WorldWideScience

Sample records for global nonproliferation efforts

  1. Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

    Chellaney, B.

    1994-01-01

    Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

  2. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

    2002-01-01

    ...) information about efforts to combat nuclear smuggling at U.S. borders. My statement today is based on the results of our May 16, 2002, report on this subject1 and information we obtained from the U.S...

  3. JAEA's efforts for regional transparency in the area of nuclear nonproliferation

    Hoffheins, Barbara; Kawakubo, Yoko; Inoue, Naoko

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has undertaken a joint R and D project with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) for the purposes of developing an Information Sharing Framework (ISF) for regional nonproliferation cooperation since July 2011. This project builds on nearly twenty years of technical cooperation between JAEA, its predecessor organizations and the DOE including the activities to define, develop and test transparency technologies and other multilateral efforts. The objective of current project is to design a viable information sharing process to support the goals of building confidence in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear programs. At the end of a two-year-effort, project partners, JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have defined the comprehensive requirements for an ISF that will ensure nonproliferation transparency success and sustainability. In October 2011, a parallel project with the similar title and objective was launched under the arrangement between the US DOE/NNSA and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Since then, JAEA, SNL, the Korea Institute for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) have jointly carried out the project in a form of informal, multilateral cooperation. The project partners have identified needs and audience for ISF, and initiated the discussion to develop requirements for ISF through workshops, meetings, regular telephone conferences, etc. The activities include conducting a survey to identify stakeholders' needs and requirements for an ISF, launching a website to practice information sharing concepts, and presenting papers. This paper provides the historical context of the current project to establish ISF, and reports the progress to date and speculates on future directions. (author)

  4. 'For good and for bad': the relations between universal obligations and particular efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation

    Dassen Van, L.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The world has 'nuclear non-proliferation' on its lips. Presidents, politicians, journalists and others refer to it as the number one peril in our times. This may be right or wrong but irrespective of the real salience of 'nuclear dangers' it has a grip on our minds and wallets. A long range of states now make active investments in the improvement of nuclear security; not only at home as they used to do, but even abroad in other places and countries where there is concern with regard to how safe nuclear and materials are kept and stored. This development is surely an expression of a shared broadening of our sense of responsibility beyond the narrow confines of statehood and borders, and therefore this development should please us. On the other hand, the truly universal measures and instruments of the NPT and the regime round it are in trouble. It is being stated in some quarters that the NPT is inadequate in a new era with new threats from sub-state actors. Nevertheless, the NPT is the only legal instrument that is a framework that either by itself or as a starting-point can serve as a tool box for long-term storage of the proliferation risks. The reason for this is that the NPT is an expression of fairness in terms of rights and balances for all states committed to non-proliferation. And its foundations are those of international law. To the extent the NPT is being questioned will there also be a risk that non-proliferation efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction and for instance global partnership will lose legitimacy; simply for the reason that only a small number of the non-proliferation concerns are given attention. This relationship between cooperative threat reduction efforts on the one hand and universal legal instruments for non-proliferation on the other is a double-edged sword. While the two can reinvigorate and strengthen each other, there is also a risk that the one - cooperative threat reduction - when given preference over

  5. Effort in Multitasking: Local and Global Assessment of Effort.

    Kiesel, Andrea; Dignath, David

    2017-01-01

    When performing multiple tasks in succession, self-organization of task order might be superior compared to external-controlled task schedules, because self-organization allows optimizing processing modes and thus reduces switch costs, and it increases commitment to task goals. However, self-organization is an additional executive control process that is not required if task order is externally specified and as such it is considered as time-consuming and effortful. To compare self-organized and externally controlled task scheduling, we suggest assessing global subjective and objectives measures of effort in addition to local performance measures. In our new experimental approach, we combined characteristics of dual tasking settings and task switching settings and compared local and global measures of effort in a condition with free choice of task sequence and a condition with cued task sequence. In a multi-tasking environment, participants chose the task order while the task requirement of the not-yet-performed task remained the same. This task preview allowed participants to work on the previously non-chosen items in parallel and resulted in faster responses and fewer errors in task switch trials than in task repetition trials. The free-choice group profited more from this task preview than the cued group when considering local performance measures. Nevertheless, the free-choice group invested more effort than the cued group when considering global measures. Thus, self-organization in task scheduling seems to be effortful even in conditions in which it is beneficiary for task processing. In a second experiment, we reduced the possibility of task preview for the not-yet-performed tasks in order to hinder efficient self-organization. Here neither local nor global measures revealed substantial differences between the free-choice and a cued task sequence condition. Based on the results of both experiments, we suggest that global assessment of effort in addition to

  6. Supporting non proliferation and global security efforts

    Pochon, E.

    2013-01-01

    CEA contributes as a major actor of France's action against nuclear proliferation and to the strengthening of nuclear security at national level as European and International levels, in particular through the support of the IAEA activities in nuclear non proliferation with the French Support Programme for the IAEA safeguards system and security with the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and cooperation projects with the European Commission. The CEA is a French government funded technological research organization, organized around 5 branches: Nuclear Energy, Technological Researches, Defence (DAM), Material Sciences and Life Sciences. Within the scope of its activities, CEA covers most of the research areas and techniques in nuclear non-proliferation and security. The CEA is also the advisor of the French Government on nuclear policy. Treaty monitoring and the development and implementation of non proliferation and global security programs is an important mission of DAM which rely on nuclear weapons manufacture and past testing experience. The programmes on non proliferation and global security carried out to fulfil DAM's mission cover the following areas: development of monitoring and detection methods and equipments, country profiles and nuclear stockpiles assessment, arms control instruments, proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle, monitoring of nuclear tests, operation and maintenance of national detection capabilities and contribution to CTBT verification systems. (A.C.)

  7. Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

    Simpson, J.

    1995-01-01

    It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

  8. The self-consistent energy system with an enhanced non-proliferated core concept for global nuclear energy utilization

    Kawashima, Masatoshi; Arie, Kazuo; Araki, Yoshio; Sato, Mitsuyoshi; Mori, Kenji; Nakayama, Yoshiyuki; Nakazono, Ryuichi; Kuroda, Yuji; Ishiguma, Kazuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    2008-01-01

    A sustainable nuclear energy system was developed based on the concept of Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES). Our study that trans-uranium (TRU) metallic fuel fast reactor cycle coupled with recycling of five long-lived fission products (LLFP) as well as actinides is the most promising system for the sustainable nuclear utilization. Efficient utilization of uranium-238 through the SCNES concept opens the doors to prolong the lifetime of nuclear energy systems towards several tens of thousand years. Recent evolution of the concept revealed compatibility of fuel sustainability, minor actinide (MA) minimization and non-proliferation aspects for peaceful use of nuclear energy systems through the discussion. As for those TRU compositions stabilized under fast neutron spectra, plutonium isotope fractions are remained in the range of reactor grade classification with high fraction of Pu240 isotope. Recent evolution of the SCNES concept has revealed that TRU recycling can cope with enhancing non-proliferation efforts in peaceful use with the 'no-blanket and multi-zoning core' concept. Therefore, the realization of SCNES is most important. In addition, along the process to the goals, a three-step approach is proposed to solve concurrent problems raised in the LWR systems. We discussed possible roles and contribution to the near future demand along worldwide expansion of LWR capacities by applying the 1st generation SCNES. MA fractions in TRU are more than 10% from LWR discharged fuels and even higher up to 20% in fuels from long interim storages. TRU recycling in the 1st generation SCNES system can reduce the MA fractions down to 4-5% in a few decades. This capability significantly releases 'MA' pressures in down-stream of LWR systems. Current efforts for enhancing capabilities for energy generation by LWR systems are efficient against the global warming crisis. In parallel to those movements, early realization of the SCNES concept can be the most viable decision

  9. The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

    Desmond, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

  10. The Galileo Teacher Training Program Global Efforts

    Doran, R.; Pennypacker, C.; Ferlet, R.

    2012-08-01

    The Galileo Teacher Training Program (GTTP) successfully named representatives in nearly 100 nations in 2009, the International Year of Astronomy (IYA2009). The challenge had just begun. The steps ahead are how to reach educators that might benefit from our program and how to help build a more fair and science literate society, a society in which good tools and resources for science education are not the privilege of a few. From 2010 on our efforts have been to strengthen the newly formed network and learn how to equally help educators and students around the globe. New partnerships with other strong programs and institutions are being formed, sponsorship schemes being outlined, new tools and resources being publicized, and on-site and video conference training conducted all over the world. Efforts to officially accredit a GTTP curriculum are on the march and a stronger certification process being outlined. New science topics are being integrated in our effort and we now seek to discuss the path ahead with experts in this field and the community of users, opening the network to all corners of our beautiful blue dot. The main aim of this article is to open the discussion regarding the urgent issue of how to reawaken student interest in science, how to solve the gender inequality in science careers, and how to reach the underprivileged students and open to them the same possibilities. Efforts are in strengthening the newly formed network and learning how to equally help educators and students around the globe.

  11. Reviewing efforts in global forest conservation for sustainable forest ...

    Reviewing efforts in global forest conservation for sustainable forest management: The World Wide Fund (WWF) case study. ... Global Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences. Journal Home · ABOUT THIS JOURNAL · Advanced Search · Current ...

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  13. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-06-21

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

  14. Effort sharing in ambitious, global climate change mitigation scenarios

    Ekholm, Tommi; Soimakallio, Sampo; Moltmann, Sara; Hoehne, Niklas; Syri, Sanna; Savolainen, Ilkka

    2010-01-01

    The post-2012 climate policy framework needs a global commitment to deep greenhouse gas emission cuts. This paper analyzes reaching ambitious emission targets up to 2050, either -10% or -50% from 1990 levels, and how the economic burden from mitigation efforts could be equitably shared between countries. The scenarios indicate a large low-cost mitigation potential in electricity and industry, while reaching low emission levels in international transportation and agricultural emissions might prove difficult. The two effort sharing approaches, Triptych and Multistage, were compared in terms of equitability and coherence. Both approaches produced an equitable cost distribution between countries, with least developed countries having negative or low costs and more developed countries having higher costs. There is, however, no definitive solution on how the costs should be balanced equitably between countries. Triptych seems to be yet more coherent than other approaches, as it can better accommodate national circumstances. Last, challenges and possible hindrances to effective mitigation and equitable effort sharing are presented. The findings underline the significance of assumptions behind effort sharing on mitigation potentials and current emissions, the challenge of sharing the effort with uncertain future allowance prices and how inefficient markets might undermine the efficiency of a cap-and-trade system.

  15. Effort sharing in ambitious, global climate change mitigation scenarios

    Ekholm, Tommi [TKK Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo (Finland); Soimakallio, Sampo; Syri, Sanna; Savolainen, Ilkka [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, P.O. Box 1000, FIN-02044 VTT (Finland); Moltmann, Sara; Hoehne, Niklas [Ecofys Germany GmbH, Cologne (Germany)

    2010-04-15

    The post-2012 climate policy framework needs a global commitment to deep greenhouse gas emission cuts. This paper analyzes reaching ambitious emission targets up to 2050, either or from 1990 levels, and how the economic burden from mitigation efforts could be equitably shared between countries. The scenarios indicate a large low-cost mitigation potential in electricity and industry, while reaching low emission levels in international transportation and agricultural emissions might prove difficult. The two effort sharing approaches, Triptych and Multistage, were compared in terms of equitability and coherence. Both approaches produced an equitable cost distribution between countries, with least developed countries having negative or low costs and more developed countries having higher costs. There is, however, no definitive solution on how the costs should be balanced equitably between countries. Triptych seems to be yet more coherent than other approaches, as it can better accommodate national circumstances. Last, challenges and possible hindrances to effective mitigation and equitable effort sharing are presented. The findings underline the significance of assumptions behind effort sharing on mitigation potentials and current emissions, the challenge of sharing the effort with uncertain future allowance prices and how inefficient markets might undermine the efficiency of a cap-and-trade system. (author)

  16. International scientific collaboration in nonproliferation

    Travelli, A.

    1998-01-01

    International collaboration is a vital component of every serious nonproliferation effort. Several examples of the experiences that the Argonne Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program has had in this area are given and, in the process, important components of the program come to light. Some of the main principles that the program has learned to follow while pursuing international collaboration projects are shared, as are the pitfalls that the program has learned to avoid. (author)

  17. The global financial crisis and health: scaling up our effort.

    Labonté, Ronald

    2009-01-01

    Economic events of the past year are beginning to create hardships for tens of thousands of Canadians. There are likely to be health effects as well, to the extent that unemployment and poverty rates rise. Conditions, however, will be much worse for those living in poorer countries. High-income countries are committing trillions of dollars in countercyclical spending and banking bail-outs. Poorer countries need to do the same, but lack the resources to do so. Yet foreign aid and fairer trade are widely expected to be among the first high-income country victims of the recession fallout as nations turn inwards and protectionist. This is neither good for global health nor necessary given the scale of untaxed (or unfairly taxed) wealth that could be harnessed for a truly global rescue package. Policy choices confront us. The Canadian public health community must hold our political leadership accountable for making those choices that will improve health globally and not further imperil the well-being of much of the world's population in efforts to secure our own future economic revival.

  18. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  19. Nuclear nonproliferation

    Neubert, M.

    1992-01-01

    The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

  20. Global unbalance in seaweed production, research effort and biotechnology markets.

    Mazarrasa, Inés; Olsen, Ylva S; Mayol, Eva; Marbà, Núria; Duarte, Carlos M

    2014-01-01

    Exploitation of the world's oceans is rapidly growing as evidenced by a booming patent market of marine products including seaweed, a resource that is easily accessible without sophisticated bioprospecting technology and that has a high level of domestication globally. The investment in research effort on seaweed aquaculture has recently been identified to be the main force for the development of a biotechnology market of seaweed-derived products and is a more important driver than the capacity of seaweed production. Here, we examined seaweed patent registrations between 1980 and 2009 to assess the growth rate of seaweed biotechnology, its geographic distribution and the types of applications patented. We compare this growth with scientific investment in seaweed aquaculture and with the market of seaweed production. We found that both the seaweed patenting market and the rate of scientific publications are rapidly growing (11% and 16.8% per year respectively) since 1990. The patent market is highly geographically skewed (95% of all registrations belonging to ten countries and the top two holding 65% of the total) compared to the distribution of scientific output among countries (60% of all scientific publications belonging to ten countries and the top two countries holding a 21%), but more homogeneously distributed than the production market (with a 99.8% belonging to the top ten countries, and a 71% to the top two). Food industry was the dominant application for both the patent registrations (37.7%) and the scientific publications (21%) followed in both cases by agriculture and aquaculture applications. This result is consistent with the seaweed taxa most represented. Kelp, which was the target taxa for 47% of the patent registrations, is a traditional ingredient in Asian food and Gracilaria and Ulva, which were the focus of 15% and 13% of the scientific publications respectively, that are also used in more sophisticated applications such as cosmetics, chemical

  1. Reagan outlines nonproliferation policy

    Walsh, J.

    1981-01-01

    The Reagan Administration wants to shift from efforts to impose direct control over the fuel cycle and nuclear technology to a framework based on cooperation and initiatives for greater political stability. A nuclear-free zone for the Middle East is one area to explore. Congress responded to this announced plan with a counter move to tighten non-proliferation strategies. Reagan's policy will be to restore the US as an aggressive, but reliable nuclear trading partner operating under adequate safeguards. Critics find this approach dangerous and contradictory. The policy is still too general to answer specific questions about bilateral arrangements, generic permits, plutonium recycling, and other matters

  2. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  3. Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-11-11

    As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

  4. Regularization in global sound equalization based on effort variation

    Stefanakis, Nick; Sarris, John; Jacobsen, Finn

    2009-01-01

    . Effort variation equalization involves modifying the conventional cost function in sound equalization, which is based on minimizing least-squares reproduction errors, by adding a term that is proportional to the squared deviations between complex source strengths, calculated independently for the sources......Sound equalization in closed spaces can be significantly improved by generating propagating waves that are naturally associated with the geometry, as, for example, plane waves in rectangular enclosures. This paper presents a control approach termed effort variation regularization based on this idea...

  5. Nuclear nonproliferation strategy in Asia

    Jenkins, F.W.

    1989-07-01

    The most immediate danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have developed the means of producing nuclear explosive materials. In East Asia, North Korea appears to be in the early stages of a weapon-related nuclear program, and before the end of the century South Korea or Taiwan could revive their past efforts to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, Japan could conceivably decide to abandon its present strong opposition to the acquisition of nuclear Weapons. At present, the United States has largely separate approaches to the nuclear weapon proliferation problems in South Asia and in East Asia. This paper argues that these separate approaches should be strengthened and integrated into a broader regional nonproliferation strategy. This regional strategy would have three major strands: inducing India and Pakistan to agree not to produce nuclear weapons or test nuclear explosive devices for a specific period; bolstering the existing nonproliferation regime, principally by maintaining nonproliferation incentives and involving China more in the nonproliferation regime; and encouraging regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

  6. Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America

    Redick, J.R.

    1981-01-01

    The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco supports peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. The lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas. The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the US Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America. 52 references

  7. Multilateral nonproliferation cooperation: US - Led effort to remove HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuels from the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland

    Shelton, Thomas A.; Viebrock, James M.; Riedy, Alexander W.; Moses, Stanley D.; Bird, Helen M.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents the efforts led by United States for removing HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuel from dhe Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. These efforts are resulted from a plan approved by the United States Government, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Georgia Governments to rapidly retrieve and transport circa 4.3 kilograms of enriched uranium. This material consisted largely of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and a small amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) fresh fuel, as well as about 800 grams of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel from a shutdown IR T-M research reactor on the outskirts of Table's, Georgia. The technical team lead by DOE consisted of HEU handling, packaging and transportation experts from the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, managed and operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, and fuel handling and transportation experts from Nac International in Norcross, Georgia, United States

  8. Interim report on the Global Design Effort Global International Linear Collider (ILC) R&D

    Harrison, M.

    2011-04-30

    The International Linear Collider: A Technical Progress Report marks the halfway point towards the Global Design Effort fulfilling its mandate to follow up the ILC Reference Design Report with a more optimised Technical Design Report (TDR) by the end of 2012. The TDR will be based on much of the work reported here and will contain all the elements needed to propose the ILC to collaborating governments, including a technical design and implementation plan that are realistic and have been better optimised for performance, cost and risk. We are on track to develop detailed plans for the ILC, such that once results from the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN establish the main science goals and parameters of the next machine, we will be in good position to make a strong proposal for this new major global project in particle physics. The two overriding issues for the ILC R&D programme are to demonstrate that the technical requirements for the accelerator are achievable with practical technologies, and that the ambitious physics goals can be addressed by realistic ILC detectors. This GDE interim report documents the impressive progress on the accelerator technologies that can make the ILC a reality. It highlights results of the technological demonstrations that are giving the community increased confidence that we will be ready to proceed with an ILC project following the TDR. The companion detector and physics report document likewise demonstrates how detector designs can meet the ambitious and detailed physics goals set out by the ILC Steering Committee. LHC results will likely affect the requirements for the machine design and the detectors, and we are monitoring that very closely, intending to adapt our design as those results become available.

  9. Fast reactors and nonproliferation

    Orlov, V.V.

    1997-01-01

    1.Three aspects of nonproliferation relevant to nuclear power are: Pu buildup in NPP spent fuel cooling ponds (∼ 104 t in case of consumption of ∼ 107 t cheap uranium). Danger of illegal radiochemical extraction of Pu for weapons production; Pu extraction from NPP fuel at the plants available in nuclear countries, its burning along with weapon-grade Pu in NPP reactors or in special-purpose burners; increased hazard of nuclear weapons sprawl with breeders and closed fuel cycle technology spreading all over the world. 2.The latter is one of major obstacles to creation of large-scale nuclear power. 3.Nuclear power of the first stage using 235 U will be able to meet the demands of certain fuel-deficient countries and regions, replacing ∼ 5-10% of conventional fuels in the global consumption for a number of decades. 4.Fast reactors of the first generation and the currently employed fuel technology are far from exhausting their potential for solving economic problems and meeting the challenges of safety, radioactive waste and nonproliferation. Development of large-scale nuclear power will become an option accepted by society for solving energy problems in the following century, provided a breeder technology is elaborated and demonstrated in the next 15-20 years, which would comply with the totality of the following requirement: full internal Pu breeding deterministic elimination of severe accidents involving fuel damage and high radioactivity releases: fast runaway, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions, etc.; reaching a balance between radioactive wastes disposed of and uranium mined in terms of radiation hazard; technology of closed fuel cycle preventing its use for Pu extraction and permitting physical protection from fuel thefts;economic competitiveness of nuclear power for most of countries and regions, i.e. primarily the cost of NPPs with fat reactors is to be below the cost of modern LWR plants, etc

  10. The European dimension in non-proliferation

    Krause, J.

    1996-01-01

    Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

  11. Nuclear fuel cycle industry. A responsible approach supporting non proliferation efforts in global perspective

    Jorant, Caroline

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents the reasons why and the manner in which nuclear industry is a stakeholder in non proliferation efforts. It then presents some recent proposals on multinational approaches to the fuel cycle industry and offers some comments and an industry view on these issues. A parallel is established with fundamental concepts in the field of radiation protection. Our industry, involved in 'nuclear technology development' (activities) qualified of 'sensitive' from a non proliferation standpoint, has major interests at stake in the evolution of the international non proliferation regime and is genuinely committed to the spreading of a non proliferation culture. The international community and in particular the nuclear community have been recently reflecting on ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in reaction to new threats or the perception thereof. Multilateral approaches regarding the nuclear fuel cycle are being discussed or proposed in this regard. Our approach as an industrial may be illustrated using the three basic principles developed in the field of radiation protection, namely limitation, justification and optimization. a) an overall limitation of sensitive facilities worldwide may be judicious, b) however no prohibition should be imposed if justified needs can be demonstrated on objective criteria, c) optimized used for existing facilities should be promoted through strengthened guarantees of supply where it may be necessary. (author)

  12. How Might Industry Governance Be Broadened To Include Nonproliferation

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2009-01-01

    Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include (1) the nuclear industry, (2) dual-use industries, and (3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that

  13. Future non-proliferation challenges

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  14. The nonproliferation predicament

    Pilat, J.F.

    1985-01-01

    This book presents papers on the non-proliferation policy being advocated by the U.S. Topics considered include political aspects, proliferation, national security, government policies, NATO, arms control, nuclear disarmament, the balance of power, U.S. foreign policy, dealing with the problem countries, international cooperation, the nuclear marketplace, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, legislation, congressional interest and input, ethical aspects, military strategy, public opinion, and terrorist groups

  15. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  16. How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

    Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

    2005-01-01

    Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

  17. United States non-proliferation policy

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  18. Methodological Considerations When Quantifying High-Intensity Efforts in Team Sport Using Global Positioning System Technology.

    Varley, Matthew C; Jaspers, Arne; Helsen, Werner F; Malone, James J

    2017-09-01

    Sprints and accelerations are popular performance indicators in applied sport. The methods used to define these efforts using athlete-tracking technology could affect the number of efforts reported. This study aimed to determine the influence of different techniques and settings for detecting high-intensity efforts using global positioning system (GPS) data. Velocity and acceleration data from a professional soccer match were recorded via 10-Hz GPS. Velocity data were filtered using either a median or an exponential filter. Acceleration data were derived from velocity data over a 0.2-s time interval (with and without an exponential filter applied) and a 0.3-second time interval. High-speed-running (≥4.17 m/s 2 ), sprint (≥7.00 m/s 2 ), and acceleration (≥2.78 m/s 2 ) efforts were then identified using minimum-effort durations (0.1-0.9 s) to assess differences in the total number of efforts reported. Different velocity-filtering methods resulted in small to moderate differences (effect size [ES] 0.28-1.09) in the number of high-speed-running and sprint efforts detected when minimum duration was GPS. Changes to how high-intensity efforts are defined affect reported data. Therefore, consistency in data processing is advised.

  19. International aspects of non-proliferation policy

    Aucoin, P.A.

    1978-01-01

    There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

  20. Nuclear non-proliferation

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  1. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  2. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  3. A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks.

    Dehaene, S; Kerszberg, M; Changeux, J P

    1998-11-24

    A minimal hypothesis is proposed concerning the brain processes underlying effortful tasks. It distinguishes two main computational spaces: a unique global workspace composed of distributed and heavily interconnected neurons with long-range axons, and a set of specialized and modular perceptual, motor, memory, evaluative, and attentional processors. Workspace neurons are mobilized in effortful tasks for which the specialized processors do not suffice. They selectively mobilize or suppress, through descending connections, the contribution of specific processor neurons. In the course of task performance, workspace neurons become spontaneously coactivated, forming discrete though variable spatio-temporal patterns subject to modulation by vigilance signals and to selection by reward signals. A computer simulation of the Stroop task shows workspace activation to increase during acquisition of a novel task, effortful execution, and after errors. We outline predictions for spatio-temporal activation patterns during brain imaging, particularly about the contribution of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate to the workspace.

  4. Multilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation

    2012-10-01

    Nathan E . Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA...or the World Bank . These organizations receive contributions from member states but have their own...Opening Reception Jack’s Lounge , Portola Hotel Friday, March 30, 2010 Timeline Content Delivery 7:30-8:30 Breakfast and Registration Cottonwood

  5. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  6. International nuclear trade and nonproliferation

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The purpose of this book, the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation, is to explore the international political and economic dimensions of nuclear trade, especially as they pertain to the behavior of eleven emerging nuclear-supplier states. More specifically, the book sets forth a conceptual framework for analyzing international nuclear trade; details the domestic and external factors that shape the nuclear export policies of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan; and identifies and assesses alternative strategies for containing the new proliferation risks posed by these emerging suppliers. The book also describes an innovative effort to utilize a computer-based system for tracking international nuclear trade

  7. Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

    Scheinman, L.

    1981-01-01

    The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

  8. Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

    Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

    2013-01-01

    This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

  9. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

  10. Nuclear non-proliferation

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  11. Heavy water and nonproliferation

    Miller, M.M.

