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Sample records for high-enriched uranium spent

  1. RUSSIAN-ORIGIN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM BULGARIA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kelly Cummins; Igor Bolshinsky; Ken Allen; Tihomir Apostolov; Ivaylo Dimitrov

    2009-07-01

    In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

  2. Russian-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment From Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor; Allen, Ken; Apostolov, Tihomir; Dimitrov, Ivaylo

    2009-01-01

    In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

  3. Repository emplacement costs for Al-clad high enriched uranium spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonell, W.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1994-01-01

    A range of strategies for treatment and packaging of Al-clad high-enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels to prevent or delay the onset of criticality in a geologic repository was evaluated in terms of the number of canisters produced and associated repository costs incurred. The results indicated that strategies in which neutron poisons were added to consolidated forms of the U-Al alloy fuel generally produced the lowest number of canisters and associated repository costs. Chemical processing whereby the HEU was removed from the waste form was also a low cost option. The repository costs generally increased for isotopic dilution strategies, because of the substantial depleted uranium added. Chemical dissolution strategies without HEU removal were also penalized because of the inert constituents in the final waste glass form. Avoiding repository criticality by limiting the fissile mass content of each canister incurred the highest repository costs

  4. Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. J. Allen; I. Bolshinsky; L. L. Biro; M. E. Budu; N. V. Zamfir; M. Dragusin

    2010-07-01

    Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world’s first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment.

  5. Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, K.J.; Bolshinsky, I.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.

    2010-01-01

    Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world's first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3. country under the RRRFR program and the 14. country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment. (authors)

  6. Monte Carlo calculational design of an NDA instrument for the assay of waste products from high enriched uranium spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccleston, G.W.; Schrandt, R.G.; MacDonald, J.L.; Cverna, F.H.

    1979-01-01

    The Monte Carlo design of the waste assay region of a dual assay system, to be installed at the Fluorinal and Storage Facility, is described. The instrument will be used by the facility operator to assay high-enriched spent fuel packages and waste solids produced from dissolution of the fuels. The fissile content discharged in the waste is expected to vary between 0 and 400 g of 235 U. Material accountability measurements of the waste must be obtained in the presence of large neutron (0.5 x 10 6 n/s) and gamma (50,000 R/hr) backgrounds. The assay system employs fast-neutron irradiation of the sample, using a 5 mg 252 Cf source, followed by delayed neutron counting after the source is transferred to storage. Calculations indicate a +-4-g (2 sigma) assay for a waste canister containing 300 g of 235 U is achievable with an end-of-life (1 mg) 252 Cf source and a background rate of 0.5 x 10 6 n/s

  7. 31 CFR 540.306 - Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). 540...) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.306 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). The term highly...

  8. Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide upper level guidance for the program that will downblend surplus highly enriched uranium for use as commercial nuclear reactor fuel or low-level radioactive waste. The intent of this document is to outline the overall mission and program objectives. The document is also intended to provide a general basis for integration of disposition efforts among all applicable sites. This plan provides background information, establishes the scope of disposition activities, provides an approach to the mission and objectives, identifies programmatic assumptions, defines major roles, provides summary level schedules and milestones, and addresses budget requirements

  9. Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fairrow, Nannette Lea

    Safeguarding special nuclear material (SNM) in the Department of Energy Complex is vital to the national security of the United States. Active and passive nondestructive assays are used to confirm the presence of SNM in various configurations ranging from waste to nuclear weapons. Confirmation measurements for nuclear weapons are more challenging because the design complicates the detection of a distinct signal for highly enriched uranium. The emphasis of this dissertation was to investigate a new nondestructive assay technique that provides an independent and distinct signal to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Once completed and tested this assay method could be applied to confirmation measurements of nuclear weapons. The new system uses a 14-MeV neutron source for interrogation and records the arrival time of neutrons between the pulses with a high efficiency detection system. The data is then analyzed by the Feynman reduced variance method. The analysis determined the amount of correlation in the data and provided a unique signature of correlated fission neutrons. Measurements of HEU spheres were conducted at Los Alamos with the new system. Then, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to verify hypothesis made about the behavior of the neutrons in the experiment. Comparisons of calculated counting rates by the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) were made with the experimental data to confirm that the measured response reflected the desired behavior of neutron interactions in the highly enriched uranium. In addition, MCNP calculations of the delayed neutron build-up were compared with the measured data. Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, this measurement method has the potential to be expanded to include mass determinations of highly enriched uranium. Although many safeguards techniques exist for measuring special nuclear material, the number of assays that can be used to confirm HEU in shielded systems is

  10. Civilian inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.

    1987-01-01

    In the future, commercial laser isotope enrichment technologies, currently under development, could make it easier for national to produce highly enriched uranium secretly. The head of a US firm that is developing a laser enrichment process predicts that in twenty years, major utilities and small countries will have relatively small, on-site, laser-based uranium enrichment facilities. Although these plants will be designed for the production of low enriched uranium, they could be modified to produce highly enriched uranium, an option that raises the possibility of countries producing highly enriched uranium in small, easily hidden facilities. Against this background, most of this report describes the current and future quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the world, their forms, the facilities in which they are produced, stored, and used, and the extent to which they are transported. 5 figures, 10 tables

  11. Criticality of mixtures of plutonium and high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grolleau, E.; Lein, M.; Leka, G.; Maidou, B.; Klenov, P.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents a criticality evaluation of moderated homogeneous plutonium-uranium mixtures. The fissile media studied are homogeneous mixtures of plutonium and high enriched uranium in two chemical forms: aqueous mixtures of metal and mixtures of nitrate solutions. The enrichment of uranium considered are 93.2wt.% 235 U and 100wt.% 235 U. The 240 Pu content in plutonium varies from 0wt.% 240 Pu to 12wt.% 240 Pu. The critical parameters (radii and masses of a 20 cm water reflected sphere) are calculated with the French criticality safety package CRISTAL V0. The comparison of the calculated critical parameters as a function of the moderator-to-fuel atomic ratio shows significant ranges in which high enriched uranium systems, as well as plutonium-uranium mixtures, are more reactive than plutonium systems. (author)

  12. Nickel container of highly-enriched uranium bodies and sodium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zinn, W.H.

    1976-01-01

    A fuel element comprises highly enriched uranium bodies coated with a nonfissionable, corrosion resistant material. A plurality of these bodies are disposed in layers, with sodium filling the interstices therebetween. The entire assembly is enclosed in a fluid-tight container of nickel

  13. Use of highly enriched uranium at the FRM-II

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boening, K. [Forschungs-Neutronenquelle FRM-II, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, D-85747 Garching bei Muenchen (Germany)

    2002-07-01

    The new FRM-II research reactor in Munich, Germany, provides a high flux of thermal neutrons outside of the core at only 20 MW power. This is achieved by using a single compact, cylindrical fuel element with highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is cooled by light water and placed in the center of a large heavy water tank. The paper outlines the arguments which have led to this core concept and summarizes its performance. It also reports on alternative studies which have been performed for the case of low enriched uranium (LEU) and compares the data of the two concepts, with the conclusion that the FRM-II cannot be converted to LEU. A concept using medium enriched uranium (MEU) is described as well as plans to develop such a fuel element in the future. Finally, it is argued that the use of HEU fuel elements at the FRM-II does not - realistically -involve any risk of proliferation. (author)

  14. 77 FR 51579 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-24

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Complex, July 30, 2012, August Uranium (93.35%). uranium-235 high-enriched 1, 2012, XSNM3726, 11006037. contained in 7.5 uranium in the kilograms uranium. form of broken metal to the Atomic Energy of Canada...

  15. Disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium: Draft environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-10-01

    This document assesses the environmental impacts at four potential sites that may result from alternatives for the disposition of United States-origin weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) that has been or may be declared surplus to national defense or defense-related program needs. In addition to the no action alternative, it assesses four alternatives that would eliminate the weapons-usability of HEU by blending it with depleted uranium, natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU) to create low-enriched uranium, either as commercial reactor fuel feedstock or as low-level radioactive waste. The potential blending sites are DOE's Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock ampersand Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and the Nuclear Fuel Services Fuel Fabrication Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. Evaluations of impacts on site infrastructure, water resources, air quality and noise, socioeconomic resources, waste management, public and occupational health, and environmental justice for the potential blending sites are included in the assessment. The intersite transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials is also assessed. The preferred alternative is to blend down surplus HEU to LEU for maximum commercial use as reactor fuel feed which would likely be done at a combination of DOE and commercial sites

  16. Transformations of highly enriched uranium into metal or oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nollet, P.; Sarrat, P.

    1964-01-01

    The enriched uranium workshops in Cadarache have a double purpose on the one hand to convert uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide, and on the other hand to recover the uranium contained in scrap materials produced in the different metallurgical transformations. The principles that have been adopted for the design and safety of these workshops are reported. The nuclear safety is based on the geometrical limitations of the processing vessels. To establish the processes and the technology of these workshops, many studies have been made since 1960, some of which have led to original achievements. The uranium hexafluoride of high isotopic enrichment is converted either by injection of the gas into ammonia or by an original process of direct hydrogen reduction to uranium tetrafluoride. The uranium contained m uranium-zirconium metal scrap can be recovered by combustion with hydrogen chloride followed treatment of the uranium chloride by fluorine in order to obtain the uranium in the hexafluoride state. Recovery of the uranium contained m various scrap materials is obtained by a conventional refining process combustion of metallic scrap, nitric acid dissolution of the oxide, solvent purification by tributyl phosphate, ammonium diuranate precipitation, calcining, reduction and hydro fluorination into uranium tetrafluoride, bomb reduction by calcium and slag treatment. Two separate workshops operate along these lines one takes care of the uranium with an isotopic enrichment of up to 3 p. 100, the other handles the high enrichments. The handling of each step of this process, bearing in mind the necessity for nuclear safety, has raised some special technological problems and has led to the conception of new apparatus, in particular the roasting furnace for metal turnings, the nitric acid dissolution unit, the continuous precipitator and ever safe filter and dryer for ammonium diuranate, the reduction and hydro fluorination furnace and the slag recovery apparatus These are

  17. 76 FR 72984 - Revised Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-28

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revised Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium The application for a license to export high-enriched Uranium has been revised as noted below. Notice... fabricate fuel France. Security Complex; October 18, Uranium (93.35%). uranium (174.0 elements in France...

  18. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage and disposition program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arms, W.M.; Everitt, D.A.; O'Dell, C.L.

    1995-01-01

    Recent changes in international relations and other changes in national priorities have profoundly affected the management of weapons-usable fissile materials within the United States (US). The nuclear weapon stockpile reductions agreed to by the US and Russia have reduced the national security requirements for these fissile materials. National policies outlined by the US President seek to prevent the accumulation of nuclear weapon stockpiles of plutonium (Pu) and HEU, and to ensure that these materials are subjected to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. The purpose of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage and Disposition Program Plan is to define and establish a planned approach for storage of all HEU and disposition of surplus HEU in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Material Disposition Program. Elements Of this Plan, which are specific to HEU storage and disposition, include program requirements, roles and responsibilities, program activities (action plans), milestone schedules, and deliverables

  19. Validation of NCSSHP for highly enriched uranium systems containing beryllium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krass, A.W.; Elliott, E.P.; Tollefson, D.A.

    1994-01-01

    This document describes the validation of KENO V.a using the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross section library for highly enriched uranium and beryllium neutronic systems, and is in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983(R1988) requirements for calculational methods. The validation has been performed on a Hewlett Packard 9000/Series 700 Workstation at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Department using the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Software code package. Critical experiments from LA-2203, UCRL-4975, ORNL-2201, and ORNL/ENG-2 have been identified as having the constituents desired for this validation as well as sufficient experimental detail to allow accurate construction of KENO V.a calculational models. The results of these calculations establish the safety criteria to be employed in future calculational studies of these types of systems

  20. 78 FR 16303 - Request To Amend a License To Export; High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-14

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export; High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70 (b) ``Public Notice of Receipt of an Application,'' please take notice that the... Application No. Docket No. U.S. Department of Energy, High-Enriched Uranium 10 kilograms uranium To...

  1. Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Cylinders Surrounded by Various Reflector Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernard Jones; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Monteirth

    2007-01-01

    A series of experiments was performed at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in 1958 to determine critical masses of cylinders of Oralloy (Oy) reflected by a number of materials. The experiments were all performed on the Comet Universal Critical Assembly Machine, and consisted of discs of highly enriched uranium (93.3 wt.% 235U) reflected by half-inch and one-inch-thick cylindrical shells of various reflector materials. The experiments were performed by members of Group N-2, particularly K. W. Gallup, G. E. Hansen, H. C. Paxton, and R. H. White. This experiment was intended to ascertain critical masses for criticality safety purposes, as well as to compare neutron transport cross sections to those obtained from danger coefficient measurements with the Topsy Oralloy-Tuballoy reflected and Godiva unreflected critical assemblies. The reflector materials examined in this series of experiments are as follows: magnesium, titanium, aluminum, graphite, mild steel, nickel, copper, cobalt, molybdenum, natural uranium, tungsten, beryllium, aluminum oxide, molybdenum carbide, and polythene (polyethylene). Also included are two special configurations of composite beryllium and iron reflectors. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with six different parameters was evaluated; namely, extrapolation to the uranium critical mass, uranium density, 235U enrichment, reflector density, reflector thickness, and reflector impurities. In addition to the idealizations made by the experimenters (removal of the platen and diaphragm), two simplifications were also made to the benchmark models that resulted in a small bias and additional uncertainty. First of all, since impurities in core and reflector materials are only estimated, they are not included in the benchmark models. Secondly, the room, support structure, and other possible surrounding equipment were not included in the model. Bias values that result from these two simplifications were determined and associated

  2. Characterization of highly enriched uranium in a nuclear forensic exercise

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nascimento, Marcos R.L. do; Quinelato, Antonio L.; Silva, Nivaldo C. da, E-mail: pmarcos@cnen.gov.br [Laboratorio de Pocos de Caldas (LAPOC/CNEN-MG), Pocos de Caldas, MG (Brazil); Sarkis, Jorge E.S., E-mail: jesarkis@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    This paper presents the characterization of two metal samples of highly enriched uranium as a contribution of Pocos de Caldas Laboratory, LAPOC, a branch of Brazilian National Commission for Nuclear Energy, CNEN, to the Round Robin 3, R R3, coordinated by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. A scenario was constructed in which two separate seizures of nuclear material occurred and forensics analysis was requested to help discern whether these incidents were related and whether these incidents exceeded country statutes. Laboratories were instructed to submit assessment reports in 24 hours, one week, and two month time frames. Besides preliminary evaluations for categorization of the material, our laboratory applied high resolution gamma spectrometry, optical emission spectrometry by inductively coupled plasma, and potentiometric titration for quantitative characterization of the samples. Concerning our technical reports answers for the three main forensics questions formulated by R R3, one of them was inconclusive, considering that LAPOC does not yet have all essential equipment for a fully satisfactory forensics nuclear analysis. (author)

  3. Characterization of highly enriched uranium in a nuclear forensic exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nascimento, Marcos R.L. do; Quinelato, Antonio L.; Silva, Nivaldo C. da; Sarkis, Jorge E.S.

    2011-01-01

    This paper presents the characterization of two metal samples of highly enriched uranium as a contribution of Pocos de Caldas Laboratory, LAPOC, a branch of Brazilian National Commission for Nuclear Energy, CNEN, to the Round Robin 3, R R3, coordinated by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. A scenario was constructed in which two separate seizures of nuclear material occurred and forensics analysis was requested to help discern whether these incidents were related and whether these incidents exceeded country statutes. Laboratories were instructed to submit assessment reports in 24 hours, one week, and two month time frames. Besides preliminary evaluations for categorization of the material, our laboratory applied high resolution gamma spectrometry, optical emission spectrometry by inductively coupled plasma, and potentiometric titration for quantitative characterization of the samples. Concerning our technical reports answers for the three main forensics questions formulated by R R3, one of them was inconclusive, considering that LAPOC does not yet have all essential equipment for a fully satisfactory forensics nuclear analysis. (author)

  4. 78 FR 60928 - Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU The Netherlands. National Nuclear Security Uranium uranium (17.1 targets in France... export from 9.4 kg of U-235 contained in 10.1 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 17.1 kg of U-235...

  5. 77 FR 73056 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-07

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... Complex. Uranium (93.2%). uranium-235 at CERCA AREVA Romans October 10, 2012 contained in 6.2 in France and to October 12, 2012 kilograms irradiate targets at XSNM3729 uranium. the BR-2 Research 11006053...

  6. 77 FR 73055 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-07

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Security Complex. Uranium uranium-235 at CERCA AREVA October 10, 2012 (93.35%). contained in Romans in France October 12, 2012 10.1 kilograms and to irradiate XSNM3730 uranium. targets at the HFR 11006054...

  7. 78 FR 33448 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-04

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Security Complex, May 13, Uranium (93.35%). uranium-235 at the National 2013, May 21, 2013, XSNM3745, contained in 7.5 Research Universal 11006098. kilograms reactor in Canada for uranium. ultimate use in...

  8. 78 FR 72123 - Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-12-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU targets in Belgium. National Nuclear Security Uranium (HEU) uranium France for irradiation in... 5.8 kg of U- 235 contained in 6.2 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 12.615 kg of U-235...

  9. Unallocated Off-Specification Highly Enriched Uranium: Recommendations for Disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bridges, D. N.; Boeke, S. G.; Tousley, D. R.; Bickford, W.; Goergen, C.; Williams, W.; Hassler, M.; Nelson, T.; Keck, R.; Arbital, J.

    2002-02-27

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made significant progress with regard to disposition planning for 174 metric tons (MTU) of surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Approximately 55 MTU of this 174 MTU are ''offspec'' HEU. (''Off-spec'' signifies that the isotopic or chemical content of the material does not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials standards for commercial nuclear reactor fuel.) Approximately 33 of the 55 MTU have been allocated to off-spec commercial reactor fuel per an Interagency Agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (1). To determine disposition plans for the remaining {approx}22 MTU, the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) co-sponsored this technical study. This paper represents a synopsis of the formal technical report (NNSA/NN-0014). The {approx} 22 MTU of off-spec HEU inventory in this study were divided into two main groupings: one grouping with plutonium (Pu) contamination and one grouping without plutonium. This study identified and evaluated 26 potential paths for the disposition of this HEU using proven decision analysis tools. This selection process resulted in recommended and alternative disposition paths for each group of HEU. The evaluation and selection of these paths considered criteria such as technical maturity, programmatic issues, cost, schedule, and environment, safety and health compliance. The primary recommendations from the analysis are comprised of 7 different disposition paths. The study recommendations will serve as a technical basis for subsequent programmatic decisions as disposition of this HEU moves into the implementation phase.

  10. HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BLEND DOWN PROGRAM AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE PRESENT AND FUTURE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magoulas, V; Charles Goergen, C; Ronald Oprea, R

    2008-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) entered into an Interagency Agreement to transfer approximately 40 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to TVA for conversion to fuel for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. Savannah River Site (SRS) inventories included a significant amount of this material, which resulted from processing spent fuel and surplus materials. The HEU is blended with natural uranium (NU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) with a 4.95% 235U isotopic content and shipped as solution to the TVA vendor. The HEU Blend Down Project provided the upgrades needed to achieve the product throughput and purity required and provided loading facilities. The first blending to low enriched uranium (LEU) took place in March 2003 with the initial shipment to the TVA vendor in July 2003. The SRS Shipments have continued on a regular schedule without any major issues for the past 5 years and are due to complete in September 2008. The HEU Blend program is now looking to continue its success by dispositioning an additional approximately 21 MTU of HEU material as part of the SRS Enriched Uranium Disposition Project

  11. Research reactor preparations for the air shipment of highly enriched uranium from Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bolshinsky, I.; Allen, K.J.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.; Paunoiu, C.; Ciocanescu, M.

    2010-01-01

    In June 2009 two air shipments transported both unirradiated (fresh) and irradiated (spent) Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel from two research reactors in Romania to the Russian Federation (RF) for conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU). The Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti (SCN Pitesti) shipped 30.1 kg of HEU fresh fuel pellets to Dimitrovgrad, Russia and the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH) shipped 23.7 kilograms of HEU spent fuel assemblies from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to Ozersk, Russia. Both HEU shipments were coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), were managed in Romania by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), and were conducted in cooperation with the Russian Federation State Corporation for Atomic Energy Rosatom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both shipments were transported by truck to and from respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at secure nuclear facilities in Russia until the material is converted into low enriched uranium. These shipments resulted in Romania becoming the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the research reactor preparations and license approvals that were necessary to safely and securely complete these air shipments of nuclear fuel. (author)

  12. Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schaper, Annette

    2013-07-01

    Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

  13. Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaper, Annette

    2013-01-01

    Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

  14. 75 FR 15743 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-30

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the...-Enriched 160.0 kilograms To fabricate fuel France. Complex, March 3, 2010. Uranium (93.35%). uranium (149...

  15. 75 FR 6223 - Application For a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-08

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application For a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the..., Uranium (93.35%). uranium (16.3 targets for December 28, 2009, XSNM3623, kilograms U-235). irradiation in...

  16. 77 FR 1956 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-12

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(b) ``Public Notice of Receipt of an Application,'' please take notice that the.... Security Complex. Uranium uranium (9.3 targets at December 21, 2011 (93.35%). kilograms U- CERCA AREVA...

  17. 75 FR 7525 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-19

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the..., February 2, Uranium (93.35%). uranium (87.3 elements in 2010, February 2, 2010, kilograms U-235). France...

  18. 78 FR 17942 - Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-25

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... Administration. Enriched Uranium contained in 99.7 Reactor in the be processed for March 6, 2013 (93.35%)) kilograms Czech Republic to medical isotope March 11, 2013 uranium) the list of production at the XSNM3622...

  19. A confirmatory measurement technique for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.

    1987-07-01

    This report describes a confirmatory measurement technique for measuring uranium items in their shipping containers. The measurement consists of a weight verification and the detection of three gamma rays. The weight can be determined very precisely, thus it severely constrains the options of the diverter who might want to imitate the gamma signal with a bogus item. The 185.7-keV gamma ray originates from 235 U, the 1001 keV originates from a daughter of 238 U, and the 2614 keV originates from a daughter of 232 U. These three gamma rays exhibit widely different attenuation properties, they correlate with enrichment and total uranium mass, and they rigorously discriminate against a likely diversion scenario (low-enriched uranium substitution). These four measured quantities, when combined, provide a signature that is very difficult to counterfeit

  20. Nickel container of highly-enriched uranium bodies and sodium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zinn, Walter H.

    1976-01-01

    A fuel element comprises highly a enriched uranium bodies coated with a nonfissionable, corrosion resistant material. A plurality of these bodies are disposed in layers, with sodium filling the interstices therebetween. The entire assembly is enclosed in a fluid-tight container of nickel.

  1. Source-driven noise analysis measurements with neptunium metal reflected by high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valentine, Timothy E.; Mattingly, John K.

    2003-01-01

    Subcritical noise analysis measurements have been performed with neptunium ( 237 Np) sphere reflected by highly enriched uranium. These measurements were performed at the Los Alamos Critical Experiment Facility in December 2002 to provide an estimate of the subcriticality of 237 Np reflected by various amounts of high-enriched uranium. This paper provides a description of the measurements and presents some preliminary results of the analysis of the measurements. The measured and calculated spectral ratios differ by 15% whereas the 'interpreted' and calculated k eff values differ by approximately 1%. (author)

  2. Department of Energy, highly enriched uranium ES ampersand H vulnerability assessment, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory site assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    In accordance with the February 22, 1996 directive issued by Secretary of Energy O'Leary on the Vulnerability Assessment of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory conducted an assessment of the site's HEU holdings and any associated vulnerabilities. The assessment was conducted between April 25 and May 24, 1996. The scope of this assessment, as defined in the Assessment Plan, included all HEU, and any spent fuel not evaluated in the Spent Fuel Vulnerability Assessment. Addressed in this assessment were all of the holdings at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) except any located at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) and the Naval Reactors Facility. Excluded from the assessment were those HEU holdings previously assessed in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory and Vulnerability Site Assessment Report and any HEU holdings evaluated in the Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment Report

  3. Isotopic analysis of uranium hexafluoride highly enriched in U-235

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaussy, L.; Boyer, R.

    1968-01-01

    Isotopic analysis of uranium in the form of the hexafluoride by mass-spectrometry gives gross results which are not very accurate. Using a linear interpolation method applied to two standards it is possible to correct for this inaccuracy as long as the isotopic concentrations are less than about 10 per cent in U-235. Above this level, the interpolations formula overestimates the results, especially if the enrichment of the analyzed samples is higher than 1.3 with respect to the standards. A formula is proposed for correcting the interpolation equation and for the extending its field of application to high values of the enrichment (≅2) and of the concentration. It is shown that by using this correction the results obtained have an accuracy which depends practically only on that of the standards, taking into account the dispersion in the measurements. (authors) [fr

  4. Use of highly enriched uranium in the material testing reactor BR2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beeckmans de West-Meerbeeck, A.

    1979-05-01

    In the material testing reactor BR2, the use of highly enriched uranium is determined by the consideration of the fast, epithermal and thermal neutron flux effectively available for the experimental devices. The choice of the core configuration is defined by combining the localisation of the experimental devices and of fuel elements of various burnup, such as to satisfy the irradiation conditions of the experimental load, compatible with an economic use of the fuel elements and safe operation of the reactor. Taking into account the present manufacturing technology for MTR fuels (37 Wt % uranium density in the fuel meat) the highly enriched uranium cannot be avoided; if higher concentration of uranium could be realised by some new manufacturing technology, the 235 U density of fuel elements at elimination should be kept at the required level and the enrichment could be reduced accordingly

  5. Use of highly enriched uranium in the material testing reactor BR2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beeckmans de West-Meerbeeck, A.

    1979-05-01

    In the material testing reactor BR2, the use of highly enriched uranium is determined by the consideration of the fast, epithermal and thermal neutron flux effectively available for the experimental devices. The choice of the core configuration is defined by combining the localisation of the experimental devices and of fuel elements of various burnup, such as to satisfy the irradiation conditions of the experimental load, compatible with an economic use of the fuel elements and safe operation of the reactor. Taking into account the present manufacturing technology for MTR fuels (37 Wt % uranium density in the fuel meat) the highly enriched uranium cannot be avoided: if higher concentration of uranium could be realised by some new manufacturing technology, the 235 U density of fuel elements at elimination should be kept at the required level and the enrichment could be reduced accordingly. (author)

  6. Transport of high enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to the Russian federation

    OpenAIRE

    Pešić Milan P.; Šotić Obrad; Hopwood William H.Jr

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents the relevant data related to the recent shipment (August 2002) of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to the Russian Federation for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gave its contribution to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist actions against nuclear material potentially usable for the production of nuclear weapons.

  7. Transport of high enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to the Russian federation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pešić Milan P.

    2002-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents the relevant data related to the recent shipment (August 2002 of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to the Russian Federation for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gave its contribution to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR Program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist actions against nuclear material potentially usable for the production of nuclear weapons.

  8. Compact reaction cell for homogenizing and down-blending highly enriched uranium metal

    Science.gov (United States)

    McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.; Horton, J.A.

    1995-05-02

    The invention is a specialized reaction cell for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide. In a preferred form, the reaction cell comprises a reaction chamber with increasing diameter along its length (e.g. a cylindrical chamber having a diameter of about 2 inches in a lower portion and having a diameter of from about 4 to about 12 inches in an upper portion). Such dimensions are important to achieve the necessary conversion while at the same time affording criticality control and transportability of the cell and product. The reaction chamber further comprises an upper port and a lower port, the lower port allowing for the entry of reactant gases into the reaction chamber, the upper port allowing for the exit of gases from the reaction chamber. A diffuser plate is attached to the lower port of the reaction chamber and serves to shape the flow of gas into the reaction chamber. The reaction cell further comprises means for introducing gases into the reaction chamber and a heating means capable of heating the contents of the reaction chamber. The present invention also relates to a method for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide in the reaction cell of the present invention. The invention is useful for down-blending highly enriched uranium metal by the simultaneous conversion of highly enriched uranium metal and natural or depleted uranium metal to uranium oxide within the reaction cell. 4 figs.

  9. Compact reaction cell for homogenizing and down-blanding highly enriched uranium metal

    Science.gov (United States)

    McLean, II, William; Miller, Philip E.; Horton, James A.

    1995-01-01

    The invention is a specialized reaction cell for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide. In a preferred form, the reaction cell comprises a reaction chamber with increasing diameter along its length (e.g. a cylindrical chamber having a diameter of about 2 inches in a lower portion and having a diameter of from about 4 to about 12 inches in an upper portion). Such dimensions are important to achieve the necessary conversion while at the same time affording criticality control and transportability of the cell and product. The reaction chamber further comprises an upper port and a lower port, the lower port allowing for the entry of reactant gasses into the reaction chamber, the upper port allowing for the exit of gasses from the reaction chamber. A diffuser plate is attached to the lower port of the reaction chamber and serves to shape the flow of gas into the reaction chamber. The reaction cell further comprises means for introducing gasses into the reaction chamber and a heating means capable of heating the contents of the reaction chamber. The present invention also relates to a method for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide in the reaction cell of the present invention. The invention is useful for down-blending highly enriched uranium metal by the simultaneous conversion of highly enriched uranium metal and natural or depleted uranium metal to uranium oxide within the reaction cell.

  10. Candidate processes for diluting the 235U isotope in weapons-capable highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Snider, J.D.

    1996-02-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile 235 U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile 235 U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel

  11. Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Directly Disposing Highly Enriched Spent Nuclear Fuel in Unsaturated Tuff - I: Nuclear Criticality Constraints

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, Rob P.; Sanchez, Lawrence C.; Trellue, Holly R.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents the mass, concentration, and volume required for a critical event to occur in homogeneous mixtures of fissile material and various other geologic materials. The fissile material considered is primarily highly enriched uranium spent fuel; however, 239 Pu is considered in some cases. The non-fissile materials examined are those found in the proposed repository area at Yucca Mountain, Nevada: volcanic tuff, iron rust, concrete, and naturally occurring water. For 235 U, the minimum critical solid concentration for tuff was 5 kg/m 3 (similar to sandstone), and in goethite, 45 kg/m 3 . The critical mass of uranium was sensitive to a number of factors, such as moisture content and fissile enrichment, but had a minimum, assuming almost 100% saturation and >20% enrichment, of 18 kg in tuff as Soddyite (or 9.5 kg as UO 2 ) and 7 kg in goethite. For 239 Pu, the minimum critical solid concentration for tuff was 3 kg/m 3 (similar to sandstone); in goethite, 20 kg/m 3 . The critical mass of plutonium was also sensitive to a number of factors, but had a minimum, assuming 100% saturation and 80-90% enrichment, of 5 kg in tuff and 6 kg in goethite

  12. Research reactor core conversion from the use of highly enriched uranium to the use of low enriched uranium fuels guidebook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-08-01

    In view of the proliferation concerns caused by the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and in anticipation that the supply of HEU to research and test reactors will be more restricted in the future, this document has been prepared to assist reactor operators in determining whether conversion to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel designs is technically feasible for their specific reactor, and to assist in making a smooth transition to the use of LEU fuel designs where appropriate

  13. Establishing a Cost Basis for Converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor from High Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, Trent; Guida, Tracey

    2010-01-01

    Under the auspices of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program, the National Nuclear Security Administration/Department of Energy (NNSA/DOE) has, as a goal, to convert research reactors worldwide from weapons grade to non-weapons grade uranium. The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) is one of the candidates for conversion of fuel from high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). A well documented business model, including tasks, costs, and schedules was developed to plan the conversion of HFIR. Using Microsoft Project, a detailed outline of the conversion program was established and consists of LEU fuel design activities, a fresh fuel shipping cask, improvements to the HFIR reactor building, and spent fuel operations. Current-value costs total $76 million dollars, include over 100 subtasks, and will take over 10 years to complete. The model and schedule follows the path of the fuel from receipt from fuel fabricator to delivery to spent fuel storage and illustrates the duration, start, and completion dates of each subtask to be completed. Assumptions that form the basis of the cost estimate have significant impact on cost and schedule.

  14. Consideration of critically when directly disposing highly enriched spent nuclear fuel in unsaturated tuff: Bounding estimates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, R.P.; Tierney, M.S.; Sanchez, L.C.; Martell, M.-A.

    1996-05-01

    This report presents one of 2 approaches (bounding calculations) which were used in a 1994 study to examine the possibility of a criticality in a repository. Bounding probabilities, although rough, point to the difficulty of creating conditions under which a critical mass could be assembled (container corrosion, separation of neutron absorbers from fissile material, collapse or precipitation of fissile material) and how significant the geochemical and hydrologic phenomena are. The study could not conceive of a mechanism consistent with conditions under which an atomic explosion could occur. Should a criticality occur in or near a container in the future, boundary consequence calculations showed that fissions from one critical event ( 20 fissions, if similar to aqueous and metal accidents and experiments) are quite small compared to the amount of fissions represented by the spent fuel itself. If it is assumed that the containers necessary to hold the highly enriched spent fuel went critical once per day for 1 million years, creating an energy release of about 10 20 fissions, the number of fissions equals about 10 28 , which corresponds to only 1% of the fission inventory in a repository containing 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal, the expected size for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

  15. Consideration of critically when directly disposing highly enriched spent nuclear fuel in unsaturated tuff: Bounding estimates

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rechard, R.P.; Tierney, M.S.; Sanchez, L.C.; Martell, M.-A.

    1996-05-01

    This report presents one of 2 approaches (bounding calculations) which were used in a 1994 study to examine the possibility of a criticality in a repository. Bounding probabilities, although rough, point to the difficulty of creating conditions under which a critical mass could be assembled (container corrosion, separation of neutron absorbers from fissile material, collapse or precipitation of fissile material) and how significant the geochemical and hydrologic phenomena are. The study could not conceive of a mechanism consistent with conditions under which an atomic explosion could occur. Should a criticality occur in or near a container in the future, boundary consequence calculations showed that fissions from one critical event (<10{sup 20} fissions, if similar to aqueous and metal accidents and experiments) are quite small compared to the amount of fissions represented by the spent fuel itself. If it is assumed that the containers necessary to hold the highly enriched spent fuel went critical once per day for 1 million years, creating an energy release of about 10{sup 20} fissions, the number of fissions equals about 10{sup 28}, which corresponds to only 1% of the fission inventory in a repository containing 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal, the expected size for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.

  16. U.S. Non-proliferation policy and programs regarding use of high-enriched uranium in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, R.A.

    1993-01-01

    Uranium enriched to 90-93%, supplied by the U.S., is now used in 141 research and test reactors in 35 countries around the world with a cumulative power of 1714 mw. Since of the order of 3 kg of 235 U is involved annually in fuel fabrication, fresh fuel transport and storage, reactor operation, and spent fuel cooling and return per megawatt of research reactor power, it is estimated that more than 5000 kg of very high-enriched uranium is handled each year to operate these reactors. Recent U.S. assessments have led to the tentative conclusion that in only approximately 11 of these reactors, generally those of highest power or power density, is the use of 90-93% enriched uranium currently a technical necessity. Universal use of the best state-of-the-art fuel technology would permit an estimated 90 of these reactors to use 20% enriched fuel, and estimated 40 others to use 45% enriched fuel, without significant performance degradation. If advanced research reactor fuel development programs currently under way in the U.S. and elsewhere are successful, it may, in fact, be possible to operate virtually all of these reactors on less than 20% enriched uranium in the longer term. The physical and economic practicality of these developmental fuels must, of course, await future assessments

  17. Conversion and Blending Facility Highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranium hexafluoride. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    This report describes the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) which will have two missions: (1) convert surplus HEU materials to pure HEU UF{sub 6} and a (2) blend the pure HEU UF{sub 6} with diluent UF{sub 6} to produce LWR grade LEU-UF{sub 6}. The primary emphasis of this blending be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The chemical and isotopic concentrations of the blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. The blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry.

  18. Conversion and Blending Facility Highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranium hexafluoride. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This report describes the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) which will have two missions: (1) convert surplus HEU materials to pure HEU UF 6 and a (2) blend the pure HEU UF 6 with diluent UF 6 to produce LWR grade LEU-UF 6 . The primary emphasis of this blending be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The chemical and isotopic concentrations of the blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. The blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry

  19. Comparison Of A Neutron Kinetics Parameter For A Polyethylene Moderated Highly Enriched Uranium System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKenzie, IV, George Espy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Goda, Joetta Marie [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Grove, Travis Justin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sanchez, Rene Gerardo [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-04-17

    This paper examines the comparison of MCNP® code’s capability to calculate kinetics parameters effectively for a thermal system containing highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Rossi-α parameter was chosen for this examination because it is relatively easy to measure as well as easy to calculate using MCNP®’s kopts card. The Rossi-α also incorporates many other parameters of interest in nuclear kinetics most of which are more difficult to precisely measure. The comparison looks at two different nuclear data libraries for comparison to the experimental data. These libraries are ENDF/BVI (.66c) and ENDF/BVII (.80c).

  20. Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  1. Analysis of civilian processing programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  2. Return of 80% highly enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Subotic, K.; Hopwood, W. Jr; Moses, S.; Wander, T.; Smirnov, A.; Kanashov, B.; Eshcherkin, A.; Efarov, S.; Olivieri, C.; Loghin, N. E.

    2003-01-01

    The transport of almost 50 kg of highly enriched (80%) uranium (HEU), in the form of fresh TVR-S fuel elements, from the Vin a Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, to the Russian Federation for uranium reprocessing was carried out in August 2002. This act was a contribution of the Government of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible actions of terrorists against nuclear material that potentially would be usable for the production of nuclear weapons. Basic aspects of this complex operation, carried out mainly by transport teams of the Vinca Institute and of the Institute for Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials from Dimitrovgrad, Russian Federation, are described in this paper. A team of IAEA safety inspectors and experts from the DOE, USA, for transport and non-proliferation, supported the whole operation. (author)

  3. Validation of the Monte Carlo Criticality Program KENO V. a for highly-enriched uranium systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Knight, J.R.

    1984-11-01

    A series of calculations based on critical experiments have been performed using the KENO V.a Monte Carlo Criticality Program for the purpose of validating KENO V.a for use in evaluating Y-12 Plant criticality problems. The experiments were reflected and unreflected systems of single units and arrays containing highly enriched uranium metal or uranium compounds. Various geometrical shapes were used in the experiments. The SCALE control module CSAS25 with the 27-group ENDF/B-4 cross-section library was used to perform the calculations. Some of the experiments were also calculated using the 16-group Hansen-Roach Library. Results are presented in a series of tables and discussed. Results show that the criteria established for the safe application of the KENO IV program may also be used for KENO V.a results.

  4. Minimizing civilian use of highly enriched uranium - FRM II and global developments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Englert, Matthias [Oeko-Institut e.V., Darmstadt (Germany)

    2016-07-01

    The need to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear applications is shrinking due to international efforts worldwide in the last three decades. Today low enriched uranium (LEU) that is not suitable for nuclear weapon purposes can be used instead in almost all civil applications. An overview of the current HEU use worldwide will be presented before focusing more on the use of HEU in research reactors and the conversion of existing reactors to LEU. Specifically interesting is the case of the German research reactor in Munich, the FRM-II. The reactor operates since ten years after intense national and international discussions over the use of weapon usable HEU to fuel the reactor. Since its construction the reactor is therefore obliged to convert to lower enrichment levels as soon as a suitable fuel becomes available. Despite huge international efforts to develop new fuels it is still not clear if and when the reactor can be converted.

  5. Return of 80% highly enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Subotic, K.; Hopwood, W. Jr; Moses, S.; Wander, T.; Smirnov, A.; Kanashov, B.; Eshcherkin, A.; Efarov, S.; Olivieri, C.; Loghin, N. E.

    2003-01-01

    The transport of almost 50 kg of highly enriched (80%) uranium (HEU), in the form of fresh TVR-S fuel elements, from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, to the Russian Federation for uranium reprocessing was carried out in August 2002. This act was a contribution of the Government of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible actions of terrorists against nuclear material that potentially would be usable for the production of nuclear weapons. Basic aspects of this complex operation, carried out mainly by transport teams of the Vinca Institute and of the Institute for Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials from Dimitrovgrad, Russian Federation, are described in this paper. A team of IAEA safety inspectors and experts from the DOE, USA, for transport and non-proliferation, supported the whole operation. (author)

  6. Fast critical assembly safeguards: NDA methods for highly enriched uranium. Summary report, October 1978-September 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bellinger, F.O.; Winslow, G.H.

    1980-12-01

    Nondestructive assay (NDA) methods, principally passive gamma measurements and active neutron interrogation, have been studied for their safeguards effectiveness and programmatic impact as tools for making inventories of highly enriched uranium fast critical assembly fuel plates. It was concluded that no NDA method is the sole answer to the safeguards problem, that each of those emphasized here has its place in an integrated safeguards system, and that each has minimum facility impact. It was found that the 185-keV area, as determined with a NaI detector, was independent of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) plate irradiation history, though the random neutron driver methods used here did not permit accurate assay of irradiated plates. Containment procedures most effective for accurate assaying were considered, and a particular geometry is recommended for active interrogation by a random driver. A model, pertinent to that geometry, which relates the effects of multiplication and self-absorption, is described. Probabilities of failing to detect that plates are missing are examined

  7. Supply of low enriched (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1997-01-01

    Enriched uranium for research reactors in the form of LEU /= low enriched uranium at 19.75% U-235) and HEU (= highly enriched uranium at 90 to 93% U-235) was and is - due to its high U-235 enrichment - a political fuel other than enriched uranium for power reactors. The sufficient availability of LEU and HEU is a vital question for research reactors, especially in Europe, in order to perform their peaceful research reactor programs. In the past the USA were in the Western hemisphere sole supplier of LEU and HEU. Today the USA have de facto stopped the supply of LEU and HEU, for HEU mainly due to political reasons. This paper deals, among others, with the present availability of LEU and HEU for European research reactors and touches the following topics: - historical US supplies, - influence of the RERTR-program, - characteristics of LEU and HEU, - military HEU enters the civil market, -what is the supply situation for LEU and HEU today? - outlook for safe supplies of LEU and HEU. (author)

  8. Use of Savannah River Site facilities for blend down of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bickford, W.E.; McKibben, J.M.

    1994-02-01

    Westinghouse Savannah River Company was asked to assess the use of existing Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities for the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). The purpose was to eliminate the weapons potential for such material. Blending HEU with existing supplies of depleted uranium (DU) would produce material with less than 5% U-235 content for use in commercial nuclear reactors. The request indicated that as much as 500 to 1,000 MT of HEU would be available for conversion over a 20-year period. Existing facilities at the SRS are capable of producing LEU in the form of uranium trioxide (UO 3 ) powder, uranyl nitrate [UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ] solution, or metal. Additional processing, and additional facilities, would be required to convert the LEU to uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) or uranium hexafluoride (UF 3 ), the normal inputs for commercial fuel fabrication. This study's scope does not include the cost for new conversion facilities. However, the low estimated cost per kilogram of blending HEU to LEU in SRS facilities indicates that even with fees for any additional conversion to UO 2 or UF 6 , blend-down would still provide a product significantly below the spot market price for LEU from traditional enrichment services. The body of the report develops a number of possible facility/process combinations for SRS. The primary conclusion of this study is that SRS has facilities available that are capable of satisfying the goals of a national program to blend HEU to below 5% U-235. This preliminary assessment concludes that several facility/process options appear cost-effective. Finally, SRS is a secure DOE site with all requisite security and safeguard programs, personnel skills, nuclear criticality safety controls, accountability programs, and supporting infrastructure to handle large quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM)

  9. Management of high enriched uranium for peaceful purposes: Status and trends

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-06-01

    Arms control agreements between some Nuclear Weapon States have led to the dismantling of many of the nuclear weapons in their military stockpiles, which in turn have produced stockpiles of excess weapons-grade high enriched uranium (HEU) from the dismantled weapons. Considering the proliferation potential of HEU, the management, control and disposition of this fissile material has become a primary focus of nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. To lessen the proliferation threat of excess HEU stockpiles, the USA agreed to purchase several tonnes of excess Russian HEU down-blended to low enriched uranium (LEU). Proliferation concerns about HEU have also resulted in a global effort to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel and to minimize civilian use of HEU. This publication addresses HEU management declared excesses, non-proliferation programmes and options for the use of HEU stockpiles, including disposition programmes. Also addressed are the influence of LEU derived from surplus HEU on the global market for uranium, technical issues associated with utilization and the disposition of HEU

  10. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as metal. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    The mission of this Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will be to blend surplus HEU metal and alloy with depleted uranium metal to produce an LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  11. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as metal. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The mission of this Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will be to blend surplus HEU metal and alloy with depleted uranium metal to produce an LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal

  12. The Pajarito Monitor: a high-sensitivity monitoring system for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Coop, K.; Garcia, C.; Martinez, J.

    1984-01-01

    The Pajarito Monitor for Special Nuclear Material is a high-sensitivity gamma-ray monitoring system for detecting small quantities of highly enriched uranium transported by pedestrians or motor vehicles. The monitor consists of two components: a walk-through personnel monitor and a vehicle monitor. The personnel monitor has a plastic-scintillator detector portal, a microwave occupancy monitor, and a microprocessor control unit that measures the radiation intensity during background and monitoring periods to detect transient diversion signals. The vehicle monitor examines stationary motor vehicles while the vehicle's occupants pass through the personnel portal to exchange their badges. The vehicle monitor has four groups of large plastic scintillators that scan the vehicle from above and below. Its microprocessor control unit measures separate radiation intensities in each detector group. Vehicle occupancy is sensed by a highway traffic detection system. Each monitor's controller is responsible for detecting diversion as well as serving as a calibration and trouble-shooting aid. Diversion signals are detected by a sequential probability ratio hypothesis test that minimizes the monitoring time in the vehicle monitor and adapts itself well to variations in individual passage speed in the personnel monitor. Designed to be highly sensitive to diverted enriched uranium, the monitoring system also exhibits exceptional sensitivity for plutonium

  13. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as oxide. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials into pure HEU oxide and (2) blend the pure HEU oxide with depleted and natural uranium oxide to produce an LWR grade LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  14. Measurement of highly enriched uranium metal buttons with the high-level neutron coincidence counter operating in the active mode

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foley, J.E.

