...

  14. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  15. Non-operative management versus operative management in high-grade blunt hepatic injury.

    Cirocchi, Roberto; Trastulli, Stefano; Pressi, Eleonora; Farinella, Eriberto; Avenia, Stefano; Morales Uribe, Carlos Hernando; Botero, Ana Maria; Barrera, Luis M

    2015-08-24

    Surgery used to be the treatment of choice in cases of blunt hepatic injury, but this approach gradually changed over the last two decades as increasing non-operative management (NOM) of splenic injury led to its use for hepatic injury. The improvement in critical care monitoring and computed tomographic scanning, as well as the more frequent use of interventional radiology techniques, has helped to bring about this change to non-operative management. Liver trauma ranges from a small capsular tear, without parenchymal laceration, to massive parenchymal injury with major hepatic vein/retrohepatic vena cava lesions. In 1994, the Organ Injury Scaling Committee of the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma (AAST) revised the Hepatic Injury Scale to have a range from grade I to VI. Minor injuries (grade I or II) are the most frequent liver injuries (80% to 90% of all cases); severe injuries are grade III-V lesions; grade VI lesions are frequently incompatible with survival. In the medical literature, the majority of patients who have undergone NOM have low-grade liver injuries. The safety of NOM in high-grade liver lesions, AAST grade IV and V, remains a subject of debate as a high incidence of liver and collateral extra-abdominal complications are still described. To assess the effects of non-operative management compared to operative management in high-grade (grade III-V) blunt hepatic injury. The search for studies was run on 14 April 2014. We searched the Cochrane Injuries Group's Specialised Register, The Cochrane Library, Ovid MEDLINE(R), Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE(R) Daily and Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R), Embase Classic+Embase (Ovid), PubMed, ISI WOS (SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, CPCI-S & CPSI-SSH), clinical trials registries, conference proceedings, and we screened reference lists. All randomised trials that compare non-operative management versus operative management in high-grade blunt hepatic injury. Two authors independently

  16. Managing Evolving Global Operations Networks

    Mykhaylenko, Alona; Wæhrens, Brian Vejrum; Johansen, John

    2015-01-01

    For many globally dispersed organisations, the home base (HB) is a historic locus of integrative and coordinating efforts that safeguard overall performance. However, the dynamism of global operations networks is increasingly pulling the centre of gravity away from the HB and dispersing it across...... the network, challenging the HB’s ability to sustain its centrality over time. To counteract this tendency, this paper addresses the gap in the literature regarding the development of the network management capability of the HB within the context of its network. Data was collected through a retrospective...... longitudinal case study of an intra-organisational operations network of one OEM and its three foreign subsidiaries. The findings suggest a row of strategic roles and corresponding managerial capabilities, which the HB needs to develop depending on the changing subsidiaries’ competencies and HB...

  17. Safety culture improvement. An adaptive management framework

    Obadia, Isaac Jose

    2005-01-01

    After the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established the safety culture concept as a proactive mean to contribute to safety improvement, starting a worldwide safety culture enhancement program within nuclear organizations mainly focused on nuclear power plants. More recently, the safety culture concept has been extended to non-power applications such as nuclear research reactors and nuclear technological research and development organizations. In 1999, the Nuclear Engineering Institute (IEN), a research and technological development unit of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), started a management change program aiming at improving its performance level of excellence. This change program has been developed assuming the occurrence of complex causal inter-relationships between the organizational culture and the implementation of the management process. A systematic and adaptive management framework comprised of a safety culture improvement practice integrated to a management process based on the Criteria for Excellence of the Brazilian Quality Award Model, has been developed and implemented at IEN. The case study has demonstrated that the developed framework makes possible an effective safety culture improvement and simultaneously facilitates an effective implementation of the management process, thus providing some governance to the change program. (author)

  18. Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation

    Kueffer, K.

    1980-01-01

    This lecture covers management aspects which have an immediate bearing on safety and identifies the objectives and tasks of management which are required for safe operation of a nuclear power plant and is based on the Codes of Practice and Safety Guides of the IAEA as well as arrangements in use at the Swiss Nuclear Power Station Beznau. This lecture - discusses the factors to be considered in structuring the operating organization, the support to be provided to plant management, the services and facilities needed and the management system for assuring the safety tasks are performed - describes the responsibilities of plant management and operating organization - outlines the requirements for recruitment, training and retraining as well as qualification and authorization of personnel - describes the programmes for maintenance, testing, examination, inspection, radiological protection, quality assurance, waste management, fuel management, emergency arrangement and security - describes the development of plant operating procedures including procedures to protect the personnel - outlines the requirements for initial and subsequent operation - describes the importance for evaluation and feedback of operating experience - describes the procedures for changes in hardware, procedures and set points - outlines the information flow and the requirements in reference to records and reports. (orig./RW)

  19. International conference on the operational safety performance in nuclear installations. Contributed papers

    2005-01-01

    In 2001, the IAEA organized an 'International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety'. The issues discussed during the conference were: (1) risk- informed decision-making; (2) influence of external factors on safety; (3) safety of fuel cycle facilities; (4) safety of research reactors; and (5) safety performance indicators. Senior nuclear safety decision makers reviewed the issues and formulated recommendations for future actions by national and international organizations. In 2004, the IAEA organized an 'International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety' in Beijing China. The issues discussed during the conference were: (1) changing environment - coping with diversity and globalization; (2) operating experience - managing changes effectively; (3) regulatory management systems - adapting to changes in the environment; and (4) long term operations - maintaining safety margins while extending plant lifetimes. The results of this conference confirmed the importance of operators and regulators of nuclear facilities meeting periodically to share experience and opinion on emerging issues and future challenges of the nuclear industry. Substantial progress has been made, and continues to be made by Member States in enhancing the safety of nuclear installations worldwide. At the same time, more attention is being given to other areas of nuclear safety. The safety standards for research reactors are being updated and new standards are planned on the safety of other facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. The Agency has taken a lead role in this effort and is receiving much support from its Member States to gain international consensus in these areas. The objective of the conference is to foster the exchange of information on operational safety performance and operating experience in nuclear installations, with the aim of consolidating an international consensus on: - the present status of these issues; - emerging issues with international implications

  20. Knowledge management for nuclear industry operating organizations

    2006-10-01

    The nuclear energy sector is characterized by lengthy time frames and technical excellence. Early nuclear plants were designed to operate for 40 years but their service life now frequently extends between 50 and 60 years. Decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear plants will also be spread over several years resulting in a life cycle - from cradle to grave - in excess of 100 years, which gives rise to two challenges for the nuclear industry: (1) Retention of existing skills and competencies for a period of over fifty years, particularly in countries where no new nuclear power plants are being planned; and (2) Development of new skills and competencies in the areas of decommissioning and radioactive waste management in many industrialized countries if younger workers cannot continue to be attracted to the nuclear disciplines. As many nuclear experts around the world are retiring, they are taking with them a substantial amount of knowledge and corporate memory. Typically, these retirees are individuals who can answer questions very easily and who possess tacit knowledge never before extracted from them. The loss of such employees who hold knowledge critical to either operations or safety poses a clear internal threat to the safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Therefore, the primary challenge of preserving such knowledge is to determine how best to capture tacit knowledge and transfer it to successors. These problems are exacerbated by the deregulation of energy markets around the world. The nuclear industry is now required to reduce its costs dramatically in order to compete with generators that have different technology life cycle profiles. In many countries, government funding has been dramatically reduced or has disappeared altogether while the profit margins of generators have been severely squeezed. The result has been lower electricity prices but also the loss of expertise as a result of downsizing to reduce salary costs, a loss of

  1. Safety culture management and quantitative indicator evaluation

    Mandula, J.

    2002-01-01

    This report discuses a relationship between safety culture and evaluation of quantitative indicators. It shows how a systematic use of generally shared operational safety indicators may contribute to formation and reinforcement of safety culture characteristics in routine plant operation. The report also briefly describes the system of operational safety indicators used at the Dukovany plant. It is a PC database application enabling an effective work with the indicators and providing all users with an efficient tool for making synoptic overviews of indicator values in their links and hierarchical structure. Using color coding, the system allows quick indicator evaluation against predefined limits considering indicator value trends. The system, which has resulted from several-year development, was completely established at the plant during the years 2001 and 2002. (author)

  2. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  3. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se

    2016-01-01

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  4. ASN guide project. Safety policy and management in INBs (base nuclear installations)

    2010-01-01

    This guide presents the recommendations of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in the field of safety policy and management (PMS) for base nuclear installations (INBs). It gives an overview and comments of some prescriptions of the so-called INB order and PMS decision. These regulatory texts define a framework for provisions any INB operator must implement to establish his safety policy, to define and implement a system which allows the safety to be maintained, the improvement of his INB safety to be permanently looked for. The following issues are addressed: operator's safety policy, identification of elements important for safety, of activities pertaining to safety, and of associated requirements, safety management organization and system, management of activities pertaining to safety, documentation and archiving

  5. Automatic road traffic safety management system in urban areas

    Oskarbski Jacek

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Traffic incidents and accidents contribute to decreasing levels of transport system reliability and safety. Traffic management and emergency systems on the road, using, among others, automatic detection, video surveillance, communication technologies and institutional solutions improve the organization of the work of various departments involved in traffic and safety management. Automation of incident management helps to reduce the time of a rescue operation as well as of the normalization of the flow of traffic after completion of a rescue operation, which also affects the reduction of the risk of secondary accidents and contributes to reducing their severity. The paper presents the possibility of including city traffic departments in the process of incident management. The results of research on the automatic incident detection in cities are also presented.

  6. Application of Grey Theory in Operator Management

    Xu, Hong

    2011-01-01

    Scientific and reasonable operator management is the basis of nuclear security. It was paid more attention after the three-mile island accident. The prediction of operators' basic behavior parameters is the premise and foundation of scientific and reasonable operator management. Grey theory happens to solve the dilemma encountered in prediction and decision-making of operator behavior in operator management of NPP. The procedure is divided into two steps: according to the history record of operators' behavior parameter, a differential equation model using grey theory is set up to predict the future behavior of operators and use grey theory to make decision for operator management. The calculation result is helpful for operator management and also useful for operators to find their shortcoming. Grey theory using in the study provides a new idea and method for future operator management in NPP

  7. Integrated therapy safety management system

    Podtschaske, Beatrice; Fuchs, Daniela; Friesdorf, Wolfgang

    2013-01-01

    Aims The aim is to demonstrate the benefit of the medico-ergonomic approach for the redesign of clinical work systems. Based on the six layer model, a concept for an ‘integrated therapy safety management’ is drafted. This concept could serve as a basis to improve resilience. Methods The concept is developed through a concept-based approach. The state of the art of safety and complexity research in human factors and ergonomics forms the basis. The findings are synthesized to a concept for ‘integrated therapy safety management’. The concept is applied by way of example for the ‘medication process’ to demonstrate its practical implementation. Results The ‘integrated therapy safety management’ is drafted in accordance with the six layer model. This model supports a detailed description of specific work tasks, the corresponding responsibilities and related workflows at different layers by using the concept of ‘bridge managers’. ‘Bridge managers’ anticipate potential errors and monitor the controlled system continuously. If disruptions or disturbances occur, they respond with corrective actions which ensure that no harm results and they initiate preventive measures for future procedures. The concept demonstrates that in a complex work system, the human factor is the key element and final authority to cope with the residual complexity. The expertise of the ‘bridge managers’ and the recursive hierarchical structure results in highly adaptive clinical work systems and increases their resilience. Conclusions The medico-ergonomic approach is a highly promising way of coping with two complexities. It offers a systematic framework for comprehensive analyses of clinical work systems and promotes interdisciplinary collaboration. PMID:24007448

  8. AMNT 2014. Key Topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 1

    Schaffrath, Andreas

    2014-01-01

    Summary report on one session of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Safety of Nuclear Installations - Methods, Analysis, Results: Backfittings for the Improvement of Safety and Efficiency. The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' will be covered in further issues of atw.