    1980-05-01

    This report begins with a historical sketch of heavy water. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus is on the natural uranium, on-power fueled, pressure tube reactor CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safeguards is discussed. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural uranium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implementing these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer

  12. The American Society of Clinical Oncology's Efforts to Support Global Cancer Medicine

    El-Saghir, Nagi S.; Cufer, Tanja; Cazap, Eduardo; de Guzman, Roselle; Othieno-Abinya, Nicholas Anthony; Sanchez, Jose Angel; Pyle, Doug

    2016-01-01

    Despite much progress in the management of malignant diseases, the number of new cases and cancer-related deaths continues to rise around the world. More than half of new cases occur in economically developing countries, where more than two thirds of cancer deaths are expected. However, implementation of all necessary steps to accomplish the dissemination of state-of-the-art prevention, diagnosis, and management will require increased allocation of resources, and, more importantly, harmonization of the efforts of hundreds of national and international public health agencies, policy-setting bodies, governments, pharmaceutical companies, and philanthropic organizations. More than 30% of the members of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) reside and practice outside US borders, and more than half of attendees at all of the scientific congresses and symposia organized by ASCO are international. As cancer has become an increasingly global disease, ASCO has evolved as a global organization. The ASCO Board of Directors currently includes members from France, Brazil, and Canada. In 2013, the ASCO Board of Directors identified a number of strategic priorities for the future. Recognizing the importance of non-US members to the society, their first strategic priority was improving the society's service to non-US members and defining these members' identity in the international oncology community. This article reviews current ASCO activities in the international arena and its future plans in global oncology. PMID:26578614

  13. Global health goals: lessons from the worldwide effort to eradicate poliomyelitis.

    Aylward, R Bruce; Acharya, Arnab; England, Sarah; Agocs, Mary; Linkins, Jennifer

    2003-09-13

    The Global Polio Eradication Initiative was launched in 1988. Assessment of the politics, production, financing, and economics of this international effort has suggested six lessons that might be pertinent to the pursuit of other global health goals. First, such goals should be based on technically sound strategies with proven operational feasibility in a large geographical area. Second, before launching an initiative, an informed collective decision must be negotiated and agreed in an appropriate international forum to keep to a minimum long-term risks in financing and implementation. Third, if substantial community engagement is envisaged, efficient deployment of sufficient resources at that level necessitates a defined, time-limited input by the community within a properly managed partnership. Fourth, although the so-called fair-share concept is arguably the best way to finance such goals, its limitations must be recognised early and alternative strategies developed for settings where it does not work. Fifth, international health goals must be designed and pursued within existing health systems if they are to secure and sustain broad support. Finally, countries, regions, or populations most likely to delay the achievement of a global health goal should be identified at the outset to ensure provision of sufficient resources and attention. The greatest threats to poliomyelitis eradication are a financing gap of US 210 million dollars and difficulties in strategy implementation in at most five countries.

  14. Nuclear power generation and nuclear nonproliferation

    Walske, C.

    1978-01-01

    In the future outlook around year 2000 of nuclear power, thought must be given to fuel reprocessing and plutonium utilization. The adverse utilization of plutonium may be prevented by the means balanced with its economical value. As the method of less cost with lower effect of nonproliferation, combination of fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and mixed plutonium/uranium processing are possible. As the method of more cost with higher effect of nonproliferation the maintenance of high radioactivity and inaccessibility of plutonium is conceivable. As for the agreeable methods in 2000, seven principles may be mentioned, such as the dependence upon the agreements among major nations and upon nuclear exporting countries. These are still inadequate, however. What is important is to provide with the sufficient safeguards to countries concerned to negate the need for nuclear weapons. Efforts are then necessary for leading nuclear countries to extend aids to other nuclear-oriented countries. (Mori, K.)

  15. International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts. Summary of an International Conference

    2014-01-01

    The International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts was organized by the IAEA and held in Vienna on 1-5 July 2013. The conference was organized in cooperation with the following organizations and initiatives: the European Union; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM); the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI); the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); the Partnership for Global Security; the Police Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL); the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI); the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS); the World Nuclear Association (WNA); and the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI). A total of 34 ministers participated in the ministerial session of the conference. Altogether, the conference attracted more than 1300 registered participants from 125 IAEA Member States and 21 organizations. The aim of the conference was to review the international community's experience and achievements to date in strengthening nuclear security, to enhance the understanding of current approaches to nuclear security worldwide and identify trends, and to provide a global forum for ministers, policymakers and senior officials to formulate views on future directions and priorities for nuclear security. This book contains the President's Summary of the conference and a summary of the ministerial session, the full text of the ministerial declaration adopted by the conference and summaries of the main conference sessions. The attached CD-ROM contains the full conference programme, the list of conference participants, the national statements from the ministerial session and a selection of papers

  16. Winners and losers of national and global efforts to reconcile agricultural intensification and biodiversity conservation.

    Egli, Lukas; Meyer, Carsten; Scherber, Christoph; Kreft, Holger; Tscharntke, Teja

    2018-05-01

    Closing yield gaps within existing croplands, and thereby avoiding further habitat conversions, is a prominently and controversially discussed strategy to meet the rising demand for agricultural products, while minimizing biodiversity impacts. The agricultural intensification associated with such a strategy poses additional threats to biodiversity within agricultural landscapes. The uneven spatial distribution of both yield gaps and biodiversity provides opportunities for reconciling agricultural intensification and biodiversity conservation through spatially optimized intensification. Here, we integrate distribution and habitat information for almost 20,000 vertebrate species with land-cover and land-use datasets. We estimate that projected agricultural intensification between 2000 and 2040 would reduce the global biodiversity value of agricultural lands by 11%, relative to 2000. Contrasting these projections with spatial land-use optimization scenarios reveals that 88% of projected biodiversity loss could be avoided through globally coordinated land-use planning, implying huge efficiency gains through international cooperation. However, global-scale optimization also implies a highly uneven distribution of costs and benefits, resulting in distinct "winners and losers" in terms of national economic development, food security, food sovereignty or conservation. Given conflicting national interests and lacking effective governance mechanisms to guarantee equitable compensation of losers, multinational land-use optimization seems politically unlikely. In turn, 61% of projected biodiversity loss could be avoided through nationally focused optimization, and 33% through optimization within just 10 countries. Targeted efforts to improve the capacity for integrated land-use planning for sustainable intensification especially in these countries, including the strengthening of institutions that can arbitrate subnational land-use conflicts, may offer an effective, yet

  17. Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

    Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

  18. Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

    Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

    2010-01-01

    In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

  19. Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington

    Jones, Chris D.; Leek, K.M.

    2006-01-01

    The nonproliferation curriculum at the University of Washington (UW) is the product of collaboration between Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security (PNWCGS) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Jackson School of International Studies (JSIS) and Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. This collaboration began in 2001 with the establishment the Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies (IGRSS). IGRSS is housed in the Jackson School, which will celebrate its centenary in 2008 as a center for the study of world regions. PNNL also engages in a number of collaborative relationships with UW units in the natural and applied sciences. The principal goal of IGRSS has been to develop courses that draw graduates and undergraduates into careers in the field of nonproliferation. Since offering its first courses in 2002, IGRSS has assisted a substantial number of UW graduate students in submitting successful applications for nonproliferation positions in U.S. government agencies, including the Nonproliferation Graduate Program at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Since 2001, several UW undergraduates have begun careers in the field of nonproliferation, either by working at national laboratories or enrolling in non-UW graduate programs. The UW brought to its nonproliferation partnership with PNNL long-established programs in a wide range of professional programs and academic disciplines, including the 14 interdisciplinary regional and topical programs of the Jackson School of International Studies. The JSIS is an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental enterprise that brings together faculty and students from across the UW. Since the late 1940s the UW has trained experts for the nation's foreign policy community in programs focused in the languages, cultures, and histories of regions deemed critical to U.S. national security. However, since the termination of its program in nuclear engineering several

  20. A short generic measure of work stress in the era of globalization: effort-reward imbalance.

    Siegrist, Johannes; Wege, Natalia; Pühlhofer, Frank; Wahrendorf, Morten

    2009-08-01

    We evaluate psychometric properties of a short version of the original effort-reward imbalance (ERI) questionnaire. This measure is of interest in the context of assessing stressful work conditions in the era of economic globalization. In a representative sample of 10,698 employed men and women participating in the longitudinal Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) in Germany, a short version of the ERI questionnaire was included in the 2006 panel wave. Structural equation modeling and logistic regression analysis were applied. In addition to satisfactory internal consistency of scales, a model representing the theoretical structure of the scales provided the best data fit in a competitive test (RMSEA = 0.059, CAIC = 4124.19). Scoring high on the ERI scales was associated with elevated risks of poor self-rated health. This short version of the ERI questionnaire reveals satisfactory psychometric properties, and can be recommended for further use in research and practice.

  1. Non-proliferation

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  2. Present status of Tomari No.3 unit construction and efforts for preventing global warming

    Ouchi, Tamotsu; Sakai, Ichiro; Makino, Takeshi

    2009-01-01

    Hokkaido Electric Power Company, Inc. (HEPCO) supplies electricity to almost all area of Hokkaido. Its service area accounts for about one-fifth of Japan's area, on the other hand, the population of the service area only accounts for 4.4% of the nation. This means Hokkaido's nature is precious, and one of HEPCO's missions is to protect such environment, with providing stable electricity. Therefore, nuclear power, which does not emit greenhouse effect gas for generation, is becoming more important. HEPCO's operating nuclear power stations are Tomari No.1 unit and No.2 unit. Their generation capacity is 579 MW respectively. Now, No.3 unit is under construction. Its generation capacity is 912 MW and it will be operational in December 2009. In Hokkaido, about one fourth of electricity is now produced by nuclear power, however, after Tomari No.3 is completed, more than 40% of electricity will be produced by nuclear. So, Tomari No.3 unit will contribute stable supply of electricity in the first half of 21st century and prevent global warming in Hokkaido. This paper describes the present status of Tomari No.3 unit construction with major specifications and our efforts to prevent global warming. (author)

  3. Present status of Tomari No.3 unit construction and efforts for preventing global warming

    Ouchi, Tamotsu

    2008-01-01

    Hokkaido Electric Power Company, Inc. (HEPCO) supplies electricity to almost all area of Hokkaido. Its service area accounts for about one-fifth of Japan's area, on the other hand, the population of the service area only accounts for 4.4% of the nation. This means Hokkaido's nature is precious, and one of HEPCO's missions is to protect such environment, with providing stable electricity. Therefore, nuclear power, which does not emit greenhouse effect gas for generation, is becoming more important. HEPCO's operating nuclear power stations are Tomari No.1 unit and No.2 unit. Their generation capacity is 579 MW respectively. Now, No.3 unit is under construction. Its generation capacity is 912 MW and it will be operational in December 2009. In Hokkaido, about one fourth of electricity is now produced by nuclear power, however, after Tomari No.3 is completed, about 40% of electricity will be produced by nuclear. So, Tomari No.3 unit will contribute stable supply of electricity in the first half of 21st century and prevent global warming in Hokkaido. This paper describes the present status of Tomari No.3 unit construction with major specifications and our efforts to prevent global warming. (author)

  4. Risk assessment, eradication, and biological control: global efforts to limit Australian acacia invasions

    Wilson, John R.U.; Gairifo, Carla; Gibson, Michelle R.; Arianoutsou, Margarita; Bakar, Baki B.; Baret, Stephane; Celesti-Grapow, Laura; DiTomaso, Joseph M.; Dufour-Dror, Jean-Marc; Kueffer, Christoph; Kull, Christian A.; Hoffman, John H.; Impson, Fiona A.C.; Loope, Lloyd L.; Marchante, Elizabete; Harchante, Helia; Moore, Joslin L.; Murphy, Daniel J.; Tassin, Jacques; Witt, Arne; Zenni, Rafael D.; Richardson, David M.

    2011-01-01

    Aim Many Australian Acacia species have been planted around the world, some are highly valued, some are invasive, and some are both highly valued and invasive. We review global efforts to minimize the risk and limit the impact of invasions in this widely used plant group. Location Global. Methods Using information from literature sources, knowledge and experience of the authors, and the responses from a questionnaire sent to experts around the world, we reviewed: (1) a generalized life cycle of Australian acacias and how to control each life stage, (2) different management approaches and (3) what is required to help limit or prevent invasions. Results Relatively few Australian acacias have been introduced in large numbers, but all species with a long and extensive history of planting have become invasive somewhere. Australian acacias, as a group, have a high risk of becoming invasive and causing significant impacts as determined by existing assessment schemes. Moreover, in most situations, long-lived seed banks mean it is very difficult to control established infestations. Control has focused almost exclusively on widespread invaders, and eradication has rarely been attempted. Classical biological control is being used in South Africa with increasing success. Main conclusions A greater emphasis on pro-active rather than reactive management is required given the difficulties managing established invasions of Australian acacias. Adverse effects of proposed new introductions can be minimized by conducting detailed risk assessments in advance, planning for on-going monitoring and management, and ensuring resources are in place for long-term mitigation. Benign alternatives (e.g. sterile hybrids) could be developed to replace existing utilized taxa. Eradication should be set as a management goal more often to reduce the invasion debt. Introducing classical biological control agents that have a successful track-record in South Africa to other regions and identifying new

  5. Nonproliferation norms in civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    Kawata, Tomio

    2005-01-01

    For sustainable use of nuclear energy in large scale, it seems inevitable to choose a closed cycle option. One of the important questions is, then, whether we can really achieve the compatibility between civilian nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation norms. In this aspect, Japan is very unique because she is now only one country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program as a non-nuclear weapon state in NPT regime. In June 2004 in the midst of heightened proliferation concerns in NPT regime, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that, for Japanese nuclear energy program, non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities were verified through the inspections and examinations under Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Based on this conclusion, the IAEA announced the implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Japan in September 2004. This paper reviews how Japan has succeeded in becoming the first country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program to qualify for integrated Safeguards, and identifies five key elements that have made this achievement happen: (1) Obvious need of nuclear fuel cycle program, (2) Country's clear intention for renunciation of nuclear armament, (3) Transparency of national nuclear energy program, (4) Record of excellent compliance with nonproliferation obligations for many decades, and (5) Numerous proactive efforts. These five key elements will constitute a kind of an acceptance model for civilian nuclear fuel cycle in NNWS, and may become the basis for building 'Nonproliferation Culture'. (author)

  6. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  7. 1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Preisinger, J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

  8. 78 FR 9768 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    2013-02-11

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8184] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice...

  9. 78 FR 9769 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on...

    2013-02-11

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8182] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Chinese and Iranian Foreign Persons AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Government...

  10. Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

    Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

    2012-01-01

    Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

  11. Romania non-proliferation policy

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    is a component of the National Development Strategy for Romania, presented to the European Union, as a main step in the accession process. Cernavoda NPP Unit 1 is in commercial operation from 1996 and assures 10% of the overall national electricity production. Cernavoda Unit 2 is now about 40% complete, and the Government of Romania has declared its completion as a national priority. The national participation in this project planned to be completed by the year 2005 comprises important contribution of the nuclear infrastructure developed in Romania for the CANDU power plants. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is also regarded as a fundamental element of the non-proliferation regime. Physical Protection comprises those measures that Romania apply to prevent or deter illegal actions taken against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials, are transported across the country. Romania received IAEA assistance to enhance its efforts to prevent unclear material and other radioactive sources from being use illegally and to detect and respond to trafficking cases, should they occur. This assistance included an IPASS Mission and training for staff involved in physical protection for nuclear material and nuclear installations. In 1993 Romania ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has following requirements for nuclear material transport: the material must be classified according to its characteristics, the material may be transported only in approved containers, containers must be marked with safety labels or placards to indicate their contents, for certain radioactive material the shipper must have in place an emergency response assistance plan. CNCAN coordinates at national level the activities regarding preventing and combating illicit trafficking with nuclear materials. From 1993 when the IAEA database was installed, Romania reported 22 incidents involving nuclear material and radioactive sources. In

  12. Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

    Cowan, Mara R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kurzrok, Andrew J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-02-13

    Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

  13. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  14. The Role of Reconciling Values in Efforts to Build Community Resilience to Global Environmental Change

    Rainie, S. C.; Ferguson, D. B.; Martinez, A.

    2017-12-01

    Global environmental change has increasingly forced researchers and policy makers to reckon with the practical and philosophical need to integrate Indigenous knowledge with western science to support sustainable, resilient communities. Despite the recognition that integration of different ways of knowing offers a compelling approach for building long-term resilience, balancing the power dynamic that favors mainstream epistemologies over other ways of knowing remains elusive. Indigenous scholars themselves often speak of "walking in two worlds," acknowledging the distinction between Indigenous knowledge and western science and the difficulty of weaving together the two approaches. Central to the distinction between different ways of knowing are the core values that drive development and application of new knowledge. The DIKW pyramid describes the hierarchical relationships between wisdom, knowledge, information, and data. In these relationships, values drive how one turns data into information, then knowledge and wisdom. Thus, if building community resilience relies on integrating Indigenous science and Western science, a central point of focus must be on establishing which of the core values from these different knowledge systems can contribute and which may impede the goal of supporting community resilience. For example, does the absence of Western science data collection protocols (a core value of empirical science) eliminate the utility of community observations of environmental change from efforts to understand system change? Indigenous data sovereignty, an emerging framework, asserts Indigenous rights to information and promotes the role of community knowledge in creating metrics, outcomes, and ultimately actions toward resilient communities. Indigenous data sovereignty acknowledges that context and values shape data in addition to providing a lens for interpreting data. Can principles for the governance of Indigenous data, such as recognizing and supporting

  15. Global Trafficking Prevalence Data Distorts Efforts to Stop Patterns of Human Trafficking

    Mike Dottridge

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available For everyone engaged in efforts to stop the exploitation and harm associated with human trafficking, it always sounds helpful to know how many people are being exploited in particular places and where they come from. Finding out should help us assess whether efforts to cut down these numbers are effective or not.

  16. From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

    Sethi, Manpreet

    1998-01-01

    This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

  17. Common sense and nonproliferation

    Kennedy, R.T.

    1985-01-01

    Since the dawn of the nuclear age nearly four decades ago, the United States has been firmly commited to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. That principle is embodied in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), support for which has been a basic tenet of US foreign policy and a basic security interest of the world at large ever since. The Reagan administration remains firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation could trigger new and grave dangers for America's security and well-being and indeed for that of all the world's peoples. Desperate leaders in future high-stakes conflicts might not shrink from nuclear blackmail or even from the use of nuclear weapons if they were available. A conventional clash between nuclear-armed states in a conflict-prone region might escalate by accident or miscalculation to a local nuclear exchange. It cannot be discounted that such a nuclear clash might threaten to involve the superpowers themselves. With proliferation, also, terrorist groups could more easily acquire nuclear weapons to extort concessions. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, then, is not solely of interest to the superpowers: it is vital to all countries and regions. The security of the countries in those regions to which nuclear weapons might spread would be most immediately and seriously affected. By their adherence to the NPT, more than 100 countries have recognized this fact

  18. Attitudes towards Internationalism through the Lens of Cognitive Effort, Global Mindset, and Cultural Intelligence

    Romano, Joan; Platania, Judith

    2014-01-01

    In the current study we examine attitudes towards internationalism through the lens of a specific set of constructs necessary in defining an effective global leader. One hundred fifty-nine undergraduates responded to items measuring need for cognition, cultural intelligence, and a set of items measuring the correlates of global mindset. In…

  19. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    Satkowiak, Lawrence [Director, Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security Programs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  20. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  1. Performing Free Radioactive Certificate as an Effort to Protect Import and Export Commodities in Globalization Era

    Kunto-Wiharto; Syarbaini

    2001-01-01

    Several activities such as nuclear weapon tests, nuclear fuel reprocessing and nuclear accidents have caused radioactive contamination in local, regional and global environment. In globalization and free trade era, every country will be faced to the condition with the movable commodities from and to another countries. Global contamination through import and export commodities is a problem will be found every country in the future. Therefore, performing free radioactive certification on import and export commodities must be carried out to protect a member of public and environment from radioactive contamination. (author)

  2. A Case Study of the Global Group for Sharing Knowledge and Efforts in Human Resources within the Nuclear Industry

    Thomas, C.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: One of the main conclusions from the IAEA’s HRD Conference in 2014 was that people and organisations in the global nuclear industry could cooperate more in sharing information and efforts. This was an inspiring conclusion, and there seemed an especially great opportunity for such sharing of information and efforts related to the attraction, recruitment, development and retention of people within the nuclear workforce. Founding members include people from the IAEA, WNA, WANO, EDF and OPG amongst others, the global working group for Human Resource matters aimed at “Building and Sustaining a Competent Nuclear Workforce” was established. This global working group is free to join and is open to anyone concerned with Building and Sustaining a Competent NuclearWorkforce. The objectives of the group are to share useful information, find others with similar objectives to cooperate with, ask questions, share opinions and crucially to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts. The group already has 160 members from more than 15 countries and is currently hosted as a group on the LinkedIn website. The vision for the group is that it will become an invaluable resource for people across the world in the nuclear industry for sharing information and efforts. (author

  3. Evaluation method of nuclear nonproliferation credibility

    Kwon, Eun-ha; Ko, Won Il

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.

  4. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-01-01

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  5. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-03-06

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  6. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  7. Future technology challenges in non-proliferation

    Richardson, J.H.

    2004-01-01

    Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Finally, different detectors combined into distributed networks offer promise for detection and tracking of radioactive materials. As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation beyond the current Advanced Protocol. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. (author)

  8. A Global Review of Sustainable Construction Project Financing: Policies, Practices, and Research Efforts

    Ming Shan

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Despite the increasing investment in sustainable development over the past decade, a systematic review of sustainable construction project financing is lacking. The objectives of this paper are to conduct a systematic review to examine the policies, practices, and research efforts in the area of sustainable construction project financing, and to explore the potential opportunities for the future research. To achieve these goals, this paper first reviewed the sustainable construction project financing practices implemented by four representative developed economies including the United Kingdom, the United States, Singapore, and Australia. Then, this paper reviewed the efforts and initiatives launched by three international organizations including the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and International Finance Corporation. After that, this paper reviewed the research efforts of sustainable construction project financing published in peer-review journals and books. This paper identified four major research themes within this area, which are the review of financial stakeholders and market of sustainable construction, benefits and barriers to sustainable construction project financing, financial vehicles for sustainable construction projects, innovative models and mechanisms for sustainable construction project financing. Additionally, this paper revealed five directions for the future research of sustainable construction project financing, which are the identification of financial issues in sustainable construction projects, the investigation of financial vehicles for sustainable construction projects in terms of their strengths, limitations, and performances, the examination of critical drivers for implementing sustainable construction project financing, the development of a knowledge-based decision support system for implementing sustainable construction financing, and the development of best practices for

  9. Comparing global alcohol and tobacco control efforts: network formation and evolution in international health governance.

    Gneiting, Uwe; Schmitz, Hans Peter

    2016-04-01

    Smoking and drinking constitute two risk factors contributing to the rising burden of non-communicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries. Both issues have gained increased international attention, but tobacco control has made more sustained progress in terms of international and domestic policy commitments, resources dedicated to reducing harm, and reduction of tobacco use in many high-income countries. The research presented here offers insights into why risk factors with comparable levels of harm experience different trajectories of global attention. The analysis focuses particular attention on the role of dedicated global health networks composed of individuals and organizations producing research and engaging in advocacy on a given health problem. Variation in issue characteristics and the policy environment shape the opportunities and challenges of global health networks focused on reducing the burden of disease. What sets the tobacco case apart was the ability of tobacco control advocates to create and maintain a consensus on policy solutions, expand their reach in low- and middle-income countries and combine evidence-based research with advocacy reaching beyond the public health-centered focus of the core network. In contrast, a similar network in the alcohol case struggled with expanding its reach and has yet to overcome divisions based on competing problem definitions and solutions to alcohol harm. The tobacco control network evolved from a group of dedicated individuals to a global coalition of membership-based organizations, whereas the alcohol control network remains at the stage of a collection of dedicated and like-minded individuals. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine © The Author 2016; all rights reserved.

  10. Los Alamos National Laboratory Training Capabilities (Possible Applications in the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program)

    Martin, Olga [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-04

    The briefing provides an overview of the training capabilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory that can be applied to nonproliferation/responsible science education at nuclear institutes in the Former Soviet Union, as part of the programmatic effort under the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program (GIPP).

  11. New dimensions in nonproliferation -- An International Atomic Energy Agency view

    Pelland, B.

    1994-01-01

    Four years ago, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intention of annexing it as Iraq's 19th state. The disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Gulf War--through the IAEA inspections--signaled the end of one proliferation era and the start of the next. In the author's remarks here, he has found it useful to identify four distinct proliferation eras, each with different features, each calling for different emphasis in international nonproliferation efforts. They provide a convenient way to look at the history of nonproliferation, and to look into the future and to the new dimensions in nonproliferation that are slowly emerging. Since the Gulf War, the nuclear world experienced a series of events of fundamental significance that changed the nature of nonproliferation, forcing changes in the mission of the IAEA and its methods. Certainly some of these events came in the form of unpleasant surprises, such as in Iraq, but very positive progress was also made on other fronts. He would like to share some perceptions of the events creating the present situation, and some views anticipating the requirements most likely to emerge in the coming years

  12. Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime, Common Structures and Divergent Trajectories in Latin America

    Sotomayor, Arturo C.

    2014-01-01

    Chapter 8 There are multiple options Latin American countries to support and comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the...

  13. National nutrition surveys in Asian countries: surveillance and monitoring efforts to improve global health.

    Song, SuJin; Song, Won O

    2014-01-01

    Asian regions have been suffering from growing double burden of nutritional health problems, such as undernutrition and chronic diseases. National nutrition survey plays an essential role in helping to improve both national and global health and reduce health disparities. The aim of this review was to compile and present the information on current national nutrition surveys conducted in Asian countries and suggest relevant issues in implementation of national nutrition surveys. Fifteen countries in Asia have conducted national nutrition surveys to collect data on nutrition and health status of the population. The information on national nutrition survey of each country was obtained from government documents, international organizations, survey website of governmental agencies, and publications, including journal articles, books, reports, and brochures. The national nutrition survey of each country has different variables and procedures. Variables of the surveys include sociodemographic and lifestyle variables; foods and beverages intake, dietary habits, and food security of individual or household; and health indicators, such as anthropometric and biochemical variables. The surveys have focused on collecting data about nutritional health status in children aged under five years and women of reproductive ages, nutrition intake adequacy and prevalence of obesity and chronic diseases for all individuals. To measure nutrition and health status of Asian populations accurately, improvement of current dietary assessment methods with various diet evaluation tools is necessary. The information organized in this review is important for researchers, policy makers, public health program developers, educators, and consumers in improving national and global health.

  14. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Donnelly, W H

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. Here the author outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US nonproliferation policy. If the future of nuclear power is to include more sensitive facilities in which plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, it must be determined whether the risks seen in proliferation are great enough to cause the USA and other governments to place such facilities under some form of international ownership or control in addition to international safeguards. A final crucial problem is deciding what can and should be done to dissuade non-nuclear-weapons states from the direct manufacture of nuclear weapons. 6 references.

  15. A brief history of the global effort to develop a preventive HIV vaccine.

    Esparza, José

    2013-08-02

    Soon after HIV was discovered as the cause of AIDS in 1983-1984, there was an expectation that a preventive vaccine would be rapidly developed. In trying to achieve that goal, three successive scientific paradigms have been explored: induction of neutralizing antibodies, induction of cell mediated immunity, and exploration of combination approaches and novel concepts. Although major progress has been made in understanding the scientific basis for HIV vaccine development, efficacy trials have been critical in moving the field forward. In 2009, the field was reinvigorated with the modest results obtained from the RV144 trial conducted in Thailand. Here, we review those vaccine development efforts, with an emphasis on events that occurred during the earlier years. The goal is to provide younger generations of scientists with information and inspiration to continue the search for an HIV vaccine. Copyright © 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  16. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  17. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  18. Web-based child pornography: The global impact of deterrence efforts and its consumption on mobile platforms.