    1980-10-01

    The portable High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter is used in the active mode with the addition of AmLi neutron sources to assay the 235 U content of highly enriched metal pieces or buttons. It is concluded that the portable instrument is a practical instrument for assaying uranium metal buttons with masses in the range 1.5 to 4 kg

  15. Implementation of the United States-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R.rutkowski, E; Armantrout, G; Mastal, E; Glaser, J; Benton, J

    2004-01-01

    The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) monitors and provides assurance that Russian weapons-grade HEU is processed into low enriched uranium (LEU) under the transparency provisions of the 1993 United States (U.S.)-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. Meeting the Agreement's transparency provisions is not just a program requirement; it is a legal requirement. The HEU Purchase Agreement requires transparency measures to be established to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are met. The Transparency concept has evolved into a viable program that consists of complimentary elements that provide necessary assurances. The key elements include: (1) monitoring by technical experts; (2) independent measurements of enrichment and flow; (3) nuclear material accountability documents from Russian plants; and (4) comparison of transparency data with declared processing data. In the interest of protecting sensitive information, the monitoring is neither full time nor invasive. Thus, an element of trust is required regarding declared operations that are not observed. U.S. transparency monitoring data and independent instrument measurements are compared with plant accountability records and other declared processing data to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the 1993 Agreement are being met. Similarly, Russian monitoring of U. S. storage and fuel fabrication operations provides assurance to the Russians that the derived LEU is being used in accordance with the Agreement. The successful implementation of the Transparency program enables the receipt of Russian origin LEU into the United States. Implementation of the 1993 Agreement is proceeding on schedule, with the permanent elimination of over 8,700 warhead equivalents of HEU. The successful implementation of the Transparency program has taken place over the last 10 years and has provided the

  16. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Return of Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Messick, C.E.; Dickerson, S.L.; Greenberg, R.F. Jr. [U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington D.C. (United States); Andes, T.C. [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2011-07-01

    In March 2010, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI), in collaboration with the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN), completed a shipment of 18.2 kilograms of non-U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States. The HEU was in the form of 71 aluminium-clad material test reactor (MTR) fuel elements and was the first GTRI Gap Program shipment that included non-U.S. origin irradiated nuclear fuel. Although shipments of research reactor fuels are not unique, this shipment served as a cornerstone to the first Presidential Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010. Carrying out the shipment became critical when a severe earthquake struck Chile just one day before the shipment was to occur. As the fuel had already been packaged in casks and the ocean vessels were nearing the port, U.S. and Chilean officials decided that it was most imperative that the shipment continue as planned. After careful analysis of the situation, inspection of the transportation packages, roadways, and port services, the shipment team was able to make the shipment occur in a safe and secure manner. This paper describes the loading activities at both the RECH-1 and RECH-2 reactors as well as the transportation of the loaded casks to the port of departure. (author)

  17. Conversion of the RB reactor neutrons by highly enriched uranium fuel and lithium deuteride

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strugar, P.; Sotic, O.; Ninkovic, M.; Pesic, M.; Altiparmakov, D.

    1981-01-01

    A thermal-to-fast-neutron converter has been constructed at the RB reactor. The material used for the conversion of thermal neutrons is highly enriched uranium fuel of Soviet production applied in Yugoslav heavy water experimental reactors RA and RB. Calculations and preliminary measurements show that the spectrum of converted neutrons only slightly differs from that of fission neutrons. The basic characteristics of converted neutrons can be expressed by the neutron radiation dose of 800 rad (8 Gy) for 1 h of reactor operation at a power level of 1 kW. This dose is approximately 10 times higher than the neutron dose at the same place without converter. At the same time, thermal neutron and gamma radiation doses are negligible. The constructed neutron converter offers wide possibilities for applications in reactor and nuclear physics and similar disciplines, where neutron spectra of high energies are required, as well as in the domain of neutron dosimetry and biological irradiations in homogeneous fields of larger dimensions. The possibility of converting thermal reactor neutrons with energies of about 14 MeV with the aid of lithium deuteride from natural lithium has been considered too. (author)

  18. Active neutron and gamma-ray imaging of highly enriched uranium for treaty verification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamel, Michael C; Polack, J Kyle; Ruch, Marc L; Marcath, Matthew J; Clarke, Shaun D; Pozzi, Sara A

    2017-08-11

    The detection and characterization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) presents a large challenge in the non-proliferation field. HEU has a low neutron emission rate and most gamma rays are low energy and easily shielded. To address this challenge, an instrument known as the dual-particle imager (DPI) was used with a portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator to detect neutrons and gamma rays from induced fission in HEU. We evaluated system response using a 13.7-kg HEU sphere in several configurations with no moderation, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) moderation, and tungsten moderation. A hollow tungsten sphere was interrogated to evaluate the response to a possible hoax item. First, localization capabilities were demonstrated by reconstructing neutron and gamma-ray images. Once localized, additional properties such as fast neutron energy spectra and time-dependent neutron count rates were attributed to the items. For the interrogated configurations containing HEU, the reconstructed neutron spectra resembled Watt spectra, which gave confidence that the interrogated items were undergoing induced fission. The time-dependent neutron count rate was also compared for each configuration and shown to be dependent on the neutron multiplication of the item. This result showed that the DPI is a viable tool for localizing and confirming fissile mass and multiplication.

  19. Verification of nuclear material balances: General theory and application to a highly enriched uranium fabrication plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Beedgen, R.; Neu, H.

    1980-08-01

    In the theoretical part it is shown that under the assumption, that in case of diversion the operator falsifies all data by a class specific amount, it is optimal in the sense of the probability of detection to use the difference MUF-D as the test statistics. However, as there are arguments for keeping the two tests separately, and furthermore, as it is not clear that the combined test statistics is optimal for any diversion strategy, the overall guaranteed probability of detection for the bivariate test is determined. A numerical example is given applying the theoretical part. Using the material balance data of a Highly Enriched Uranium fabrication plant the variances of MUF, D (no diversion) and MUF-D are calculated with the help of the standard deviations of operator and inspector measurements. The two inventories of the material balance are stratified. The samples sizes of the strata and the total inspection effort for data verification are determined by game theoretical methods (attribute sampling). On the basis of these results the overall detection probability of the combined system (data verification and material accountancy) is determined both for the MUF-D test and the bivariate (D,MUF) test as a function of the goal quantity. The results of both tests are evaluated for different diversion strategies. (orig./HP) [de

  20. Stationary and protable instruments for assay of HEU [highly enriched uranium] solids holdup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russo, P.A.; Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Stephens, M.M.; Brumfield, T.L.; Gunn, C.S.; Watson, D.R.

    1987-01-01

    Two NaI(Tl)-based instruments, one stationary and one portable, designed for automated assay of highly enriched uranium (HEU) solids holdup, are being evaluated at the scrap recovery facility of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The stationary instrument, a continuous monitor of HEU within the filters of the chip burner exhaust system, measures the HEU deposits that accumulate erratically and rapidly during chip burner operation. The portable system was built to assay HEU in over 100 m of elevated piping used to transfer UO 3 , UO 2 , and UF 4 powder to, from, and between the fluid bed conversion furnances and the powder storage hoods. Both instruments use two detector heads. Both provide immediate automatic readout of accumulated HEU mass. The 186-keV 235 U gamma ray is the assay signature, and the 60-keV gamma ray from an 241 Am source attached to each detector is used to normalize the 186-keV rate. The measurement geometries were selected for compatibility with simple calibration models. The assay calibrations were calculated from these models and were verified and normalized with measurements of HEU standards built to match geometries of uniform accumulations on the surfaces of the process equipment. This instrumentation effort demonstrates that simple calibration models can often be applied to unique measurement geometries, minimizing the otherwise unreasonable requirements for calibration standards and allowing extension of the measurements to other process locations

  1. Conversion of the University of Missouri-Rolla Reactor from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bolon, A.E.; Straka, M.; Freeman, D.W.

    1997-01-01

    The objectives of this project were to convert the UMR Reactor fuel from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and to ship the HEU fuel back to the Department of Energy Savannah River Site. The actual core conversion was completed in the summer of 1992. The HEU fuel was offloaded to an onsite storage pit where it remained until July, 1996. In July, 1996, the HEU fuel was shipped to the DOE Savannah River Site. The objectives of the project have been achieved. DOE provided the following funding for the project. Several papers were published regarding the conversion project and are listed in the Attachment. In retrospect, the conversion project required much more time and effort than originally thought. Several difficulties were encountered including the unavailability of a shipping cask for several years. The authors are grateful for the generous funding provided by DOE for this project but wish to point out that much of their efforts on the conversion project went unfunded

  2. The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

    2008-12-23

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission

  3. Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Voluntary statement on highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale, dated 12 September 2001, from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France has made available statements of the stocks of highly enriched uranium held by it as of 31 December 1999 and 31 December 2000. With reference to the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the Permanent Mission of France has also conveyed in its note verbale that 'Concerned to promote transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful nuclear activities, the Government of the French Republic has decided to publish, on a voluntary basis, information on the highly enriched uranium it holds for civil purposes'. In the light of the request expressed by the Government of France in its note verbale of 28 November 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), and the request in its note verbale of 12 September 2001, the texts of the enclosures of the note verbale of 12 September 2001 are attached for the information of all Member States

  4. Validation of KENO V.a for highly enriched uranium systems with hydrogen and/or carbon moderation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elliott, E.P.; Vornehm, R.G.; Dodds, H.L. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes the validation in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983(R1988) of KENO V.a using the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross-section library for systems containing highly-enriched uranium, carbon, and hydrogen and for systems containing highly-enriched uranium and carbon with high carbon to uranium (C/U) atomic ratios. The validation has been performed for two separate computational platforms: an IBM 3090 mainframe and an HP 9000 Model 730 workstation, both using the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Software (NCSS) code package. Critical experiments performed at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility, in support of the Rover reactor program, and at the Pajarito site at Los Alamos National Laboratory were identified as having the constituents desired for this validation as well as sufficient experimental detail to allow accurate construction of KENO V.a calculational models. Calculated values of k eff for the Rover experiments, which contain uranium, carbon, and hydrogen, are between 1.0012 ± 0.0026 and 1.0245 ± 0.0023. Calculation of the Los Alamos experiments, which contain uranium and carbon at high C/U ratios, yields values of k eff between 0.9746 ± 0.0028 and 0.9983 ± 0.0027. Safety criteria can be established using this data for both types of systems

  5. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008 [es

  6. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009 [es

  7. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011 [es

  8. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [es

  9. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012 [es

  10. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [es

  11. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [fr

  12. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006

  13. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011

  14. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009

  15. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010

  16. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008

  17. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012

  18. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009

  19. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  20. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [fr

  1. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009 [fr

  2. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011 [fr

  3. Nuclear threat initiative - Kazakhstan project on elimination of high-enriched uranium. 8 October 2005, Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2001, NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) has made important contributions towards securing weapon-usable nuclear material and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, NTI pledged $1.15 million to the Agency?s Nuclear Security Fund, which has been used to achieve tangible nuclear security improvements: upgrades to physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear and radioactive material; urgently needed training in nuclear security for national officials; enhanced detection capabilities at border crossings; and improved national and international readiness for responding to terrorist acts. NTI has consistently sought to target its contributions to address areas of high priority. A primary point of focus has been to secure (and, where possible, eliminate) material that could be diverted for weapons purposes. In P roject Vinca , NTI committed $5 million in 2002 to help remove high enriched uranium fuel from a research reactor near Belgrade, for return to Russia. With support from Russia, the United States and NTI, seven transfers of fresh fuel back to Russia have been made since 2002 - a total of 112 kilograms of HEU. Current plans foresee further shipments of fresh HEU from another three countries in the next 15 months. The IAEA is also continuing to work on arrangements for the repatriation of spent research reactor fuel of Russian origin. In 2001, Sam Nunn and NTI president Charles Curtis approached the Kazakh Government to offer support for the safe transportation of the unused nuclear fuel from the shutdown BN-350 reactor - nearly 3000 kilograms - to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant JSC (UMP), where it could be dismantled and down-blended into LEU (NTI-Kazakhstan project). By the end of this year, 2897 kilograms of HEU - enough to produce dozens of nuclear bombs - will have been down-blended to LEU and placed in safe storage. Throughout the project, the IAEA has been implementing

  4. From high enriched to low enriched uranium fuel in research reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Van Den Berghe, S.; Leenaers, A.; Koonen, E.; Moons, F.; Sannen, L. [Nuclear Materials Science Institute, SCK.CEN, Boeretang 200, B-2400 Mol (Belgium)

    2010-07-01

    Since the 1970's, global efforts have been going on to replace the high-enriched (>90% {sup 235}U), low-density UAlx research reactor fuel with high-density, low enriched (<20% {sup 235}U) replacements. This search is driven by the attempt to reduce the civil use of high-enriched material because of proliferation risks and terrorist threats. American initiatives, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program have triggered the development of reliable low-enriched fuel types for these reactors, which can replace the high enriched ones without loss of performance. Most success has presently been obtained with U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} dispersion fuel, which is currently used in many research reactors in the world. However, efforts to search for a replacement with even higher density, which will also allow the conversion of some high flux research reactors that currently cannot change to U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} (eg. BR2 in Belgium), have continued and are for the moment mainly directed towards the U(Mo) alloy fuel (7-10 w% Mo). This paper provides an overview of the past efforts and presents the current status of the U(Mo) development. (authors)

  5. From high enriched to low enriched uranium fuel in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Den Berghe, S.; Leenaers, A.; Koonen, E.; Moons, F.; Sannen, L.

    2010-01-01

    Since the 1970's, global efforts have been going on to replace the high-enriched (>90% 235 U), low-density UAlx research reactor fuel with high-density, low enriched ( 235 U) replacements. This search is driven by the attempt to reduce the civil use of high-enriched material because of proliferation risks and terrorist threats. American initiatives, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program have triggered the development of reliable low-enriched fuel types for these reactors, which can replace the high enriched ones without loss of performance. Most success has presently been obtained with U 3 Si 2 dispersion fuel, which is currently used in many research reactors in the world. However, efforts to search for a replacement with even higher density, which will also allow the conversion of some high flux research reactors that currently cannot change to U 3 Si 2 (eg. BR2 in Belgium), have continued and are for the moment mainly directed towards the U(Mo) alloy fuel (7-10 w% Mo). This paper provides an overview of the past efforts and presents the current status of the U(Mo) development. (authors)

  6. Validation of the Monte Carlo Criticality Program KENO V.a for highly-enriched uranium systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knight, J.R.

    1984-11-01

    A series of calculations based on critical experiments have been performed using the KENO V.a Monte Carlo Criticality Program for the purpose of validating KENO V.a for use in evaluating Y-12 Plant criticality problems. The experiments were reflected and unreflected systems of single units and arrays containing highly enriched uranium metal or uranium compounds. Various geometrical shapes were used in the experiments. The SCALE control module CSAS25 with the 27-group ENDF/B-4 cross-section library was used to perform the calculations. Some of the experiments were also calculated using the 16-group Hansen-Roach Library. Results are presented in a series of tables and discussed. Results show that the criteria established for the safe application of the KENO IV program may also be used for KENO V.a results

  7. An integrated video- and weight-monitoring system for the surveillance of highly enriched uranium blend down operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lenarduzzi, R.; Castleberry, K.; Whitaker, M.; Martinez, R.

    1998-01-01

    An integrated video-surveillance and weight-monitoring system has been designed and constructed for tracking the blending down of weapons-grade uranium by the US Department of Energy. The instrumentation is being used by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its task of tracking and verifying the blended material at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth, Ohio. The weight instrumentation developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory monitors and records the weight of cylinders of the highly enriched uranium as their contents are fed into the blending facility while the video equipment provided by Sandia National Laboratory records periodic and event triggered images of the blending area. A secure data network between the scales, cameras, and computers insures data integrity and eliminates the possibility of tampering. The details of the weight monitoring instrumentation, video- and weight-system interaction, and the secure data network is discussed

  8. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of fuel cycle programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. Reference annual mass flows and inventories for a representative 1,400 Mwe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycle have been investigated for three cases: the 100 percent uranium oxide UO 2 fuel loading once through cycle, and the 33 percent mixed oxide MOX loading configuration for a first and second plutonium recycle. The analysis addresses fuel cycle developments; plutonium and uranium inventory and flow balances; nuclear fuel processing operations; UO 2 once-through and MOX first and second recycles; and the economic incentives to draw-down the excess separated plutonium stores. The preliminary analysis explores several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium arisings and HEU, and the consequences of the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments

  9. NARCISS critical stand experiments for studying the nuclear safety in accident water immersion of highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Glushkov, E.S.; Bubelev, V.G.

    2005-01-01

    A brief description of the Topaz-2 SNPS designed under scientific supervision of RRC KI in Russia, and of the NARCISS critical facility, is given. At the NARCISS critical facility, neutronic peculiarities and nuclear safety issues of the Topaz-2 system reactor were studied experimentally. This work is devoted to a detailed description of experiments on investigation of criticality safety in accident water immersion og highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements, performed at the NARCISS facility. The experiments were carried out at water-moderated critical assemblies with varying height, number, and spacing of fuel elements. The results obtained in the critical experiments, computational models of the investigated critical configurations, and comparison of the computational and experimental results are given [ru

  10. Conversion of highly enriched uranium in thorium-232 based oxide fuel for light water reactors: MOX-T fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vapirev, E; Jordanov, T; Khristoskov, I [Sofia Univ. (Bulgaria). Fizicheski Fakultet

    1996-12-31

    The possibility of using highly enriched uranium available from military inventories for production of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) has been proposed. The fuel is based on U-235 dioxide as fissile isotope and Th-232 dioxide as a non-fissile isotope. It is shown that although the fuel conversion coefficient to U-233 is expected to be less than 1, the proposed fuel has several important advantages resulting in cost reduction of the nuclear fuel cycle. The expected properties of MOX fuel (cross-sections, generated chains, delayed neutrons) are estimated. Due to fuel generation the initial enrichment is expected to be 1% less for production of the same energy. In contrast to traditional fuel no long living actinides are generated which reduces the disposal and reprocessing cost. 7 refs.

  11. Automated instruments for in-line accounting of highly enriched uranium at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Stephens, M.M.; Brumfield, T.L.; Smith, S.E.; McCullough, E.E.; Jeter, I.W.; Bowers, G.L.

    1985-02-01

    Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Oak Ridge Y-12 facility for recovery of highly enriched uranium (HEU). One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments was a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos personnel. This evaluation included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurements performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system and comparison of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function and design of the instruments and detailed results of the operational evaluation are reported

  12. Research on the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) nitrate by using the microwave denitration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bao Weimin; Song Chongli

    1998-08-01

    In order to simplify the denitration process by microwave heating, the uranyl nitrate is firstly denitrated and converted into UO 3 . The produced UO 3 was then further heated in the microwave field to transfer UO 3 to U 3 O 8 and to form a single product of U 3 O 8 . When the phase transfer from UO 3 to U 3 O 8 occurs, the temperature of the product increases 200∼300 degree C in two minutes. The phase-transfer temperature can be controlled by the input power of microwave. High quality U 3 O 8 can be obtained at a denitration temperature about 500 degree C. It contains no residual NO x and has a specific surface area great than 3 m 2 /g. The denitration temperature is measured with an IR-thermometer and checked with an optic fiber thermometer. The working curve and process parameter were studied in a microwave denitration unit for high enriched uranyl nitrate solution (90 g(U)/L, 4 mol/L HNO 3 and 1.2 L per batch)

  13. Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Annuli and Cylinders with Polyethylene Reflectors and/or Internal Polyethylene Moderator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler Sumner; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Montierth

    2007-01-01

    A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, experiments of uranium metal annuli with and without polyethylene reflectors and with the central void region either empty or filled with polyethylene were evaluated under ICSBEP Identifier HEU-MET-FAST-076. The outer diameter of the uranium annuli varied from 9 to 15 inches in two-inch increments. In addition, there were uranium metal cylinders with diameters varying from 7 to 15 inches with complete reflection and reflection on one flat surface to simulate floor reflection. Most of the experiments were performed between February 1964 and April 1964. Five partially reflected (reflected on the top only) experiments were assembled in November 1967, but are judged by the evaluators not to be of benchmark quality. Twenty-four of the twenty-five experiments have been determined to have fast spectra. The only exception has a mixed spectrum. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with five different parameters associated with the uranium parts and three associated with the polyethylene parts was evaluated. Included were uranium mass, height, diameter, isotopic content, and impurity content and polyethylene mass, diameter, and impurity content. There were additional uncertainties associated with assembly alignment, support structure, and the value

  14. Disposition of highly enriched uranium obtained from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Environmental assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-05-01

    This EA assesses the potential environmental impacts associated with DOE's proposal to transport 600 kg of Kazakhstand-origin HEU from Y-12 to a blending site (B ampersand W Lynchburg or NFS Erwin), transport low-enriched UF6 blending stock from a gaseous diffusion plant to GE Wilmington and U oxide blending stock to the blending site, blending the HEU and uranium oxide blending stock to produce LEU in the form of uranyl nitrate, and transport the uranyl nitrate from the blending site to USEC Portsmouth

  15. Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Pu from nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neff, T.L.

    1992-01-01

    Last year, as the Soviet Union began to crumble and the Bush-Gorbachev talks had advanced to consider the dismantling of actual warheads instead of mere delivery systems, Dr. Thomas L. Neff, a senior member of MIT's Center for International Studies, tinkered with the notion that one day soon the US could be buying Russian uranium from scrapped nuclear arms. He also considered the costly business of dismantlement and set to work on an ingenious proposal. The basic idea was simply to purchase the HEU from Russia using funds derived from savings in the US Department of Energy's enrichment enterprise. The proposal, now part of an umbrella agreement between the US and Russia announced in early September, promises large strategic benefits for the US in terms of both financing dismantlement (to the tune of $100 million annually), as well as political oversight for the operation itself. In the words of Dr. Neff, who made briefings to both governments on the proposal, open-quotes It's a budget-neutral, win-win solution.close quotes What follows is an illustrated, step-by-step analysis of the proposal, as well as a reprint of Dr. Neff's paper, Disposition of HEU and Pu from Nuclear Weapons, as presented to the Uranium Institute's annual symposium last month

  16. NUCLEAR ISOTOPIC DILUTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BY DRY BLENDING VIA THE RM-2 MILL TECHNOLOGY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajamani, Raj K.; Latchireddi, Sanjeeva; Devrani, Vikas; Sethi, Harappan; Henry, Roger; Chipman, Nate

    2003-01-01

    DOE has initiated numerous activities to focus on identifying material management strategies to disposition various excess fissile materials. In particular the INEEL has stored 1,700 Kg of offspec HEU at INTEC in CPP-651 vault facility. Currently, the proposed strategies for dispositioning are (a) aqueous dissolution and down blending to LEU via facilities at SRS followed by shipment of the liquid LEU to NFS for fabrication into LWR fuel for the TVA reactors and (b) dilution of the HEU to 0.9% for discard as a waste stream that would no longer have a criticality or proliferation risk without being processed through some type of enrichment system. Dispositioning this inventory as a waste stream via aqueous processing at SRS has been determined to be too costly. Thus, dry blending is the only proposed disposal process for the uranium oxide materials in the CPP-651 vault. Isotopic dilution of HEU to typically less than 20% by dry blending is the key to solving the dispositioning issue (i.e., proliferation) posed by HEU stored at INEEL. RM-2 mill is a technology developed and successfully tested for producing ultra-fine particles by dry grinding. Grinding action in RM-2 mill produces a two million-fold increase in the number of particles being blended in a centrifugal field. In a previous study, the concept of achieving complete and adequate blending and mixing (i.e., no methods were identified to easily separate and concentrate one titanium compound from the other) in remarkably short processing times was successfully tested with surrogate materials (titanium dioxide and titanium mono-oxide) with different particle sizes, hardness and densities. In the current project, the RM-2 milling technology was thoroughly tested with mixtures of natural uranium oxide (NU) and depleted uranium oxide (DU) stock to prove its performance. The effects of mill operating and design variables on the blending of NU/DU oxides were evaluated. First, NU and DU both made of the same oxide

  17. Preliminary Accident Analyses for Conversion of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) from Highly Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dunn, Floyd E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Olson, Arne P. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, Erik H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Sun, Kaichao S. [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Newton, Jr., Thomas H. [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Hu, Lin-wen [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)

    2013-09-30

    The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR-II) is a research reactor in Cambridge, Massachusetts designed primarily for experiments using neutron beam and in-core irradiation facilities. It delivers a neutron flux comparable to current LWR power reactors in a compact 6 MW core using Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. In the framework of its non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MITR. This report presents the preliminary accident analyses for MITR cores fueled with LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo. Preliminary results demonstrate adequate performance, including thermal margin to expected safety limits, for the LEU accident scenarios analyzed.

  18. The NNSA global threat reduction initiative's efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staples, Parrish

    2010-01-01

    The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU); Demonstrating the viability of medical isotope production technologies that do not use HEU; Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide; and Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview on the recent developments and priorities for GTRI program activities in 2010, with a particular focus on GTRI's efforts to demonstrate the viability of non-HEU based medical isotope production technologies. (author)

  19. Conversion of highly enriched uranium in thorium-232 based oxide fuel for light water reactors: MOX-T fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vapirev, E I; Jordanov, T; Christoskov, I [Sofia Univ. (Bulgaria). Fizicheski Fakultet

    1994-12-31

    The idea of conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from warheads without mixing it with natural uranium as well as the utilization of plutonium as fuel component is discussed. A nuclear fuel which is a mixture of 4% {sup 235}U (HEU) as a fissile isotope and 96 % {sup 232}Th (ThO{sub 2}) as a non-fissile isotope in a mixed oxide with thorium fuel is proposed. It is assumed that plutonium can also be used in the proposed fuel in a mixture with {sup 235}U. The following advantages of the use of HEU in LWRs in mixed {sup 235}U - Th fuel are pointed out: (1) No generation of long-living plutonium and americium isotopes (in case of reprocessing the high level radioactive wastes will contain only fission fragments and uranium); (2) The high conversion ratio of Th extends the expected burnup by approximately 1/3 without higher initial enrichment (the same initial enrichment simplifies the problem for compensation of the excess reactivity in the beginning with burnable poison and boric acid); (3) The high conversion ratio of Th allows the fuel utilization with less initial enrichment (by approx. 1/3) for the same burnup; thus less excess reactivity has to be compensated after reloading; in case of fuel reprocessing all fissile materials ({sup 235}U + {sup 233}U) could be chemically extracted. Irrespectively to the optimistic expectations outlined, further work including data on optimal loading and reloading schemes, theoretical calculations of thermal properties of {sup 235}U + Th fuel rods, manufacturing of several test fuel assemblies and investigations of their operational behaviour in a reactor core is still needed. 1 fig., 7 refs.

  20. Critical experiments simulating accidental water immersion of highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponomarev-Stepnoi, N.N.; Glushkov, L.S.

    2003-01-01

    The paper focuses on experimental analysis of nuclear criticality safety at accidental water immersion of fuel elements of the Russian TOPAZ-2 space nuclear power system reactor. The structure of water-moderated heterogeneous critical assemblies at the NARCISS facility is described in detail, including sizes, compositions, densities of materials of the main assembly components for various core configurations. Critical parameters of the assemblies measured for varying number of fuel elements, height of fuel material in fuel elements and their arrangement in the water moderator with a uniform or variable spacing are presented. It has been found from the experiments that at accidental water immersion of fuel elements involved, the minimum critical mass equal to approximately 20 kg of uranium dioxide is achieved at 31-37 fuel elements. The paper gives an example of a physical model of the water-moderated heterogeneous critical assembly with a detailed characterization of its main components that can be used for calculations using different neutronic codes, including Monte Carlo ones. (author)

  1. Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 12 October 2004, from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2003. The Government of France has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2003. In light of the request expressed by the Government of France in its Note Verbale of 28 November 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the enclosures of the Note Verbale of 12 October 2004 are attached for the information of all Member States

  2. Communication received from Germany concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 18 April 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2004. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2004. In light of the request expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the enclosures of the letter of 18 April 2005 are attached for the information of all Member States

  3. Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 2 September 2003, from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2002. The Government of France has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high-enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2002. In light of the request expressed by the Government of France in its Note Verbale of 28 November 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the enclosures of the Note Verbale of 2 September 2003 are attached for the information of all Member States

  4. Technical basis in support of the conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) core from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium - core neutron physics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stillman, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Foyto, L [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; McKibben, J C [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Peters, N. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Stevens, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    2012-09-01

    This report contains the results of reactor design and performance for conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support of the U. S. government.

  5. Validation of COG10 and ENDFB6R7 on the Auk Workstation for General Application to Highly Enriched Uranium Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Percher, Catherine G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2011-08-08

    The COG 10 code package1 on the Auk workstation is now validated with the ENBFB6R7 neutron cross section library for general application to highly enriched uranium (HEU) systems by comparison of the calculated keffective to the expected keffective of several relevant experimental benchmarks. This validation is supplemental to the installation and verification of COG 10 on the Auk workstation2.

  6. Communication received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning its national holdings of civil high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the note verbale and its attachment dated 1 July 1998 received by the Director General of the IAEA from the Permanent Mission to the IAEA of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, making available information on its national holdings of civil high enriched uranium as of 31 December 1997

  7. A feasibility study concerning the conversion of the TR-2 reactor from using highly enriched uranium to light enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aldemir, T.; Turgut, H.M.; Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, L.J.

    1983-01-01

    A study has been made of the feasibility of converting the 5-MW TR-2 reactor at CNAEM to use fuel with uranium enrichment of 3 O 8 -Al fuel meat with a uranium density in the range 2.3 to 3.0 g/cm 3 in the fuel meat with meat thickness varying between 0.9 and 1.00 mm, the number of plates in the LEU element being reduced from 23 in the HEU element to 19 to 20 to maintain adequate cooling. Fuels within this density range are expected to be commercially available within the next two years. From the results of the study it appears to be feasible to safely operate the TR-2 reactor using LEU fuel without increased fuel cycle costs or decreased performance using U 2 O 8 fuels with densities in the 2.3 to 3.0 gU/cm 3 range. (author)

  8. ZPR-3 Assembly 11: A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average 235U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lell, R.M.; McKnight, R.D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.

    2010-01-01

    Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of the important features of the critical

  9. Replacement of highly enriched uranium by medium or low-enriched uranium in fuels for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwartz, J.P.

    To exclude the possibility of an explosive use of the uranium obtained from an elementary chemical process, one needs to use a fuel less enriched than 20 weight percent in U 235 . This goal can be reached by two ways: 1. The low density fuels, i.e. U or U 3 O 8 /Al fuels. One has to increase their U content from 1.3 g U/cm 3 presently qualified under normal operation conditions. Several manufacturers such as CERCA in France developed these fuels with a near-term objective of about 2 g U/cm 3 and a long-term objective of 3 g U/cm 3 . 2. The high density fuels. They are the UO 2 Caramel plate type fuels now under consideration, and U 3 Si and UMo as a long-term potential

  10. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials to pure HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend pure HEU UNH with depleted and natural UNH to produce HEU UNH crystals. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU Will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  11. Transformations of highly enriched uranium into metal or oxide; Etudes des procedes de transformation des composes d'uranium a fort enrichissement isotopique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nollet, P; Sarrat, P [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Fontenay-aux-Roses (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1964-07-01

    The enriched uranium workshops in Cadarache have a double purpose on the one hand to convert uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide, and on the other hand to recover the uranium contained in scrap materials produced in the different metallurgical transformations. The principles that have been adopted for the design and safety of these workshops are reported. The nuclear safety is based on the geometrical limitations of the processing vessels. To establish the processes and the technology of these workshops, many studies have been made since 1960, some of which have led to original achievements. The uranium hexafluoride of high isotopic enrichment is converted either by injection of the gas into ammonia or by an original process of direct hydrogen reduction to uranium tetrafluoride. The uranium contained m uranium-zirconium metal scrap can be recovered by combustion with hydrogen chloride followed treatment of the uranium chloride by fluorine in order to obtain the uranium in the hexafluoride state. Recovery of the uranium contained m various scrap materials is obtained by a conventional refining process combustion of metallic scrap, nitric acid dissolution of the oxide, solvent purification by tributyl phosphate, ammonium diuranate precipitation, calcining, reduction and hydro fluorination into uranium tetrafluoride, bomb reduction by calcium and slag treatment. Two separate workshops operate along these lines one takes care of the uranium with an isotopic enrichment of up to 3 p. 100, the other handles the high enrichments. The handling of each step of this process, bearing in mind the necessity for nuclear safety, has raised some special technological problems and has led to the conception of new apparatus, in particular the roasting furnace for metal turnings, the nitric acid dissolution unit, the continuous precipitator and ever safe filter and dryer for ammonium diuranate, the reduction and hydro fluorination furnace and the slag recovery apparatus These are

  12. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) politics: An enigma wrapped up in a warhead and boxed in political chaos

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1993-01-01

    It could be fairly said that while the Cold War arose in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and hostility, it is ending with an equal amount of confusion and uncertainty. More than a year has passed since the US and Russia signed a tentative HEU agreement in August 1992. Many of the details have been worked out, but major questions remain. And they're not just on the Russian side. The fine points of President Clinton's overall nuclear policy are only now beginning to emerge. In his first major foreign policy address, before the United Nations in late September, Clinton called for a worldwide ban on the production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. open-quotes Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations,close quotes said Clinton before the UN. open-quotes We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever.close quotes As the veil lifts from Clinton's nuclear policy, it appears the Administration realizes that Russia may have more HEU than originally thought. That possibility has been confirmed by Minatom Minister Mikhailov's disclosures to the NUKEM Market Report, which brought a greater degree of certainty to estimates that had been floating around for some time. When the Bush Administration signed the HEU pact, it apparently thought the 500 metric tons comprised most of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Now that the number appears higher, Clinton may propose to accelerate and enlarge the HEU deal. He is due to summit with Yeltsin, if Yeltsin survives, next spring. The 500-metric-ton deal may only be the first step

  13. Feasibility and options for purchasing nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from the former Soviet Union (FSU)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    In response to a recent tasking from the National Security Council, this report seeks to analyze the possible options open to the US for purchasing, from the former Soviet Union (FSU) substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the accelerated weapons retirements and dismantlements that will soon be taking place. The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the implications of some of the options that now appear to be open to the United States, it being recognized that several issues might have to be addressed in further detail if the US Government, on its own, or acting with others seeks to negotiate any such purchases on an early basis. As an outgrowth of the dissolution of the Soviet Union three of the C.I.S. republics now possessing nuclear weapons, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have stated that it is their goal, without undue delay, to become non-nuclear weapon states as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of overriding US concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, and the significant opportunity that the availability of such a large quantity of surplus weapons grade material might present in this regard, especially to a cash-starved FSU Republic. Additionally, the US, in its endeavor to drawdown its own arsenal, needs to assure itself that these materials are not being reconfigured into more modern weapons within the CIS in a manner which would be inconsistent with the stated intentions and publicized activities. The direct purchase of these valuable materials by the US government or by interested US private enterprises could alleviate these security concerns in a straightforward and very expeditious manner, while at the same time pumping vitally needed hard currency into the struggling CIS economy. Such a purchase would seem to be entirely consistent with the Congressional mandate indicated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991

  14. Communication received from the Governor of Norway to the Agency concerning the International Symposium of Minimisation of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Civilian Nuclear Sector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Director General has received a communication from the Governor of Norway, attaching the Chair's Summary of the discussions held during the International Symposium of Minimisation of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Civilian Nuclear Sector which was held in Oslo from 17 to 20 June 2006 as well as the summary from the technical workshop of the Symposium. The communication and, as requested therein, the attached two summaries, are herewith circulated for the information of Member States

  15. Calibration Tools for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxide and Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide with a Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M; O'Connell, W; Cochran, C; Rinard, P

    2003-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has completed an extensive effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. Earlier papers described the PAN shuffler calibration over a range of item properties by standards measurements and an extensive series of detailed simulation calculations. With a single normalization factor, the simulations agree with the HEU oxide standards measurements to within ±1.2% at one standard deviation. Measurement errors on mixed U-Pu oxide samples are in the ±2% to ±10% range, or ±20 g for the smaller items. The purpose of this paper is to facilitate transfer of the LLNL procedure and calibration algorithms to external users who possess an identical, or equivalent, PAN shuffler. Steps include (1) measurement of HEU standards or working reference materials (WRMs); (2) MCNP simulation calculations for the standards or WRMs and a range of possible masses in the same containers; (3) a normalization of the calibration algorithms using the standard or WRM measurements to account for differences in the 252 Cf source strength, the delayed-neutron nuclear data, effects of the irradiation protocol, and detector efficiency; and (4) a verification of the simulation series trends against like LLNL results. Tools include EXCEL/Visual Basic programs which pre- and post-process the simulations, control the normalization, and embody the calibration algorithms

  16. Los Alamos National Laboratory Support for Commercial U.S. Production of 99Mo without the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dale, Gregory E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-03-04

    There is currently a serious shortage of 99Mo, from which to generate the medically significant isotope 99mTc. Most of the world's supply comes from the fission of highly enriched uranium targets--this is a proliferation concern. This document focuses on the technology involved in two alternative methods: electron accelerator production of 99Mo from the 100Mo(γ,n)99Mo reaction and production of 99Mo as a fission product in a subcritical, DT accelerator-driven low enriched uranium salt solution.

  17. Development of a treatment technology for diluting highly enriched AL-based DOE spent nuclear fuel: principles and practices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adams, T.M.; Duncan, A.J.; Peacock, H.B.; Fisher, D.L.

    2001-01-01

    The Savannah River Site is the U.S. Department of Energy's preferred site for return and treatment of all aluminum-base, spent, research and test reactor fuel assemblies. There are over 20,000 spent fuel assemblies now stored in different countries around the world, and by 2035 many will be returned to SRS for treatment and interim storage. Interim storage canisters at SRS will be sent to a Mined Geologic Repository for long-term geologic storage. Laboratory and plant layout of a full-scale process for irradiated fuel has been completed. Tests of the off gas absorption system have been initiated using both surrogate and irradiated RERTR mini fuel plates. An pilot-scale L-Area Experimental Facility (LEF) is planned to validate induction furnace operations, remote handling, and the off gas system for trapping volatile elements under plant operating conditions. (authors)

  18. Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Cowherd, W. M. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program; Rickman, B. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program

    2014-12-01

    This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. In the framework of non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MURR. This report presents the results of a study of core behavior under a set of accident conditions for MURR cores fueled with HEU U-Alx dispersion fuel or LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo

  19. Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Jaluvka, D. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States)

    2017-02-01

    This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members in the Research and Test Reactor Department at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. MURR LEU conversion is part of an overall effort to develop and qualify high-density fuel within the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor Conversion (USHPRR) program conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3).

  20. ZPR-3 Assembly 6F : A spherical assembly of highly enriched uranium, depleted uranium, aluminum and steel with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 47 atom %.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D; Schaefer, R. W.; Nuclear Engineering Division

    2010-09-30

    Assembly 6F (ZPR-3/6F), the final phase of the Assembly 6 program, simulated a spherical core with a thick depleted uranium reflector. ZPR-3/6F was designed as a fast reactor physics benchmark experiment with an average core {sup 235}U enrichment of approximately 47 at.%. Approximately 81.4% of the total fissions in this assembly occur above 100 keV, approximately 18.6% occur below 100 keV, and essentially none below 0.625 eV - thus the classification as a 'fast' assembly. This assembly is Fast Reactor Benchmark No. 7 in the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specifications and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3/6F began in late December 1956, and the experimental measurements were performed in January 1957. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates, depleted uranium plates, perforated aluminum plates and stainless steel plates loaded into aluminum drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of three columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, three columns of 0.125 in.-wide depleted uranium plates, nine columns of 0.125 in.-wide perforated aluminum plates and one column of stainless steel plates. The maximum length of each column of core material in a drawer was 9 in. (228.6 mm). Because of the goal to produce an approximately spherical core, core fuel and diluent column lengths generally varied between adjacent drawers and frequently within an individual drawer. The axial reflector consisted of depleted uranium plates and blocks loaded in the available space in the front (core) drawers, with the remainder loaded into back drawers behind the front drawers. The radial reflector consisted of blocks of depleted uranium loaded directly into the matrix tubes. The assembly geometry approximated a reflected sphere as closely as the square matrix tubes, the drawers and the

  1. Experiments and Simulations of the Use of Time-Correlated Thermal Neutron Counting to Determine the Multiplication of an Assembly of Highly Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David L. Chichester; Mathew T. Kinlaw; Scott M. Watson; Jeffrey M. Kalter; Eric C. Miller; William A. Noonan

    2014-11-01

    A series of experiments and numerical simulations using thermal-neutron time-correlated measurements has been performed to determine the neutron multiplication, M, of assemblies of highly enriched uranium available at Idaho National Laboratory. The experiments used up to 14.4 kg of highly-enriched uranium, including bare assemblies and assemblies reflected with high-density polyethylene, carbon steel, and tungsten. A small 252Cf source was used to initiate fission chains within the assembly. Both the experiments and the simulations used 6-channel and 8-channel detector systems, each consisting of 3He proportional counters moderated with polyethylene; data was recorded in list mode for analysis. 'True' multiplication values for each assembly were empirically derived using basic neutron production and loss values determined through simulation. A total of one-hundred and sixteen separate measurements were performed using fifty-seven unique measurement scenarios, the multiplication varied from 1.75 to 10.90. This paper presents the results of these comparisons and discusses differences among the various cases.

  2. Communication received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 17 July 2003, from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of the United Kingdom, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its national holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2002. The Government of the United Kingdom has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU), and of civil depleted, natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, as of 31 December 2002. 3. In the light of the requests expressed by the Government of the United Kingdom in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998) and in its Note Verbale of 17 July 2003, the Note Verbale of 17 July 2003 and the enclosures thereto are attached for the information of all Member States

  3. Reduction of uranium in disposal conditions of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myllykylae, E.

    2008-02-01

    This literature study is a summary of publications, in which the reduction of uranium by iron has been investigated in anaerobic groundwater conditions or in aqueous solution in general. The basics of the reduction phenomena and the oxidation states, complexes and solubilities of uranium and iron in groundwaters are discussed as an introduction to the subject, as well as, the Finnish disposal concept of spent nuclear fuel. The spent fuel itself mainly (∼96 %) consists of a sparingly soluble uranium(IV) dioxide, UO 2 (s), which is stable phase in the anticipated reducing disposal conditions. If spent fuel gets in contact with groundwater, oxidizing conditions might be induced by the radiolysis of water, or by the intrusion of oxidizing glacial melting water. Under these conditions, the oxidation and dissolution of uranium dioxide to more soluble U(VI) species could occur. This could lead to the mobilization of uranium and other components of spent fuel matrix including fission products and transuranium elements. The reduction of uranium back to oxidation state U(IV) can be considered as a favourable immobilization mechanism in a long-term, leading to precipitation due to the low solubility of U(IV) species. The cast iron insert of the disposal canister and its anaerobic corrosion products are the most important reductants under disposal conditions, but dissolved ferrous iron may also function as reductant. Other iron sources in the buffer or near-field rock, are also considered as possible reductants. The reduction of uranium is a very challenging phenomenon to investigate. The experimental studies need e.g. well-controlled anoxic conditions and measurements of oxidation states. Reduction and other simultaneous phenomena are difficult to distinghuish. The groundwater conditions (pH, Eh and ions) influence on the prevailing complexes of U and Fe and on forming corrosion products of iron and, thus they determine also the redox chemistry. The partial reduction of

  4. Production of Fission Product 99Mo using High-Enriched Uranium Plates in Polish Nuclear Research Reactor MARIA: Technology and Neutronic Analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jaroszewicz Janusz

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available The main objective of 235U irradiation is to obtain the 99mTc isotope, which is widely used in the domain of medical diagnostics. The decisive factor determining its availability, despite its short lifetime, is a reaction of radioactive decay of 99Mo into 99mTc. One of the possible sources of molybdenum can be achieved in course of the 235U fission reaction. The paper presents activities and the calculation results obtained upon the feasibility study on irradiation of 235U targets for production of 99Mo in the MARIA research reactor. Neutronic calculations and analyses were performed to estimate the fission products activity for uranium plates irradiated in the reactor. Results of dummy targets irradiation as well as irradiation uranium plates have been presented. The new technology obtaining 99Mo is based on irradiation of high-enriched uranium plates in standard reactor fuel channel and calculation of the current fission power generation. Measurements of temperatures and the coolant flow in the molybdenum installation carried out in reactor SAREMA system give online information about the current fission power generated in uranium targets. The corrective factors were taken into account as the heat generation from gamma radiation from neighbouring fuel elements as well as heat exchange between channels and the reactor pool. The factors were determined by calibration measurements conducted with aluminium mock-up of uranium plates. Calculations of fuel channel by means of REBUS code with fine mesh structure and libraries calculated by means of WIMS-ANL code were performed.

  5. Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Mixed Oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

    2002-01-01

    As a follow-on to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide, a method has been developed to extend the use of the PAN shuffler to the measurement of HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. This method uses the current LLNL HEU oxide calibration algorithms, appropriately corrected for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, and recently developed PuO 2 calibration algorithms to yield the mass of 235 U present via differences between the expected count rate for the PuO 2 and the measured count rate of the mixed U-Pu oxide. This paper describes the LLNL effort to use PAN shuffler measurements of units of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) and CRM 146 (uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) and a selected set of LLNL PuO 2 -bearing containers in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to each to (1) establish and validate a correction to the HEU calibration algorithm for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, (2) develop a PuO 2 calibration algorithm that includes the effect of PuO 2 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (8.57 cm to 9.88 cm inside diameter and 9.60 cm to 13.29 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop and validate the method for establishing the mass of 235 U present in an unknown of mixed U-Pu oxide.