  9. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  10. Radiation safety management system in a radioactive facility

    Amador, Zayda H.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: This paper illustrates the Cuban experience in implementing and promoting an effective radiation safety system for the Centre of Isotopes, the biggest radioactive facility of our country. Current management practice demands that an organization inculcate culture of safety in preventing radiation hazard. The aforementioned objectives of radiation protection can only be met when it is implemented and evaluated continuously. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important to implement radiation safety policy efficiently. Maintaining and improving safety culture is a continuous process. There is a need to establish a program to measure, review and audit health and safety performance against predetermined standards. All those areas of the radiation protection program are considered (e.g. licensing and training of the staff, occupational exposure, authorization of the practices, control of the radioactive material, radiological occurrences, monitoring equipment, radioactive waste management, public exposure due to airborne effluents, audits and safety costs). A set of indicators designed to monitor key aspects of operational safety performance are used. Their trends over a period of time are analyzed with the modern information technologies, because this can provide an early warning to plant management for searching causes behind the observed changes. In addition to analyze the changes and trends, these indicators are compared against identified targets and goals to evaluate performance strengths and weaknesses. A structured and proper radiation self-auditing system is seen as a basic requirement to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety. The integrated safety management system establishment has been identified as a goal and way for the continuous improvement. (author)

  11. Development of safety function assessment trees for pressurized heavy water reactor LP/SD operations

    Yang, Hui Chang; Chung, Chang Hyun; Kim, Ki Yong; Jee, Moon Hak; Sung, Chang Kyoung

    2003-01-01

    The objective of Configuration Risk Management Program(CRMP) is to maintain the safety level by assuring the defense-in-depth of nuclear power plant while the configurations are changed during plant operations, especially for the LP/SD. Such a safety purpose can be achieved by establishing the risk monitoring programs with both quantitative and qualitative features. Generally, the quantitative risk evaluation models, i.e., PRA models are used for the risk evaluation during full power operation, and the qualitative risk evaluation models such as safety function assessment trees are used. Through this study, safety function assessment trees were developed

  12. Fatigue Management in Spaceflight Operations

    Whitmire, Alexandra

    2011-01-01

    Sleep loss and fatigue remain an issue for crewmembers working on the International Space Station, and the ground crews who support them. Schedule shifts on the ISS are required for conducting mission operations. These shifts lead to tasks being performed during the biological night, and sleep scheduled during the biological day, for flight crews and the ground teams who support them. Other stressors have been recognized as hindering sleep in space; these include workload, thinking about upcoming tasks, environmental factors, and inadequate day/night cues. It is unknown if and how other factors such as microgravity, carbon dioxide levels, or increased radiation, may also play a part. Efforts are underway to standardize and provide care for crewmembers, ground controllers and other support personnel. Through collaborations between research and operations, evidenced-based clinical practice guidelines are being developed to equip flight surgeons with the tools and processes needed for treating circadian desynchrony (and subsequent sleep loss) caused by jet lag and shift work. The proper implementation of countermeasures such as schedules, lighting protocols, and cognitive behavioral education can hasten phase shifting, enhance sleep and optimize performance. This panel will focus on Fatigue Management in Spaceflight Operations. Speakers will present on research-based recommendations and technologies aimed at mitigating sleep loss, circadian desynchronization and fatigue on-orbit. Gaps in current mitigations and future recommendations will also be discussed.

  13. Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

  14. Workplace safety management as correlates of wellbeing among ...

    Workplace safety management as correlates of wellbeing among factory ... working in manufacturing firms do not enjoy the desirable level of wellbeing ... Keywords: employees' wellbeing, safety management, workers safety training, design of ...

  15. Operational safety performance of Slovak NPPs in 2005

    Tomek, J.

    2006-01-01

    In this presentation author presents operational safety performance of Slovak NPPs in 2005. Operation of Slovak NPPs in 2005 was safe and reliable, with: - high level of performance low risk; - minimal impact on the personnel, environment and public; - positive attitude to safety.

  16. International comparison of safety criteria applied to radwaste repositories. Safety aspects of the post-operational phase

    Baltes, B.

    1994-01-01

    There is a generally accepted system of framework safety conditions governing the construction, operation, and post-operational monitoring of radwaste repositories. Although the development of these framework conditions may vary from country to country, the resulting criteria are based on the commonly accepted system of priciples and purposes established for ultimate radioactive waste disposal. The experience accumulated by GRS in the course of the plan approval procedure for the Konrad mine site and the safety-relevant studies performed for the planned Morsleben repository clearly show demand for further development of the safety criteria. In Germany, it is especially the safety criteria and detailed requirements filling the framework safety conditions that need revision and in-depth definition, as well as comparison and harmonisation with internationally applied criteria. These activities will particularly consider the international convention on radioactive waste management currently in preparation under the auspieces of the IAEA. (orig.) [de

  17. Long-term safety issues associated with mixer pump operation

    Kubic, W.L. Jr.

    1994-01-01

    In this report, we examine several long-term issues: the effect of pump operation on future gas release events (GREs), uncontrolled chemical reactions, chronic toxic gas releases, foaming, and erosion and corrosion. Heat load in excess of the design limit, uncontrolled chemical reactions, chronic toxic gas releases, foaming, and erosion and corrosion have been shown not to be safety concerns. The effect of pump operation on future GREs could not be quantified. The problem with evaluating the long-term effects of pump operation on GREs is a lack of knowledge and uncertainty. In particular, the phenomena governing gas retention, particle size distribution, and settling are not well understood, nor are the interactions among these factors understood. There is a possibility that changes in these factors could increase the size of future GREs. Bounding estimates of the potential increase in size of GREs are not possible because of a lack of engineering data. Proper management of the hazards can reduce, but not eliminate, the possibility of undesirable changes. Maintaining temperature within the historical limits can reduce the possibility of undesirable changes. A monitoring program to detect changes in the gas composition and crust thickness will help detect slowly occurring changes. Because pump operation has be shown to eliminate GREs, continued pump operation can eliminate the hazards associated with future GREs

  18. 76 FR 35130 - Pipeline Safety: Control Room Management/Human Factors

    2011-06-16

    ...: Control Room Management/Human Factors AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration... the Control Room Management/Human Factors regulations in order to realize the safety benefits sooner... FR 5536). By this amendment to the Control Room Management/Human Factors (CRM) rule, an operator must...

  19. LMFBR operational safety: the EBR-II experience

    Sackett, J.I.; Allen, N.L.; Dean, E.M.; Fryer, R.M.; Larson, H.A.; Lehto, W.K.

    1978-01-01

    The mission of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) has evolved from that of a small LMFBR demonstration plant to a major irradiation-test facility. Because of that evolution, many operational-safety issues have been encountered. The paper describes the EBR-II operational-safety experience in four areas: protection-system design, safety-document preparation, tests of off-normal reactor conditions, and tests of elements with breached cladding

  20. Predisposal management of high level radioactive waste. Safety guide

    2005-01-01

    Radioactive waste is generated in the generation of electricity in nuclear power plants and in the use of radioactive material in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized. The principles and requirements that govern the safety of the management of radioactive waste are presented in 'The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management', 'Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety' and 'Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, Including Decommissioning'. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide regulatory bodies and the operators that generate and manage radioactive waste with recommendations on how to meet the principles and requirements established in Refs for the predisposal management of HLW. This Safety Guide applies to the predisposal management of HLW. For liquid HLW arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel the recommendations of this Safety Guide apply from when liquid waste from the first extraction process is collected for storage and subsequent processing. Recommendations and guidance on the storage of spent fuel, whether or not declared as waste, subsequent to its removal from the storage facility of a reactor are provided in Refs. For spent fuel declared as waste this Safety Guide applies to all activities subsequent to its removal from the storage facility of a reactor and prior to its disposal. Requirements pertaining to the transport of spent fuel, whether or not declared as waste, and of all forms of HLW are established. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the safety aspects of managing HLW, including the planning, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of equipment or facilities for the predisposal management of HLW. It addresses the following elements: (a) The characterization and processing (i.e. pretreatment

  1. Safety parameter display system: an operator support system for enhancement of safety in Indian PHWRs

    Subramaniam, K.; Biswas, T.

    1994-01-01

    Ensuring operational safety in nuclear power plants is important as operator errors are observed to contribute significantly to the occurrence of accidents. Computerized operator support systems, which process and structure information, can help operators during both normal and transient conditions, and thereby enhance safety and aid effective response to emergency conditions. An important operator aid being developed and described in this paper, is the safety parameter display system (SPDS). The SPDS is an event-independent, symptom-based operator aid for safety monitoring. Knowledge-based systems can provide operators with an improved quality of information. An information processing model of a knowledge based operator support system (KBOSS) developed for emergency conditions using an expert system shell is also presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the design issues involved in the use of a knowledge based systems for real time safety monitoring and fault diagnosis. (author). 8 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab

  2. Safety of radioactive waste management. Proceedings of an international conference

    2000-01-01

    The principal objective of the Conference was to enable members of the scientific community and representatives of facilities which produce radioactive waste, of bodies responsible for radioactive waste management, of nuclear regulatory bodies and of public interest groups, among others, to engage in an open dialogue. The open dialogue which took place may, by providing policy and decision makers with a basis for political action, prove to be an important step in the search for the international consensus so essential in the area of radioactive waste management. The relevant policies and activities of the IAEA, the European Commission, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the World Health Organization were presented. The evolution, under the aegis of the IAEA, of a de facto international radiation and nuclear safety regime was noted. In the area of radioactive waste safety, this regime consists of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the body of international waste safety standards established by the IAEA and other international organizations, and the IAEA's mechanisms for providing for the application of those standards. The topics covered by the Conference were: Current international co-operative efforts; Recommendations from the International Commission on Radiological Protection; Recommendations from the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group; Conclusions and recommendations of the International Symposium on the Restoration of Environments with Radioactive Residues; Siting of radioactive waste management facilities; Participation of interested parties; Legislative and general radiation safety aspects; Removal of material from regulatory control (exclusion, exemption and clearance); Predisposal management (dilution, recycling, transmutation, etc.); Near surface disposal; Residues from the mining and processing of radioactive ores; Long term institutional control; Geological disposal

  3. An introduction to a new IAEA safety guide: 'ageing management for nuclear power plants'

    Pachner, J.; Inagaki, T.; Kang, K.S.

    2008-01-01

    This paper reports on a new IAEA Safety Guide entitled 'Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants' which is currently in an advanced draft form, awaiting approval of publication. The new Safety Guide will be an umbrella document for a comprehensive set of guidance documents on ageing management which have been issued by the IAEA. The Safety Guide first presents basic concepts of ageing management as a common basis for the recommendations on: proactive management of ageing throughout the life cycle of a nuclear power plant (NPP); systematic approach to managing ageing in the operation of NPPs; managing obsolescence; and review of ageing management for long term operation (life extension). The Safety Guide is intended to assist operators in establishing, implementing and improving systematic ageing management programs in NPPs and may be used by regulators in preparing regulatory standards and guides, and in verifying that ageing in nuclear power plants is being effectively managed. (author)

  4. Stringent cost management and preservation of safety culture, a contradiction?

    Petersen, Klaus; Pamme, H.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Competition in the deregulated electricity market does not leave nuclear power plants unaffected. Hence the question is to answer, whether the safety is going to suffer under the cost pressure on the market. Therefore the target of NPP operator's cost management is to run plants at maximum availability and with optimized cost structures that lead to minimized specific generating costs. The c osts of safety , with their fixed-cost character, are elements of this cost structure. The process of economic optimization of the cost structure does not permit cost minimization on its own sake in the area of operation cost and fuel cost (front and back end). The basis of economical assessment rather must be the minimization of potential risks which could entail losses of availability. However, many investments like plant modifications or preventive maintenance efforts made in order to avoid losses of availability to a large extent also imply at least a preservation or even higher levels of safety. Thus, economic efficiency and safety are closely correlated. Public opinion is very sensible as soon as the high level of plant safety seems to be touched by economic pressure. But realizing that German NPP are endowed with mature design and safety features, improvements of safety standards can only marginally be increased by further technical optimizations. Therefore plant management, man-machine-interface and the individual behaviour of the employees are targets for improvement of nuclear safety and economic efficiency by increasing the efficiency of processes. An even more efficient use of scarce funds and a tolerable political environment should allow the safety level of NPP to be upheld, and safety culture could be maintained and even be improved. (author)

  5. The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Guide

    2009-01-01

    This Safety Guide is applicable throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, including any subsequent period of institutional control, until there is no significant residual radiation hazard. For a nuclear installation, the lifetime includes site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. These stages in the lifetime of a nuclear installation may overlap. This Safety Guide may be applied to nuclear installations in the following ways: (a)To support the development, implementation, assessment and improvement of the management system of those organizations responsible for research, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation; (b)As an aid in the assessment by the regulatory body of the adequacy of the management system of a nuclear installation; (c)To assist an organization in specifying to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any specific element that should be included within the supplier's management system for the supply of products. This Safety Guide follows the structure of the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities, whereby: (a)Section 2 provides recommendations on implementing the management system, including recommendations relating to safety culture, grading and documentation. (b)Section 3 provides recommendations on the responsibilities of senior management for the development and implementation of an effective management system. (c)Section 4 provides recommendations on resource management, including guidance on human resources, infrastructure and the working environment. (d)Section 5 provides recommendations on how the processes of the installation can be specified and developed, including recommendations on some generic processes of the management system. (e)Section 6 provides recommendations on the measurement, assessment and improvement of the management system of a nuclear installation. (f

  6. The Management System for Nuclear Installations. Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Guide is applicable throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, including any subsequent period of institutional control, until there is no significant residual radiation hazard. For a nuclear installation, the lifetime includes site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. These stages in the lifetime of a nuclear installation may overlap. This Safety Guide may be applied to nuclear installations in the following ways: (a) To support the development, implementation, assessment and improvement of the management system of those organizations responsible for research, site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear installation; (b) As an aid in the assessment by the regulatory body of the adequacy of the management system of a nuclear installation; (c) To assist an organization in specifying to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any specific element that should be included within the supplier's management system for the supply of products. This Safety Guide follows the structure of the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities, whereby: (a) Section 2 provides recommendations on implementing the management system, including recommendations relating to safety culture, grading and documentation. (b) Section 3 provides recommendations on the responsibilities of senior management for the development and implementation of an effective management system. (c) Section 4 provides recommendations on resource management, including guidance on human resources, infrastructure and the working environment. (d) Section 5 provides recommendations on how the processes of the installation can be specified and developed, including recommendations on some generic processes of the management system. (e) Section 6 provides recommendations on the measurement, assessment and improvement of the management system of a nuclear

  7. Mobility management and road safety.

    2012-01-01

    Mobility management stands for organizing 'smart travel' and focuses on reducing the amount of car mobility (particularly during peak hours) by stimulating travellers to refrain from travelling (telecommuting), to travel at a different time of day (avoiding peak hours) or to choose a different means

  8. Improving Operational Risk Management Using Business Performance Management Technologies

    Bram Pieket Weeserik; Marco Spruit

    2018-01-01

    Operational Risk Management (ORM) comprises the continuous management of risks resulting from: human actions, internal processes, systems, and external events. With increasing requirements, complexity and a growing volume of risks, information systems provide benefits for integrating risk management activities and optimizing performance. Business Performance Management (BPM) technologies are believed to provide a solution for effective Operational Risk Management by offering several combined ...