    Steel, Chad M S

    2015-06-01

    Our study is the first to look at mobile device use for child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) consumption, and at the global impact of deterrence efforts by search providers. We used data from Google, Bing, and Yandex to assess how web searches for CSEM are being conducted, both at present and historically. Our findings show that the blocking efforts by Google and Microsoft have resulted in a 67% drop in the past year in web-based searches for CSEM. Additionally, our findings show that mobile devices are a substantial platform for web-based consumption of CSEM, with tablets and smartphones representing 32% of all queries associated with CSEM conducted on Bing. Further, our findings show that a major search engine not located in the United States, Yandex, did not undertake blocking efforts similar to those implemented by Google and Microsoft and has seen no commensurate drop in CSEM searches and continues to profit from ad revenue on these queries. While the efforts by Google and Microsoft have had a deterrence effect in the United States, searchers from Russia and other locations where child pornography possession is not criminalized have continued to use these services. Additionally, the same lax enforcement environment has allowed searchers from the United States to utilize Yandex with little fear of detection or referral to United States law enforcement from the Russian authorities. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. The global survey of physicists: A collaborative effort illuminates the situation of women in physics

    Ivie, Rachel; Tesfaye, Casey Langer; Czujko, Roman; Chu, Raymond

    2013-03-01

    The results of the Global Survey of Physicists draw attention to the need to focus on factors other than representation when discussing the situation of women in physics. Previous studies of women in physics have mostly focused on the lack of women in the field. This study goes beyond the obvious shortage of women and shows that there are much deeper issues. For the first time, a multinational study was conducted with approximately 15,000 respondents from 130 countries, showing that problems for women in physics transcend national borders. Across all countries, women have fewer resources and opportunities and are more affected by cultural expectations concerning child care. We show that limited resources and opportunities hurt career progress, and because women have fewer opportunities and resources, their careers progress more slowly. We also show the disproportionate effects of children on women physicists' careers. Cultural expectations about home and family are difficult to change. However, for women to have successful outcomes and advance in physics, they must have equal access to resources and opportunities.

  20. Floating Forests: Validation of a Citizen Science Effort to Answer Global Ecological Questions

    Rosenthal, I.; Byrnes, J.; Cavanaugh, K. C.; Haupt, A. J.; Trouille, L.; Bell, T. W.; Rassweiler, A.; Pérez-Matus, A.; Assis, J.

    2017-12-01

    Researchers undertaking long term, large-scale ecological analyses face significant challenges for data collection and processing. Crowdsourcing via citizen science can provide an efficient method for analyzing large data sets. However, many scientists have raised questions about the quality of data collected by citizen scientists. Here we use Floating-Forests (http://floatingforests.org), a citizen science platform for creating a global time series of giant kelp abundance, to show that ensemble classifications of satellite data can ensure data quality. Citizen scientists view satellite images of coastlines and classify kelp forests by tracing all visible patches of kelp. Each image is classified by fifteen citizen scientists before being retired. To validate citizen science results, all fifteen classifications are converted to a raster and overlaid on a calibration dataset generated from previous studies. Results show that ensemble classifications from citizen scientists are consistently accurate when compared to calibration data. Given that all source images were acquired by Landsat satellites, we expect this consistency to hold across all regions. At present, we have over 6000 web-based citizen scientists' classifications of almost 2.5 million images of kelp forests in California and Tasmania. These results are not only useful for remote sensing of kelp forests, but also for a wide array of applications that combine citizen science with remote sensing.

  1. The emergence of Ebola as a global health security threat: From ′lessons learned′ to coordinated multilateral containment efforts

    Sarathi Kalra

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available First reported in remote villages of Africa in the 1970s, the Ebolavirus was originally believed to be transmitted to people from wild animals. Ebolavirus (EBOV causes a severe, frequently fatal hemorrhagic syndrome in humans. Each outbreak of the Ebolavirus over the last three decades has perpetuated fear and economic turmoil among the local and regional populations in Africa. Until now it has been considered a tragic malady confined largely to the isolated regions of the African continent, but it is no longer so. The frequency of outbreaks has increased since the 1970s. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in Western Africa has been the most severe in history and was declared a public health emergency by the World Health Organization. Given the widespread use of modern transportation and global travel, the EBOV is now a risk to the entire Global Village, with intercontinental transmission only an airplane flight away. Clinically, symptoms typically appear after an incubation period of approximately 11 days. A flu-like syndrome can progress to full hemorrhagic fever with multiorgan failure, and frequently, death. Diagnosis is confirmed by detection of viral antigens or Ribonucleic acid (RNA in the blood or other body fluids. Although historically the mortality of this infection exceeded 80%, modern medicine and public health measures have been able to lower this figure and reduce the impact of EBOV on individuals and communities. The treatment involves early, aggressive supportive care with rehydration. Core interventions, including contact tracing, preventive initiatives, active surveillance, effective isolation and quarantine procedures, and timely response to patients, are essential for a successful outbreak control. These measures, combined with public health education, point-of-care diagnostics, promising new vaccine and pharmaceutical efforts, and coordinated efforts of the international community, give new hope to the Global effort to eliminate Ebola

  2. The Emergence of Ebola as a Global Health Security Threat: From ‘Lessons Learned’ to Coordinated Multilateral Containment Efforts

    Kalra, Sarathi; Kelkar, Dhanashree; Galwankar, Sagar C.; Papadimos, Thomas J.; Stawicki, Stanislaw P.; Arquilla, Bonnie; Hoey, Brian A.; Sharpe, Richard P.; Sabol, Donna; Jahre, Jeffrey A.

    2014-01-01

    First reported in remote villages of Africa in the 1970s, the Ebolavirus was originally believed to be transmitted to people from wild animals. Ebolavirus (EBOV) causes a severe, frequently fatal hemorrhagic syndrome in humans. Each outbreak of the Ebolavirus over the last three decades has perpetuated fear and economic turmoil among the local and regional populations in Africa. Until now it has been considered a tragic malady confined largely to the isolated regions of the African continent, but it is no longer so. The frequency of outbreaks has increased since the 1970s. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in Western Africa has been the most severe in history and was declared a public health emergency by the World Health Organization. Given the widespread use of modern transportation and global travel, the EBOV is now a risk to the entire Global Village, with intercontinental transmission only an airplane flight away. Clinically, symptoms typically appear after an incubation period of approximately 11 days. A flu-like syndrome can progress to full hemorrhagic fever with multiorgan failure, and frequently, death. Diagnosis is confirmed by detection of viral antigens or Ribonucleic acid (RNA) in the blood or other body fluids. Although historically the mortality of this infection exceeded 80%, modern medicine and public health measures have been able to lower this figure and reduce the impact of EBOV on individuals and communities. The treatment involves early, aggressive supportive care with rehydration. Core interventions, including contact tracing, preventive initiatives, active surveillance, effective isolation and quarantine procedures, and timely response to patients, are essential for a successful outbreak control. These measures, combined with public health education, point-of-care diagnostics, promising new vaccine and pharmaceutical efforts, and coordinated efforts of the international community, give new hope to the Global effort to eliminate Ebola as a public

  3. A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

    Duggan, Ruth A

    2006-04-01

    In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

  4. Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

  5. The ASPIRE-to-Excellence Program: A Global Effort to Improve the Quality of Medical Education.

    Hunt, Dan; Klamen, Debra; Harden, Ronald M; Ali, Farzand

    2017-12-19

    Publications and organizations ranking medical schools rely heavily on schools' research-oriented and grant-success data because those are the publicly available data. To address the vacuum of evidence for medical education quality, in 2012 the Association of Education in Europe (AMEE) introduced an initiative entitled A Schools Programme for International Recognition of Excellence in Education (ASPIRE) awards. ASPIRE panels of international experts in specific areas of medical education have developed internationally peer-based criteria to benchmark excellence in social accountability, student engagement, student assessment, faculty development, and simulation; they plan to publish criteria on curriculum design and development in 2018. Schools are encouraged to use ASPIRE criteria to challenge themselves and, for a fee, may submit evidence that they have met the criteria for excellence in one or more of the five areas. The international panels then judge the evidence submitted by the school and determine whether an award of excellence is merited.The authors share lessons learned from five years of program experience. Of the 88 schools submitting evidence, 38 have been recognized for their excellence in one of the ASPIRE topic areas. As the number of representatives from the schools that are awarded ASPIRE recognition continues to increase and those individuals find new ways to contribute, hopes are high for this program. Challenges remain in how to better define excellence in low-resources settings, what new areas to take on, and how to keep infrastructure costs down. However, as an example of continuing global interaction for quality improvement, optimism prevails.

  6. On the structure of nonproliferation measures

    Kano, Takashi

    1994-01-01

    The author proposed a new analysis method of nonproliferation measures depending on full perception of common threat of nuclear proliferation to entire human being. Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan were analysed by this method and it revealed the following results: 1) There is a large discrepancy between the nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan mainly because of the different standpoints of both nations and partly because of the difference of understanding on the definition of nonproliferation, and the object of nonproliferation measures. 2) The total structure of nuclear nonproliferation measures becomes more visible through categorization of nonproliferation measures, depending on implementater, target for implementation, characteristics of the measures (soft-liner, legal, or hard-liner) and risk factor for reduction of the total risk of nuclear weapon use. 3) The total structure of nonproliferation measures is multi-barrier structure on the process to reach the actual nuclear weapon use, and each barrier is composed of multi-defense in depth structure including various soft-liner, legal, and hard-linear measures. 4) Various nonproliferation measures can be stored in a data base, based on the proposed structural analysis, which enables further comprehensive analysis for specific purposes efficiently. (author)

  7. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  8. Reassessing nuclear nonproliferation policy

    Smith, G.; Rathjens, G.

    1981-01-01

    Unresolved proliferation problems are as serious issues for the Reagan Administration as East-West relations and dependence on imported oil. The linkage of nuclear weapons to power reactors is debatable, but developing and industrialized countries alike feel that nuclear power is an important option. A review of Carter policies finds them flawed in several respects. Although they heightened worldwide concern about proliferation, they fell short because (1) most governments and the nuclear industry reacted negatively; (2) they offered no way to deal with countries which construct only weapons facilities; (3) they did not help the US image as a reliable supplier; (4) no realistic fuel-cycle alternatives emerged; and (5) little has been done about fuel assurances and international spent-fuel storage. Past policies need to be restructured under new premises to deal effectively with the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. The effort should stress collective rather than unilateral action and a renewed effort for a comprehensive test ban treaty. 10 references

  9. The NNSA global threat reduction initiative's efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production

    Staples, Parrish

    2010-01-01

    The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU); Demonstrating the viability of medical isotope production technologies that do not use HEU; Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide; and Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview on the recent developments and priorities for GTRI program activities in 2010, with a particular focus on GTRI's efforts to demonstrate the viability of non-HEU based medical isotope production technologies. (author)

  10. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  11. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  12. Statement at Inauguration Ceremony for Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    Washington. Through my windows in Dupont Circle, I could see smoke and flames rising from the Pentagon - a terrible and unforgettable sight. Since then, the IAEA has devoted increasing attention to preventing nuclear and radioactive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. In April last year, President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, attended by leaders from 47 countries. I also had the honour to participate. I was pleased that the IAEA's efforts to help countries make their nuclear facilities and borders more secure against the threat of nuclear terrorism were recognized at the highest levels. The heads of government gave strong moral and political support to our work. It was also noteworthy that the Communique and Work Plan agreed at the Summit highlighted the importance of education, training and capacity-building in nuclear security. Of course, the work of the IAEA goes well beyond non-proliferation and nuclear security. It also includes helping countries which want to introduce nuclear power - which is the sovereign decision of each state - to do so safely, securely and sustainably. We help them establish the technical and regulatory infrastructure and put the necessary legislation in place. Recently, we published a revised Handbook of Nuclear Law which is aimed at helping countries to develop an effective national legal framework governing the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also run courses in nuclear law in Montpellier, France. As you can see, there are many areas in which we can cooperate with the Vienna Center. As a human being, as Director General of the IAEA - and particularly as a citizen of the only country ever to experience the unspeakable horror of nuclear bombs - I believe with all my heart and soul that these horrific weapons must be eliminated. Achieving that goal will require continued global efforts to increase awareness and understanding of the vital importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

  13. Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements

    Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

  14. Non-proliferation and disarmament

    Ritter von Wagner, A.

    1993-01-01

    In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

  15. Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1984-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

  16. INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-07-18

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  17. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    Garcia, Humberto; Burr, Tom; Coles, Garill A.; Edmunds, Thomas A.; Garrett, Alfred; Gorensek, Maximilian; Hamm, Luther; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Tzanos, Constantine P.; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  18. Integration Of Facility Modeling Capabilities For Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  19. Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

  20. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  1. The global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Challenges and prospects for the future. Interview with Mr. Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, November 26, 2009

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2009-01-01

    President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs since November 2007, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala has had a long career as a Sri Lankan diplomat and leader in the field of international security. Among his numerous appointments, Mr. Dhanapala headed the Geneva-based UNIDIR. He chaired the widely acclaimed 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. He was Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations from 1998 to 2003. In this interview, Mr. Dhanapala gives us his thoughts about the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a few months before the 8. NPT Review Conference. (author)

  2. Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

    1979-04-01

    The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

  3. Overview of past, ongoing and future efforts of the integrated modeling of global change for Northern Eurasia

    Monier, Erwan; Kicklighter, David; Sokolov, Andrei; Zhuang, Qianlai; Melillo, Jerry; Reilly, John

    2016-04-01

    Northern Eurasia is both a major player in the global carbon budget (it includes roughly 70% of the Earth's boreal forest and more than two-thirds of the Earth's permafrost) and a region that has experienced dramatic climate change (increase in temperature, growing season length, floods and droughts) over the past century. Northern Eurasia has also undergone significant land-use change, both driven by human activity (including deforestation, expansion of agricultural lands and urbanization) and natural disturbances (such as wildfires and insect outbreaks). These large environmental and socioeconomic impacts have major implications for the carbon cycle in the region. Northern Eurasia is made up of a diverse set of ecosystems that range from tundra to forests, with significant areas of croplands and pastures as well as deserts, with major urban areas. As such, it represents a complex system with substantial challenges for the modeling community. In this presentation, we provide an overview of past, ongoing and possible future efforts of the integrated modeling of global change for Northern Eurasia. We review the variety of existing modeling approaches to investigate specific components of Earth system dynamics in the region. While there are a limited number of studies that try to integrate various aspects of the Earth system (through scale, teleconnections or processes), we point out that there are few systematic analyses of the various feedbacks within the Earth system (between components, regions or scale). As a result, there is a lack of knowledge of the relative importance of such feedbacks, and it is unclear how policy relevant current studies are that fail to account for these feedbacks. We review the role of Earth system models, and their advantages/limitations compared to detailed single component models. We further introduce the human activity system (global trade, economic models, demographic model and so on), the need for coupled human/earth system models

  4. Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

    2000-01-01

    The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

  5. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    Kim, Hyun Chul

    2011-01-01

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water reactor power plants

  6. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    Kim, Hyun Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water

  7. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  8. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  9. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  10. Non-proliferation and international safeguards

    Blix, H.

    1992-01-01

    Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

  11. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Program of the DPRK

    - Park Sang Hoon

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

  12. The future of non-proliferation

    Gere, F.

    2000-01-01

    This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

  13. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  14. Nonproliferation characteristics of advanced fuel cycle concepts

    Persiani, P.J.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiatives and safeguards methods and systems. Alternative cycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products

  15. Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors' spent fuel

    1994-01-01

    One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE's Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE's efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back spent fuel

  16. Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

    Tertrais, B

    2005-07-01

    In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

  17. Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

    Tertrais, B.

    2005-01-01

    In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

  18. Global threat reduction initiative efforts to address transportation challenges associated with the recovery of disused radioactive sealed sources - 10460

    Whitworth, Julie; Abeyta, Cristy L.; Griffin, Justin M.; Matzke, James L.; Pearson, Michael W.; Cuthbertson, Abigail; Rawl, Richard; Singley, Paul

    2010-01-01

    Proper disposition of disused radioactive sources is essential for their safe and secure management and necessary to preclude their use in malicious activities. Without affordable, timely transportation options, disused sealed sources remain in storage at hundreds of sites throughout the country and around the world. While secure storage is a temporary measure, the longer sources remain disused or unwanted the chances increase that they will become unsecured or abandoned. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Off-Site Source Recovery Project (GTRIlOSRP), recovers thousands of disused and unwanted sealed sources annually as part of GTRl's larger mission to reduce and protect high risk nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Faced with decreasing availability of certified transportation containers to support movement of disused and unwanted neutron- and beta/gamma-emitting radioactive sealed sources, GTRIlOSRP has initiated actions to ensure the continued success of the project in timely recovery and management of sealed radioactive sources. Efforts described in this paper to enhance transportation capabilities include: (sm b ullet) Addition of authorized content to existing and planned Type B containers to support the movement of non-special form and other Type B-quantity sealed sources; (sm b ullet) Procurement of vendor services for the design, development, testing and certification of a new Type B container to support transportation of irradiators, teletherapy heads or sources removed from these devices using remote handling capabilities such as the IAEA portable hot cell facility; (sm b ullet) Expansion of shielded Type A container inventory for transportation of gamma-emitting sources in activity ranges requiring use of shielding for conformity with transportation requirements; (sm b ullet) Approval of the S300 Type A fissile container for transport of Pu-239 sealed sources internationally; (sm b ullet) Technology transfer of

  19. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    NONE

    1995-12-19

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

  20. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    1995-01-01

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States

  1. 76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    2011-05-27

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 7485] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government... of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of...

  2. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  3. Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation

    Betts, R.K.

    1977-01-01

    The spread of nuclear weapons has finally become a central item on the foreign policy agenda. But the fervor of most opponents of proliferation has been matched only by their reluctance to deal with the causes of the threat. The misplaced focus on ways to isolate weapons-related capabilities obscures the importance of the stickier but more salient problem of the incentives many nations have to get a bomb: fear or ambition. As long as antiproliferation strategy goes no further than schemes to keep the genie in a few bottles, we risk doing both more and less than necessary. Distressingly few arms-control enthusiasts have faced up to the full price of nonproliferation. The needed reorientation in thinking, which is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power, has been impeded by prevalent fallacies of emphasis about what causes the threat, who the candidates for proliferation are, and what strategies are applicable to which candidates. The author proceeds to discuss: (1) causes (the moralist fallacy, the economic fallacy, the diseconomic fallacy, and the technicist fallacy); (2) candidates (the pygmy states, the paranoid states, the pariah states, and five options of the U.S.); (3) cures (the fatalist fallacy, the multilateral fallacy, the embargo fallacy, the safeguards fallacy, the umbrella fallacy, the two-wrongs-don't-make-a-right fallacy, and the golden key fallacy); and (4) choices

  4. Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

    Pregenzer, Arian

    2014-01-01

    Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

  5. Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

  6. The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

    Hoffmann, N.

    1995-01-01

    This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

  7. The non-proliferation experiment

    Hannon, W.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    On September 22, 1993, the Department of Energy detonated more than 1.2 million kg of blasting agent in a tunnel in Rainier Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. The resulting explosion generated seismic, electromagnetic, and air pressure signals that were recorded on instruments deployed at distances ranging from a few meters to hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of kilometers. More than 12 organizations made measurements before, during, and after the explosions. The explosion and its associated experiments are known as the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Analyses of the measurements made during the NPE and comparisons with similar measurements made on previous nearly nuclear explosions and on a co-located smaller explosion detonated at the same site are providing basic phenomenological insights into what is potentially one of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)-distinguishing between nuclear explosions and some of the many conventional explosions that occur each year. The NPE is also providing information on the use of chemical explosions to develop empirical discriminants in regions where no nuclear explosions have been recorded. In another verification application, several NPE projects are examining the utility of on-site, pre-shot, shot-time, and post-shot measurements of gas seepage, seismic activity, and other observables as a means of identifying the source of signals that appear like nuclear explosions at regional distances. Two related activities are being considered. First, challenge on-site inspections, conducted after an event has occurred, may be able to use the characteristics of phenomena that persist after the explosion to detect and identify the source of the signals that appeared ambiguous or explosion-like to remote sensors. Second, cooperative, on-site measurements made at the time of a pre-nounced conventional explosion may provide assurance that a nuclear explosion did not occur as part of or in place of the pre-announced explosion.

  8. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  9. Transparency and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. Enhancing transparency, strengthening the nonproliferation regime

    Hamada, Kazuko

    2008-01-01

    Driven by the prospect of rapid economic growth and the perceived need for energy security, the Asia-Pacific region is destined to increase its nuclear energy use in the coming decades. This projected increase, however, will bring with it nuclear proliferation concerns, fueling fears about the security of nuclear material and creating suspicions about its use. The increasing use of nuclear energy inevitably necessitates supplementary efforts, designed to ensure nuclear security and a legitimate use of nuclear energy, other than the obligation to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nuclear transparency measures could be useful tools for building confidence that the increasing nuclear energy use does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. These measures could also foster a cooperative tradition that can address rising concerns over nuclear trafficking and terrorism, which require regional coordination to combat. However, moderate progress in implementing transparency measures suggests a lack of political appreciation of this concept. Thus, this paper describes various forms of potential transparency measures to expand the possibilities of the transparency concept and explore areas in which this concept might be applicable. This paper also clarifies some challenges involving transparency projects, and suggests possible ways to address these challenges. (author)

  10. New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

    Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

    2002-01-01

    Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

  11. Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru

    1997-01-01

    Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

  12. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  13. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  14. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  15. EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

    1994-12-31

    This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

  16. The NASA Global Climate Change Education Project: An Integrated Effort to Improve the Teaching and Learning about Climate Change (Invited)

    Chambers, L. H.; Pippin, M. R.; Welch, S.; Spruill, K.; Matthews, M. J.; Person, C.

    2010-12-01

    The NASA Global Climate Change Education (GCCE) Project, initiated in 2008, seeks to: - improve the teaching and learning about global climate change in elementary and secondary schools, on college campuses, and through lifelong learning; - increase the number of people, particularly high school and undergraduate students, using NASA Earth observation data, Earth system models, and/or simulations to investigate and analyze global climate change issues; - increase the number of undergraduate students prepared for employment and/or to enter graduate school in technical fields relevant to global climate change. Through an annual solicitation, proposals are requested for projects that address these goals using a variety of approaches. These include using NASA Earth system data, interactive models and/or simulations; providing research experiences for undergraduate or community college students, or for pre- or in-service teachers; or creating long-term teacher professional development experiences. To date, 57 projects have been funded to pursue these goals (22 in 2008, 18 in 2009, and 17 in 2010), each for a 2-3 year period. The vast majority of awards address either teacher professional development, or use of data, models, or simulations; only 7 awards have been made for research experiences. NASA, with assistance from the Virginia Space Grant Consortium, is working to develop these awardees into a synergistic community that works together to maximize its impact. This paper will present examples of collaborations that are evolving within this developing community. It will also introduce the opportunities available in fiscal year 2011, when a change in emphasis is expected for the project as it moves within the NASA Office of Education Minority University Research and Education Program (MUREP).

  17. Japan’s efforts to promote global health using satellite remote sensing data from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency for prediction of infectious diseases and air quality

    Tamotsu Igarashi

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available In this paper we review the status of new applications research of the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA for global health promotion using information derived from Earth observation data by satellites in cooperation with inter-disciplinary collaborators. Current research effort at JAXA to promote global public health is focused primarily on the use of remote sensing to address two themes: (i prediction models for malaria and cholera in Kenya, Africa; and (ii air quality assessment of small, particulate matter (PM2.5, nitrogen dioxide (NO2 and ozone (O3. Respiratory and cardivascular diseases constitute cross-boundary public health risk issues on a global scale. The authors report here on results of current of a collaborative research to call attention to the need to take preventive measures against threats to public health using newly arising remote sensing information from space.

  18. Sci-Fri AM: Quality, Safety, and Professional Issues 07: Global Medical Physics Efforts: Closing the Gap

    Van Dyk, Jacob

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: There is an increasing awareness of the disparity in Medical Physics needs between high income countries (HICs) and low-to-middle income countries (LMICs). This is especially evident with the growing incidence of cancer in LMICs. Projections from the recent Lancet Oncology Commission on Expanding Global Access to Radiotherapy indicate that an additional 22,000 Medical Physicists will be required by 2035 to provide uniform access to radiation therapy globally. This paper addresses possibilities and challenges associated with closing the Medical Physics gap between HICs and LMICs. Methods: Medical Physics and Oncology related organizations involved in providing support to enhance cancer therapy in LMICs were reviewed, especially as related to education, training and human resource development. Results: More than 35 organizations involved in addressing the cancer crisis in LMICs were found. Of these, 16 involve Medical Physics activities, with 7 being specific Medical Physics-related organizations. Ten of the 16 are involved in some LMIC activities with 6 having a major emphasis on LMIC contexts. Conclusions: The development of Medical Physics human resource capacity is a major challenge for LMICs. Fifty-five countries have no radiation therapy capabilities and by implication no capacity to train Medical Physicists. Overt attention with structured and altruistic actions by HIC contexts will help make inroads into the LMIC needs. Clear options throughout career structures in support of global health considerations combined with strong partnerships between interested parties in HICs and LMICs will enhance the development of safe and resource-appropriate strategies for advancing Medical Physics capabilities.

  19. Sci-Fri AM: Quality, Safety, and Professional Issues 07: Global Medical Physics Efforts: Closing the Gap

    Van Dyk, Jacob [Western University (Canada)

    2016-08-15

    Purpose: There is an increasing awareness of the disparity in Medical Physics needs between high income countries (HICs) and low-to-middle income countries (LMICs). This is especially evident with the growing incidence of cancer in LMICs. Projections from the recent Lancet Oncology Commission on Expanding Global Access to Radiotherapy indicate that an additional 22,000 Medical Physicists will be required by 2035 to provide uniform access to radiation therapy globally. This paper addresses possibilities and challenges associated with closing the Medical Physics gap between HICs and LMICs. Methods: Medical Physics and Oncology related organizations involved in providing support to enhance cancer therapy in LMICs were reviewed, especially as related to education, training and human resource development. Results: More than 35 organizations involved in addressing the cancer crisis in LMICs were found. Of these, 16 involve Medical Physics activities, with 7 being specific Medical Physics-related organizations. Ten of the 16 are involved in some LMIC activities with 6 having a major emphasis on LMIC contexts. Conclusions: The development of Medical Physics human resource capacity is a major challenge for LMICs. Fifty-five countries have no radiation therapy capabilities and by implication no capacity to train Medical Physicists. Overt attention with structured and altruistic actions by HIC contexts will help make inroads into the LMIC needs. Clear options throughout career structures in support of global health considerations combined with strong partnerships between interested parties in HICs and LMICs will enhance the development of safe and resource-appropriate strategies for advancing Medical Physics capabilities.

  20. A 'special effort' to provide improved sounding and cloud-motion wind data for FGGE. [First GARP Global Experiment

    Greaves, J. R.; Dimego, G.; Smith, W. L.; Suomi, V. E.

    1979-01-01

    Enhancement and editing of high-density cloud motion wind assessments and research satellite soundings have been necessary to improve the quality of data used in The Global Weather Experiment. Editing operations are conducted by a man-computer interactive data access system. Editing will focus on such inputs as non-US satellite data, NOAA operational sounding and wind data sets, wind data from the Indian Ocean satellite, dropwindsonde data, and tropical mesoscale wind data. Improved techniques for deriving cloud heights and higher resolution sounding in meteorologically active areas are principal parts of the data enhancement program.