  6. Separation and recovery method for depleted uranium from spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imoto, Yoshie; Fujita, Reiko.

    1993-01-01

    Spent oxide fuels are reduced in a molten salt of CaCl 2 -CaF 2 to convert them into metals, then melted in an Fe-U bath disposed in an electrolytic refining vessel and brought into contact with molten Mg, to extract transuranium elements and rare earth elements contained in the Fe-U bath as metals in the molten Mg. Then molten Mg is removed and the residue is brought into contact with KCl-LiCl molten salt and electrolyzed using the Fe-U as an anode. Then, uranium is recovered by deposition on an iron cathode disposed in chloride electrolytes of the electrolytic refining vessel. Uranium and transuranium elements can be thus separated and, for example, depleted uranium for use in blanket fuels can be recovered easily. This can greatly reduce the temporary storage amount of depleted uranium, to eliminate requirement for a large-scaled facility used exclusively for storing uranium and long time management for uranium. (T.M.)

  7. Licensing considerations in converting NRC-licensed non-power reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, R.E.

    1985-01-01

    During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern with the possibility that highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely used in non-power reactors around the world, might be diverted from its intended peaceful uses. In 1982 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a policy statement that was intended to conform with the perceived international thinking, and that addressed the two relevant areas in which NRC has statutory responsibility, namely, export of special nuclear materials for non-USA non-power reactors, and the licensing of USA-based non-power reactors not owned by the Federal government. To further address the second area, NRC issued a proposed rule for public comment that would require all NRC-licensed non-power reactors using HEU to convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, unless they could demonstrate a unique purpose. Currently the NRC staff is revising the proposed rule. An underlying principle guiding the staff is that as long as a change in enrichment does not lead to safety-related reactor modifications, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question, the licensee could convert the core without prior NRC approval. At the time of writing this paper, a regulatory method of achieving this principle has not been finalized. (author)

  8. Licensing considerations in converting NRC-licensed non-power reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carter, R E

    1985-07-01

    During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern with the possibility that highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely used in non-power reactors around the world, might be diverted from its intended peaceful uses. In 1982 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a policy statement that was intended to conform with the perceived international thinking, and that addressed the two relevant areas in which NRC has statutory responsibility, namely, export of special nuclear materials for non-USA non-power reactors, and the licensing of USA-based non-power reactors not owned by the Federal government. To further address the second area, NRC issued a proposed rule for public comment that would require all NRC-licensed non-power reactors using HEU to convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, unless they could demonstrate a unique purpose. Currently the NRC staff is revising the proposed rule. An underlying principle guiding the staff is that as long as a change in enrichment does not lead to safety-related reactor modifications, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question, the licensee could convert the core without prior NRC approval. At the time of writing this paper, a regulatory method of achieving this principle has not been finalized. (author)

  9. Update on Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium Oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

    2002-01-01

    In October of 1999, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) began an effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron (PAN) drum shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide. A single unit of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (Uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) was used to (1) develop a mass calibration curve for HEU oxide in the nominal range of 393 g to 3144 g 235 U, and (2) perform a detailed axial and radial mapping of the detector response over a wide region of the PAN shuffler counting chamber. Results from these efforts were reported at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 4lSt Annual Meeting in July 2000. This paper describes subsequent efforts by LLNL to use a unit of CRM 146 (Uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to CRM 149 and CRM 146 units and a selected set of containers with CRM 149-equivalent U 3 O 8 to (1) extend the low range of the reported mass calibration curve to 10 g 235 U, (2) evaluate the effect of U 3 O 8 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (5.24 cm to 12.17 cm inside diameter and 6.35 cm to 17.72 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop mass calibration curves for U 3 O 8 enriched to 20.1 wt% 235 U and 52.5 wt% 235 U.

  10. Communication received from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 22 September 2003, from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2002. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2002. 3. In light of the request expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the Note Verbale of 22 September 2003 and the enclosures thereto are attached for the information of all Member States

  11. Communication received from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 17 September 2004, from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2003. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2003. In light of the request expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the Note Verbale of 17 September 2004 and the enclosures thereto are attached for the information of all Member States

  12. Getting the plutonium disposition job done: the concept of a joint-venture disposition enterprise financed by additional sales of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1996-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of a concept which has the potential to provide both substantial financing needed for disposition of plutonium from excess nuclear weapons and the long-term management structure required to implement this effort. The three most important issues were underlined. First, it is urgent to modernize security and accounting systems for all weapon-usable nuclear materials, particularly from former Soviet Union. Second, excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) must be brought under international monitoring to ensure irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. Third, quick move should be done towards actual disposition of excess plutonium and HEU. Technology already exists, but the key issues are how to get finance and manage this operation, particularly given its immense scope and controversial nature. An international joint venture 'Enterprise for nuclear Security' that would build and operate plutonium disposition facilities under stringent non-proliferation controls, financed through additional sales of HEU is a potentially promising approach to addressing the most difficult issues facing the disposition problem

  13. Extraction of Uranium Using Nitrogen Dioxide and Carbon Dioxide for Spent Fuel Reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kayo Sawada; Daisuke Hirabayashi; Youichi Enokida [EcoTopia Science Institute, Nagoya University, Nagoya, 464-8603 (Japan)

    2008-07-01

    For the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels, a new method to extract actinides from spent fuel using highly compressed gases, nitrogen dioxide and carbon dioxide was proposed. Uranium extraction from broken pieces, whose average grain size was 5 mm, of uranium dioxide pellet with nitrogen dioxide and carbon dioxide was demonstrated in the present study. (authors)

  14. Biamperometric estimation of uranium in input KMP samples of spent fuel reprocessing plant: field experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurba, P.B.; Dhakras, S.P.; Chaugule, G.A.; Venugopal, A.K.; Singh, R.K.; Bajpai, D.D.; Nair, P.R.; Xavier, Mary; Aggarwal, S.K.

    2000-01-01

    Feasibility of simple, precise and accurate biamperometric determination of uranium at about 0.1 mg level was earlier established using simulated uranium standards. To evaluate the usefulness of this method for accurate determination of uranium in spent fuel dissolver solution samples, analytical work was carried out

  15. Isotopic analysis of uranium hexafluoride highly enriched in U-235; Analyse isotopique de l'hexafluorure d'uranium fortement enrichi en U 235

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chaussy, L; Boyer, R [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Pierrelatte (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1968-07-01

    Isotopic analysis of uranium in the form of the hexafluoride by mass-spectrometry gives gross results which are not very accurate. Using a linear interpolation method applied to two standards it is possible to correct for this inaccuracy as long as the isotopic concentrations are less than about 10 per cent in U-235. Above this level, the interpolations formula overestimates the results, especially if the enrichment of the analyzed samples is higher than 1.3 with respect to the standards. A formula is proposed for correcting the interpolation equation and for the extending its field of application to high values of the enrichment ({approx_equal}2) and of the concentration. It is shown that by using this correction the results obtained have an accuracy which depends practically only on that of the standards, taking into account the dispersion in the measurements. (authors) [French] L'analyse isotopique de l'uranium sous forme d'hexafluorure, par spectrometrie de masse, fournit des resultats bruts entaches d'inexactitude. Une methode d'interpolation lineaire entre deux etalons permet de corriger cette inexactitude, tant que les concentrations isotopiques sont inferieures a 10 pour cent en U-235 environ. Au-dessus de cette valeur, la formule d'interpolation surestime les resultats, notamment si l'enrichissement des echantillons analyses par rapport aux etalons est superieur a 1,3. On propose une formule de correction de l'equation d'interpolation qui etend son domaine d'application jusqu'a des valeurs elevees d'enrichissement ({approx_equal}2) et de concentration. On montre experimentalement que par cette correction, les resultats atteignent, a la precision des mesures, une exactitude qui ne depend pratiquement plus que de celles des etalons. (auteurs)

  16. ZPR-3 Assembly 11 : A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.; National Security; Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering

    2010-09-30

    Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of

  17. Radionuclide compositions of spent fuel and high level waste for the uranium and plutonium fuelled PWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fairclough, M.P.; Tymons, B.J.

    1985-06-01

    The activities of a selection of radionuclides are presented for three types of reactor fuel of interest in radioactive waste management. The fuel types are for a uranium 'burning' PWR, a plutonium 'burning' PWR using plutonium recycled from spent uranium fuel and a plutonium 'burning' PWR using plutonium which has undergone multiple recycle. (author)

  18. Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ackerman, J.P.

    1992-03-17

    A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.

  19. Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ackerman, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished

  20. Initiation of depleted uranium oxide and spent fuel testing for the spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Molecke, M.A.; Gregson, M.W.; Sorenson, K.B. [Sandia National Labs. (United States); Billone, M.C.; Tsai, H. [Argonne National Lab. (United States); Koch, W.; Nolte, O. [Fraunhofer Inst. fuer Toxikologie und Experimentelle Medizin (Germany); Pretzsch, G.; Lange, F. [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany); Autrusson, B.; Loiseau, O. [Inst. de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (France); Thompson, N.S.; Hibbs, R.S. [U.S. Dept. of Energy (United States); Young, F.I.; Mo, T. [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States)

    2004-07-01

    We provide a detailed overview of an ongoing, multinational test program that is developing aerosol data for some spent fuel sabotage scenarios on spent fuel transport and storage casks. Experiments are being performed to quantify the aerosolized materials plus volatilized fission products generated from actual spent fuel and surrogate material test rods, due to impact by a high energy density device, HEDD. The program participants in the U.S. plus Germany, France, and the U.K., part of the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks, WGSTSC have strongly supported and coordinated this research program. Sandia National Laboratories, SNL, has the lead role for conducting this research program; test program support is provided by both the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. WGSTSC partners need this research to better understand potential radiological impacts from sabotage of nuclear material shipments and storage casks, and to support subsequent risk assessments, modeling, and preventative measures. We provide a summary of the overall, multi-phase test design and a description of all explosive containment and aerosol collection test components used. We focus on the recently initiated tests on ''surrogate'' spent fuel, unirradiated depleted uranium oxide, and forthcoming actual spent fuel tests. The depleted uranium oxide test rodlets were prepared by the Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, in France. These surrogate test rodlets closely match the diameter of the test rodlets of actual spent fuel from the H.B. Robinson reactor (high burnup PWR fuel) and the Surry reactor (lower, medium burnup PWR fuel), generated from U.S. reactors. The characterization of the spent fuels and fabrication into short, pressurized rodlets has been performed by Argonne National Laboratory, for testing at SNL. The ratio of the aerosol and respirable particles released from HEDD-impacted spent

  1. A Preliminary Study on the Reuse of the Recovered Uranium from the Spent CANDU Fuel Using Pyroprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, C. J.; Na, S. H.; Yang, J. H.; Kang, K. H.; Lee, J. W.

    2009-01-01

    During the pyroprocessing, most of the uranium is gathered in metallic form around a solid cathode during an electro-refining process, which is composed of about 94 weight percent of the spent fuel. In the previous study, a feasibility study has been done to reuse the recovered uranium for the CANDU reactor fuel following the traditional DUPIC (direct use of spent pressurized water reactor fuel into CANDU reactor) fuel fabrication process. However, the weight percent of U-235 in the recovered uranium is about 1 wt% and it is sufficiently re-utilized in a heavy water reactor which uses a natural uranium fuel. The reuse of recovered uranium will bring not only a huge economic profit and saving of uranium resources but also an alleviation of the burden on the management and the disposal of the spent fuel. The research on recycling of recovered uranium was carried out 10 years ago and most of the recovered uranium was assumed to be imported from abroad at that time. The preliminary results showed there is the sufficient possibility to recycle recovered uranium in terms of a reactor's characteristics as well as the fuel performance. However, the spent CANDU fuel is another issue in the storage and disposal problem. At present, most countries are considering that the spent CANDU fuel is disposed directly due to the low enrichment (∼0.5 wt%) of the discharge fissile content and lots of fission products. If mixing the spent CANDU fuel and the spent PWR fuel, the estimated uranium fissile enrichment will be about 0.6 wt% ∼ 1.0 wt% depending on the mixing ratio, which is sufficiently reusable in a CANDU reactor. Therefore, this paper deals with a feasibility study on the recovered uranium of the mixed spent fuel from the pyroprocessing. With the various mixing ratios between the PWR spent fuel and the CANDU spent fuel, a reactor characteristics including the safety parameters of the CANDU reactor was evaluated

  2. Initiation of depleted uranium oxide and spent fuel testing for the spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.; Gregson, M.W.; Sorenson, K.B.

    2004-01-01

    We provide a detailed overview of an on-going, multinational test programme that is developing aerosol data for some spent fuel sabotage scenarios on spent fuel transport and storage casks. Experiments are being performed to quantify the aerosolised materials plus volatilised fission products generated from actual spent fuel and surrogate material test rods, due to impact by a high-energy/density device. The programme participants in the United States plus Germany, France and the United Kingdom, part of the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks (WGSTSC) have strongly supported and coordinated this research programme. Sandia National Laboratories has the lead role for conducting this research programme; test programme support is provided by both the US Department of Energy and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We provide a summary of the overall, multiphase test design and a description of all explosive containment and aerosol collection test components used. We focus on the recently initiated tests on 'surrogate' spent fuel, unirradiated depleted uranium oxide and forthcoming actual spent fuel tests. We briefly summarise similar results from completed surrogate tests that used non-radioactive, sintered cerium oxide ceramic pellets in test rods. (author)

  3. Analysis of the Reuse of Uranium Recovered from the Reprocessing of Commercial LWR Spent Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DelCul, Guillermo Daniel [ORNL; Trowbridge, Lee D [ORNL; Renier, John-Paul [ORNL; Ellis, Ronald James [ORNL; Williams, Kent Alan [ORNL; Spencer, Barry B [ORNL; Collins, Emory D [ORNL

    2009-02-01

    This report provides an analysis of the factors involved in the reuse of uranium recovered from commercial light-water-reactor (LWR) spent fuels (1) by reenrichment and recycling as fuel to LWRs and/or (2) by recycling directly as fuel to heavy-water-reactors (HWRs), such as the CANDU (registered trade name for the Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor). Reuse is an attractive alternative to the current Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) baseline plan, which stores the reprocessed uranium (RU) for an uncertain future or attempts to dispose of it as 'greater-than-Class C' waste. Considering that the open fuel cycle currently deployed in the United States already creates a huge excess quantity of depleted uranium, the closed fuel cycle should enable the recycle of the major components of spent fuel, such as the uranium and the hazardous, long-lived transuranic (TRU) actinides, as well as the managed disposal of fission product wastes. Compared with the GNEP baseline scenario, the reuse of RU in the uranium fuel cycle has a number of potential advantages: (1) avoidance of purchase costs of 11-20% of the natural uranium feed; (2) avoidance of disposal costs for a large majority of the volume of spent fuel that is reprocessed; (3) avoidance of disposal costs for a portion of the depleted uranium from the enrichment step; (4) depending on the {sup 235}U assay of the RU, possible avoidance of separative work costs; and (5) a significant increase in the production of {sup 238}Pu due to the presence of {sup 236}U, which benefits somewhat the transmutation value of the plutonium and also provides some proliferation resistance.

  4. Analysis of the Reuse of Uranium Recovered from the Reprocessing of Commercial LWR Spent Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DelCul, Guillermo D.; Trowbridge, Lee D.; Renier, John-Paul; Ellis, Ronald James; Williams, Kent Alan; Spencer, Barry B.; Collins, Emory D.

    2009-01-01

    This report provides an analysis of the factors involved in the reuse of uranium recovered from commercial light-water-reactor (LWR) spent fuels (1) by reenrichment and recycling as fuel to LWRs and/or (2) by recycling directly as fuel to heavy-water-reactors (HWRs), such as the CANDU (registered trade name for the Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor). Reuse is an attractive alternative to the current Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) baseline plan, which stores the reprocessed uranium (RU) for an uncertain future or attempts to dispose of it as 'greater-than-Class C' waste. Considering that the open fuel cycle currently deployed in the United States already creates a huge excess quantity of depleted uranium, the closed fuel cycle should enable the recycle of the major components of spent fuel, such as the uranium and the hazardous, long-lived transuranic (TRU) actinides, as well as the managed disposal of fission product wastes. Compared with the GNEP baseline scenario, the reuse of RU in the uranium fuel cycle has a number of potential advantages: (1) avoidance of purchase costs of 11-20% of the natural uranium feed; (2) avoidance of disposal costs for a large majority of the volume of spent fuel that is reprocessed; (3) avoidance of disposal costs for a portion of the depleted uranium from the enrichment step; (4) depending on the 235 U assay of the RU, possible avoidance of separative work costs; and (5) a significant increase in the production of 238 Pu due to the presence of 236 U, which benefits somewhat the transmutation value of the plutonium and also provides some proliferation resistance

  5. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

  6. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

  7. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [es

  8. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [es

  9. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 June 2012 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [es

  10. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  11. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 June 2012 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [fr

  12. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 21 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008

  13. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  14. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  15. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  16. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009

  17. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010

  18. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006

  19. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [es

  20. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [fr

  1. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [fr

  2. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [fr

  3. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  4. Uranium-236 in light water reactor spent fuel recycled to an enriching plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de la Garza, A.

    1977-01-01

    The introduction of 236 U to an enriching plant by recycling spent fuel uranium results in enriched products containing 236 U, a parasitic neutron absorber in reactor fuel. Convenient approximate methodology determines 235 236 U, and total uranium flowsheets with associated separative work requirements in enriching plant operations for use by investigators of the light water reactor fuel cycle not having recourse to specialized multicomponent cascade technology. Application of the methodology has been made to compensation of an enriching plant product for 236 U content and to the value at an enriching plant of spent fuel uranium. The approximate methodology was also confirmed with more exact calculations and with some experience with 236 U in an enriching plant

  5. Uranium Oxide Rate Summary for the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project (OCRWM)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PAJUNEN, A.L.

    2000-09-20

    The purpose of this document is to summarize the uranium oxidation reaction rate information developed by the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project and describe the basis for selecting reaction rate correlations used in system design. The selection basis considers the conditions of practical interest to the fuel removal processes and the reaction rate application during design studies. Since the reaction rate correlations are potentially used over a range of conditions, depending of the type of evaluation being performed, a method for transitioning between oxidation reactions is also documented. The document scope is limited to uranium oxidation reactions of primary interest to the SNF Project processes. The reactions influencing fuel removal processes, and supporting accident analyses, are: uranium-water vapor, uranium-liquid water, uranium-moist air, and uranium-dry air. The correlation selection basis will consider input from all available sources that indicate the oxidation rate of uranium fuel, including the literature data, confirmatory experimental studies, and fuel element observations. Trimble (2000) summarizes literature data and the results of laboratory scale experimental studies. This document combines the information in Trimble (2000) with larger scale reaction observations to describe uranium oxidation rate correlations applicable to conditions of interest to the SNF Project.

  6. DUSCOBS - a depleted-uranium silicate backfill for transport, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Pope, R.B.; Ashline, R.C.; DeHart, M.D.; Childs, K.W.; Tang, J.S.

    1995-01-01

    A Depleted Uranium Silicate COntainer Backfill System (DUSCOBS) is proposed that would use small, isotopically-depleted uranium silicate glass beads as a backfill material inside storage, transport, and repository waste packages containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The uranium silicate glass beads would fill all void space inside the package including the coolant channels inside SNF assemblies. Based on preliminary analysis, the following benefits have been identified. DUSCOBS improves repository waste package performance by three mechanisms. First, it reduces the radionuclide releases from SNF when water enters the waste package by creating a local uranium silicate saturated groundwater environment that suppresses (1) the dissolution and/or transformation of uranium dioxide fuel pellets and, hence, (2) the release of radionuclides incorporated into the SNF pellets. Second, the potential for long-term nuclear criticality is reduced by isotopic exchange of enriched uranium in SNF with the depleted uranium (DU) in the glass. Third, the backfill reduces radiation interactions between SNF and the local environment (package and local geology) and thus reduces generation of hydrogen, acids, and other chemicals that degrade the waste package system. In addition, the DUSCOBS improves the integrity of the package by acting as a packing material and ensures criticality control for the package during SNF storage and transport. Finally, DUSCOBS provides a potential method to dispose of significant quantities of excess DU from uranium enrichment plants at potential economic savings. DUSCOBS is a new concept. Consequently, the concept has not been optimized or demonstrated in laboratory experiments

  7. Uranium Oxide Rate Summary for the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project (OCRWM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PAJUNEN, A.L.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to summarize the uranium oxidation reaction rate information developed by the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project and describe the basis for selecting reaction rate correlations used in system design. The selection basis considers the conditions of practical interest to the fuel removal processes and the reaction rate application during design studies. Since the reaction rate correlations are potentially used over a range of conditions, depending of the type of evaluation being performed, a method for transitioning between oxidation reactions is also documented. The document scope is limited to uranium oxidation reactions of primary interest to the SNF Project processes. The reactions influencing fuel removal processes, and supporting accident analyses, are: uranium-water vapor, uranium-liquid water, uranium-moist air, and uranium-dry air. The correlation selection basis will consider input from all available sources that indicate the oxidation rate of uranium fuel, including the literature data, confirmatory experimental studies, and fuel element observations. Trimble (2000) summarizes literature data and the results of laboratory scale experimental studies. This document combines the information in Trimble (2000) with larger scale reaction observations to describe uranium oxidation rate correlations applicable to conditions of interest to the SNF Project

  8. Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium. Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation. Report submitted to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbman, Gunnar; Calogero, Francesco; Martellini, Maurizio; Bremer Maerli, Morten; Nikitin, Alexander; Prawitz, Jan

    2004-04-01

    This study is of an exploratory nature. It provides preliminary assessments of issues of relevance for HEU elimination in Russia including: (a) technical issues concerning the HEU down-blending; uranium transparency and verification requirements; description of current Russian HEU locations; the HEU down-blending capacities, and the HEU logistics, and (b) various political and financial requirements and considerations. For future, practical project measures to be put in place, further investigations that deal with HEU logistics and handling are needed. Such studies - that obviously should include and engage key Russian actors - are possible, if they take legitimate Russian security and sensitivity concerns into consideration. Interestingly, there is a growing perception in Russia that large stocks of HEU are not required and that they could, in fact, constitute a source of danger

  9. Verification experiment on the downblending of high enriched uranium (HEU) at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Digital video surveillance of the HEU feed stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez, R.L.; Tolk, K.; Whiting, N.; Castleberry, K.; Lenarduzzi, R.

    1998-01-01

    As part of a Safeguards Agreement between the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, was added to the list of facilities eligible for the application of IAEA safeguards. Currently, the facility is in the process of downblending excess inventory of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) from US defense related programs for commercial use. An agreement was reached between the US and the IAEA that would allow the IAEA to conduct an independent verification experiment at the Portsmouth facility, resulting in the confirmation that the HEU was in fact downblended. The experiment provided an opportunity for the DOE laboratories to recommend solutions/measures for new IAEA safeguards applications. One of the measures recommended by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and selected by the IAEA, was a digital video surveillance system for monitoring activity at the HEU feed stations. This paper describes the SNL implementation of the digital video system and its integration with the Load Cell Based Weighing System (LCBWS) from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The implementation was based on commercially available technology that also satisfied IAEA criteria for tamper protection and data authentication. The core of the Portsmouth digital video surveillance system was based on two Digital Camera Modules (DMC-14) from Neumann Consultants, Germany

  10. Critical review of uranium resources and production capability to 2020

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Underhill, D.H.

    2002-01-01

    Even with a modest forecast of nuclear power growth for the next 25 years, it is expected that the world uranium requirements will increase. This analysis indicates uranium mine production will continue to be the primary supply of requirements through 2020. Secondary supplies, such as low enriched uranium blended from highly enriched uranium, reprocessing of spent fuel would have to make-up the remaining balance, although the contribution of US and Russian strategic stockpiles is not well known at this time. (author)

  11. Britain's resources of coal and spent uranium fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oldby, R.

    1982-01-01

    Estimates of the United Kingdom's reserves of coal and of spent fuel from nuclear reactors, provided during the 1970's by the National Coal Board and the Atomic Energy Authority, are examined. These estimates, which tend to increase steadily, are based on statistics on fuel reserves which do not constitute cold hard facts but are judgements about the probable outcome of a series of events in space and time. It is felt that this analysis of energy resource claims does not suggest intentional rivalry by the Atomic Energy Authority and the National Coal Board though the fact that they both represent responses at the political level in the campaign for government support seems evident. A reluctance to adopt the modern distinction between resources and reserves in such analyses is also noted. (U.K.)

  12. Recovery of fissile materials from plutonium residues, miscellaneous spent nuclear fuel, and uranium fissile wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.

    1997-01-01

    A new process is proposed that converts complex feeds containing fissile materials into a chemical form that allows the use of existing technologies (such as PUREX and ion exchange) to recover the fissile materials and convert the resultant wastes to glass. Potential feed materials include (1) plutonium scrap and residue, (2) miscellaneous spent nuclear fuel, and (3) uranium fissile wastes. The initial feed materials may contain mixtures of metals, ceramics, amorphous solids, halides, and organics. 14 refs., 4 figs

  13. Depleted uranium oxides as spent-nuclear-fuel waste-package invert and backfill materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Haire, M.J.

    1997-01-01

    A new technology has been proposed in which depleted uranium, in the form of oxides or silicates, is placed around the outside of the spent nuclear fuel waste packages in the geological repository. This concept may (1) reduce the potential for repository nuclear criticality events and (2) reduce long-term release of radionuclides from the repository. As a new concept, there are significant uncertainties

  14. Study on uranium metallization yield of spent Pressurized Water Reactor fuels and oxidation behavior of fission products in uranium metals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Ke Chon; Lee, Chang Heon; Kim, Won Ho

    2003-01-01

    Metallization yield of uranium oxide to uranium metal from lithium reduction process of spent Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuels was measured using thermogravimetric analyzer. A reduced metal produced in the process was divided into a solid and a powder part, and each metallization yield was measured. Metallization yield of the solid part was 90.7∼95.9 wt%, and the powder being 77.8∼71.5 wt% individually. Oxidation behaviour of the quarternary alloy was investigated to take data on the thermal oxidation stability necessary for the study on dry storage of the reduced metal. At 600∼700 .deg. C, weight increments of allow of No, Ru, Rh and Pd was 0.40∼0.55 wt%. Phase change on the surface of the allow was started at 750 .deg. C. In particular, Mo was rapidly oxidized and then the alloy lost 0.76∼25.22 wt% in weight

  15. Comparison of uranium dissolution rates from spent fuel and uranium dioxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steward, S.A.; Gray, W.J.

    1994-01-01

    Two similar sets of dissolution experiments, resulting from a statistical experimental design were performed in order to examine systematically the effects of temperature (25--75 degree C), dissolved oxygen (0.002-0.2 atm overpressure), pH (8--10) and carbonate concentrations (2--200 x 10 -4 molar) on aqueous dissolution of UO 2 and spent fuel. The average dissolution rate was 8.6 mg/m 2 ·day for UO 2 and 3.1 mg/m 2 ·day for spent fuel. This is considered to be an insignificant difference; thus, unirradiated UO 2 and irradiated spent fuel dissolved at about the same rate. Moreover, regression analyses indicated that the dissolution rates of UO 2 and spent fuel responded similarly to changes in pH, temperature, and carbonate concentration. However, the two materials responded very differently to dissolved oxygen concentration. Approximately half-order reaction rates with respect to oxygen concentration were found for UO 2 at all conditions tested. At room temperature, spent fuel dissolution (reaction) rates were nearly independent of oxygen concentration. At 75 degree C, reaction orders of 0.35 and 0.73 were observed for spent fuel, and there was some indication that the reaction order with respect to oxygen concentration might be dependent on pH and/or carbonate concentration as well as on temperature

  16. How can Korea secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing rights?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roh, Seungkook; Kim, Wonjoon

    2014-01-01

    South Korea is heavily dependent on energy resources from other countries and nuclear energy accounts for 31% of Korea's electric power generation as a major energy. However, Korea has many limitations in uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing under the current Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement, although they are economically and politically important to Korea due to a significant problems in nuclear fuel storages. Therefore, in this paper, we first examine those example countries – Japan, Vietnam, and Iran – that have made nuclear agreements with the U.S. or have changed their agreements to allow the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel. Then, we analyze those countries' nuclear energy policies and review their strategic repositioning in the relationship with the U.S. We find that a strong political stance for peaceful usage of nuclear energy including the legislation of nuclear laws as was the case of Japan. In addition, it is important for Korea to acquire advanced technological capability such as sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) because SFR technologies require plutonium to be used as fuel rather than uranium-235. In addition, Korea needs to leverage its position in nuclear agreement between China and the U.S. as was the case of Vietnam

  17. Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxides within DOE-STD-3013-2000 Containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M E; O'Connell, W J

    2005-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) uses the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. In June 2002, at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management, LLNL reported on an extensive effort to calibrate this shuffler, based on standards measurements and extensive simulations, for HEU oxides and mixed U-Pu oxides in thin-walled primary and secondary containers. In August 2002, LLNL began to also use DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers for HEU oxide and mixed U-Pu oxide. These DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers are comprised of a stainless steel convenience can enclosed in welded stainless steel primary and secondary containers. Compared to the double thin-walled containers, the DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers have substantially thicker walls, and the density of materials in these containers was found to extend over a greater range (1.35 g/cm 3 to 4.62 g/cm 3 ) than foreseen for the double thin-walled containers. Further, the DOE-STD-3013-2000 Standard allows for oxides containing at least 30 wt% Pu plus U whereas the calibration algorithms for thin-walled containers were derived for virtually pure HEU or mixed U-Pu oxides. An initial series of Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to given quantities of HEU oxide and mixed U-Pu oxide in DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers was generated and compared with the response predicted by the calibration algorithms for thin-walled containers. Results showed a decrease on the order of 10% in the count rate, and hence a decrease in the calculated U mass for measured unknowns, with some varying trends versus U mass. Therefore a decision was made to develop a calibration algorithm for the PAN shuffler unique to the DOE-STD-3013-2000 container. This paper describes that effort and selected unknown item measurement results

  18. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Alemania en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-07-27

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 29 de abril de 2011, de la Mision Permanente de la Republica Federal de Alemania ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Alemania, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/5491 de 22 de junio de 1998 y en adelante denominadas las 'directrices'), y de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, presenta las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2010. El Gobierno de la Republica Federal de Alemania tambien ha presentado un estado de sus existencias anuales de uranio muy enriquecido (UME) de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2010.

  19. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Alemania en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-09-04

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 3 de julio de 2007, de la Mision Permanente de la Republica Federal de Alemania ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Alemania, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'las Directrices') y de conformidad con los Anexos B y C de las Directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2006. El Gobierno de la Republica Federal de Alemania tambien ha presentado una declaracion relativa a las cifras anuales de sus existencias de uranio muy enriquecido (UME) de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2006.

  20. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Alemania en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2009-11-02

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una carta de fecha 16 de junio de 2009 dirigida al OIEA por la Mision Permanente de la Republica Federal de Alemania, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Alemania, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/5491 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'Directrices') y, de conformidad con los Anexos B y C de las Directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2008. El Gobierno de la Republica Federal de Alemania tambien ha presentado una declaracion relativa a las cifras anuales de sus existencias de uranio muy enriquecido (UME) de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2008.

  1. Comparison of potential radiological consequences from a spent-fuel repository and natural uranium deposits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wick, O.J.; Cloninger, M.O.

    1980-09-01

    A general criterion has been suggested for deep geological repositories containing spent fuel - the repositories should impose no greater radiological risk than due to naturally occurring uranium deposits. The following analysis investigates the rationale of that suggestion and determines whether current expectations of spent-fuel repository performance are consistent with such a criterion. In this study, reference spent-fuel repositories were compared to natural uranium-ore deposits. Comparisons were based on intrinsic characteristics, such as radionuclide inventory, depth, proximity to aquifers, and regional distribution, and actual and potential radiological consequences that are now occurring from some ore deposits and that may eventually occur from repositories and other ore deposits. The comparison results show that the repositories are quite comparable to the natural ore deposits and, in some cases, present less radiological hazard than their natural counterparts. On the basis of the first comparison, placing spent fuel in a deep geologic repository apparently reduces the hazard from natural radioactive materials occurring in the earth's crust by locating the waste in impermeable strata without access to oxidizing conditions. On the basis of the second comparison, a repository constructed within reasonable constraints presents no greater hazard than a large ore deposit. It is recommended that if the naturally radioactive environment is to be used as a basis for a criterion regarding repositories, then this criterion should be carefully constructed. The criterion should be based on the radiological quality of the waters in the immediate region of a specific repository, and it should be in terms of an acceptable potential increase in the radiological content of those waters due to the existence of the repository

  2. A disposition strategy for highly enriched, aluminum-based fuel from research and test reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKibben, J.M.; Gould, T.H.; McDonell, W.R.; Bickford, W.E.

    1994-01-01

    The strategy proposed in this paper offers the Department of Energy an approach for disposing of aluminum-based, highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels from foreign and domestic research reactors. The proposal is technically, socially, and economically sound. If implemented, it would advance US non-proliferation goals while also disposing of the spent fuel's waste by timely and proven methods using existing technologies and facilities at SRS without prolonged and controversial storage of the spent fuel. The fuel would be processed through 221-H. The radioactive fission products (waste) would be treated along with existing SRS high level waste by vitrifying it as borosilicate glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for disposal in the national geological repository. The HEU would be isotopically diluted, during processing, to low-enriched uranium (LEU) which can not be used to make weapons, thus eliminating proliferation concerns. The LEU can be sold to fabricators of either research reactor fuel or commercial power fuel. This proposed processing-LEU recycle approach has several important advantages over other alternatives, including: Lowest capital investment; lowest net total cost; quickest route to acceptable waste form and final geologic disposal; and likely lowest safety, health, and environmental impacts

  3. Standard guide for pyrophoricity/combustibility testing in support of pyrophoricity analyses of metallic uranium spent nuclear fuel

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2007-01-01

    1.1 This guide covers testing protocols for testing the pyrophoricity/combustibility characteristics of metallic uranium-based spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The testing will provide basic data for input into more detailed computer codes or analyses of thermal, chemical, and mechanical SNF responses. These analyses would support the engineered barrier system (EBS) design bases and safety assessment of extended interim storage facilities and final disposal in a geologic repository. The testing also could provide data related to licensing requirements for the design and operation of a monitored retrievable storage facility (MRS) or independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). 1.2 This guide describes testing of metallic uranium and metallic uranium-based SNF in support of transportation (in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR71), interim storage (in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR72), and geologic repository disposal (in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR60/63). The testing described ...

  4. Use of depleted uranium silicate glass to minimize release of radionuclides from spent nuclear fuel waste packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.

    1996-01-01

    A Depleted Uranium Silicate Container Backfill System (DUSCOBS) is proposed that would use small, isotopically-depleted uranium silicate glass beads as a backfill material inside repository waste packages containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The uranium silicate glass beads would fill the void space inside the package including the coolant channels inside SNF assemblies. Based on preliminary analysis, the following benefits have been identified. DUSCOBS improves repository waste package performance by three mechanisms. First, it reduces the radionuclide releases from SNF when water enters the waste package by creating a local uranium silicate saturated groundwater environment that suppresses (a) the dissolution and/or transformation of uranium dioxide fuel pellets and, hence, (b) the release of radionuclides incorporated into the SNF pellets. Second, the potential for long-term nuclear criticality is reduced by isotopic exchange of enriched uranium in SNF with the depleted uranium (DU) in the glass. Third, the backfill reduces radiation interactions between SNF and the local environment (package and local geology) and thus reduces generation of hydrogen, acids, and other chemicals that degrade the waste package system. Finally, DUSCOBS provides a potential method to dispose of significant quantities of excess DU from uranium enrichment plants at potential economic savings. DUSCOBS is a new concept. Consequently, the concept has not been optimized or demonstrated in laboratory experiments

  5. The geochemical immobilization of uranium in a spent fuel repository in the Canadian Shield: Evidence from natural analogue investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bottomley, D.J.

    1996-04-01

    Natural analogue studies of uranium ore deposits provide valuable information on the geochemical conditions that control the mobilization of uranium and associated radionuclides in groundwaters. At Cigar Lake in northern Saskatchewan, the Pocos de Caldas site in Brazil, and at Palmottu in Finland, groundwaters are sufficiently reducing to prevent significant oxidation of U +4 to the more soluble U +6 oxidation state. Despite being one of the richest uranium deposits in the world, uranium concentrations in the groundwaters around the Cigar Lake ore are less than 5 x 10 -8 M. Even under oxiding conditions uranium may not necessarily be highly mobilized by groundwaters. Studies of the relatively shallow uranium ore deposits in the Alligator Rivers region of Australia have shown that uranium transport by groundwater can be limited because of uranium sorption onto secondary iron oxides within the aquifer. However, studies at 'negative analgoue' sites indicate that where the host rocks contain low concentrations of reductants such as iron sulphides, strongly reducing conditions are not established and high concentrations of dissolved uranium can result, even in areas where uranium ore deposits are not known to occur. The release rate of radionuclides from a spent fuel repository will be strongly dependent on the redox conditions that are established following resaturation of the repository. Groundwater at depths of 500 m in a granitic pluton may not be sufficiently reducing to prevent oxidative dissolution of uranium or oxidation of associated radionuclides such as 99 Tc. Accordingly other shield rocks richer in reductants, such as greenstone belts, should be considered as potential host rocks for a repository or the repository should be constructed at depths closer to 1000 m in granitic rock where more reducing conditions are likely to prevail. Alternatively, addition of reductants to the waste containers may be feasible as a means of maintaining reducing conditions

  6. The Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. Policy Options for Ensuring Long-term Supply Security of Molybdenum-99 and/or Technetium-99m Produced Without Highly Enriched Uranium Targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Westmacott, Chad; Cameron, Ron

    2012-01-01

    Following the shortages of the key medical radioisotopes, molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo) and its daughter technetium-99m (' 99m Tc), the OECD-Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) created the High-level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Radioisotopes (HLG-MR). Since 2009, this group has identified the reasons for the isotope shortages and developed a policy approach to address the challenges to a long-term secure supply of these important medical isotopes. On top of the ongoing concerns related to long-term reliability, all current long-term major 99 Mo-producing nations have agreed to convert to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets for the production of 99 Mo. This decision was made based on important nonproliferation reasons; however, the conversion will have potential impacts on the global supply chain - both in terms of costs and available capacity. Recognising that conversion is important and will occur, and also recognising the need to ensure a long-term secure supply of 99 Mo/' 99m Tc, the NEA, along with stakeholders, examined potential policy options that could be used by to ensure a reliable supply of 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc produced without highly enriched uranium (HEU), consistent with the time frames and policies of the HLG-MR. This discussion paper provides the various policy options available to governments to encourage a reliable supply of 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc produced without HEU. The examination of these options was done through the lens of ensuring a reliable supply, consistent with the time frames and policies of the HLG-MR. The options described in this document are meant to meet this objective by taking one of three general actions: - Making the option of purchasing or producing non-HEU-based 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc more attractive. - Making the option of purchasing or producing HEU-based 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc less attractive. - Limiting access to HEU-based 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc. This paper presents the options in each category and provides some views

  7. Separation and Recovery of Uranium Metal from Spent Light Water Reactor Fuel via Electrolytic Reduction and Electrorefining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herrmann, S.D.; Li, S.X.

    2010-01-01

    A series of bench-scale experiments was performed in a hot cell at Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate the separation and recovery of uranium metal from spent light water reactor (LWR) oxide fuel. The experiments involved crushing spent LWR fuel to particulate and separating it from its cladding. Oxide fuel particulate was then converted to metal in a series of six electrolytic reduction runs that were performed in succession with a single salt loading of molten LiCl - 1 wt% Li2O at 650 C. Analysis of salt samples following the series of electrolytic reduction runs identified the diffusion of select fission products from the spent fuel to the molten salt electrolyte. The extents of metal oxide conversion in the post-test fuel were also quantified, including a nominal 99.7% conversion of uranium oxide to metal. Uranium metal was then separated from the reduced LWR fuel in a series of six electrorefining runs that were performed in succession with a single salt loading of molten LiCl-KCl-UCl3 at 500 C. Analysis of salt samples following the series of electrorefining runs identified additional partitioning of fission products into the molten salt electrolyte. Analyses of the separated uranium metal were performed, and its decontamination factors were determined.

  8. High enrichment to low enrichment core's conversion. Technical securities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abbate, P.; Madariaga, M.R.

    1990-01-01

    This work presents the fulfillment of the technical securities subscribed by INVAP S.E. for the conversion of a high enriched uranium core. The reactor (of 5 thermal Mw), built in the 50's and 60's, is of the 'swimming pool' type, with light water and fuel elements of the curve plates MTR type, enriched at 93.15 %. These are neutronic and thermohydraulic securities. (Author) [es

  9. Recycling of nuclear matters. Myths and realities. Calculation of recycling rate of the plutonium and uranium produced by the French channel of spent fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coeytaux, X.; Schneider, M.

    2000-05-01

    The recycling rate of plutonium and uranium are: from the whole of the plutonium separated from the spent fuel ( inferior to 1% of the nuclear matter content) attributed to France is under 50% (under 42 tons on 84 tons); from the whole of plutonium produced in the French reactors is less than 20% (42 tons on 224 tons); from the whole of the uranium separated from spent fuels attributed to France is about 10 % (1600 tons on 16000 tons); from the whole of the uranium contained in the spent fuel is slightly over 5%. (N.C.)

  10. The effect of pulse voltage and capacitance on biosorption of uranium by biomass derived from whiskey distillery spent wash

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bustard, M.; Rollan, A.; McHale, A.P. [Biotechnology Research Group, School of Applied Biological and Chemical Sciences, University of Ulster (United Kingdom)

    1999-01-01

    Biosorption of uranium by residual biomass from The Old Bushmill`s Distillery Co. Ltd., Bushmills, Co. Antrim, Northern Ireland, following exposure to short and intense electric pulses has been examined. The biomass was prepared from the distillery spent wash and consisted of non-viable yeast and bacterial cells. As shown previously, untreated biomass had a maximum biosorption capacity of 170 mg uranium/g dry weight biomass. When biosorption reactions were placed between two electrodes and exposed to electric pulses with field strengths ranging from 1.25-3.25 kV/cm at a capacitance of 25 {mu}F, biosorption increased from 170 mg of uranium to 275 mg uranium/g dry weight biomass. The data were obtained from biosorption isotherm analyses and taken as the degree of biosorption at residual uranium concentrations of 3 mM. In addition, when the capacitance of the electric pulses increased from 0.25 {mu}F to 25 {mu}F at a fixed pulse field strength the degree of biosorption increased from 210 mg uranium to 240 mg uranium/g dry weight biomass. The results suggest that application of short and intense electric pulses to biosorption reactions may play an important role in enhancing microbial biosorption of toxic metals/radionuclides from waste water streams. (orig.) With 2 tabs., 10 refs.

  11. Research reactor spent fuel management in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Audero, M.A.; Bevilacqua, A.M.; Mehlich, A.M.; Novara, O.

    2002-01-01

    The research reactor spent fuel (RRSF) management strategy will be presented as well as the interim storage experience. Currently, low-enriched uranium RRSF is in wet interim storage either at reactor site or away from reactor site in a centralized storage facility. High-enriched uranium RRSF from the centralized storage facility has been sent to the USA in the framework of the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program. The strategy for the management of the RRSF could implement the encapsulation for interim dry storage. As an alternative to encapsulation for dry storage some conditioning processes are being studied which include decladding, isotopic dilution, oxidation and immobilization. The immobilized material will be suitable for final disposal. (author)

  12. Potential benefits and impacts on the CRWMS transportation system of filling spent fuel shipping casks with depleted uranium silicate glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, R.B.; Forsberg, C.W.; DeHart, M.D.; Childs, K.W.; Tang, J.S.

    1996-01-01

    A new technology, the Depleted Uranium Silicate COntainer Fill System (DUSCOFS), is proposed to improve the performance and reduce the uncertainties of geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), thus reducing both radionuclide release rates from the waste package and the potential for repository nuclear criticality events. DUSCOFS may also provide benefits for SNF storage and transport if it is loaded into the container early in the waste management cycle. Assessments have been made of the benefits to be derived by placing depleted uranium silicate (DUS) glass into SNF containers for enhancing repository performance assessment and controlling criticality over geologic times in the repository. Also, the performance, benefits, and impacts which can be derived if the SNF is loaded into a multi-purpose canister with DUS glass at a reactor site have been assessed. The DUSCOFS concept and the benefits to the waste management cycle of implementing DUSCOFS early in the cycle are discussed in this paper

  13. Reprocessing flowsheet and material balance for MEU spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abraham, L.

    1978-10-01

    In response to nonproliferation concerns, the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) Fuel Recycle Development Program is investigating the processing requirements for a denatured medium-enriched uranium--thorium (MEU/Th) fuel cycle. Prior work emphasized the processing requirements for a high-enriched uranium--thorium (HEU/Th) fuel cycle. This report presents reprocessing flowsheets for an HTGR/MEU fuel recycle base case. Material balance data have been calculated for reprocessing of spent MEU and recycle fuels in the HTGR Recycle Reference Facility (HRRF). Flowsheet and mass flow effects in MEU-cycle reprocessing are discussed in comparison with prior HEU-cycle flowsheets

  14. High enrichment to low enrichment core's conversion. Accidents analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abbate, P.; Rubio, R.; Doval, A.; Lovotti, O.