  9. Project safety studies - nuclear waste management (PSE)

    1981-10-01

    The project 'Safety Studies-Nuclear Waste Management' (PSE) is a research project performed by order of the Federal Minister for Research and Technology, the general purpose of which is to deepen and ensure the understanding of the safety aspects of the nuclear waste management and to prepare a risk analysis which will have to be established in the future. Owing to this the project is part of a series of projects which serve the further development of the concept of nuclear waste management and its safety, and which are set up in such a way as to accompany the realization of that concept. This report contains the results of the first stage of the project from 1978 to mid-1981. (orig./RW) [de

  10. Intranet-based safety documentation in management of major hazards and occupational health and safety.

    Leino, Antti

    2002-01-01

    In the European Union, Council Directive 96/82/EC requires operators producing, using, or handling significant amounts of dangerous substances to improve their safety management systems in order to better manage the major accident potentials deriving from human error. A new safety management system for the Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant in Helsinki, Finland, was implemented in this study. The system was designed to comply with both the new safety liabilities and the requirements of OHSAS 18001 (British Standards Institute, 1999). During the implementation phase experiences were gathered from the development processes in this small organisation. The complete documentation was placed in the intranet of the plant. Hyperlinks between documents were created to ensure convenience of use. Documentation was made accessible for all workers from every workstation.

  11. Institutional failure: are safety management systems the answer?

    Waddington, J.G.; Lafortune, J.F. [International Safety Research, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Duffey, R.B. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada)

    2009-07-01

    In spite of an overwhelming number of safety management programs, incidents and accidents that could seemingly, in hindsight, have been prevented, still occur. Institutional failure is seen as a major contributor in almost all cases. With the anticipated significant increase in the number of nuclear plants around the world, a drastic step in the way we manage safety is deemed essential to further reduce the currently already very low rate of accidents to levels that will not cause undue public concern and threaten the success of the nuclear 'renaissance'. To achieve this, many industries have already started implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) approach, aimed at harmonizing, rationalizing and integrating management processes, safety culture and operational risk assessment. This paper discusses the origins and the nature of SMS based in part on the experience of the aviation industry, and shows how SMS is poised to be the next generation in the way the nuclear industry manages safety. It also discusses the need for better direct measures of risk to demonstrate the success of SMS implementation. (author)

  12. Institutional failure: are safety management systems the answer?

    Waddington, J.G.; Lafortune, J.F.; Duffey, R.B.

    2009-01-01

    In spite of an overwhelming number of safety management programs, incidents and accidents that could seemingly, in hindsight, have been prevented, still occur. Institutional failure is seen as a major contributor in almost all cases. With the anticipated significant increase in the number of nuclear plants around the world, a drastic step in the way we manage safety is deemed essential to further reduce the currently already very low rate of accidents to levels that will not cause undue public concern and threaten the success of the nuclear 'renaissance'. To achieve this, many industries have already started implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) approach, aimed at harmonizing, rationalizing and integrating management processes, safety culture and operational risk assessment. This paper discusses the origins and the nature of SMS based in part on the experience of the aviation industry, and shows how SMS is poised to be the next generation in the way the nuclear industry manages safety. It also discusses the need for better direct measures of risk to demonstrate the success of SMS implementation. (author)

  13. Attitudes to teamwork and safety among Italian surgeons and operating room nurses.

    Prati, Gabriele; Pietrantoni, Luca

    2014-01-01

    Previous studies have shown that surgical team members' attitudes about safety and teamwork in the operating theatre may play a role in patient safety. The aim of this study was to assess attitudes about teamwork and safety among Italian surgeons and operating room nurses. Fifty-five surgeons and 48 operating room nurses working in operating theatres at one hospital in Italy completed the Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire (ORMAQ). Results showed several discrepancies in attitudes about teamwork and safety between surgeons and operating room nurses. Surgeons had more positive views on the quality of surgical leadership, communication, teamwork, and organizational climate in the theatre than operating room nurses. Operating room nurses reported that safety rules and procedures were more frequently disregarded than the surgeons. The results are only partially aligned with previous ORMAQ surveys of surgical teams in other countries. The differences emphasize the influence of national culture, as well as the particular healthcare system. This study shows discrepancies on many aspects in attitudes to teamwork and safety between surgeons and operating room nurses. The findings support implementation and use of team interventions and human factor training. Finally, attitude surveys provide a method for assessing safety culture in surgery, for evaluating the effectiveness of training initiatives, and for collecting data for a hospital's quality assurance programme.

  14. 76 FR 1504 - Pipeline Safety: Establishing Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure or Maximum Operating Pressure...

    2011-01-10

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No... Mitigation AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); DOT. ACTION: Notice... system. To that end, the Hazardous Liquid and Gas Transmission Pipeline Integrity Management (IM...

  15. Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

    Goicea, Lucian

    2012-01-01

    Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

  16. Safety Culture in Pre-operational Phases of Nuclear Power Plant Projects

    NONE

    2012-09-15

    An abundance of information exists on safety culture related to the operational phases of nuclear power plants; however, pre-operational phases present unique challenges. This publication focuses on safety culture during pre-operational phases that span the interval from before a decision to launch a nuclear power programme to first fuel load. It provides safety culture insights and focuses on eight generic issues: safety culture understanding; multicultural aspects; leadership; competencies and resource competition; management systems; learning and feedback; cultural assessments; and communication. Each issue is discussed in terms of: specific challenges; desired state; approaches and methods; and examples and resources. This publication will be of interest to newcomers and experienced individuals faced with the opportunities and challenges inherent in safety culture programmes aimed at pre-operational activities.

  17. Safety Culture in Pre-operational Phases of Nuclear Power Plant Projects

    2012-01-01

    An abundance of information exists on safety culture related to the operational phases of nuclear power plants; however, pre-operational phases present unique challenges. This publication focuses on safety culture during pre-operational phases that span the interval from before a decision to launch a nuclear power programme to first fuel load. It provides safety culture insights and focuses on eight generic issues: safety culture understanding; multicultural aspects; leadership; competencies and resource competition; management systems; learning and feedback; cultural assessments; and communication. Each issue is discussed in terms of: specific challenges; desired state; approaches and methods; and examples and resources. This publication will be of interest to newcomers and experienced individuals faced with the opportunities and challenges inherent in safety culture programmes aimed at pre-operational activities.

  18. LNG TERMINAL SAFE OPERATION MANAGEMENT

    Andrzej ADAMKIEWICZ; Włodzimierz KAMIŃSKI

    2012-01-01

    This article presents the significance of LNG terminal safety issues in natural gas sea transport. It shows particular requirements for LNG transmission installations resulting from the specific properties of LNG. Out of the multi‐layer critical safety areas comprising structural elements of the terminal safety system, possibilities to decrease the risk of emergency occurrence on LNG terminals have been selected. Tasks performed by the LNG terminal, together with its own personnel and the out...

  19. LNG TERMINAL SAFE OPERATION MANAGEMENT

    Andrzej ADAMKIEWICZ

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available This article presents the significance of LNG terminal safety issues in natural gas sea transport. It shows particular requirements for LNG transmission installations resulting from the specific properties of LNG. Out of the multi‐layer critical safety areas comprising structural elements of the terminal safety system, possibilities to decrease the risk of emergency occurrence on LNG terminals have been selected. Tasks performed by the LNG terminal, together with its own personnel and the outside one, have been defined. General theses for LNG terminal safety have been formulated.

  20. 49 CFR 192.909 - How can an operator change its integrity management program?

    2010-10-01

    ... (Continued) PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) PIPELINE SAFETY TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL AND OTHER GAS BY PIPELINE: MINIMUM FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Gas Transmission Pipeline Integrity Management § 192.909 How can an operator change its integrity management...

  1. Integrated environment, safety, and health management system description

    Zoghbi, J. G.

    2000-01-01

    The Integrated Environment, Safety, and Health Management System Description that is presented in this document describes the approach and management systems used to address integrated safety management within the Richland Environmental Restoration Project

  2. Advanced safety management systems for maintenance of pipeline integrity

    Borysiewicz, M.; Potempski, S.

    2005-01-01

    One of the duties of the pipeline's operator is to introduce means for protection of human safety and the environment. This should be reflected in preparation of comprehensive Risk Management System with its key element Activity Programme for Management of Pipeline Integrity. In the paper such programme has been described taking into account law regulations and practical activities undertaken in technologically advanced countries (mainly USA and EU), where such solutions are implemented in routine operations. Possible solutions of realization of all elements of the programme, as well as information on utilization of computer aided support have been also included. (authors)

  3. Knowledge management and networking for enhancing nuclear safety

    Taniguchi, T.; Lederman, L.

    2004-01-01

    Striving for innovative solutions to enhance efficiency of programme delivery and a wider outreach of its nuclear safety activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed an Integrated Safety Approach as a platform for linking its safety related statutory functions and its many associated activities. The approach recognizes the vital importance of effective management of the knowledge base and builds on the integration between the IAEA's safety standards and all aspects of the provision for their application, including peer reviews and technical meetings to share lessons learned. The IAEA is using knowledge management techniques to develop process flows, map safety knowledge and to promote knowledge sharing. The first practical application was the establishment of a knowledge base related to safety aspects of ageing and long-term operation of nuclear power plants. The IAEA is also promoting and facilitating the establishment of regional nuclear and radiation safety networks to preserve existing knowledge and expertise as well as to strengthen sharing and creation of new knowledge in these fields. Prominent examples are the Asian Nuclear Safety Network established in the frame of the IAEA's Programme on the Safety of Nuclear Installations in South East Asia, Pacific and Far East Countries, and the Ibero-American Radiation Safety Network in the frame of the Ibero-American Forum of Nuclear Regulators. Results to date are most encouraging and suggest that this pioneer work should be extended to other regions and eventually to a global nuclear safety network. Responsive to the need of Member States, the IAEA Secretariat has prepared and made available a large number of up-to-date training packages in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety, using IAEA safety standards as a basis. It is also providing instruction to trainers in Member States on the use of these modules. This ensures that the material is properly used and that the IAEA

  4. Safety margins of operating reactors. Analysis of uncertainties and implications for decision making

    2003-01-01

    Maintaining safety in the design and operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is a very important task under the conditions of a challenging environment, affected by the deregulated electricity market and implementation of risk informed regulations. In Member States, advanced computer codes are widely used as safety analysis tools in the framework of licensing of new NPP projects, safety upgrading programmes of existing NPPs, periodic safety reviews, renewal of operating licences, use of the safety margins for reactor power uprating, better utilization of nuclear fuel and higher operational flexibility, for justification of lifetime extensions, development of new emergency operating procedures, analysis of operational events, and development of accident management programmes. The issue of inadequate quality of safety analysis is becoming important due to a general tendency to use advanced tools for better establishment and utilization of safety margins, while the existence of such margins assure that NPPs operate safely in all modes of operation and at all times. The most important safety margins relate to physical barriers against release of radioactive material, such as fuel matrix and fuel cladding, reactor coolant system boundary, and the containment. Typically, safety margins are determined with use of computational tools for safety analysis. Advanced best estimate computer codes are suggested e.g. in the IAEA Safety Guide on Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants to be used for current safety analysis. Such computer codes require their careful application to avoid unjustified reduction in robustness of the reactor safety. The issue of uncertainties in safety analyses and their impact on evaluation of safety margins is addressed in a number of IAEA guidance documents, in particular in the Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. It is also discussed in various technical meetings and workshops devoted to this area. The

  5. Safety Culture for Regulator Competence Management in Embarking States

    Kandil, M.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: Safety is based on preventive actions where the ability of a regulatory body to fulfill its responsibilities depends largely on the competence of its staff. Building employees’ skills and knowledge is an investment for each employee and in the future of the organization. This building must be the competence of its staff integration with their safety culture, the essential to ensure competent human resources as required in the IAEA safety standards and other documents, in which the need and importance of ensuring regulatory competence is emphasized. As it involves both operational and management issues, safety culture is a sensitive topic for regulators whose role is to ensure compliance with safety requirements and not to intervene in management decisions. A number of embarking States are aspiring to develop nuclear power generation and this means that, among other things, regulatory bodies have to be established and rapidly expanded. This paper reports major considerations on the integration of safety culture with an adequate competence management system for regulators in embarking states. (author

  6. ILK statement about the regulatory authorities' perception of operators' self-assessment of safety culture

    2005-01-01

    Over the past few years, German licensing and supervisory authorities have devoted increasing attention to safety management and safety culture issues. At present, German plant operators are introducing systems for self-assessment of the safety culture in their plants, such as the Safety Culture Assessment System developed by VGB Power Tech (VGB-SBS). In its statement, the International Committee on Nuclear Technology (ILK) addresses an effective approach of the authorities in evaluating the self-assessment of safety culture conducted by operators. ILK proposes a total of ten recommendations for evaluating the self-assessment system of the operators by the authority. The regulatory authorities should see to it that the operators establish a self-assessment system for aspects of organization and personnel, and use it continuously. The measures derived from this self-assessment by the operators, and the reasons underlying them, should be discussed with the authorities. In addition to the operators, also the regulatory authorities and the technical expert organizations commissioned by them should carry out self-assessments of their respective supervisory activities, taking into account also special events, such as changes in government, and develop appropriate programs of measures to be taken. In evaluating safety culture, the regulatory authorities should strive to support the activities of operators in improving their safety culture. A spirit of mutual confidence and cooperation should exist between operators and authorities. The recommendations expressed in the statement deliberately leave room for detailed implementation by the parties concerned. (orig.)