  1. Joint U.S./Russian plutonium disposition study: Nonproliferation issues

    Jaeger, C.; Erkkila, B.; Fearey, B.; Ehinger, M.; McAllister, S.; Chitaykin, V.; Ptashny, V.

    1996-01-01

    In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse

  2. Lessons learned from the non-proliferation experiment

    McWilliam, C.; Curtis, S. [DOE, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Department of Energy sponsored Non-Proliferation Experiment (formerly known as the Chemical Kiloton) involved the detonation of blasting agent approximately equivalent to one kiloton of energy release on the Nevada Test Site in an effort to determine if (and if so, which) discriminators exist between conventional and nuclear detonations of similar yield. Coordination among hundreds of scientists from at least fifteen different organizations were required to design the experiments necessary to collect and interpret data from this unique and complex event. Stakeholders and members of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament observed the progress of the experiment first hand. The experiment was a success in that a vast majority of the expected data was collected and shared quickly and efficiently throughout the international scientific community. The management of the project was discussed among the major co-sponsoring organizations and the significant {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} are presented.

  3. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    McKown, T.O. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Explosive Effects Physics Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) as part of its effort to define source functions for seismic waves. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX (COntinuous Reflectometry for Radius vs Time EXperiment) system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities on three levels and in a number of radial directions. The CORRTEX experiments fielded in the explosive chamber will be described, including a description of the explosive emplacement from the perspective of its impact on the CORRTEX results. The data obtained are reviewed and the resulting detonation velocities are reported. A variation of detonation velocity with depth in the explosive and the apparent underdetonation and overdetonation of the explosive in different radial directions is reported.

  4. Sharing knowledge, shaping Europe US technological collaboration and nonproliferation

    Krige, John

    2016-01-01

    In the 1950s and the 1960s, U.S. administrations were determined to prevent Western European countries from developing independent national nuclear weapons programs. To do so, the United States attempted to use its technological pre-eminence as a tool of “soft power” to steer Western European technological choices toward the peaceful uses of the atom and of space, encouraging options that fostered collaboration, promoted nonproliferation, and defused challenges to U.S. technological superiority. In Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, John Krige describes these efforts and the varying degrees of success they achieved. Krige explains that the pursuit of scientific and technological leadership, galvanized by America’s Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, was also used for techno-political collaboration with major allies. He examines a series of multinational arrangements involving shared technological platforms and aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation, and he describes the roles of the Department ...

  5. Systems resilience: a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  6. Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-12-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  7. Status Report of the DPHEP Study Group: Towards a Global Effort for Sustainable Data Preservation in High Energy Physics

    Akopov, Zaven [Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY), Hamburg (Germany); Amerio, Silvia [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Padova (Italy); Asner, David [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Avetisyan, Eduard [Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY), Hamburg (Germany); Barring, Olof [European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva (Switzerland); Beacham, James [New York Univ., NY (United States); Bernardi, Gregorio [Lab. Nuclear Physics and High Energies (LPNHE), Paris (France); Bethke, Siegfried [Max Planck Institute for Physics (MPI), Munich (Germany); Boehnlein, Amber [SLAC National Accelerator Lab., Menlo Park, CA (United States); Brooks, Travis [SLAC National Accelerator Lab., Menlo Park, CA (United States); Browder, Thomas [Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI (United States); Brun, Rene [European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva (Switzerland); Cartaro, Concetta [SLAC National Accelerator Lab., Menlo Park, CA (United States); Cattaneo, Marco [European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva (Switzerland); Chen, Gang [Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Beijing (China). Inst. of High Energy Physics (IHEP); Corney, David [Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC), Oxford (United Kingdom). Rutherford Appleton Lab. (RAL); Cranmer, Kyle [New York Univ., NY (United States); Culbertson, Ray [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); Dallmeier-Tiessen, Sunje [European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva (Switzerland); Denisov, Dmitri [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States). et al.

    2013-03-27

    Data from high-energy physics (HEP) experiments are collected with significant financial and human effort and are mostly unique. An inter-experimental study group on HEP data preservation and long-term analysis was convened as a panel of the International Committee for Future Accelerators (ICFA). The group was formed by large collider-based experiments and investigated the technical and organisational aspects of HEP data preservation. An intermediate report was released in November 2009 addressing the general issues of data preservation in HEP. This paper includes and extends the intermediate report. It provides an analysis of the research case for data preservation and a detailed description of the various projects at experiment, laboratory and international levels. In addition, the paper provides a concrete proposal for an international organisation in charge of the data management and policies in high-energy physics.

  8. Status Report of the DPHEP Study Group: Towards a Global Effort for Sustainable Data Preservation in High Energy Physics

    Akopov, Zaven; Asner, David; Avetisyan, Eduard; Barring, Olof; Beacham, James; Bellis, Matthew; Bernardi, Gregorio; Bethke, Siegfried; Boehnlein, Amber; Brooks, Travis; Browder, Thomas; Brun, Rene; Cartaro, Concetta; Cattaneo, Marco; Chen, Gang; Corney, David; Cranmer, Kyle; Culbertson, Ray; Dallmeier-Tiessen, Sunje; Denisov, Dmitri; Diaconu, Cristinel; Dodonov, Vitaliy; Doyle, Tony; Dubois-Felsmann, Gregory; Ernst, Michael; Gasthuber, Martin; Geiser, Achim; Gianotti, Fabiola; Giubellino, Paolo; Golutvin, Andrey; Gordon, John; Guelzow, Volker; Hara, Takanori; Hayashii, Hisaki; Heiss, Andreas; Hemmer, Frederic; Hernandez, Fabio; Heyes, Graham; Holzner, Andre; Igo-Kemenes, Peter; Iijima, Toru; Incandela, Joe; Jones, Roger; Kemp, Yves; van Dam, Kerstin Kleese; Knobloch, Juergen; Kreincik, David; Lassila-Perini, Kati; Le Diberder, Francois; Levonian, Sergey; Levy, Aharon; Li, Qizhong; Lobodzinski, Bogdan; Maggi, Marcello; Malka, Janusz; Mele, Salvatore; Mount, Richard; Neal, Homer; Olsson, Jan; Ozerov, Dmitri; Piilonen, Leo; Punzi, Giovanni; Regimbal, Kevin; Riley, Daniel; Roney, Michael; Roser, Robert; Ruf, Thomas; Sakai, Yoshihide; Sasaki, Takashi; Schnell, Gunar; Schroeder, Matthias; Schutz, Yves; Shiers, Jamie; Smith, Tim; Snider, Rick; South, David M.; St. Denis, Rick; Steder, Michael; Van Wezel, Jos; Varnes, Erich; Votava, Margaret; Wang, Yifang; Weygand, Dennis; White, Vicky; Wichmann, Katarzyna; Wolbers, Stephen; Yamauchi, Masanori; Yavin, Itay; von der Schmitt, Hans

    2012-01-01

    Data from high-energy physics (HEP) experiments are collected with significant financial and human effort and are mostly unique. An inter-experimental study group on HEP data preservation and long-term analysis was convened as a panel of the International Committee for Future Accelerators (ICFA). The group was formed by large collider-based experiments and investigated the technical and organisational aspects of HEP data preservation. An intermediate report was released in November 2009 addressing the general issues of data preservation in HEP. This paper includes and extends the intermediate report. It provides an analysis of the research case for data preservation and a detailed description of the various projects at experiment, laboratory and international levels. In addition, the paper provides a concrete proposal for an international organisation in charge of the data management and policies in high-energy physics.

  9. Status Report of the DPHEP Collaboration: A Global Effort for Sustainable Data Preservation in High Energy Physics

    Amerio, Silvia; Berghaus, Frank; Blomer, Jakob; Branson, Andrew; Cancio, Germán; Cartaro, Concetta; Chen, Gang; Dallmeier-Tiessen, Sünje; Diaconu, Cristinel; Ganis, Gerardo; Gheata, Mihaela; Hara, Takanori; Herner, Ken; Hildreth, Mike; Jones, Roger; Kluth, Stefan; Krücker, Dirk; Lassila-Perini, Kati; Maggi, Marcello; Marco de Lucas, Jesus; Mele, Salvatore; Pace, Alberto; Schröder, Matthias; Shamdasani, Jetendr; Shiers, Jamie; Smith, Tim; Sobie, Randall; South, David Michael; Verbytskyi, Andrii; Viljoen, Matthew; Wang, Lu; Zimmermann, Markus

    2015-01-01

    Data from High Energy Physics (HEP) experiments are collected with significant financial and human effort and are mostly unique. An inter-experimental study group on HEP data preservation and long-term analysis was convened as a panel of the International Committee for Future Accelerators (ICFA). The group was formed by large collider-based experiments and investigated the technical and organizational aspects of HEP data preservation. An intermediate report was released in November 2009 addressing the general issues of data preservation in HEP and an extended blueprint paper was published in 2012. In July 2014 the DPHEP collaboration was formed as a result of the signature of the Collaboration Agreement by seven large funding agencies (others have since joined or are in the process of acquisition) and in June 2015 the first DPHEP Collaboration Workshop and Collaboration Board meeting took place. This status report of the DPHEP collaboration details the progress during the period from 2013 to 2015 inclusive.

  10. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  11. Implementing the strengthened non-proliferation regime in Georgia

    Chelidze, L.

    2009-01-01

    A few years ago Georgia faced complicated problems in nuclear and radiation safety field, namely: weakness of infrastructure for state management, incomplete inventory of radiation sources, orphan sources all over the post soviet military bases and as a result several radiological emergencies, overexposed victims and high risk of attracting international terrorists to use the country as a rout for illegal movement of radiation sources or nuclear materials. IAEA policy and strategy for nonproliferation showed that it is not the one country problem. The coalition of democratic countries immediately responded to aroused problems. Step by step Georgia established a regulatory body, worked out national legislation, developed licensing and inspection activities, nearly finished installation of radiation portals at the whole perimeter of the country. Several successful cases of prevention of the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through borders of Georgia identified country's ability to contribute its shear to the Global Nuclear security.(author)

  12. Problems of the nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contributions to the international discussion

    Blix, H.; Butler, P. von; Fischer, W.; Caccia Dominioni, F.; Frick, H.; Gmelin, W.; Haeckel, E.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

    1994-01-01

    The volume assembles a number of essays wherein basic problems of nonproliferation are identified and discussed in view of recent developments and future policy requirements. What is the role of multilateral institutions in the containment of nuclear proliferation? How are Western Europe's security needs to be reconciled with the tenets of the global nonproliferation regime? How can international safeguards be upgraded so as to increase confidence among states? What kinds of disciplinary instruments are needed for the international community to prevent an unco-operative state from gaining access to nuclear weapons? What kinds of obstacles stand in the way of smooth co-operation between the European Union and the United States in the nuclear field? How does the demise of global bipolarity impinge on the need to pursue an international nuclear order? The essays in this volume seek to combine structural analysis of conceptual issues with substantive policy recommendations. (orig./HP) [de

  13. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  14. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  15. The emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The number of states capable of exporting nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services is large and growing. Once confined primarily to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the list of actual and potential nuclear suppliers now includes many countries that do not subscribe to the NPT or to other international nuclear export control agreements. Although international control accords---such as the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines---do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, they do reduce the risks of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition for export. The purpose of this book---the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on the emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation---is to remedy, at least in part, this data deficiency

  16. Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

    Kimminich, O.

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

  17. Synergies between nonproliferation regimes: A pragmatic approach

    Findlay, Trevor; Meier, Oliver

    2001-01-01

    Full text: With the recent progress in establishing international nonproliferation regimes, the question of synergies between different verification and monitoring regimes is becoming more acute. Three multilateral and universal nonproliferation organisations covering safeguards on civil nuclear materials, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons are up and running. A regime on biological weapons is under negotiation. Several regional organisations concerned with monitoring nonproliferation commitments in the nuclear field are in place; others are being established. Past discussions on synergies between these regimes have suffered from being too far-reaching. These discussions often have not reflected adequately the political difficulties of cooperation between regimes with different membership, scope and institutional set-up. This paper takes a pragmatic look at exploiting synergies and identifies some potential and real overlaps in the work between different verification regimes. It argues for a bottom-up approach and identifies building blocks for collaboration between verification regimes. By realising such, more limited potential for cooperation, the ground could be prepared for exploiting other synergies between these regimes. (author)

  18. An effort to improve track and intensity prediction of tropical cyclones through vortex initialization in NCUM-global model

    Singh, Vivek; Routray, A.; Mallick, Swapan; George, John P.; Rajagopal, E. N.

    2016-05-01

    Tropical cyclones (TCs) have strong impact on socio-economic conditions of the countries like India, Bangladesh and Myanmar owing to its awful devastating power. This brings in the need of precise forecasting system to predict the tracks and intensities of TCs accurately well in advance. However, it has been a great challenge for major operational meteorological centers over the years. Genesis of TCs over data sparse warm Tropical Ocean adds more difficulty to this. Weak and misplaced vortices at initial time are one of the prime sources of track and intensity errors in the Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) models. Many previous studies have reported the forecast skill of track and intensity of TC improved due to the assimilation of satellite data along with vortex initialization (VI). Keeping this in mind, an attempt has been made to investigate the impact of vortex initialization for simulation of TC using UK-Met office global model, operational at NCMRWF (NCUM). This assessment is carried out by taking the case of a extremely severe cyclonic storm "Chapala" that occurred over Arabian Sea (AS) from 28th October to 3rd November 2015. Two numerical experiments viz. Vort-GTS (Assimilation of GTS observations with VI) and Vort-RAD (Same as Vort-GTS with assimilation of satellite data) are carried out. This vortex initialization study in NCUM model is first of its type over North Indian Ocean (NIO). The model simulation of TC is carried out with five different initial conditions through 24 hour cycles for both the experiments. The results indicate that the vortex initialization with assimilation of satellite data has a positive impact on the track and intensity forecast, landfall time and position error of the TCs.

  19. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2012-08-20

    Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  20. Efforts to monitor Global progress on individual and community demand for immunization: Development of definitions and indicators for the Global Vaccine Action Plan Strategic Objective 2.

    Hickler, Benjamin; MacDonald, Noni E; Senouci, Kamel; Schuh, Holly B

    2017-06-16

    The Second Strategic Objective of the Global Vaccine Action Plan, "individuals and communities understand the value of vaccines and demand immunization as both their right and responsibility", differs from the other five in that it does not focus on supply-side aspects of immunization programs but rather on public demand for vaccines and immunization services. This commentary summarizes the work (literature review, consultations with experts, and with potential users) and findings of the UNICEF/World Health Organization Strategic Objective 2 informal Working Group on Vaccine Demand, which developed a definition for demand and indicators related to Strategic Objective 2. Demand for vaccines and vaccination is a complex concept that is not external to supply systems but rather encompasses the interaction between human behaviors and system structure and dynamics. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

  1. The Non-Proliferation Malaise

    Sur, Serge

    2013-01-01

    Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons no longer occupy more than a relatively modest position in the international security field, which is more significantly threatened by recent forms of conflict - particularly asymmetrical -, the contemporary challenges posed by terrorism, the collapse of States and ensuing civil violence, organised crime, massacres, regional destabilisation, and the emerging threats related to deleterious uses of the Internet. Analysing these challenges and threats, and defining and implementing effective responses constitutes the priorities of the international agenda and mobilizes the energy and capabilities of States, alliances and coalitions, and international organisations. The time when the nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR and the arms control efforts that attempted to frame and control it dominated the international relations scene has passed. This duo has been succeeded by a relative lack of interest on the part of nuclear powers towards their own arms. (author)

  2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  3. Nuclear nonproliferation: The long haul

    Dunn, L.A.

    1985-01-01

    The policy of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency rests upon the recognition that nuclear proliferation would profoundly threaten international stability and global order. Suspicions among traditional rivals would be exacerbated, regional disputes made more complex, and the possibility of local conflict increased. The security and well-being of the United Sttes and its close friends and allies, but also the security and well-being of the countries acquiring these weapons, would be threatened. Indeed, the greatest chance of use of nuclear weapons stems not from the US-Soviet strategic balance but from the possible emergence of small, unstable nuclear arsenals in many regions of the world characterized by crises and periodic military conflict

  4. Re-thinking global health sector efforts for HIV and tuberculosis epidemic control: promoting integration of programme activities within a strengthened health system.

    Maher, Dermot

    2010-07-05

    of joint planning and joint funding of integrated delivery as part of strengthened health systems. As both a danger and an opportunity, the global financial crisis may entail disaster or recovery for global health sector efforts for HIV and tuberculosis epidemic control. Review of policies and progress in control paves the way for identification of synergies between the two programmes, within strengthened health services. The silver lining in the global economic crisis could be better control of the HIV and tuberculosis epidemics, better overall health system performance and outcomes, and better value for money.

  5. Re-thinking global health sector efforts for HIV and tuberculosis epidemic control: promoting integration of programme activities within a strengthened health system

    Maher Dermot

    2010-07-01

    development and scaling up interventions, and identify ways of joint planning and joint funding of integrated delivery as part of strengthened health systems. Summary As both a danger and an opportunity, the global financial crisis may entail disaster or recovery for global health sector efforts for HIV and tuberculosis epidemic control. Review of policies and progress in control paves the way for identification of synergies between the two programmes, within strengthened health services. The silver lining in the global economic crisis could be better control of the HIV and tuberculosis epidemics, better overall health system performance and outcomes, and better value for money.

  6. Developing Effluent Analysis Technologies to Support Nonproliferation Initiatives, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third quarter 1995

    Schubert, S A; Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue provides an overview of the Effluent Research Program of the DOE Office of Research and Development, highlighting a number of representative projects within this program in support of nonproliferation initiatives. Technologies reported include portable instruments for on-site inspections, standoff detectors, fieldable, real-time instruments, field collection techniques, and ultrasensitive laboratory techniques.

  7. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2011-01-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA's mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It's all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies.

  8. Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

    Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

    2012-02-01

    International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

  9. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2011-04-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It’s all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies

  10. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    Pregenzer, Arian L.

    2014-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation

  11. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    Pregenzer, Arian L. [Senior Scientist, Retired, Sandia National Laboratories, 13013 Arroyo de Vista NE, Albuquerque, NM 87111 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation.

  12. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  13. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  14. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  15. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-01-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  16. No-lose targets as an option to integrate non-Annex I countries in global emission reduction efforts. A game-theoretical analysis

    Duscha, Vicki

    2012-07-01

    Substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions of 50% and more below 1990 levels by 2050 are necessary, to limit mean temperature increase below 2 C above pre-industrial levels. While the Kyoto Protocol foresees emission reduction targets for Annex I countries only, current and projected greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the growing economic importance of emerging economies call for an integration of non-Annex I countries in global reduction efforts. No-lose targets set emission reduction targets and define incentives for meeting the target, in contrast to binding reduction targets that use penalties to ensure compliance. One form of incentive is the participation in an international emissions trading market. While a few conceptual and quantitative analyses of no-lose targets can be found in the literature, economic analyses have not been carried out so far. In this thesis, two theoretical frameworks are introduced to analyze the potential of no-lose targets to contribute to global emission reduction efforts. First, a two-player, two-stage model is developed to model a non-Annex I country's participation decision and derive the contribution to global emission reductions. Then a two-player participation game is introduced to analyze the effects that the participation decision of one non-Annex I country has on another non-Annex I country also facing a no-lose target. Two market forms, a perfectly competitive market, and a market with market power on the side of the non-Annex I country are analyzed. In order to complement the highly stylized theoretical frameworks, a quantitative analysis applying marginal abatement cost curves is conducted to estimate the contribution of no-lose targets to reaching the 2 C target. The analyses show that no-lose targets can result in substantial contributions from non-Annex I countries to global emission reductions, in particular if the reduction potential in the non-Annex I countries is large, compared to that of the Annex I

  17. Prevent, Counter, and Respond - A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016-FY2020)

    None

    2015-03-01

    NNSA’s second core mission is reducing global nuclear dangers by preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, countering efforts to acquire such weapons or materials, and responding to nuclear or radiological incidents. In 2015, NNSA reorganized its nonproliferation activities based on core competencies and realigned its counterterrorism and counterproliferation functions to more efficiently address both current and emerging threats and challenges. The reorganization accompanied the March 2015 release of the first ever Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This report, which NNSA will update annually, highlights key nuclear threat trends and describes NNSA’s integrated threat reduction strategy.

  18. The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

    Kahiluoto, K.

    1995-01-01

    Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

  19. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  20. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Its Relevance for the Global Security

    Dáša ADAŠKOVÁ

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT is one of important international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures. One of its pillars is the verification mechanism that has been built as an international system of nuclear testing detection to enable the control of observance of the obligations anchored in the CTBT. Despite the great relevance to the global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, the CTBT is still not in force. The main aim of the article is to summarize the importance of the CTBT and its entry into force not only from the international relations perspective but also from the perspective of the technical implementation of the monitoring system.

  1. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

    Haeckel, E.

    1990-01-01

    International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

  2. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  3. Development and current trends in the international nonproliferation regime

    Sessoms, A.L.

    1984-01-01

    The IAEA and its safeguards system is placed into a historical perspective. A personal perspective on the nonproliferation regime and on the Agency's role in it is then presented. This is done initially by discussing some of the landmark events in the history of the nonproliferation regime. Subsequently some of the history of arms control agreements and of the role of the IAEA are noted. Then political motivations of state and ways the Agency has an impact in the political nonproliferation sphere are addressed

  4. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  5. U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation

    Podvig, Pavel

    2010-02-01

    The United States and Russia, the two largest nuclear powers, have a special obligation to provide leadership in nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the past year the two countries made an effort to restart the arms control process by concluding a new treaty that would bring their legal disarmament obligations in line with the realities of their post-cold war relationships. The process of negotiating deeper nuclear reductions in the new environment turned out to be rather difficult, since the approaches that the countries used in the past are not well suited to dealing with issues like conversion of strategic nuclear delivery systems to conventional missions, tactical nuclear weapons, or dismantlement of nuclear warheads. This presentation considers the recent progress in U.S.-Russian arms control process and outlines the key issues at the negotiations. It also considers prospects for further progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament and issues that will be encountered at later stages of the process. The author argues that success of the arms reductions will depend on whether the United States and Russia will be able to build an institutional framework for cooperation on a range of issues - from traditional arms control to securing nuclear materials and from missile defense to strengthening the international nuclear safeguards. )

  6. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  7. Effortful echolalia.

    Hadano, K; Nakamura, H; Hamanaka, T

    1998-02-01

    We report three cases of effortful echolalia in patients with cerebral infarction. The clinical picture of speech disturbance is associated with Type 1 Transcortical Motor Aphasia (TCMA, Goldstein, 1915). The patients always spoke nonfluently with loss of speech initiative, dysarthria, dysprosody, agrammatism, and increased effort and were unable to repeat sentences longer than those containing four or six words. In conversation, they first repeated a few words spoken to them, and then produced self initiated speech. The initial repetition as well as the subsequent self initiated speech, which were realized equally laboriously, can be regarded as mitigated echolalia (Pick, 1924). They were always aware of their own echolalia and tried to control it without effect. These cases demonstrate that neither the ability to repeat nor fluent speech are always necessary for echolalia. The possibility that a lesion in the left medial frontal lobe, including the supplementary motor area, plays an important role in effortful echolalia is discussed.

  8. Positive steps toward non-proliferation

    Greenhalgh, G.

    1979-08-30

    Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

  9. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  10. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  11. Utilization of atomic energy in Asia and nuclear nonproliferation system

    Ishii, Makoto

    1995-01-01

    The economical growth in East Asia is conspicuous as it was called East Asian Miracle, and also the demand of energy increased rapidly. The end of Cold War created the condition for the further development in this district. Many countries advanced positively the plan of atomic energy utilization, and it can be said that the smooth progress of atomic energy utilization is the key for the continuous growth in this district in view of the restriction of petroleum resources and its price rise in future and the deterioration of global environment. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) has accomplished large role, but also its limitation became clear. At present, there is not the local security system in Asia, but in order that the various countries in Asia make the utilization of atomic energy and the security compatible, it is useful to jointly develop safety technology, execute security measures and form the nuclear fuel cycle as Asia. Energy and environmental problems in Asia are reported. Threat is essentially intention and capability, and the regulation only by capability regardless of intention brings about unrealistic result. The limitation of the NPT is discussed. The international relation of interdependence deepends after Cold War, and the security in Asia after Cold War is considered. As the mechanism of forming the nuclear fuel cycle for whole Asia, it is desirable to realize ASIATOM by accumulating the results of possible cooperation. (K.I.)

  12. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    Burr, Tom; Gorensek, M.B.; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclearnonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facilitymodeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facilitymodeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facilitymodelingcapabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferationanalysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facilitymodeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facilitymodelingcapabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  13. Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

    Parker, F.

    2012-01-01

    The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

  14. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  15. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  16. Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

    Streeper, Charles Blamires

    2009-01-01

    In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the

  17. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  18. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-11-15

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  19. Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation

    2010-06-01

    Use. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995) 7. 5 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First Use." Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 163-182. 6 The Stanley Foundation...America’s Nuclear Posture. (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, 2010) 1. 60 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First...Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. S.l.: s.n., 1971. Nonproliferation--60 Years Later. DVD. Directed by Carla Robbins. Washington D.C

  20. Post-Cold War Effects on the Non-proliferation Regime

    Kessler, Carol E.

    2006-03-31

    This journal article analyzes nuclear and security related events of the past 15 years to illustrate the changes in geopolitics and the shifting balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reflection upon these events establishes the context for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The author concludes that post Soviet communism hastened the movement towards a unipolar system with hegemonic power vested in the United States, and this geopolitical imbalance fostered insecurities and greater threats. Multilateral cooperation and commitment from the US would help this leader achieve its goal of security through increased global confidence in the international system.

  1. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  2. The world's non-proliferation regime in time

    Bunn, George

    2005-01-01

    The idea for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries was supported unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1961. The NPT permits the P-5 to have nuclear weapons. All other NPT signatories are 'non-nuclear-weapon States' who are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain their signatures, the NPT promises assistance to them in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. Besides the P-5, the treaty now has 184 countries that have promised not to have nuclear weapons and that have agreed to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are carrying out their promises. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) withdrew from it. Of these four countries, only India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Israel and North Korea are assumed to have them. The non-proliferation regime today includes much more than the NPT. The IAEA standards for inspection were the next most important element. The IAEA inspection requirements negotiated in the early 1970s were shown to be inadequate by Iraq's success in hiding its nuclear-weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War of 1991. The Additional Protocol of 1997 is slowly replacing these requirements, but, as of December 2004, was in effect in only 62 NPT member countries. The regime includes the agreements creating nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Mongolia. The countries that formed these zones are also members of the NPT. The regime includes suggestions for standards and financial assistance plus requirements for physical protection of nuclear material from theft by terrorists or others. These efforts range from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the technical assistance provided by the IAEA and some countries, to the financial assistance offered by the G-8 and some other IAEA

  3. The NPT regime, present and future global security: an American view

    Thompson, Sam.

    1987-01-01

    Although not perfect, an international non-proliferation regime as set out by the IAEA and Non-Proliferation Treaty is in existence. The history of the involvement of the United States in the development of this regime is mentioned as a background to explaining the current approach of the Reagan Administration to non-proliferation. Trends and challenges which may affect future global security are then identified and discussed. The author is optimistic about the future. (U.K.)