    1990-01-01

    This work analyzes the different accidents that may occur in the reactor's facility after the 20% high-enriched uranium core's conversion. The reactor (of 5 thermal Mw), built in the 50's and 60's, is of the 'swimming pool' type, with light water and fuel elements of the curve plates MTR type, enriched at 93.15 %. This analysis includes: a) accidents by reactivity insertion; b) accidents by coolant loss; c) analysis by flow loss and d) fission products release. (Author) [es

  15. Depleted uranium oxides as spent-nuclear-fuel waste-package fill materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.

    1997-01-01

    Depleted uranium dioxide fill inside the waste package creates the potential for significant improvements in package performance based on uranium geochemistry, reduces the potential for criticality in a repository, and consumes DU inventory. As a new concept, significant uncertainties exist: fill properties, impacts on package design, post- closure performance

  16. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [es

  17. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 6 June 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [es

  18. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 17 June 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

  19. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 23 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and the International Organizations in Vienna in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [es

  20. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 3 July 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [es

  1. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 26 June 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008 [es

  2. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 August 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2004

  3. Communication received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 2 August 2004 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2003

  4. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 23 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and the International Organizations in Vienna in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [fr

  5. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 3 July 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [fr

  6. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 17 June 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  7. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 3 July 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011

  8. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 23 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and the International Organizations in Vienna in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006

  9. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 6 June 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010

  10. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 17 June 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  11. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009

  12. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 26 June 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008

  13. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 6 June 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [fr

  14. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [fr

  15. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 26 June 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008 [fr

  16. Characteristics of plutonium, curium and uranium in hulls of FUGEN MOX spent fuel by destructive analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iijima, Shizuka; Goto, Yuichi; Samoto, Hirotaka; Shichi, Ryo; Shimizu, Takenori

    2011-01-01

    We have been developing a non-destructive assay system called hulls monitor for nuclear fuel materials retained in hulls at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP). The hulls monitor is based on a passive neutron measurement method, so its applicability should be evaluated by a destructive analysis of hulls that are recovered from the reprocessing process. In this study, hulls came from the Advanced Thermal Reactor (ATR) FUGEN were taken from the dissolution process of TRP and destructively analyzed. Two kinds of hulls from ATR-MOX spent fuel assemblies and from ATR-UO 2 spent fuel assemblies were taken and soaked with nitric acid then fused with ammonium hydrogen sulfate, followed by Pu, 244 Cm, U mass determination by alpha spectrometry and ICP-AES. The characteristics of hulls came from MOX spent fuel assemblies were revealed by comparison of ATR-MOX spent fuel with ATR-UO 2 spent fuel. (author)

  17. Biosorption of uranium by cross-linked and alginate immobilized residual biomass from distillery spent wash

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bustard, M.; McHale, A.P.

    1997-01-01

    Residual biomass from a whiskey distillery was examined for its ability to function as a biosorbent for uranium. Biomass recovered and lyophilised exhibited a maximum biosorption capacity of 165-170 mg uranium/g dry weight biomass at 15 C. With a view towards the development of continuous or semi-continuous flow biosorption processes it was decided to immobilize the material by (1) cross-linking with formaldehyde and (2) introducing that material into alginate matrices. Cross-linking the recovered biomass resulted in the formation of a biosorbent preparation with a maximum biosorption capacity of 185-190 mg/g dry weight biomass at 15 C. Following immobilization of biomass in alginate matrices it was found that the total amount of uranium bound to the matrix did not change with increasing amounts of biomass immobilized. It was found however, that the proportion of uranium bound to the biomass within the alginate-biomass matrix increased with increasing biomass concentration. Further analysis of these preparations demonstrated that the alginate-biomass matrix had a maximum biosorption capacity of 220 mg uranium/g dry weight of the matrix, even at low concentrations of biomass. (orig.). With 3 figs., 1 tab

  18. Biosorption of uranium by cross-linked and alginate immobilized residual biomass from distillery spent wash

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bustard, M. [Biotechnology Research Group, School of Applied Biological and Chemical Sciences, University of Ulster, Coleraine (United Kingdom); McHale, A.P. [Biotechnology Research Group, School of Applied Biological and Chemical Sciences, University of Ulster, Coleraine (United Kingdom)

    1997-08-01

    Residual biomass from a whiskey distillery was examined for its ability to function as a biosorbent for uranium. Biomass recovered and lyophilised exhibited a maximum biosorption capacity of 165-170 mg uranium/g dry weight biomass at 15 C. With a view towards the development of continuous or semi-continuous flow biosorption processes it was decided to immobilize the material by (1) cross-linking with formaldehyde and (2) introducing that material into alginate matrices. Cross-linking the recovered biomass resulted in the formation of a biosorbent preparation with a maximum biosorption capacity of 185-190 mg/g dry weight biomass at 15 C. Following immobilization of biomass in alginate matrices it was found that the total amount of uranium bound to the matrix did not change with increasing amounts of biomass immobilized. It was found however, that the proportion of uranium bound to the biomass within the alginate-biomass matrix increased with increasing biomass concentration. Further analysis of these preparations demonstrated that the alginate-biomass matrix had a maximum biosorption capacity of 220 mg uranium/g dry weight of the matrix, even at low concentrations of biomass. (orig.). With 3 figs., 1 tab.

  19. Price of military uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klimenko, A.V.

    1998-01-01

    The theoretical results about optimum strategy of use of military uranium confirmed by systems approach accounts are received. The numerical value of the system approach price of the highly enriched military uranium also is given

  20. Removal of uranium from spent salt from the moltensalt oxidation process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Summers, L.; Hsu, P.C.; Holtz, E.V.; Hipple, D.; Wang, F.; Adamson, M.

    1997-03-01

    Molten salt oxidation (MSO) is a thermal process that has the capability of destroying organic constituents of mixed wastes, hazardous wastes, and energetic materials. In this process, combustible waste and air are introduced into the molten sodium carbonate salt. The organic constituents of the waste materials are oxidized to carbon dioxide and water, while most of the inorganic constituents, including toxic metals, minerals, and radioisotopes, are retained in the molten salt bath. As these impurities accumulate in the salt, the process efficiency drops and the salt must be replaced. An efficient process is needed to separate these toxic metals, minerals, and radioisotopes from the spent carbonate to avoid generating a large volume of secondary waste. Toxic metals such as cadmium, chromium, lead, and zinc etc. are removed by a method described elsewhere. This paper describes a separation strategy developed for radioisotope removal from the mixed spent salt, as well as experimental results, as part of the spent salt cleanup. As the MSO system operates, inorganic products resulting from the reaction of halides, sulfides, phosphates, metals and radionuclides with carbonate accumulate in the salt bath. These must be removed to prevent complete conversion of the sodium carbonate, which would result in eventual losses of destruction efficiency and acid scrubbing capability. There are two operational modes for salt removal: (1) during reactor operation a slip-stream of molten salt is continuously withdrawn with continuous replacement by carbonate, or (2) the spent salt melt is discharged completely and the reactor then refilled with carbonate in batch mode. Because many of the metals and/or radionuclides captured in the salt are hazardous and/or radioactive, spent salt removed from the reactor would create a large secondary waste stream without further treatment. A spent salt clean up/recovery system is necessary to segregate these materials and minimize the amount of

  1. Critical review of uranium resources and production capability to 2020

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-08-01

    This report was prepared to assess the changing uranium supply and demand situation as well as the adequacy of uranium resources and the production capability to supply uranium concentrate to meet reactor demand through 2020. Uranium production has been meeting only 50 to 60 percent of the world requirements with the balance met from sale of excess inventory offered on the market at low prices. It is generally agreed by most specialists that the end of the excess inventory is approaching. With inventory no longer able to meet the production shortfall it is necessary to significantly expand uranium production to fill an increasing share of demand. Non-production supplies of uranium, such as the blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) warheads to produce low enriched reactor fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel, are also expected to grow in importance as a fuel source. This analysis addresses three major concerns as follows: adequacy of resources to meet projected demand; adequacy of production capability to produce the uranium; and market prices to sustain production to fill demand. This analysis indicates uranium mine production to be the primary supply providing about 76 to 78 percent of cumulative needs through 2020. Alternative sources supplying the balance, in order of relative importance are: (1) low enriched uranium (LEU) blended from 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Russian weapons, plus initial US Department of Energy (US DOE) stockpile sales (11 to 13%); (2) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (6%) and; (3) utility and Russian stockpiles. Further this report gives uranium production profiles by countries: CIS producers (Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and other producers (Australia, Canada, China, Gabon, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, United States of America)

  2. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamdoun, N.A.

    2007-01-01

    The article includes a historical preface about uranium, discovery of portability of sequential fission of uranium, uranium existence, basic raw materials, secondary raw materials, uranium's physical and chemical properties, uranium extraction, nuclear fuel cycle, logistics and estimation of the amount of uranium reserves, producing countries of concentrated uranium oxides and percentage of the world's total production, civilian and military uses of uranium. The use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War, the Balkans and Iraq has caused political and environmental effects which are complex, raising problems and questions about the effects that nuclear compounds left on human health and environment.

  3. Corrosion of aluminum, uranium and plutonium in the presence of water in spent fuel storage tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grzetic, I.

    1997-01-01

    General problem associated with research reactor exploitation is safe storage of spent nuclear fuel. One of the possible solutions is its storage in aluminum containers filled and cooled with water. With time aluminum starts to corrode. The chemical corrosion of aluminum, as a heterogenous process, could be investigated in two ways. First, is direct investigation of Al corrosion per se, following hydrogen generation during the corrosion of Al in the presence of water. Both ways are based on available physico-chemical and thermodynamical data. Recent measurements of water quality in the Vinca Institute spent fuel pool clearly indicates that the particular case, corrosion is likely to be present. For the particular case, corrosion process could considered in two directions. The first one discusses the corrosion process of reactor fuel aluminum cladding in general. The second consideration is related with theoretically and empirically based calculations of hydrogen pressure in the closed aluminum containers in order to predict their resistance to the increased pressure. Finally, the corrosion of U, Pu and Cd is discussed with respect to solubility and influence of hydrogen on U and UO 2 under wet conditions. (author)

  4. Transport and leaching of technetium and uranium from spent UO2 fuel in compacted bentonite clay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramebaeck, H.; Albinsson, Y.; Skaalberg, M.; Eklund, U.B.; Kjellberg, L.; Werme, L.

    2000-01-01

    The transport properties of Tc and U in compacted bentonite clay and the leaching behaviour of these elements from spent nuclear fuel in the same system were investigated. Pieces of spent UO 2 fuel were embedded in bentonite clay (ρ d =2100 kg/m 3 ). A low saline synthetic groundwater was used as the aqueous phase. After certain experimental times, the bentonite clay was cut into 0.1 mm thick slices, which were analysed for their content of Tc and U. Measurements were made using inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Tc analysis comprised chemical separation. The analysis of U was done by means of detecting 236 U, since the natural content of U in bentonite clay made it impossible to distinguish between U originating from the fuel and the clay. The influence of different additives mixed into the clay was studied. The results showed an influence on both transport and leaching behaviour when metallic Fe was mixed into the clay. This indicates that Tc and U are reduced to their lower oxidation states as a result of this additive

  5. A confirmatory measurement technique for HEU [highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Goldman, A.; Russo, P.A.; Stovall, L.; Brumfield, T.L.; Gunn, C.S.; Watson, D.R.; Beedgen, R.

    1987-01-01

    Precise measurements of the special nuclear material (SNM) in an item can be used to confirm that the item has not been tampered with. These measurements do not require a highly accurate calibration, but they should be based on an attribute that is unique to the SNM. We describe an instrument that performs gamma-ray measurements at three energies: 185.7 keV, 1001 keV, and 2614 keV. This instrument collects data for 200 s from shipping containers (208-l barrels). These measurements help to distinguish the issue of material control - Has any material been diverted? - from the issue of measurement control - Is there a measurement bias?

  6. 31 CFR 540.317 - Uranium feed; natural uranium feed.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium feed; natural uranium feed... (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.317 Uranium feed; natural uranium feed. The...

  7. Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors' spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE's Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE's efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back spent fuel

  8. Development of the Melt-Dilute Treatment Technology for Al-Based DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peacock, H.B.; Adams, T.M.; Iyer, N.C.

    1998-09-01

    Spent foreign and domestic research reactor fuel assemblies will be sent to Savannah River Site and prepared for interim and eventual geologic storage. Many of the fuel plates have been made with high enriched uranium, and during long term storage, the integrity of the fuel maybe effected if the canister is breached. To reduce the potential for criticality, proliferation, and reduce storage volume, a new treatment technology called melt-dilute is being developed at SRS. The technique will melt the spent fuel assemblies and will dilute the isotopic content to below 20%. The process is simple and versatile

  9. Derived enriched uranium market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutkowski, E.

    1996-01-01

    The potential impact on the uranium market of highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons dismantling in the Russian Federation and the USA is analyzed. Uranium supply, conversion, and enrichment factors are outlined for each country; inventories are also listed. The enrichment component and conversion components are expected to cause little disruption to uranium markets. The uranium component of Russian derived enriched uranium hexafluoride is unresolved; US legislation places constraints on its introduction into the US market

  10. Kinetic and thermodynamic studies of uranium minerals. Assessment of the long-term evolution of spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Casas, I; Bruno, J; Cera, E [MBT Tecnologia Ambiental, Cerdanyola (Spain); Finch, R J; Ewing, R C [Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-10-01

    We have studied the dissolution behavior of uraninite, becquerelite, schoepite and uranophane. The information obtained under a variety of experimental conditions has been combined with extensive solid phase characterizations, performed in both leached and unleached samples. The overall objective is to construct a thermodynamic and kinetic model for the long-term oxidation alteration of UO{sub 2}(s), as an analogy of the spent nuclear fuel matrix. We have determined the solubility product for becquerelite (logK{sub s0} 32.7{+-}1.3) and uranophane (logK{sub s0} = 7.8{+-}0.8). In some experiments, the reaction progress has shown initial dissolution of uranophane followed by precipitation of a secondary solid phase, characterized as soddyite. The solubility production for this phase has been determined (logK{sub s0} = 3.0{+-}2.9). We have studied the kinetics of dissolution of uraninite, uranophane and schoepite under oxidizing conditions in synthetic granitic groundwater. BET measurements have been performed for uraninite and uranophane. For schoepite, the measurement has not been performed due to lack of sufficient amount of sample. The normalized rates of dissolution of uraninite and uranophane have been calculated referred to the uranium release, as 1.97x10{sup -8} moles h{sup -1} m{sup -2} and 4.0x 10{sup -9} moles h{sup -1} m{sup -2}, respectively. For schoepite, the dissolution process has shown two different rates, with a relatively fast initial dissolution rate of 1.97x10{sup -8} moles h{sup -1} followed, after approximately 1000 hours, by a slower one of 1.4x10{sup -9} moles h{sup -1}. No formation of secondary phases has been observed in those experiments, although final uranium concentrations have in all cases exceeded the solubility of uranophane, the thermodynamically more stable phase under the experimental conditions. 24 refs, 45 figs.

  11. Kinetic and thermodynamic studies of uranium minerals. Assessment of the long-term evolution of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Casas, I.; Bruno, J.; Cera, E.; Finch, R.J.; Ewing, R.C.

    1994-10-01

    We have studied the dissolution behavior of uraninite, becquerelite, schoepite and uranophane. The information obtained under a variety of experimental conditions has been combined with extensive solid phase characterizations, performed in both leached and unleached samples. The overall objective is to construct a thermodynamic and kinetic model for the long-term oxidation alteration of UO 2 (s), as an analogy of the spent nuclear fuel matrix. We have determined the solubility product for becquerelite (logK s0 32.7±1.3) and uranophane (logK s0 = 7.8±0.8). In some experiments, the reaction progress has shown initial dissolution of uranophane followed by precipitation of a secondary solid phase, characterized as soddyite. The solubility production for this phase has been determined (logK s0 = 3.0±2.9). We have studied the kinetics of dissolution of uraninite, uranophane and schoepite under oxidizing conditions in synthetic granitic groundwater. BET measurements have been performed for uraninite and uranophane. For schoepite, the measurement has not been performed due to lack of sufficient amount of sample. The normalized rates of dissolution of uraninite and uranophane have been calculated referred to the uranium release, as 1.97x10 -8 moles h -1 m -2 and 4.0x 10 -9 moles h -1 m -2 , respectively. For schoepite, the dissolution process has shown two different rates, with a relatively fast initial dissolution rate of 1.97x10 -8 moles h -1 followed, after approximately 1000 hours, by a slower one of 1.4x10 -9 moles h -1 . No formation of secondary phases has been observed in those experiments, although final uranium concentrations have in all cases exceeded the solubility of uranophane, the thermodynamically more stable phase under the experimental conditions. 24 refs, 45 figs

  12. Situation of test and research reactors' spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Kenichi; Uchiyama, Junzo; Sato, Hiroshi

    1996-01-01

    The U.S. DOE decided a renewal Off-Site Fuel Policy for stopping to spread a highly enriched uranium which was originally enriched at the U.S., the policy declared that to receive all HEU spent fuels from Test and Research reactors in all the world. In Japan, under bilateral agreement of cooperation between the government of the United States and the government of Japan concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the highly enriched uranium of Test and Research Reactors' fuels was purchased from the U.S. and the fuels had been manufactured in Japan, America, Germany and France. On the other hand, a former president of the U.S. J. Carter proposed that to convert the fuels from HEU to LEU concerning a nonproliferation of nuclear materials in 1978, and Japan absolutely supported this policy. Under this condition, the U.S. stopped to receive the spent fuels from the other countries concerning legal action to the Off-Site Fuels Policy. As a result, the spent fuels are increasing, and to cross to each reactor's storage capacity, and if this policy start, a faced crisis of Test and Research Reactors will be avoided. (author)

  13. Uranium in selected endorheic basins as partial analogue for spent fuel behavior in salt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Luik, A.E.

    1987-01-01

    If uranium (U) behavior with respect to the components of certain endorheic (closed) basin subsurface, playa, or terminal lake brines were quantitatively understood, the ability to predict the long-term redistribution of emplaced U among analogous components of salt formations may be enhanced. Tests that determine the nature of U interactions with pure mineral and organic matter surfaces are important, but studying the natural systems available could give indications of long-term stabilities of processes, and of preferential processes. For example, some metals present in trace quantities, such as U, may be coprecipitated in the oxidized zone with an evaporite mineral that may afterward undergo diagenesis, especially if conditions become more reducing. During diagenesis, the trace metal may be remobilized, but scavenged by sulfides or organic particulates, leaving the evaporite mineral depleted of its trace metal content. A survey of the literature shows trace metal behavior in closed basins has been studied. However, information on U consists of only a few abundance determinations for some evaporite systems. Obtaining and interpreting natural analogue data for the U and Th decay series in selected endorheic basin environments is suggested. 44 refs., 3 figs

  14. Uranium in selected endorheic basins as partial analogue for spent fuel behavior in salt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luik, A.E. van

    1987-01-01

    If uranium (U) behavior with respect to the components of certain endorheic (closed) basin subsurface, playa, or terminal lake brines were quantitatively understood, the ability to predict the long-term redistribution of emplaced U among analogous components of salt formations may be enhanced. Tests that determine the nature of U interactions with pure mineral and organic matter surfaces are important, but studying the natural systems available could give indications of long-term stabilities of processes, and of preferential processes. For example, some metals present in trace quantities, such as U, may be coprecipitated in the oxidized zone with an evaporite mineral that may afterwards undergo diagenesis, especially if conditions become more reducing. During diagenesis, the trace metal may be remobilized, but scavenged by sulfides or organic particulates, leaving the evaporite mineral depleted of its trace metal content. A survey of the literature shows some trace metal behavior in closed basins has been studied. However, information on U consists of only a few abundance determinations for some evaporite systems. Obtaining and interpreting natural analogue data for the U and Th decay series in selected endorheic basin environments is suggested. (author)

  15. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuney, M.; Pagel, M.; Leroy, J.

    1992-01-01

    First, this book presents the physico-chemical properties of Uranium and the consequences which can be deduced from the study of numerous geological process. The authors describe natural distribution of Uranium at different scales and on different supports, and main Uranium minerals. A great place in the book is assigned to description and classification of uranium deposits. The book gives also notions on prospection and exploitation of uranium deposits. Historical aspects of Uranium economical development (Uranium resources, production, supply and demand, operating costs) are given in the last chapter. 7 refs., 17 figs

  16. Handling of spent fuel from research reactors in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanda, K.

    1997-01-01

    In Japan eleven research reactors are in operation. After the 19th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research Reactors and Test Reactors (RERTR) on October 6-10, 1996, Seoul, Korea, the Five Agency Committee on Highly Enriched Uranium, which consists of Science and Technology Agency, the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute (KURRI) met on November 7,1996, to discuss the handling of spent fuel from research reactors in Japan. Advantages and disadvantages to return spent fuel to the USA in comparison to Europe were discussed. So far, a number of spent fuel elements in JAERI and KURRI are to be returned to the US. The first shipment to the US is planned for 60 HEU elements from JMTR in 1997. The shipment from KURRI is planned to start in 1999. (author)

  17. Alternative dispositioning methods for HEU spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krupa, J.F.; McKibben, J.M.; Parks, P.B.; DuPont, M.E.

    1995-01-01

    The United States has a strong policy on prevention of the international spread of nuclear weapons. This policy was announced in Presidential Directive PDD-13 and summarized in a White House press release September 27, 1993. Two cornerstones of this policy are: seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly- enriched uranium or plutonium; propose hor-ellipsis prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside international safeguards. The Department of Energy is currently struggling to devise techniques that safely and efficiently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) while satisfying national non-proliferation policies. SRS plans and proposals for disposing of their SNF are safe and cost effective, and fully satisfy non-proliferation objectives

  18. PWR fuel of high enrichment with erbia and enriched gadolinia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bejmer, Klaes-Håkan; Malm, Christian

    2011-01-01

    Today standard PWR fuel is licensed for operation up to 65-70 MWd/kgU, which in most cases corresponds to an enrichment of more than 5 w/o "2"3"5U. Due to criticality safety reason of storage and transportation, only fuel up to 5 w/o "2"3"5U enrichment is so far used. New fuel storage installations and transportation casks are necessary investments before the reactivity level of the fresh fuel can be significantly increased. These investments and corresponding licensing work takes time, and in the meantime a solution that requires burnable poisons in all pellets of the fresh high-enriched fuel might be used. By using very small amounts of burnable absorber in every pellet the initial reactivity can be reduced to today's levels. This study presents core calculations with fuel assemblies enriched to almost 6 w/o "2"3"5U mixed with a small amount of erbia. Some of the assemblies also contain gadolinia. The results are compared to a reference case containing assemblies with 4.95 w/o "2"3"5U without erbia, utilizing only gadolinia as burnable poison. The comparison shows that the number of fresh fuel assemblies can be reduced by 21% (which increases the batch burnup by 24%) by utilizing the erbia fuel concept. However, increased cost of uranium due to higher enrichment is not fully compensated for by the cost gain due to the reduction of the number assemblies. Hence, the fuel cycle cost becomes slightly higher for the high enrichment erbia case than for the reference case. (author)

  19. Yugoslav spent nuclear fuel management program and international perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Subotic, K.; Sotic, O.; Plecas, I.; Ljubenov, V.; Peric, A.; Milosevic, M.

    2002-01-01

    Spent nuclear fuel stored in the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, consists of about 2.5 tons of metal uranium (initial enrichment 2%) and about 20 kg uranium dioxide (dispersed in aluminum matrix, initial fuel uranium enrichment 80%). This spent nuclear fuel is generated in operation of the RA heavy water research reactor during 1959-1984 period. Both types of fuel are of ex-USSR origin, have the same shape and dimensions and approximately the same initial mass of 235 nuclide. They are known as the TVR-S type of fuel elements. The total of 8030 spent fuel elements are stored at the RA research reactor premises, almost all in the spent fuel pool filled by ordinary water. The last used 480 high-enriched uranium spent fuel elements are kept in the drained RA reactor core since 1984. Fuel layer of both enrichments is covered with thin aluminium cladding. Due to non-suitable chemical parameters of water in the spent fuel storage pool, the corrosion processes penetrated aluminium cladding and aluminium walls od storage containers during storage period long from 20 to 40 years. Activity of fission products ( 137 Cs) is detected in water samples during water inspection in 1996 and experts of the lAEA Russia and USA were invited to help. By end of 2001, some remediation of the water transparency of the storage pool and inspections of water samples taken from the storage containers with the spent fuel elements were carried out by the Vinca Institute staff and with the help of experts from the Russia and the IAEA. Following new initiatives on international perspective on spent fuel management, a proposal was set by the IAEA, and was supported by the governments of the USA and the Russian Federation to ship the spent fuel elements of the RA research reactor to Mayak spent fuel processing plant in Russia. This paper describes current status of the reactor RA spent fuel elements, initiative for new Yugoslav spent fuel management program speculates on some of the

  20. Simulation of uranium aluminide dissolution in a continuous aluminum dissolver system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, D.R.; Farman, R.F.; Christian, J.D.

    1990-01-01

    This paper reports on the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) which recovers highly-enriched uranium (uranium that contains at least 20 atom percent 235 U) from spent nuclear reactor fuel by dissolution of the fuel elements and extraction of the uranium from the aqueous dissolver product. Because the uranium is highly-enriched, consideration must be given to whether a critical mass can form at any stage of the process. In particular, suspended 235 U-containing particles are of special concern, due to their high density (6.8 g/cm 3 ) and due to the fact that they can settle into geometrically unfavorable configurations when not adequately mixed. A portion of the spent fuel is aluminum-alloy-clad uranium aluminide (UAl 3 ) particles, which dissolve more slowly than the cladding. As the aluminum alloy cladding dissolves in mercury-catalyzed nitric acid, UAl 3 is released. Under standard operating conditions, the UAl 3 dissolves rapidly enough to preclude the possibility of forming a critical mass anywhere in the system. However, postulated worst-case abnormal operating conditions retard uranium aluminide dissolution, and thus require evaluation. To establish safety limits for operating parameters, a computerized simulation model of uranium aluminide dissolution in the aluminum fuel dissolver system was developed

  1. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    The article briefly discusses the Australian government policy and the attitude of political party factions towards the mining and exporting of the uranium resources in Australia. Australia has a third of the Western World's low-cost uranium resources

  2. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, H. [NUKEM GmbH, Alzenau (Germany)

    1997-08-01

    Since the RERTR-meeting In Newport/USA in 1990 the author delivered a series of papers in connection with the fuel cycle for research reactors dealing with its front-end. In these papers the author underlined the need for unified specifications for enriched uranium metal suitable for the production of fuel elements and made proposals with regard to the re-use of in Europe reprocessed highly enriched uranium. With regard to the fuel cycle of research reactors the research reactor community was since 1989 more concentrating on the problems of its back-end since the USA stopped the acceptance of spent research reactor fuel on December 31, 1988. Now, since it is apparent that these back-end problem have been solved by AEA`s ability to reprocess and the preparedness of the USA to again accept physically spent research reactor fuel the author is focusing with this paper again on the front-end of the fuel cycle on the question whether there is at all a safe supply of low and high enriched uranium for research reactors in the future.

  3. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1997-01-01

    Since the RERTR-meeting In Newport/USA in 1990 the author delivered a series of papers in connection with the fuel cycle for research reactors dealing with its front-end. In these papers the author underlined the need for unified specifications for enriched uranium metal suitable for the production of fuel elements and made proposals with regard to the re-use of in Europe reprocessed highly enriched uranium. With regard to the fuel cycle of research reactors the research reactor community was since 1989 more concentrating on the problems of its back-end since the USA stopped the acceptance of spent research reactor fuel on December 31, 1988. Now, since it is apparent that these back-end problem have been solved by AEA's ability to reprocess and the preparedness of the USA to again accept physically spent research reactor fuel the author is focusing with this paper again on the front-end of the fuel cycle on the question whether there is at all a safe supply of low and high enriched uranium for research reactors in the future

  4. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poty, B.; Cuney, M.; Bruneton, P.; Virlogeux, D.; Capus, G.

    2010-01-01

    With the worldwide revival of nuclear energy comes the question of uranium reserves. For more than 20 years, nuclear energy has been neglected and uranium prospecting has been practically abandoned. Therefore, present day production covers only 70% of needs and stocks are decreasing. Production is to double by 2030 which represents a huge industrial challenge. The FBR-type reactors technology, which allows to consume the whole uranium content of the fuel, is developing in several countries and will ensure the long-term development of nuclear fission. However, the implementation of these reactors (the generation 4) will be progressive during the second half of the 21. century. For this reason an active search for uranium ores will be necessary during the whole 21. century to ensure the fueling of light water reactors which are huge uranium consumers. This dossier covers all the aspects of natural uranium production: mineralogy, geochemistry, types of deposits, world distribution of deposits with a particular attention given to French deposits, the exploitation of which is abandoned today. Finally, exploitation, ore processing and the economical aspects are presented. Contents: 1 - the uranium element and its minerals: from uranium discovery to its industrial utilization, the main uranium minerals (minerals with tetravalent uranium, minerals with hexavalent uranium); 2 - uranium in the Earth's crust and its geochemical properties: distribution (in sedimentary rocks, in magmatic rocks, in metamorphic rocks, in soils and vegetation), geochemistry (uranium solubility and valence in magmas, uranium speciation in aqueous solution, solubility of the main uranium minerals in aqueous solution, uranium mobilization and precipitation); 3 - geology of the main types of uranium deposits: economical criteria for a deposit, structural diversity of deposits, classification, world distribution of deposits, distribution of deposits with time, superficial deposits, uranium

  5. On line spectrophotometry with optical fibers. Application to uranium-plutonium separation in a spent fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boisde, G.; Mus, G.; Tachon, M.

    1985-06-01

    Optimization of mixer-settler operation for uranium-plutonium separation in the Purex process can be obtained by remote spectrophotometry with optical fibers. Data acquisition on uranium VI, uranium IV and plutonium III is examined in function of acidity and nitrate content of the solution. Principles for on line multicomponent monitoring and mathematical modelization of the measurements are described [fr

  6. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackay, G.A.

    1978-01-01

    The author discusses the contribution made by various energy sources in the production of electricity. Estimates are made of the future nuclear contribution, the future demand for uranium and future sales of Australian uranium. Nuclear power growth in the United States, Japan and Western Europe is discussed. The present status of the six major Australian uranium deposits (Ranger, Jabiluka, Nabarlek, Koongarra, Yeelerrie and Beverley) is given. Australian legislation relevant to the uranium mining industry is also outlined

  7. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The development, prospecting, research, processing and marketing of South Africa's uranium industry and the national policies surrounding this industry form the headlines of this work. The geology of South Africa's uranium occurences and their positions, the processes used in the extraction of South Africa's uranium and the utilisation of uranium for power production as represented by the Koeberg nuclear power station near Cape Town are included in this publication

  8. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, E.D.J.

    1974-01-01

    A discussion is given of uranium as an energy source in The Australian economy. Figures and predictions are presented on the world supply-demand position and also figures are given on the added value that can be achieved by the processing of uranium. Conclusions are drawn about Australia's future policy with regard to uranium (R.L.)

  9. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toens, P.D.

    1981-03-01

    The geological setting of uranium resources in the world can be divided in two basic categories of resources and are defined as reasonably assured resources, estimated additional resources and speculative resources. Tables are given to illustrate these definitions. The increasing world production of uranium despite the cutback in the nuclear industry and the uranium requirements of the future concluded these lecture notes

  10. Uranium conversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina

    2006-03-01

    FOI, has performed a study on uranium conversion processes that are of importance in the production of different uranium compounds in the nuclear industry. The same conversion processes are of interest both when production of nuclear fuel and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are considered. Countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions, with the intention to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, need some degree of uranium conversion capability depending on the uranium feed material available. This report describes the processes that are needed from uranium mining and milling to the different conversion processes for converting uranium ore concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the uranium compound used in most enrichment facilities. The processes needed to produce uranium dioxide for use in nuclear fuel and the processes needed to convert different uranium compounds to uranium metal - the form of uranium that is used in a nuclear weapon - are also presented. The production of uranium ore concentrate from uranium ore is included since uranium ore concentrate is the feed material required for a uranium conversion facility. Both the chemistry and principles or the different uranium conversion processes and the equipment needed in the processes are described. Since most of the equipment that is used in a uranium conversion facility is similar to that used in conventional chemical industry, it is difficult to determine if certain equipment is considered for uranium conversion or not. However, the chemical conversion processes where UF 6 and UF 4 are present require equipment that is made of corrosion resistant material

  11. Determination of the uranium concentration in samples of raw, retorted and spent shale from Irati, Parana-Brazil, by the fission track registration technique

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cabral, R.G.

    1981-02-01

    The feasibility of the determination of uranium in oil shale, by the fission track registration technique is studied. The wet and dry methods were employed, using a Bayer policarbonate, Makrofol KG, as detector. It was created a new variant of the dry method. The fission track registration technique was used in samples of raw, retorted and spent shale from Irati, Parana in Brazil, 16 μg U/g, 20 μg U/g and 20μg U/g were found, respectively, with a total error ranging from 19% to 20%. Some experimental results were included for illustration and comparison. The feasibility of the determination of uranium in oil shale from Irati was verified. (Author) [pt

  12. 31 CFR 540.309 - Natural uranium.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Natural uranium. 540.309 Section 540... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.309 Natural uranium. The term natural uranium means uranium found in...

  13. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whillans, R.T.

    1981-01-01

    Events in the Canadian uranium industry during 1980 are reviewed. Mine and mill expansions and exploration activity are described, as well as changes in governmental policy. Although demand for uranium is weak at the moment, the industry feels optimistic about the future. (LL)

  14. Selected nondestructive assay instrumentation for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Baker, M.P.; Strittmatter, R.; Jain, M.; Evans, M.L.

    1979-01-01

    A selected set of nondestructive assay instruments for an international safeguards system at uranium enrichment plants is currently under development. These instruments are of three types: in-line enrichment meters for feed, product, and tails streams; area radiation monitors for direct detection of high-enriched uranium production, and an enrichment meter for spent alumina trap material. The current status of the development of each of these instruments is discussed, with supporting data, as well as the role each would play in a total international safeguards system. 5 figures

  15. Available Reprocessing and Recycling Services for Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    The high enriched uranium (HEU) take back programmes will soon have achieved their goals. When there are no longer HEU inventories at research reactors and no commerce in HEU for research reactors, the primary driver for the take back programmes will cease. However, research reactors will continue to operate in order to meet their various mission objectives. As a result, inventories of low enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel will continue to be created during the research reactors' lifetime and, therefore, there is a need to develop national final disposition routes. This publication is designed to address the issues of available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent fuel and discusses the various back end management aspects of the research reactor fuel cycle.

  16. Chemistry of Uranium in brines related to the spent fuel disposal in a salt repository. Part I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diaz Arocas, P.; Grambow, B.

    1993-01-01

    This report describes the work performed from september 1991 to december 1992. Our work is focused on the chemistry of uranium in highly saline solution. Experiments were performed to study the formation process and the stability of solid phases of U(VI) in NaCl solution at different ionic strength. The characterization of solid phases and of uranium concentration in solution are reported as a function of time. Experiments in NaClO 4 at low concentration have been performed for comparison. A method is proposed for uranium analyses in highly concentrated salt solution. The work has been carried out in KfK (INE), Germany. (Author) 10 figs

  17. Sequential separation of transuranic elements and fission products from uranium metal ingots in electrolytic reduction process of spent PWR fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang Heon Lee; Kih Soo Joe; Won Ho Kim; Euo Chang Jung; Kwang Yong Jee

    2009-01-01

    A sequential separation procedure has been developed for the determination of transuranic elements and fission products in uranium metal ingot samples from an electrolytic reduction process for a metallization of uranium dioxide to uranium metal in a medium of LiCl-Li 2 O molten salt at 650 deg C. Pu, Np and U were separated using anion-exchange and tri-n-butylphosphate (TBP) extraction chromatography. Cs, Sr, Ba, Ce, Pr, Nd, Sm, Eu, Gd, Zr and Mo were separated in several groups from Am and Cm using TBP and di(2-ethylhexyl)phosphoric acid (HDEHP) extraction chromatography. Effect of Fe, Ni, Cr and Mg, which were corrosion products formed through the process, on the separation of the analytes was investigated in detail. The validity of the separation procedure was evaluated by measuring the recovery of the stable metals and 239 Pu, 237 Np, 241 Am and 244 Cm added to a synthetic uranium metal ingot dissolved solution. (author)

  18. Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, R M

    1976-01-01

    Evidence of expanding markets, improved prices and the short supply of uranium became abundantly clear in 1975, providing the much needed impetus for widespread activity in all phases of uranium operations. Exploration activity that had been at low levels in recent years in Canada was evident in most provinces as well as the Northwest Territories. All producers were in the process of expanding their uranium-producing facilities. Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) by year-end had authorized the export of over 73,000 tons of U/sub 3/0/sub 8/ all since September 1974, when the federal government announced its new uranium export guidelines. World production, which had been in the order of 25,000 tons of U/sub 3/0/sub 8/ annually, was expected to reach about 28,000 tons in 1975, principally from increased output in the United States.

  19. On the Potential of Nuclear Fission Energy for Effective Reduction of Carbon Emission under the Constraint of Uranium Resources Use without Spent Fuel Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.; Pevec, D.; Matijevic, M.

    2010-01-01

    Urgency to stop further increase of greenhouse gases emissions and reverse the trends, as stated in the Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) Report and in Copenhagen discussions, limits the realistic choice of energy technologies to those available now or in the near future of few decades. In the coming fifty years neither nuclear fusion nor carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be expected to give a significant contribution to world energy production. Two perspective intermittent sources such as wind and solar together with nuclear fission energy covering the base load consumption appears to be a combination with a potential to produce a large share of carbon free energy in the total world energy production. This contribution considers the issues, associated with required large scale deployment of nuclear fission energy. A serious question associated with nuclear energy is nuclear proliferation. Spread of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing installations in many new countries constructing nuclear reactors would be a major concern in present political environment. We investigate whether uranium resources would be sufficient to support nuclear build-up in next 50-60 years sufficiently large to significantly reduce carbon emission without reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. A positive answer would mean that 50-60 years can be available to develop effective international control of nuclear fuel cycle installations. Our results show that a maximum nuclear build-up which would consume currently estimated uranium resources by 2065 without reprocessing could reduce by 2065 carbon emission by 39.6% of the total reduction needed to bring the WEO 2009 Reference Scenario prediction of total GHG emissions in 2065 to the level of the WEO 450 Scenario limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees of C. The less demanding strategy of the nuclear replacement of all non-CCS coal power plants retiring during the 2025-2065 period would reduce emission

  20. Subcritical Measurements Research Program for Fresh and Spent Materials Test Reactor Fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanchard, A.

    1999-01-01

    'A series of subcritical noise measurements were performed on fresh and spent University of Missouri Research Reactor fuel assemblies. These experimental measurements were performed for the purposes of providing benchmark quality data for validating transport theory computer codes and nuclear cross-section data used to perform criticality safety analyses for highly enriched, uranium-aluminum Material Test Reactor fuel assemblies. A mechanical test rig was designed and built to hold up to four fuel assemblies and neutron detectors in a subcritical array. The rig provided researchers with the ability to evaluate the reactivity effects of variable fuel/detector spacing, fuel rotation, and insertion of metal reflector plates into the lattice.'

  1. Multilateral nonproliferation cooperation: US - Led effort to remove HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuels from the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shelton, Thomas A.; Viebrock, James M.; Riedy, Alexander W.; Moses, Stanley D.; Bird, Helen M.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents the efforts led by United States for removing HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuel from dhe Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. These efforts are resulted from a plan approved by the United States Government, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Georgia Governments to rapidly retrieve and transport circa 4.3 kilograms of enriched uranium. This material consisted largely of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and a small amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) fresh fuel, as well as about 800 grams of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel from a shutdown IR T-M research reactor on the outskirts of Table's, Georgia. The technical team lead by DOE consisted of HEU handling, packaging and transportation experts from the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, managed and operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, and fuel handling and transportation experts from Nac International in Norcross, Georgia, United States

  2. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perkin, D.J.

    1982-01-01

    Developments in the Australian uranium industry during 1980 are reviewed. Mine production increased markedly to 1841 t U 3 O 8 because of output from the new concentrator at Nabarlek and 1131 t of U 3 O 8 were exported at a nominal value of $37.19/lb. Several new contracts were signed for the sale of yellowcake from Ranger and Nabarlek Mines. Other developments include the decision by the joint venturers in the Olympic Dam Project to sink an exploration shaft and the release of an environmental impact statement for the Honeymoon deposit. Uranium exploration expenditure increased in 1980 and additions were made to Australia's demonstrated economic uranium resources. A world review is included

  3. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gabelman, J.W.; Chenoweth, W.L.; Ingerson, E.

    1981-01-01

    The uranium production industry is well into its third recession during the nuclear era (since 1945). Exploration is drastically curtailed, and many staffs are being reduced. Historical market price production trends are discussed. A total of 3.07 million acres of land was acquired for exploration; drastic decrease. Surface drilling footage was reduced sharply; an estimated 250 drill rigs were used by the uranium industry during 1980. Land acquisition costs increased 8%. The domestic reserve changes are detailed by cause: exploration, re-evaluation, or production. Two significant discoveries of deposits were made in Mohave County, Arizona. Uranium production during 1980 was 21,850 short tons U 3 O 8 ; an increase of 17% from 1979. Domestic and foreign exploration highlights were given. Major producing areas for the US are San Juan basin, Wyoming basins, Texas coastal plain, Paradox basin, northeastern Washington, Henry Mountains, Utah, central Colorado, and the McDermitt caldera in Nevada and Oregon. 3 figures, 8 tables

  4. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    Recent decisions by the Australian Government will ensure a significant expansion of the uranium industry. Development at Roxby Downs may proceed and Ranger may fulfil two new contracts but the decision specifies that apart from Roxby Downs, no new mines should be approved. The ACTU maintains an anti-uranium policy but reaction to the decision from the trade union movement has been muted. The Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) has been asked by the Government to conduct an inquiry into a number of issues relating to Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle. The inquiry will examine in particular Australia's nuclear safeguards arrangements and the adequacy of existing waste management technology. In two additional decisions the Government has dissociated itself from a study into the feasibility of establishing an enrichment operation and has abolished the Uranium Advisory Council. Although Australian reserves account for 20% of the total in the Western World, Australia accounts for a relatively minor proportion of the world's uranium production

  5. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The French Government has decided to freeze a substantial part of its nuclear power programme. Work has been halted on 18 reactors. This power programme is discussed, as well as the effect it has on the supply of uranium by South Africa

  6. Sogin enriched uranium extraction (EUREX) plant spent fuel pool cleaning and decontamination utilizing the Smart Safe solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Denton, M.S.; Gili, M.; Nasta, M.; Quintiliani, R.; Caccia, G.; Botzen, W.; Forrester, K.

    2009-01-01

    SOGIN's EUREX facility in Italy was developed as a pilot plant functional testing laboratory for spent fuel reprocessing. This facility was operated successfully for many years since 1970 and was eventually shutdown consistent with Italy's suspension of all nuclear operations. At the time of suspension, the EUREX facility still had spent nuclear fuel assemblies in storage from a nearby PWR. Other fuel assemblies from an Italian AGR had remained stored in the spent fuel pool for the 20 years or so waiting for removal and reprocessing abroad. Being Magnox fuel elements, their recovery for the transport produced a huge amount of sludge in the pool. During this time, sediment, dirt, corrosion products, fuel cladding, etc. has collected within the fuel pool as a crud layer dispersed throughout. Most of this crud has accumulated on the horizontal surfaces of the pool and fuel element assemblies, while some remains as a suspended colloidal material. Furthermore many other contaminated metal components, used during the operation years, where still inside the pool. Due to a pool leak discovered in 2006, SOGIN speeded up its pool decommissioning program, making also available the transfer of the spent fuel to a nearby interim repository, with the goal to completely drain the pool in the shortest period of time. In order for SOGIN to successfully transfer the fuel assemblies from their current storage basket locations to the spent fuel transfer cask, the bulk of the crud needed to be removed. This cleanup operation was deemed necessary to minimize the suspension of contamination in the water during underwater handling operations. This would reduce the decontamination efforts on the transfer cask upon removal, once loaded with the spent fuel, and enhance safety by reducing potential underwater visibility issues. The operations were completed in July 2008 with the release to the environment of the pool water, thoroughly purified and without any relevant radiological impact. The

  7. Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-04-01

    The Department of Energy has completed the Environmental Assessment (EA) of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the proposed action. The EA and FONSI are enclosed for your information. The Department has decided to accept a limited number of spent nuclear fuel elements (409 elements) containing uranium that was enriched in the United States from eight research reactors in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. This action is necessary to maintain the viability of a major US nuclear weapons nonproliferation program to limit or eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civil programs. The purpose of the EA is to maintain the cooperation of the foreign research reactor operators with the nonproliferation program while a more extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is prepared on a proposed broader policy involving the acceptance of up to 15,000 foreign research reactor spent fuel elements over a 10 to 15 year period. Based on an evaluation of transport by commercial container liner or chartered vessel, five eastern seaboard ports, and truck and train modes of transporting the spent fuel overland to the Savannah River Sits, the Department has concluded that no significant impact would result from any combination of port and made of transport. In addition, no significant impacts were found from interim storage of spent fuel at the Savannah River Site

  8. Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-04-01

    The Department of Energy has completed the Environmental Assessment (EA) of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the proposed action. The EA and FONSI are enclosed for your information. The Department has decided to accept a limited number of spent nuclear fuel elements (409 elements) containing uranium that was enriched in the United States from eight research reactors in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. This action is necessary to maintain the viability of a major US nuclear weapons nonproliferation program to limit or eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civil programs. The purpose of the EA is to maintain the cooperation of the foreign research reactor operators with the nonproliferation program while a more extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is prepared on a proposed broader policy involving the acceptance of up to 15,000 foreign research reactor spent fuel elements over a 10 to 15 year period. Based on an evaluation of transport by commercial container liner or chartered vessel, five eastern seaboard ports, and truck and train modes of transporting the spent fuel overland to the Savannah River Sits, the Department has concluded that no significant impact would result from any combination of port and made of transport. In addition, no significant impacts were found from interim storage of spent fuel at the Savannah River Site.