  7. Mastery of risks and operational safety, risks and opportunities

    2004-01-01

    Creating socially useful richness is certainly the prime reason for companies to exist. Reaching this always moving target leads to seize opportunities and to take risks at the same time. For companies, risks and opportunities are two indissociable factors. Any decision making has to deal with an uncertain environment with random events of technological, economical, biological, human, environmental or natural origin. Because of the fear of uncertainty, risk acts as a brake to initiatives. In front of this problem, companies have to adopt a prevention policy based on a global and systemic approach, by identifying, evaluating, quantifying, sorting, mastering and managing unwanted events and by communicating about the way to treat them. In front of uncertainties, the operational safety, thanks to its methods and tools, supplies an incomparable contribution in the form of an help to any decision made with uncertainties. Operational safety contributes to the evaluation of costs and makes more realistic the economical estimations by taking into account the foreseeable and unforeseeable risks. The mastery of unwanted events, of their stakes and uncertainties, allows companies to carry out their projects in non-determined contexts and in a competitive environment. This colloquium concerns all socio-economical actors: industrialists, investors, decision makers, university and laboratory staffs, etc., who need a better evaluation of risks for a better mastery of their decisions in all sectors of activity. Seventeen papers of this conference, dealing with safety analysis and risk assessment at nuclear facilities and at other energy-related facilities, have been selected for Inis. (J.S.)

  8. FLIGHT SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND EVALUATION OF FLIGHT SAFETY LEVEL OF AN AVIATION ENTERPRISE

    B. V. Zubkov

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available This article is devoted to studying the problem of safety management system (SMS and evaluating safety level of an aviation enterprise.This article discusses the problems of SMS, presented at the 41st meeting of the Russian Aviation Production Commanders Club in June 2014 in St. Petersburg in connection with the verification of the status of the CA of the Russian Federation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO in the same year, a set of urgent measures to eliminate the deficiencies identified in the current safety management system by participants of this meeting were proposed.In addition, the problems of evaluating flight safety level based on operation data of an aviation enterprise were analyzed. This analysis made it possible to take into account the problems listed in this article as a tool for a comprehensive study of SMS parameters and allows to analyze the quantitative indicators of the flights safety level.The concepts of Acceptable Safety Level (ASL indicators are interpreted differently depending on the available/applicable methods of their evaluation and how to implement them in SMS. However, the indicators for assessing ASL under operational condition at the aviation enterprise should become universal. Currently, defined safety levels and safety indicators are not yet established functionally and often with distorted underrepresented models describing their contextual contents, as well as ways of integrating them into SMS aviation enterprise.The results obtained can be used for better implementation of SMS and solving problems determining the aviation enterprise technical level of flight safety.

  9. Development of a Safety Assessment Information System for the Management of Periodic Safety Assessment Activities

    Song, Tae Young

    2007-01-01

    At present, the 10-year Periodic Safety Review(PSR) has been performing to confirm all the aspects of safety issues for all the operating plants in compliance with domestic nuclear law of article 23, subarticle 3. For each plant, in addition, Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) and Severe Accident Management Guideline(SAMG) are being implemented and revised periodically to reflect the latest safety level according to principle fulfillment of severe accident policy statement. The assessment reports, as one of outcomes from these activities, are submitted into and reviewed by domestic regulatory body. During reviewing (in-office duty) and licensing (regulatory duty) process, a large number of outcomes of which most are the formal technical reports and licensing materials, are inevitably produced. Moreover, repeated review process over the plants can make them accumulated and produce a variety of documents additionally. This circumstance motivates to develop effective tool or system for the management of these reports and related technical documents for the future use in licensing process and for subsequent plant assessments. This paper presents the development status of Safety Assessment Information System(SAIS) which manages safety-related documents of PSR, PSA and SAMG for practical use for experienced engineers in charge of these areas

  10. Development of a Safety Assessment Information System for the Management of Periodic Safety Assessment Activities

    Song, Tae Young [Nuclear Engineering and Technology Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2007-07-01

    At present, the 10-year Periodic Safety Review(PSR) has been performing to confirm all the aspects of safety issues for all the operating plants in compliance with domestic nuclear law of article 23, subarticle 3. For each plant, in addition, Probabilistic Safety Assessment(PSA) and Severe Accident Management Guideline(SAMG) are being implemented and revised periodically to reflect the latest safety level according to principle fulfillment of severe accident policy statement. The assessment reports, as one of outcomes from these activities, are submitted into and reviewed by domestic regulatory body. During reviewing (in-office duty) and licensing (regulatory duty) process, a large number of outcomes of which most are the formal technical reports and licensing materials, are inevitably produced. Moreover, repeated review process over the plants can make them accumulated and produce a variety of documents additionally. This circumstance motivates to develop effective tool or system for the management of these reports and related technical documents for the future use in licensing process and for subsequent plant assessments. This paper presents the development status of Safety Assessment Information System(SAIS) which manages safety-related documents of PSR, PSA and SAMG for practical use for experienced engineers in charge of these areas.

  11. JET Tokamak, preparation of a safety case for tritium operations

    Boyer, Helen, E-mail: helen.boyer@ccfe.ac.uk [CCFE, Culham Science Centre (United Kingdom); Plummer, David; Johnston, Jane [CCFE, Culham Science Centre (United Kingdom)

    2016-11-01

    Highlights: • A safety case incorporating technical and ITER related upgrades. • Hazard analysis reworked to include new modelling assessments. • Fitness for purpose assessment of safety controls. - Abstract: A new Safety Case is required to permit tritium operations on JET during the forthcoming DTE2 campaign. The outputs, benefits and lessons learned associated with the production of this Safety Case are presented. The changes that have occurred to the Safety Case methodology since the last JET tritium Safety Case are reviewed. Consideration is given to the effects of modifications, particularly ITER related changes, made to the JET and the impact these have on the hazard assessments as well as normal operations. Several specialized assessments, including recent MELCOR modelling, have been undertaken to support the production of this Safety Case and the impact of these assessments is outlined. Discussion of the preliminary actions being taken to progress implementation of this Safety Case is provided, highlighting new methods to improve the dissemination of the key Safety Case results to the plant operators. Finally, the work required to complete this Safety Case, before the next tritium campaign, is summarized.

  12. INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES

    Volodymyr Kharchenko

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with the analysis of the researches conducted in the field of safety management systems.Safety management system framework, methods and tools for safety analysis in Air Traffic Control have been reviewed.Principles of development of Integrated safety management system in Air Traffic Services have been proposed.

  13. Contribution of operating feedback to probabilistic safety studies

    Guio, J.M. de; Lannoy, A.

    1992-03-01

    This paper presents the method used for PWR unit operation feedback analysis and its contribution to probabilistic safety studies. The targets were as follows: - use of failure data banks to assess reliability parameters, - use of event data banks to identify and quantify main system initiating events, - determination of a standard operating profile. These studies, performed in the context of nuclear power plant safety programs, prove useful not only to safety engineers but also to equipment experts, designers, operators and maintenance specialists. They constitute basic data for studies in all these areas or the departure point for new investigations. (authors). 3 figs., 3 tabs., 3 refs

  14. On Safety Management. A Frame of Reference for Studies of Safety Management with Examples From Non-Nuclear Contexts of Relevance for Nuclear Safety

    Svensson, Ola; Salo, Ilkka; Allwin, Pernilla

    2004-11-01

    A good knowledge about safety management from risk technologies outside the area of nuclear power may contribute to both broaden the perspectives on safety management in general, and point at new opportunities for improving safety measures within the nuclear industry. First, a theoretical framework for the study of safety management in general is presented, followed by three case studies on safety management from different non-nuclear areas with potential relevance for nuclear safety. The chapters are written as separate reports and can be read independently of each other. The nuclear industry has a long experience about the management of risky activities, involving all the stages from planing to implementation, both on a more generalized level and in the specific branches of activities (management, administration, operation, maintenance, etc.). Here, safety management is a key concept related to these areas of activities. Outside the field of nuclear power there exist a number of different non-nuclear risk technologies, each one with their own specific needs and experiences about safety management. The differences between the areas consist partly of the different experiences caused by the different technologies. Besides using own experiences in safety practices within the own areas of activities, it may be profitable to take advantage in knowledge and experiences from one area and put it in practice in another area. In order to facilitate knowledge transfer from one technological area to another it may be possible to adapt a common theoretical model, for descriptions and explanations, to the different technologies. Such a model should admit that common denominators for safety management across the areas might be identified and described with common concepts. Systems theory gives the opportunity to not only create models that are descriptive for events within the limits of a given technology, but also to generate knowledge that can be transferred to other

  15. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  16. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  17. VVER operational safety improvements: lessons learnt from European co-operation and future research needs

    Pazdera, F.; Vasa, I.; Zd'arek, J.

    2003-01-01

    The paper summarises involvement of Nuclear Research Institute Rez (NRI) in the areas which are directly related to Reactor Operational Safety and Plant Life Management, it also gives an idea how results of the research projects can be used to enhance safety of VVER reactors. These issues are for many years subject of a wide international co-operation effort, covered by such programmes as PHARE, OECD/NEA TACIS, 5th Framework Programme. Nuclear Research Institute participated in the majority of these programmes and projects, which allowed us to evaluate benefits (especially for VVER reactors) of the projects already finalised or running, as well as to formulate so-called 'future research needs', which possibly may be pursued within 6th Framework Programme. The paper highlights the main features of some projects our Institute was and is involved in, emphasising the most important results, expectations and future needs. It also very briefly, deals with some general and particular lessons learnt within these projects and their application to VVER reactors, especially as to their safety improvement. The paper also mentions VVER-focused projects and activities, co-ordinated by the OECD, which should enable to extend multilateral contacts already existing between organisations of the EU countries to include organisations from Russia, USA, Japan and possibly some other countries

  18. Food safety and total quality management

    Barendsz, A.W.

    1998-01-01

    Food safety is a growing global concern not only because of its continuing importance for public health but also because of its impact on international trade. The application of total quality management (TQM) provides the best possible care by continuously improving products and services to meet or

  19. The company's management puts priority on safety

    Tomek, J.

    2006-01-01

    On 29-30 June, 2006, the training for workers of the Slovenske elektrarne, a. s. was organized to explain the most important management safety aspects on leadership awareness (Nuclear Leadership Awareness Course). The course was held at the regional consultation center in Jaslovske Bohunice. (author)

  20. Fire Safety. Managing School Facilities, Guide 6.

    Department for Education and Employment, London (England). Architects and Building Branch.

    This booklet discusses how United Kingdom schools can manage fire safety and minimize the risk of fire. The guide examines what legislation school buildings must comply with and covers the major risks. It also describes training and evacuation procedures and provides guidance on fire precautions, alarm systems, fire fighting equipment, and escape…

  1. A holistic view on Safety Management

    Jørgensen, Kirsten

    to prevent accidents is to identify the risks in all kinds of situations and take precautions by establishing safety barriers either technically or by improving the processes involved in managing these barriers, as well as bringing about behavioral improvements through good leadership. A project initiated...

  2. 76 FR 14592 - Safety Management System; Withdrawal

    2011-03-17

    ...), Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 494...). The FAA also chartered the Safety Management System Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) (Order No..., including the ANPRM. On March 31, 2010, the ARC submitted its report to the FAA. As a result of the...

  3. Evaluation of food safety management systems in Serbian dairy industry

    Igor Tomašević

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper reports incentives, costs, difficulties and benefits of food safety management systems implementation in the Serbian dairy industry. The survey involved 27 food business operators with the national milk and dairy market share of 65 %. Almost two thirds of the assessed dairy producers (70.4 % claimed that they had a fully operational and certified HACCP system in place, while 29.6 % implemented HACCP, but had no third party certification. ISO 22000 was implemented and certified in 29.6 % of the companies, while only 11.1 % had implemented and certified IFS standard. The most important incentive for implementing food safety management systems for Serbian dairy producers was to increase and improve safety and quality of dairy products. The cost of product investigation/analysis and hiring external consultants were related to the initial set-up of food safety management system with the greatest importance. Serbian dairy industry was not greatly concerned by the financial side of implementing food safety management systems due to the fact that majority of prerequisite programmes were in place and regularly used by almost 100 % of the producers surveyed. The presence of competency gap between the generic knowledge for manufacturing food products and the knowledge necessary to develop and implement food safety management systems was confirmed, despite the fact that 58.8 % of Serbian dairy managers had university level of education. Our study brings about the innovation emphasizing the attitudes and the motivation of the food production staff as the most important barrier for the development and implementation of HACCP. The most important identified benefit was increased safety of dairy products with the mean rank scores of 6.85. The increased customer confidence and working discipline of staff employed in food processing were also found as important benefits of implementing/operating HACCP. The study shows that the level of HACCP

  4. A Safety Management Model for FAR 141 Approved Flight Schools

    Mendonca, Flavio A. C.; Carney, Thomas Q

    2017-01-01

    The Safety Management Annex (Annex 19), which became applicable in November 2013, consolidates safety management provisions previously contained in six other International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexes, and will serve as a resource for overarching state safety management responsibilities. Through Annex 19, ICAO has required that its member states develop and implement safety management systems (SMS) to improve safety. This mandate includes an approved training organization that i...