  4. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2005-01-01

    Leaders around the world and across the ideological spectrum agree that the global nonproliferation regime is facing a serious test. The emergence of sophisticated terrorist networks, black markets in nuclear technology, and technological leaps associated with globalization have conspired to threaten one of the most successful examples of international cooperation in history. The rampant proliferation of nuclear weapons that was predicted at the start of the nuclear age has been largely held in check and the use of those weapons avoided. Nonetheless, with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the threat of nuclear proliferation seems more serious than ever. Although experts readily concede that there exist many pathways to proliferation, the threat posed by the misuse of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has received considerable recent attention. While the connection between nuclear energy and nonproliferation has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of the nuclear age, world events have brought the issue to the forefront once again. United States President George W. Bush and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammad ElBaradei are among those who have highlighted proliferation risks associated with civilian nuclear power programs and called for revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime to address new threats. From the possibility of diversion or theft of nuclear material or technology, to the use of national civilian programs as a cover for weapons programs - what some have called latent proliferation - the fuel cycle appears to many to represent a glaring proliferation vulnerability. Just as recognition of these risks is not new, neither is recognition of the many positive benefits of nuclear energy. In fact, a renewed interest in exploiting these benefits has increased the urgency of addressing the risks. Global energy demand is expected to at least double by the middle of

  5. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  6. Nonproliferation, disarmament and the security link

    Raja Mohan, C.

    1997-01-01

    It is obvious that nuclear weapons are here to stay for a long time to come. Many nation states are likely to operate on the premise that the combination of nuclear weapons and long range missile provides an unrivalled source of power. The United States and India cannot hope to structure cooperation on the hope that nuclear weapons can be marginalised and eventually eliminated from the international calculus of power. Nor can they go by the premise that the existing structure of international power can be frozen through the strengthening of the current nonproliferation regime. Continued diffusion of power and the spread of technology as well as the political dynamics could break the current order. This bleak assessment does not however imply that there are no prospects for cooperation between India and the United States. If both the nations move towards a more realistic policy positions and locate their nuclear dialogue in a broader strategic context, it should not be impossible to develop areas of cooperation

  7. Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

    Delory, Stephane

    2011-01-01

    In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

  8. Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Leventhal, P.

    1986-01-01

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

  9. Regional dialogue and multilateral arms control efforts today

    Graham, T. Jr.

    1994-01-01

    The significance of arms control and non-proliferation tasks is stressed emphasising what has been done, and-more important-what must still be done. Although tangible developments at the regional level may seem at times to be slow in coming, it is important to remember that the United States-Soviet transition from voluntary declarations to detailed arms control agreements with intrusive verification regimes spanned the entire length of cold war. Given the instabilities afflicting these regions, establishing a regional dialogue is itself a confidence-building measure. The experience of the United States and the former Soviet Union amply demonstrates that mere existence of regular dialogue can reduce tension by providing a platform for communication among military and Government participants even when political crisis prevents diplomatic contacts at senior levels. The international community should be encouraged by the progress that has been made to date to address regional instabilities. Such steps are an integral part of the international effort, carried out both at the United Nations and elsewhere, to adopt acceptable levels of conventional military forces and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Given the instabilities afflicting these regions, establishing a regional dialogue is itself a confidence-building measure. World changes, while potentially dangerous and certainly challenging, offer the hope of replacing antagonism with cooperation, creating a progressively more democratic global environment, preventing proliferation, and dampening regional conflicts. Continuing to make effective use of the entire mix of arms control and confidence-building tools will help to realize these hopes

  10. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  11. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  12. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    completely stalled; there is now real uncertainty about US ratification of the New START treaty with the Russian Federation, and with it any major new round of arms reduction negotiations; there has been less movement than hoped for in reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrine; there has been no movement on the file of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); and concern about the intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) remain as strong as ever. About the only ray of real light for the year has been the substantial measure of agreement achieved at the Washington Summit on nuclear security issues and cooperative implementation of the global anti-terrorism agenda. In my own approach to difficult international policy issues, I usually err on the side of congenital optimism, and it is possible to see the glass as half full rather than half empty on most of the specific issues I have mentioned - and others as well, such as the question of multilateralization of sensitive stages of the fuel cycle on which the IAEA Board of Governors has already expended so much time and energy. The road ahead - as mapped in detail, for example, in the report last year by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), with which I hope you are familiar - was always going to be long and slow. But everything depends on some real momentum being sustained. If that momentum is lost, as it was during the fifteen years or so of sleepwalking that followed the initial flurry of disarmament activity in the early post-Cold War years, and looks in real danger right now of being completely lost again, it is not easy to see how it will ever be regained. And that is very bad news indeed for this planet. It is worth reminding ourselves on these occasions, although the facts and arguments are familiar enough to this audience, why such an outcome would be such bad news, and why it is that the work that is done at symposiums

  13. Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

    Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Kyrgyz Republic is principle and sequential member of accepting effective international measures, directed to active prevention to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, its components and means of delivery. Commitment to prevention policy and WMD nonproliferation is one of basic principles of foreign and domestic policy of Kyrgyz Republic. The real measure against WMD proliferation and relating to its production technologies of military, special and dual use is international export control based on national systems of export control including smoothly running national system of account for, control and physical protection of arm materials. Currently juridical basis of export control system in Kyrgyz Republic is actively developing. In 2003 the Law of Kyrgyz Republic On export control, based on principles and norms of international law in the field of export control was adopted. The Law On export control determines basic principles of state policy, legal activity basis of state management and participants of foreign-economic activity in the field of export control, as well as defines their rights, obligations and responsibilities in this field. Also in the law, the requirements of international treaties realization in the field of WMD nonproliferation and means of their delivery, signed by Kyrgyzstan, is defined as one of national systems goals of export control. In article 13, Law On export control it is defined that international cooperation in the field of export control by means of efforts coordination and cooperation with foreign states on prevention of WMD nonproliferation, means of their delivery and technologies on their creation; participation in international regimes of export control and international forums, as well as carrying out negotiations, consultations with foreign states, bilateral information exchange and realization of joint programs and other events in the field of export control on bilateral and multilateral basis. By

  14. Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction

    Leek, K.M.

    2006-01-01

    Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

  15. 76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

    2011-11-07

    ..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

  16. The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

    Dreicer, M.

    2016-01-01

    The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider ''The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.'' We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-roliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what and how much can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-for-attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

  17. The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

    Dreicer, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-08-30

    The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

  18. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

  19. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

  20. Enhancing atmospheric mercury research in China to improve the current understanding of the global mercury cycle: the need for urgent and closely coordinated efforts.

    Ci, Zhijia; Zhang, Xiaoshan; Wang, Zhangwei

    2012-06-05

    The current understanding of the global mercury (Hg) cycle remains uncertain because Hg behavior in the environment is very complicated. The special property of Hg causes the atmosphere to be the most important medium for worldwide dispersion and transformation. The source and fate of atmospheric Hg and its interaction with the surface environment are the essential topics in the global Hg cycle. Recent declining measurement trends of Hg in the atmosphere are in apparent conflict with the increasing trends in global anthropogenic Hg emissions. As the single largest country contributor of anthropogenic Hg emission, China's role in the global Hg cycle will become more and more important in the context of the decreasing man-made Hg emission from developed regions. However, much less Hg information in China is available. As a global pollutant which undergoes long-range transport and is persistence in the environment, increasing Hg knowledge in China could not only promote the Hg regulation in this country but also improve the understanding of the fundamental of the global Hg cycle and further push the abatement of this toxin on a global scale. Then the atmospheric Hg research in China may be a breakthrough for improving the current understanding of the global Hg cycle. However, due to the complex behavior of Hg in the atmosphere, a deeper understanding of the atmospheric Hg cycle in China needs greater cooperation across fields.

  1. In search of plutonium: A nonproliferation journey

    Hecker, Siegfried

    2010-02-01

    In February 1992, I landed in the formerly secret city of Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, followed a few days later by a visit to Snezhinsk, their Livermore. The briefings we received of the Russian nuclear weapons program and tours of their plutonium, reactor, explosives, and laser facilities were mind boggling considering the Soviet Union was dissolved only two months earlier. This visit began a 17-year, 41 journey relationship with the Russian nuclear complex dedicated to working with them in partnership to protect and safeguard their weapons and fissile materials, while addressing the plight of their scientists and engineers. In the process, we solved a forty-year disagreement about the plutonium-gallium phase diagram and began a series of fundamental plutonium science workshops that are now in their tenth year. At the Yonbyon reprocessing facility in January 2004, my North Korean hosts had hoped to convince me that they have a nuclear deterrent. When I expressed skepticism, they asked if I wanted to see their ``product.'' I asked if they meant the plutonium; they replied, ``Well, yes.'' Thus, I wound up holding 200 grams of North Korean plutonium (in a sealed glass jar) to make sure it was heavy and warm. So began the first of my six journeys to North Korea to provide technical input to the continuing North Korean nuclear puzzle. In Trombay and Kalpakkam a few years later I visited the Indian nuclear research centers to try to understand how India's ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion can be accomplished safely and securely. I will describe these and other attempts to deal with the nonproliferation legacy of the cold war and the new challenges ahead. )

  2. Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

    Joly, J.

    2013-01-01

    Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  3. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  4. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report; ANNUAL

    NONE

    2000-01-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community

  5. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report

    NONE

    2000-03-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

  6. New insights from direct monitoring of turbidity currents; and a proposal for co-ordinating international efforts at a series of global "turbidity current test sites"

    Talling, Peter

    2015-04-01

    Turbidity currents, and other types of submarine sediment density flow, arguably redistribute more sediment across the surface of the Earth than any other flow process. It is now over 60 years since the seminal publication of Kuenen and Migliorini (1950) in which they made the link between sequences of graded bedding and turbidity currents. The deposits of submarine sediment density flows have been described in numerous locations worldwide, and this might lead to the view that these flows are well understood. However, it is sobering to note quite how few direct measurements we have from these submarine flows in action. Sediment concentration is the critical parameter controlling such flows, yet it has never been measured directly for flows that reach and build submarine fans. How then do we know what type of flow to model in flume tanks, or which assumptions to use to formulate numerical simulations or analytical models? It is proposed here that international efforts are needed for an initiative to monitor active turbidity currents at a series of 'test sites' where flows occur frequently. The flows evolve significantly, such that source to sink data are needed. We also need to directly monitor flows in different settings with variable triggering factors and flow path morphologies because their character can vary significantly. Such work should integrate numerical and physical modelling with the collection of field observations in order to understand the significance of field observations. Such an international initiative also needs to include coring of deposits to link flow processes to deposit character, because in most global locations flow behaviour must be inferred from deposits alone. Collection of seismic datasets is also crucial for understanding the larger-scale evolution and resulting architecture of these systems, and to link with studies of subsurface reservoirs. Test site datasets should thus include a wide range of data types, not just from direct flow

  7. Globalization

    Tulio Rosembuj

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available There is no singular globalization, nor is the result of an individual agent. We could start by saying that global action has different angles and subjects who perform it are different, as well as its objectives. The global is an invisible invasion of materials and immediate effects.

  8. Globalization

    Tulio Rosembuj

    2006-01-01

    There is no singular globalization, nor is the result of an individual agent. We could start by saying that global action has different angles and subjects who perform it are different, as well as its objectives. The global is an invisible invasion of materials and immediate effects.

  9. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  10. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young

    2015-01-01

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation

  11. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation.

  12. Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

    Nye, J.S.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

  13. The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

    Herron, L.W.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

  14. SIGMA: the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, E.

    2000-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistance approach of the SIGMA technology suggests a new kind of global control of the uranium enrichment market, where some developing countries might access an Enrichment plant without access to the technology itself. In this paper, we investigate the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  15. SIGMA, the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, J.

    2001-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries have limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistant approach of the SIGMA technology, suggest a new kind of global control of the Uranium Enrichment Market, were some developing countries might access to an Enrichment plant without accessing to the technology itself. In this paper, we analyse the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  16. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  17. Globalization

    Andru?cã Maria Carmen

    2013-01-01

    The field of globalization has highlighted an interdependence implied by a more harmonious understanding determined by the daily interaction between nations through the inducement of peace and the management of streamlining and the effectiveness of the global economy. For the functioning of the globalization, the developing countries that can be helped by the developed ones must be involved. The international community can contribute to the institution of the development environment of the gl...

  18. U.S. Nonproliferation Policies and the Future of Nuclear Cooperation

    Kim, Byoung Jo; Lee, Sang Hyun

    2008-12-01

    In order for Korea to enhance nuclear cooperation with the U.S., the most urgent thing is to prove its nonproliferation commitment to international community, and legislate solid nonproliferation policies. To achieve these goals, Korean government need to consider to create Nonproliferation Task Force in the government and focus on proving Korea's firm commitment for nonproliferation. Along with it, as a civilian counterpart, Nonproliferation Research Center must be created as soon as possible to research, plan, and publicize Korea's nonproliferation policies and measures. At the same time, the government must set up a control tower that will coordinate Korea's nuclear diplomacy and guide proper division of labor among governmental and nongovernmental agencies in nonproliferation area. Finally, to raise general public's awareness about the danger of nuclear proliferation, government must invest on to develop educational programs and public relationship programs to educate the Korean public

  19. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2013-09-23

    This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

  20. Former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow Served at U.S. Mission

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2014-10-01

    Because of her training and professional experiences, Rosalyn Leitch, a Security Specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow with NIS (2012-2013) was able to transition into temporary assignment as UNVIE Acting Nuclear Security Attaché from November 2013 through February 2014.

  1. Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

  2. Recreational sea fishing in Europe in a global context-Participation rates, fishing effort, expenditure, and implications for monitoring and assessment

    Hyder, Kieran; Weltersbach, Marc Simon; Armstrong, Mike; Ferter, Keno; Townhill, Bryony; Ahvonen, Anssi; Arlinghaus, Robert; Baikov, Andrei; Bellanger, Manuel; Birzaks, Janis; Borch, Trude; Cambie, Giulia; Graaf, De Martin; Diogo, Hugo M.C.; Dziemian, Łukasz; Gordoa, Ana; Grzebielec, Ryszard; Hartill, Bruce; Kagervall, Anders; Kapiris, Kostas; Karlsson, Martin; Kleiven, Alf Ring; Lejk, Adam M.; Levrel, Harold; Lovell, Sabrina; Lyle, Jeremy; Moilanen, Pentti; Monkman, Graham; Morales-Nin, Beatriz; Mugerza, Estanis; Martinez, Roi; O'Reilly, Paul; Olesen, Hans Jakob; Papadopoulos, Anastasios; Pita, Pablo; Radford, Zachary; Radtke, Krzysztof; Roche, William; Rocklin, Delphine; Ruiz, Jon; Scougal, Callum; Silvestri, Roberto; Skov, Christian; Steinback, Scott; Sundelöf, Andreas; Svagzdys, Arvydas; Turnbull, David; Hammen, Van Der Tessa; Voorhees, Van David; Winsen, Van Frankwin; Verleye, Thomas; Veiga, Pedro; Vølstad, Jon-Helge; Zarauz, Lucia; Zolubas, Tomas; Strehlow, Harry V.

    2018-01-01

    Marine recreational fishing (MRF) is a high-participation activity with large economic value and social benefits globally, and it impacts on some fish stocks. Although reporting MRF catches is a European Union legislative requirement, estimates are only available for some countries. Here, data on

  3. Recreational sea fishing in Europe in a global context—Participation rates, fishing effort, expenditure, and implications for monitoring and assessment

    Hyder, Kieran; Weltersbach, Marc Simon; Armstrong, Mike

    2018-01-01

    Marine recreational fishing (MRF) is a high‐participation activity with large economic value and social benefits globally, and it impacts on some fish stocks. Although reporting MRF catches is a European Union legislative requirement, estimates are only available for some countries. Here, data on...

  4. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  5. Environmental measurements and technology for non-proliferation objectives. Final report

    Broadway, J.A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to identify multi-disciplinary and single focus laboratories from the environmental and public health communities that can serve as technical center of opportunity for nuclear, inorganic and organic analyses. The objectives of the Office of Research and Development effort are twofold: (1) to identify the technology shortcomings and technologies gaps (thus requirements) within these communities that could benefit from state-of-the-art infield analysis technologies currently under development and (2) to promote scientist-to-scientist dialog and technical exchange under such existing US government internship programs (eg SABIT/USDOC) to improve skills and work relationships. Although the data analysis will focus on environmentally sensitive signatures and materials, the office of Research and Development wishes to further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives by assessing the current technical skill and ingenious analytical tools in less-developed countries so as to broaden the base of capability for multi-species measurement technology development

  6. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

  7. Humble Expectations (on Non-proliferation and Disarmament)

    Persbo, Andreas

    2014-04-01

    The last few years have been, to paraphrase Charles Dickens, an epoch of belief and an epoch of incredulity. The optimistic tide triggered in the spring of 2009 by President Obama's Prague speech appears to be receding. Recent developments in Ukraine provide ammunition for those who doubted the value and wisdom of nuclear arms reductions. It is easy, indeed comfortable, to point to the value of deterrence in times of political fears and tension between those who are nuclear armed. However, Ukraine is not a validation of nuclear weapons possession, nor is it proof that deterrence works. If it were, it carries with it the uncomfortable thought that nuclear weapons deter countries from stepping up in the defence of smaller nations. The consequences of such a chain of thought are unsettling: by extension, it may well be that nuclear force - while securing the borders of those states that can wield it - ultimately undermines the principle of collective security embodied in Article I of the UN Charter. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently stated, 'disarmament in its classic 'meaning' is more and more of the past'. But what has really changed? The prospects for multilateral disarmament efforts have been slim throughout the nuclear age. Disarmament, even a simple reduction of nuclear arms not required for defence needs, has always been a long-term effort, requiring patience and careful planning, and is not suitable for people more who prefer high rhetoric, lofty ambition, and quixotic goals. Things are progressing, albeit slowly. The P-5 process is making small but important advances in formulating joint terminology. While the outcome (expected in 2015) is likely to be under-whelming for many, the effort should not be dismissed, but encouraged. Further work is required to lay the substratum on which disarmament can occur, especially so in regards to the mechanics of multilateral verification, and the future role of international

  8. Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Kimura, Naohito; Naoi, Yosuke

    2010-01-01

    In April 2010, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Japan demonstrated its commitment to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security and announced the establishment of the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), under the guidance and authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (MEXT), and in cooperation with other ministries. The goal of the Center is to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and security in emerging nuclear power countries by sharing Japan's accumulated experiences in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve its goal, the Center serves three functions: (1) human resource and capacity building, (2) infrastructure development and technical assistance and (3) international coordination and cooperation. The Center will offer three types of training courses to strengthen human resources and capacity building in emerging nuclear power countries. In the Training Course on Nuclear Security, the participants will learn the design and evaluation process for physical protection and detection of and response to illegal or unauthorized acts related to nuclear materials. They will learn these issues not only through lectures and training but also using mockup facilities and virtual reality systems. Second, in the Training Course on Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), the Center will teach the experience of advanced safeguards activities in Japan for its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a non-nuclear weapon state. The participants will learn the IAEA and national safeguards systems, the material accounting system and inspector activities. Third, in the Training on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework, the participants will learn the international framework of nuclear non-proliferation including the IAEA safeguards system and

  9. Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

    Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

    2009-01-01

    near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion

  10. Implementing `bio-prospecting reproductive knowledge': An effort scenario to conserved Indonesian biodiversity and endemicity toward a post-modern globalized world

    Djati, Muhammad Sasmito

    2017-05-01

    Indonesia has a mega-diversity of plant and animal. The local people in Indonesia usually take the benefits of plant diversity in their environment. The use of herbal medicine is widespread, not only for local people but also for modern society. The aim of this study is to review plant medicine with a role in the reproduction system of Indonesian society, and also conservation biodiversity efforts of endemic plants in Indonesia. These include Sauropus androgynus, Elephantopus scaber, and Polycias obtusa. All of them have already been proven as stimuli of the reproductive system, with immunomodulatory, antioxidant, and antimicrobial properties. The role of rural community in Indonesia was to conserve the herbal plants in their environment and obtain some benefits to maintain their good health. Besides rural communities, government, companies, and researchers also have a role in the conservation of herbal medicine.

  11. Globalization

    Plum, Maja

    Globalization is often referred to as external to education - a state of affair facing the modern curriculum with numerous challenges. In this paper it is examined as internal to curriculum; analysed as a problematization in a Foucaultian sense. That is, as a complex of attentions, worries, ways...... of reasoning, producing curricular variables. The analysis is made through an example of early childhood curriculum in Danish Pre-school, and the way the curricular variable of the pre-school child comes into being through globalization as a problematization, carried forth by the comparative practices of PISA...

  12. Globalization

    F. Gerard Adams

    2008-01-01

    The rapid globalization of the world economy is causing fundamental changes in patterns of trade and finance. Some economists have argued that globalization has arrived and that the world is “flat†. While the geographic scope of markets has increased, the author argues that new patterns of trade and finance are a result of the discrepancies between “old†countries and “new†. As the differences are gradually wiped out, particularly if knowledge and technology spread worldwide, the t...

  13. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    Buckner, M.R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Sanders, T.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  14. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    Buckner, M.R.; Sanders, T.L.

    2001-01-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  15. Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1985-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

  16. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and

  17. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    Pilat, Joseph F.

    2009-01-01

    nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are

  18. Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

    Warnecke, S.J.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

  19. URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

    Korbmacher, T.

    2015-01-01

    URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

  20. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

  1. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

  2. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  3. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  4. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  5. Institutional overviews. Overview of the JAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center

    Senzaki, Masao

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was formed within the new Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to carry out safeguards and material control duties for the JAEA. Development of technologies and procedures for safeguards is an important duty. In addition, the new NPSTC will assume a 'think tank' role in support of the nonproliferation regime, help train nonproliferation experts, and cooperate with academic, government and non-governmental organizations on nonproliferation issues. This report briefly summarizes the formation of the JAEA and describes the duties and structure of the NPSTC in detail. (author)

  6. Export policy and non-proliferation

    Fischer, D.A.V.

    1978-01-01

    Developing countries with a nuclear programme are about a dozen according to information obtained by IAEA. They are a group hostile to any restriction imposed on nuclear technology export and consider that such restriction is contrary to the global concept of North/South co-operation which provides for transfer of advanced technology. In particular, they object to the fact that nuclear weapon states make use of Article 4 of the NPT. Industrialised countries are required to keep a balance between a regular and stable supply system and the assurance that exported nuclear installations and materials are placed under international control according to the IAEA Safeguards. (NEA) [fr

  7. Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

    Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2015-10-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

  8. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-01-01

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  9. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nonproliferation of Chemical and...—Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of.... Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on...

  10. IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

    2000-01-01

    Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

  11. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  12. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards; Accountability e regime de nao proliferacao nuclear: uma avaliacao do modelo de vigilancia mutua brasileiro-argentina de salvaguardas nucleares

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-08-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  13. Considerations on nonproliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1994-01-01

    This paper summarizes the past history of worldwide nonproliferation regime, then proposes the future improvements on the regime. Present worldwide nonproliferation regime have been formulated during the cold war era. Therefore, the structure and measures of the regime were heavily influenced by the features of cold war era. Though the cold war was over, still new international order does not seem to be on the horizon, we need to review the present regime and to improve the regime compatible to new world situation. Generally speaking, the nonproliferation regime have gained moderate success so far. We could point out the following features as a kind of success: 1) No increase of overt Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), 2) All five NWSs have finally participated to the NPT, 3) South Africa has destroyed its nuclear weapons and became Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), 4) Successful conclusions of some regional arrangements, such as Tlatelolco, Ralotonga, and 5) Strengthening of export control on sensitive items. On the other hand, we recognize the following points as the failures of the regime. 6) India, Pakistan and Israel reject to join the NPT, 7) Existence of some violation against NPT regime, i.e. Iraqi case and DPRK case, 8) Insufficient effective measures against brain drain problem, 9) Risk exists for the long term extension of NPT, and 10) Insufficient flexibility to meet changing boundary conditions. We would propose the various measures for strengthening to meet changing boundary conditions, as follows: 11) Measures to be taken along with future civil use of Plutonium, 12) Strengthening and rationalizing international safeguards, 13) Countermeasures for emerging new types of nuclear proliferation, 14) Strengthening nuclear material control in NWS, 15) Measures to be taken for nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons, and 16) Nuclear disarmament. (author)

  14. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

  15. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

  16. Global Data Grid Efforts for ATLAS

    Gardner, R.

    2001-01-01

    Over the past two years computational data grids have emerged as a promising new technology for large scale, data-intensive computing required by the LHC experiments, as outlined by the recent "Hoffman" review panel that addressed the LHC computing challenge. The problem essentially is to seamlessly link physicists to petabyte-scale data and computing resources, distributed worldwide, and connected by high-bandwidth research networks. Several new collaborative initiatives in Europe, the United States, and Asia have formed to address the problem. These projects are of great interest to ATLAS physicists and software developers since their objective is to offer tools that can be integrated into the core ATLAS application framework for distributed event reconstruction, Monte Carlo simulation, and data analysis, making it possible for individuals and groups of physicists to share information, data, and computing resources in new ways and at scales not previously attempted. In addition, much of the distributed IT...

  17. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

  18. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

  19. Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

    Abdelwahab, Biad

    2010-01-01

    context marked by conflicting signs in terms of non-proliferation and disarmament, e.g. a new American administration more open to multilateralism and proliferation crises (A). The nuclear non-proliferation regime of which the NPT is the touchstone is based on a complex balance between the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, non-proliferation control requirements and commitment to disarmament. However, major challenges are weakening that balance underpinning the 'global nuclear order'

  20. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  1. Remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, United Nations Security Council, 24 September 2009, New York, USA

    ElBaradei, M.

    2009-01-01

    IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) limited his speech to a few key issues. First he stated that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is fragile and has many shortcomings because the IAEA's legal authority is severely limited in some countries and the IAEA verification mandate is centred on nuclear material and not on weaponization activities. Secondly there is a growing number of states that have mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Any one of these states could develop nuclear weapons in a short span of time, if, for example, it decided to withdraw from the NPT. There is a need to move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thirdly the highest level of protection for nuclear and radioactive material has to be provided. A fourth issue is the need to strengthen the IAEA. A fifth issue is that the IAEA cannot do its work in isolation but depends on a supportive political process, with the Security Council at its core. A sixth issue is that the Security Council must put more emphasis on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases of proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust. Finally, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is gratified to see nuclear disarmament back at the top of the international agenda, as well as recognition of the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

  2. Cooperative transparency for nonproliferation. Technology demonstrations at the Joyo test bed for advanced remote monitoring

    Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

    2009-01-01

    The term 'Transparency' has been used widely by many authors and practitioners for various purposes, and there is an assortment of definitions for the term. These definitions vary depending on the field in which the term is used and within the context of its usage. For the purposes of our current project on regional, cooperative nonproliferation transparency and remote monitoring, the relevant field is nuclear nonproliferation, and in this context, we define the term Cooperative Nonproliferation Transparency as: 'Providing sufficient and appropriate information to a cooperating party so that they can independently develop their own evaluation and assessment of the reviewed party regarding their consistency with nonproliferation goals.' Key aspects of cooperative nonproliferation transparency activities include mutually agreeing upon the type of information or data that will be shared, how it will be collected, and who has access to that information. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's (JAEA) Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) has been exploring the possible use, development, and application of methods and technologies for Cooperative Transparency for Nonproliferation to support regional confidence building and cooperation n the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the East Asia region. (author)

  3. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  4. The Rarotonga treaty: regional approach to non-proliferation in the South Pacific

    Papadimitropulos, P.