  9. Uranium management activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, D.; Marshall, E.; Sideris, T.; Vasa-Sideris, S.

    2001-01-01

    One of the missions of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Office (ORO) has been the management of the Department's uranium materials. This mission has been accomplished through successful integration of ORO's uranium activities with the rest of the DOE complex. Beginning in the 1980's, several of the facilities in that complex have been shut down and are in the decommissioning process. With the end of the Cold War, the shutdown of many other facilities is planned. As a result, inventories of uranium need to be removed from the Department facilities. These inventories include highly enriched uranium (HEU), low enriched uranium (LEU), normal uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). The uranium materials exist in different chemical forms, including metals, oxides, solutions, and gases. Much of the uranium in these inventories is not needed to support national priorities and programs. (author)

  10. Standard specification for uranium metal enriched to more than 15 % and less Than 20 % 235U

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2000-01-01

    1.1 This specification covers nuclear grade uranium metal that has either been processed through an enrichment plant, or has been produced by the blending of highly enriched uranium with other uranium, to obtain uranium of any 235U concentration below 20 % (and greater than 15 %) and that is intended for research reactor fuel fabrication. The scope of this specification includes specifications for enriched uranium metal derived from commercial natural uranium, recovered uranium, or highly enriched uranium. Commercial natural uranium, recovered uranium and highly enriched uranium are defined in Section 3. The objectives of this specification are to define the impurity and uranium isotope limits for commercial grade enriched uranium metal. 1.2 This specification is intended to provide the nuclear industry with a standard for enriched uranium metal which is to be used in the production of research reactor fuel. In addition to this specification, the parties concerned may agree to other appropriate conditions. ...

  11. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Battey, G.C.; McKay, A.D.

    1988-01-01

    Production for 1986 was 4899 t U 3 O 8 (4154 t U), 30% greater than in 1985, mainly because of a 39% increase in production at Ranger. Exports for 1986 were 4166 t U 3 O 8 at an average f.o.b. unit value of $40.57/lb U 3 O 8 . Private exploration expenditure for uranium in Australia during the 1985-86 fiscal year was $50.2 million. Plans were announced to increase the nominal capacity of the processing plant at Ranger from 3000 t/year U 3 O 8 to 4500 t and later to 6000 t/year. Construction and initial mine development at Olympic Dam began in March. Production is planned for mid 1988 at an annual rate of 2000 t U 3 O 8 , 30 000 t Cu, and 90 000 oz (2800 kg) Au. The first long-term sales agreement was concluded in September 1986. At the Manyingee deposit, testing of the alkaline solution mining method was completed, and the treatment plant was dismantled. Spot market prices (in US$/lb U 3 O 8 ) quoted by Nuexco were generally stable. From January-October the exchange value fluctuated from US$17.00-US$17.25; for November and December it was US$16.75. Australia's Reasonably Assured Resources of uranium recoverable at less than US$80/kg U at December 1986 were estimated as 462 000 t U, 3000 t U less than in 1985. This represents 30% of the total low-cost RAR in the WOCA (World Outside the Centrally Planned Economy Areas) countries. Australia also has 257 000 t U in the low-cost Estimated Additional Resources Category I, 29% of the WOCA countries' total resources in this category

  12. Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory Site Report on the Production and Use of Recycled Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. C. Lewis; D. C. Barg; C. L. Bendixsen; J. P. Henscheid; D. R. Wenzel; B. L. Denning

    2000-09-01

    Recent allegations regarding radiation exposure to radionuclides present in recycled uranium sent to the gaseous diffusion plants prompted the Department of Energy to undertake a system-wide study of recycled uranium. Of particular interest, were the flowpaths from site to site operations and facilities in which exposure to plutonium, neptunium and technetium could occur, and to the workers that could receive a significant radiation dose from handling recycled uranium. The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory site report is primarily concerned with two locations. Recycled uranium was produced at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant where highly enriched uranium was recovered from spent fuel. The other facility is the Specific Manufacturing Facility (SMC) where recycled, depleted uranium is manufactured into shapes for use by their customer. The SMC is a manufacturing facility that uses depleted uranium metal as a raw material that is then rolled and cut into shapes. There are no chemical processes that might concentrate any of the radioactive contaminant species. Recyclable depleted uranium from the SMC facility is sent to a private metallurgical facility for recasting. Analyses on the recast billets indicate that there is no change in the concentrations of transuranics as a result of the recasting process. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant was built to recover high-enriched uranium from spent nuclear fuel from test reactors. The facility processed diverse types of fuel which required uniquely different fuel dissolution processes. The dissolved fuel was passed through three cycles of solvent extraction which resulted in a concentrated uranyl nitrate product. For the first half of the operating period, the uranium was shipped as the concentrated solution. For the second half of the operating period the uranium solution was thermally converted to granular, uranium trioxide solids. The dose reconstruction project has evaluated work exposure and

  13. IAEA activities related to research reactor fuel conversion and spent fuel return programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldman, Ira N.; Adelfang, Pablo; Ritchie, Iain G.

    2005-01-01

    The IAEA has been involved for more than twenty years in supporting international nuclear non-proliferation efforts associated with reducing the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in international commerce. IAEA projects and activities have directly supported the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) programme, as well as directly associated efforts to return research reactor fuel to the country where it was originally enriched. IAEA efforts have included the development and maintenance of several data bases with information related to research reactors and research reactor spent fuel inventories that have been essential in planning and managing both RERTR and spent fuel return programmes. Other IAEA regular budget programs have supported research reactor fuel conversion from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), and in addressing issues common to many member states with spent fuel management problems and concerns. The paper briefly describes IAEA involvement since the early 1980's in these areas, including regular budget and Technical Co-operation programme activities, and focuses on efforts in the past five years to continue to support and accelerate U.S. and Russian research reactor spent fuel return programmes. (author)

  14. IAEA activities related to research reactor fuel conversion and spent fuel return programmes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ritchie, I.G.; Adelfang, P.; Goldman, I.N.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: The IAEA has been involved for more than twenty years in supporting international nuclear non-proliferation efforts associated with reducing the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in international commerce. IAEA projects and activities have directly supported the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) programme, as well as directly associated efforts to return research reactor fuel to the country of origin where it was originally enriched. IAEA efforts have included the development and maintenance of several data bases with information related to research reactors and research reactor spent fuel inventories that have been essential in planning and managing both RERTR and spent fuel return programmes. Other IAEA regular budget programmes have supported research reactor fuel conversion from HEU to low enriched uranium, and in addressing issues common to many member states with spent fuel management problems and concerns. The paper briefly describes IAEA involvement since the early 1980's in these areas, including regular budget and Technical Co-operation programme activities, and focuses on efforts in the past five years to continue to support and accelerate U.S. and Russian research reactor spent fuel return programmes. It is hoped that an announcement of the extension of the U.S. Acceptance Programme, which is expected in the very near future, will facilitate the life extensions of many productive TRIGA reactors around the world. (author)

  15. A practical approach to burn-up credit use in package design approval for PWR uranium oxide spent fuel assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kroger, H.; Reiche, I.

    2009-01-01

    TN International has applied for a license for the TN 24 E transport and storage cask with the German competent authority using a new Burn-up Credit (BUC) approach for PWR uranium oxide fuel assemblies based on actinides and six selected fission products. In order to enable the use of BUC for fission products, various experimental data have to be provided for the two important aspects of the criticality calculation. Firstly, post-irradiation examination (PIE) experiments for the verification of the calculated fission product concentrations have to be provided for each selected fission product. These data are then used to validate the depletion calculations. Secondly, experimental data for the criticality calculations in the form of critical benchmark experiments have to be provided. The submitted data will be investigated for their applicability to the TN 24 E transport and storage cask. Since the application is limited to six fission products only, the conservatism of the BUC approach can be further justified, as the reduction in reactivity from the remaining fission products (about 190) is not taken credit for. (authors)

  16. Benchmark criticality experiments for fast fission configuration with high enriched nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sikorin, S.N.; Mandzik, S.G.; Polazau, S.A.; Hryharovich, T.K.; Damarad, Y.V.; Palahina, Y.A.

    2014-01-01

    Benchmark criticality experiments of fast heterogeneous configuration with high enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel were performed using the 'Giacint' critical assembly of the Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research - Sosny (JIPNR-Sosny) of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. The critical assembly core comprised fuel assemblies without a casing for the 34.8 mm wrench. Fuel assemblies contain 19 fuel rods of two types. The first type is metal uranium fuel rods with 90% enrichment by U-235; the second one is dioxide uranium fuel rods with 36% enrichment by U-235. The total fuel rods length is 620 mm, and the active fuel length is 500 mm. The outer fuel rods diameter is 7 mm, the wall is 0.2 mm thick, and the fuel material diameter is 6.4 mm. The clad material is stainless steel. The side radial reflector: the inner layer of beryllium, and the outer layer of stainless steel. The top and bottom axial reflectors are of stainless steel. The analysis of the experimental results obtained from these benchmark experiments by developing detailed calculation models and performing simulations for the different experiments is presented. The sensitivity of the obtained results for the material specifications and the modeling details were examined. The analyses used the MCNP and MCU computer programs. This paper presents the experimental and analytical results. (authors)

  17. Uranium conversion; Urankonvertering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina [Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm (Sweden)

    2006-03-15

    FOI, has performed a study on uranium conversion processes that are of importance in the production of different uranium compounds in the nuclear industry. The same conversion processes are of interest both when production of nuclear fuel and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are considered. Countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions, with the intention to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, need some degree of uranium conversion capability depending on the uranium feed material available. This report describes the processes that are needed from uranium mining and milling to the different conversion processes for converting uranium ore concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the uranium compound used in most enrichment facilities. The processes needed to produce uranium dioxide for use in nuclear fuel and the processes needed to convert different uranium compounds to uranium metal - the form of uranium that is used in a nuclear weapon - are also presented. The production of uranium ore concentrate from uranium ore is included since uranium ore concentrate is the feed material required for a uranium conversion facility. Both the chemistry and principles or the different uranium conversion processes and the equipment needed in the processes are described. Since most of the equipment that is used in a uranium conversion facility is similar to that used in conventional chemical industry, it is difficult to determine if certain equipment is considered for uranium conversion or not. However, the chemical conversion processes where UF{sub 6} and UF{sub 4} are present require equipment that is made of corrosion resistant material.

  18. Spent fuel reprocessing method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shoji, Hirokazu; Mizuguchi, Koji; Kobayashi, Tsuguyuki.

    1996-01-01

    Spent oxide fuels containing oxides of uranium and transuranium elements are dismantled and sheared, then oxide fuels are reduced into metals of uranium and transuranium elements in a molten salt with or without mechanical removal of coatings. The reduced metals of uranium and transuranium elements and the molten salts are subjected to phase separation. From the metals of uranium and transuranium elements subjected to phase separation, uranium is separated to a solid cathode and transuranium elements are separated to a cadmium cathode by an electrolytic method. Molten salts deposited together with uranium to the solid cathode, and uranium and transuranium elements deposited to the cadmium cathode are distilled to remove deposited molten salts and cadmium. As a result, TRU oxides (solid) such as UO 2 , Pu 2 in spent fuels can be reduced to U and TRU by a high temperature metallurgical method not using an aqueous solution to separate them in the form of metal from other ingredients, and further, metal fuels can be obtained through an injection molding step depending on the purpose. (N.H.)

  19. 31 CFR 540.315 - Uranium-235 (U235).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium-235 (U235). 540.315 Section... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.315 Uranium-235 (U235). The term uranium-235 or U235 means the fissile...

  20. Performance assessment of the direct disposal in unsaturated tuff of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste owned by U.S. Department of Energy. Volume 1: Executive summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rechard, R.P. [ed.] [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States). WIPP Performance Assessment Dept.

    1995-03-01

    This assessment studied the performance of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in a hypothetical repository in unsaturated tuff. The results of this 10-month study are intended to help guide the Office of Environment Management of the US Department of Energy (DOE) on how to prepare its wastes for eventual permanent disposal. The waste forms comprised spent fuel and high-level waste currently stored at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and the Hanford reservation. About 700 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) of the waste under study is stored at INEL, including graphite spent nuclear fuel, highly enriched uranium spent fuel, low enriched uranium spent fuel, and calcined high-level waste. About 2,100 MTHM of weapons production fuel, currently stored on the Hanford reservation, was also included. The behavior of the waste was analyzed by waste form and also as a group of waste forms in the hypothetical tuff repository. When the waste forms were studied together, the repository was assumed also to contain about 9,200 MTHM high-level waste in borosilicate glass from three DOE sites. The addition of the borosilicate glass, which has already been proposed as a final waste form, brought the total to about 12,000 MTHM. A source term model was developed to study the wide variety of waste forms, which included radionuclides residing in 10 different matrices and up to 8 nested layers of material that might react with water. The possibility and consequences of critical conditions occurring in or near containers of highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel were also studied.

  1. Spent fuel pyroprocessing demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McFarlane, L.F.; Lineberry, M.J.

    1995-01-01

    A major element of the shutdown of the US liquid metal reactor development program is managing the sodium-bonded spent metallic fuel from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II to meet US environmental laws. Argonne National Laboratory has refurbished and equipped an existing hot cell facility for treating the spent fuel by a high-temperature electrochemical process commonly called pyroprocessing. Four products will be produced for storage and disposal. Two high-level waste forms will be produced and qualified for disposal of the fission and activation products. Uranium and transuranium alloys will be produced for storage pending a decision by the US Department of Energy on the fate of its plutonium and enriched uranium. Together these activities will demonstrate a unique electrochemical treatment technology for spent nuclear fuel. This technology potentially has significant economic and technical advantages over either conventional reprocessing or direct disposal as a high-level waste option

  2. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. This is a summary of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel

  3. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Francia en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-17

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 24 de agosto de 20010, de la Mision Permanente de Francia ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Francia, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 22 de junio de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'directrices') y, de conformidad con los Anexos B y C de las directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias nacionales de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2009.

  4. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Francia en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-09-04

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 17 de julio de 2007, de la Mision Permanente de Francia ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Francia, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (contenidas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'directrices') y, de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias nacionales de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31de diciembre de 2006.

  5. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Francia en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-12-29

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 13 de noviembre de 2006, de la Mision Permanente de Francia ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Francia, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (contenidas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 22 de junio de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'directrices') y, de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias nacionales de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2005.

  6. Industrial plants for production of highly enriched nitrogen-15

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krell, E.; Jonas, C.

    1977-01-01

    A discussion is presented of the present stage of development of large-scale enrichment of 15 N. The most important processes utilized to separate nitrogen isotopes, namely chemical exchange in the NO/NO 2 /HNO 3 system and low-temperature distillation of NO at -151 0 C, are compared, especially with respect to their economics and use of energy. As examples, chemical exchange plants in the GDR are discussed, and the research activities necessary to optimize the process, especially to solve aerodynamic, hydrodynamic, interface and processing problems, are reviewed. Good results were obtained by the choice of an optimum location and the design of a plant for pre-enrichment to 10 at.% 15 N and an automatically operating two-section cascade for the high enrichment of 15 N to more than 99 at.%. The chemical industry has taken over operation of the plant with the consequence that the raw materials are all available without additional transport. All by-products (nitrous gases and sulphuric acid) are returned for use elsewhere within the industry. The technology of the plant has been chosen so that the quantity of highly enriched product can be varied within a wide range. The final product is used to synthesize more than 250 different 15 N-labelled compounds which are also produced on an industrial scale. (author)

  7. Bombs grade 'spent' nuclear material removed from Uzbekistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Spent nuclear fuel containing enough uranium to produce 2.5 nuclear weapons has been safely returned to Russia from Uzbekistan in a classified mission completed on 19 April 2006. It is the first time that fuel used in a nuclear research reactor - referred to as 'spent' - has been repatriated to Russia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Under tight security, 63 kilograms of spent highly enriched uranium (HEU) was transported to Mayak in Russia, in four separate shipments. IAEA safeguards inspectors monitored and verified the packing of the fuel for transport over the course of 16 days. The secret operation, six years in the planning, was a joint undertaking of the IAEA, the United States, Uzbekistan, Russia and Kazakhstan as part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The aim of the GTRI is to identify, secure and recover high-risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. 'There was particular concern about the Uzbek spent fuel given its significant quantity and that it was no longer 'self protecting', 'the IAEA's Crosscutting Co-ordinator for Research Reactors, Mr. Pablo Adelfang, said. 'This means that the fuel has lost its high radioactivity. In other words, it would no longer injure anyone who handled it and would not deter potential thieves,' Mr. Adelfang said. 'The shipment is an important step to reduce stockpiles of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear materials. Russia, the US, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan should be applauded for their successful cooperation. It will contribute to the security of both Uzbekistan and the international community,' he added. In Russia, the fuel will be processed so that it can not be used for atomic bombs. Russia originally supplied the nuclear fuel to Uzbekistan for use in its 10 megawatt research reactor. Located at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of Uzbekistan, 30 km from Tashkent, the reactor is currently used for research and to produce isotopes for medical purposes. The IAEA is

  8. Performance assessment of the direct disposal in unsaturated tuff or spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste owned by USDOE: Volume 2, Methodology and results

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rechard, R.P. [ed.

    1995-03-01

    This assessment studied the performance of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in a hypothetical repository in unsaturated tuff. The results of this 10-month study are intended to help guide the Office of Environment Management of the US Department of Energy (DOE) on how to prepare its wastes for eventual permanent disposal. The waste forms comprised spent fuel and high-level waste currently stored at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and the Hanford reservations. About 700 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) of the waste under study is stored at INEL, including graphite spent nuclear fuel, highly enriched uranium spent fuel, low enriched uranium spent fuel, and calcined high-level waste. About 2100 MTHM of weapons production fuel, currently stored on the Hanford reservation, was also included. The behavior of the waste was analyzed by waste form and also as a group of waste forms in the hypothetical tuff repository. When the waste forms were studied together, the repository was assumed also to contain about 9200 MTHM high-level waste in borosilicate glass from three DOE sites. The addition of the borosilicate glass, which has already been proposed as a final waste form, brought the total to about 12,000 MTHM.

  9. Performance assessment of the direct disposal in unsaturated tuff or spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste owned by USDOE: Volume 2, Methodology and results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, R.P.

    1995-03-01

    This assessment studied the performance of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in a hypothetical repository in unsaturated tuff. The results of this 10-month study are intended to help guide the Office of Environment Management of the US Department of Energy (DOE) on how to prepare its wastes for eventual permanent disposal. The waste forms comprised spent fuel and high-level waste currently stored at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and the Hanford reservations. About 700 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) of the waste under study is stored at INEL, including graphite spent nuclear fuel, highly enriched uranium spent fuel, low enriched uranium spent fuel, and calcined high-level waste. About 2100 MTHM of weapons production fuel, currently stored on the Hanford reservation, was also included. The behavior of the waste was analyzed by waste form and also as a group of waste forms in the hypothetical tuff repository. When the waste forms were studied together, the repository was assumed also to contain about 9200 MTHM high-level waste in borosilicate glass from three DOE sites. The addition of the borosilicate glass, which has already been proposed as a final waste form, brought the total to about 12,000 MTHM

  10. Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

  11. The Y-12 National Security Complex Foreign Research Reactor Uranium Supply Production

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nelson, T. [Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States); Keller, A.P. [Disposition and Supply Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

    2011-07-01

    The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) HEU Disposition, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), and the United States (U.S.) FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Programs. The FRR Supply Program supports the important U.S. government nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel under the RERTR Program. The NNSA Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign government agencies for the supply of LEU for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. In addition to uranium metal feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 can produce LEU in different forms to support new fuel development or target fabrication for medical isotope production. With production improvements and efficient delivery preparations, Y-12 continues to successfully support the global research reactor community. (author)

  12. Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Treatment and Management of Sodium-Bonded Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    DOE is responsible for the safe and efficient management of its sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel. This fuel contains metallic sodium, a highly reactive material; metallic uranium, which is also reactive; and in some cases, highly enriched uranium. The presence of reactive materials could complicate the process of qualifying and licensing DOE's sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel inventory for disposal in a geologic repository. Currently, more than 98 percent of this inventory is located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), near Idaho Falls, Idaho. In addition, in a 1995 agreement with the State of Idaho, DOE committed to remove all spent nuclear fuel from Idaho by 2035. This EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with the treatment and management of sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel in one or more facilities located at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) at INEEL and either the F-Canyon or Building 105-L at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. DOE has identified and assessed six proposed action alternatives in this EIS. These are: (1) electrometallurgical treatment of all fuel at ANL-W, (2) direct disposal of blanket fuel in high-integrity cans with the sodium removed at ANL-W, (3) plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) processing of blanket fuel at SRS, (4) melt and dilute processing of blanket fuel at ANL-W, (5) melt and dilute processing of blanket fuel at SRS, and (6) melt and dilute processing of all fuel at ANL-W. In addition, Alternatives 2 through 5 include the electrometallurgical treatment of driver fuel at ANL-W. Under the No Action Alternative, the EIS evaluates both the continued storage of sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel until the development of a new treatment technology or direct disposal without treatment. Under all of the alternatives, the affected environment is primarily within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of spent nuclear fuel treatment facilities. Analyses indicate

  13. Discussion on prospecting potential for rich uranium deposits in Xiazhuang uranium ore-field, northern Guangdong

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Lieqin; Tan Zhengzhong

    2004-01-01

    Based on analyzing the prospecting potential for uranium deposits in Xiazhuang uranium ore field this paper discusses the prospecting for rich uranium deposits and prospecting potential in the region. Research achievements indicate: that the Xiazhuang ore-field is an ore-concentrated area where uranium has been highly enriched, and possesses good prospecting potential and perspective, becoming one of the most important prospecting areas for locating rich uranium deposits in northern Guangdong; that the 'intersection type', the alkaline metasomatic fractured rock type and the vein-group type uranium deposits are main targets and the prospecting direction for future uranium prospecting in this region

  14. Available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tozser, Sandor; Marshall, Frances M.; Adelfang, Pablo; Bradley, Edward [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Budu, Madalina Elena [SOSNY Research and Development Company, Moscow (Russian Federation); Chiguer, Mustapha [AREVA, Paris La Defense (France)

    2016-03-15

    International activities in the back end of the research reactor (RR) fuel cycle have so far been dominated by the programmes of acceptance of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by the country where it was originally enriched. In the future inventories of LEU SNF will continue to be created and the back end solution of RR SNF remains a critical issue. The IAEA, based on the experience gained during the decade of international cooperation in supporting the objectives of the HEU take-back programmes, drew up a report presenting available reprocessing and recycling services for RR SNF. This paper gives an overview of the report, which will address all aspects of reprocessing and recycling services for RR SNF.

  15. The United States spent fuel acceptance policy - A year in review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huizenga, David G.

    1997-01-01

    Through the combined efforts of the United States and many other nations participating in the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, much progress has been made toward reducing the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in international commerce. A little more than a year ago, the U.S. Department of Energy adopted a new 1 0-year policy to accept research reactor spent nuclear fuel into the United States from other nations. The policy supports U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation objectives and demonstrates the continued commitment of the U.S. to the RERTR program. This paper is a review of the past year's activities and addresses the progress made since the policy was implemented

  16. A continuing success - The United States Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mustin, Tracy P.; Clapper, Maureen; Reilly, Jill E.

    2000-01-01

    to be successful in reducing the amount of high enriched uranium in civil nuclear activities, thus supporting worldwide nonproliferation efforts. This success is due to the continuing cooperation and coordination between the United States Government and the research reactor community. Eligible reactor operators interested in participating in this program are strongly encouraged to evaluate their inventory of fuel and determine a plan for future shipments as soon as possible. (author)

  17. Operational report, Advantages of gradual introducing of highly enriched fuel into the RA reactor core from economic aspect and users needs; Radni izvestaj, Prednost postupka parcijalnog uvodjenja visokoobogacenog goriva u reaktor RA sa aspekta ekonomicnosti i potreba korisnika

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martinc, R et al. [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1976-10-14

    The possibility of increasing the neutron flux in the RA reactor was considered for a number of years. The possibilities of reactor reconstruction are not realistic and they should be disregarded. The possibility that remains is to achieve higher neutron flux by improving the fueling scheme and above all by introducing highly enriched fuel into the reactor core. Decision to purchase highly enriched fuel was quicker due to the fact that the 2% enriched uranium fuel is not fabricated any more. There are two procedures for exchanging the fuel in the reactor core: a) removal of partially spent 2% enriched fuel and formation of the core with fresh highly enriched fuel; b) gradually introducing the new fuel into the existing RA reactor core according to a special transfer regime. This report includes some comparative analyses of these two procedures from both economic point of view and the needs of users, as well as some technical conditions. These results are in favour of gradual introducing of new fuel into the reactor core. relevant direct savings amount to 3 000 000 dinars. Some of the most important advantages cannot be estimated in this way. This report does not cover the safety analyses results which are presented in a series of other papers. [Serbo-Croat] Vec vise godina razmatra se mogucnost za povecanje neutronskog fluksa u reaktoru RA. Mogucnosti za rekonstrukciju reaktora RA u tom smislu su minimalne i realno ih treba odbaciti. Prema tome preostaje da se povecanje neutronskog fluksa postigne usavrsavanjem seme izmene goriva, a pre svega uvodjenjem goriva sa visokim stepenom obogacenja u reaktor RA. Donosenje odluke o nabavci visokoobogacenog goriva i njegovom uvodjenju u reaktor ubrzano je i cinjenicom da se staro 2% obogaceno uransko gorivo vise ne proizvodi. Postoje dva postupka za prevodjenje reaktora na ovo gorivo: a) Uklanjanjem poluistrosenog 2% obogacenog goriva iz reaktora i formiranjem jezgra iskljucivo od svezeg visokoobogacenog goriva, b

  18. Ewing's sarcoma precursors are highly enriched in embryonic osteochondrogenic progenitors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tanaka, Miwa; Yamazaki, Yukari; Kanno, Yohei; Igarashi, Katsuhide; Aisaki, Ken-ichi; Kanno, Jun; Nakamura, Takuro

    2014-07-01

    Ewing's sarcoma is a highly malignant bone tumor found in children and adolescents, and the origin of this malignancy is not well understood. Here, we introduced a Ewing's sarcoma-associated genetic fusion of the genes encoding the RNA-binding protein EWS and the transcription factor ETS (EWS-ETS) into a fraction of cells enriched for osteochondrogenic progenitors derived from the embryonic superficial zone (eSZ) of long bones collected from late gestational murine embryos. EWS-ETS fusions efficiently induced Ewing's sarcoma-like small round cell sarcoma formation by these cells. Analysis of the eSZ revealed a fraction of a precursor cells that express growth/differentiation factor 5 (Gdf5), the transcription factor Erg, and parathyroid hormone-like hormone (Pthlh), and selection of the Pthlh-positive fraction alone further enhanced EWS-ETS-dependent tumor induction. Genes downstream of the EWS-ETS fusion protein were quite transcriptionally active in eSZ cells, especially in regions in which the chromatin structure of the ETS-responsive locus was open. Inhibition of β-catenin, poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase 1 (PARP1), or enhancer of zeste homolog 2 (EZH2) suppressed cell growth in a murine model of Ewing's sarcoma, suggesting the utility of the current system as a preclinical model. These results indicate that eSZ cells are highly enriched in precursors to Ewing's sarcoma and provide clues to the histogenesis of Ewing's sarcoma in bone.

  19. 31 CFR 540.308 - Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). 540.308... OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.308 Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). The term low enriched...

  20. IAEA activities in support of the international programmes to return fresh and spent research reactor nuclear fuel to the conuntry of origin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adelgang, P.; Tozser, S.; Marshall, F.; Borio di Tigliole, A.

    2017-01-01

    The IAEA has been involved for more than thirty years in supporting international nuclear non-proliferation efforts associated with reducing the amount of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), whose enrichment is ≥ 20% in 235U, in international commerce. In particular, IAEA projects and activities have directly supported the two main international efforts to return fresh and spent HEU research reactor fuel to the country where it was originally enriched: the United States Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRRSNF) Acceptance Programme and the United States-IAEA-Russian Federation tripartite initiative known as the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Programme. This report gives an account of IAEA efforts in support of both programmes including a historical overview of fuel return shipments and a brief description of associated cooperation activities carried out by the IAEA. [es

  1. Draft Environmental Impact Statement on a proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel. Management Alternative 3 analyzes a hybrid alternative. This document is Vol. 1 of 2 plus summary volume

  2. A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded

  3. Available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tozser, Sandor Miklos; Adelfang, Pablo; Bradley, Ed [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Budu, Madalina [SOSNY Research and Development Company, Moscow (Russian Federation); Chiguer, Mustapha [AREVA, Paris (France)

    2015-05-15

    International activities in the back-end of the research reactor (RR) fuel cycle have so far been dominated by the programmes of acceptance of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by the country where it was originally enriched. These programmes will soon have achieved their goals and the SNF take-back programmes will cease. However, the needs of the nuclear community dictate that the majority of the research reactors continue to operate using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in order to meet the varied mission objectives. As a result, inventories of LEU SNF will continue to be created and the back-end solution of RR SNF remains a critical issue. In view of this fact, the IAEA, based on the experience gained during the decade of international cooperation in supporting the objectives of the HEU take-back programmes, will draw up a report presenting available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent nuclear fuel. This paper gives an overview of the guiding document which will address all aspects of Reprocessing and Recycling Services for RR SNF, including an overview of solutions, decision making support, service suppliers, conditions (prerequisites, options, etc.), services offered by the managerial and logistics support providers with a focus on available transport packages and applicable transport modes.

  4. Development and application of a safeguards system in a fabrication plant for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuypers, M.; Stricht, E. van der

    1979-01-01

    This paper gives a general view of the safeguards activities performed at the Nukem Fabrication plant (Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany) during the last seven years. The main safeguards-relevant features of the plant are given and discussed. The importance is stressed of a good working relationship between the three principal partners, viz. the operator, the safeguards authority and the latter's technical support service. The definition, implementation and improvement of safeguards equipment and activities are outlined. The paper describes the internal organization established by the operator to fulfil his responsibilities, the safeguards philosophy, the Non-Destructive Assay equipment permanently installed by Euratom Safeguards, the results obtained, and the evaluation of the material balances. Conclusions are drawn (and specific comments made throughout the paper) from the experience gained over this period of seven years. (author)

  5. Nuclear criticality safety for warehousing of 55-gal drums containing highly enriched uranium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robinson, R.C.; Dodds, H.L.

    1989-01-01

    Subcritical data for six separate arrays of 55-gal 17H steel shipping/storage containers is calculated and used to determine safe storage limits for U(97.5)-metal in a warehouse environment at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Results are presented for three different forms of fissile material: 97.5 wt% 235 U enriched metal (ρ 0 = 18.76 g/cm 3 ) cylinders, metal spheres, and low density (ρ = 0.25 ρ 0 ) metal cylinders

  6. Direct-scanning alpha spectrometer for americium and plutonium contamination on highly-enriched uranium surfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, W.C.; Martinez, H.E.; Abeyta, C.L.; Morgan, A.N.; Nelson, T.O.

    1997-01-01

    Trace Pu 239 and Am 241 contamination on a surface whose alpha count is dominated by U 235 and U 234 decay has been successfully quantified by counting swipes in external alpha spectroscopy chambers. The swipe process, however, is labor intensive and subject to uncertainties in the swiping process as well as degraded spectral resolution due to the presence of the swipe material. A multichannel instrument for automated in situ measurements of interior and exterior contamination has been developed which incorporates a rotary table, 13 fixed ion-implanted silicon detectors, and spectroscopy electronics. Custom software was written to allow alpha spectrometer to function as a virtual instrument in the LabView environment. This system gives improved speed and resolution as well as a complete log of the location of areas of high surface contamination, a feature not practical to obtain by other methods, and one which opens the possibility of long term studies such as Pu outgrowth evaluation employing the instrument. The authors present performance data as well as system integration, calibration, control, and dynamic geometric efficiency calculations related to the design of this and next generation systems

  7. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996. World inventories, capabilities and policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.; Berkhout, F.; Walker, W.

    1997-01-01

    This book provides an updated authoritative survey of the quantities of fissile material produced for nuclear weapons and in the civilian fuel cycle. The control of fissile materials and associated technologies are at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The authors demonstrate that despite technical, political and economic difficulties, a fully effective material control regime is feasible. The main steps towards realisation of such a regime are identified. (UK)

  8. Spent fuel workshop'2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poinssot, Ch.

    2002-01-01

    This document gathers the transparencies of the presentations given at the 2002 spent fuel workshop: Session 1 - Research Projects: Overview on the IN CAN PROCESSES European project (M. Cowper), Overview on the SPENT FUEL STABILITY European project (C. Poinssot), Overview on the French R and D project on spent fuel long term evolution, PRECCI (C. Poinssot); Session 2 - Spent Fuel Oxidation: Oxidation of uranium dioxide single crystals (F. Garrido), Experimental results on SF oxidation and new modeling approach (L. Desgranges), LWR spent fuel oxidation - effects of burn-up and humidity (B. Hanson), An approach to modeling CANDU fuel oxidation under dry storage conditions (P. Taylor); Session 3 - Spent Fuel Dissolution Experiments: Overview on high burnup spent fuel dissolution studies at FZK/INE (A. Loida), Results on the influence of hydrogen on spent fuel leaching (K. Spahiu), Leaching of spent UO 2 fuel under inert and reducing conditions (Y. Albinsson), Fuel corrosion investigation by electrochemical techniques (D. Wegen), A reanalysis of LWR spent fuel flow through dissolution tests (B. Hanson), U-bearing secondary phases formed during fuel corrosion (R. Finch), The near-field chemical conditions and spent fuel leaching (D. Cui), The release of radionuclides from spent fuel in bentonite block (S.S. Kim), Trace actinide behavior in altered spent fuel (E. Buck, B. Hanson); Session 4 - Radiolysis Issues: The effect of radiolysis on UO 2 dissolution determined from electrochemical experiments with 238 Pu doped UO 2 M. Stroess-Gascoyne (F. King, J.S. Betteridge, F. Garisto), doped UO 2 studies (V. Rondinella), Preliminary results of static and dynamic dissolution tests with α doped UO 2 in Boom clay conditions (K. Lemmens), Studies of the behavior of UO 2 / water interfaces under He 2+ beam (C. Corbel), Alpha and gamma radiolysis effects on UO 2 alteration in water (C. Jegou), Behavior of Pu-doped pellets in brines (M. Kelm), On the potential catalytic behavior of

  9. A comparison between thorium-uranium and low enrichment uranium cycles in the high temperature reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cerles, J M

    1973-03-15

    In a previous report, it was shown that the Uranium cycle could be used as well with multi-hole block (GGA type) as with tubular elements. Now, in a F.S.V. geometry, a comparison is made between Thorium cycle and Uranium cycle. This comparison will be concerned with the physical properties of the materials, the needs of natural Uranium, the fissile material inventory and, at last, an attempt of economical considerations. In this report the cycle will be characterizd by the fertile material. So, we write ''Thorium cycle'' for Highly Enriched Uranium - Thorium cycle and ''Uranium cycle'' for low Enrichment Uranium cycle.

  10. The assessment of the long-term evolution of the spent nuclear fuel matrix by kinetic, thermodynamic and spectroscopic studies of uranium minerals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruno, J.; Casas, I.; Cera, E.; Ewing, R.C.; Finch, R.J.

    1995-01-01

    The long term behavior of spent nuclear fuel is discussed in the light of recent thermodynamic and kinetic data on mineralogical analogues related to the key phases in the oxidative alteration of uraninite. The implications for the safety assessment of a repository of the established oxidative alteration sequence of the spent fuel matrix are illustrated with Pagoda calculations. The application to the kinetic and thermodynamic data to source term calculations indicates that the appearance and duration of the U(VI) oxyhydroxide transient is critical for the stability of the fuel matrix

  11. A report on the transport of MTR-type spent fuel assemblies of the Philippine Research Reactor (PRR-1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, Magno B.; Leopando, Leonardo S.

    1999-03-01

    Fifty one (51) fuel assemblies of mixed enrichment from the Philippine Research Reactor (PRR-1), consisting of 50 spent and 1 fresh, were shipped to the United States last 14 March 1999 under the U.S. Return of Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) fuel policy. The shipment was in line with the U.S. initiative to implement its Record of Decision (ROD) which took effect on 13 May 1996 to accept and manage all FRR uranium fuel of U.S. origin and enriched in the United States. The shipment program would last10 years, ending midnight of 13 May 2006. The ROD provided a 3 year extension period within which to accept FRR spent nuclear fuel (SNF) withdrawn from reactors after 2006. The U.S. policy gave priority to the NPT significance of high enriched U, as the prime target of the return of FRR policy. Classified as a developing country, the Philippines, through the PNRI, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Energy for the cost-free shipment of PRR-1 spent fuel to the United States. Spent fuel loading and transport operations to the port area lasted seven (7) days, from 8 to 14 March 1999. (Author)

  12. Disposal of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blomeke, J.O.; Ferguson, D.E.; Croff, A.G.

    1978-01-01

    Based on preliminary analyses, spent fuel assemblies are an acceptable form for waste disposal. The following studies appear necessary to bring our knowledge of spent fuel as a final disposal form to a level comparable with that of the solidified wastes from reprocessing: 1. A complete systems analysis is needed of spent fuel disposition from reactor discharge to final isolation in a repository. 2. Since it appears desirable to encase the spent fuel assembly in a metal canister, candidate materials for this container need to be studied. 3. It is highly likely that some ''filler'' material will be needed between the fuel elements and the can. 4. Leachability, stability, and waste-rock interaction studies should be carried out on the fuels. The major disadvantages of spent fuel as a disposal form are the lower maximum heat loading, 60 kW/acre versus 150 kW/acre for high-level waste from a reprocessing plant; the greater long-term potential hazard due to the larger quantities of plutonium and uranium introduced into a repository; and the possibility of criticality in case the repository is breached. The major advantages are the lower cost and increased near-term safety resulting from eliminating reprocessing and the treatment and handling of the wastes therefrom

  13. Criticality issues with highly enriched fuels in a repository environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, L.L.; Sanchez, L.C.; Rath, J.S.

    1998-03-01

    This paper presents preliminary analysis of a volcanic tuff repository containing a combination of low enrichment commercial spent nuclear fuels (SNF) and DOE-owned SNF packages. These SNFs were analyzed with respect to their criticality risks. Disposal of SNF packages containing significant fissile mass within a geologic repository must comply with current regulations relative to criticality safety during transportation and handling within operational facilities. However, once the repository is closed, the double contingency credits for criticality safety are subject to unremediable degradation, (e.g., water intrusion, continued presence of neutron absorbers in proximity to fissile material, and fissile material reconfiguration). The work presented in this paper focused on two attributes of criticality in a volcanic tuff repository for near-field and far-field scenarios: (1) scenario conditions necessary to have a criticality, and (2) consequences of a nuclear excursion that are components of risk. All criticality consequences are dependent upon eventual water intrusion into the repository and subsequent breach of the disposal package. Key criticality parameters necessary for a critical assembly are: (1) adequate thermal fissile mass, (2) adequate concentration of fissile material, (3) separation of neutron poison from fissile materials, and (4) sufficient neutron moderation (expressed in units of moderator to fissile atom ratios). Key results from this study indicated that the total energies released during a single excursion are minimal (comparable to those released in previous solution accidents), and the maximum frequency of occurrence is bounded by the saturation and temperature recycle times, thus resulting in small criticality risks

  14. Uranium dioxide electrolysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Willit, James L [Batavia, IL; Ackerman, John P [Prescott, AZ; Williamson, Mark A [Naperville, IL

    2009-12-29

    This is a single stage process for treating spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors. The spent nuclear fuel, uranium oxide, UO.sub.2, is added to a solution of UCl.sub.4 dissolved in molten LiCl. A carbon anode and a metallic cathode is positioned in the molten salt bath. A power source is connected to the electrodes and a voltage greater than or equal to 1.3 volts is applied to the bath. At the anode, the carbon is oxidized to form carbon dioxide and uranium chloride. At the cathode, uranium is electroplated. The uranium chloride at the cathode reacts with more uranium oxide to continue the reaction. The process may also be used with other transuranic oxides and rare earth metal oxides.

  15. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Hans; Laucht, Juergen

    1996-01-01

    Since the RERTR meeting in 1990 at Newport/USA, NUKEM recommended that the research reactor community agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) since there existed numerous specifications both from suppliers/fabricators and research reactors. The target recommended by NUKEM is to arrive at a worldwide unified standard specification in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for fabrication of research reactor fuel elements. In our paper presented at the RERTR meeting at Paris in September 1995, we pointed out that LEU and HEU supplied by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in the past was never 'virgin' material, i.e., it was mixed with reprocessed uranium. Our recommendation was to include this fact in the proposed unified specification. Since the RERTR meeting in 1995 progress on a unified standard specification has been made and we would like to provide more specific information about that in this paper. Furthermore, we will deal with the question whether there is a secure supply of LEU for converted research reactors. We list current and potential suppliers of LEU, noting however, that the DOE has for a number of years been unable to supply any LEU due to production problems. The future availability of LEU of U.S. origin is, of course, essential for those research reactor operators which have converted their reactors from HEU to LEU and which are intending to return spent fuel of U.S. origin to the U.S.A. (author)

  16. HEU and Leu FueL Shielding Comparative Study Applied for Spent Fuel Transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Margeanu, C.A.; Margeanu, S.; Barbos, D.

    2009-01-01

    INR Pitesti owns and operates a TRIGA dual-core Research Reactor for material testing, power reactor fuel and nuclear safety studies. The dual core concept involves the operation of a 14 MW TRIGA steady-state, high flux research and material testing reactor at one end of a large pool, and the independent operation of an annular-core pulsing reactor (TRIGA-ACPR) at the other end of the pool. The steady-state reactor is mostly used for long term testing of power reactor fuel components (pellets, pins, subassemblies and fuel assemblies) followed by post-irradiation examination. Following the general trend to replace the He fuel type (High Enriched Uranium) by Leu fuel type (Low Enriched Uranium), in the light of international agreements between IAEA and the states using He fuel in their nuclear reactors, Inr Past's have been accomplished the TRIGA research reactor core full conversion on May 2006. The He fuel repatriation in US in the frame of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return Programme effectively started in 1999, the final stage being achieved in summer of 2008. Taking into account for the possible impact on the human and environment, in all activities associated to nuclear fuel cycle, the spent fuel or radioactive waste characteristics must be well known. Shielding calculations basic tasks consist in radiation doses calculation, in order to prevent any risks both for personnel protection and impact on the environment during the spent fuel manipulation, transport and storage. The paper is a comparative study of Leu and He fuel utilization effects for the shielding analysis during spent fuel transport. A comparison against the measured data for He spent fuel, available from the last stage of the spent fuel repatriation, is presented. All the geometrical and material data related on the spent fuel shipping cask were considered according to the Nac-Lt Cask approved model. The shielding analysis estimates radiation doses to shipping cask wall surface

  17. Turkey's regulatory plans for high enriched to low enriched conversion of TR-2 reactor core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guelol Oezdere, Oya

    2003-01-01

    Turkey is a developing country and has three nuclear facilities two of which are research reactors and one pilot fuel production plant. One of the two research reactors is TR-2 which is located in Cekmece site in Istanbul. TR-2 Reactor's core is composed of both high enriched and low enriched fuel and from high enriched to low enriched core conversion project will take place in year 2005. This paper presents the plans for drafting regulations on the safety analysis report updates for high enriched to low enriched core conversion of TR-2 reactor, the present regulatory structure of Turkey and licensing activities of nuclear facilities. (author)

  18. Choice and utilization of slightly enriched uranium fuel for high performance research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cerles, J.M.; Schwartz, J.P.

    1978-01-01

    Problems relating to the replacement of highly enriched (90% or 93% U 235 ) uranium fuel: by moderately enriched (20% or 40% in U 235 ) metallic uranium fuel and slightly enriched (3% or 8% in U 235 ) uranium oxide fuel are discussed

  19. How much uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenward, M.

    1976-01-01

    Comment is made on the latest of a series of reports on world uranium resources from the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency and the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (Uranium resources, production and demand (including other nuclear fuel cycle data), published by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris). The report categories uranium reserves by their recovery cost and looks at power demand and the whole of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. The effect that fluctuations in uranium prices have had on exploration for new uranium resources is considered. It is stated that increased exploration is essential considering the long lead times involved but that thanks to today's higher prices there are distinct signs that prospecting activities are increasing again. (U.K.)

  20. Waste arisings from a high-temperature reactor with a uranium-thorium fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    This paper presents an equilibrium-recycle condition flow sheet for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR) fuel cycle which uses thorium and high-enriched uranium (93% U-235) as makeup fuel. INFCE Working Group 7 defined percentage losses to various waste streams are used to adjust the heavy-element mass flows per gigawatt-year of electricity generated. Thorium and bred U-233 are recycled following Thorex reprocessing. Fissile U-235 is recycled one time following Purex reprocessing and then is discarded to waste. Plutonium and other transuranics are discarded to waste. Included are estimates of volume, radioactivity, and heavy-element content of wastes arising from HTR fuel element fabrication; HTR operation, maintenance, and decommissioning; and reprocessing spent fuel where the waste is unique to the HTR fuel cycle

  1. Inspection experience with RA-3 spent nuclear fuel assemblies at CNEA's central storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novara, Oscar; LaFuente, Jose; Large, Steve; Andes, Trent; Messick, Charles

    2000-01-01

    Aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel from Argentina's RA-3 research reactor is to be shipped to the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, USA. The spent nuclear fuel contains highly enriched uranium of U.S. origin and is being returned under the US Department of Energy's Foreign Research Reactor/Domestic Research Reactor (FRR/DRR) Receipt Program. An intensive inspection of 207 stored fuel assemblies was conducted to assess shipping cask containment limitations and assembly handling considerations. The inspection was performed with video equipment designed for remote operation, high portability, easy setup and usage. Fuel assemblies were raised from their vertical storage tubes, inspected by remote video, and then returned to their original storage tube or transferred to an alternate location. The inspections were made with three simultaneous video systems, each with dedicated viewing, digital recording, and tele-operated control from a shielded location. All 207 fuel assemblies were safely and successfully inspected in fifteen working days. Total dose to personnel was about one-half of anticipated dose. (author)

  2. Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Directly Disposing Highly Enriched Spent Nuclear Fuel in Unsaturated Tuff - II: Geochemical Constraints

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, Rob P.; Sanchez, Lawrence C.; Trellue, Holly R.