  5. Environmental issues in operations management

    Muthulingam, Suresh

    Adoption of sustainable operating practices is becoming an increasingly important issue for many organizations in the world today. In this dissertation, I use empirical methods to investigate factors that influence the adoption of sustainable practices and also identify issues that may hinder the adoption of such practices. I explore these issues in two diverse settings. In Chapter 1, I investigate the adoption and non-adoption of energy efficiency initiatives using a database of over 100,000 recommendations provided to more than 13,000 small and medium sized manufacturing firms. Even though the average payback across all recommendations is just over one year, many of these profitable opportunities are not implemented. Using a probit instrumental variable model, I identify four biases in the adoption of these recommendations. First, managers are myopic as they miss out on many profitable opportunities. Second, managers are more influenced by upfront costs than by net benefits when evaluating such initiatives. Third, adoption of a recommendation depends not only on its characteristics but also on the sequence in which the recommendations are presented. Adoption rates are higher for initiatives appearing early in a list of recommendations. Finally, adoption is not influenced by the number of options provided to decision makers. This contributes to the debate about whether or not choice overload occurs. We highlight decision biases previously unobserved in the Operations Management literature using field data rather than experimental data. We draw implications for enhancing adoption of energy efficiency initiatives and for other decision contexts where a collection of process improvement recommendations are made to firms. In Chapter 2, I examine the depth of adoption of the voluntary LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) standards for green buildings. Depth of adoption refers to the extent to which the buildings adopt practices related to the standard

  6. Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

    Woollam, P.B.; Cameron, H.M.; Davies, A.R.; Hiscox, A.W.

    1995-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment methodology has been applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

  7. Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

    Woollam, P.B.

    1993-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment methodology is being applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results from facilities used by the first 16 reactors is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

  8. AMNT 2014. Key Topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 1

    Schaffrath, Andreas [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS), Garching (Germany). Forschungszentrum

    2014-10-15

    Summary report on one session of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Safety of Nuclear Installations - Methods, Analysis, Results: Backfittings for the Improvement of Safety and Efficiency. The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' will be covered in further issues of atw.

  9. Communication's Role in Safety Management and Performance for the Road Safety Practices

    Salim Keffane (s)

    2014-01-01

    Communication among organizations could play an important role in increasing road safety. To get in-depth knowledge of its role, this study measured managers' and employees' perceptions of the communication's role on six safety management and performance criteria for road safety practices by conducting a survey using a questionnaire among 165 employees and 135 managers. Path analysis using AMOS-19 software shows that some of the safety management road safety practices have high correlation wi...

  10. A basis for sound management-plant-operator interface

    Oak, H.D.

    1983-01-01

    Sound management-plant-operator interface is based on the application of suitable quality assurance principles. Quality assurance can aptly be termed ''putting priority and emphasis where such are due''. Accordingly, the application of suitable quality assurance principles achieves the all-important combination of both safety and production. Neither of these is mutually exclusive of the other, and both together establish the prime foundation for long-term nuclear power plant operation. This paper presents the application of suitable quality assurance principles to the management, the plant, the operators, and the interface between them. (author)

  11. Risk and Work Configuration Management as a Function of Integrated Safety Management

    Lana Buehrer; Michele Kelly; Fran Lemieux; Fred Williams

    2007-01-01

    National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), has established a work management program and corresponding electronic Facilities and Operations Management Information System (e-FOM) to implement Integrated Safety Management (ISM). The management of work scopes, the identification of hazards, and the establishment of implementing controls are reviewed and approved through electronic signatures. Through the execution of the program and the implementation of the electronic system, NSTec staff work within controls and utilize feedback and improvement process. The Integrated Work Control Manual further implements the five functions of ISM at the Activity level. By adding the Risk and Work Configuration Management program, NSTec establishes risk acceptance (business and physical) for liabilities within the performance direction and work management processes. Requirements, roles, and responsibilities are specifically identified in the program while e-FOM provides the interface and establishes the flowdown from the Safety Chain to work and facilities management processes to company work-related directives, and finally to Subject Matter Expert concurrence. The Program establishes, within the defined management structure, management levels for risk identification, risk mitigation (controls), and risk acceptance (business and physical) within the Safety Chain of Responsibility. The Program also implements Integrated Safeguards and Security Management within the NSTec Safety Chain of Responsibility. Once all information has been entered into e-FOM, approved, and captured as data, the information becomes searchable and sortable by hazard, location, organization, mitigating controls, etc

  12. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues.

  13. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues

  14. Safety management and public spaces: restoring balance.

    Ball, David J; Ball-King, Laurence

    2013-05-01

    Since 2000, the reputation of health and safety in the United Kingdom has been tarnished, so much so that it has become the subject of both a media circus and a government inquiry. This not only threatens the worthy goals of health and safety, but also impacts upon the associated tool of risk assessment itself such that "risk assessment" is increasingly seen by the public at large as a term inviting ridicule, even abuse. The main thrust of the government's examination of health and safety has been its concern that safety requirements were placing a disproportionate burden on business. However, there is another source of discontent, which is public chagrin over the impact of injury control measures upon life beyond the conventional workplace, in particular upon the public spaces that people frequent in their leisure time and on the activities they engage in there. This article provides a perspective on this second dimension of the crisis in confidence. It describes how many U.K. agencies with responsibilities for a wide portfolio of public amenities ranging from the provision of play spaces for the young to the management of publicly accessible countryside, the maintenance of urban and rural trees, the stewardship of sites of cultural heritage, and the pursuit of outdoor educational activities have responded to some conflicts posed to their services by the new safety culture. It concludes with a discussion of implications for the management of public space and for risk assessment itself. © 2012 Society for Risk Analysis.

  15. RATU2, research for safety and operability

    Solin, J.

    1998-01-01

    The Finnish research programme on the structural integrity of nuclear power plants, RATU2 was launched in 1995 for four years to coordinate the independent national research and development work aiming for structural safety in NPP's. The general planning and goal setting of the programme was based on the research need assessment and evaluation of the previous RATU programme. The research plans have been updated and refined annually on the basis of available funding. The RATU2 programme is briefly introduced in this paper. The role of RATU2 in the national nuclear energy research field, the research areas, administrative data, main objectives and future plans are reported in this paper

  16. Renewal of JOYO plant operation management expert tool (JOYPET)

    Okawa, Toshikatsu; Aita, Tsuyoshi; Murakami, Takanori; Ito, Hideaki; Aoki; Hiroshi; Oda, Toshihiro

    2004-03-01

    JOYO Plant Operation Management Expert Tool system named JOYPET has been developed with the aim of confirming the stable and safety operation of JOYO and improving operational reliability in future FBR plants. New JOYPET system was designed and manufactured in 2002, and began on operation in 2003, because the former system, which was designed in 1988 and operated from 1991 to 2002, was superannuated, and it was difficult to obtain alternative hardwares and replace parts. The difference between the former system and the later new one was adopted the web-online system to use LAN (Local Area Network) instead of the host and the terminal computer system. Then the new system enabled to take unitary document management for reactor operation, and each person was able to search, refer and make document on line directly. This paper summarized the new JOYPET system design, manufacturing, system constitution and operation actual result. (author)

  17. OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS FOR REDUCING NOISE AND THE SAFETY OF AIR OPERATIONS

    Anna KWASIBORSKA

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Many European airports are located in close proximity to residential or protected areas. Aircraft noise emissions caused by the landing and taking off of aircraft are a big problem in these areas. From an operational point of view, the method for reducing noise is to reduce traffic volume or change its organization, especially during the night. Some procedures and tools have been developed to support air traffic management in the implementation of operational constraints necessary to maintain noise at an acceptable level. The objective of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of these tools. For this purpose, we have analysed existing methods of operational noise reduction, taking into account their influence on the structure, smoothness, punctuality and, especially, the safety of air traffic. As a result, existing risks have been identified, while methods have been proposed to combine two important air traffic service tasks: ensuring safety, while taking into account the environmental constraints, especially in relation to the acoustic climate.

  18. Drug Safety Crises Management in Pharmacovigilance

    Gloria Shalviri

    2018-05-01

    Full Text Available Background: Adverse drug events can cause serious consequences including death. A published report by Lazarou et al in 1998 showed that adverse drug events were the 4th to 6th leading cause of death in the United States. These events may lead to drug safety crises in some issues, which need to take crises management process for solving the problem and/or preventing similar events.Objectives: To evaluate nature of drug safety crises based on adverse events reported to Iranian Pharmacovigilance Center from 1999 through 2012. To mention success and failure outcomes of crises management process taken against detected crises.Methods: All adverse drug events received by Iranian Pharmacovigilance Center from 1999 through 2012 were evaluated for reports with fatal outcome. All alerting letters and manuscripts published by the Center during the same period were reviewed for detailed information on detected crises. World Health Organization definition was used for detecting drug safety crises.Results: Among 42036 registered cases in our database, 463 deaths were recorded. The most frequent suspected drug for adverse events with fatal outcome was ceftriaxone (100 cases. Ten different drug safety crises issues were detected during the study period and their successful or failure outcomes were evaluated. There were 112 issued alerting letters and 17 published manuscript during the same period which was monitored for detailed information.  Conclusion: It is necessary for national pharmacovigilance centers to have prepared programs for crises management. This could be useful for reducing drug related mortality.

  19. Statement on safety requirements concerning the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station

    2012-12-01

    This report published by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI investigates the safety requirements with respect to the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station in Switzerland. Relevant international requirements and Swiss legal stipulations concerning the long-term operation of the power station are stated. The management of aging processes is looked at. The regular verification of the integrity of various plant components such as containments, piping, steam generation system, etc. is looked at in detail. The state-of-the-art concerning deterministic accident analyses and refitting technology are discussed, as are automated safety systems. The applicable laws, decrees and guidelines are listed in appendices

  20. Proceedings of the High Consequence Operations Safety Symposium

    1994-12-01

    Many organizations face high consequence safety situations where unwanted stimuli due to accidents, catastrophes, or inadvertent human actions can cause disasters. In order to improve interaction among such organizations and to build on each others` experience, preventive approaches, and assessment techniques, the High Consequence Operations Safety Symposium was held July 12--14, 1994 at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The symposium was conceived by Dick Schwoebel, Director of the SNL Surety Assessment Center. Stan Spray, Manager of the SNL System Studies Department, planned strategy and made many of the decisions necessary to bring the concept to fruition on a short time scale. Angela Campos and about 60 people worked on the nearly limitless implementation and administrative details. The initial symposium (future symposia are planned) was structured around 21 plenary presentations in five methodology-oriented sessions, along with a welcome address, a keynote address, and a banquet address. Poster papers addressing the individual session themes were available before and after the plenary sessions and during breaks.

  1. Safety operation of training reactor VR-1

    Matejka, K.

    2001-01-01

    There are three nuclear research reactors in the Czech Republic in operation now: light water reactor LVR-15, maximum reactor power 10 MW t , owner and operator Nuclear Research Institute Rez; light water zero power reactor LR-0, maximum reactor power 5 kW t , owner and operator Nuclear Research Institute Rez and training reactor VR-1 Sparrow, maximum reactor power 5 kW t , owner and operate Faculty of Nuclear Sciences and Physical Engineering, CTU in Prague. The training reactor VR-1 Vrabec 'Sparrow', operated at the Faculty of Nuclear Sciences and Physical Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague, was started up on December 3, 1990. Particularly it is designed for training the students of Czech universities, preparing the experts for the Czech nuclear programme, as well as for certain research work, and for information programmes in the nuclear programme, as well as for certain research work, and for information programmes in sphere of using the nuclear energy (public relations). (author)

  2. EDF Skills Management for Operations

    Poizat, Christophe

    2014-01-01

    Training Standards: EDF Nuclear Generation Training Strategy & Fundamentals for Managing Competencies - Adaptation of INPO ACAD02-001: 1 – Management of Competencies; 2 – Training Management for Performance Improvement; 3 – Management of Training Processes & Resources; 4 – Initial Training; 5 – Continuing Training; 6 – Training Implementation & Trainee Evaluation; 7 – Training Effectiveness Evaluation; 8 – Engagement of NPP’s Personnel in Competencies

  3. Arianespace Launch Service Operator Policy for Space Safety (Regulations and Standards for Safety)

    Jourdainne, Laurent

    2013-09-01

    Since December 10, 2010, the French Space Act has entered into force. This French Law, referenced as LOS N°2008-518 ("Loi relative aux Opérations Spatiales"), is compliant with international rules. This French Space Act (LOS) is now applicable for any French private company whose business is dealing with rocket launch or in orbit satellites operations. Under CNES leadership, Arianespace contributed to the consolidation of technical regulation applicable to launch service operators.Now for each launch operation, the operator Arianespace has to apply for an authorization to proceed to the French ministry in charge of space activities. In the files issued for this purpose, the operator is able to justify a high level of warranties in the management of risks through robust processes in relation with the qualification maintenance, the configuration management, the treatment of technical facts and relevant conclusions and risks reduction implementation when needed.Thanks to the historic success of Ariane launch systems through its more than 30 years of exploitation experience (54 successes in a row for latest Ariane 5 launches), Arianespace as well as European public and industrial partners developed key experiences and knowledge as well as competences in space security and safety. Soyuz-ST and Vega launch systems are now in operation from Guiana Space Center with identical and proved risks management processes. Already existing processes have been slightly adapted to cope with the new roles and responsibilities of each actor contributing to the launch preparation and additional requirements like potential collision avoidance with inhabited space objects.Up to now, more than 12 Ariane 5 launches and 4 Soyuz-ST launches have been authorized under the French Space Act regulations. Ariane 5 and Soyuz- ST generic demonstration of conformity have been issued, including exhaustive danger and impact studies for each launch system.This article will detail how Arianespace

  4. Improvements in operational safety performance of the Magnox power stations

    Marchese, C.J. [BNFL Magnox Generation, Berkeley (United Kingdom)

    2000-10-01

    In the 43 years since commencement of operation of Calder Hall, the first Magnox power station, there remain eight Magnox stations and 20 reactors still in operation, owned by BNFL Magnox Generation. This paper describes how the operational safety performance of these stations has significantly improved over the last ten years. This has been achieved against a background of commercial competition introduced by privatization and despite the fact that the Magnox base design belongs to the past. Finally, the company's future plans for continued improvements in operational safety performance are discussed. (author)

  5. Heat sink management during CANDU low level operation

    Wang Liansheng

    2008-01-01

    This paper introduces the practice of low-level operation with opening on the main heat transport system during an outage for a Candu-6 nuclear power plant, analyses the risks of losing heat sink during this condition, and points out the safety measures and management requirement for controlling such risks. This paper can be used as a reference for improving and optimizing the heat sink management for the coming outages. (author)

  6. Operational safety performance indicator system at the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant - Experience with indicator aggregation

    Mandula, J.

    2001-01-01

    The operational safety performance indicators serve as an important tool of performance monitoring and management at the Dukovany NPP. A software-supported system has been developed, which has included: data collection, central data storage, graphic output production and periodical report generation. Analyses of performance indicator trends together with evaluation in respect of annually updated target values and acceptance criteria are used for operational safety reviews forming an integral part of continual self-assessment process. This contribution has been focused on experience obtained during development of the operational safety assessment model using indicator aggregation. It summarises problems that had to be paid specific attention in the development process. Thanks to their solution, the model has become a synoptic monitor and a useful tool for operational safety assessment. (author)

  7. Application of life-cycle information for advancement in safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Application of safety information to advanced safety management support system

    Suzuki, Kazuhiko; Ishida, Michihiko

    2005-08-01

    Risk management is major concern to nuclear energy reprocessing plants to improve plant and process reliability and ensure their safety. This is because we are required to predict potential risks before any accident or disaster occurs. The advancement of safety design and safety systems technologies showed large amount of useful safety-related knowledge that can be of great importance to plant operation to reduce operation risks and ensure safety. This research proposes safety knowledge modeling framework on the basis of ontology technologies to systematically construct plant knowledge model, which includes plant structure, operation, and the associated behaviors. In such plant knowledge model safety related information is defined and linked to the different elements of plant knowledge model. Ontology editor is employed to define the basic concepts and their inter-relations, which are used to capture and construct plant safety knowledge. In order to provide detailed safety knowledgebase, HAZOP results are analyzed and structured so that safety-related knowledge are identified and structured within the plant knowledgebase. The target safety knowledgebase includes: failures, deviations, causes, consequences, and fault propagation as mapped to plant knowledge. The proposed ontology-based safety framework is applied on case study nuclear plant to structure failures, causes, consequences, and fault propagation, which are used to support plant operation. (author)

  8. Developments in safety and operations culture in BNFL's thorp reprocessing plant, Sellafield, Cumbria

    Kett, P.J.

    2000-01-01

    One of the best descriptions of Culture is 'how we do things around here'. In a stable organisation it is extremely difficult to change any type of culture, whether it is an operations, customer service or safety culture. To change culture one of two elements are essential. There must be either a significant external pressure felt by all in the organisation or a change in senior management, with authority to set a new direction for the organisation. BNFL had a unique opportunity through the commissioning and operation of the Thorp Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield to shape a new Safety and Operations Culture. Both the key elements for change were present. Thorp was a high profile flagship plant that had attracted multinational investment. It incorporated new technology. The workforce had volunteered to operate the plant. A strong senior management team was specially selected. The plant was being commissioned in an environment where there was significant opposition by 'anti nuclear' groups. It was essential to both BNFL and the wider international nuclear community that Thorp was commissioned and operated safely. A strong operating culture was developed with safety as the corner stone. The culture comprises three key components. Rigorous plant safety case and risk assessments before work commences and modifications to the plant occur; A high level of involvement by all levels of the workforce in both operations and safety matters; Strong supportive leadership which does not allow safety standards to be compromised and encourages open debate on how to improve. During commissioning and early operation of Thorp the robustness of the Safety and Operations Culture was demonstrated. On several occasions, despite intense commercial pressure, operations were halted until the situation was resolved both technically and procedurally. This paper describes how the Safety and Operations Culture was developed. The key factors for success include recruitment, team selection

  9. MOSEG code for safety oriented maintenance management Safety of management of maintenance oriented by MOSEG code

    Torres Valle, Antonio

    2005-01-01

    Full text: One of the main reasons that makes maintenance contribute highly when facing safety problems and facilities availability is the lack of maintenance management systems to solve these fields in a balanced way. Their main setbacks are shown in this paper. It briefly describes the development of an integrating algorithm for a safety and availability-oriented maintenance management by virtue of the MOSEG Win 1.0 code. (author)

  10. Alertness management : strategic naps in operational settings

    1995-01-01

    Managing fatigue in complex operational settings requires attention to multiple factors, including hours of service, scheduling, education and training, countermeasures, technology, and research. Alertness-management strategies can be used to promote...

  11. Regulatory Approach to Safety of Long Time Operating Research Reactors in Russia

    Sapozhnikov, Alexander

    2013-01-01

    In the Russian Federation more than 60% of operating Nuclear Research Facilities (NRFs) are of age over 30 years old or their usage exceeds originally conceived continuous operation. In this regard, important areas of regulatory body activity are: 1) a systematic assessment of the actual state of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety, 2) control of implementation of organizational and technical measures to mitigate ageing impact on the basis of programmes to manage reliability (service life) of SSCs, and 3) issues of facility modification/reconstruction in line with up-to-day safety requirements. The practice of licensing NRFs with long operating times shows that the national regulations are generally in compliance with IAEA recommendations for ageing management of research reactors. In operating organizations, the ageing management is being effectively provided as a part of the integrated management system for NRFs, including the monitoring of the reliability of SSCs, a methodology to detect their ageing, reporting and investigation of events, analysis of their root causes, and measures to prevent and mitigate ageing effects to safety. The report outlines a good practice of safety regulation of NRFs with long operating times and based on lessons learned from experience, including challenges for future improvement of ageing management

  12. Regulatory Approach to Safety of Long Time Operating Research Reactors in Russia

    Sapozhnikov, Alexander [Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2013-07-01

    In the Russian Federation more than 60% of operating Nuclear Research Facilities (NRFs) are of age over 30 years old or their usage exceeds originally conceived continuous operation. In this regard, important areas of regulatory body activity are: 1) a systematic assessment of the actual state of structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety, 2) control of implementation of organizational and technical measures to mitigate ageing impact on the basis of programmes to manage reliability (service life) of SSCs, and 3) issues of facility modification/reconstruction in line with up-to-day safety requirements. The practice of licensing NRFs with long operating times shows that the national regulations are generally in compliance with IAEA recommendations for ageing management of research reactors. In operating organizations, the ageing management is being effectively provided as a part of the integrated management system for NRFs, including the monitoring of the reliability of SSCs, a methodology to detect their ageing, reporting and investigation of events, analysis of their root causes, and measures to prevent and mitigate ageing effects to safety. The report outlines a good practice of safety regulation of NRFs with long operating times and based on lessons learned from experience, including challenges for future improvement of ageing management.

  13. International Safety ManagementSafety Management Systems and the Challenges of Changing a Culture

    Gregory Hanchrow

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Over the past generation, the ISM code has brought forth tremendous opportunities to investigate and enhance the human factor in shipping through the implementation of Safety Management Systems. One of the critical factors to this implementation has been mandatory compliance and a requirement for obtaining a Document of Compliance (DOC for vessels operating globally or at least internationally. A primary objective of these systems is to maintain them as “living” or “dynamic” systems that are always evolving. As the ISM code has evolved, there have been instances where large organizations have opted to maintain a voluntary DOC from their respective class society. This has been accomplished with a large human factor element as typically an organizational culture does not always accept change readily especially if there is not a legal requirement to do so. In other words, when considering maritime training is it possible that organizations may represent cultural challenges? The intent of this paper will be to research large maritime operations that have opted for a document of compliance voluntarily and compare them to similar organizations that have been mandated by international law to do the same. The result should be to gain insight into the human factors that must contribute to a culture change in the organization for the purposes of a legal requirement versus the human factors that contribute to a voluntary establishment of a safety management system. This analysis will include both the executive decision making that designs a system implementation and the operational sector that must execute its implementation. All success and failures of education and training can be determined by the outcome. Did the training achieve its goal? Or has the education prepared the students to embrace a new idea in conjunction with a company goal or a new regulatory scheme? In qualifying the goal of a successful ISM integration by examining both

  14. Forest management practices and the occupational safety and health administration logging standard

    John R. Myers; David Elton Fosbroke

    1995-01-01

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has established safety and health regulations for the logging industry. These new regulations move beyond the prior OSHA pulpwood harvesting standard by including sawtimber harvesting operations. Because logging is a major tool used by forest managers to meet silvicultural goals, managers must be aware of what...

  15. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  16. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  17. Crisis Management- Operational Logistics & Asset Visibility Technologies

    Braunbeck, Richard A; Mastria, Michael F

    2006-01-01

    The purpose of this MBA Project was to identify and explore logistical frameworks that leverage technology to overcome problems associated with coordinated logistics operations during crisis management...

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  20. 33 CFR 96.320 - What is involved to complete a safety management audit and when is it required to be completed?

    2010-07-01

    ... Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations. (3) Make sure the audit is carried out by a team of... safety management audit and when is it required to be completed? 96.320 Section 96.320 Navigation and... SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS How Will Safety Management Systems Be...

  1. Safety assessment for Area 5 radioactive-waste-management site

    Hunter, P.H.; Card, D.H.; Horton, K.

    1982-09-01

    The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Safety Assessment Document contains evaluations of site characteristics, facilities, and operating practices that contribute to the safe handling, storage, and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes at the Nevada Test Site. Physical geography, cultural factors, climate and meteorology, geology, hydrology (with emphasis on radionuclide migration), ecology, natural phenomena, and natural resources are discussed and determined to be suitable for effective containment of radionuclides. A separate section considers facilities and operating practices such as monitoring, storage/disposal criteria, site maintenance, equipment, and support. The section also considers the transportation and waste handling requirements supporting the new Greater Confinement Disposal Facility (GCDF), GCDF demonstration project, and other requirements for the safe handling, storage, and disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. Finally, the document provides an analysis of releases and an assessment of the near-term operational impacts and dose commitments to operating personnel and the general public from normal operations and anticipated accidental occurrences. The conclusion of this report is that the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site is suitable for low-level radioactive waste handling, storage, and disposal. Also, the new GCDF demonstration project will not affect the overall safety of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

  2. AMNT 2014. Key topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 2

    Fischer, Klaus-Christian; Willschuetz, Hans-Georg; Wortmann, Birgit

    2014-01-01

    Summary report on the following sessions of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Thermo Dynamics and Fluid Dynamics: Experiments and Backfittings for the Improvement of Safety and Efficiency; - Safety of Nuclear Installations - Methods, Analyses, Results: In-Vessel Phenomena; Ex-Vessel Phenomena; - Standards and Regulations; Hazard and Safety Analysis; and Validation and Uncertainty Analysis. The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' have been covered in atw 10 (2014) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  3. Operational safety analysis status of Novi Han repository

    Boiadjiev, A.

    2000-01-01

    This article presents the status of the safety studies and activities related to Novi Han repository. The case of this facility is such that no clear boundary exists between post-closure safety assessment and operational safety assessment. The major findings of these activities are given. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for Novi Han repository is developed by Risk Engineering Ltd. under a contract with the Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes. The general structure and main conclusions and recommendations of the SAR are presented. (author)

  4. Improving plant state information for better operational safety

    Girard, C.; Olivier, E.; Grimaldi, X.

    1994-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety is strongly dependent on components' reliability and particularly on plant state information reliability. This information, used by the plant operators in order to produce appropriate actions, have to be of a high degree of confidence, especially in accidental conditions where safety is threatened. In this perspective, FRAMATOME, EDF and CEA have started a joint research program to prospect different solutions aiming at a better reliability for critical information needed to safety operate the plant. This paper gives the main results of this program and describes the developments that have been made in order to assess reliability of different information systems used in a Nuclear Power Plant. (Author)

  5. Ageing management of Indian PHWRs - safety aspects

    Kapoor, R.K.; Sah, B.M.L.; Das, M.; Srinivasan, G.R.

    1994-01-01

    Ageing management has now become a vital area of concern. Ageing management includes determination of degradation factors, taking various steps to determine present conditions of systems, structures and components and taking mitigating steps. It also includes updating, modernization, refurbishment etc. It is important that ageing management starts right from the time of commissioning of the unit and is treated as a continuous process, and a parallel effort to the normal running of the plant. Thus elaborate research and development efforts are required to be instituted. Life extension could have a high benefit to cost ratio. Various steps to ensure safety in ageing management are listed. Selection of critical items, condition monitoring and life estimation of the same and a chronological check sheet from 0 to 60 years, for Indian PHWRs is explained. Areas where future research and development and other efforts need to be directed is listed. The paper concludes emphasizing the need for a systematized approach to ageing management. It recommends intensive research in certain listed areas and suggests standing committees in specialized areas to tap Indian experience in other industries and establishments. A safety guide is also required to be produced to cover all facets of ageing management. (author). 3 appendices

  6. Managing the early termination of operation of nuclear power plants

    2003-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the statutory mandate to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. However, it has become more and more apparent that many States are facing the decision of closing nuclear power plants (NPPs) before expiration of their operating licences. Some NPPs have already closed and the owners are evaluating the effects on their staffs, the local economies and safety at the sites. It is evident that safety aspects and management strategies are important factors to be reviewed and monitored throughout the process of early termination and closure.The owners and employees of the NPPs are realizing that they are entering into very difficult phases of the plant life cycle with significant safety concerns. Although a great deal of work has been done to review and process information on technical aspects of early termination prior to decommissioning, far less attention has been given to the management and organizational issues involved in maintaining the required safety level in such nuclear installations. It is important that when decisions are made to terminate operation early, the same safety measures are applied to management concerns for strategic planning as are applied to technical reviews. These management and organizational issues are fundamental to any future decommissioning process. Managers at sites that decided to close early may be working to cope with management of change issues arising during the transition from operation to decommissioning as they monitor resource and competence needs, as well as staff morale and technical issues. If these issues are not treated satisfactorily they can have significant safety consequences. The organization often must address all these challenges with little guidance or experience and with reduced resources. This Safety Report has been developed with the support of experts from regulatory, operating and

  7. Safety review of experiments at Albuquerque Operations Office

    Elliott, K.

    1984-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque Operations Office is responsible for the safety overview of nuclear reactor and critical assembly facilities at Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Rocky Flats Plant. The important safety concerns with these facilities involve the complex experiments that are performed, and that is the area emphasized. A determination is made by the Albuquerque Office (AL) with assistance from DOE/OMA whether or not a proposed experiment is an unreviewed safety question. Meetings are held with the contractor to resolve and clarify questions that are generated during the review of the proposed experiment. The AL safety evaluation report is completed and any recommendations are discussed. Prior to the experiment a preoperational appraisal is performed to assure that personnel, procedures, and equipment are in readiness for operations. During the experiment, any abnormal condition is reviewed in detail to determine any safety concerns

  8. Management services, quality assurance, and safety

    Anon.

    1987-01-01

    Broad technical and administrative support for the programmatic research and development activities of the Fusion Energy Division is provided by the Management Services Section and by the division's quality assurance (QA) and safety programs. Support is provided through effective communication with division programmatic staff and through the coordination of resources from disciplines outside the division. The QA activity in the division emphasizes the development and documentation of a QA program that conforms to national standards, the review and approval of engineering documents, supplier surveillance, identification and documentation of nonconforming items, audits, and QA assessments/plans. The division's safety activities include a formal safety program, emergency planning activities, and environmental protection services. Efforts devoted to the removal of hazardous wastes from division facilities were expanded during 1986

  9. Management by process based systems and safety focus

    Rydnert, Bo; Groenlund, Bjoern

    2005-12-01

    An initiative from The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate led to this study carried out in the late autumn of 2005. The objective was to understand in more detail how an increasing use of process management affects organisations, on the one hand regarding risks and security, on the other hand regarding management by objectives and other management and operative effects. The main method was interviewing representatives of companies and independent experts. More than 20 interviews were carried out. In addition a literature study was made. All participating companies are using Management Systems based on processes. However, the methods chosen, and the results achieved, vary extensively. Thus, there are surprisingly few examples of complete and effective management by processes. Yet there is no doubt that management by processes is effective and efficient. Overall goals are reached, business results are achieved in more reliable ways and customers are more satisfied. The weaknesses found can be translated into a few comprehensive recommendations. A clear, structured and acknowledged model should be used and the processes should be described unambiguously. The changed management roles should be described and obeyed extremely legibly. New types of process objectives need to be formulated. In addition one fact needs to be observed and effectively fended off. Changes are often met by mental opposition on management level, as well as among co-workers. This fact needs attention and leadership. Safety development is closely related to the design and operation of a business management system and its continual improvement. A deep understanding of what constitutes an efficient and effective management system affects the understanding of safety. safety culture and abilities to achieve safety goals. Concerning risk, the opinions were unambiguous. Management by processes as such does not result in any further risks. On the contrary. Processes give a clear view of production and

  10. Alertness management in flight operations - Strategic napping

    Rosekind, Mark R.; Gander, Philippa H.; Dinges, David F.

    1991-01-01

    Strategic napping in two different flight operation environments is considered to illustrate its application as a fatigue countermeasure. Data obtained from commercial short-haul and long-haul operations demonstrated the utility and current practices of strategic napping. A preplanned cockpit nap acted as an acute 'safety valve' for the sleep loss, circadian disruption, and fatigue that occurs in long-haul flying.

  11. Time management for preclinical safety professionals.

    Wells, Monique Y

    2010-08-01

    A survey about time management in the workplace was distributed to obtain a sense of the level of job satisfaction among preclinical safety professionals in the current economic climate, and to encourage reflection upon how we manage time in our work environment. Roughly equal numbers of respondents (approximately 32%) identified themselves as management or staff, and approximately 27% indicated that they are consultants. Though 45.2% of respondents indicated that time management is very challenging for the profession in general, only 36.7% find it very challenging for themselves. Ten percent of respondents view time management to be exceedingly challenging for themselves. Approximately 34% of respondents indicated that prioritization of tasks was the most challenging aspect of time management for them. Focusing on an individual task was the second most challenging aspect (26%), followed equally by procrastination and delegation of tasks (12.4%). Almost equal numbers of respondents said that they would (35.2%) or might (33.3%) undertake training to improve their time management skills. Almost equal numbers of participants responded "perhaps" (44.6%) or "yes" (44.2%) to the question of whether management personnel should be trained in time management.

  12. Integrated Management System Incorporating Quality Management and Management of Environment, Health and Occupational Safety

    Manchev, B.; Nenkova, B.; Tomov, E.

    2012-01-01

    Risk Engineering Ltd is a Bulgarian private company founded in 1990 to provide engineering and consulting services applicable to each and every field of the energy sector. Since its establishment Risk Engineering Ltd develops, implement and apply a System for quality assurance, certified for the first time by BVQI (now Bureau Veritas Certification) in 1999 for conformity with the standard ISO 9001:1994. Later on, in connection with the revision of the standards of ISO 9000 series and introduction of the standard ISO 9001:2000 a Quality Management System in conformity with the standard ISO 9001:2000 was developed, introduced and certified. At present, Risk Engineering Ltd has got developed, documented, introduced and certified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance (LRQA) Quality Management System in compliance with ISO 9001:2008 on the process approach basis. On this basis and including the requirements of the ISO 14001:2004 (regarding the environment) and OHSAS 18001:2007 (regarding the health and occupational safety), Risk Engineering Ltd has developed and introduced Integrated Management System aim at achieving and demonstrating good results regarding protection of the environment, health and occupational safety. The processes under control by the Integrated Management System and applicable at the company are divided in two general types: A) Management processes: Strategic management and Management of the human resources. B) Processes describing the main activities: design/development process; project management; management of industrial projects and technical infrastructure project; construction, installation, repair and operation of power industry facilities; commercial activities and marketing; investigation of energy efficiency of industrial systems and certification of buildings regarding energy efficiency; consulting activity in the field of industry and energy as well as consultant in accordance with the Law of the Spatial Planning; management of the

  13. How Can Every Organization Manage the Operational Risk?

    Ferry Jie

    2002-03-01

    Full Text Available This article describe how every organization (generally and Australian Organizations (specifically can manage the operational risks.  Recently, the operational risks are the significant issues in every organization because every organization will suffer from poor operational performance due to risks, failure, and problems such as a number of losses which are likely to be made worse. Basically, the operational risk management process has five steps, identification, analysis, treatment, controlling, and communication/consulting. Generally, many organizations (in particularly in Australia and New Zealand have already used AS/NZS 4360-Risk Management System, AS/NZS 4801-Occupational Health and Safety Management System, ISO 14001: Effective Environmental Management System, ISO 9001: Quality Management System, AS/NZS 7799: Information Security Management, AS/NZS 3806: Compliance Management System for reducing/mitigating/managing the operational risks. Based on the SAI Certification Register, the number of Australian Organizations got the AS/NZS ISO 9000 series, AS/NZS 14000 series, AS/NZS 4801 and AS/NZS 7799.2:2000 Certifications are 3338, 30, 20 and 5 respectively. It can conclude that Australian Organizations prefer used AS/NZS ISO 9000 series rather than AS/NZS ISO 14000 series, AS/NZS 4801 and AS/NZS 7799.2:2000.

  14. Airline Safety Management: The development of a proactive safety mechanism model for the evolution of safety management system

    Hsu, Yueh-Ling

    2004-01-01

    The systemic origins of many accidents have led to heightened interest in the way in which organisations identify and manage risks within the airline industry. The activities which are thought to represent the term "organisational accident", "safety culture" and "proactive approach" are documented and seek to explain the fact that airlines differ in their willingness and ability to conduct safety management. However, an important but yet relatively undefined task in the airline...

  15. Safety risk management of underground engineering in China: Progress, challenges and strategies

    Qihu Qian

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available Underground construction in China is featured by large scale, high speed, long construction period, complex operation and frustrating situations regarding project safety. Various accidents have been reported from time to time, resulting in serious social impact and huge economic loss. This paper presents the main progress in the safety risk management of underground engineering in China over the last decade, i.e. (1 establishment of laws and regulations for safety risk management of underground engineering, (2 implementation of the safety risk management plan, (3 establishment of decision support system for risk management and early-warning based on information technology, and (4 strengthening the study on safety risk management, prediction and prevention. Based on the analysis of the typical accidents in China in the last decade, the new challenges in the safety risk management for underground engineering are identified as follows: (1 control of unsafe human behaviors; (2 technological innovation in safety risk management; and (3 design of safety risk management regulations. Finally, the strategies for safety risk management of underground engineering in China are proposed in six aspects, i.e. the safety risk management system and policy, law, administration, economy, education and technology.

  16. Safety and Waste Management for SAM Chemistry Methods

    The General Safety and Waste Management page offers section-specific safety and waste management details for the chemical analytes included in EPA's Selected Analytical Methods for Environmental Remediation and Recovery (SAM).

  17. Safety and Waste Management for SAM Pathogen Methods

    The General Safety and Waste Management page offers section-specific safety and waste management details for the pathogens included in EPA's Selected Analytical Methods for Environmental Remediation and Recovery (SAM).

  18. Safety and Waste Management for SAM Radiochemical Methods

    The General Safety and Waste Management page offers section-specific safety and waste management details for the radiochemical analytes included in EPA's Selected Analytical Methods for Environmental Remediation and Recovery (SAM).

  19. Safety and Waste Management for SAM Biotoxin Methods

    The General Safety and Waste Management page offers section-specific safety and waste management details for the biotoxins included in EPA's Selected Analytical Methods for Environmental Remediation and Recovery (SAM).

  20. Process safety management for highly hazardous chemicals

    NONE

    1996-02-01

    Purpose of this document is to assist US DOE contractors who work with threshold quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (HHCs), flammable liquids or gases, or explosives in successfully implementing the requirements of OSHA Rule for Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119). Purpose of this rule is to prevent releases of HHCs that have the potential to cause catastrophic fires, explosions, or toxic exposures.

  1. Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention

    Johnson, Teresa A.

    2006-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation reviews the issues surrounding the management of knowledge in regards to safety and mission assurance. The JSC workers who were hired in the 1960's are slated to retire in the next two to three years. The experiences and knowledge of these NASA workers must be identified, and disseminated. This paper reviews some of the strategies that the S&MA is developing to capture that valuable institutional knowledge.

  2. Hanford site operator changes management

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    This article is a brief discussion of management changes at the Westinghouse Hanford Corporation. A. LeMar Trego has relieved Thomas Anderson as president of WHC. This was in response to recent shortcomings in Westinghouse's management of the environmental restoration and their failure to receive a $10M performance bonus

  3. Dam safety management in Victoria (Australia)

    Adem, J.

    1996-01-01

    The Victoria state government's decision to make dam owners accountable for safety and upkeep of their dams was reported. To give effect to this decision a series of guidelines have been developed which outline the required activities and skills to ensure that dams are properly managed within a framework of 'light-handed' regulation. The guidelines are also intended to ensure that dam management becomes an integral part of the business decision making process, not just a set of prescribed technical procedures. Details of the direction being taken and the proposed controls to ensure compliance with national and international standards were described. 4 refs., 2 figs

  4. Lessons from feedback of safety operating experience for reactor physics

    Suchomel, J.; Rapavy, S.