    1988-01-01

    The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation in the South-Pacific-the Rarotonga treaty - is discussed. The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation is aimed in a wide sense at the assistance to detante in a certain region and the propagation of measures strengthening confidence there. On December 11, 1975 at the initiative of New Zealand and Fiji the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear-free zone in the South-Pacific. In compliance with the Rarotonga treaty a large nuclear-free zone is created. The participants of the Rarotonga Treaty assess the values of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

  5. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-01-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  6. First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

    1979-01-01

    Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

  7. Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

    Dickson, D.

    1979-01-01

    Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

  8. Developments in capture-γ libraries for nonproliferation applications

    Hurst, A. M.; Firestone, R. B.; Sleaford, B. W.; Bleuel, D. L.; Basunia, M. S.; Bečvář, F.; Belgya, T.; Bernstein, L. A.; Carroll, J. J.; Detwiler, B.; Escher, J. E.; Genreith, C.; Goldblum, B. L.; Krtička, M.; Lerch, A. G.; Matters, D. A.; McClory, J. W.; McHale, S. R.; Révay, Zs.; Szentmiklosi, L.; Turkoglu, D.; Ureche, A.; Vujic, J.

    2017-09-01

    The neutron-capture reaction is fundamental for identifying and analyzing the γ-ray spectrum from an unknown assembly because it provides unambiguous information on the neutron-absorbing isotopes. Nondestructive-assay applications may exploit this phenomenon passively, for example, in the presence of spontaneous-fission neutrons, or actively where an external neutron source is used as a probe. There are known gaps in the Evaluated Nuclear Data File libraries corresponding to neutron-capture γ-ray data that otherwise limit transport-modeling applications. In this work, we describe how new thermal neutron-capture data are being used to improve information in the neutron-data libraries for isotopes relevant to nonproliferation applications. We address this problem by providing new experimentally-deduced partial and total neutron-capture reaction cross sections and then evaluate these data by comparison with statistical-model calculations.

  9. Improving Capture-gamma Libraries for Nonproliferation Applications

    Sleaford, Brad W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Hurst, Aaron M. [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2016-11-01

    This report describes the measurement, evaluation and incorporation of new -ray spectroscopic data into the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) for nonproliferation applications. Analysis and processing techniques are described along with key deliverables that have been met over the course of this project. A total of nine new ENDF libraries have been submitted to the National Nuclear Data Center at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and are now available in the ENDF/B-VIII.beta2 release. Furthermore, this project has led to more than ten peer-reviewed publications and provided theses for ve graduate students. This project is a component of the NA-22 venture collaboration on \\Correlated Nuclear Data in Fission Events" (LA14-V-CorrData-PD2Jb).

  10. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  11. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

    Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

    1990-01-01

    The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

  12. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

  13. Naval nuclear propulsion and the international nonproliferation regime

    Guimaraes, Leonam dos Santos

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) acquisition by Non-Proliferation Treaty No- Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NNWS) Navies does not imply nuclear weapon proliferation risks higher than those related to stationary research and power reactors. It must then be recognized that stringent restraints on supplies and political pressures on governments, both exercised very effectively by No-Proliferation Treaty - Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NWS) against NPT-NNWS indigenous development of SSN and associated fuel cycle facilities, are fundamentally based on geopolitical and military strategic objectives. This practice is far from being related exclusively to the NPT spirit: in fact, it is a matter of freedom at seas and not of nuclear proliferation. (author)

  14. Future of US utilities under non-proliferation policy

    Ladesich, J.N.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policy, a negative policy that closes the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is only a small part of a chaotic energy environment characterized by inaction. The impact of this environment on California utilities has resulted in a virtual moratorium on new facilities at a time when the nuclear option can be shown to be vital. Utilities are experiencing uncertainties in future power generation because alternatives to nuclear energy may not be the best choices. Utilities feel frustrated by the inaction; not by the objectives of the accountability and security proposals. The utilities will continue to support nuclear power and the completion of the fuel cycle in spite of these uncertainties

  15. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  16. Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. First quarter 1995

    Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This first quarter issue for 1995 highlights the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program is managed by the DOE`s Basic Energy Sciences program within the Office of Energy Research. Each year, the SBIR program solicits research ideas of interest to the DOE. Articles contained in this issue include: The Small Business Innovation Research Program supported by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security; Automated cueing to man-made objects via multispectral image; Security systems get smart with advanced processing and thermal imaging; A breakthrough in cooling system technology; The APSTNG neutron probe; Lithium-doped fullerene neutron detector; Miniature GC-MS for on-site chemical analysis; and Winner of Sandia President`s Quality Award.

  17. Passive measurements of mixed-oxide fuel for nuclear nonproliferation

    Dolan, Jennifer L.; Flaska, Marek; Pozzi, Sara A.; Chichester, David L.

    2013-01-01

    We present new results on passive measurements and simulations of mixed-oxide fuel-pin assemblies. Potential tools for mixed-oxide fuel pin characterization are discussed for future nuclear-nonproliferation applications. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors coupled with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline and optimized pulse-shape discrimination method were used. Measurement analysis included pulse-height distributions to distinguish between purely fission neutron sources and alpha-n plus fission neutrons sources. Time-dependent cross-correlation functions were analyzed to measure the fission neutron contribution to the measured sample's neutron source. The use of Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX-PoliMi is discussed in conjunction with the measurements

  18. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    McKown, T.O.

    1994-03-01

    The non-proliferation experiment, originally called the chemical kiloton experiment, was planned and executed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate the seismic yield relationship and distinguishing seismic signals between a nuclear event and a large mass conventional explosion. The Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments to further their studies of the source function for signals observed seismically. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities in multiple levels and in numerous directions. A description of the CORRTEX experiments fielded, a review of the data obtained and some interpretations of the data are reported.

  19. Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

    Iyengar, P.K.

    1995-01-01

    So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

  20. Computer Language Choices in Arms Control and Nonproliferation Regimes

    White, G K

    2005-01-01

    The U.S. and Russian Federation continue to make substantive progress in the arms control and nonproliferation transparency regimes. We are moving toward an implementation choice for creating radiation measurement systems that are transparent in both their design and in their implementation. In particular, the choice of a programming language to write software for such regimes can decrease or significantly increase the costs of authentication. In this paper, we compare procedural languages with object-oriented languages. In particular, we examine the C and C++ languages; we compare language features, code generation, implementation details, and executable size and demonstrate how these attributes aid or hinder authentication and backdoor threats. We show that programs in lower level, procedural languages are more easily authenticated than are object-oriented ones. Potential tools and methods for authentication are covered. Possible mitigations are suggested for using object-oriented programming languages

  1. National independence and nonproliferation in the new states of Central Asia

    Gleason, G.

    1993-12-01

    Five independent states emerged in Central Asia from the breakup of the USSR. One of these states, Kazakhstan, possesses nuclear weapons. The other four of these states, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are not known to possess nuclear weapons, however they occupy a geostrategic position which makes them important to non-proliferation efforts. The present report profiles the capabilities and intentions of these four Central Asian states. The analysis of capabilities suggests that none of these states has the capability to develop a usable nuclear weapon. However, all of these countries-- especially Uzbekistan--have components of the old Soviet nuclear weapons complex which are now orphans. They have no use for these facilities and must either re-profile them, destroy them, or transfer them. The analysis of intentions suggests that the dynamics of national independence have created a situation in which Uzbekistan has hegemonic designs in the region. Implications for retarding nuclear proliferation in the Central Asian region are examined. Opportunities for outside influence are assessed.

  2. Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

    Rathjens, G.

    1979-01-01

    The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

  3. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  4. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

    1999-12-31

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

  5. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Tazaki, Makiko; Keeney, Robin; Puckett, John; Stanbro, William; Nakhleh, Charles

    1998-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet no.21, which was signed in February 1996, 'The Joint Research on 'Transparency' in Nuclear Nonproliferation' under the 'Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation.' The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops. (author)

  6. Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

    Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-18

    The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  7. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1998-01-01

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

  8. Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

    Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

    2005-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

  9. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Grand, C.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  10. Second annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to Secretary's Annual Report to Congress

    1980-01-01

    This document covers: goals of US nonproliferation policy, agreements for cooperation, technical exchange, US as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels, IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, implementation of US nonproliferation policy, classification, cooperation in strengthening international safeguards and physical security, the US-IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement, US spent fuel storage policy, development of proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

  11. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  12. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

    2017-01-01

    The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

  13. On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

    Kano, Takashi

    1996-01-01

    The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

  14. Development of a Dual-Particle Imaging System for Nonproliferation Applications

    Poitrasson-Riviere, Alexis Pierre Valere

    A rising concern in our society is preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissionable material. This prevention can be incorporated at multiple levels, from the use of nuclear safeguards in nuclear facilities to the detection of threat objects in the field. At any level, systems used for such tasks need to be specially designed for use with Special Nuclear Material (SNM) which is defined by the NRC as plutonium and uranium enriched in U-233 or U-235 isotopes. These radioactive materials have the particularity of emitting both fast neutrons and gamma rays; thus, systems able to detect both particles simultaneously are particularly desirable. In the field of nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards, detection systems capable of accurately imaging various sources of radiation can greatly simplify any monitoring or detection task. The localization of the radiation sources can allow users of the system to focus their efforts on the areas of interest, whether it be for radiation detection or radiation characterization. This thesis describes the development of a dual-particle imaging system at the University of Michigan to address these technical challenges. The imaging system relies on the use of organic liquid scintillators that can detect both fast neutrons and gamma rays, and inorganic NaI(Tl) scintillators that are not very sensitive to neutrons yet yield photoelectric absorptions from gamma rays. A prototype of the imaging system has been constructed and operated. The system will aid the remote monitoring of nuclear materials within facilities, and it has the scalability for standoff detection in the field. A software suite has been developed to analyze measured data in real time, in an effort to obtain a system as close to field-ready as possible. The system's performance has been tested with various materials of interest, such as MOX and plutonium metal, measured at the PERLA facility of the Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy. The robust and

  15. Third Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference and 29th regular session of the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, November 20, 1985

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    Ambassador Lewis A. Dunn of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Danny J. Boggs of DOE reported on two recent international conferences relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control. Dunn summarized the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference and its final declaration in which participants reaffirmed treaty principles and made recommendations for strengthening its efforts and enhancing its implementation. Boggs summarized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference, and noted the significance of China's recent entry into IAEA. They stressed that energy security is a key factor in the success of IAEA safeguards because it affects trade and international cooperation. US contributions to the success of non-proliferation policies depend upon our ability to share technological information with less advanced nations. Questions and responses and an appendix with the final declaration of the Review Conference follow the testimony

  16. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  17. India and the BRICS: Global Bandwagoning and Regional Balancing

    Matthew D Stephen

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Indian policy makers have welcomed India’s framing as a ‘rising power’ and celebrated the BRICS initiative as a common front in reforming aspects of global governance. Yet China’s rise in Asia has unsettled the balances of power which have underpinned the region, as a consequence of which India has hesitantly pursued a strategic rapprochement with the United States. Assessing New Delhi’s multilateral and geo-strategic diplomacy, this article argues that India bandwagons with the BRICS on a global level, but seeks to balance China at the regional level. On the global multilateral level, India has common cause with other rising powers in reforming the policies and structures of most international organizations. The exceptions are the United Nations Security Council and the Non-proliferation Treaty, where China and Russia can be qualified as established powers. On the regional level, however, India has maintained ties to Russia and cultivated a strong relationship with the United States in an effort to balance and increase leverage relative to a rising China. This underlines that major power rivalries are strongly mediated by issue area and institutional context.

  18. Academic perspectives on the non-proliferation problem

    Gummett, P.

    1984-01-01

    The USA has demonstrated a greater penchant for a technical focus aimed at denial than any other state, despite a brief interlude under President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when it displayed a total lack of concern about proliferation. This terminated with the sudden reawakening of interest following the Indian explosion and the announcement that the USA was not prepared to accept additional requests for uranium-enrichment services. According to Brenner, this enrichment crisis was engineered as a deliberate act of policy: yet this act of policy was unrelated to non-proliferation objectives. Rather, the Nixon administration's interest in privatisation in general, and commercialisation of enriched-uranium supply in particular, had led to a bureaucratic battle between the domestic side of the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). This battle was totally unrelated to foreign policy: a situation not without precedent in this area. Nixon's Republican administration deliberately provoked a supply bottleneck by changing the terms of AEC supply contracts, with the intention of forcing the Democrat-dominated JCAE to agree to the entry of private industry into the uranium-enrichment business. The outcome was more dramatic than had been intended

  19. Verification lessons learned and CTBT's contribution to disarmament and nonproliferation

    Zerbo, L.

    2013-01-01

    The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear tests for any purposes. The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the nonproliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. It is enforced through the extensive International Monitoring System designed to detect and deter nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater and underground. In the process of monitoring and detecting a potential nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year - the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The civil and scientific applications of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the tsunamis, of the movements of whales and much more. The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons. It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally nondiscriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications by the end of the year, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality. (A.C.)

  20. Non-proliferation policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    Shkol'nik, V.S.; Zhantikin, T.M.

    1997-01-01

    The present abstract reveals the aspects of Kazakstan's non-proliferation policy. After acquiring independence in Kazakstan there remained a huge nuclear inheritance of the USSR. Kazakstan had to determine its policy regarding nuclear stuff. One of the most important test sites of the former USSR - Semipalatinsk test site - was closed. The Republic signed the Lisbon Protocols to the Treaty between the USSR and USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic and offensive arms. On December 13, 1993, Kazakstan and the IAEA concluded the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. All nuclear weapons were removed from Kazakstan territory, work resulting in military nuclear power use was terminated. A wide program on conversion of the former military research infrastructure is being performed with the support of some foreign countries. For instance Kazakstan / USA jointly work on withdrawing highly enriched nuclear materials from Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the USA enterprises for processing ('Sapphere'). Another conversion activity is liquidation of the former testing holes at Semipalatinsk test site. In relation to this there appeared an agreement between U.S. Department of defence and Ministry of Sciences and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakstan (October, 3, 1995). A sensitive information is present at the area of the former test site. The traditional IAEA safeguards are used to nuclear facilities and nuclear materials

  1. Suggested non-proliferation criteria for commercial nuclear fuel cycles

    Laney, R.V.; Heubotter, P.R.

    1978-01-01

    Based on the Administration's policy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through diversion of fuel from commercial reactor fuel cycles, a ''benchmark'' set of nonproliferation criteria was prepared for the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. These criteria should eliminate incremental risks of proliferation beyond those inherent in the present generation of low-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors operating in a once-through mode, with internationally safeguarded storage of spent fuel. They focus on the balanced application of technical constraints consistent with the state of the technology, with minimal requirements for institutional constraints, to provide a basis for assessing the proliferation resistance of proposed fission power systems. The paper contains: (1) our perception of the nuclear energy policy and of the baseline proliferation risk accepted under this policy; (2) objectives for a reactor and fuel cycle strategy which address the technical, political, and institutional aspects of diversion and proliferation and, at the same time, satisfy the Nation's needs for efficient, timely, and economical utilization of nuclear fuel resources; (3) criteria which are responsive to these objectives and can therefore be used to screen proposed reactor and fuel cycle strategies; and (4) a rationale for these criteria

  2. Ionospheric measurements for the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Fitzgerald, T.J.

    1994-01-01

    The detection of explosions using ionospheric techniques relies on measuring perturbations induced in radio propagation by acoustics waves which disturb the electron density of the ionosphere. Such techniques have been applied to the detection of atmospheric explosions, underground nuclear tests, earthquakes, and surface mining explosions. The nighttime ionosphere presents a difficulty for the detection of explosions because in the absence of solar ionization radiation the electron density in the altitude range of 90 to 200 km decays after sunset and perturbation effects are correspondingly reduced. On the other hand, acoustic waves produced by weak sources reach a maximum amplitude in the altitude range of 100 to 150 km and are highly attenuated at altitudes above 200 km. For safety reasons, most planned explosions are conducted during daylight which has limited the experimental measurements during nighttime. However a recent opportunity for a nighttime measurement occurred in connection with the Non-Proliferation Experiment which consisted of the detonation of a large chemical charge underground at the Nevada Test Site near midnight local time. the results, based on a new technique of using medium frequency radio transmissions provided by commercial broadcasts to detect explosion effects, were negative. The most likely explanation for the negative result is that the radio transmissions did not reflect at a low enough altitude to sense the perturbations produced by the acoustic waves

  3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

    2010-01-01

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  4. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of INSC. TACIS focussed on the

  5. Estimation of inspection effort

    Mullen, M.F.; Wincek, M.A.

    1979-06-01

    An overview of IAEA inspection activities is presented, and the problem of evaluating the effectiveness of an inspection is discussed. Two models are described - an effort model and an effectiveness model. The effort model breaks the IAEA's inspection effort into components; the amount of effort required for each component is estimated; and the total effort is determined by summing the effort for each component. The effectiveness model quantifies the effectiveness of inspections in terms of probabilities of detection and quantities of material to be detected, if diverted over a specific period. The method is applied to a 200 metric ton per year low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facility. A description of the model plant is presented, a safeguards approach is outlined, and sampling plans are calculated. The required inspection effort is estimated and the results are compared to IAEA estimates. Some other applications of the method are discussed briefly. Examples are presented which demonstrate how the method might be useful in formulating guidelines for inspection planning and in establishing technical criteria for safeguards implementation

  6. THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

    Tom COPPEN

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

  7. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  8. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  9. Canada's Global Partnership Program

    Ellis, M.

    2007-01-01

    Curbing the proliferation of biological weapons (BW) is an essential element of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G8 Leaders committed to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing biological weapons and related materials, equipment and technology. To this end, Canada's Global Partnership Program is investing heavily in biological non-proliferation activities in countries of the former Soviet Union. A comprehensive strategy has been developed to help improve biological safety (biosafety) and biological security (biosecurity) with provision for addressing dual-use concerns. Raising awareness and creating a self-sustaining culture of biosecurity is a key driver of the program. Through this strategy, Canada is assisting various FSU countries to: develop and implement effective and practical biosafety/biosecurity standards and guidelines; establish national and/or regional biosafety associations; develop and deliver effective biosafety and biosecurity training; put in place enhanced physical security measures and equipment. In addition to biosafety and biosecurity, the GPP supports a broad range of Biological Non-Proliferation projects and initiatives, including dozens of projects aimed at redirecting former biological weapons scientists. To date, most of these activities have been supported through Canada's contribution to the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre Ukraine (STCU).(author)

  10. Impact of Monoenergetic Photon Sources on Nonproliferation Applications Final Report

    Geddes, Cameron [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Ludewigt, Bernhard [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Valentine, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Quiter, Brian [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Descalle, Marie-Anne [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Warren, Glen [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kinlaw, Matt [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Thompson, Scott [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Chichester, David [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Miller, Cameron [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Pozzi, Sara [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

    2017-03-01

    Near-monoenergetic photon sources (MPSs) have the potential to improve sensitivity at greatly reduced dose in existing applications and enable new capabilities in other applications, particularly where passive signatures do not penetrate or are insufficiently accurate. MPS advantages include the ability to select energy, energy spread, flux, and pulse structures to deliver only the photons needed for the application, while suppressing extraneous dose and background. Some MPSs also offer narrow angular divergence photon beams which can target dose and/or mitigate scattering contributions to image contrast degradation. Current bremsstrahlung photon sources (e.g., linacs and betatrons) produce photons over a broad range of energies, thus delivering unnecessary dose that in some cases also interferes with the signature to be detected and/or restricts operations. Current sources must be collimated (reducing flux) to generate narrow divergence beams. While MPSs can in principle resolve these issues, they remain at relatively low TRL status. Candidate MPS technologies for nonproliferation applications are now being developed, each of which has different properties (e.g. broad vs. narrow angular divergence). Within each technology, source parameters trade off against one another (e.g. flux vs. energy spread), representing a large operation space. This report describes a broad survey of potential applications, identification of high priority applications, and detailed simulations addressing those priority applications. Requirements were derived for each application, and analysis and simulations were conducted to define MPS parameters that deliver benefit. The results can inform targeting of MPS development to deliver strong impact relative to current systems.

  11. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  12. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  13. 76 FR 81004 - Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S...

    2011-12-27

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7741] Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign... Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: A determination has been made that a number of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures...

  14. The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

    Zieger, G.

    1975-01-01

    An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

  15. Dynamics of postirradiation intracellular cysteine and aspartic proteinases profiles in proliferating and nonproliferating mammalian cells

    Korbelik, M.; Osmak, M.; Suhar, A.; Turk, V.; Skrk, J.

    1990-01-01

    Dynamics of postirradiation intracellular cysteine and aspartic proteinases profiles were examined in proliferating and nonproliferating Chinese hamster fibroblasts (V 79). The results show that there are significant alterations in cysteine and aspartic intracellular proteinases activity already in the early postirradiation period, which are different in proliferating and nonproliferating cells. Irradiation of the cells examined to low doses and up to 15 Gy induced an increase in cysteine proteinases activity in the early postexposure period, while at higher irradiation doses applied, the activity of these proteinases was decreased. These observations suggest that intracellular proteinases are actively participating in process involving recovery from radiation injury or cell killing. (orig.) [de

  16. Cooperative Remote Monitoring, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Fourth quarter 1995

    Alonzo, G M [ed.

    1995-01-01

    The DOE`s Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE`s objectives in arms control and nonproliferation. The contents of this issue are: cooperative remote monitoring--trends in arms control and nonproliferation; Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS); Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring Systems (ATMS); Tracking and Nuclear Materials by Wide-Area Nuclear Detection (WAND); Cooperative Monitoring Center; the International Remote Monitoring Project; international US and IAEA remote monitoring field trials; Project Dustcloud: monitoring the test stands in Iraq; bilateral remote monitoring: Kurchatov-Argonne-West Demonstration; INSENS Sensor System Project.

  17. Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

    Miller, S.E.

    1993-01-01

    Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

  18. Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  19. Environmental effects of additional uranium development required by a non-proliferation policy

    Baca, T.E.; Scudella, G.

    1978-01-01

    New Mexico can expect to see an accelerated development of its uranium resources. The President's policy on non-proliferation will impact the degree and quantity of uranium ore mined. Environmental impacts are significant and are affected by the mining and milling phase more than any other aspect of the uranium fuel cycle. The state has begun evaluating the resource-associated impacts of uranium mining and milling, although very little reliable data are available. The information gathered, however, shows a need for state and Federal evaluation of both the impacts and the non-proliferation policy. 4 references

  20. Status and prospect of non-proliferation activities of ISTC and STCU

    Richard, M.; Daoust Maleval, D.; Louvet, P.

    2009-01-01

    This article examines the role of the International Science and Technology Centre of Moscow (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine in Kiev (STCU) in preventing proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise and know-how of scientists and engineers from the Former Soviet Union countries. The Centres were created in the first half of the nineties, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse raised very serious concerns: over the risk of former WMD scientists and engineers being recruited by States of concern or terrorist groups that wished to develop their own WMD capabilities and means of delivery; and the possibility that scientists and engineers would be driven to sell their knowledge, know-how or equipment in order to survive. Since the Centres' inception, the regional and international context has changed dramatically at both economic and strategic levels, in particular regarding non-proliferation and global security. Changes of a political and strategic nature in the former Soviet Union required the European Union to review its relationship with Russia, to reassess the importance of Central Asian Countries and the future of Ukraine as it is pulled between Russia and Europe. The Centres have had to adapt to these changes. The article draws from an evaluation of the Centres' non-proliferation activities, carried out by the authors between November 2006 and September 2007 at the request of the European Commission. Moreover, since completion of the mission, many events, important for the strategic relationships between E U, Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries occurred as the affirmation of Russia's regional leadership: its rearmament along with the stiffening of its relationships with western countries and some neighbours and closure to visitors; the Georgia-Russia conflict; and the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. As CIS countries are more affected by the current economical crisis

  1. Institutional effectiveness in international regimes. An analysis of the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coping with the political malignity in the case of Iran

    Oezden, Tugba

    2015-07-01

    Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent ranking due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Contrary to North Korea, Iran is determined to stay as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. The question of this study is ''why the processes of the NPT Regime cannot specify the nature and scope of Irans nuclear program?'' The three main the processes of the regime, which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the multilateral negotiations, are examined to determine the weaknesses of the regime. This study argues that the regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.

  2. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  3. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  4. Fukushima Daiichi: implications for carbon-free energy, nuclear nonproliferation, and community resilience.

    Hall, Howard L

    2011-07-01

    Implications of the nuclear power plant accidents at Fukushima Daiichi are explored in this commentary. In addition to questions of nuclear reactor regulatory standards, broader implications on noncarbon-emitting energy production, nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and community resilience and emergency response against catastrophic events are explored. Copyright © 2011 SETAC.

  5. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M. [Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, State Scientific Center of Russian Federation, Obninsk (Russian Federation)

    2001-07-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  6. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects. Key issue paper no. 5

    NONE

    1997-06-01

    This paper examines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime (Section 2) and the issues most likely to arise as the civil nuclear fuel cycle develops over the next 50 years (Section 3). Section 4 deals with fuel cycles and nuclear material inventories. 14 refs.

  7. U.S.-China commercial nuclear commerce: Nonproliferation and trade issues

    1997-01-01

    The report concludes that the United States should not be denied access to the Chinese nuclear energy program. To the contrary, the report finds that--provided China meets the requisite nonproliferation criteria--it is strongly in the US national interest to engage in peaceful nuclear, cooperation with China, from security, environmental, safety, and economic perspectives

  8. Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

    Armanet, P.

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

  9. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M.

    2001-01-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  10. Outlook to nonproliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among turkish speaking countries

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 Nuclear Power Plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non proliferation of nuclear weapons, great affords were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the 1st Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join the European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasia Region. So, there are significant developments in the cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owing to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's, TAEK, besides the co operations with various countries, has involved in cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and

  11. Application of the Terrestar Satellite Constellation to the Global Initiative for Tracking Special and Nonproliferation Material

    2011-09-01

    PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified 19. SECURITY...Wi-Fi networks can be 30 found everywhere from your home to the local Starbucks they have a short range, on the order of tens of meters, and as a

  12. The joint verification experiments as a global non-proliferation exercise

    Shaner, J.W.