    2003-01-01

    This article presents several reasonable cases in which four mechanisms - dissolution, physical mixing, adsorption, and precipitation (either chemical change or evaporation) - might concentrate fissile material in and around a disposal container for radioactive waste at the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The possible masses, concentrations, and volume are then compared to criticality limits. The cases examined evaluate the geologic barrier role in preventing criticality since engineered options for preventing criticality (e.g., boron or gadolinium neutron absorber in the disposal container) are not considered. The solid concentrations able to form in the natural environment are insufficient for criticality to occur because (a) solutions of 235 U and 239 Pu are clearly not critical; (b) physical mixing of fissile material with the entire potential iron oxide (as goethite - FeOOH) in a waste package is not critical; (c) the adsorption of 239 Pu on consolidated iron oxide in a waste package is not critical; (d) the adsorption of 235 U on consolidated iron oxide in a waste package is not critical when accounting for reduced adsorption because of carbonates at high pH; (e) the filtration of iron oxide colloids, containing fissile material, by the thin invert material is not critical; (f) insufficient retention through precipitation of 235 U or 239 Pu occurs in the invert; (g) adsorption of 235 U and 239 Pu on devitrified or clinoptolite-rich tuff below the repository is not critical; (h) the average precipitation/adsorption of 235 U as uranyl silicates in the tuff is not critical by analogy with calcite deposition in lithophysae at Yucca Mountain; and (i) precipitation/adsorption (caused by cyclic drying) as uranyl silicates on fracture surfaces of the tuff is not critical by analogy with the oxidation of UO 2 , migration of U VI , and precipitation in fractures at the Nopal I ore deposit in Mexico

  3. A multi-attribute utility decision analysis for treatment alternatives for the DOE/SR aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, Freddie J.; Weiner, Ruth Fleischman; Wheeler, Timothy A.; Sorenson, Ken B.; Kuzio, Kenneth A.

    2000-01-01

    A multi-attribute utility analysis is applied to a decision process to select a treatment method for the management of aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al-SNF) owned by the US Department of Energy (DOE). DOE will receive, treat, and temporarily store Al-SNF, most of which is composed of highly enriched uranium, at its Savannah River Site in South Carolina. DOE intends ultimately to send the treated Al-SNF to a geologic repository for permanent disposal. DOE initially considered ten treatment alternatives for the management of Al-SNF, and has narrowed the choice to two of these: the direct disposal and melt and dilute alternatives. The decision analysis presented in this document focuses on a formal decision process used to evaluate these two remaining alternatives

  4. The future of the uranium mining industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capus, G.; Galaud, G.

    1993-01-01

    This paper presents the state of natural Uranium market today. In a first part, the author gives a brief history about nuclear programs history in Usa and Europe and describes natural Uranium demand and supply (Uranium mines, recycling, excessive civil stocks, military stocks using). In a second part, evolutions and futures of Uranium industry is studied: using of excessive stocks in Western Europe, using of military stocks, recycling of Uranium from spent fuels reprocessing, uranium deposits, future natural uranium market. 6 refs., 4 figs., 3 tabs., 3 photos

  5. Foreign research reactor uranium supply program: The Y-12 national security complex process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, T.; Eddy, B.G.

    2010-01-01

    The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the HEU Disposition Program, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, and the United States FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program. The Y-12 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign governments for the supply of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. This program supports the important U.S. government and nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to LEU fuel under the guidance of the NNSA RERTR Program. In conjunction with the FRR SNF Acceptance Program which supports the global nonproliferation efforts to disposition U.S.-origin HEU, the Y-12 FRR Uranium Supply Program can provide the LEU for the replacement fuel fabrication. In addition to feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 supplies LEU for target fabrication for medical isotope production. The Y-12 process uses supply forecasting tools, production improvements and efficient delivery preparations to successfully support the global research reactor community

  6. Dry Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel - 13321

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, T.M.; Dunsmuir, M.D.; Leduc, D.R.; Severynse, T.F.; Sindelar, R.L. [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States); Moore, E.N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Spent fuel from domestic and foreign research reactors is received and stored at the Savannah River Site's L Area Material Storage (L Basin) Facility. This DOE-owned fuel consists primarily of highly enriched uranium in metal, oxide or silicide form with aluminum cladding. Upon receipt, the fuel is unloaded and transferred to basin storage awaiting final disposition. Disposition alternatives include processing via the site's H Canyon facility for uranium recovery, or packaging and shipment of the spent fuel to a waste repository. A program has been developed to provide a phased approach for dry storage of the L Basin fuel. The initial phase of the dry storage program will demonstrate loading, drying, and storage of fuel in twelve instrumented canisters to assess fuel performance. After closure, the loaded canisters are transferred to pad-mounted concrete overpacks, similar to those used for dry storage of commercial fuel. Unlike commercial spent fuel, however, the DOE fuel has high enrichment, very low to high burnup, and low decay heat. The aluminum cladding presents unique challenges due to the presence of an oxide layer that forms on the cladding surface, and corrosion degradation resulting from prolonged wet storage. The removal of free and bound water is essential to the prevention of fuel corrosion and radiolytic generation of hydrogen. The demonstration will validate models predicting pressure, temperature, gas generation, and corrosion performance, provide an engineering scale demonstration of fuel handling, drying, leak testing, and canister backfill operations, and establish 'road-ready' storage of fuel that is suitable for offsite repository shipment or retrievable for onsite processing. Implementation of the Phase I demonstration can be completed within three years. Phases II and III, leading to the de-inventory of L Basin, would require an additional 750 canisters and 6-12 years to complete. Transfer of the fuel from basin storage

  7. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-07-19

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 6 June 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [Spanish] La Secretaria ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 6 de junio de 2011, de la Mision Permanente del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 22 de junio de 1998 y denominadas en adelante las 'directrices') y de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, presenta las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2010.

  8. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-13

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [Spanish] La Secretaria ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 28 de julio de 2010, de la Mision Permanente del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y denominadas en adelante las 'directrices') y de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, presenta las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2009.

  9. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2009-10-30

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 26 June 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008 [Spanish] La Secretaria ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 26 de junio de 2009, de la Mision Permanente del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 22 de junio de 1998 y denominadas en adelante las 'directrices') y de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, presenta las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2008.

  10. Communication Received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-09-25

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 23 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and the International Organizations in Vienna in the enclosures of which the Government, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [Spanish] La Secretaria ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 23 de agosto de 2007, de la Mision Permanente del Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte ante las Naciones Unidas y las Organizaciones Internacionales con sede en Viena, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y denominadas en adelante las 'Directrices') y de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las Directrices, presenta las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2006.

  11. Depleted uranium management alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hertzler, T.J.; Nishimoto, D.D.

    1994-08-01

    This report evaluates two management alternatives for Department of Energy depleted uranium: continued storage as uranium hexafluoride, and conversion to uranium metal and fabrication to shielding for spent nuclear fuel containers. The results will be used to compare the costs with other alternatives, such as disposal. Cost estimates for the continued storage alternative are based on a life-cycle of 27 years through the year 2020. Cost estimates for the recycle alternative are based on existing conversion process costs and Capital costs for fabricating the containers. Additionally, the recycle alternative accounts for costs associated with intermediate product resale and secondary waste disposal for materials generated during the conversion process.

  12. Depleted uranium management alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hertzler, T.J.; Nishimoto, D.D.

    1994-08-01

    This report evaluates two management alternatives for Department of Energy depleted uranium: continued storage as uranium hexafluoride, and conversion to uranium metal and fabrication to shielding for spent nuclear fuel containers. The results will be used to compare the costs with other alternatives, such as disposal. Cost estimates for the continued storage alternative are based on a life-cycle of 27 years through the year 2020. Cost estimates for the recycle alternative are based on existing conversion process costs and Capital costs for fabricating the containers. Additionally, the recycle alternative accounts for costs associated with intermediate product resale and secondary waste disposal for materials generated during the conversion process

  13. Studsvik's implementation of the DOE spent fuel return program: The US perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grover, Stephen; Browser, Rita C.

    1996-01-01

    The government of Sweden has long been a proponent of nuclear nonproliferation policies. This includes laws governing the conduct of the Studsvik R2 Reactor in Nykoeping, Sweden. Studsvik became a participant in the RERTR program early on and was one of the first research reactors to convert from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. Since Studsvik operates the reactor on a commercial basis, it is important to fully comply with all Swedish laws and regulations for the operation of a nuclear reactor. This includes development of a proper long term program for the final disposition for the irradiated fuel. For this reason it was very important to Studsvik to be involved in the process for development of the DOE Spent Fuel Return Program as early as possible. This process included input into the Environmental Impact Statement process, early contractual negotiations after the issuance of the Record of Decision, participation in litigation involving the Spent Fuel Return Program, and plans for return of HEU fuel on the first European shipment. Not only was program involvement important, but actual program implementation was necessary for Studsvik to maintain its reactor license. Studsvik needed to have fuel included in the first shipment in the return program not only for licensing considerations, but also to reduce the proliferation risk associated with the storage of non-self protecting fuel. To ensure participation in the first shipment, Studsvik's activities included the early development of Appendix A's, coordinating the shipment, obtaining approvals and authorizations, and other technical aspects. (author)

  14. Disposition Options for Uranium-233

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beahm, E.C.; Dole, L.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Icenhour, A.S.; Storch, S.N.

    1999-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD), in support of the U.S. arms-control and nonproliferation policies, has initiated a program to disposition surplus weapons-usable fissile material by making it inaccessible and unattractive for use in nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable fissile materials include plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233 (sup 233)U. In support of this program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory led DOE's contractor efforts to identify and characterize options for the long-term storage and disposal of excess (sup 233)U. Five storage and 17 disposal options were identified and are described herein

  15. Cooperative efforts for the removal of high-enriched fresh fuel from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopwood, W.; Moses, S.; Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Wander, T.

    2003-01-01

    In August 2002, the inventory of high-enriched uranium (HEU) fresh fuel at the Vinca Institute in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, was repackaged and shipped to the Russian Federation (R.F.), its country of origin under the former Soviet Union. Several thousand small fuel elements were repackaged by the Vinca Institute into approved shipping containers provided by the RF and loaded onto the approved ground transportation vehicle. The transportation from the Vinca Institute to the Belgrade Airport was done under the planning and protection of Yugoslavian and Serbian military and police organizations, with technical oversight being provided by the Vinca staff that escorted the convoy. Under constant security protection, the Russian crew loaded the fuel containers onto the cargo plane, and later it departed for an airport near Dimitrovgrad, Russia. In addition to the domestic control and accounting provided during this operation, this inventory was under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and its inspectors appropriately confirmed, sealed and documented the inventory. The United States (U.S.) observers were also present, and appropriate data were collected because of nonproliferation interests and contractual support for all phases of the operation. Since this event, the Vinca staff has generated several papers describing the technical background and detailed activities of this operation. This paper describes the removal from the U.S. observers perspectives and recognizes the significant cooperation among the supporting countries and the achievements of the organizations directly involved. (author)

  16. U.S. uranium supply to the research and test reactor community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, Elaine M.

    2002-01-01

    From the 1950s through the early 1990s, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was the primary supplier of low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to research and test reactors worldwide. The formerly called Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was put into operational stand down in 1994 due to inadequate safety documentation. This paper will discuss the re-start of the Y-12 Plant and its current capabilities. Additionally, the paper will address recent changes within the DOE, with the creation of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). It will show how the change to NNSA and an organizational re-alignment has improved efficiencies. NNSA is committed to operate its sales program so that it is complementary to, and in support of, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) and Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRR SNF) Return Programs. The NNSA is committed to provide an assurance of competitively-priced, high-quality uranium supply to the research and test reactor community under long-term contracts. This paper will discuss some of NNSA's recent successes in long-term contracting and meeting deliveries. (author)

  17. Spent fuel management in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shirahashi, K.; Maeda, M.; Nakai, T.

    1996-01-01

    Japan has scarce energy resources and depends on foreign resources for 84% of its energy needs. Therefore, Japan has made efforts to utilize nuclear power as a key energy source since mid-1950's. Today, the nuclear energy produced from 49 nuclear power plants is responsible for about 31% of Japan's total electricity supply. The cumulative amount of spent fuel generated as of March 1995 was about 11,600 Mg U. Japan's policy of spent fuel management is to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and recycle recovered plutonium and uranium as nuclear fuel. The Tokai reprocessing plant continues stable operation keeping the annual treatment capacity or around 90 Mg U. A commercial reprocessing plant is under construction at Rokkasho, northern part of Japan. Although FBR is the principal reactor to use plutonium, LWR will be a major power source for some time and recycling of the fuel in LWRs will be prompted. (author). 3 figs

  18. Secondary Uranium Phases of Spent Nuclear Fuel. Coffinite, USiO4, and Studtite, UO4.4H2O. Synthesis, Characterization, and Investigations Regarding Phase Stability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Labs, Sabrina

    2014-01-01

    The miscibility behavior of the USiO 4 - ThSiO 4 system was investigated. The end members and ten solid solutions U x Th (1-x) SiO 4 with x = 0.12 - 0.92 were successfully synthesized, without formation of other secondary uranium or thorium phases. Lattice parameters of the solid solutions evidently follow Vegard's Law. Investigation of the local structure with EXAFS reveals small differences between U and Th environment attributed to different atomic radii of the metal atoms but no implications for a miscibility gap. The data provided confirms complete miscibility for the system USiO 4 - ThSiO 4 . The structure of the end members was studied in detail with XRD and discussed with special regard to the oxygen positions and the often neglected Si-O bond length. USiO 4 could be obtained without UO 2 impurities and the lattice parameters derived from Rietveld refinement as c = 6.2606(3) Aa and a = 6.9841(3) Aa. The Si-O distance in USiO 4 appears to be 1.64 Aa, which is more reasonable than earlier reported values. Synchrotron X-ray powder diffraction pattern and Raman spectra of synthetic coffinite, USiO 4 , were obtained for pressures up to 35 GPa and 18 GPa, respectively. From the changes in the diffraction pattern it can be concluded that USiO 4 undergoes a first order phase transition from zircon-type (space group I 4 1 /amd) to scheelite-type structure (space group I 4 1 /a) at ∼ 15 GPa and room-temperature. Contrary to earlier reports, the data indicates that this transition is completely reversible upon pressure release. Pressure dependencies of the Raman modes for the zircon structured phase are larger than those reported for hafnon, HfSiO 4 , and zircon, ZrSiO 4 , indicating that coffinite, USiO 4 , is more compressible than these orthosilicates. Bulk moduli fitted from the p-V data for the zircon-type and scheelite-type USiO 4 phase are compared to those known to literature for other MSiO 4 (M = U, Hf, Zr) compounds. The bulk modulus for zircon

  19. Highly enriched Betaproteobacteria growing anaerobically with p-xylene and nitrate

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rotaru, Amelia-Elena; Probian, Christina; Wilkes, Heinz

    2010-01-01

    The identity of the microorganisms capable of anaerobic p-xylene degradation under denitrifying conditions is hitherto unknown. Here, we report highly enriched cultures of freshwater denitrifying bacteria that grow anaerobically with p-xylene as the sole organic carbon source and electron donor. ...

  20. Stable isotope ratio measurements on highly enriched water samples by means of laser spectrometry

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Trigt, R; Kerstel, E.R.T.; Visser, GH; Meijer, H.A.J.

    2001-01-01

    We demonstrate the feasibility of using laser spectrometry (LS) to analyze isotopically highly enriched water samples (i.e., delta H-2 less than or equal to 15000 parts per thousand, delta O-18 less than or equal to 1200 parts per thousand), as often used in the biomedical doubly labeled water (DLW)

  1. History of the use of uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miettinen, J.K.

    1989-01-01

    Uranium was found 200 years ago, though the first use for it - in colouring glass yellow, orange or green - was only found 40 years later. When its radioactivity was discovered in 1896, interest in research into uranium increased and for a brief period it was used for improving the ductility of steel. The isolation of radium from uranium ore in 1904 caused a boom for uranium mining for radium. It found use in healing skin cancer, for various 'health' preparations like radon-containing water, and for making self-luminous paints. The discovery of fission 50 years ago increased the use of uranium into large industrial-scale applications. For fission weapons highly enriched U-235 and Pu-239 were needed. Today the main use is for uranium enriched to about 3 per cent U-235 for light water power reactors. Other important uses are for submarines, icebreakers and satellites

  2. High-uranium-loaded U3O8--Al fuel element development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, M.M.

    1978-01-01

    The High-Uranium-Loaded U 3 O 8 --Al Fuel Development Program supports Argonne National Laboratory efforts to develop high-uranium-density research and test reactor fuel to accommodate use of low-uranium enrichment. The goal is to fuel most research and test reactors with uranium of less than 20% enrichment for the purpose of lowering the potential for diversion of highly-enriched material for nonpeaceful usages

  3. Remote Handling Devices for Disposition of Enriched Uranium Reactor Fuel Using Melt-Dilute Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heckendorn, F.M.

    2001-01-01

    Remote handling equipment is required to achieve the processing of highly radioactive, post reactor, fuel for the melt-dilute process, which will convert high enrichment uranium fuel elements into lower enrichment forms for subsequent disposal. The melt-dilute process combines highly radioactive enriched uranium fuel elements with deleted uranium and aluminum for inductive melting and inductive stirring steps that produce a stable aluminum/uranium ingot of low enrichment

  4. Vapor corrosion of aluminum cladding alloys and aluminum-uranium fuel materials in storage environments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lam, P.; Sindelar, R.L.; Peacock, H.B. Jr.

    1997-04-01

    An experimental investigation of the effects of vapor environments on the corrosion of aluminum spent nuclear fuel (A1 SNF) has been performed. Aluminum cladding alloys and aluminum-uranium fuel alloys have been exposed to environments of air/water vapor/ionizing radiation and characterized for applications to degradation mode analysis for interim dry and repository storage systems. Models have been developed to allow predictions of the corrosion response under conditions of unlimited corrodant species. Threshold levels of water vapor under which corrosion does not occur have been identified through tests under conditions of limited corrodant species. Coupons of aluminum 1100, 5052, and 6061, the US equivalent of cladding alloys used to manufacture foreign research reactor fuels, and several aluminum-uranium alloys (aluminum-10, 18, and 33 wt% uranium) were exposed to various controlled vapor environments in air within the following ranges of conditions: Temperature -- 80 to 200 C; Relative Humidity -- 0 to 100% using atmospheric condensate water and using added nitric acid to simulate radiolysis effects; and Gamma Radiation -- none and 1.8 x 10 6 R/hr. The results of this work are part of the body of information needed for understanding the degradation of the A1 SNF waste form in a direct disposal system in the federal repository. It will provide the basis for data input to the ongoing performance assessment and criticality safety analyses. Additional testing of uranium-aluminum fuel materials at uranium contents typical of high enriched and low enriched fuels is being initiated to provide the data needed for the development of empirical models

  5. Experience of shipping Russian-origin research reactor spent fuel to the Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-11-01

    The primary goal of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) programme is to advance nuclear non-proliferation objectives by eliminating stockpiles of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU). The RRRFR programme was first conceived during trilateral discussions among the USA, the Russian Federation and the IAEA, initiated in 1999, when participants identified more than 20 research reactors in 17 countries having Russian/Soviet supplied fuel. In 2000, the Director General of the IAEA sent a letter to 15 countries asking for their willingness to return HEU spent fuel to the Russian Federation. Fourteen countries responded positively to the Director General's letter. In 2004, the Russian Federation and the USA signed a Government-to-Government Agreement concerning cooperation to return the Russian produced research reactor nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation. This agreement established the legal framework necessary for the cooperation between the Russian Federation and the USA for the return of Russian supplied research reactor fuel from eligible countries. Under the Bratislava agreements concluded by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in February 2005, both countries committed to completing all shipments of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel currently stored outside research reactors by the end of 2010. Up to the time of writing (May 2009) the programme has completed 19 shipments totalling over 838 kg of Russian-origin HEU spent and fresh fuel which has been returned from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Kazakhstan, Latvia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. During this time, the programme successfully removed all HEU from two countries, Latvia and Bulgaria. HEU spent fuel shipments have been the most complex shipments under the RRRFR programme, which will be the focus of this publication. The first shipment of HEU spent fuel from Uzbekistan was completed in January 2006, followed by HEU spent fuel

  6. Moving into the 21st century - The United States' Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huizenga, David G.; Mustin, Tracy P.; Saris, Elizabeth C.; Reilly, Jill E.

    1999-01-01

    participate in the program. As we move into the 21st century we will continue to work together to eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and support our mutual nonproliferation objectives. (author)

  7. Spent fuel transportation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kondrat'ev, A.N.; Kosarev, Yu.A.; Yulikov, E.A.

    1977-01-01

    In this paper, problems of transportation of nuclear spent fuel to reprocessing plants are discussed. The solutions proposed are directed toward the achievement of the transportation as economic and safe as possible. The increase of the nuclear power plants number in the USSR and the great distances between these plants and the reprocessing plants involve an intensification of the spent fuel transportation. Higher burnup and holdup time reduction cause the necessity of more bulky casks. In this connection, the economic problems become still more important. One of the ways of the problem solution is the development of rational and cheap cask designs. Also, the enforcement in the world of the environmental and personnel health protection requires to increase the transportation reliability and safety. The paper summarizes safe transportation rules with clarifying the following questions: the increase of the transport unit quantity of the spent fuel; rational shipment organization that minimizes vehicle turnover cycle duration; development of the reliable calculation methods to determine strength, thermal conditions and nuclear safety of transport packaging as applied to the vehicles of high capacity; maximum unification of vehicles, calculation methods and documents; and cask testing on models and in pilot scale on specific test rigs to assure that they meet the international safe fuel shipment rules. Besides, some considerations on the choice and use of structural materials for casks are given, and problems of manufacturing such casks from uranium and lead are considered, as well as problems of the development of fireproof shells, control instrumentation, vehicles decontamination, etc. All the problems are considered from the point of view of normal and accidental shipment conditions. Conclusions are presented [ru

  8. Method for processing spent nuclear reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levenson, M.; Zebroski, E.L.

    1981-01-01

    A method and apparatus are claimed for processing spent nuclear reactor fuel wherein plutonium is continuously contaminated with radioactive fission products and diluted with uranium. Plutonium of sufficient purity to fabricate nuclear weapons cannot be produced by the process or in the disclosed reprocessing plant. Diversion of plutonium is prevented by radiation hazards and ease of detection

  9. Detection of uranium enrichment activities using environmental monitoring techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Belew, W.L.; Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

    1993-01-01

    Uranium enrichment processes have the capability of producing weapons-grade material in the form of highly enriched uranium. Thus, detection of undeclared uranium enrichment activities is an international safeguards concern. The uranium separation technologies currently in use employ UF 6 gas as a separation medium, and trace quantities of enriched uranium are inevitably released to the environment from these facilities. The isotopic content of uranium in the vegetation, soil, and water near the plant site will be altered by these releases and can provide a signature for detecting the presence of enriched uranium activities. This paper discusses environmental sampling and analytical procedures that have been used for the detection of uranium enrichment facilities and possible safeguards applications of these techniques

  10. Development of advanced spent fuel management process. The fabrication and oxidation behavior of simulated metallized spent fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ro, Seung Gy; Shin, Y.J.; You, G.S.; Joo, J.S.; Min, D.K.; Chun, Y.B.; Lee, E.P.; Seo, H.S.; Ahn, S.B

    1999-03-01

    The simulated metallized spent fuel ingots were fabricated and evaluated the oxidation rates and the activation energies under several temperature conditions to develop an advanced spent fuel management process. It was also checked the alloying characteristics of the some elements with metal uranium. (Author). 3 refs., 1 tab., 36 figs.

  11. The risks of the Taiwan research reactor spent fuel project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-06-01

    The proposed action is to transport up to 118 spent fuel rods, to include canned spent fuel rod particulates immobilized on filters, from a research reactor in Taiwan by sea to Hampton Roads, Virginia, and then overland by truck to the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels at the Savannah River Site (SRS). At SRS, the spent fuel will be reprocessed to recover uranium and plutonium. 55 refs., 8 tabs

  12. The main conditions ensured problemless implementation of 235U high enriched fuel in Kozloduy NPP (Bulgaria) - WWER-1000 Units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobrevski, I.; Zaharieva, N.; Minkova, K.; Michaylov, G.; Penev, P.; Gerchev, N.

    2009-01-01

    The collected water chemistry and radiochemistry data during the operation of the Kozloduy NPP Unit 5 for the period 2006-2009 (12-th, 13-th 14-th and 15-th fuel cycles) undoubtedly indicate for WWER-1000 Units (whose specific features are: Steam generators with austenitic stainless steel 08Cr18N10T tubing; Steam generators are with horizontal straight tubing and Fuel elements cladding material is Zr-1%Nb (Zr1Nb) alloy), that one realistic way for problemless implementation of 235 U high enriched fuel have been found. The main feature characteristics of this way are: Implementation of solid neutron burnable absorbers together with the dissolved in coolant neutron absorber - natural boric acid; Application of fuel cladding materials with enough corrosion resistance by the specific fuel cladding environment created by presence of SNB; Keeping of suitable coolant water chemistry which ensures low corrosion rates of core- and out-of-core- materials and limits in core (cladding) depositions and restricts out-of-core radioactivity buildup. The realization of this way in WWER-1000 Units in Kozloduy NPP was practically carried out through: 1) Implementation of Russian fuel assemblies TVSA which have as fuel cladding material E-110 alloy (Zr1Nb) with enough high corrosion resistance by presence of sub-cooled nucleate boiling (SNB) and use burnable absorber (Gd) integrated in the uranium-gadolinium (U-Gd 2 O 3 ) fuel (fuel rod with 5.0% Gd 2 O 3 ); 2) Development and implementation of water chemistry primary circuit guidelines, which require the relation between boric acid concentration and total alkalising agent concentrations to ensure coolant pH 300 = 7.0 - 7.2 values during the whole operation period. The above mentioned conditions by the passing of WWER-1000 Units in NPP Kozloduy to uranium fuel with 4.4% 235 U (TVSA fuel assemblies) practically ensured avoidance of the creation of the necessary conditions for AOA onset. The operational experience (2006-2009) of the

  13. Profileration-proof uranium/plutonium and thorium/uranium fuel cycles. Safeguards and non-profileration. 2. rev. ed.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kessler, G.

    2017-07-01

    test reactors or future <20% U-235 enriched uranium fuel of light-water-reactors operating in the U/Th fuel cycle to high enriched uranium (HEU) which could be misused to design nuclear weapons. A technical solution for this proliferation danger of <20% U-235 enriched uranium is the admixture of about 0.1% of the isotope U-232. It is shown that during re-enrichment in gas ultra-centrifuges this U-232 admixture is enriched to 11% while the U-235 is enriched to 72%.This leads to a number of technical consequences which make such high enriched uranium proliferation-proof. Similarly the U-233/U-235 fuel of future light-water-reactors operating in the U/Th fuel cycle can become proliferation-proof against re-enrichment in a cascade of gas ultracentrifuges as this fuel produces a certain contamination by U-232 from nuclear reactions of neutrons with Th-232 during its burnup in the reactor core.

  14. Savannah River Site, spent nuclear fuel management, draft environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    The management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has been an integral part of the mission of the Savannah River Site (SRS) for more than 40 years. Until the early 1990s, SNF management consisted primarily of short-term onsite storage and reprocessing in the SRS chemical separation facilities to produce strategic nuclear materials. With the end of the Cold War, the US Department of Energy (DOE) decided to phase out reprocessing of SNF for the production of nuclear weapons materials. Therefore, the management strategy for this fuel has shifted from short-term storage and reprocessing for the recovery of highly-enriched uranium and transuranic isotopes to stabilization, when necessary, and interim storage pending final disposition that includes preparing aluminum-based SNF for placement in a geologic repository. In addition to the fuel already onsite, the SRS will receive SNF from foreign research reactors until 2009 and from domestic research reactors until, potentially, 2035. As a result, the safe and efficient management of SNF will continue to be an important SRS mission. This EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of DOE's proposed plans for management SNF assigned to SRS

  15. Chapter 1. General information about uranium. 1.10. Uranium application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khakimov, N.; Nazarov, Kh.M.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2011-01-01

    Full text: Metallic uranium or its compounds are used as nuclear fuel in nuclear reactors. A natural or low-enriched admixture of uranium isotopes is applied in stationery reactors of nuclear power plants, and products of a high enrichment degree are used in nuclear power plants or in reactors that operates with fast neutrons. 235 U is a source of nuclear energy in nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium is used as armour-piercing core in bombshells. 238 U serves as a source of secondary nuclear fuel - plutonium. (author)

  16. Chapter 1. General information about uranium. 1.10. Uranium application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khakimov, N.; Nazarov, Kh.M.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2012-01-01

    Full text: Metallic uranium or its compounds are used as nuclear fuel in nuclear reactors. A natural or low-enriched admixture of uranium isotopes is applied in stationery reactors of nuclear power plants, and products of a high enrichment degree are used in nuclear power plants or in reactors that operates with fast neutrons. 235 U is a source of nuclear energy in nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium is used as armour-piercing core in bombshells. 238 U serves as a source of secondary nuclear fuel - plutonium.

  17. Development of advanced spent fuel management process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Seong Won; Shin, Y. J.; Cho, S. H.

    2004-03-01

    The research on spent fuel management focuses on the maximization of the disposal efficiency by a volume reduction, the improvement of the environmental friendliness by the partitioning and transmutation of the long lived nuclides, and the recycling of the spent fuel for an efficient utilization of the uranium source. In the second phase which started in 2001, the performance test of the advanced spent fuel management process consisting of voloxidation, reduction of spent fuel and the lithium recovery process has been completed successfully on a laboratory scale. The world-premier spent fuel reduction hot test of a 5 kgHM/batch has been performed successfully by joint research with Russia and the valuable data on the actinides and FPs material balance and the characteristics of the metal product were obtained with experience to help design an engineering scale reduction system. The electrolytic reduction technology which integrates uranium oxide reduction in a molten LiCl-Li 2 O system and Li 2 O electrolysis is developed and a unique reaction system is also devised. Design data such as the treatment capacity, current density and mass transfer behavior obtained from the performance test of a 5 kgU/batch electrolytic reduction system pave the way for the third phase of the hot cell demonstration of the advanced spent fuel management technology

  18. 252Cf-source-driven noise analysis measurements for characterization of concrete highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage vaults

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valentine, T.E.; Mihalczo, J.T.

    1993-01-01

    The 252 Cf-source-driven noise analysis method has been used in measurements for subcritical configurations of fissile systems for a variety of applications. Measurements of 25 fissile systems have been performed with a wide variety of materials and configurations. This method has been applied to measurements for (1) initial fuel loading of reactors, (2) quality assurance of reactor fuel elements, (3) fuel preparation facilities, (4) fuel processing facilities, (5) fuel storage facilities, (6) zero-power testing of reactors, and (7) verification of calculational methods for assemblies with the neutron k 252 Cf source and commercially available detectors was feasible and to determine if the measurement could characterize the ability of the concrete to isolate the fissile material

  19. Method of reprocessing spent nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamiyama, Hiroaki; Inoue, Tadashi; Miyashiro, Hajime.

    1987-01-01

    Purpose: To facilitate the storage management for the wastes resulting from reprocessing by chemically separating transuranium elements such as actionoid elements together with uranium and plutonium. Method: Spent fuels from a nuclear reactor are separated into two groups, that is, a mixture of uranium, plutonium and transuranium elements and cesium, strontium and other nuclear fission products. Virgin uranium is mixed to adjust the mixture of uranium, plutonium and transuranium elements in the first group, which is used as the fuels for the nuclear reactor. After separating to recover useful metals such as cesium and strontium are separated from short half-decay nuclear fission products of the second group, other nuclear fission products are stored and managed. This enables to shorten the storage period and safety storage and management for the wastes. (Takahashi, M.)

  20. Development of advanced spent fuel management process. System analysis of advanced spent fuel management process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ro, S.G.; Kang, D.S.; Seo, C.S.; Lee, H.H.; Shin, Y.J.; Park, S.W.

    1999-03-01

    The system analysis of an advanced spent fuel management process to establish a non-proliferation model for the long-term spent fuel management is performed by comparing the several dry processes, such as a salt transport process, a lithium process, the IFR process developed in America, and DDP developed in Russia. In our system analysis, the non-proliferation concept is focused on the separation factor between uranium and plutonium and decontamination factors of products in each process, and the non-proliferation model for the long-term spent fuel management has finally been introduced. (Author). 29 refs., 17 tabs., 12 figs

  1. Study on erbium loading method to improve reactivity coefficients for low radiotoxic spent fuel HTGR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fukaya, Y., E-mail: fukaya.yuji@jaea.go.jp; Goto, M.; Nishihara, T.

    2015-11-15

    Highlights: • We attempted and optimized erbium loading methods to improve reactivity coefficients for LRSF-HTGR. • We elucidated the mechanism of the improvements for each erbium loading method by using the Bondarenko approach. • We concluded the erbium loading method by embedding into graphite shaft is preferable. - Abstract: Erbium loading methods are investigated to improve reactivity coefficients of Low Radiotoxic Spent Fuel High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (LRSF-HTGR). Highly enriched uranium is used for fuel to reduce the generation of toxicity from uranium-238. The power coefficients are positive without the use of any additive. Then, the erbium is loaded into the core to obtain negative reactivity coefficients owing to the large resonance the peak of neutron capture reaction of erbium-167. The loading methods are attempted to find the suitable method for LRSF-HTGR. The erbium is mixed in a CPF fuel kernel, loaded by binary packing with fuel particles and erbium particles, and embedded into the graphite shaft deployed in the center of the fuel compact. It is found that erbium loading causes negative reactivity as moderator temperature reactivity, and from the viewpoint of heat transfer, it should be loaded into fuel pin elements for pin-in-block type fuel. Moreover, the erbium should be incinerated slowly to obtain negative reactivity coefficients even at the End Of Cycle (EOC). A loading method that effectively causes self-shielding should be selected to avoid incineration with burn-up. The incineration mechanism is elucidated using the Bondarenko approach. As a result, it is concluded that erbium embedded into graphite shaft is preferable for LRSF-HTGR to ensure that the reactivity coefficients remain negative at EOC.

  2. Research reactor spent nuclear fuel shipment from the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Svoboda, K.; Broz, V.; Novosad, P.; Podlaha, J.; Svitak, F.

    2009-01-01

    In May 2004, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative agreement was signed by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation. The goal of this initiative is to minimize, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, the existing threat of misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials for terrorist purposes, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), fresh and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and plutonium, which have been stored in a number of countries. Within the framework of the initiative, HEU materials and SNF from research reactors of Russian origin will be transported back to the Russian Federation for reprocessing/liquidation. The program is designated as the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program and is similar to the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, which is underway for nuclear materials of United States origin. These RRRFR activities are carried out under the responsibilities of the respective ministries (i.e., U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Russian Federation Rosatom). The Czech Republic and the Nuclear Research Institute Rez, plc (NRI) joined Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 2004. During NRI's more than 50 years of existence, radioactive and nuclear materials had accumulated and had been safely stored on its grounds. In 1995, the Czech regulatory body , State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS), instructed NRI that all ecological burdens from its past activities must be addressed and that the SNF from the research reactor LVR -15 had to be transported for reprocessing. At the end of November 2007, all these activities culminated with the unique shipment to the Russian Federation of 527 fuel assemblies of SNF type EK-10 (enrichment 10% U-235) and IRT-M (enrichment 36% and 80% U-235) and 657 irradiated fuel rods of EK-10 fuel, which were used in LVR-15 reactor. (authors)

  3. Depleted uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huffer, E.; Nifenecker, H.

    2001-02-01

    This document deals with the physical, chemical and radiological properties of the depleted uranium. What is the depleted uranium? Why do the military use depleted uranium and what are the risk for the health? (A.L.B.)

  4. Release of U(VI) from spent biosorbent immobilized in cement concrete blocks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Venkobachar, C.; Iyengar, L.; Mishra, U.K.; Chauhan, M.S. [Indian Inst. of Tech., Kanpur (India)

    1995-12-01

    This paper deals with cementation as the method for the disposal of spent biosorbent, Ganoderma lucidum (a wood rotting macrofungi) after it is used for the removal of Uranium. Results on the uranium release during the curing of cement-concrete (CC) blocks indicated that placing the spent sorbent at the center of the blocks during their casting yields better immobilization of uranium as compared to the homogeneous mixing of the spent sorbent with the cement. Short term leach tests indicated that the uranium release was negligible in simulated seawater, 1.8% in 0.2 N sodium carbonate and 6.0% in 0.2 N HCl. The latter two leachates were used to represent the extreme environmental conditions. It was observed that the presence of the spent biosorbent up to 5% by weight did not affect the compressive strength of CC blocks. Thus cementation technique is suitable for the immobilization of uranium loaded biosorbent for its ultimate disposal.

  5. Release of U(VI) from spent biosorbent immobilized in cement concrete blocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Venkobachar, C.; Iyengar, L.; Mishra, U.K.; Chauhan, M.S.

    1995-01-01

    This paper deals with cementation as the method for the disposal of spent biosorbent, Ganoderma lucidum (a wood rotting macrofungi) after it is used for the removal of Uranium. Results on the uranium release during the curing of cement-concrete (CC) blocks indicated that placing the spent sorbent at the center of the blocks during their casting yields better immobilization of uranium as compared to the homogeneous mixing of the spent sorbent with the cement. Short term leach tests indicated that the uranium release was negligible in simulated seawater, 1.8% in 0.2 N sodium carbonate and 6.0% in 0.2 N HCl. The latter two leachates were used to represent the extreme environmental conditions. It was observed that the presence of the spent biosorbent up to 5% by weight did not affect the compressive strength of CC blocks. Thus cementation technique is suitable for the immobilization of uranium loaded biosorbent for its ultimate disposal

  6. Purification process of uranium hexafluoride containing traces of plutonium fluoride and/or neptunium fluoride

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aubert, J.; Bethuel, L.; Carles, M.

    1983-01-01

    In this process impure uranium hexafluoride is contacted with a metallic fluoride chosen in the group containing lead fluoride PbF 2 , uranium fluorides UFsub(4+x) (0 3 at a temperature such as plutonium and/or neptunium are reduced and pure uranium hexafluoride is recovered. Application is made to uranium hexafluoride purification in spent fuel reprocessing [fr

  7. Developments in uranium in 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chenoweth, W.L.

    1987-01-01

    Imported uranium and low prices continued to plague the domestic uranium industry and, as a result, the Secretary of Energy declared the domestic industry to be nonviable for the second straight year. Uranium exploration expenditures in the US declined for the eighth consecutive year. In 1986, an estimated $19 million was spent on uranium exploration, including 1.9 million ft of surface drilling. This drilling was done mainly in producing areas and in areas of recent discoveries. Production of uranium concentrate increased in 1986, when 13.8 million lb of uranium oxide (U 3 O 8 ) were produced, a 22% increase over 1985. Uranium produced as the result of solution mining and as the by-product of phosphoric acid production accounted for about 37% of the total production in the US. At the end of 1986, only 6 uranium mills were operating in the US. Canada continued to dominate the world market. The development under way at the huge Olympic Dam deposit in Australia will increase that country's production. US uranium production is expected to show a small decrease in 1987. 3 figures, 2 tables

  8. Remediation of spent block in Uvanas deposit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nurgaziev, M.A.; Iskakov, M.M.

    2012-01-01

    In 2007 by 'Kazatomprom' and 'Mining company' board decision, the branch of 'Mining company', 'Steppe ore management body' is reorganized in structure subdivision, the basic activity of which is organization and carrying out remediation works on spent blocks of PSV uranium deposit. In 2002 works are completed on OVOS for operating deposits Uvanas, Kanjugan, Northern Karamurun and Eastern Minkuduk. The results of present work were reported in IAEA conference. The working project 'Remediation of spent blocks of PSV uranium deposit PV-17 polygon of Steppe ore management body' approved in 2005 was developed for carrying out the remediation works. Works funding were carried out from liquidation fund of the current deposit established in accordance with the Republic of Kazakhstan law 'About interior and interior use'. Deposits remediation is the part of deposit operation life cycle which obliges to operate deposits with minimum expenditures for remediation.

  9. Uranium exploration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Voto, R.H.

    1984-01-01

    This paper is a review of the methodology and technology that are currently being used in varying degrees in uranium exploration activities worldwide. Since uranium is ubiquitous and occurs in trace amounts (0.2 to 5 ppm) in virtually all rocks of the crust of the earth, exploration for uranium is essentially the search of geologic environments in which geologic processes have produced unusual concentrations of uranium. Since the level of concentration of uranium of economic interest is dependent on the present and future price of uranium, it is appropriate here to review briefly the economic realities of uranium-fueled power generation. (author)

  10. Development of uranium metal targets for 99Mo production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiencek, T.C.; Hofman, G.L.

    1993-10-01

    A substantial amount of high enriched uranium (HEU) is used for the production of medical-grade 99 Mo. Promising methods of producing irradiation targets are being developed and may lead to the reduction or elimination of this HEU use. To substitute low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in the production of 99 Mo, the target material may be changed to uranium metal foil. Methods of fabrication are being developed to simplify assembly and disassembly of the targets. Removal of the uranium foil after irradiation without dissolution of the cladding is a primary goal in order to reduce the amount of liquid radioactive waste material produced in the process. Proof-of-concept targets have been fabricated. Destructive testing indicates that acceptable contact between the uranium foil and the cladding can be achieved. Thermal annealing tests, which simulate the cladding/uranium diffusion conditions during irradiation, are underway. Plans are being made to irradiate test targets

  11. Uranium as Raw Material for Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lelek, V.

    2006-01-01

    There is lot of information bringing our attention to the problem of limited raw material resources. Fortunately uranium for nuclear energy is very concentrated source and that is why its transport brings no problems and could be realized from anywhere. Second question is if overall resources are available for current nuclear energy development. Data documenting reasons for nowadays price growth are presenting and it is clearly shown that the most probable explanation is that there is gap in new uranium mines preparation and the lot of smaller mines were closed in the period of low uranium prices. Conclusion is that there is at least for the first half of this century even for thermal reactors enough uranium. Situation could be changed if there will massive production of liquid fuel using hydrogen, produced through nuclear heating. Public information about former military uranium resources are also included. Contemporary about one half of US nuclear power-stations is using high enriched uranium diluted with natural uranium - it is expected to continue this way up to 2012. Uranium is complicated market (Authors)

  12. Gas phase adsorption technology for nitrogen isotope separation and its feasibility for highly enriched nitrogen gas production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inoue, Masaki; Asaga, Takeo

    2000-04-01

    Highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas is favorable to reduce radioactive carbon-14 production in reactor. The cost of highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas in mass production is one of the most important subject in nitride fuel option in 'Feasibility Study for FBR and Related Fuel Cycle'. In this work gas phase adsorption technology was verified to be applicable for nitrogen isotope separation and feasible to produce highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas in commercial. Nitrogen isotopes were separated while ammonia gas flows through sodium-A type zeolite column using pressure swing adsorption process. The isotopic ratio of eight samples were measured by high resolution mass spectrometry and Fourier transform microwave spectroscopy. Gas phase adsorption technology was verified to be applicable for nitrogen isotope separation, since the isotopic ratio of nitrogen-15 and nitrogen-14 in samples were more than six times as high as in natural. The cost of highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas in mass production were estimated by the factor method. It revealed that highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas could be supplied in a few hundred yen per gram in mass production. (author)

  13. Pyrochemical processing of DOE spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laidler, J.J.

    1995-01-01

    A compact, efficient method for conditioning spent nuclear fuel is under development. This method, known as pyrochemical processing, or open-quotes pyroprocessing,close quotes provides a separation of fission products from the actinide elements present in spent fuel and further separates pure uranium from the transuranic elements. The process can facilitate the timely and environmentally-sound treatment of the highly diverse collection of spent fuel currently in the inventory of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The pyroprocess utilizes elevated-temperature processes to prepare spent fuel for fission product separation; that separation is accomplished by a molten salt electrorefining step that provides efficient (>99.9%) separation of transuranics. The resultant waste forms from the pyroprocess, are stable under envisioned repository environment conditions and highly leach-resistant. Treatment of any spent fuel type produces a set of common high-level waste forms, one a mineral and the other a metal alloy, that can be readily qualified for repository disposal and avoid the substantial costs that would be associated with the qualification of the numerous spent fuel types included in the DOE inventory

  14. Transport and storage of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lung, M.; Lenail, B.

    1987-01-01

    From a safety standpoint, spent fuel is clearly not ideal for permanent disposal and reprocessing is the best method of preparing wastes for long-term storage in a repository. Furthermore, the future may demonstrate that some fission products recovered in reprocessing have economic applications. Many countries have in fact reached the point at which the recycling of plutonium and uranium from spent fuel is economical in LWR's. Even in countries where this is not yet evident, (i.e., the United States), the French example shows that the day will come when spent fuel will be retrieved for reprocessing and recycle. It is highly questionable whether spent fuel will ever be considered and treated as waste in the same sense as fission products and processed as such, i.e., packaged in a waste form for permanent disposal. Even when recycled fuel material can no longer be reused in LWR's because of poor reactivity, it will be usable in FBR's. Based on the considerable experience gained by SGN and Cogema, this paper has provided practical discussion and illustrations of spent fuel transport and storage of a very important step in the nuclear fuel management process. The best of spent fuel storage depends on technical, economic and policy considerations. Each design has a role to play and we hope that the above discussion will help clarify certain issues

  15. Spent Fuel Management Newsletter. No. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-03-01

    This Newsletter has been prepared in accordance with the recommendations of the International Regular Advisory Group on Spent Fuel Management and the Agency's programme (GC XXXII/837, Table 76, item 14). The main purpose of the Newsletter is to provide Member States with new information about the state-of-the-art in one of the most important parts of the nuclear fuel cycle - Spent Fuel Management. The contents of this publication consists of two parts: (1) IAEA Secretariat contribution -work and programme of the Nuclear Materials and Fuel Cycle Technology Section of the Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management, recent and planned meetings and publications, Technical Co-operation projects, Co-ordinated Research programmes, etc. (2) Country reports - national programmes on spent fuel management: current and planned storage and reprocessing capacities, spent fuel arisings, safety, transportation, storage, treatment of spent fuel, some aspects of uranium and plutonium recycling, etc. The IAEA expects to publish the Newsletter once every two years between the publications of the Regular Advisory Group on Spent Fuel Management. Figs and tabs

  16. Spent fuel storage and transportation - ANSTO experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irwin, Tony

    2002-01-01

    The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) has operated the 10 MW DIDO class High Flux Materials Test Reactor (HIFAR) since 1958. Refuelling the reactor produces about 38 spent fuel elements each year. Australia has no power reactors and only one operating research reactor so that a reprocessing plant in Australia is not an economic proposition. The HEU fuel for HIFAR is manufactured at Dounreay using UK or US origin enriched uranium. Spent fuel was originally sent to Dounreay, UK for reprocessing but this plant was shutdown in 1998. ANSTO participates in the US Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Return program and also has a contract with COGEMA for the reprocessing of non-US origin fuel

  17. Developments in uranium in 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chenoweth, W.L.

    1983-01-01

    Slippage in demand, increasing costs, and low spot market prices continued to influence the uranium industry during 1982. The supply of uranium exceeds the current demand and, as a result, exploration for uranium declined in the United States for the fourth straight year. During 1982, 92 companies spent $73.86 million on uranium exploration, including 6.1 million ft of surface drilling. This drilling was done mainly in the producing areas and in the areas of recent discoveries. During the year, a significant discovery was announced in south-central Virginia, the first major discovery in the eastern United States. Production of uranium concentrate declined in 1982, when 1,343 short tons of uranium oxide were produced. Numerous mines and 4 mills were closed during the year. Domestic uranium reserves, as calculated by the Department of Energy, decreased during 1982, mainly because of increasing production costs and the lack of exploration to find new reserves. Exploration for uranium in foreign countries also declined during 1982. Canada and Australia continue to dominate the long-term supply

  18. Low enrichment of uranium in the light of the nuclear weapon problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barstad, G.