    1999-01-01

    Analyses of events in WWER operations as a part of safety experience feedback provide a valuable source of lessons for reactor physics. Examples of events from Bohunice operation will be shown such as events with inadequate approach to criticality, positive reactivity insertions, expulsion of a control rod from shut-down reactor, problems with reactor protection system and control rods. (Authors)

  5. 14 CFR 417.121 - Safety critical preflight operations.

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety critical preflight operations. 417.121 Section 417.121 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... surveillance. A launch operator must implement its hazard area surveillance and clearance plan, of § 417.111(j...

  6. The 'PROCESO' index: a new methodology for the evaluation of operational safety in the chemical industry

    Marono, M.; Pena, J.A.; Santamaria, J.

    2006-01-01

    The acknowledgement of industrial installations as complex systems in the early 1980s outstands as a milestone in the path to operational safety. Process plants are social-technical complex systems of a dynamic nature, whose properties depend not only on their components, but also on the inter-relations among them. A comprehensive assessment of operational safety requires a systemic approach, i.e. an integrated framework that includes all the relevant factors influencing safety. Risk analysis methodologies and safety management systems head the list of methods that point in this direction, but they normally require important plant resources. As a consequence, their use is frequently restricted to especially dangerous processes often driven by compliance with legal requirements. In this work a new safety index for the chemical industry, termed the 'Proceso' Index (standing for the Spanish terms for PROCedure for the Evaluation of Operational Safety), has been developed. PROCESO is based on the principles of systems theory, has a tree-like structure and considers 25 areas to guide the review of plant safety. The method uses indicators whose respective weight values have been obtained via an expert judgement technique. This paper describes the steps followed to develop this new Operational Safety Index, explains its structure and illustrates its application to process plants

  7. Operational safety experience feedback by means of unusual event reports

    1996-07-01

    Operational experience of nuclear power plants can be used to great advantage to enhance safety performance provided adequate measures are in place to collect and analyse it and to ensure that the conclusions drawn are acted upon. Feedback of operating experience is thus an extremely important tool to ensure high standards of safety in operational nuclear power plants and to improve the capability to prevent serious accidents and to learn from minor deviations and equipment failures - which can serve as early warnings -to prevent even minor events from occurring. Mechanisms also need to be developed to ensure that operating experience is shared both nationally as well as internationally. The operating experience feedback process needs to be fully and effectively established within the nuclear power plant, the utility, the regulatory organization as well as in other institutions such as technical support organizations and designers. The main purpose of this publication is to reflect the international consensus as to the general principles and practices in the operational safety experience feedback process. The examples of national practices for the whole or for particular parts of the process are given in annexes. The publication complements the IAEA Safety Series No.93 ''Systems for Reporting Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants'' (1989) and may also give a general guidance for Member States in fulfilling their obligations stipulated in the Nuclear Safety Convention. Figs, tabs

  8. Operational safety experience feedback by means of unusual event reports

    NONE

    1996-07-01

    Operational experience of nuclear power plants can be used to great advantage to enhance safety performance provided adequate measures are in place to collect and analyse it and to ensure that the conclusions drawn are acted upon. Feedback of operating experience is thus an extremely important tool to ensure high standards of safety in operational nuclear power plants and to improve the capability to prevent serious accidents and to learn from minor deviations and equipment failures - which can serve as early warnings -to prevent even minor events from occurring. Mechanisms also need to be developed to ensure that operating experience is shared both nationally as well as internationally. The operating experience feedback process needs to be fully and effectively established within the nuclear power plant, the utility, the regulatory organization as well as in other institutions such as technical support organizations and designers. The main purpose of this publication is to reflect the international consensus as to the general principles and practices in the operational safety experience feedback process. The examples of national practices for the whole or for particular parts of the process are given in annexes. The publication complements the IAEA Safety Series No.93 ``Systems for Reporting Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants`` (1989) and may also give a general guidance for Member States in fulfilling their obligations stipulated in the Nuclear Safety Convention. Figs, tabs.

  9. Refurbishment and safety management of JMTR in extended showdown

    Ide, Hiroshi; Hori, Naohiko; Gorai, Shigeru; Kusunoki, Tsuyoshi

    2011-06-01

    Japan Materials Testing Reactor (JMTR) is a testing reactor dedicated to the irradiation tests of materials and fuels. The reactor type of the JMTR is light water moderated and cooled tank type. It achieved first criticality in 1968. Operation was started in 1970. The JMTR had been being operated for 38 years from first criticality to the JMTR No.165 cycle finished. Periodic Safety Review (PSR) was carried out with confirming the integrity inspection of the JMTR reactor facilities. And the 10 years maintenance plan was made in 2004. After that, the restart of the JMTR has been strongly requested from various users as the only irradiation testing reactor in Japan. Finally, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) decided the refurbishment and restart of the JMTR in December 2006, and the refurbishment works was started from FY 2007. The equipment to remain in use and that which needs replacing before the restart of the JMTR was selected after having been evaluated on its damage and wear due to aging significance in safety functions, past safety-related maintenance date, and the enhancement of facility operation. The renewal work of power supply system, boiler, radioactive waste facility, etc. was already carried out as scheduled. The renewal work of reactor control system, nuclear instrumentation system and so on is being carried out. As for the safety management during reactor operation, the facility periodical own inspection and daily inspection is carried out for the purpose of maintaining soundness and reliability of facilities and equipments. And it is confirmed that the performance of facilities and equipments is maintained. As for the radiation control, irradiation dose limit determined by the law is obeyed. Based on the Concept of radiation protection of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP), reduction of dose is endeavored. The safety management during reactor shutdown is also carried out as well as it of reactor operation term. However, the

  10. Code on the safety of nuclear research reactors: Operation

    1992-01-01

    The purpose of this publication is to provide the essential requirements and recommendations for the safe operation of research reactors, with emphasis on the supervisory and managerial aspects. However, the publication also provides some guidance and information on topics concerning all the organizations involved in operation. These objectives are expressed in terms of requirements and recommendations for the safe operation of research reactors. Emphasis is placed on the safety requirements that shall be met rather than on the ways in which they can be met. The requirements and recommendations may form the foundation necessary for a Member State to develop regulations and safety criteria for its research reactor programme.

  11. Safety and operation of the Stade nuclear power plant

    Salcher, H.

    1991-01-01

    The concept of PreussenElektra is to continuously increase the existing safety standard of the Stade nuclear power station using experience gained from faults and operation in nuclear power stations and the progressive state of the art. Modifications to achieve the most gentle operation of the plant have been completed and other are on-going. To do so instruments were attached to those components which are susceptible to fatigue to record the transients and extensive calculatory records were kept. Although the plant has almost 20 years successful operation behind it, it can still stand up well to comparisons with more recent plants as far as safety aspects are concerned. 6 figs

  12. Applying lessons from commercial aviation safety and operations to resuscitation.

    Ornato, Joseph P; Peberdy, Mary Ann

    2014-02-01

    Both commercial aviation and resuscitation are complex activities in which team members must respond to unexpected emergencies in a consistent, high quality manner. Lives are at stake in both activities and the two disciplines have similar leadership structures, standard setting processes, training methods, and operational tools. Commercial aviation crews operate with remarkable consistency and safety, while resuscitation team performance and outcomes are highly variable. This commentary provides the perspective of two physician-pilots showing how commercial aviation training, operations, and safety principles can be adapted to resuscitation team training and performance. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  13. Annual report on nuclear power station operational management, 1984

    1985-09-01

    As of the end of fiscal year 1984, 28 nuclear power plants were in operation in Japan, the total power output of which was 20.56 million kW, equivalent to 22.9 % of the total generated electric power in Japan. Now nuclear power generation bears a very important role in the stable supply and cost stabilization of electric power. The result of the capacity factor in fiscal year 1984 was 73.9 %, which showed that the nuclear power generation and safety management technologies in Japan are at the top level in the world. However, in order that nuclear power generation accomplishes the role as main power source sufficiently hereafter by increasing the number of plants, the reliability and economical efficiency must be further improved, and especially the safety management and operational management become important. For the purpose, the operational experience accumulated so far must be effectively utilized. In this book, the outline of the administration on the safety regulation of nuclear power generation, the state of operation of nuclear power plants, the state of accidents and failures, the state of regular inspections and so on are summarized. Also the state of radioactive waste management and the radiation control for workers are reported. (Kako, I.)

  14. The work of the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)

    Hide, K.W.

    1996-01-01

    The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme was set up by the IAEA in 1982 to assist Member States to enhance the operational safety of nuclear power plants. Each team is staffed by senior experts in the relevant fields. The review team discusses with plant staff the existing operational programmes for plant which may be under construction, being commissioned or already operating. Following a detailed examination of a safety programme, the OSART team lists strengths and weaknesses and makes recommendations on how to overcome the latter. Since their conclusions are based on the best prevailing international practice, they may be more stringent than those based on national criteria. The results of the 77 missions conducted at 62 plants in 28 countries by the end of 1994 are summarised. (UK)

  15. Operation safety of control systems. Principles and methods

    Aubry, J.F.; Chatelet, E.

    2008-01-01

    This article presents the main operation safety methods that can be implemented to design safe control systems taking into account the behaviour of the different components with each other (binary 'operation/failure' behaviours, non-consistent behaviours and 'hidden' failures, dynamical behaviours and temporal aspects etc). To take into account these different behaviours, advanced qualitative and quantitative methods have to be used which are described in this article: 1 - qualitative methods of analysis: functional analysis, preliminary risk analysis, failure mode and failure effects analyses; 2 - quantitative study of systems operation safety: binary representation models, state space-based methods, event space-based methods; 3 - application to the design of control systems: safe specifications of a control system, qualitative analysis of operation safety, quantitative analysis, example of application; 4 - conclusion. (J.S.)

  16. Graduate Student Project: Operations Management Product Plan

    Fish, Lynn

    2007-01-01

    An operations management product project is an effective instructional technique that fills a void in current operations management literature in product planning. More than 94.1% of 286 graduates favored the project as a learning tool, and results demonstrate the significant impact the project had in predicting student performance. The author…

  17. Integration of operational research and environmental management

    Bloemhof - Ruwaard, J.M.

    1996-01-01


    The subject of this thesis is the integration of Operational Research and Environmental Management. Both sciences play an important role in the research of environmental issues. Part I describes a framework for the interactions between Operational Research and Environmental Management.

  18. The role of the regulator in promoting and evaluating safety culture. Operating experience feedback programme approach

    Perez, S.

    2002-01-01

    Promoting and Evaluating Safety Culture (S.C.) in Operating Organizations must be one of the main Nuclear Regulator goals to achieve. This can be possible only if each and every one of the regulatory activities inherently involves S.C. It can be seen throughout attitudes, values, uses and practices in both individuals and the whole regulatory organization. One among all the regulatory tools commonly used by regulators to promote and evaluate the commitment of the licensees with safety culture as a whole involves organizational factors and particular attention is directed to the operating organization. This entailed a wide range of activities, including all those related with management of safety performance. Operating Experience Feedback Programme as a tool to enhance safety operation is particularly useful for regulators in the evaluation of the role of S.C. in operating organization. Safety Culture is recognized as a subset of the wider Organizational Culture. Practices that improve organizational effectiveness can also contribute to enhance safety. An effective event investigation methodology is a specific practice, which contributes to a healthy Safety Culture. (author)

  19. Operation management of the prototype heavy water reactor 'Fugen'

    Muramatsu, Akira; Takei, Hiroaki; Iwanaga, Shigeru; Noda, Masao; Hara, Hidemi

    1983-01-01

    The advanced thermal reactor Fugen power station has continued almost smooth operation since it began the full scale operation as the first homemade power reactor in Japan in March, 1979. In the initial period of operation, some troubles were experienced, but now, it can be said that the operational techniques of heavy water-moderated, boiling light water-cooled, pressure tube type reactors have been established, through the improvement of the operational method and equipment, and the operational experience. Also, the verification of the operational ability, maintainability, reliability and safety of this new type reactor, that is the mission of the prototype reactor, achieved steadily the good results. Hereafter, the verification of operational performance is the main objective because it is required for the design, construction and operation of the demonstration reactor. The organization for the operation management and operation, the communication at the time of the abnormality, the operation of the plant, that is, start up, stop and the operation at the rated output, the works during plant stoppage, the operation at the time of the plant abnormality, the operation of waste treatment facility and others, the improvement of the operational method, and the education and training of operators are reported. (Kako, I.)

  20. Self-assessment of operational safety for nuclear power plants

    1999-12-01

    Self-assessment processes have been continuously developed by nuclear organizations, including nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear industry and governmental organizations are showing an increasing interest in the implementation of this process as an effective way for improving safety performance. Self-assessment involves the use of different types of tools and mechanisms to assist the organizations in assessing their own safety performance against given standards. This helps to enhance the understanding of the need for improvements, the feeling of ownership in achieving them and the safety culture as a whole. Although the primary beneficiaries of the self-assessment process are the plant and operating organization, the results of the self-assessments are also used, for example, to increase the confidence of the regulator in the safe operation of an installation, and could be used to assist in meeting obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Such considerations influence the form of assessment, as well as the type and detail of the results. The concepts developed in this report present the basic approach to self-assessment, taking into consideration experience gained during Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, from organizations and utilities which have successfully implemented parts of a self-assessment programme and from meetings organized to discuss the subject. This report will be used in IAEA sponsored workshops and seminars on operational safety that include the topic of self-assessment