    1998-01-01

    This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the second of two Joint Verification Experiments conducted by the Soviet Union and the US. These two experiments, one at the Nevada test site in the US, and the second here at the Semipalatinsk test site were designed to test the verification of a nuclear testing treaty limiting the size underground explosions to 150 kilotons. By building trust and technical respect between the weapons scientists of the two most powerful adversaries, the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) had the unanticipated result of initiating a suite of cooperative projects and programs aimed at reducing the Cold War threats and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

  13. The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

    Ehrlich, Thomas

    1970-01-01

    In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

  14. The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

    Ehrlich, Thomas [School of Law, Stanford University, CA (United States)

    1970-05-01

    In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

  15. Literality and Cognitive Effort

    Lacruz, Isabel; Carl, Michael; Yamada, Masaru

    2018-01-01

    We introduce a notion of pause-word ratio computed using ranges of pause lengths rather than lower cutoffs for pause lengths. Standard pause-word ratios are indicators of cognitive effort during different translation modalities.The pause range version allows for the study of how different types...... remoteness. We use data from the CRITT TPR database, comparing translation and post-editing from English to Japanese and from English to Spanish, and study the interaction of pause-word ratio for short pauses ranging between 300 and 500ms with syntactic remoteness, measured by the CrossS feature, semantic...... remoteness, measured by HTra, and syntactic and semantic remoteness, measured by Literality....

  16. Breckinridge Project, initial effort

    None, None

    1982-09-01

    Report III, Volume 1 contains those specifications numbered A through J, as follows: General Specifications (A); Specifications for Pressure Vessels (C); Specifications for Tanks (D); Specifications for Exchangers (E); Specifications for Fired Heaters (F); Specifications for Pumps and Drivers (G); and Specifications for Instrumentation (J). The standard specifications of Bechtel Petroleum Incorporated have been amended as necessary to reflect the specific requirements of the Breckinridge Project, and the more stringent specifications of Ashland Synthetic Fuels, Inc. These standard specifications are available to the Initial Effort (Phase Zero) work performed by all contractors and subcontractors. Report III, Volume 1 also contains the unique specifications prepared for Plants 8, 15, and 27. These specifications will be substantially reviewed during Phase I of the project, and modified as necessary for use during the engineering, procurement, and construction of this project.

  17. Mapping telemedicine efforts

    Kierkegaard, Patrick

    2015-01-01

    are being utilized? What medical disciplines are being addressed using telemedicine systems? Methods: All data was surveyed from the "Telemedicinsk Landkort", a newly created database designed to provide a comprehensive and systematic overview of all telemedicine technologies in Denmark. Results......Objectives: The aim of this study is to survey telemedicine services currently in operation across Denmark. The study specifically seeks to answer the following questions: What initiatives are deployed within the different regions? What are the motivations behind the projects? What technologies......: The results of this study suggest that a growing number of telemedicine initiatives are currently in operation across Denmark but that considerable variations existed in terms of regional efforts as the number of operational telemedicine projects varied from region to region. Conclusions: The results...

  18. Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

    Mecinovic, S.

    2007-01-01

    The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

  19. Strengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis

    Pabian, Frank V [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14

    This slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA safeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote 'all-source synergy.' As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs. Foremost of the geospatial tools are the 'Digital Virtual Globes' (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previously used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to: (1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness; (2) Pre-inspection planning; (3) Onsite orientation and navigation; (4) Post-inspection reporting; (5) Site monitoring over time for changes; (6) Verification of states site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports; and (7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States). Additionally, as an 'open-source', such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct broad area search for undeclared nuclear sites and activities - either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a 'free' cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: 'crowdsourcing'), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant

  20. Iran's Relations to the East: Nonproliferation and Regional Security in a Changing Southwest Asia

    Tehsin, Muhammad [Quaid-I-Azam Univ., Islamabad (Pakistan)

    2014-11-01

    This study attempts to answer the following questions: would a successful JPOA result in nuclear nonproliferation and regional security in Southwest Asia; and could the Middle East and South Asia work together to contain the threat of Salafi jihadism?

  1. Swedish nuclear waste efforts

    Rydberg, J.

    1981-09-01

    After the introduction of a law prohibiting the start-up of any new nuclear power plant until the utility had shown that the waste produced by the plant could be taken care of in an absolutely safe way, the Swedish nuclear utilities in December 1976 embarked on the Nuclear Fuel Safety Project, which in November 1977 presented a first report, Handling of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Final Storage of Vitrified Waste (KBS-I), and in November 1978 a second report, Handling and Final Storage of Unreprocessed Spent Nuclear Fuel (KBS II). These summary reports were supported by 120 technical reports prepared by 450 experts. The project engaged 70 private and governmental institutions at a total cost of US $15 million. The KBS-I and KBS-II reports are summarized in this document, as are also continued waste research efforts carried out by KBS, SKBF, PRAV, ASEA and other Swedish organizations. The KBS reports describe all steps (except reprocessing) in handling chain from removal from a reactor of spent fuel elements until their radioactive waste products are finally disposed of, in canisters, in an underground granite depository. The KBS concept relies on engineered multibarrier systems in combination with final storage in thoroughly investigated stable geologic formations. This report also briefly describes other activities carried out by the nuclear industry, namely, the construction of a central storage facility for spent fuel elements (to be in operation by 1985), a repository for reactor waste (to be in operation by 1988), and an intermediate storage facility for vitrified high-level waste (to be in operation by 1990). The R and D activities are updated to September 1981

  2. Worldwide effort against smoking.

    1986-07-01

    The 39th World Health Assembly, which met in May 1986, recognized the escalating health problem of smoking-related diseases and affirmed that tobacco smoking and its use in other forms are incompatible with the attainment of "Health for All by the Year 2000." If properly implemented, antismoking campaigns can decrease the prevalence of smoking. Nations as a whole must work toward changing smoking habits, and governments must support these efforts by officially stating their stand against smoking. Over 60 countries have introduced legislation affecting smoking. The variety of policies range from adopting a health education program designed to increase peoples' awareness of its dangers to increasing taxes to deter smoking by increasing tobacco prices. Each country must adopt an antismoking campaign which works most effectively within the cultural parameters of the society. Other smoking policies include: printed warnings on cigarette packages; health messages via radio, television, mobile teams, pamphlets, health workers, clinic walls, and newspapers; prohibition of smoking in public areas and transportation; prohibition of all advertisement of cigarettes and tobacco; and the establishment of upper limits of tar and nicotine content in cigarettes. The tobacco industry spends about $2000 million annually on worldwide advertising. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), controlling this overabundance of tobacco advertisements is a major priority in preventing the spread of smoking. Cigarette and tobacco advertising can be controlled to varying degrees, e.g., over a dozen countries have enacted a total ban on advertising on television or radio, a mandatory health warning must accompany advertisements in other countries, and tobacco companies often are prohibited from sponsoring sports events. Imposing a substantial tax on cigarettes is one of the most effective means to deter smoking. However, raising taxes and banning advertisements is not enough because

  3. Outlook on non-proliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among Turkish speaking countries

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, great efforts were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the first Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join to European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasian Region. So, there are significant developments in cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owning to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's TAEK, besides the cooperation with various countries, has involved to cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for

  4. Anti-terror/non-proliferation efforts and South Korea's planning for atomic energy

    Chun, Chae Sung

    2006-01-01

    This study deals with the relationship between rapidly changing international security environments, the US security policy on the one hand, and policy environments of atomic energy. Based on the notion that the issue of atomic energy development is closely interrelated with the situation of international security especially after the tragic incident of 9/11, this study focuses on the impact of changing security environments on the conditions under which South Korea uses atomic power. It also deals with the subject of how the new framework of NPT, and the policy of IAEA influences upon South Korea's atomic polices in the future. This study examines the nature and contents of the US foreign policy and its efforts toward nonproliferation and counterproliferation. This study also deals with the Iranian case in which the US efforts of counterproliferation and Iranian argument for the rights of peaceful use of atomic energy based on the concept of national sovereignty. The Iranian case sheds light on the most acute aspect of current stage of nonproliferation, but also on the way of solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. This study also take issue with the future course of nonprolieration and the South Korea's policy for its maximum use of atomic energy

  5. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

    1985-01-01

    The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

  6. The impact of non-proliferation policies on the uranium market - an industry view

    Stephany, M.

    1977-01-01

    It is concluded that from an economic point of view, the impact of the present political discussions on non-proliferation (referring particularly to U.S. and Canadian initiatives) on the uranium market (through the choice of reactor programmes in different countries, and other parts of the fuel cycle, such an enrichment, reprocessing, the use of plutonium and the disposal of radioactive waste) cannot be assessed quantitatively. It is believed, however, that in general terms the non-proliferation issue will lead to an increase in the cost of nuclear energy and of all energy. It is also considered that it will tend to strengthen nationalism and thereby to restrict international trade. (U.K.)

  7. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2008 - May 2009

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2010-03-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 16th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. We provide this annual report to review program activities from June 2008 through May 2009 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2008. Contents include: Welcome Letter Introduction The NGFP Team Program Management Highlights Class of 2008 Incoming Fellows Orientation Travel Career Development Management of the Fellows Performance Highlights Closing Ceremony Encore Performance Where They Are Now Alumnus Career Highlights: Christine Buzzard Class of 2009 Applicant Database Upgrades Fall Recruitment Activities Interviews Hiring and Clearances Introducing the Class of 2009 Class of 2010 Recruitment Strategy On the Horizon Appendix A: Class of 2009 Fellows

  8. American alliances and nuclear non-proliferation. The end of nuclear weapon activities of US allies

    Schneider, Jonas

    2016-01-01

    Jonas Schneider tackles a question that is of great interest both to scholars of nuclear proliferation and to practitioners of nonproliferation diplomacy: Why do some political leaders of U.S. allies agree to abandon their nation's nuclear weapons activities, while others - who are often members of the same allied government and sometimes even of the same political party - steadfastly reject such a course reversal? Our existing stock of theories does not fare well in accounting for this important variation in leaders' attitudes. To solve this puzzle, Schneider develops an innovative theory that draws on the individual status conceptions of allied political leaders. Subsequently, the author undertakes to test his theory using four thoroughly researched case studies, and he derives important lessons for international nonproliferation diplomacy toward the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

  9. The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

    Mueller, H.

    1990-01-01

    West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

  10. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

  11. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Sandra Colombo

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

  12. The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

    Fischer, W.

    1988-12-01

    The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

  13. Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

  14. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  15. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    NONE

    1970-04-22

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  16. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  17. Framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection for Nonproliferation Impact Assessments

    Bari, R.

    2008-01-01

    This report describes a framework for proliferation resistance and physical protection evaluation for the fuel cycle systems envisioned in the expansion of nuclear power for electricity generation. The methodology is based on an approach developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation framework and on a qualitative evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced in previous Nonproliferation Impact Assessments performed by DOE

  18. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  19. Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Courteix, Simone.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  20. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

  1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

    Fischer, W.

    1991-06-01

    The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

  3. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  4. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of nuclear nonproliferation

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Keeney, R.; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakhleh, C.; Puckett, J.; Stanbro, W.

    1999-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet No. 21, which was signed in February 1996, ''The Joint Research on Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation'' under the ''Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation''. The purpose of Action Sheet 21 is to provide a fundamental study on Transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability for the nuclear energy from the nuclear nonproliferation point of view. This project consists of independent research and then joint discussion at workshops that address a series of topics and issues in transparency. The activities covered in Action Sheet 21 took place over a period of 18 months. Three workshops were held; the first and the third hosted by PNC in Tokyo, Japan and the second hosted by LANL in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US. The following is a summary of the three workshops. The first workshop addressed the policy environment of transparency. Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: (1) a definition of transparency, (2) reasons for transparency, (3) detailed goals of transparency and (4) obstacles to transparency. The topic of the second workshop was ''Development of Transparency Options.'' The activities accomplished were (1) identify type of facilities where transparency might be applied, (2) define criteria for applying transparency, and (3) delineate applicable transparency options. The goal of the third workshop, ''Technical Options for Transparency,'' was to (1) identify conceptual options for transparency system design; (2) identify instrumentation, measurement, data collection and data processing options; (3) identify data display options; and (4) identify technical

  5. Prospects for regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in remote monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation and transparency

    Olsen, John

    2006-01-01

    The JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have cooperated for a decade in development and testing of remote monitoring technologies in support of international safeguards. With this technology approaching maturity, the JAEA/SNL partnership now envisions regional cooperation to use these technologies to advance nuclear transparency and strengthen nonproliferation, as well. This presentation summarizes the technical evolution and notes the opportunity for regional cooperation to include institutions in the ROK, as well as Japan and the US. (author)

  6. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  7. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  9. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  10. The Effort Paradox: Effort Is Both Costly and Valued.

    Inzlicht, Michael; Shenhav, Amitai; Olivola, Christopher Y

    2018-04-01

    According to prominent models in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and economics, effort (be it physical or mental) is costly: when given a choice, humans and non-human animals alike tend to avoid effort. Here, we suggest that the opposite is also true and review extensive evidence that effort can also add value. Not only can the same outcomes be more rewarding if we apply more (not less) effort, sometimes we select options precisely because they require effort. Given the increasing recognition of effort's role in motivation, cognitive control, and value-based decision-making, considering this neglected side of effort will not only improve formal computational models, but also provide clues about how to promote sustained mental effort across time. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  11. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  12. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  13. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  14. Consideration on non-proliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents some proposals for improvement of non-proliferation regime including safeguards structures with historical changes of international regime. Current non-proliferation regime was established under the circumstances of Cold War, and it's structure and measures were influenced by the situation of these time. Although, a couple of years have passed from end of Cold War, new world order has not established yet. Therefore, it is expected that the current regime could be improved in accordance with new world order. Generally speaking, it could be welcomed that the current regime has got some successes from two points of views, namely no new nuclear weapon states have emerged and after the establishment of NPT and all nuclear weapon state is joined NPT finally. However, it is the authors' concern that some gray countries, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, have not joined the NPT yet and cases of Iraqi and DPRK have occurred. After reviewing of such new situation, some proposals will be presented in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet current world conditions

  15. Workshop on regional cooperation in remote monitoring for transparency and nonproliferation

    Olsen, John; Inoue, Naoko; Hori, Masato; Hashimoto, Yu; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2006-06-01

    The Workshop on Regional Cooperation in Remote Monitoring for Transparency and Nonproliferation on 8-9 February at O'arai, Japan, brought together remote monitoring experts to share technical experience and consider potential uses of remote monitoring for nuclear transparency and strengthened nonproliferation. Sponsored by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), this event gathered thirty five attendees from the JAEA, the Republic of Korea's National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). U.S. technical experts represented Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Workshop discussions and interactions met or surpassed all goals: On the technical front, the JAEA, NNCA, and SNL exchanged presentations on their respective uses and technical approaches to remote monitoring. These included systems for both international safeguards and transparency. The IAEA shared valuable guidance on future remote monitoring system requirements. Following the presentations SNL conducted training in remote monitoring for technical personnel. In parallel project planning discussions, the JAEA, NNCA, SNL and the U.S. DOE reaffirmed mutual interest in regional cooperation in remote monitoring that could eventuate in exchange of safeguards-related data. A productive off-the-record session by all parties considered the path forward and established intermediate steps and time scales. The 15 of the presented papers are indexed individually. (J.P.N.)

  16. Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic

    ... Policy The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic Published: Nov 29, 2017 Facebook Twitter ... 2001-FY 2018 Request The Global Response to HIV/AIDS International efforts to combat HIV began in ...

  17. International Education and Training Centre (Nuclear security and Nonproliferation) and Ideas for Educational Test Facilities in the centre

    Seo, Hyung Min [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    With respect to the nuclear security-related multilateral agreements, many states and international societies recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Under this circumstance, finally, on April 12-13, 2010, US President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an issue which he has identified as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. The goals of the Nuclear Security Summit were to come to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material, and to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorism. The Summit focused on the security of nuclear materials, nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy. At the summit, the Republic of Korea was chosen as the host of the next Summit in 2012. After President Barack Obama declared the opening of the Summit and explained the purpose of the meeting, he designated Korea as the host of the Second Nuclear Security Summit, which was unanimously approved by the participating leaders. During the Summit, President Lee introduced Korea's measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials and laid out what contributions Korea would make to the international community. He also stated that the North Korean leader would be welcomed at the next summit only if his country made substantial pledges toward nuclear disarmament during the Six-Party Talks and announced that Seoul would host the general assembly of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2011 and would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an education and training center on nuclear security in 2014

  18. International Education and Training Centre (Nuclear security and Nonproliferation) and Ideas for Educational Test Facilities in the centre

    Seo, Hyung Min

    2010-01-01

    With respect to the nuclear security-related multilateral agreements, many states and international societies recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Under this circumstance, finally, on April 12-13, 2010, US President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an issue which he has identified as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. The goals of the Nuclear Security Summit were to come to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material, and to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorism. The Summit focused on the security of nuclear materials, nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy. At the summit, the Republic of Korea was chosen as the host of the next Summit in 2012. After President Barack Obama declared the opening of the Summit and explained the purpose of the meeting, he designated Korea as the host of the Second Nuclear Security Summit, which was unanimously approved by the participating leaders. During the Summit, President Lee introduced Korea's measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials and laid out what contributions Korea would make to the international community. He also stated that the North Korean leader would be welcomed at the next summit only if his country made substantial pledges toward nuclear disarmament during the Six-Party Talks and announced that Seoul would host the general assembly of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2011 and would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an education and training center on nuclear security in 2014

  19. Egg origin determination efforts

    Horvath, A.; Futo, I.; Vodila, G.; Palcsu, L.

    2012-01-01

    Complete text of publication follows. As a co-operation with the Poultry Product Board, egg and drinking water samples were received in order to investigate whether the country of origin of the egg can be determined based on its stable isotope composition with the aim of market protection of the Hungarian eggs against the mislabelled foreign ones. The scientific background is that drinking water of egg laying hens is assumed to reflect the composition of regional precipitation, and it is also an input data in the process of egg formation. In the first sampling, altogether 23 sets of egg and drinking water samples were received from different production sites covering the whole area of Hungary. The egg white samples were vacuum distilled and frozen out by liquid nitrogen at -196 deg C. The process was monitored by two vacuum gauges. Water frozen out together with the drinking water samples was measured were measured by a Thermo Finnigan Delta PLUS XP isotope ratio mass spectrometer using a GasBench II peripheral unit equipped with a GC-autosampler. As a second issue, additionally, elemental composition of egg shells were also performed for series of Hungarian, Czech and Polish egg samples by energy dispersive X-ray fluorescence. The drinking waters fit well to the Global Meteoric Water Line indicating their precipitation origin. It was experienced that the water in egg white gets enriched compared to the drinking water (Δ 18 O = -4.9 ± 1.0 per thousand and Δ D = -21.8 ± 6.4 per thousand), however, this shift is independent of the type of the hens, since the mean shifts in the eggs of Tetra and Hy-line hens are similar within error bar. For more depleted drinking water, the shift of the egg white was higher than for more enriched ones. This can be due to the contribution of the nutriment isotopic composition. The water isotope composition of the Hungarian eggs investigated was δ 18 O = -4.8 - -7.3 per thousand and δD = -46.0 - -70.7 per thousand, therefore egg

  20. International workshop on transparency technology for nonproliferation cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Applications of remote monitoring and secure communications for regional confidence building

    Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

    2009-08-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) sponsored an international workshop 20-22 February 2008 on 'Transparency Technology for Nonproliferation Cooperation in the Asia Pacific - Applications of Remote Monitoring and Secure Communications for Regional Confidence Building.' The Workshop focused on identifying appropriate roles and functions for Transparency in addressing nonproliferation concerns associated with the use of nuclear energy, particularly in the East Asia region. Participants from several East Asia countries included representatives from nuclear energy research institutions, Ministries, facility operators, and non-governmental organizations. Regional participation from countries currently developing their nuclear energy infrastructure was also encouraged. Several promising students from the University of Tokyo and the Tokyo Institute of Technology, representing the next generation of nuclear energy experts, also participated in the meeting and added significant value and fresh viewpoints. The participants agreed that transparency has many roles and definitions, and that its usefulness ranges for verification and compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to building trust and confidence in the activities of the state and other regional nuclear energy stakeholders. In addition, they identified a need for further education among the professional community, public, operators, and regulators as a key factor in transparency effectiveness. Also, the education and cultivation of the next generation of nuclear energy experts was identified as crucial to the long-term success and acceptance of nuclear energy development. And finally, that the development, selection, and implementation of technology that is appropriate to the goals and participants of a transparency effort are unique to each situation and are key to the successful acceptance of cooperative transparency and regional confidence building. At the conclusion of the Workshop it was importantly

  1. Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    ) establish a framework for multilateral management and control of the 'back end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal); and 4) create a similar framework for multilateral management and control of the 'front end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and fuel production). Regarding the protection of nuclear material it is reported that multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries to improve the physical protection of such material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Many governments have also responded to UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. Both the Convention and resolution 1540 call on countries to criminalize the illicit possession and use of radioactive material, and aim to enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit trafficking. And in July, parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed on major changes that would make it legally binding for countries to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage and transport. With strong support from the IAEA, Russia and the US, multiple countries are also taking steps to convert their research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, and to return the HEU to the country of origin. For nuclear non-proliferation commitments to be effective, they must be backed by credible mechanisms to deal with cases of compliance. The potential for being referred to the UN Security Council has clearly acted as an inducement for compliance in some cases; however, we should recall that the referral of North Korea to the Council, in 1992 and again in 2003, resulted in little to no action. To be effective, the UN Security Council must be ready at all times to engage, in order to cope with emerging threats to international peace and security. On the nuclear disarmament front, no mechanism exists to monitor compliance with

  2. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    foreseen by for instance the Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of

  3. Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management Preliminary Concepts

    Jones, E; Dreicer, M.

    2006-01-01

    The world is at a turning point, moving away from the Cold War nuclear legacy towards a future global nuclear enterprise; and this presents a transformational challenge for nuclear materials management. Achieving safety and security during this transition is complicated by the diversified spectrum of threat 'players' that has greatly impacted nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security requirements. Rogue states and non-state actors no longer need self-contained national nuclear expertise, materials, and equipment due to availability from various sources in the nuclear market, thereby reducing the time, effort and cost for acquiring a nuclear weapon (i.e., manifestations of latency). The terrorist threat has changed the nature of military and national security requirements to protect these materials. An Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management (IGNMM) approach would address the existing legacy nuclear materials and the evolution towards a nuclear energy future, while strengthening a regime to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. In this paper, some preliminary concepts and studies of IGNMM will be presented. A systematic analysis of nuclear materials, activities, and controls can lead to a tractable, integrated global nuclear materials management architecture that can help remediate the past and manage the future. A systems approach is best suited to achieve multi-dimensional and interdependent solutions, including comprehensive, end-to-end capabilities; coordinated diverse elements for enhanced functionality with economy; and translation of goals/objectives or standards into locally optimized solutions. A risk-informed basis is excellent for evaluating system alternatives and performances, and it is especially appropriate for the security arena. Risk management strategies--such as defense-in-depth, diversity, and control quality--help to weave together various technologies and practices into a strong and robust security fabric. Effective

  4. Global biosurveillance: enabling science and technology. Workshop background and motivation: international scientific engagement for global security

    Cui, Helen H [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-18

    Through discussion the conference aims to: (1) Identify core components of a comprehensive global biosurveillance capability; (2) Determine the scientific and technical bases to support such a program; (3) Explore the improvement in biosurveillance to enhance regional and global disease outbreak prediction; (4) Recommend an engagement approach to establishing an effective international community and regional or global network; (5) Propose implementation strategies and the measures of effectiveness; and (6) Identify the challenges that must be overcome in the next 3-5 years in order to establish an initial global biosurveillance capability that will have significant positive impact on BioNP as well as public health and/or agriculture. There is also a look back at the First Biothreat Nonproliferation Conference from December 2007. Whereas the first conference was an opportunity for problem solving to enhance and identify new paradigms for biothreat nonproliferation, this conference is moving towards integrated comprehensive global biosurveillance. Main reasons for global biosurveillance are: (1) Rapid assessment of unusual disease outbreak; (2) Early warning of emerging, re-emerging and engineered biothreat enabling reduced morbidity and mortality; (3) Enhanced crop and livestock management; (4) Increase understanding of host-pathogen interactions and epidemiology; (5) Enhanced international transparency for infectious disease research supporting BWC goals; and (6) Greater sharing of technology and knowledge to improve global health.

  5. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  6. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  7. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  8. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  9. WMD Nonproliferation: Biosecurity in the Age of Terrorism

    Phillips, C. J.; Chesser, R. K.

    2007-01-01

    The international community has cooperated in arenas where diplomacy, treaties and conventions, and international bodies such as the IAEA and UN Security Council can have successful roles controlling WMD proliferation. This especially is the case for nuclear and chemical weapons. In our view, the potential use of biological agents and toxins presents a distinctive challenge not necessarily amenable to standard solutions and legal controls. Commercial biotechnology, basic biological research, and public and animal health are intertwined and of global significance. Advancements in these civilian activities have legitimate value, but also can serve the needs of state-sponsored defensive and offensive biological weapons programs. More important, technical and scientific advances and development of public bioinformatics databases also simplifies an otherwise complex world for trans-national terrorists. In our paper we will draw upon our personal international experiences, including in the former Soviet Union and Iraq, to explain our concept of 'shared risk' within the scientific community. Personal engagement, meaningful collaboration, adherence to uniform ethics and standards, and common scientific goals on an international scale are the best hedge against bio-terrorism. The global scientific community already is based upon shared principles that cross both cultural and political boundaries and thus are pre-adapted to play a major role in preventing the use of biology as a terrorist weapon.(author)

  10. WMD Nonproliferation: Biosecurity in the Age of Terrorism

    Phillips, C J [Department of Biological Sciences, Texas Tech University, Lubbock (United States); Chesser, R K [Center for Environmental Radiation Studies and Department of Biology, Texas Tech University, Lubbock (United States)

    2007-07-01

    The international community has cooperated in arenas where diplomacy, treaties and conventions, and international bodies such as the IAEA and UN Security Council can have successful roles controlling WMD proliferation. This especially is the case for nuclear and chemical weapons. In our view, the potential use of biological agents and toxins presents a distinctive challenge not necessarily amenable to standard solutions and legal controls. Commercial biotechnology, basic biological research, and public and animal health are intertwined and of global significance. Advancements in these civilian activities have legitimate value, but also can serve the needs of state-sponsored defensive and offensive biological weapons programs. More important, technical and scientific advances and development of public bioinformatics databases also simplifies an otherwise complex world for trans-national terrorists. In our paper we will draw upon our personal international experiences, including in the former Soviet Union and Iraq, to explain our concept of 'shared risk' within the scientific community. Personal engagement, meaningful collaboration, adherence to uniform ethics and standards, and common scientific goals on an international scale are the best hedge against bio-terrorism. The global scientific community already is based upon shared principles that cross both cultural and political boundaries and thus are pre-adapted to play a major role in preventing the use of biology as a terrorist weapon.(author)

  11. Status, progress and plans for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Global Threat Reduction Initiative

    Bieniawski, Andrew

    2005-01-01

    This presentation discusses the efforts under the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, also known as GTRI. On May 26, 2004, then Secretary of Energy Abraham established GTRI. GTRI is a cooperative program to provide international support for countries' national programs to identify, secure, recover or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a potential threat to the international community. The formation of GTRI consolidated a number of nonproliferation programs you may be familiar with that work together to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear applications worldwide. In particular, the Office of Global Threat Reduction, which was set up to implement GTRI, has oversight of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program, the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance program, and the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return program. This consolidation allows these three programs to work in concert to bring about the elimination of research reactor materials as a source of proliferation concern. This speech is highlighting the work that these programs have undertaken in cooperation with the global research reactor community and the importance placed on fuel development under the RERTR program It contains an update on the work done to support the US - Russian Presidential Bratislava Summit Statement

  12. Collaborative human-machine nuclear non-proliferation analysis

    Greitzer, F.L.; Badalamente, R.V.; Stewart, T.S.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of this paper is to report on the results of a project investigating support concepts for the information treatment needs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, also referred to as the Agency) and its attempts to strengthen international safeguards. The aim of the research was to define user/computer interface concepts and intelligent support features that will enhance the analyst`s access to voluminous and diverse information, the ability to recognize and evaluate uncertain data, and the capability to make decisions and recommendations. The objective was to explore techniques for enhancing safeguards analysis through application of (1) more effective user-computer interface designs and (2) advanced concepts involving human/system collaboration. The approach was to identify opportunities for human/system collaboration that would capitalize on human strengths and still accommodate human limitations. This paper documents the findings and describes a concept prototype, Proliferation Analysis Support System (PASS), developed for demonstration purposes. The research complements current and future efforts to enhance the information systems used by the IAEA, but has application elsewhere, as well.