    1979-09-01

    A difficult problem in the immediate future will be to direct civil nuclear technology in such a way that the ability to produce nuclear weapons by additional countries is prevented. There are two main problems. First, enrichment plants can be used to produce high enriched uranium, which can be used in nuclear weapons, as well as low enriched reactor fuel. Second, plutonium produced during reactor operation can be used as nuclear weapon material, as well as for nuclear fuel. The problem discussed here is particularly the development of an enrichment process which is economic for low enriched reactor fuel, but which may not easily be adapted to produce high enriched uranium. (JIW)

  19. Reprocessing method for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujie, Makoto; Shoji, Yuichi; Kobayashi, Tsuguyuki.

    1997-01-01

    After reducing oxides of uranium (U), plutonium (Pu) and miner actinides in spent fuels by magnesium (Mg) in a molten salt, rear earth element oxides and salts of alkali metals and alkaline earth metals contained in the molten salt phase are separated and removed. Further, the Mg phase containing the reduced metals is evaporated to separate and remove Mg, thereby recovering U, Pu and minor actinides. In a lithium (Li) process, Li 2 O also generated in the reduction step is regenerated to Li simultaneously, and the reduction is conducted while suppressing the Li 2 O concentration in the molten salt low. This can improve the reduction rate of oxides of U, Pu and minor actinides compared with conventional cases. Since Li 2 O is regenerated into Li in the reduction step of the Li process, deposited Li 2 O is not carried to an electrolysis purification step, and recovering rate of U, Pu and minor actinides is not lowered. (T.M.)

  20. Spent fuel workshop'2002

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poinssot, Ch

    2002-07-01

    This document gathers the transparencies of the presentations given at the 2002 spent fuel workshop: Session 1 - Research Projects: Overview on the IN CAN PROCESSES European project (M. Cowper), Overview on the SPENT FUEL STABILITY European project (C. Poinssot), Overview on the French R and D project on spent fuel long term evolution, PRECCI (C. Poinssot); Session 2 - Spent Fuel Oxidation: Oxidation of uranium dioxide single crystals (F. Garrido), Experimental results on SF oxidation and new modeling approach (L. Desgranges), LWR spent fuel oxidation - effects of burn-up and humidity (B. Hanson), An approach to modeling CANDU fuel oxidation under dry storage conditions (P. Taylor); Session 3 - Spent Fuel Dissolution Experiments: Overview on high burnup spent fuel dissolution studies at FZK/INE (A. Loida), Results on the influence of hydrogen on spent fuel leaching (K. Spahiu), Leaching of spent UO{sub 2} fuel under inert and reducing conditions (Y. Albinsson), Fuel corrosion investigation by electrochemical techniques (D. Wegen), A reanalysis of LWR spent fuel flow through dissolution tests (B. Hanson), U-bearing secondary phases formed during fuel corrosion (R. Finch), The near-field chemical conditions and spent fuel leaching (D. Cui), The release of radionuclides from spent fuel in bentonite block (S.S. Kim), Trace actinide behavior in altered spent fuel (E. Buck, B. Hanson); Session 4 - Radiolysis Issues: The effect of radiolysis on UO{sub 2} dissolution determined from electrochemical experiments with {sup 238}Pu doped UO{sub 2} M. Stroess-Gascoyne (F. King, J.S. Betteridge, F. Garisto), doped UO{sub 2} studies (V. Rondinella), Preliminary results of static and dynamic dissolution tests with {alpha} doped UO{sub 2} in Boom clay conditions (K. Lemmens), Studies of the behavior of UO{sub 2} / water interfaces under He{sup 2+} beam (C. Corbel), Alpha and gamma radiolysis effects on UO{sub 2} alteration in water (C. Jegou), Behavior of Pu-doped pellets in brines

  1. Current status and future prospects of uranium resources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuronuma, Chosuke

    1997-01-01

    Uranium is contained in various things in natural world, for example, 3 ppm in granite and 3x10 -3 ppm in seawater. Uranium exists in the state of tetra, penta and hexa-valence in nature, and in oxidizing environment, it exists as uranyl radical of hexa-valence, forms soluble complexes, and easily moves with water. In reducing environment, it becomes insoluble state of tetra-valence and precipitates. This property of uranium is deeply related to the way of forming the deposit, and it is explained. The uranium resources of the recovery cost being 80 dollars per kg U or less are 2,120,000 t, and 60% of the total exists in Australia, Kazakstan and Canada. The cumulative production of uranium in the world from 1945 to 1995 was 1,810,000 t. Of the total production, 875,000 t was used for civil purpose, and 750,000 t was used for military purpose. The uranium deposits in Canada are very high quality, and produce 1/3 of the world uranium production. There are the inventories of 150,000-200,000 t U. The diversion of military high enriched uranium to civil purpose is reported. The state of uranium market, the prospect of demand and supply of uranium, and the exploration and development of uranium resources are described. (K.I.)

  2. Calculational study of benchmark critical experiments on high-enriched uranyl nitrate solution systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, I.; Rothe, R.E.

    1978-01-01

    Criticality calculations on minimally reflected, concrete-reflected, and plastic-reflected single tanks and on arrays of cylinders reflected by concrete and plastic have been performed using the KENO-IV code with 16-group Hansen-Roach neutron cross sections. The fissile material was high-enriched (93.17% 235 U) uranyl nitrate [UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ] solution. Calculated results are compared with those from a benchmark critical experiments program to provide the best possible verification of the calculational technique. The calculated k/sub eff/'s underestimate the critical condition by an average of 1.28% for the minimally reflected single tanks, 1.09% for the concrete-reflected single tanks, 0.60% for the plastic-reflected single tanks, 0.75% for the concrete-reflected arrays of cylinders, and 0.51% for the plastic-reflected arrays of cylinders. More than half of the present comparisons were within 1% of the experimental values, and the worst calculational and experimental discrepancy was 2.3% in k/sub eff/ for the KENO calculations

  3. The miscibility and oxidation study of the simulated metallic spent fuel for the development of an advanced spent fuel management process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, Y. J.; You, G. S.; Ju, J. S.; Lee, E. P.; Seo, H. S.; Ahn, S. B. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    1999-03-01

    The simulated metallic spent fuel ingots were fabricated and evaluated the oxidation rates and the activation energies under several temperature conditions to develop an advanced spent fuel management process. It was also checked the immiscibility of the some elements with metal uranium. 2 refs., 45 figs. (Author)

  4. Probable leaching mechanisms for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, R.; Katayama, Y.B.

    1981-01-01

    At the Pacific Northwest Laboratory, researchers in the Waste/Rock Interaction Technology Program are studying spent fuel as a possible waste form for the Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation. This paper presents probable leaching mechanisms for spent fuel and discusses current progress in identifying and understanding the leaching process. During the past year, experiments were begun to study the complex leaching mechanism of spent fuel. The initial work in this investigation was done with UO 2 , which provided the most information possible on the behavior of the spent-fuel matrix without encountering the very high radiation levels associated with spent fuel. Both single-crystal and polycrystalline UO 2 samples were used for this study, and techniques applicable to remote experimentation in a hot cell are being developed. The effects of radiation are being studied in terms of radiolysis of water and surface activation of the UO 2 . Dissolution behavior and kinetics of UO 2 were also investigated by electrochemical measurement techniques. These data will be correlated with those acquired when spent fuel is tested in a hot cell. Oxidation effects represent a major area of concern in evaluating the stability of spent fuel. Dissolution of UO 2 is greatly increased in an oxidizing solution because the dissolution is then controlled by the formation of hexavalent uranium. In solutions containing very low oxygen levels (i.e., reducing solutions), oxidation-induced dissolution may be possible via a previously oxidized surface, through exposure to air during storage, or by local oxidants such as O 2 and H 2 O 2 produced from radiolysis of water and radiation-activated UO 2 surfaces. The effects of oxidation not only increase the dissolution rate, but could lead to the disintegration of spent fuel into fine fragments

  5. Uranium silicide activities at Babcock and Wilcox

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noel, W.W.; Freim, J.B.

    1983-01-01

    Babcock and Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD) in conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is actively involved in the Reduced Enrichment Research Test Reactor (RERTR) Program to produce low enriched fuel elements for research reactors. B and W and ANL have undertaken a joint effort in which NNFD will fabricate two low enriched uranium (LEU), Oak Ridge Reactor (ORR) elements with uranium silicide fuel furnished by ANL. These elements are being fabricated for irradiation testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Concurrently with this program, NNFD is developing and implementing the uranium silicide and uranium aluminide fuel fabrication technology. NNFD is fabricating the uranium silicide ORR elements in a two-phase program, Development and Production. To summarize: 1. Full size fuel plates can be made with U 3 SiAl but the fabricator must prevent oxidation of the compact prior to hot roll bonding; 2. Providing the ANL U 3 Si x irradiation results are successful, NNFD plans to provide two ORR elements during February 1983; 3. NNFD is developing and implementing U 3 Si x and UAI x fuel fabrication technology to be operational in 1983; 4. NNFD can supply U 3 O 8 high enriched uranium (HEU) or low enriched uranium (LEU) research reactor elements; 5. NNFD is capable of providing high quality, cost competitive LEU or HEU research reactor elements to meet the needs of the customer

  6. Analysis of nuclear reaction products and materials; Preliminary treatment of uranium analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soedyartomo.

    1976-01-01

    Pre-treatment of samples is necessary to be done in order to achieve the efficient steps and accurate results of uranium analysis. The pre-treatment is particularly affected by the type of sample, the uranium concentration predicated in the sample, and the uranium analytical method which will be applied. A brief discussion about the pre-treatment of uranium analysis in the uranium ore processing and the reprocessing of spent fuel is given. (author)

  7. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, D.

    1985-01-01

    How should the decision in favour of reprocessing and against alternative waste management concepts be judged from an economic standpoint. Reprocessing is not imperative neither for resource-economic reasons nor for nuclear energy strategy reasons. On the contrary, the development of an ultimate storage concept representing a real alternative promising to close, within a short period of time, the nuclear fuel cycle at low cost. At least, this is the result of an extensive economic efficiency study recently submitted by the Energy Economics Institute which investigated all waste management concepts relevant for the Federal Republic of Germany in the long run, i.e. direct ultimate storage of spent fuel elements (''Other waste disposal technologies'' - AE) as well as reprocessing of spent fuel elements where re-usable plutonium and uranium are recovered and radioactive waste goes to ultimate storage (''Integrated disposal'' - IE). Despite such fairly evident results, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has favoured the construction of a reprocessing plant. From an economic point of view there is no final answer to the question whether or not the argumentation is sufficient to justify the decision to construct a reprocessing plant. This is true for both the question of technical feasibility and issues of overriding significance of a political nature. (orig./HSCH) [de

  8. The EBR-II spent fuel treatment program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lineberry, M.J.; McFarlane, H.F.

    1995-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory has refurbished and equipped an existing hot cell facility for demonstrating a high-temperature electrometallurgical process for treating spent nuclear fuel from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-11. Two waste forms will be produced and qualified for geologic disposal of the fission and activation products. Relatively pure uranium will be separated for storage. Following additional development, transuranium elements will be blended into one of the high-level waste streams. The spent fuel treatment program will help assess the viability of electrometallurgical technology as a spent fuel management option

  9. Assuaging Nuclear Energy Risks: The Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myers, Astasia

    2011-01-01

    The recent nuclear renaissance has motivated many countries, especially developing nations, to plan and build nuclear power reactors. However, domestic low enriched uranium demands may trigger nations to construct indigenous enrichment facilities, which could be redirected to fabricate high enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The potential advantages of establishing multinational uranium enrichment sites are numerous including increased low enrichment uranium access with decreased nuclear proliferation risks. While multinational nuclear initiatives have been discussed, Russia is the first nation to actualize this concept with their Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). This paper provides an overview of the historical and modern context of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle as well as the evolution of Russia's IUEC, which exemplifies how international fuel cycle cooperation is an alternative to domestic facilities.

  10. Production of Mo-99 using low-enriched uranium silicide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hutter, J.C.; Srinivasan, B.; Vicek, M.; Vandegrift, G.F.

    1994-01-01

    Over the last several years, uranium silicide fuels have been under development as low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets for Mo-99. The use of LEU silicide is aimed at replacing the UAl x alloy in the highly-enriched uranium dissolution process. A process to recover Mo-99 from low-enriched uranium silicide is being developed at Argonne National Laboratory. The uranium silicide is dissolved in alkaline hydrogen peroxide. Experiments performed to determine the optimum dissolution procedure are discussed, and the results of dissolving a portion of a high-burnup (>40%) U 3 Si 2 miniplate are presented. Future work related to Mo-99 separation and waste disposal are also discussed

  11. Riddle of depleted uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hussein, A.S.

    2005-01-01

    Depleted Uranium (DU) is the waste product of uranium enrichment from the manufacturing of fuel rods for nuclear reactors in nuclear power plants and nuclear power ships. DU may also results from the reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel. Potentially DU has both chemical and radiological toxicity with two important targets organs being the kidney and the lungs. DU is made into a metal and, due to its availability, low price, high specific weight, density and melting point as well as its pyrophoricity; it has a wide range of civilian and military applications. Due to the use of DU over the recent years, there appeared in some press on health hazards that are alleged to be due to DU. In these paper properties, applications, potential environmental and health effects of DU are briefly reviewed

  12. Kintyre uranium project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-04-01

    This project book is designed to outline the nature of the Kintyre uranium project for those associated with the project as employees, contractors and consultants and others. It explains why Canning Resources Pty Limited and CRA Exploration believe this resource and other resources in the Rundall region should be developed. It also outlines the environmental and social issues involved and the proposed means of addressing those issues. The Kintyre resource and associated areas of geological prospectivity are located in the Rundall region on the edge of the Great Sandy Desert, in the East Pilbara region of Western Australia. Canning Resources with CRA Exploration has spent over $20 million in the past two years in intensive drilling and exploration efforts in the Kintyre area and intends to spend a further $10 million in 1988. Investigations so far reveal that the resource has features which make it competitive with the best uranium mines in the world

  13. The development of fast reactors - Effects on the Swedish system of management of spent fuel; Utveckling av snabba reaktorer - Paaverkan paa det svenska systemet foer hantering av anvaent braensle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hans Forsstroem, Hans [SKB International AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

    2013-09-15

    Since the start of the nuclear power era studies have been performed of how to utilise the uranium energy resource in the most effective way. Only about one percent of the energy potential of uranium is utilised in the light water reactors of today. To improve the utilization other types of reactors are needed. With fast reactors theoretically 50-100 times more energy can be extracted from the uranium. This will require reprocessing of the uranium and multiple recycling of the plutonium. Plutonium and uranium can also be recycled in light water reactors, but this will only improve the uranium utilisation by about 20 %. Recycling of plutonium on a routine basis is presently only done in France. The development of fast reactors has been going on since the end of the 1940ies. During the 1970ies the planning was that a large number of fast reactors and their associated fuel cycle facilities would be in operation by the year 2000. The development has, however, for different reasons been much slower than planned. The general assessment today is that fast reactor, if they will be realised, will hardly give an important contribution to energy production until after 2050. Nuclear power production has instead been dominated by light water reactors similar to the ones in use in Sweden. Light water reactors are believed to continue to dominate during the next decades. To start a fast reactor system plutonium (or highly enriched uranium) will be needed. Such plutonium is contained in spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors. This raises the question: Should the spent nuclear fuel be stored so that the potential energy resource in the fuel can be used in the future instead of disposing of it as a waste? The answer to this question will depend on when the material will be useful, i.e. when fast reactors have been introduced on a large scale. It will also depend on the demand for plutonium at this time, i.e. will plutonium be a scarce redundant resource at this point of time

  14. Spent fuels program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shappert, L.B.

    1983-01-01

    The goal of this task is to support the Domestic Spent Fuel Storage Program through studies involving the transport of spent fuel. A catalog was developed to provide authoritative, timely, and accessible transportation information for persons involved in the transport of irradiated reactor fuel. The catalog, drafted and submitted to the Transportation Technology Center, Sandia National Laboratories, for their review and approval, covers such topics as federal, state, and local regulations, spent fuel characteristics, cask characteristics, transportation costs, and emergency response information

  15. Present status of JMTR spent fuel shipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyazawa, Masataka; Watanabe, Masao; Yokokawa, Makoto; Sato, Hiroshi; Ito, Haruhiko

    2002-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) has been consistently making the enrichment reduction of reactor fuels in cooperation with RERTR Program and FRR SNF Acceptance Program both conducted along with the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy and JMTR, 50 MW test reactor in Oarai Research Establishment, has achieved core conversion, from its initial 93% enriched UAl alloy to 45% enriched uranium-aluminide fuel, and then to the current 19.8% enriched uranium-silicide fuel. In order to return all of JMTR spent fuels, to be discharged from the reactor by May 12, 2006, to the U.S.A. by May 12, 2009, JAERI is planning the transportation schedule based on one shipment per year. The sixth shipment of spent fuels to U.S. was carried out as scheduled this year, where the total number of fuels shipped amounts to 651 elements. All of the UAl alloy elements have so far been shipped and now shipments of 45% enriched uranium-aluminide type fuels are in progress. Thus far the JMTR SFs have been transported on schedule. From 2003 onward are scheduled more then 850 elements to be shipped. In this paper, we describe our activities on the transportation in general and the schedule for the SFs shipments. (author)

  16. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; Prerada isluzenog nuklearnog goriva

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gal, I [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Laboratorija za visoku aktivnost, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1963-12-15

    This report covers: chemical-technology investigation of modified purex process for reprocessing of spent fuel; implementation of the procedure for obtaining plutonium peroxide and oxalate; research in the field of uranium, plutonium, and fission products separation by inorganic ion exchangers and extraction by organic solutions; study of the fission products in the heavy water RA reactor.

  17. Fundamental study on recovery uranium oxide from HEPA filters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Izumida, T.; Noguchi, Y.

    1993-01-01

    Large numbers of spent HEPA filters are produced at uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Uranium oxide particles have been collected on these filters. Then, a spent HEPA filter treatment system was developed from the viewpoint of recovering the UO 2 and minimizing the volume. The system consists of a mechanical separation process and a chemical dissolution process. This paper describes the results of fundamental experiments on recovering UO 2 from HEPA filters

  18. Development of advanced spent fuel management process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Young Joon; Cho, S. H.; You, G. S.

    2001-04-01

    Currently, the economic advantage of any known approach to the back end fuel cycle of a nuclear power reactor has not been well established. Thus the long term storage of the spent fuel in a safe manner is one of the important issues to be resolved in countries where the nuclear power has a relatively heavy weight in power production of that country. At KAERI, as a solution to this particular issue midterm storage of the spent fuel, an alternative approach has been developed. This approach includes the decladding and pulverization process of the spent PWR fuel rod, the reducing process from the uranium oxide to a metallic uranium powder using Li metal in a LiCl salt, the continuous casting process of the reduced metal, and the recovery process of Li from mixed salts by the electrolysis. We conducted the laboratory scale tests of each processes for the technical feasibility and determination for the operational conditions for this approach. Also, we performed the theoretical safety analysis and conducted integral tests for the equipment integration through the Mock-up facility with non-radioactive samples. There were no major issues in the approach, however, material incompatibility of the alkaline metal and oxide in a salt at a high temperature and the reactor that contains the salt became a show stopper of the process. Also the difficulty of the clear separation of the salt with metals reduced from the oxide became a major issue

  19. Czechoslovak uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pluskal, O.

    1992-01-01

    Data and knowledge related to the prospecting, mining, processing and export of uranium ores in Czechoslovakia are presented. In the years between 1945 and January 1, 1991, 98,461.1 t of uranium were extracted. In the period 1965-1990 the uranium industry was subsidized from the state budget to a total of 38.5 billion CSK. The subsidies were put into extraction, investments and geologic prospecting; the latter was at first, ie. till 1960 financed by the former USSR, later on the two parties shared costs on a 1:1 basis. Since 1981 the prospecting has been entirely financed from the Czechoslovak state budget. On Czechoslovak territory uranium has been extracted from deposits which may be classified as vein-type deposits, deposits in uranium-bearing sandstones and deposits connected with weathering processes. The future of mining, however, is almost exclusively being connected with deposits in uranium-bearing sandstones. A brief description and characteristic is given of all uranium deposits on Czechoslovak territory, and the organization of uranium mining in Czechoslovakia is described as is the approach used in the world to evaluate uranium deposits; uranium prices and actual resources are also given. (Z.S.) 3 figs

  20. Safe transport of spent fuels after long-term storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aritomi, M.; Takeda, T.; Ozaki, S.

    2004-01-01

    Considering the scarcity of energy resources in Japan, a nuclear energy policy pertaining to the spent fuel storage has been adopted. The nuclear energy policy sets the rules that spent fuels generated from LWRs shall be reprocessed and that plutonium and unburnt uranium shall be recovered and reused. For this purpose, a reprocessing plant, which has a reprocessing capability of 800 ton/yr, is under construction at Rokkasho Village. However, it is anticipated that the start of its operation will be delayed. In addition, the amount of spent fuels generated from nuclear power plants exceeds its reprocessing capability. Therefore, the establishment of storage technology for spent fuels becomes an urgent problem in Japan in order to continue smoothly the LWR operations. In this paper, the background of nuclear power generation in Japan is introduced at first. Next, the policy of spent fuel storage in Japan and circumstances surrounding the spent fuels in Japan are mentioned. Furthermore, the major subjects for discussions to settle and improve 'Standard for Safety Design and Inspection of Metal Casks for Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility' in Atomic Energy Society of Japan are discussed, such as the integrity of fuel cladding, basket, shielding material and metal gasket for the long term storage for achieving safe transport of spent fuels after the storage. Finally, solutions to the unsolved subject in establishing the spent fuel interim storage technologies ase introduced accordingly

  1. Uranium in South Africa: 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-03-01

    South Africa's participation in the nuclear industry was limited to the production of uranium and research, with minor commercial activities. The commissioning of the Koeberg Nuclear power station in 1984 placed South Africa firmly on the path of commercial nuclear power generation. A unique, locally developed uranium enrichment process will enable South Africa to be self-sufficient in its nuclear-fuel needs. Uranium has always been of secondary importance to gold as a target commodity in the exploration of the quartz-pebble conglomerates. In the Witwatersrand Basin it is estimated that in excess of R100 million was spent on exploration during 1985. This was spent primarily in the search for gold but as many of the gold reefs are uraniferous, new uranium resources are being discovered concurrently with those of gold. Uranium mineralization is present in rocks which encompass almost the whole of the geological history of South Africa. Significant mineralization is restricted to five fairly well-defined time periods. Each period is characterized by a distinct type or combination of types of mineralization. Resource estimates are divided into separate categories that reflect different levels of confidence in the quantities reported. The resource categories are further separated into levels of exploitability based on the estimated cost of their exploitation. A major part (87%) of South Africa's uranium resources is present as a by-product of gold in the quartz-pebble conglomerates of the Witwatersrand Basin. The uranium resources in the reasonably assured resources (RAR) and estimated additional resources - category I (EAR-I) catogories were 483 300 t U. Production during 1985 was 4880 t U. Although a production peaking at over 1200 t U/a is theoretically attainable, it is considered, from market projections, that a production ceilling of 10 000 t U/a would be more realistic

  2. Experiments for evaluation of corrosion to develop storage criteria for interim dry storage of aluminum-alloy clad spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peacock, H.B.; Sindelar, R.L.; Lam, P.S.; Murphy, T.H.

    1994-01-01

    The technical bases for specification of limits to environmental exposure conditions to avoid excessive degradation are being developed for storage criteria for dry storage of highly-enriched, aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuels owned by the US Department of Energy. Corrosion of the aluminum cladding is a limiting degradation mechanism (occurs at lowest temperature) for aluminum exposed to an environment containing water vapor. Attendant radiation fields of the fuels can lead to production of nitric acid in the presence of air and water vapor and would exacerbate the corrosion of aluminum by lowering the pH of the water solution. Laboratory-scale specimens are being exposed to various conditions inside an autoclave facility to measure the corrosion of the fuel matrix and cladding materials through weight change measurements and metallurgical analysis. In addition, electrochemical corrosion tests are being performed to supplement the autoclave testing by measuring differences in the general corrosion and pitting corrosion behavior of the aluminum cladding alloys and the aluminum-uranium fuel materials in water solutions

  3. Remote technologies for handling spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, M.S.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear programme in India involves building and operating power and research reactors, production and use of isotopes, fabrication of reactor fuel, reprocessing of irradiated fuel, recovery of plutonium and uranium-233, fabrication of fuel containing plutonium-239, uranium-233, post-irradiation examination of fuel and hardware and handling solid and liquid radioactive wastes. Fuel that could be termed 'spent' in thermal reactors is a source for second generation fuel (plutonium and uranium-233). Therefore, it is only logical to extend remote techniques beyond handling fuel from thermal reactors to fuel from fast reactors, post-irradiation examination etc. Fabrication of fuel containing plutonium and uranium-233 poses challenges in view of restriction on human exposure to radiation. Hence, automation will serve as a step towards remotisation. Automated systems, both rigid and flexible (using robots) need to be developed and implemented. Accounting of fissile material handled by robots in local area networks with appropriate access codes will be possible. While dealing with all these activities, it is essential to pay attention to maintenance and repair of the facilities. Remote techniques are essential here. There are a number of commonalities in these requirements and so development of modularized subsystems, and integration of different configurations should receive attention. On a long-term basis, activities like decontamination, decommissioning of facilities and handling of waste generated have to be addressed. While robotized remote systems have to be designed for existing facilities, future designs of facilities should take into account total operation with robotic remote systems. (author)

  4. Uranium ores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poty, B.; Roux, J.

    1998-01-01

    The processing of uranium ores for uranium extraction and concentration is not much different than the processing of other metallic ores. However, thanks to its radioactive property, the prospecting of uranium ores can be performed using geophysical methods. Surface and sub-surface detection methods are a combination of radioactive measurement methods (radium, radon etc..) and classical mining and petroleum prospecting methods. Worldwide uranium prospecting has been more or less active during the last 50 years, but the rise of raw material and energy prices between 1970 and 1980 has incited several countries to develop their nuclear industry in order to diversify their resources and improve their energy independence. The result is a considerable increase of nuclear fuels demand between 1980 and 1990. This paper describes successively: the uranium prospecting methods (direct, indirect and methodology), the uranium deposits (economical definition, uranium ores, and deposits), the exploitation of uranium ores (use of radioactivity, radioprotection, effluents), the worldwide uranium resources (definition of the different categories and present day state of worldwide resources). (J.S.)

  5. Uranium market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rubini, L.A.; Asem, M.A.D.

    1990-01-01

    The historical development of the uranium market is present in two periods: The initial period 1947-1970 and from 1970 onwards, with the establishment of a commercial market. The world uranium requirements are derived from the corresponding forecast of nuclear generating capacity, with, particular emphasis to the brazilian requirements. The forecast of uranium production until the year 2000 is presented considering existing inventories and the already committed demand. The balance between production and requirements is analysed. Finally the types of contracts currently being used and the development of uranium prices in the world market are considered. (author)

  6. Uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    This report looks at the following issues: How much Soviet uranium ore and enriched uranium are imported into the United States and what is the extent to which utilities flag swap to disguise these purchases? What are the U.S.S.R.'s enriched uranium trading practices? To what extent are utilities required to return used fuel to the Soviet Union as part of the enriched uranium sales agreement? Why have U.S. utilities ended their contracts to buy enrichment services from DOE?

  7. MANAGING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL WASTES AT THE IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hill, Thomas J

    2005-09-01

    The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INL) has a large inventory of diverse types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This legacy is in part due to the history of the INL as the National Reactor Testing Station, in part to its mission to recover highly enriched uranium from SNF and in part to it’s mission to test and examine SNF after irradiation. The INL also has a large diversity of SNF storage facility, some dating back 50 years in the site history. The success of the INL SNF program is measured by its ability to: 1) achieve safe existing storage, 2) continue to receive SNF from other locations, both foreign and domestic, 3) repackage SNF from wet storage to interim dry storage, and 4) prepare the SNF for dispositioning in a federal repository. Because of the diversity in the SNF and the facilities at the INL, the INL is addressing almost very condition that may exist in the SNF world. Many of solutions developed by the INL are applicable to other SNF storage sites as they develop their management strategy. The SNF being managed by the INL are in a variety of conditions, from intact assemblies to individual rods or plates to powders, rubble, and metallurgical mounts. Some of the fuel has been in wet storage for over forty years. The fuel is stored bare, or in metal cans and either wet under water or dry in vaults, caissons or casks. Inspections have shown varying degrees of corrosion and degradation of the fuel and the storage cans. Some of the fuel has been recanned under water, and the conditions of the fuel inside the second or third can are unknown. The fuel has been stored in one of 10 different facilities: five wet pools and one casks storage pad, one vault, two generations of caisson facilities, and one modular Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The wet pools range from forty years old to the most modern pool in the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The near-term objective is moving the fuel in the older wet storage facilities to

  8. Electrometallurgical treatment of oxide spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karell, E. J.

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) inventory of spent nuclear fuel contains a wide variety of oxide fuel types that may be unsuitable for direct repository disposal in their current form. The molten-salt electrometallurgical treatment technique developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has the potential to simplify preparing and qualifying these fuels for disposal by converting them into three uniform product streams: uranium metal, a metal waste form, and a ceramic waste form. This paper describes the major steps in the electrometallurgical treatment process for oxide fuels and provides the results of recent experiments performed to develop and scale up the process

  9. Spent nuclear fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Romanato, Luiz Sergio

    2005-01-01

    When a country becomes self-sufficient in part of the nuclear cycle, as production of fuel that will be used in nuclear power plants for energy generation, it is necessary to pay attention for the best method of storing the spent fuel. Temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel is a necessary practice and is applied nowadays all over the world, so much in countries that have not been defined their plan for a definitive repository, as well for those that already put in practice such storage form. There are two main aspects that involve the spent fuels: one regarding the spent nuclear fuel storage intended to reprocessing and the other in which the spent fuel will be sent for final deposition when the definitive place is defined, correctly located, appropriately characterized as to several technical aspects, and licentiate. This last aspect can involve decades of studies because of the technical and normative definitions at a given country. In Brazil, the interest is linked with the storage of spent fuels that will not be reprocessed. This work analyses possible types of storage, the international panorama and a proposal for future construction of a spent nuclear fuel temporary storage place in the country. (author)

  10. The gas centrifuge, uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, A.

    1988-01-01

    The author considers the consequences for controlling nuclear proliferation of the emergence of the gas centrifuge method for enriching uranium and succeeds in the difficult and delicate task of saying enough about gas centrifuge techniques for readers to judge, what may be involved in fully embracing gas centrifuge enrichment within the constraints of an anti-proliferation strategy, whilst at the same time saying nothing that could be construed as encouraging an interest in the gas centrifuge route to highly enriched uranium where none had before existed. (author)

  11. The SLOWPOKE-2 reactor with low enrichment uranium oxide fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Townes, B.M.; Hilborn, J.W.

    1985-06-01

    A SLOWPOKE-2 reactor core contains less than 1 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the proliferation risk is very low. However, to overcome proliferation concerns a new low enrichment uranium (LEU) fuelled reactor core has been designed. This core contains approximately 180 fuel elements based on the Zircaloy-4 clad UOsub(2) CANDU fuel element, but with a smaller outside diameter. The physics characteristics of this new reactor core ensure the inherent safety of the reactor under all conceivable conditions and thus the basic SLOWPOKE safety philosophy which permits unattended operation is not affected

  12. International uranium production. A South African perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sinclair-Smith, D.

    1984-01-01

    Between 1981 and 1983 South Africa experienced a decline in its uranium resources of 23% in the less than $80/kg U category and 12% in the less than $130/kg U category. In 1983 only $5 million was spent on exploration, with activities being concentrated in the Witwatersrand Basin as a byproduct of gold exploration. South Africa has maintained a production level of around 6000 mt U in 1981, 1982 and 1983. One unusual feature of the South African uranium scene is the ability to selectively dump relatively high grade uranium tailings after the extraction of gold and to rework this material as well as material dumped prior to the emergence of the uranium industry. Uranium from this source amounted to some 28% of total production in 1983. (L.L.) (2 tabs., 6 figs.)

  13. Uranium mining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lange, G.

    1975-01-01

    The winning of uranium ore is the first stage of the fuel cycle. The whole complex of questions to be considered when evaluating the profitability of an ore mine is shortly outlined, and the possible mining techniques are described. Some data on uranium mining in the western world are also given. (RB) [de

  14. Uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    GAO was asked to address several questions concerning a number of proposed uranium enrichment bills introduced during the 100th Congress. The bill would have restructured the Department of Energy's uranium enrichment program as a government corporation to allow it to compete more effectively in the domestic and international markets. Some of GAO's findings discussed are: uranium market experts believe and existing market models show that the proposed DOE purchase of a $750 million of uranium from domestic producers may not significantly increase production because of large producer-held inventories; excess uranium enrichment production capacity exists throughout the world; therefore, foreign producers are expected to compete heavily in the United States throughout the 1990s as utilities' contracts with DOE expire; and according to a 1988 agreement between DOE's Offices of Nuclear Energy and Defense Programs, enrichment decommissioning costs, estimated to total $3.6 billion for planning purposes, will be shared by the commercial enrichment program and the government

  15. Uranium resources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    This is a press release issued by the OECD on 9th March 1976. It is stated that the steep increases in demand for uranium foreseen in and beyond the 1980's, with doubling times of the order of six to seven years, will inevitably create formidable problems for the industry. Further substantial efforts will be needed in prospecting for new uranium reserves. Information is given in tabular or graphical form on the following: reasonably assured resources, country by country; uranium production capacities, country by country; world nuclear power growth; world annual uranium requirements; world annual separative requirements; world annual light water reactor fuel reprocessing requirements; distribution of reactor types (LWR, SGHWR, AGR, HWR, HJR, GG, FBR); and world fuel cycle capital requirements. The information is based on the latest report on Uranium Resources Production and Demand, jointly issued by the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. (U.K.)

  16. Spent sulfite liquor developments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Black, H H

    1958-01-01

    A review of methods of utilizing spent sulfite liquor, including evaporation and burning, fermentation to produce yeast or alcohol, production of vanillin and lignosulfonates, and use as a roadbinder.

  17. Spent fuel management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The production of nuclear electricity results in the generation of spent fuel that requires safe, secure and efficient management. Appropriate management of the resulting spent fuel is a key issue for the steady and sustainable growth of nuclear energy. Currently about 10,000 tonnes heavy metal (HM) of spent fuel are unloaded every year from nuclear power reactors worldwide, of which 8,500 t HM need to be stored (after accounting for reprocessed fuel). This is the largest continuous source of civil radioactive material generated, and needs to be managed appropriately. Member States have referred to storage periods of 100 years and even beyond, and as storage quantities and durations extend, new challenges arise in the institutional as well as in the technical area. The IAEA gives high priority to safe and effective spent fuel management. As an example of continuing efforts, the 2003 International Conference on Storage of Spent Fuel from Power Reactors gathered 125 participants from 35 member states to exchange information on this important subject. With its large number of Member States, the IAEA is well-positioned to gather and share information useful in addressing Member State priorities. IAEA activities on this topic include plans to produce technical documents as resources for a range of priority topics: spent fuel performance assessment and research, burnup credit applications, cask maintenance, cask loading optimization, long term storage requirements including records maintenance, economics, spent fuel treatment, remote technology, and influence of fuel design on spent fuel storage. In addition to broader topics, the IAEA supports coordinated research projects and technical cooperation projects focused on specific needs

  18. Uranium supply and demand

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spriggs, M J

    1976-01-01

    Papers were presented on the pattern of uranium production in South Africa; Australian uranium--will it ever become available; North American uranium resources, policies, prospects, and pricing; economic and political environment of the uranium mining industry; alternative sources of uranium supply; whither North American demand for uranium; and uranium demand and security of supply--a consumer's point of view. (LK)

  19. Spent fuel. Dissolution and oxidation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grambow, B.

    1989-03-01

    Data from studies of the low temperature air oxidation of spent fuel were retrieved in order to provide a basis for comparison between the mechanism of oxidation in air and corrosion in water. U 3 O 7 is formed by diffusion of oxygen into the UO 2 lattice. A diffusion coefficient of oxygen in the fuel matric was calculated for 25 degree C to be in the range of 10 -23 to 10 -25 m 2 /s. The initial rates of U release from spent fuel and from UO 2 appear to be similar. The lowest rates (at 25 degree c >10 -4 g/(m 2 d)) were observed under reducing conditions. Under oxidizing conditions the rates depend mainly of the nature and concentraion of the oxidant and/or on corbonate. In contact with air, typical initial rates at room temperature were in the range between 0.001 and 0.1 g/(m 2 d). A study of apparent U solubility under oxidizing conditions was performed and it was suggested that the controlling factor is the redox potential at the UO 2 surface rather than the E h of the bulk solution. Electrochemical arguments were used to predict that at saturation, the surface potential will eventually reach a value given by the boundaries at either the U 3 O 7 /U 3 O 8 or the U 3 O 7 /schoepite stability field, and a comparison with spent fuel leach data showed that the solution concentration of uranium is close to the calculated U solubility at the U 3 O 7 /U 3 O 8 boundary. The difference in the cumulative Sr and U release was calculated from data from Studsvik laboratory. The results reveal that the rate of Sr release decreases with the square root of time under U-saturated conditions. This time dependence may be rationalized either by grain boundary diffusion or by diffusion into the fuel matrix. Hence, there seems to be a possibility of an agreement between the Sr release data, structural information and data for oxygen diffusion in UO 2 . (G.B.)

  20. Recycled Uranium Mass Balance Project Y-12 National Security Complex Site Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-12-01

    This report has been prepared to summarize the findings of the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Complex) Mass Balance Project and to support preparation of associated U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) site reports. The project was conducted in support of DOE efforts to assess the potential for health and environmental issues resulting from the presence of transuranic (TRU) elements and fission products in recycled uranium (RU) processed by DOE and its predecessor agencies. The United States government used uranium in fission reactors to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons production. Because uranium was considered scarce relative to demand when these operations began almost 50 years ago, the spent fuel from U.S. fission reactors was processed to recover uranium for recycling. The estimated mass balance for highly enriched RU, which is of most concern for worker exposure and is the primary focus of this project, is summarized in a table. A discrepancy in the mass balance between receipts and shipments (plus inventory and waste) reflects an inability to precisely distinguish between RU and non-RU shipments and receipts involving the Y-12 Complex and Savannah River. Shipments of fresh fuel (non-RU) and sweetener (also non-RU) were made from the Y-12 Complex to Savannah River along with RU shipments. The only way to distinguish between these RU and non-RU streams using available records is by enrichment level. Shipments of {le}90% enrichment were assumed to be RU. Shipments of >90% enrichment were assumed to be non-RU fresh fuel or sweetener. This methodology using enrichment level to distinguish between RU and non-RU results in good estimates of RU flows that are reasonably consistent with Savannah River estimates. Although this is the best available means of distinguishing RU streams, this method does leave a difference of approximately 17.3 MTU between receipts and shipments. Slightly depleted RU streams received by the Y-12 Complex from ORGDP and

  1. Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR Part 191)

    Science.gov (United States)

    This regulation sets environmental standards for public protection from the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level wastes and wastes that contain elements with atomic numbers higher than uranium (transuranic wastes).

  2. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    2004-01-01

    Since the RERTR-Meeting in Newport/USA in 1990 recommended in several papers to the research reactor community to agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for acceptance and for fabrication of fresh fuel elements. This target for unified and simplified specification has only been partially reached due to different interests of the fabricators because they want to receive the uranium as pure as possible. As a result of various investigations, however, it became clear that both LEU and HEU received from the United States since the late fifties had different qualities which we have to deal with today due to the availability of stocks. We are now one step forward to know more precisely the properties of LEU and HEU we have received in the past. This uranium was never virgin and we have to cope with this situation. Therefore in my present paper I have concentrated on the documentation of analytical work performed on samples of LEU and HEU received in the past. I propose furthermore a frame of unified specifications for so-called virgin LEU and HEU including uranium from a Zero-experiment. In addition I am giving a recommendation for specifications of LEU obtained by blending of reprocessed HEU. Finally I am touching the question of secure supplies of fresh LEU. (author)

  3. Technology for down-blending weapons grade uranium into commercial reactor-usable uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbital, J.G.; Snider, J.D.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used in nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching the uranium isotope 235 U from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by permanently diluting the concentration of the 235 U isotope, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope re-enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended, low-enriched uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel. The DOE has evaluated three candidate processes for down blending surplus HEU. These candidate processes are: (1) uranium hexafluoride blending; (2) molten uranium metal blending; and (3) uranyl nitrate solution blending. This paper describes each of these candidate processes. It also compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each process with respect to: (1) the various forms and compounds of HEU comprising the surplus inventory, (2) the use of down-blended product as commercial reactor fuel, or (3) its disposal as waste

  4. Moving to world's best uranium address

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noakes, Frank

    2006-01-01

    Most exploration dollars spent in South Australia are focused on exploiting uranium. This is for good reason as South Australia is the world's best address for uranium. Pressure to cut CO 2 emissions and the ballistic growth of the Chinese and Indian economies has heightened expectations that the worldwide use of uranium for power generation will mushroom beyond its current 17% market share. The recent Australia-China deal only seems to confirm this; hence uranium's growing popularity among miners and explorers. Such is the attractiveness of uranium-related floats, when Toro Energy sought $18m in March it was swamped with more than three times share application volume. In the north west, Southern Gold and Hindmarsh Resources are expectantly drilling for commercial uranium deposits all around the acreage that hosts the Challenger gold mine in the Gawler Craton. The first exploration drilling for uranium in quaternary-age river channels will take place in South Australia's far north in May. Red Metal says while older and deeper tertiary river channels in the area that host the Beverley uranium mine were explored for uranium, the younger near-surface channel has not had a single hole drilled for uranium. This is despite the area being one of the 'hottest radiogenic terrains in South Australia'. The company will target calcrete-style uranium mineralisation similar to the Yerrlirrie deposit in Western Australia (52,000t U308). Tasman Resources will start drilling to test seven uranium targets within 30km of Olympic Dam, the world's largest known uranium deposit, later this year. Tasman also holds tenements adjoining the Warrior uranium deposit near Tarcoola that contains known radiometric anomalies within the 40km-long Wynbring paleochannels. They are the fourth largest uranium explorer in South Australia. Alliance Resources and its JV partner Quasar Resources are exploring the Beverley 4 Mile uranium prospect at Arkaroola. Quasar is an affiliate of Heathgate Resources

  5. Nondestructive verification and assay systems for spent fuels. Technical appendixes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Phillips, J.R.; Baker, M.P.

    1982-04-01

    Six technical appendixes are presented that provide important supporting technical information for the study of the application of nondestructive measurements to spent-fuel storage. Each appendix addresses a particular technical subject in a reasonably self-contained fashion. Appendix A is a comparison of spent-fuel data predicted by reactor operators with measured data from reprocessors. This comparison indicates a rather high level of uncertainty in previous burnup calculations. Appendix B describes a series of nondestructive measurements at the GE-Morris Operation Spent-Fuel Storage Facility. This series of experiments successfully demonstrated a technique for reproducible positioning of fuel assemblies for nondestructive measurement. The experimental results indicate the importance of measuring the axial and angular burnup profiles of irradiated fuel assemblies for quantitative determination of spent-fuel parameters. Appendix C is a reasonably comprehensive bibliography of reports and symposia papers on spent-fuel nondestructive measurements to April 1981. Appendix D is a compendium of spent-fuel calculations that includes isotope production and depletion calculations using the EPRI-CINDER code, calculations of neutron and gamma-ray source terms, and correlations of these sources with burnup and plutonium content. Appendix E describes the pulsed-neutron technique and its potential application to spent-fuel measurements. Although not yet developed, the technique holds the promise of providing separate measurements of the uranium and plutonium fissile isotopes. Appendix F describes the experimental program and facilities at Los Alamos for the development of spent-fuel nondestructive measurement systems. Measurements are reported showing that the active neutron method is sensitive to the replacement of a single fuel rod with a dummy rod in an unirradiated uranium fuel assembly

  6. Uranium, depleted uranium, biological effects; Uranium, uranium appauvri, effets biologiques

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    Physicists, chemists and biologists at the CEA are developing scientific programs on the properties and uses of ionizing radiation. Since the CEA was created in 1945, a great deal of research has been carried out on the properties of natural, enriched and depleted uranium in cooperation with university laboratories and CNRS. There is a great deal of available data about uranium; thousands of analyses have been published in international reviews over more than 40 years. This presentation on uranium is a very brief summary of all these studies. (author)

  7. Uranium toxicology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferreyra, Mariana D.; Suarez Mendez, Sebastian

    1997-01-01

    In this paper are presented the methods and procedures optimized by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) for the determination of: natural uranium mass, activity of enriched uranium in samples of: urine, mucus, filters, filter heads, rinsing waters and Pu in urine, adopted and in some cases adapted, by the Environmental Monitoring and Internal Dosimetry Laboratory. The analyzed material corresponded to biological and environmental samples belonging to the staff professionally exposed that work in plants of the nuclear fuel cycle. For a better comprehension of the activities of this laboratory, it is included a brief description of the uranium radiochemical toxicity and the limits internationally fixed to preserve the workers health

  8. Aqueous dissolution rates of uranium oxides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steward, S.A.; Mones, E.T.

    1994-10-01

    An understanding of the long-term dissolution of waste forms in groundwater is required for the safe disposal of high level nuclear waste in an underground repository. The main routes by which radionuclides could be released from a geological repository are the dissolution and transport processes in groundwater flow. Because uranium dioxide is the primary constituent of spent nuclear fuel, the dissolution of its matrix in spent fuel is considered the rate-limiting step for release of radioactive fission products. The purpose of our work has been to measure the intrinsic dissolution rates of uranium oxides under a variety of well-controlled conditions that are relevant to a repository and allow for modeling. The intermediate oxide phase U 3 O 8 , triuranium octaoxide, is quite stable and known to be present in oxidized spent fuel. The trioxide, UO 3 , has been shown to exist in drip tests on spent fuel. Here we compare the results of essentially identical dissolution experiments performed on depleted U 3 O 8 and dehyrated schoepite or uranium trioxide monohydrate (UO 3 ·H 2 O). These are compared with earlier work on spent fuel and UO 2 under similar conditions

  9. Spent fuel storage facility, Kalpakkam

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shreekumar, B.; Anthony, S.

    2017-01-01

    Spent Fuel Storage Facility (SFSF), Kalpakkam is designed to store spent fuel arising from PHWRs. Spent fuel is transported in AERB qualified/authorized shipping cask by NPCIL to SFSF by road or rail route. The spent fuel storage facility at Kalpakkam was hot commissioned in December 2006. All systems, structures and components (SSCs) related to safety are designed to meet the operational requirements

  10. Spent fuel storage and isolation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bensky, M.S.; Kurzeka, W.J.; Bauer, A.A.; Carr, J.A.; Matthews, S.C.

    1979-02-01

    The principal spent fuel activities conducted within the commercial waste and spent fuel within the Commercial Waste and Spent Fuel Packaging Program are: simulated near-surface (drywell) storage demonstrations at Hanford and the Nevada Test Site; surface (sealed storage cask) and drywell demonstrations at the Nevada Test Site; and spent fuel receiving and packaging facility conceptual design. These investigations are described

  11. Enriched-uranium feed costs for the High-Temperature Gas-Cooled reactor: trends and comparison with other reactor concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, W.E.

    1976-04-01

    This report discusses each of the components that affect the unit cost for enriched uranium; that is, ore costs, U 3 O 8 to UF 6 conversion cost, costs for enriching services, and changes in transaction tails assay. Historical trends and announced changes are included. Unit costs for highly enriched uranium (93.15 percent 235 U) and for low-enrichment uranium (3.0, 3.2, and 3.5 percent 235 U) are displayed as a function of changes in the above components and compared. It is demonstrated that the trends in these cost components will probably result in significantly less cost increase for highly enriched uranium than for low-enrichment uranium--hence favoring the High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

  12. Porous membrane electrochemical cell for uranium and transuranic recovery from molten salt electrolyte

    Science.gov (United States)

    Willit, James L [Batavia, IL

    2010-09-21

    An improved process and device for the recovery of the minor actinides and the transuranic elements (TRU's) from a molten salt electrolyte. The process involves placing the device, an electrically non-conducting barrier between an anode salt and a cathode salt. The porous barrier allows uranium to diffuse between the anode and cathode, yet slows the diffusion of uranium ions so as to cause depletion of uranium ions in the catholyte. This allows for the eventual preferential deposition of transuranics present in spent nuclear fuel such as Np, Pu, Am, Cm. The device also comprises an uranium oxidation anode. The oxidation anode is solid uranium metal in the form of spent nuclear fuel. The spent fuel is placed in a ferric metal anode basket which serves as the electrical lead or contact between the molten electrolyte and the anodic uranium metal.

  13. Porous membrane electrochemical cell for uranium and transuranic recovery from molten salt electrolyte

    Science.gov (United States)

    Willit, James L.

    2007-09-11

    An improved process and device for the recovery of the minor actinides and the transuranic elements (TRU's) from a molten salt electrolyte. The process involves placing the device, an electrically non-conducting barrier between an anode salt and a cathode salt. The porous barrier allows uranium to diffuse between the anode and cathode, yet slows the diffusion of uranium ions so as to cause depletion of uranium ions in the catholyte. This allows for the eventual preferential deposition of transuranics present in spent nuclear fuel such as Np, Pu, Am, Cm. The device also comprises an uranium oxidation anode. The oxidation anode is solid uranium metal in the form of spent nuclear fuel. The spent fuel is placed in a ferric metal anode basket which serves as the electrical lead or contact between the molten electrolyte and the anodic uranium metal.

  14. Corrosion of Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Long-Term Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rodney C. Ewing

    2004-10-07

    Spent nuclear fuel, essentially U{sub 2}, accounts for over 95% of the total radioactivity of all of the radioactive wastes in the United States that require disposal, disposition or remediation. The UO{sub 2} in SNF is not stable under oxiding conditions and may also be altered under reducing conditions. The alteration of SNF results in the formation of new uranium phases that can cause the release or retardation of actinide and fission product radionuclides. Over the long term, and depending on the extent to which the secondary uranium phases incorporate fission products and actinides, these alteration phases become the near-field source term.

  15. Corrosion of Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Long-Term Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, Rodney C.

    2004-01-01

    Spent nuclear fuel, essentially U 2 , accounts for over 95% of the total radioactivity of all of the radioactive wastes in the United States that require disposal, disposition or remediation. The UO 2 in SNF is not stable under oxiding conditions and may also be altered under reducing conditions. The alteration of SNF results in the formation of new uranium phases that can cause the release or retardation of actinide and fission product radionuclides. Over the long term, and depending on the extent to which the secondary uranium phases incorporate fission products and actinides, these alteration phases become the near-field source term

  16. International safeguards concerns of Spent Fuel Disposal Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussions on the subjects of safeguarding large quantities of plutonium contained in spent fuels to be disposed of in geologic respositories. All the spent fuel disposal scenarios examined here pose a variety of safeguards problems, none of which are adequately addressed by the international safeguards community. The spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles in underground repositories would become an increasingly attractive target for diversion because of their plutonium content and decreasing radioactivity. Current design of the first geologic repository in the US will have the capacity to accommodate wastes equivalent to 70,000 Mt of uranium from commercial and defense fuel cycles. Of this, approximately 62,000 Mt uranium equivalent will be commerical spent fuel, containing over 500 Mt of plutonium. International safeguards commitments may require us to address the safeguards issues of disposing of such large quanities of plutonium in a geologic repository, which has the potential to become a plutonium mine in the future. This paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries and the DOE before geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality

  17. Rossing uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1979-01-01

    In this article the geology of the deposits of the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia is discussed. The planning of the open-pit mining, the blasting, drilling, handling and the equipment used for these processes are described

  18. Spent fuel dissolution studies FY 1991 to 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, W.J.; Wilson, C.N.

    1995-12-01

    Dissolution and transport as a result of groundwater flow are generally accepted as the primary mechanisms by which radionuclides from spent fuel placed in a geologic repository could be released to the biosphere. To help provide a source term for performance assessment calculations, dissolution studies on spent fuel and unirradiated uranium oxides have been conducted over the past few years at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in support of the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project. This report describes work for fiscal years 1991 through 1994. The objectives of these studies and the associated conclusions, which were based on the limited number of tests conducted so far, are described in the following subsections

  19. Spent fuel management: Current status and prospects 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    Spent fuel management has always been one of the most important stages in the nuclear fuel cycle and it is still one of the most vital problems common to all countries with nuclear reactors. It begins with the discharge of spent fuel from a power or a research reactor and ends with its ultimate disposition, either by direct disposal or by reprocessing of the spent fuel. Two options exist at present - an open, once-through cycle with direct disposal of the spent fuel and a closed cycle with reprocessing of the spent fuel and recycling of plutonium and uranium in new mixed oxide fuels. The selection of a spent fuel strategy is a complex procedure in which many factors have to be weighed, including political, economic and safeguards issues as well as protection of the environment. Continuous attention is being given by the IAEA to the collection, analysis and exchange of information on spent fuel management. Its role in this area is to provide a forum for the exchange of information and to co-ordinate and to encourage closer co-operation among Member States in certain research an development activities that are of common interest. Refs, figs and tabs

  20. Guidebook on spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The Guidebook summarizes the experience and information in various areas related to spent fuel storage: technological aspects, the transport of spent fuel, economical, regulatory and institutional aspects, international safeguards, evaluation criteria for the selection of a specific spent fuel storage concept, international cooperation on spent fuel storage. The last part of the Guidebook presents specific problems on the spent fuel storage in the United Kingdom, Sweden, USSR, USA, Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland

  1. Uranium, depleted uranium, biological effects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Physicists, chemists and biologists at the CEA are developing scientific programs on the properties and uses of ionizing radiation. Since the CEA was created in 1945, a great deal of research has been carried out on the properties of natural, enriched and depleted uranium in cooperation with university laboratories and CNRS. There is a great deal of available data about uranium; thousands of analyses have been published in international reviews over more than 40 years. This presentation on uranium is a very brief summary of all these studies. (author)

  2. Spent Fuel in Chile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    López Lizana, F.

    2015-01-01

    The government has made a complete and serious study of many different aspects and possible road maps for nuclear electric power with strong emphasis on safety and energy independence. In the study, the chapter of SFM has not been a relevant issue at this early stage due to the fact that it has been left for later implementation stage. This paper deals with the options Chile might consider in managing its Spent Fuel taking into account foreign experience and factors related to safety, economics, public acceptance and possible novel approaches in spent fuel treatment. The country’s distinctiveness and past experience in this area taking into account that Chile has two research reactors which will have an influence in the design of the Spent Fuel option. (author)

  3. Uranium loans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    When NUEXCO was organized in 1968, its founders conceived of a business based on uranium loans. The concept was relatively straightforward; those who found themselves with excess supplies of uranium would deposit those excesses in NUEXCO's open-quotes bank,close quotes and those who found themselves temporarily short of uranium could borrow from the bank. The borrower would pay interest based on the quantity of uranium borrowed and the duration of the loan, and the bank would collect the interest, deduct its service fee for arranging the loan, and pay the balance to those whose deposits were borrowed. In fact, the original plan was to call the firm Nuclear Bank Corporation, until it was discovered that using the word open-quotes Bankclose quotes in the name would subject the firm to various US banking regulations. Thus, Nuclear Bank Corporation became Nuclear Exchange Corporation, which was later shortened to NUEXCO. Neither the nuclear fuel market nor NUEXCO's business developed quite as its founders had anticipated. From almost the very beginning, the brokerage of uranium purchases and sales became a more significant activity for NUEXCO than arranging uranium loans. Nevertheless, loan transactions have played an important role in the international nuclear fuel market, requiring the development of special knowledge and commercial techniques

  4. Uranium: do leave it in the ground!

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunyard, P.

    1990-01-01

    A previous author has argued that it would be best in the long run to consume uranium as much as possible in reactors rather than leave it in the ground in order to save the earth and generations into the far distant future from the evils of radiation. The argument is based on a comparison between the radioactive decay processes of fissioned uranium and uranium left in the earth to decay in its own time. It can be shown that from 300 days after reactor shut down onwards, the spent fuel will generate barely 1% of the radioactive energy that it would were it left untouched in the ground. Counter arguments are presented based largely on the risks to human health and life presented by uranium mining and disasters at nuclear plants such as that at Chernobyl. Illustrations are given of the suffering of people living near uranium mines arising from soil contamination by uranium tailings; the widespread radioactive contamination of the surrounding area and increased cancer mortality rates due to the Chernobyl accident are described. Finally, it is pointed out that uranium serves as a radioactive heat source in the gigantic recycling of rocks and the regeneration of the planet. All these arguments lead to the conclusion that uranium is best left in the earth. (UK)

  5. Spent fuel reprocessing options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-08-01

    The objective of this publication is to provide an update on the latest developments in nuclear reprocessing technologies in the light of new developments on the global nuclear scene. The background information on spent fuel reprocessing is provided in Section One. Substantial global growth of nuclear electricity generation is expected to occur during this century, in response to environmental issues and to assure the sustainability of the electrical energy supply in both industrial and less-developed countries. This growth carries with it an increasing responsibility to ensure that nuclear fuel cycle technologies are used only for peaceful purposes. In Section Two, an overview of the options for spent fuel reprocessing and their level of development are provided. A number of options exist for the treatment of spent fuel. Some, including those that avoid separation of a pure plutonium stream, are at an advanced level of technological maturity. These could be deployed in the next generation of industrial-scale reprocessing plants, while others (such as dry methods) are at a pilot scale, laboratory scale or conceptual stage of development. In Section Three, research and development in support of advanced reprocessing options is described. Next-generation spent fuel reprocessing plants are likely to be based on aqueous extraction processes that can be designed to a country specific set of spent fuel partitioning criteria for recycling of fissile materials to advanced light water reactors or fast spectrum reactors. The physical design of these plants must incorporate effective means for materials accountancy, safeguards and physical protection. Section four deals with issues and challenges related to spent fuel reprocessing. The spent fuel reprocessing options assessment of economics, proliferation resistance, and environmental impact are discussed. The importance of public acceptance for a reprocessing strategy is discussed. A review of modelling tools to support the

  6. Synthesis of uranium metal using laser-initiated reduction of uranium tetrafluoride by calcium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    West, M.H.; Martinez, M.M.; Nielsen, J.B.; Court, D.C.; Appert, Q.D.

    1995-09-01

    Uranium metal has numerous uses in conventional weapons (armor penetrators) and nuclear weapons. It also has application to nuclear reactor designs utilizing metallic fuels--for example, the former Integral Fast Reactor program at Argonne National Laboratory. Uranium metal also has promise as a material of construction for spent-nuclear-fuel storage casks. A new avenue for the production of uranium metal is presented that offers several advantages over existing technology. A carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) laser is used to initiate the reaction between uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ) and calcium metal. The new method does not require induction heating of a closed system (a pressure vessel) nor does it utilize iodine (I 2 ) as a chemical booster. The results of five reductions of UF 4 , spanning 100 to 200 g of uranium, are evaluated, and suggestions are made for future work in this area

  7. Uranium isotope separation from 1941 to the present

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maier-Komor, Peter

    2010-01-01

    Uranium isotope separation was the key development for the preparation of highly enriched isotopes in general and thus became the seed for target development and preparation for nuclear and applied physics. In 1941 (year of birth of the author) large-scale development for uranium isotope separation was started after the US authorities were warned that NAZI Germany had started its program for enrichment of uranium and might have confiscated all uranium and uranium mines in their sphere of influence. Within the framework of the Manhattan Projects the first electromagnetic mass separators (Calutrons) were installed and further developed for high throughput. The military aim of the Navy Department was to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines with practically unlimited range. Parallel to this the army worked on the development of the atomic bomb. Also in 1941 plutonium was discovered and the production of 239 Pu was included into the atomic bomb program. 235 U enrichment starting with natural uranium was performed in two steps with different techniques of mass separation in Oak Ridge. The first step was gas diffusion which was limited to low enrichment. The second step for high enrichment was performed with electromagnetic mass spectrometers (Calutrons). The theory for the much more effective enrichment with centrifugal separation was developed also during the Second World War, but technical problems e.g. development of high speed ball and needle bearings could not be solved before the end of the war. Spying accelerated the development of uranium separation in the Soviet Union, but also later in China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. In this paper, the physical and chemical procedures are outlined which lead to the success of the project. Some security aspects and Non-Proliferation measures are discussed.

  8. Uranium isotope separation from 1941 to the present

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maier-Komor, Peter, E-mail: Peter@Maier-Komor.d [Retired from Physik-Department E12, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, D-85747 Garching (Germany)

    2010-02-11

    Uranium isotope separation was the key development for the preparation of highly enriched isotopes in general and thus became the seed for target development and preparation for nuclear and applied physics. In 1941 (year of birth of the author) large-scale development for uranium isotope separation was started after the US authorities were warned that NAZI Germany had started its program for enrichment of uranium and might have confiscated all uranium and uranium mines in their sphere of influence. Within the framework of the Manhattan Projects the first electromagnetic mass separators (Calutrons) were installed and further developed for high throughput. The military aim of the Navy Department was to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines with practically unlimited range. Parallel to this the army worked on the development of the atomic bomb. Also in 1941 plutonium was discovered and the production of {sup 239}Pu was included into the atomic bomb program. {sup 235}U enrichment starting with natural uranium was performed in two steps with different techniques of mass separation in Oak Ridge. The first step was gas diffusion which was limited to low enrichment. The second step for high enrichment was performed with electromagnetic mass spectrometers (Calutrons). The theory for the much more effective enrichment with centrifugal separation was developed also during the Second World War, but technical problems e.g. development of high speed ball and needle bearings could not be solved before the end of the war. Spying accelerated the development of uranium separation in the Soviet Union, but also later in China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. In this paper, the physical and chemical procedures are outlined which lead to the success of the project. Some security aspects and Non-Proliferation measures are discussed.

  9. Uranium isotope separation from 1941 to the present

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maier-Komor, Peter

    2010-02-01

    Uranium isotope separation was the key development for the preparation of highly enriched isotopes in general and thus became the seed for target development and preparation for nuclear and applied physics. In 1941 (year of birth of the author) large-scale development for uranium isotope separation was started after the US authorities were warned that NAZI Germany had started its program for enrichment of uranium and might have confiscated all uranium and uranium mines in their sphere of influence. Within the framework of the Manhattan Projects the first electromagnetic mass separators (Calutrons) were installed and further developed for high throughput. The military aim of the Navy Department was to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines with practically unlimited range. Parallel to this the army worked on the development of the atomic bomb. Also in 1941 plutonium was discovered and the production of 239Pu was included into the atomic bomb program. 235U enrichment starting with natural uranium was performed in two steps with different techniques of mass separation in Oak Ridge. The first step was gas diffusion which was limited to low enrichment. The second step for high enrichment was performed with electromagnetic mass spectrometers (Calutrons). The theory for the much more effective enrichment with centrifugal separation was developed also during the Second World War, but technical problems e.g. development of high speed ball and needle bearings could not be solved before the end of the war. Spying accelerated the development of uranium separation in the Soviet Union, but also later in China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. In this paper, the physical and chemical procedures are outlined which lead to the success of the project. Some security aspects and Non-Proliferation measures are discussed.

  10. Calibration of spent fuel measurement assembly

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koleska, Michal; Viererbl, Ladislav; Marek, Milan

    2014-01-01

    The LVR-15 research reactor (Czech Republic) had been converted from the highly enriched IRT-2M to the low enriched IRT-4M fuel. For the possibility of the independent pre-transport evaluation of IRT-2M burnup, a spectrometric system was developed. This spectrometric system consists of the fuel holder, the collimator and the portable Canberra Big MAC HPGe (High Purity Germanium) detector. In order to have well reproducible and reliable experimental data for modeling of the measurement system, calibration with the 110m Ag isotope with known activity was performed. This isotope was chosen for having energies similar to isotopes measured in fuel assemblies. The 110m Ag isotope was prepared by irradiating of the silver foil in LVR-15 research reactor; its activity was evaluated in the LVR-15's spectrometric laboratory. From the measured data, an efficiency curve of the spectrometric system has been determined. The experimental data were compared to the calculation results with the MCNPX model of the spectrometric system. - Highlights: • Calibration of research reactor spent fuel measurement assembly. • On-site prepared 110m Ag isotope used for the measurement. • Calculated self-shielding factor for the IRT-2M fuel. • Applicable to other research reactor fuel geometries

  11. Technical problems in case of utilizing uranium of medium enrichment for a research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanda, Keiji; Shibata, Shun-ichi

    1979-01-01

    Usually, highly enriched uranium of 90 - 93% is used for research reactors, but the US government proposed the strong policy to use low enriched uranium of the uranium of medium enrichment in unavoidable case from the viewpoint of the resistance to nuclear proliferation in November, 1977. This policy is naturally applied to Japan also. The export of highly enriched uranium will be permitted only when the President approves it after the technical and economical evaluations by the government. The Kyoto University high flux reactor has the features which are not seen in other research reactors, such as medical irradiation, and it is hard to attain the objectives of researches unless HEU is used. The application for the export of HEU was accepted in February, 1978. The nuclear characteristics of the KUHFR when medium or low enriched uranium is used, the criticality experiment in the KUCA using the uranium of medium enrichment, and the burning test on the uranium fuel plates of medium enrichment are described. The research project to lower the degree of enrichment in the fuel for research and test reactors is expected to be continued down to less than 20%. The MEU of 45% enrichment will be actually used in 1983. (Kako, I.)

  12. Uranium mass and neutron multiplication factor estimates from time-correlation coincidence counts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xie, Wenxiong [China Academy of Engineering Physics, Center for Strategic Studies, Beijing 100088 (China); Li, Jiansheng [China Academy of Engineering Physics, Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, Mianyang 621900 (China); Zhu, Jianyu [China Academy of Engineering Physics, Center for Strategic Studies, Beijing 100088 (China)

    2015-10-11

    Time-correlation coincidence counts of neutrons are an important means to measure attributes of nuclear material. The main deficiency in the analysis is that an attribute of an unknown component can only be assessed by comparing it with similar known components. There is a lack of a universal method of measurement suitable for the different attributes of the components. This paper presents a new method that uses universal relations to estimate the mass and neutron multiplication factor of any uranium component with known enrichment. Based on numerical simulations and analyses of 64 highly enriched uranium components with different thicknesses and average radii, the relations between mass, multiplication and coincidence spectral features have been obtained by linear regression analysis. To examine the validity of the method in estimating the mass of uranium components with different sizes, shapes, enrichment, and shielding, the features of time-correlation coincidence-count spectra for other objects with similar attributes are simulated. Most of the masses and multiplications for these objects could also be derived by the formulation. Experimental measurements of highly enriched uranium castings have also been used to verify the formulation. The results show that for a well-designed time-dependent coincidence-count measuring system of a uranium attribute, there are a set of relations dependent on the uranium enrichment by which the mass and multiplication of the measured uranium components of any shape and size can be estimated from the features of the source-detector coincidence-count spectrum.

  13. Uranium extraction from gold-uranium ores

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laskorin, B.N.; Golynko, Z.Sh.

    1981-01-01

    The process of uranium extraction from gold-uranium ores in the South Africa is considered. Flowsheets of reprocessing gold-uranium conglomerates, pile processing and uranium extraction from the ores are presented. Continuous counter flow ion-exchange process of uranium extraction using strong-active or weak-active resins is noted to be the most perspective and economical one. The ion-exchange uranium separation with the succeeding extraction is also the perspective one.

  14. Department of Energy depleted uranium recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosinski, F.E.; Butturini, W.G.; Kurtz, J.J.

    1994-01-01

    With its strategic supply of depleted uranium, the Department of Energy is studying reuse of the material in nuclear radiation shields, military hardware, and commercial applications. the study is expected to warrant a more detailed uranium recycle plan which would include consideration of a demonstration program and a program implementation decision. Such a program, if implemented, would become the largest nuclear material recycle program in the history of the Department of Energy. The bulk of the current inventory of depleted uranium is stored in 14-ton cylinders in the form of solid uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ). The radioactive 235 U content has been reduced to a concentration of 0.2% to 0.4%. Present estimates indicate there are about 55,000 UF 6 -filled cylinders in inventory and planned operations will provide another 2,500 cylinders of depleted uranium each year. The United States government, under the auspices of the Department of Energy, considers the depleted uranium a highly-refined strategic resource of significant value. A possible utilization of a large portion of the depleted uranium inventory is as radiation shielding for spent reactor fuels and high-level radioactive waste. To this end, the Department of Energy study to-date has included a preliminary technical review to ascertain DOE chemical forms useful for commercial products. The presentation summarized the information including preliminary cost estimates. The status of commercial uranium processing is discussed. With a shrinking market, the number of chemical conversion and fabrication plants is reduced; however, the commercial capability does exist for chemical conversion of the UF 6 to the metal form and for the fabrication of uranium radiation shields and other uranium products. Department of Energy facilities no longer possess a capability for depleted uranium chemical conversion

  15. Uranium mining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The economic and environmental sustainability of uranium mining has been analysed by Monash University researcher Dr Gavin Mudd in a paper that challenges the perception that uranium mining is an 'infinite quality source' that provides solutions to the world's demand for energy. Dr Mudd says information on the uranium industry touted by politicians and mining companies is not necessarily inaccurate, but it does not tell the whole story, being often just an average snapshot of the costs of uranium mining today without reflecting the escalating costs associated with the process in years to come. 'From a sustainability perspective, it is critical to evaluate accurately the true lifecycle costs of all forms of electricity production, especially with respect to greenhouse emissions, ' he says. 'For nuclear power, a significant proportion of greenhouse emissions are derived from the fuel supply, including uranium mining, milling, enrichment and fuel manufacture.' Dr Mudd found that financial and environmental costs escalate dramatically as the uranium ore is used. The deeper the mining process required to extract the ore, the higher the cost for mining companies, the greater the impact on the environment and the more resources needed to obtain the product. I t is clear that there is a strong sensitivity of energy and water consumption and greenhouse emissions to ore grade, and that ore grades are likely to continue to decline gradually in the medium to long term. These issues are critical to the current debate over nuclear power and greenhouse emissions, especially with respect to ascribing sustainability to such activities as uranium mining and milling. For example, mining at Roxby Downs is responsible for the emission of over one million tonnes of greenhouse gases per year and this could increase to four million tonnes if the mine is expanded.'

  16. Reprocessing of spent plasma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierini, G.

    1981-01-01

    This invention relates to a process for removing helium and other impurities from a mixture containing deuterium and tritium, a deuterium/tritium mixture when purified in accordance with such a process and, more particularly, to a process for the reprocessing of spent plasma removed from a thermofusion reactor. (U.K.)

  17. Using X-ray, K-edge densitometry in spent fuel characterization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jensen, T.; Aljundi, T.; Gray, J.N.

    1998-01-01

    There are instances where records for spent nuclear fuel are incomplete, as well as cases where fuel assemblies have deteriorated during storage. To bring these materials into compliance for long term storage will require determination of parameters such as enrichment, total fissionable material, and burnup. To obtain accurate estimates of these parameters will require the combination of information from different inspection techniques. A method which can provide an accurate measure of the total uranium in the spent fuel is X-ray K-edge densitometry. To assess the potential for applying this method in spent fuel characterization, the authors have measured the amount of uranium in stacks of reactor fuel plates containing nuclear materials of different enrichments and alloys. They have obtained good agreement with expected uranium concentrations ranging from 60 mg/cm 2 to 3,000 mg/cm 2 , and have demonstrated that these measurements can be made in a high radiation field (> 200 mR/hr)

  18. Uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rae, H.K.; Melvin, J.G.

    1988-06-01

    Canada is the world's largest producer and exporter of uranium, most of which is enriched elsewhere for use as fuel in LWRs. The feasibility of a Canadian uranium-enrichment enterprise is therefore a perennial question. Recent developments in uranium-enrichment technology, and their likely impacts on separative work supply and demand, suggest an opportunity window for Canadian entry into this international market. The Canadian opportunity results from three particular impacts of the new technologies: 1) the bulk of the world's uranium-enrichment capacity is in gaseous diffusion plants which, because of their large requirements for electricity (more than 2000 kW·h per SWU), are vulnerable to competition from the new processes; 2) the decline in enrichment costs increases the economic incentive for the use of slightly-enriched uranium (SEU) fuel in CANDU reactors, thus creating a potential Canadian market; and 3) the new processes allow economic operation on a much smaller scale, which drastically reduces the investment required for market entry and is comparable with the potential Canadian SEU requirement. The opportunity is not open-ended. By the end of the century the enrichment supply industry will have adapted to the new processes and long-term customer/supplier relationships will have been established. In order to seize the opportunity, Canada must become a credible supplier during this century

  19. Transuranium element recovering method for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todokoro, Akio; Kihara, Yoshiyuki; Okada, Hisashi

    1998-01-01

    Spent fuels are dissolved in nitric acid, the obtained dissolution liquid is oxidized by electrolysis, and nitric acid of transuranium elements are precipitated together with nitric acid of uranium elements from the dissolution solution and recovered. Namely, the transuranium elements are oxidized to an atomic value level at which nitric acid can be precipitated by an oxidizing catalyst, and cooled to precipitate nitric acid of transuranium elements together with nitric acid of transuranium elements, accordingly, it is not necessary to use a solvent which has been used so far upon recovering transuranium elements. Since no solvent waste is generated, a recovery method taking the circumstance into consideration can be provided. Further, nitric acid of uranium elements and nitric acid of transuranium elements precipitated and recovered together are dissolved in nitric acid again, cooled and only uranium elements are precipitated selectively, and recovered by filtration. The amount of wastes can be reduced to thereby enabling to mitigate control for processing. (N.H.)

  20. Spent nuclear fuel recycling with plasma reduction and etching

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Yong Ho

    2012-06-05

    A method of extracting uranium from spent nuclear fuel (SNF) particles is disclosed. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) (containing oxides of uranium, oxides of fission products (FP) and oxides of transuranic (TRU) elements (including plutonium)) are subjected to a hydrogen plasma and a fluorine plasma. The hydrogen plasma reduces the uranium and plutonium oxides from their oxide state. The fluorine plasma etches the SNF metals to form UF6 and PuF4. During subjection of the SNF particles to the fluorine plasma, the temperature is maintained in the range of 1200-2000 deg K to: a) allow any PuF6 (gas) that is formed to decompose back to PuF4 (solid), and b) to maintain stability of the UF6. Uranium (in the form of gaseous UF6) is easily extracted and separated from the plutonium (in the form of solid PuF4). The use of plasmas instead of high temperature reactors or flames mitigates the high temperature corrosive atmosphere and the production of PuF6 (as a final product). Use of plasmas provide faster reaction rates, greater control over the individual electron and ion temperatures, and allow the use of CF4 or NF3 as the fluorine sources instead of F2 or HF.

  1. Uranium update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steane, R.

    1997-01-01

    This paper is about the current uranium mining situation, especially that in Saskatchewan. Canada has a unique advantage with the Saskatchewan uranium deposits. Making the most of this opportunity is important to Canada. The following is reviewed: project development and the time and capital it takes to bring a new project into production; the supply and demand situation to show where the future production fits into the world market; and our foreign competition and how we have to be careful not to lose our opportunity. (author)

  2. Storage of spent fuel from power reactors in India management and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Changrani, R.D.; Bajpai, D.D.; Kodilkar, S.S.

    1999-01-01

    The spent fuel management programme in India is based on closing the nuclear fuel cycle with reprocessing option. This will enable the country to enhance energy security through maximizing utilization of available limited uranium resources while pursuing its Three Stage Nuclear Power Programme. Storage of spent fuel in water pools remains as prevailing mode in the near term. In view of inventory build up of spent fuel, an Away-From-Reactor (AFR) On-Site (OS) spent fuel storage facility has been made operational at Tarapur. Dry storage casks also have been developed as 'add on' system for additional storage of spent fuels. The paper describes the status and experience pertaining to spent fuel storage practices in India. (author)

  3. Challenges dealing with depleted uranium in Germany - Reuse or disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moeller, Kai D.

    2007-01-01

    possibility could be the use of depleted uranium for the blending of High enriched Uranium (HEU) or with Plutonium to MOX-elements. (authors)

  4. A safety study on the wet storage of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, Kwan Sik; Whang, Joo Ho; Lee, Hoo Kun; Choi, Jong Won; Lee, Jong Geun

    1989-02-01

    This study is to provide data related with a basic design of the spent fuel storage facility in the field of radiation and to establish the safety assessment methodology of away from reactor spent fuel storage facility. This is in progress and continue upto the year of 1991. The mathematical model which predict the quantity of environmental release of fission and corrosion products from spent fuel received and stored in wet storage facility operated in normal conditions was prepared. The decay characteristic of domestic spent fuels are analysed and then the coefficients for the prediction of the decay heat by simple formular was determined. This correlations could predict decay heat of spent fuel with ±10% difference from ORIGEN2 results. The release factor of cobalt out of PWR spent fuel in PIE pool is 7.97 x 10-12∼8.49 x 10-11 Ci/ sec-rod, which appears to be linear without being connected with the types of fuel defects, but that of cesium varies with the defect type and the exposure time in water. In water condition, release factor of uranium out of CANDU fuel pellets appears to be about 5 x 10-8/day, whose tendency is similar to that of cesium of the latter half of the exposure time of water. (Author)

  5. Conditioning of spent nuclear fuel for permanent disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laidler, J.J.

    1994-01-01

    A compact, efficient method for conditioning spent nuclear fuel is under development This method, known as pyrochemical processing, or open-quotes pyroprocessing,close quotes provides a separation of fission products from the actinide elements present in spent fuel and further separates pure uranium from the transuranic elements. The process can facilitate the timely and environmentally-sound treatment of the highly diverse collection of spent fuel currently in the inventory of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The pyroprocess utilizes elevated-temperature processes to prepare spent fuel for fission product separation; that separation is accomplished by a molten salt electrorefining step that provides efficient (99.9%) separation of transuranics. The resultant waste forms from the pyroprocess are stable under envisioned repository environment conditions and highly leach-resistant. Treatment of any spent fuel type produces a set of common high-level waste forms, one a mineral and the other a metal alloy, that can be readily qualified for repository disposal and preclude the substantial costs that would be associated with the qualification of the numerous spent fuel types included in the DOE inventory

  6. Development of compaction technique for spent fuel skeletons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoon, Ji Sup; Kim, Young Hwan; Jung, Jae Hoo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-12-01

    To increase the utilization of uranium resources contained in the spent fuel, the spent fuel is reused. For this, the spent fuel is dismantled or spent fuel rod is extracted from the spent fuel assembly. When the rod is extracted, the remaining components of spent fuel assembly, so called a NFBC(Non-Fuel Bearing Components), should be compacted for the final disposal. To this end, several companies developed the NFBC compactors. German company, named as GNS has developed the direct compression devices of the NFBCs for the rod consolidation and installed it at the PKA(2) of pilot conditioning plant. B and W (Babcock and Wilcox) in USA adopted cutting method rather than the compression method and developed the special cutting devices of NFBC which can be applied underwater environment. In this study the characteristics of these two methods was investigated, in terms of fabrication cost of devices, maintainability in a high radioactive environment, required power and work volume for operation. Also, the optimal power source is selected by comparing the maximum power versus the work volume for operation. In addition to these, the reduction ratio of the bulk volume is obtained while varying the cutting length of the NFBC through a series of experiments. Based on the results of analysis and experiments, the cutting method after compression is selected as an optimal volume reduction method and its design specification is obtained. 8 refs., 62 figs., 32 tabs. (Author)

  7. Conditioning of spent nuclear fuel for permanent disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laidler, J.J.

    1994-01-01

    A compact, efficient method for conditioning spent nuclear fuel is under development. This method, known as pyrochemical processing, or pyroprocessing, provides a separation of fission products from the actinide elements present in spent fuel and further separates pure uranium from the transuranic elements. The process can facilitate the timely and environmentally-sound treatment of the highly diverse collection of spent fuel currently in the inventory of the US Department of Energy (DOE). The pyroprocess utilizes elevated-temperature processes to prepare spent fuel for fission product separation; that separation is accomplished by a molten salt electrorefining step that provides efficient (> 99.9%) separation of transuranics. The resultant waste forms from the pyroprocess are stable under envisioned repository environment conditions and highly leach-resistant. Treatment of any spent fuel type produces a set of common high-level waste forms, one a mineral and the other a metal alloy, that can be readily qualified for repository disposal and that avoid the substantial costs that would be associated with the qualification of the numerous spent fuel types included in the DOE inventory

  8. The development of uranium foil farication technology utilizing twin roll method for Mo-99 irradiation target

    CERN Document Server

    Kim, C K; Park, H D

    2002-01-01

    MDS Nordion in Canada, occupying about 75% of global supply of Mo-99 isotope, has provided the irradiation target of Mo-99 using the rod-type UAl sub x alloys with HEU(High Enrichment Uranium). ANL (Argonne National Laboratory) through co-operation with BATAN in Indonesia, leading RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors) program substantially for nuclear non-proliferation, has designed and fabricated the annular cylinder of uranium targets, and successfully performed irradiation test, in order to develop the fabrication technology of fission Mo-99 using LEU(Low Enrichment Uranium). As the uranium foils could be fabricated in laboratory scale, not in commercialized scale by hot rolling method due to significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the development of new technology. Under these circumstances, the invention of uranium foil fabrication technology utilizing twin-roll casting method in KAERI is found to be able to fabricate LEU or...

  9. Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

    1996-01-01

    Most of the world's supply of 99 mTc for medical purposes is currently produced from the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers. (author)

  10. Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

    1996-01-01

    Most of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is currently produced form the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers

  11. Development of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.

    1997-01-01

    The Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program has continued its effort in the past 3 yr to develop use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to produce the fission product 99 Mo. This work comprises both target and chemical processing development and demonstration. Two major target systems are now being used to produce 99 Mo with highly enriched uranium-one employing research reactor fuel technology (either uranium-aluminum alloy or uranium aluminide-aluminum dispersion) and the other using a thin deposit of UO 2 on the inside of a stainless steel (SST) tube. This paper summarizes progress in irradiation testing of targets based on LEU uranium metal foils. Several targets of this type have been irradiated in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor operating at 22.5 MW

  12. Spent fuel and radioactive-waste inventories, projections, and characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    Current inventories and characteristics of commercial spent fuels and both commercial and US Department of Energy radioactive wastes were compiled, based on the most reliable information available from government sources and the open literature, technical reports, and direct contacts. Future waste and spent fuel to be generated over the next 40 years, and characteristics of these materials are also presented, based on a present DOE/EIA projection of US commercial nuclear power growth and expected defense-related and industrial and institutional activities. Materials considered, on a chapter-by-chapter basis, are: spent fuel, high-level waste, transuranic waste, low-level waste, remedial action waste, active uranium mill tailings, airborne waste, and decommissioning. For each category, current and projected inventories are given through the year 2020. The land usage requirements are given for storage/disposal of low-level and transuranic wastes, and for the present inventories of inactive uranium mill tailings. For each waste category the radioactivity and thermal power are calculated. Isotopic compositions and cost data are given for each waste type and for spent fuel

  13. Encapsulating spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fleischer, L.R.; Gunasekaran, M.

    1979-01-01

    A system is described for encapsulating spent nuclear fuel discharged from nuclear reactors in the form of rods or multi-rod assemblies. The rods are completely and contiguously enclosed in concrete in which metallic fibres are incorporated to increase thermal conductivity and polymers to decrease fluid permeability. This technique provides the advantage of acceptable long-term stability for storage over the conventional underwater storage method. Examples are given of suitable concrete compositions. (UK)

  14. Application of an indirect method for determination of quality of spent solvent in a reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, K.K.; Thomas, George; Varadarajan, N.

    1986-01-01

    In Purex process, the solvent tri-n-butyl phosphate with an inert diluent n-dodecane is employed for the separation of uranium and plutonium. Since the solvent undergoes degration, it is necessary to constantly monitor the quality of the spent solvent before it is reused. Uranium retention number for solvent as a measure of the presence of dibutyl phosphate in the solvent has been investigated. This paper describes an indirect method for the estimation of the quality of the spent solvent. (author)

  15. Spent fuel and radioactive waste inventories, projections, and characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-09-01

    Current inventories and characteristics of commercial spent fuels and both commercial and US Department of Energy (DOE) radioactive wastes were compiled through December 31, 1983, based on the most reliable information available from government sources and the open literature, technical reports, and direct contacts. Future waste and spent fuel to be generated over the next 37 years and characteristics of these materials are also presented, consistent with the latest DOE/Energy Information Administration (EIA) or projection of US commercial nuclear power growth and expected defense-related and private industrial and institutional activities. Materials considered, on a chapter-by-chapter basis, are: spent fuel, high-level waste, transuranic waste, low-level waste, commercial uranium mill tailings, airborne waste, remedial action waste, and decommissioning waste. For each category, current and projected inventories are given through the year 2020, and the radioactivity and thermal power are calculated, based on reported or calculated isotopic compositions. 48 figures, 107 tables

  16. Machining of uranium and uranium alloys

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, T.O.

    1981-01-01

    Uranium and uranium alloys can be readily machined by conventional methods in the standard machine shop when proper safety and operating techniques are used. Material properties that affect machining processes and recommended machining parameters are discussed. Safety procedures and precautions necessary in machining uranium and uranium alloys are also covered. 30 figures

  17. Uranium/fuel cycle 74, New Orleans, Louisiana, 17--20 March 1974. Program report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The highlight of papers presented at the conference are summarized. The sessions covered uranium raw material, transportation of spent fuel and radioactive waste, plutonium recycle, waste management, and safeguards. (U.S.)

  18. Spent fuel dissolution mechanisms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ollila, K.

    1993-11-01

    This study is a literature survey on the dissolution mechanisms of spent fuel under disposal conditions. First, the effects of radiolysis products on the oxidative dissolution mechanisms and rates of UO 2 are discussed. These effects have mainly been investigated by using electrochemical methods. Then the release mechanisms of soluble radionuclides and the dissolution of the UO 2 matrix including the actinides, are treated. Experimental methods have been developed for measuring the grain-boundary inventories of radionuclides. The behaviour of cesium, strontium and technetium in leaching tests shows different trends. Comparison of spent fuel leaching data strongly suggests that the release of 90 Sr into the leachant can be used as a measure of the oxidation/dissolution of the fuel matrix. Approaches to the modelling UO 2 , dissolution are briefly discussed in the next chapter. Lastly, the use of natural material, uraninite, in the evaluation of the long-term performance of spent fuel is discussed. (orig.). (81 ref., 37 figs., 8 tabs.)

  19. Characterization plan for Hanford spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abrefah, J.; Thornton, T.A.; Thomas, L.E.; Berting, F.M.; Marschman, S.C.

    1994-12-01

    Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at the Hanford Site Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX) was terminated in 1972. Since that time a significant quantity of N Reactor and Single-Pass Reactor SNF has been stored in the 100 Area K-East (KE) and K-West (KW) reactor basins. Approximately 80% of all US Department of Energy (DOE)-owned SNF resides at Hanford, the largest portion of which is in the water-filled KE and KW reactor basins. The basins were not designed for long-term storage of the SNF and it has become a priority to move the SNF to a more suitable location. As part of the project plan, SNF inventories will be chemically and physically characterized to provide information that will be used to resolve safety and technical issues for development of an environmentally benign and efficient extended interim storage and final disposition strategy for this defense production-reactor SNF

  20. Uranium mining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cheeseman, E.W.

    1980-01-01

    The international uranium market appears to be currently over-supplied with a resultant softening in prices. Buyers on the international market are unhappy about some of the restrictions placed on sales by the government, and Canadian sales may suffer as a result. About 64 percent of Canada's shipments come from five operating Ontario mines, with the balance from Saskatchewan. Several other properties will be producing within the next few years. In spite of the adverse effects of the Three Mile Island incident and the default by the T.V.A. of their contract, some 3 600 tonnes of new uranium sales were completed during the year. The price for uranium had stabilized at US $42 - $44 by mid 1979, but by early 1980 had softened somewhat. The year 1979 saw the completion of major environmental hearings in Ontario and Newfoundland and the start of the B.C. inquiry. Two more hearings are scheduled for Saskatchewan in 1980. The Elliot Lake uranium mining expansion hearings are reviewed, as are other recent hearings. In the production of uranium for nuclear fuel cycle, environmental matters are of major concern to the industry, the public and to governments. Research is being conducted to determine the most effective method for removing radium from tailings area effluents. Very stringent criteria are being drawn up by the regulatory agencies that must be met by the industry in order to obtain an operating licence from the AECB. These criteria cover seepages from the tailings basin and through the tailings retention dam, seismic stability, and both short and long term management of the tailings waste management area. (auth)