  13. National participation in nuclear projects: An effort worth trying

    Albisu, F.

    1986-04-01

    National participation in nuclear power projects was a star subject in the seventies in dealings between supplying and receiving countries; around it international gatherings like ICONTT conferences, IAEA meetings, and others were almost institutionalized. The fact that many of those dealings, which were prosecuted for extended periods, are not being materialized into actual projects (suffice it to mention those of Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, China, etc.) has provided a slow shift of the title role in the international nuclear picture to the apparent main obstacles to that materialization, that is, financial and/or non-proliferation aspects. But, in fact, a growing, well planned participation by a country's industry, its organizations and its individuals in its nuclear programme is clearly the most important product (other than, obviously, power itself) that can be derived from such a programme. A product from which many other sectors benefit. This paper deals with significant aspects of the national participation effort, among other: existing industrial infrastructure, and its evaluation; technology transfer channels and its implications; situations where national participation may look less easy to implement: turnkey projects, shop-mounted or barge-installed blocks or complete plants, etc.; progressive participation along the project, and with subsequent projects; the role of the utility and the Government. Cases drawn from the experience of the author's company in several countries, and specially the case of Spain, are commented. (author)

  14. Nuclear non-proliferation: The security context, 5 October 2007, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

    ElBaradei, M.

    2007-01-01

    Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, stated that nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. We have witnessed the emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology. Countries have managed to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Sophisticated extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. n parallel, nuclear material and nuclear material production have become more difficult to control. Energy security concerns and fears of climate change are prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. And to ensure a supply of reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - a step that brings them quite close to nuclear weapons capability. Add to this the 27 000 nuclear warheads that already exist in the arsenals of nine countries, and the hair trigger alert deployment level of some of these weapons. And as if these stockpiles and their deployment were not threat enough, most of these countries continue to repeat two inherently contradictory mantras: first, that it is important for them to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security; and second, that no one else should have them. 'Do as I say, not as I do'. Against this backdrop, there are four critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we must strengthen - addressing both symptoms and root causes - if we are to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and our ultimate self-destruction. First, we must develop a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats. Second, we must secure existing nuclear material stockpiles and tighten controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material. Third, we must strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. Fourth, we urgently need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves. In conclusion, it is clear that a security strategy rooted in 'Us

  15. Cognitive effort: A neuroeconomic approach

    Braver, Todd S.

    2015-01-01

    Cognitive effort has been implicated in numerous theories regarding normal and aberrant behavior and the physiological response to engagement with demanding tasks. Yet, despite broad interest, no unifying, operational definition of cognitive effort itself has been proposed. Here, we argue that the most intuitive and epistemologically valuable treatment is in terms of effort-based decision-making, and advocate a neuroeconomics-focused research strategy. We first outline psychological and neuroscientific theories of cognitive effort. Then we describe the benefits of a neuroeconomic research strategy, highlighting how it affords greater inferential traction than do traditional markers of cognitive effort, including self-reports and physiologic markers of autonomic arousal. Finally, we sketch a future series of studies that can leverage the full potential of the neuroeconomic approach toward understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms that give rise to phenomenal, subjective cognitive effort. PMID:25673005

  16. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  17. IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    2002-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

  18. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  19. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage imposition options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to burn the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the non-proliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  20. Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

    Sevchik, M.

    2000-01-01

    Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

  1. Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

    Burr, T.L.

    1994-04-01

    This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance

  2. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    1988-08-01

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  3. Non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific

    1992-01-01

    In the face of improved international relations, regional and subregional issues have acquired additional urgency and importance in the field of disarmament and international security. The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems is thus being actively encouraged by the international community. Towards this end, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is seeking to promote regional approaches to disarmament either through the united nations regional centres for peace and Disarmament or cooperation with individual Governments. Within this framework this conference was dealing with non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific region

  4. Comments on fuel cycle concepts and impacts on nonproliferation and safeguards concerns

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of proliferation risk profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the proliferation risk concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces the proliferation risk concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the proliferation risk characteristics of fuel cycles concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on proliferation characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring development of advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures

  5. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  6. Selected Examples of LDRD Projects Supporting Test Ban Treaty Verification and Nonproliferation

    Jackson, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Al-Ayat, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Walter, W. R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2015-02-23

    The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at the DOE National Laboratories was established to ensure the scientific and technical vitality of these institutions and to enhance the their ability to respond to evolving missions and anticipate national needs. LDRD allows the Laboratory directors to invest a percentage of their total annual budget in cutting-edge research and development projects within their mission areas. We highlight a selected set of LDRD-funded projects, in chronological order, that have helped provide capabilities, people and infrastructure that contributed greatly to our ability to respond to technical challenges in support of test ban treaty verification and nonproliferation.

  7. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  8. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  9. The role of Brazil in multilateral disarmament efforts

    Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Abstract This article examines Brazil’s motivations, objectives, and action in international instances related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT. The paper describes the evolution of Brazilian attitudes and decisions and discusses prospects for nuclear disarmament opened by the proposal of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.

  10. The role of Brazil in multilateral disarmament efforts

    Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte

    2017-01-01

    Abstract This article examines Brazil’s motivations, objectives, and action in international instances related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The paper describes the evolution of Brazilian attitudes and decisions and discusses prospects for nuclear disarmament opened by the proposal of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.

  11. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    1979-12-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations. While any final assessment of such measures and alternatives would have to examine the circumstances particular to each nation, it is hoped that the more generic assessments conducted here will be useful in suggesting guidelines for developing an improved nonproliferation regime which also helps to meet nuclear-energy needs. One chapter outlines the existing nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bilateral and multilateral requirements for agreements of cooperation and transfers of technology, and existing provisons for sanctions for violation of nonproliferation commitments. The chapter then proceeds to an assessment of various alternatives for providing assurance of fuel supply in light of this current regime. Another chapter examines a set of technical and institutional measures and alternatives for various components of once-through and closed fuel cycles. The components of the once-through fuel cycle assessed are enrichment services and spent-fuel management; the components of closed fuel cycles assessed are reprocessing and plutonium management and fast-breeder reactor (FBR) deployment

  12. Multidisciplinary Efforts Driving Translational Theranostics

    Hu, Tony Y.

    2014-01-01

    This themed issue summarizes significant efforts aimed at using “biological language” to discern between “friends” and “foes” in the context of theranostics for true clinical application. It is expected that the success of theranostics depends on multidisciplinary efforts, combined to expedite our understanding of host responses to “customized” theranostic agents and formulating individualized therapies. PMID:25285169

  13. Learning Environment and Student Effort

    Hopland, Arnt O.; Nyhus, Ole Henning

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between satisfaction with learning environment and student effort, both in class and with homework assignments. Design/methodology/approach: The authors use data from a nationwide and compulsory survey to analyze the relationship between learning environment and student effort. The…

  14. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

  15. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations.

  16. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations

  17. Respiratory effort from the photoplethysmogram.

    Addison, Paul S

    2017-03-01

    The potential for a simple, non-invasive measure of respiratory effort based on the pulse oximeter signal - the photoplethysmogram or 'pleth' - was investigated in a pilot study. Several parameters were developed based on a variety of manifestations of respiratory effort in the signal, including modulation changes in amplitude, baseline, frequency and pulse transit times, as well as distinct baseline signal shifts. Thirteen candidate parameters were investigated using data from healthy volunteers. Each volunteer underwent a series of controlled respiratory effort maneuvers at various set flow resistances and respiratory rates. Six oximeter probes were tested at various body sites. In all, over three thousand pleth-based effort-airway pressure (EP) curves were generated across the various airway constrictions, respiratory efforts, respiratory rates, subjects, probe sites, and the candidate parameters considered. Regression analysis was performed to determine the existence of positive monotonic relationships between the respiratory effort parameters and resulting airway pressures. Six of the candidate parameters investigated exhibited a distinct positive relationship (poximeter probe and an ECG (P2E-Effort) and the other using two pulse oximeter probes placed at different peripheral body sites (P2-Effort); and baseline shifts in heart rate, (BL-HR-Effort). In conclusion, a clear monotonic relationship was found between several pleth-based parameters and imposed respiratory loadings at the mouth across a range of respiratory rates and flow constrictions. The results suggest that the pleth may provide a measure of changing upper airway dynamics indicative of the effort to breathe. Copyright © 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  18. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

    Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  19. Phase transitions in least-effort communications

    Prokopenko, Mikhail; Ay, Nihat; Obst, Oliver; Polani, Daniel

    2010-01-01

    We critically examine a model that attempts to explain the emergence of power laws (e.g., Zipf's law) in human language. The model is based on the principle of least effort in communications—specifically, the overall effort is balanced between the speaker effort and listener effort, with some trade-off. It has been shown that an information-theoretic interpretation of this principle is sufficiently rich to explain the emergence of Zipf's law in the vicinity of the transition between referentially useless systems (one signal for all referable objects) and indexical reference systems (one signal per object). The phase transition is defined in the space of communication accuracy (information content) expressed in terms of the trade-off parameter. Our study explicitly solves the continuous optimization problem, subsuming a recent, more specific result obtained within a discrete space. The obtained results contrast Zipf's law found by heuristic search (that attained only local minima) in the vicinity of the transition between referentially useless systems and indexical reference systems, with an inverse-factorial (sub-logarithmic) law found at the transition that corresponds to global minima. The inverse-factorial law is observed to be the most representative frequency distribution among optimal solutions

  20. One watt initiative: A global effort to reduce leaking electricity

    Meier, Alan K.; LeBot, Benoit

    1999-01-01

    Many domestic appliances and commercial equipment consume some electric power when they are switched off or not performing their primary purpose. The typical loss per appliance is low (from 1 to 25 W) but, when multiplied by the billions of appliances in houses and in commercial buildings, standby losses represent a significant fraction of total electricity use. Several initiatives to reduce standby losses have appeared in different parts of the world. One proposal, the 1-watt plan, seeks to harmonize these initiatives by establishing a single target for all appliances. This paper explains the background to the 1-watt plan, identifies some unresolved aspects, and gives some estimates of energy savings

  1. Advancing Globally Integrated Logistics Effort 2017 Wargame Report

    2017-09-01

    Netzer, Patricia. 2011. Foreign Disaster Relief Guidebook. CNA Corporation. CRM D0024959.A2. [77] Bell, Lauren, Jenna Davis, Ramzy Azar, Lynne...Jurgielewicz Leavitt, and Erin Rebhan. 2008. Future Strategies: Analysis of Navy Medicine Humanitarian Assistance. CNA Corporation. CRM D0019089.A2

  2. Effort rights-based management

    Squires, Dale; Maunder, Mark; Allen, Robin

    2017-01-01

    Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish...... populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments...

  3. Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1999-01-01

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

  4. Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1997-01-01

    On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

  5. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  6. Geology, geophysics, and physical properties of the U12n.25 non-proliferation experiment site

    Baldwin, M.J.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experiment was conducted in the U12n.25 drift in N-Tunnel at the Nevada Test Site. The geologic characterization of the site was performed by Raytheon Services Nevada geologists in the standard manner used for all underground nuclear weapons-effects tests executed by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The U12n.25 test bed was constructed in zeolitized ash-fall tuff of the Tunnel Beds Tuff, Subunit 4K, 389.0 m below the surface of Rainier Mesa. The structural geology of the site was simple, with the nearest fault plane projected to be 12 m below the mined cavity at closest approach, and an average bedding dip of seven degrees to the northwest. The cavity excavation revealed several small fractures, including one which produced minor amounts of free water during construction. The physical properties of the site were well within the range of experience for the zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel and no geology-related problems were encountered during construction. The zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel has been the site of twenty nuclear tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The similarities of geologic setting, site geometry, and physical properties allow many comparisons of Non-Proliferation Experiment results with the large nuclear-test data base.

  7. Cavity pressure/residual stress measurements from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Heinle, R.A.; Hudson, B.C. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hatch, M.A. Jr.

    1994-12-31

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment to determine post-detonation gas pressure inside the explosive cavity and the residual rock stress in the region immediately outside the cavity. Before detonation there was significant concern that steam and detonation products would create very high temperatures and pressure in the blast cavity that would exist for weeks and months after firing. This could constitute a safety hazard to personnel re-entering the tunnel. Consequently the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was asked to field its Cavity Pressure/Residual stress monitor system on the Non-Proliferation Experiment. We obtained experimental data for the first 600 ms after the explosion and again several weeks after detonation upon tunnel re-entry. We recorded early-time cavity pressure of about 8.3 MPa. In addition we believe that the ends of our sensor hoses were subjected to an ambient driving pressure of about 0.5 MPa (absolute) that persisted until at least three weeks after zero time.

  8. Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts

    Lister, Sarah A

    2005-01-01

    .... Though influenza pandemics occur with some regularity, and the United States has been involved in specific planning efforts since the early 1990s, the H5N1 situation has created a sense of urgency...

  9. Effort Estimation in BPMS Migration

    Drews, Christopher; Lantow, Birger

    2018-01-01

    Usually Business Process Management Systems (BPMS) are highly integrated in the IT of organizations and are at the core of their business. Thus, migrating from one BPMS solution to another is not a common task. However, there are forces that are pushing organizations to perform this step, e.g. maintenance costs of legacy BPMS or the need for additional functionality. Before the actual migration, the risk and the effort must be evaluated. This work provides a framework for effort estimation re...

  10. Fissile material ban: global and non-discriminatory?

    Datt, Savita

    1995-01-01

    With the indefinite and unconditional extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) now out of the way, the next issue on the non-proliferation agenda is that of the existing stocks and further production of plutonium and weapons grade uranium. More than the existing stocks and the surplus fissile materials made available through arms control and disarmament measures, it is the further production of such materials which is sought to be tackled urgently. Of prime concern are the nuclear programmes of threshold countries like India, Pakistan and Israel (countries out of the NPT fold) which need to be capped at all costs. The best method of achieving this, it is believed can be through a global ban on the production of fissile materials. 15 refs

  11. The global initiative against the nuclear terrorism; La iniciativa global contra el terrorismo nuclear

    Lossada Torres-Quevedo, A.

    2008-07-01

    The magnitude of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and subsequent attacks in Madrid, London, Bali and Iraq have been cause for condemnation and have forced the international community to make a concerted effort to prevent this kind of attack. Moreover, the risk that Al Qaeda could get hold of weapons of mass destruction has led to the inclusion of non-proliferation as a key element of the strategies to combat terrorism and to the launch of several initiative to prevent the possibility of these types of weapons or their precursors from falling into the hands of terrorist groups and to adequately manage the consequences. (Author)

  12. 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    1995-01-01

    On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  13. Abstracts of 3. International scientific-practical conference 'Semipalatinsk Test Site. Radiation Legacy and Non-proliferation Issues'

    2008-01-01

    The Conference gathered representatives of more than 25 countries and international organizations. In the Conference among with actual problems of current environment conditions in Kazakhstan, perspective trends in the field of radiation protection, radio-ecological and radiobiological research and issues of international co-operation in support of non-proliferation regime, other advanced scientific projects were considered [ru

  14. U.S. nonproliferation policy in the decade of the eighties: Past dilemmas and prospects for the future

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    No single event had more effect on the policies concerning nuclear importation and exportation activities than the 1974 detonation of a nuclear explosive device in India. This led eventually to the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The author describes the difficult negotiations of the U.S. administration with Euratom, Japan, China, and Latin America. (CW) [de

  15. Dopamine, behavioral economics, and effort

    John D Salamone

    2009-09-01

    Full Text Available Abstract. There are numerous problems with the hypothesis that brain dopamine (DA systems, particularly in the nucleus accumbens, directly mediate the rewarding or primary motivational characteristics of natural stimuli such as food. Research and theory related to the functions of mesolimbic DA are undergoing a substantial conceptual restructuring, with the traditional emphasis on hedonia and primary reward yielding to other concepts and lines of inquiry. The present review is focused upon the involvement of nucleus accumbens DA in behavioral activation and effort-related processes. Viewed from the framework of behavioral economics, the effects of accumbens DA depletions and antagonism on food-reinforced behavior are highly dependent upon the work requirements of the instrumental task, and DA depleted rats are more sensitive to increases in response costs (i.e., ratio requirements. Moreover, interference with accumbens DA transmission exerts a powerful influence over effort-related choice behavior. Rats with accumbens DA depletions or antagonism reallocate their instrumental behavior away from food-reinforced tasks that have high response requirements, and instead these rats select a less-effortful type of food-seeking behavior. Nucleus accumbens DA and adenosine interact in the regulation of effort-related functions, and other brain structures (anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, ventral pallidum also are involved. Studies of the brain systems regulating effort-based processes may have implications for understanding drug abuse, as well as energy-related disorders such as psychomotor slowing, fatigue or anergia in depression and other neurological disorders.

  16. Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

    Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, H.-T.

    2010-01-01

    Roč. 13, č. 3 (2010), s. 249-259 ISSN 1386-4157 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : minimum-effort game * coordination game * experiments * social capital Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.868, year: 2010

  17. Global Awareness in the Classroom: Global Classroom Initiative

    Education Canada, 2004

    2004-01-01

    As countries around the world move toward global integration, knowledge of how Canada interrelates globally is becoming an increasingly useful asset. It is important that young Canadians learn what it means to become responsible global citizens. Awareness about global issues and appreciation of Canada's efforts in international development offer a…

  18. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  19. Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    1998-12-01

    On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

  20. ASME Code Efforts Supporting HTGRs

    D.K. Morton

    2012-09-01

    In 1999, an international collaborative initiative for the development of advanced (Generation IV) reactors was started. The idea behind this effort was to bring nuclear energy closer to the needs of sustainability, to increase proliferation resistance, and to support concepts able to produce energy (both electricity and process heat) at competitive costs. The U.S. Department of Energy has supported this effort by pursuing the development of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, a high temperature gas-cooled reactor. This support has included research and development of pertinent data, initial regulatory discussions, and engineering support of various codes and standards development. This report discusses the various applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes and standards that are being developed to support these high temperature gascooled reactors during construction and operation. ASME is aggressively pursuing these codes and standards to support an international effort to build the next generation of advanced reactors so that all can benefit.

  1. ASME Code Efforts Supporting HTGRs

    D.K. Morton

    2011-09-01

    In 1999, an international collaborative initiative for the development of advanced (Generation IV) reactors was started. The idea behind this effort was to bring nuclear energy closer to the needs of sustainability, to increase proliferation resistance, and to support concepts able to produce energy (both electricity and process heat) at competitive costs. The U.S. Department of Energy has supported this effort by pursuing the development of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, a high temperature gas-cooled reactor. This support has included research and development of pertinent data, initial regulatory discussions, and engineering support of various codes and standards development. This report discusses the various applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes and standards that are being developed to support these high temperature gascooled reactors during construction and operation. ASME is aggressively pursuing these codes and standards to support an international effort to build the next generation of advanced reactors so that all can benefit.

  2. Effort Estimation in BPMS Migration

    Christopher Drews

    2018-04-01

    Full Text Available Usually Business Process Management Systems (BPMS are highly integrated in the IT of organizations and are at the core of their business. Thus, migrating from one BPMS solution to another is not a common task. However, there are forces that are pushing organizations to perform this step, e.g. maintenance costs of legacy BPMS or the need for additional functionality. Before the actual migration, the risk and the effort must be evaluated. This work provides a framework for effort estimation regarding the technical aspects of BPMS migration. The framework provides questions for BPMS comparison and an effort evaluation schema. The applicability of the framework is evaluated based on a simplified BPMS migration scenario.

  3. Nonproliferation Sanctions

    2001-01-01

    ILSA). On May 18, 1998, the Administration announced that in- vestment by French, Malaysian , and Russian firms in Iran’s oil and gas industry...for the participation in royalties , earnings, or profits in that development, without regard to the form of the participation. The term "investment

  4. A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

    Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded

  5. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-07-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  6. Effort problem of chemical pipelines

    Okrajni, J.; Ciesla, M.; Mutwil, K. [Silesian Technical University, Katowice (Poland)

    1998-12-31

    The problem of the technical state assessment of the chemical pipelines working under mechanical and thermal loading has been shown in the paper. The pipelines effort after the long time operating period has been analysed. Material geometrical and loading conditions of the crack initiation and crack growth process in the chosen object has been discussed. Areas of the maximal effort have been determined. The material structure charges after the long time operating period have been described. Mechanisms of the crack initiation and crack growth in the pipeline elements have been analysed and mutual relations between the chemical and mechanical influences have been shown. (orig.) 16 refs.

  7. Authentication of monitoring systems for non-proliferation and arms control

    Fuller, J.L.; Kouzes, R.T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Radiation measurement and systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems will be authenticated. Authentication is the process by which a monitoring party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. Attribute measurement systems are specific examples of radiation measurement systems that are being developed in the United States and the Russian Federation. Under one bilateral agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction (DoD DTRA/CTR) Program is constructing a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to hold up to 50 tons of plutonium from the disassembly of Russian Federation nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being held between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for cooperative development of attribute measurement systems to provide confidence that the material is of weapons origin and other purposes. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is leading the authentication effort for U.S. interests at FMSF. There are two basic requirements for an attribute measurement system: protection of classified information, and assurance of credible performance of the system for the measurement. The technology used to protect classified information is referred to as an information barrier. An information barrier consists of technology and procedures that prevent the release of host-country classified information to a monitoring party during a joint inspection of a sensitive item. Information barriers are used on monitoring systems that are exposed to host-party classified materials

  8. Reproductive effort in viscous populations

    Pen, Ido

    Here I study a kin selection model of reproductive effort, the allocation of resources to fecundity versus survival, in a patch-structured population. Breeding females remain in the same patch for life. Offspring have costly, partial long-distance dispersal and compete for breeding sites, which

  9. Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

    1989-01-01

    This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

  10. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  11. National Nuclear Security Administration Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report in Brief: October 2007 - May 2008

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.; Sandusky, Jessica A.

    2009-05-01

    This abbreviated Annual Report covers program activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) from October 2007 through May 2008--the timeframe between the last Annual Report (which covered activities through September 2007) and the next report (which will begin with June 2008 activities). In that timeframe, the NGFP continued building a solid foundation as the program began reaping the benefits of recently implemented changes. This report is organized by Fellowship class and the pertinent program activities for each, including: October 2007 Recruiting events and final applications (Class of 2008) Winter 2007 Selection and hiring (Class of 2008) Spring 2008 Career development roundtables (Class of 2007) Orientation planning (Class of 2008) Recruitment planning and university outreach (Class of 2009) May 2008 Closing ceremony (Class of 2007)

  12. Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

    Leventhal, P. [Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}further steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.

  13. Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

    Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

  14. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Netchaev, B.

    1976-01-01

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

  15. Anti-neutrino flux in a research reactor for non-proliferation application

    Khakshournia, Samad; Foroughi, Shokoufeh [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

    2017-11-15

    Owing to growing interest in the study of emitted antineutrinos from nuclear reactors to test the Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, antineutrino flux was studied in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using ORIGEN code. According to our prediction, antineutrino rate was obtained 2.6 x 10{sup 17} (v{sub e}/sec) in the core No. 57F of the TRR. Calculations indicated that evolution of antineutrino flux was very slow with time and the performed refueling had not an observable effect on antineutrino flux curve for a 5 MW reactor with the conventional refueling program. It is seen that for non-proliferation applications the measurement of the contribution of {sup 239}Pu to the fission using an antineutrino detector is not viable in the TRR.

  16. Airborne Multisensor Pod System, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Second quarter 1995

    Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue focuses on the Airborne Multisensor Pod System (AMPS) which is a collaboration of many of the DOE national laboratories to provide a scientific environment to research multiple sensors and the new information that can be derived from them. The bulk of the research has been directed at nonproliferation applications, but it has also proven useful in environmental monitoring and assessment, and land/water management. The contents of this issue are: using AMPS technology to detect proliferation and monitor resources; combining multisensor data to monitor facilities and natural resources; planning a AMPS mission; SAR pod produces images day or night, rain or shine; MSI pod combines data from multiple sensors; ESI pod will analyze emissions and effluents; and accessing AMPS information on the Internet.

  17. The Asia-Pacific region: non-proliferation and other disarmament issues

    1992-01-01

    In the past few years, the United States and the former Soviet Union began to adjust their force structures in Asia-Pacific region. In this respect, a large range of issues have been raised in discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Apart from the issues and trends related to proliferation, military expenditure, arms transfer and other disarmament matters, the specific situations in the respective subregions of South-East Asia, South Asia and North-East Asia were discussed. Comprehensive and verified commitments not to possess any such weapons is stressed as the main goal of the meeting. It is vitally important that opportunities that were opened should be seized to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological as well as highly destabilizing conventional weapons

  18. Non-Proliferation Community, Do We Really Speak the Same Language?

    Chatelus, R.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Michel, Q.; Viski, A.; Sevini, F.; Charatsis, C.; )

    2015-01-01

    The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others. The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number of terms, used because of their meaning in English are ''false friends'' in other languages, i.e., they are used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g., technology, transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation. Improvements might include revising official reference documents

  19. Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

    Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

  20. The Non-Proliferation Experiment recorded at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility

    Carr, D.B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment was recorded by five different seismic stations operated by Sandia National Laboratories at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility, approximately 7.6{degrees} from the Nevada Test Site. Two stations are different versions of the Deployable Seismic Verification System developed by the Department of Energy to provide seismic data to verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Vault and borehole versions of the Designated Seismic Stations also recorded the event. The final station is test instrumentation located at depths of 10, 40 and 1200 feet. Although the event is seen clearly at all the stations, there are variations in the raw data due to the different bandwidths and depths of deployment. One Deployable Seismic Verification System has been operating at Pinedale for over three years and in that time recorded 14 nuclear explosions and 4 earthquakes from the Nevada Test Site, along with numerous other western U.S. earthquakes. Several discriminants based on the work by Taylor et al. (1989) have been applied to this data. First the discriminants were tested by comparing the explosions only to the 4 earthquakes located on the Test Site. Only one discriminant, log(L{sub g}/P{sub g}), did not show clear separation between the earthquakes and nuclear explosions. When other western U.S. events are included, only the M{sub b} vs. M{sub s} discriminant separated the event. In all cases where discrimination was possible, the Non-Proliferation Experiment was indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion.