Macro Security Methodology for Conducting Facility Security and Sustainability Assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Herdes, Greg A.; Freier, Keith D.; Wright, Kyle A.

2007-01-01

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has developed a macro security strategy that not only addresses traditional physical protection systems, but also focuses on sustainability as part of the security assessment and management process. This approach is designed to meet the needs of virtually any industry or environment requiring critical asset protection. PNNL has successfully demonstrated the utility of this macro security strategy through its support to the NNSA Office of Global Threat Reduction implementing security upgrades at international facilities possessing high activity radioactive sources that could be used in the assembly of a radiological dispersal device, commonly referred to as a 'dirty bomb'. Traditional vulnerability assessments provide a snap shot in time of the effectiveness of a physical protection system without significant consideration to the sustainability of the component elements that make up the system. This paper describes the approach and tools used to integrate technology, plans and procedures, training, and sustainability into a simple, quick, and easy-to-use security assessment and management tool.

Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woods, P.J.

1998-05-01

This document provides a plan for implementing surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) activities to ensure the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility is maintained in a safe, environmentally secure, and cost-effective manner until subsequent closure during the final disposition phase of decommissioning. This plan has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines provided in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM) Decommissioning Resource Manual (DOE/EM-0246) (DOE 1995), and Section 8.6 of TPA change form P-08-97-01 to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology, et al. 1996). Specific objectives of the S ampersand M program are: Ensure adequate containment of remaining radioactive and hazardous material. Provide security control for access into the facility and physical safety to surveillance personnel. Maintain the facility in a manner that will minimize potential hazards to the public, the environment, and surveillance personnel. Provide a plan for the identification and compliance with applicable environmental, safety, health, safeguards, and security requirements

Security culture for nuclear facilities

Science.gov (United States)

Gupta, Deeksha; Bajramovic, Edita

2017-01-01

Natural radioactive elements are part of our environment and radioactivity is a natural phenomenon. There are numerous beneficial applications of radioactive elements (radioisotopes) and radiation, starting from power generation to usages in medical, industrial and agriculture applications. But the risk of radiation exposure is always attached to operational workers, the public and the environment. Hence, this risk has to be assessed and controlled. The main goal of safety and security measures is to protect human life, health, and the environment. Currently, nuclear security considerations became essential along with nuclear safety as nuclear facilities are facing rapidly increase in cybersecurity risks. Therefore, prevention and adequate protection of nuclear facilities from cyberattacks is the major task. Historically, nuclear safety is well defined by IAEA guidelines while nuclear security is just gradually being addressed by some new guidance, especially the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS), IEC 62645 and some national regulations. At the overall level, IAEA NSS 7 describes nuclear security as deterrence and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear, other radioactive substances and their associated facilities. Nuclear security should be included throughout nuclear facilities. Proper implementation of a nuclear security culture leads to staff vigilance and a high level of security posture. Nuclear security also depends on policy makers, regulators, managers, individual employees and members of public. Therefore, proper education and security awareness are essential in keeping nuclear facilities safe and secure.

Ghana's Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dahlstrom, Danielle

2013-01-01

At the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital outside Accra, Pearl Lovelyn Lawson checks the records of the next patient to undergo radiotherapy and adjusts the dose settings of the teletherapy machine. It is business as usual at the facility that treats over fifty patients each day. But Lawson's routine now includes additional procedures to ensure that the highly radioactive cobalt-60 source located inside the machine remains secure. Nuclear security devices and systems such as double locks, motion sensors, and cameras that transmit images to a central alarm system have been installed to ensure that the source cannot be stolen, the facility sabotaged, or unauthorized access gained. At Korle Bu physical protection measures were upgraded as part of Ghana's Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP). Preventing, detecting and responding to criminal acts like the theft or illegal transfer of a radioactive source, is an international priority that could be addressed through an INSSP. As one of its key nuclear security services, the IAEA assists Member States in drafting such plans. An INSSP is developed jointly with the Member State, using a holistic approach to nuclear security capacity building. It reinforces the primary objective of a State's nuclear security regime to protect people, society, and the environment from the harmful consequences of a nuclear security event. Addressing five components - the legal and regulatory framework, prevention, detection, and sustainability - the jointly developed plan identifies the needs, responsible entities and organizations within the State, as well as the timeframe for the implementation of agreed nuclear security related activities. Ghana's INSSP, tailored to its specific needs, is based on findings and recommendations from advisory service missions carried out in Ghana, including an International Nuclear Security Advisory Service mission and an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission. Ghana's INSSP was

Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning Program Surveillance and Maintenance Plan, Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Poderis, Reed J. [NSTec; King, Rebecca A. [NSTec

2013-09-30

This Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M) Plan describes the activities performed between deactivation and final decommissioning of the following facilities located on the Nevada National Security Site, as documented in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order under the Industrial Sites program as decontamination and decommissioning sites: ? Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD) Facility: o EMAD Building (Building 25-3900) o Locomotive Storage Shed (Building 25-3901) ? Test Cell C (TCC) Facility: o Equipment Building (Building 25-3220) o Motor Drive Building (Building 25-3230) o Pump Shop (Building 25-3231) o Cryogenic Lab (Building 25-3232) o Ancillary Structures (e.g., dewars, water tower, piping, tanks) These facilities have been declared excess and are in various stages of deactivation (low-risk, long-term stewardship disposition state). This S&M Plan establishes and implements a solid, cost-effective, and balanced S&M program consistent with federal, state, and regulatory requirements. A graded approach is used to plan and conduct S&M activities. The goal is to maintain the facilities in a safe condition in a cost-effective manner until their final end state is achieved. This plan accomplishes the following: ? Establishes S&M objectives and framework ? Identifies programmatic guidance for S&M activities to be conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) ? Provides present facility condition information and identifies hazards ? Identifies facility-specific S&M activities to be performed and their frequency ? Identifies regulatory drivers, NNSA/NFO policies and procedures, and best management practices that necessitate implementation of S&M activities ? Provides criteria and frequencies for revisions and updates ? Establishes the process for identifying and dispositioning a condition that has not been previously identified or

Physical security of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dixon, H.

1987-01-01

A serious problem with present security systems at nuclear facilities is that the threats and standards prepared by the NRC and DOE are general, and the field offices are required to develop their own local threats and, on that basis, to prepared detailed specifications for security systems at sites in their jurisdiction. As a result, the capabilities of the systems vary across facilities. Five steps in particular are strongly recommended as corrective measures: 1. Those agencies responsible for civil nuclear facilities should jointly prepare detailed threat definitions, operational requirements, and equipment specifications to protect generic nuclear facilities, and these matters should be issued as policy. The agencies should provide sufficient detail to guide the design of specific security systems and to identify candidate components. 2. The DOE, NRC, and DOD should explain to Congress why government-developed security and other military equipment are not used to upgrade existing security systems and to stock future ones. 3. Each DOE and NRC facility should be assessed to determine the impact on the size of the guard force and on warning time when personnel-detecting radars and ground point sensors are installed. 4. All security guards and technicians should be investigated for the highest security clearance, with reinvestigations every four years. 5. The processes and vehicles used in intrafacility transport of nuclear materials should be evaluated against a range of threats and attack scenarios, including violent air and vehicle assaults. All of these recommendations are feasible and cost-effective. The appropriate congressional subcommittees should direct that they be implemented as soon as possible

Safeguards and security issues at the MRS facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McGuinn, E.; Birch, M.; Jones, J.; Floyd, W.

1993-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high level radioactive waste in a way that ensures the protection of the public from any unacceptable radiological risks and the maintenance of the national security. To achieve these objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved security program at its facilities including the Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility. This program will safeguard nuclear information and provide not only for the physical protection of facilities but also for the nuclear material being handled and stored. Several key regulatory issues were identified during the development of the safeguards and security (S ampersand S) program for the MRS. These issues relate to developing a realistic definition of the security threat at the MRS and establishing a single set of regulatory requirements. Resolution of these issues is important to implement a realistic S ampersand S program who scope is commensurate with the potential risk at the MRS and complies with all appropriate regulatory requirements. OCRWM is working toward a timely resolution of these issues and on the formulation of an S ampersand S program for implementation at the MRS. As an initial step, DOE has proposed an S ampersand S strategy for the MRS based on a set of assumed resolutions to the key regulatory issues. With this approach, the facility designers will be able to evaluate possible S ampersand S concepts for integration into the MRS early in the design process

Security planning an applied approach

CERN Document Server

Lincke, Susan

2015-01-01

This book guides readers through building an IT security plan. Offering a template, it helps readers to prioritize risks, conform to regulation, plan their defense and secure proprietary/confidential information. The process is documented in the supplemental online security workbook. Security Planning is designed for the busy IT practitioner, who does not have time to become a security expert, but needs a security plan now. It also serves to educate the reader of a broader set of concepts related to the security environment through the Introductory Concepts and Advanced sections. The book serv

Bechtel Hanford, Inc. network security plan for the environmental restoration contract

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCaffrey, M.B.

1997-01-01

As part of the Computer Protection Program, this Network Security Plan identifies the specific security measures used to protect the Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) enterprise network. The network consists of the communication infrastructure and information systems used by BHI to perform work related to the Environmental Restoration Contract (ERC) at the Hanford Site. It provides electronic communication between the ERC-leased facilities in Richland, Washington and other facilities located on the Hanford Site. Network gateways to other site and offsite networks provide electronic communication with the rest of the Hanford community. The enterprise network is comprised of several individual networks that operate under different conditions and perform different functions. The principal network used by BHI is the Bechtel Local Area Network (BLAN). This document identifies specific security issues surrounding the BLAN and the measures BHI takes to protect it. The other BHI-operated networks are discussed from the perspective of the security impact they have on the BLAN. This plan addresses security for individual and shared computer systems connected to the BHI networks as well as the gateways between other site and external networks. It specifically does not address computer-based information systems that store or process particularly sensitive data, computer systems connected to other site networks (e.g., Hanford Local Area Network), or standalone computers located in ERC facilities

Virtual reality in the creation of a tool to support planning of physical security at nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Santo, Andre Cotelli do E.; Mol, Antonio Carlos de A.; Goncalves, Deise Galvao de S.; Marins, Eugenio; Freitas, Victor Goncalves G.

2013-01-01

In recent years was observed the importance of improving the physical security of nuclear facilities, mainly due to the increasing advancement of brazilian nuclear program. The present work aims to develop a tool that allows the visualization and planning of action strategies in a virtual environment, in order to improve this security. To this end, was created a virtual model of the Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN), which is located on Ilha do Fundao - Rio de Janeiro - Brazil. This environment is a three-dimensional model, with representations close to reality, where virtual characters (avatars) can move and interact in real time. In this virtual world, it was developed a dynamic weather system, where is possible to change between day and night, and climate changes such as: rain, storms, snow, among other features. Furthermore, the tool has a surveillance system using virtual cameras, allowing the monitoring of the environment. This way, making possible to simulate strategies approach, allowing an evaluation of the procedures performed, as well as assisting in the training of security installations subject to radiation. (author)

Virtual reality in the creation of a tool to support planning of physical security at nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Santo, Andre Cotelli do E.; Mol, Antonio Carlos de A.; Goncalves, Deise Galvao de S.; Marins, Eugenio; Freitas, Victor Goncalves G., E-mail: cotelli.andre@gmail.com, E-mail: mol@ien.gov.br, E-mail: deise.galvao@gmail.com, E-mail: eugenio@ien.gov.br, E-mail: vgoncalves@ien.gov.br [Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN/CNEN-RJ), Rio De Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

2013-07-01

In recent years was observed the importance of improving the physical security of nuclear facilities, mainly due to the increasing advancement of brazilian nuclear program. The present work aims to develop a tool that allows the visualization and planning of action strategies in a virtual environment, in order to improve this security. To this end, was created a virtual model of the Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN), which is located on Ilha do Fundao - Rio de Janeiro - Brazil. This environment is a three-dimensional model, with representations close to reality, where virtual characters (avatars) can move and interact in real time. In this virtual world, it was developed a dynamic weather system, where is possible to change between day and night, and climate changes such as: rain, storms, snow, among other features. Furthermore, the tool has a surveillance system using virtual cameras, allowing the monitoring of the environment. This way, making possible to simulate strategies approach, allowing an evaluation of the procedures performed, as well as assisting in the training of security installations subject to radiation. (author)

304 Concretion facility closure plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-04-01

The Hanford Site, located northwest of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium Zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy, and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets in the 304 Concretion Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLRMW) with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Concretion Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of materials and wastes managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Concretion Facility (304 Facility). Clean closure of the 304 Facility is the proposed method for closure of the facility. Justification for this proposal is presented. 15 refs., 22 figs., 4 tabs

Computer security at ukrainian nuclear facilities: interface between nuclear safety and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chumak, D.; Klevtsov, O.

2015-01-01

Active introduction of information technology, computer instrumentation and control systems (I and C systems) in the nuclear field leads to a greater efficiency and management of technological processes at nuclear facilities. However, this trend brings a number of challenges related to cyber-attacks on the above elements, which violates computer security as well as nuclear safety and security of a nuclear facility. This paper considers regulatory support to computer security at the nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The issue of computer and information security considered in the context of physical protection, because it is an integral component. The paper focuses on the computer security of I and C systems important to nuclear safety. These systems are potentially vulnerable to cyber threats and, in case of cyber-attacks, the potential negative impact on the normal operational processes can lead to a breach of the nuclear facility security. While ensuring nuclear security of I and C systems, it interacts with nuclear safety, therefore, the paper considers an example of an integrated approach to the requirements of nuclear safety and security

Nuclear Security in Action at Facilities in Ghana

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dahlstrom, Danielle

2013-01-01

Nuclear security is a national responsibility. An Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) is a tool that enables States to address nuclear security in a comprehensive way and to strengthen its national nuclear security regime, beginning with the legislative and regulatory framework within a State. Operating areas in nuclear facilities like research reactors which use highly enriched uranium, require additional physical protection measures to ensure the security of the nuclear material and prevent acts of sabotage. Other radioactive materials, like sealed radioactive sources used in radiotherapy machines in hospitals for cancer treatment, need to be protected so that they are not stolen and used with malicious intent. Nuclear and other radioactive material needs to be kept in safe and secure storage, which incorporates various types of physical barriers to prevent theft and unauthorized access. Intrusion detection and assessment systems, like cameras and sensors, help to ensure timely and adequate responses to any security incident. Responding to a nuclear security incident, and mitigating its consequences, requires specialized equipment like isotope identifiers, and competent and well trained personnel. Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs) focus on human resource development as well as technical and scientific support which contribute to the sustainability of nuclear security in a State

6 CFR 37.41 - Security plan.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 6 Domestic Security 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security plan. 37.41 Section 37.41 Domestic... Security plan. (a) In General. States must have a security plan that addresses the provisions in paragraph (b) of this section and must submit the security plan as part of its REAL ID certification under § 37...

304 Concretion Facility Closure Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-10-01

The Hanford Site, located northwest of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium with Zircaloy-2 and copper silicon allo , uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy, and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gal containers) in the 304 Concretion Facility (304 Facility), located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLRMW) with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Concretion Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040 (Ecology 1991). This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of materials and wastes managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Facility. The strategy for closure of the 304 Facility is presented in Section 6.0

[Planning a Health Residence for Prison Security Measures, Tuscany (Italy)].

Science.gov (United States)

Porfido, Eugenio; Colombai, Renato; Scarpa, Franco; Totaro, Michele; Tani, Luca; Baldini, Claudio; Baggiani, Angelo

2016-01-01

Health Residences for Prison Security Measures are facilities hosting psychotic persons who have committed crimes and providing them with personalized rehabilitation and treatment plans to promote their reinstatement in society. The aim of this study was to describe the criteria for planning and designing a prison health residence in the Tuscany region (Italy), to be managed by the regional healthcare service, in line with current regulations, with dedicated staff for providing specific treatment plans and programmes.

Guidelines for developing NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) ADP security risk management plans

Science.gov (United States)

Tompkins, F. G.

1983-01-01

This report presents guidance to NASA Computer security officials for developing ADP security risk management plans. The six components of the risk management process are identified and discussed. Guidance is presented on how to manage security risks that have been identified during a risk analysis performed at a data processing facility or during the security evaluation of an application system.

Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (French Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The possibility that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used for malicious purposes cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. States have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material and to respond effectively to nuclear security events. States have agreed to strengthen existing instruments and have established new international legal instruments to enhance nuclear security worldwide. Nuclear security is fundamental in the management of nuclear technologies and in applications where nuclear or other radioactive material is used or transported. Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security regime. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. This recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of and response to trafficking in such material; national response plans; and contingency measures. With its Nuclear Security Series, the IAEA aims to assist States in implementing and sustaining such a regime in a coherent and integrated manner. The IAEA Nuclear Security Series comprises Nuclear Security Fundamentals, which include objectives and essential elements of a State's nuclear security regime; Recommendations; Implementing Guides; and Technical Guidance. Each State carries the full responsibility for nuclear security, specifically: to provide for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities; to ensure the security of such material in use, storage or in transport; to combat illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movement of such material; and to be prepared to respond to a nuclear security event. This publication is in the Technical Guidance

Security central processing unit applications in the protection of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goetzke, R.E.

1987-01-01

New or upgraded electronic security systems protecting nuclear facilities or complexes will be heavily computer dependent. Proper planning for new systems and the employment of new state-of-the-art 32 bit processors in the processing of subsystem reports are key elements in effective security systems. The processing of subsystem reports represents only a small segment of system overhead. In selecting a security system to meet the current and future needs for nuclear security applications the central processing unit (CPU) applied in the system architecture is the critical element in system performance. New 32 bit technology eliminates the need for program overlays while providing system programmers with well documented program tools to develop effective systems to operate in all phases of nuclear security applications

Introduction of regulatory guide on cyber security of L and C systems in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kang, Y.; Jeong, C. H.; Kim, D. I.

2008-01-01

In the case of unauthorized individuals, systems and entities or process threatening the instrumentation and control systems of nuclear facilities using the intrinsic vulnerabilities of digital based technologies, those systems may lose their own required functions. The loss of required functions of the systems can seriously affect the safety of nuclear facilities. Consequently, digital instrumentation and control systems, which perform functions important to safety, should be designed and operated to respond to cyber threats capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of digital based technologies. To make it possible, the developers and licensees of nuclear facilities should perform appropriate cyber security activities throughout the whole life cycle of digital instrumentation and control systems. Under the goal of securing the safety of nuclear facilities, this paper presents the regulatory on cyber security activities to remove the cyber threats that exploit the vulnerabilities of digital instrumentation and control systems and to mitigate the effect of such threats. Presented regulatory guide includes establishing the cyber security policy and plan, analyzing and classifying the cyber threats and cyber security assessment of digital instrumentation and control systems. (authors)

Physical security of cut-and-cover underground facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morse, W.D.

1998-01-01

To aid designers, generic physical security objectives and design concepts for cut-and-cover underground facilities are presented. Specific aspects addressing overburdens, entryways, security doors, facility services, emergency egress, security response force, and human elements are discussed

Strategic planning and security analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DePasquale, S.

1991-01-01

Nuclear security master planning is a deliberative process, founded on the premise that the broad scope of security must be analyzed before any meaningful determinations may be reached on an individual security aspect. This paper examines the analytical process required in developing a Security Master Plan. It defines a four stage process concluding with the selection of security measures encompassing physical security, policy and procedure considerations and guard force deployment. The final product orchestrates each security measure in a complementary and supportive configuration

A security/safety survey of long term care facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

Acorn, Jonathan R

2010-01-01

What are the major security/safety problems of long term care facilities? What steps are being taken by some facilities to mitigate such problems? Answers to these questions can be found in a survey of IAHSS members involved in long term care security conducted for the IAHSS Long Term Care Security Task Force. The survey, the author points out, focuses primarily on long term care facilities operated by hospitals and health systems. However, he believes, it does accurately reflect the security problems most long term facilities face, and presents valuable information on security systems and practices which should be also considered by independent and chain operated facilities.

Conducting Computer Security Assessments at Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-06-01

Computer security is increasingly recognized as a key component in nuclear security. As technology advances, it is anticipated that computer and computing systems will be used to an even greater degree in all aspects of plant operations including safety and security systems. A rigorous and comprehensive assessment process can assist in strengthening the effectiveness of the computer security programme. This publication outlines a methodology for conducting computer security assessments at nuclear facilities. The methodology can likewise be easily adapted to provide assessments at facilities with other radioactive materials

75 FR 55574 - Joint Public Roundtable on Swap Execution Facilities and Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

2010-09-13

...; File No. 4-612] Joint Public Roundtable on Swap Execution Facilities and Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') and Securities and Exchange Commission... discuss swap execution facilities and security-based swap execution facilities in the context of certain...

Quality Assurance Project Plan for Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.

1991-06-01

This Quality Assurance Project Plan addresses the quality assurance requirements for the Facility Monitoring Plans of the overall site-wide environmental monitoring plan. This plan specifically applies to the sampling and analysis activities and continuous monitoring performed for all Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan activities conducted by Westinghouse Hanford Company. It is generic in approach and will be implemented in conjunction with the specific requirements of individual Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans. This document is intended to be a basic road map to the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan documents (i.e., the guidance document for preparing Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan determinations, management plan, and Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans). The implementing procedures, plans, and instructions are appropriate for the control of effluent monitoring plans requiring compliance with US Department of Energy, US Environmental Protection Agency, state, and local requirements. This Quality Assurance Project Plan contains a matrix of organizational responsibilities, procedural resources from facility or site manuals used in the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, and a list of the analytes of interest and analytical methods for each facility preparing a Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan. 44 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs

Comprehensive facilities plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-09-01

The Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory`s Comprehensive Facilities Plan (CFP) document provides analysis and policy guidance for the effective use and orderly future development of land and capital assets at the Berkeley Lab site. The CFP directly supports Berkeley Lab`s role as a multiprogram national laboratory operated by the University of California (UC) for the Department of Energy (DOE). The CFP is revised annually on Berkeley Lab`s Facilities Planning Website. Major revisions are consistent with DOE policy and review guidance. Facilities planing is motivated by the need to develop facilities for DOE programmatic needs; to maintain, replace and rehabilitate existing obsolete facilities; to identify sites for anticipated programmatic growth; and to establish a planning framework in recognition of site amenities and the surrounding community. The CFP presents a concise expression of the policy for the future physical development of the Laboratory, based upon anticipated operational needs of research programs and the environmental setting. It is a product of the ongoing planning processes and is a dynamic information source.

Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Uranium Trioxide(UO3) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McGuire, J.J.

1999-01-01

This document provides a plan for implementing surveillance and maintenance (S and M) activities to ensure the Uranium Oxide(UO3) Facility is maintained in a safe, environmentally secure, and cost effective manner until subsequent closure during the final disposition phase of decommissioning. This plan has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines provided in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) Decommissioning Resource Manual (DOE 1995) and Section 8.6 of TPA change form P-08-97-01 to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology, et al. 1996)

Physical security technologies for weapons complex reconfiguration facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeger, C.D.

1994-01-01

Sandia National Laboratories was a member of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S ampersand S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration. The physical security systems in the new and upgraded facilities being considered for the WCR had to meet DOE orders and other requirements set forth in the WCR Programmatic Design Criteria (PDC), incorporate the latest physical security technologies using proven state-of-the-art systems and meet fundamental security principles. The outcome was to avoid costly retrofits and provide effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, costs and schedule. Physical security requirements for WCR facilities include: (1) reducing S ampersand S life-cycle costs, (2) where feasible automating S ampersand S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, (3) increasing the amount of delay to outsider adversary attack, (4) compartmentalizing the facility to minimize the number of personnel requiring access to critical areas and (5) having reliable and maintainable systems. To be most effective against threats physical security must be integrated with facility operations, safety and other S ampersand S activities, such as material control and accountability, nuclear measurements and computer and information security. This paper will discuss the S ampersand S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical security technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed

Development on Guidance of Cyber Security Exercise for the Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyundoo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Cyber threats and attacks are increasing rapidly against infrastructure including energy and utilities industry over the world. Because of lack of human resource and incident response system to prevent or defend increased cyber threats, many governments and major national infrastructures perform cyber security exercises to improve capabilities of cyber security incident response. Accordingly there are exponential growth in the number of cyber security exercises over the past decade with the trend expecting to accelerate in the coming years. Even though there were many cyber security exercises in the Nuclear Facilities, this exercise was first which focused on mitigation and recovery of the system of the Nuclear Facility against cyber incident. So many insufficient items were deduced such as absence of a procedure for mitigation and recovery of cyber incident. These procedures should be developed and established through 3rd phase of Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and other technical complement actions under regulatory body’s guidance. Also developed and existed procedures should be regularly performed to make cyber incident response team and related people rapidly response against cyber incident through exercises or other training. The insufficient items come from the exercise should be reflected to developed and existed procedures by periods.

Development on Guidance of Cyber Security Exercise for the Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyundoo

2016-01-01

Cyber threats and attacks are increasing rapidly against infrastructure including energy and utilities industry over the world. Because of lack of human resource and incident response system to prevent or defend increased cyber threats, many governments and major national infrastructures perform cyber security exercises to improve capabilities of cyber security incident response. Accordingly there are exponential growth in the number of cyber security exercises over the past decade with the trend expecting to accelerate in the coming years. Even though there were many cyber security exercises in the Nuclear Facilities, this exercise was first which focused on mitigation and recovery of the system of the Nuclear Facility against cyber incident. So many insufficient items were deduced such as absence of a procedure for mitigation and recovery of cyber incident. These procedures should be developed and established through 3rd phase of Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and other technical complement actions under regulatory body’s guidance. Also developed and existed procedures should be regularly performed to make cyber incident response team and related people rapidly response against cyber incident through exercises or other training. The insufficient items come from the exercise should be reflected to developed and existed procedures by periods

How to implement security controls for an information security program at CBRN facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lenaeus, Joseph D.; O'Neil, Lori Ross; Leitch, Rosalyn M.; Glantz, Clifford S.; Landine, Guy P.; Bryant, Janet L.; Lewis, John; Mathers, Gemma; Rodger, Robert; Johnson, Christopher

2015-01-01

This document was prepared by PNNL within the framework of Project 19 of the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative entitled, ''Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management systems and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control.'' It provides management and workers at CBRN facilities, parent organization managers responsible for those facilities, and regulatory agencies (governmental and nongovernmental) with guidance on the best practices for protecting information security. The security mitigation approaches presented in this document were chosen because they present generally accepted guidance in an easy-to-understand manner, making it easier for facility personnel to grasp key concepts and envision how security controls could be implemented by the facility. This guidance is presented from a risk management perspective.

How to implement security controls for an information security program at CBRN facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lenaeus, Joseph D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); O' Neil, Lori Ross [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Leitch, Rosalyn M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Glantz, Clifford S. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Landine, Guy P. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Bryant, Janet L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Lewis, John [National Nuclear Lab., Workington (United Kingdom); Mathers, Gemma [National Nuclear Lab., Workington (United Kingdom); Rodger, Robert [National Nuclear Lab., Workington (United Kingdom); Johnson, Christopher [National Nuclear Lab., Workington (United Kingdom)

2015-12-01

This document was prepared by PNNL within the framework of Project 19 of the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative entitled, ''Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management systems and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control.'' It provides management and workers at CBRN facilities, parent organization managers responsible for those facilities, and regulatory agencies (governmental and nongovernmental) with guidance on the best practices for protecting information security. The security mitigation approaches presented in this document were chosen because they present generally accepted guidance in an easy-to-understand manner, making it easier for facility personnel to grasp key concepts and envision how security controls could be implemented by the facility. This guidance is presented from a risk management perspective.

Facility effluent monitoring plan determinations for the 400 Area facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.

1991-09-01

This Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan determination resulted from an evaluation conducted for the Westinghouse Hanford Company 400 Area facilities on the Hanford Site. The Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan determinations have been prepared in accordance with A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans. Two major Westinghouse Hanford Company facilities in the 400 Area were evaluated: the Fast Flux Test Facility and the Fuels Manufacturing and examination Facility. The determinations were prepared by Westinghouse Hanford Company. Of these two facilities, only the Fast Flux Test Facility will require a Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan. 7 refs., 5 figs., 4 tabs

78 FR 48029 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-07

... Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security By the authority vested in me as President by the... at reducing the safety risks and security risks associated with hazardous chemicals. However... to further improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators...

Hanford Facility contingency plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sutton, L.N.; Miskho, A.G.; Brunke, R.C.

1993-10-01

The Hanford Facility Contingency Plan, together with each TSD unit-specific contingency plan, meets the WAC 173-303 requirements for a contingency plan. This plan includes descriptions of responses to a nonradiological hazardous materials spill or release at Hanford Facility locations not covered by TSD unit-specific contingency plans or building emergency plans. This plan includes descriptions of responses for spills or releases as a result of transportation activities, movement of materials, packaging, and storage of hazardous materials

49 CFR 659.23 - System security plan: contents.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false System security plan: contents. 659.23 Section 659... State Oversight Agency § 659.23 System security plan: contents. The system security plan must, at a... system security plan; and (e) Document the rail transit agency's process for making its system security...

SNL Five-Year Facilities & Infrastructure Plan FY2015-2019

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cipriani, Ralph J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2014-12-01

Sandia’s development vision is to provide an agile, flexible, safer, more secure, and efficient enterprise that leverages the scientific and technical capabilities of the workforce and supports national security requirements in multiple areas. Sandia’s Five-Year Facilities & Infrastructure Planning program represents a tool to budget and prioritize immediate and short-term actions from indirect funding sources in light of the bigger picture of proposed investments from direct-funded, Work for Others and other funding sources. As a complementary F&I investment program, Sandia’s indirect investment program supports incremental achievement of the development vision within a constrained resource environment.

6 CFR 27.200 - Information regarding security risk for a chemical facility.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... chemical facility. 27.200 Section 27.200 Domestic Security DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM STANDARDS Chemical Facility Security Program § 27.200 Information regarding security risk for a chemical facility. (a) Information to determine security risk. In order to...

Facility effluent monitoring plan determinations for the 200 Area facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.

1991-11-01

The following facility effluent monitoring plan determinations document the evaluations conducted for the Westinghouse Hanford Company 200 Area facilities (chemical processing, waste management, 222-S Laboratory, and laundry) on the Hanford Site in south central Washington State. These evaluations determined the need for facility effluent monitoring plans for the 200 Area facilities. The facility effluent monitoring plan determinations have been prepared in accordance with A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438 (WHC 1991). The Plutonium/Uranium Extraction Plant and UO 3 facility effluent monitoring plan determinations were prepared by Los Alamos Technical Associates, Richland, Washington. The Plutonium Finishing Plant, Transuranic Waste Storage and Assay Facility, T Plant, Tank Farms, Low Level Burial Grounds, and 222-S Laboratory determinations were prepared by Science Applications International Corporation of Richland, Washington. The B Plant Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan Determination was prepared by ERCE Environmental Services of Richland, Washington

Facility effluent monitoring plan for 242-A Evaporator facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crummel, G.M.; Gustavson, R.D.

1993-03-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1* for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could affect employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation showed the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-1**. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

77 FR 63849 - Facility Security Officer Training Requirements; Correction

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-17

... DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Coast Guard [Docket No. USCG-2012-0908] Facility Security Officer... comments on the development of a Facility Security Officer training program. The notice contains an inaccurate Internet link to RSVP for the public meeting. DATES: The notice of public meeting; request for...

National Ignition Facility Cryogenic Target Systems Interim Management Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warner, B

2002-01-01

Restricted availability of funding has had an adverse impact, unforeseen at the time of the original decision to projectize the National Ignition Facility (NIF) Cryogenic Target Handling Systems (NCTS) Program, on the planning and initiation of these efforts. The purpose of this document is to provide an interim project management plan describing the organizational structure and management processes currently in place for NCTS. Preparation of a Program Execution Plan (PEP) for NCTS has been initiated, and a current draft is provided as Attachment 1 to this document. The National Ignition Facility is a multi-megajoule laser facility being constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in the Department of Energy (DOE). Its primary mission is to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) by performing experiments studying weapons physics, including fusion ignition. NIF also supports the missions of weapons effects, inertial fusion energy, and basic science in high-energy-density physics. NIF will be operated by LLNL under contract to the University of California (UC) as a national user facility. NIF is a low-hazard, radiological facility, and its operation will meet all applicable federal, state, and local Environmental Safety and Health (ES and H) requirements. The NCTS Interim Management Plan provides a summary of primary design criteria and functional requirements, current organizational structure, tracking and reporting procedures, and current planning estimates of project scope, cost, and schedule. The NIF Director controls the NIF Cryogenic Target Systems Interim Management Plan. Overall scope content and execution schedules for the High Energy Density Physics Campaign (SSP Campaign 10) are currently undergoing rebaselining and will be brought into alignment with resources expected to be available throughout the NNSA Future Years National Security Plan (FYNSP). The revised schedule for

Chemical Facility Security: Regulation and Issues for Congress

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Shea, Dana A; Tatelman, Todd B

2007-01-01

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed security regulations for chemical facilities, implementing the statutory authority granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L...

Assessing the Security Vulnerabilities of Correctional Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Morrison, G.S.; Spencer, D.S.

1998-10-27

The National Institute of Justice has tasked their Satellite Facility at Sandia National Laboratories and their Southeast Regional Technology Center in Charleston, South Carolina to devise new procedures and tools for helping correctional facilities to assess their security vulnerabilities. Thus, a team is visiting selected correctional facilities and performing vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment helps to identi~ the easiest paths for inmate escape, for introduction of contraband such as drugs or weapons, for unexpected intrusion fi-om outside of the facility, and for the perpetration of violent acts on other inmates and correctional employees, In addition, the vulnerability assessment helps to quantify the security risks for the facility. From these initial assessments will come better procedures for performing vulnerability assessments in general at other correctional facilities, as well as the development of tools to assist with the performance of such vulnerability assessments.

Y-12 National Security Complex National Historic Preservation Act Historic Preservation Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2003-09-30

The Historic Preservation Plan (HPP) recognizes that the Y-12 National Security Complex is a vital and long-term component of DOE and NNSA. In addition to NNSA missions, the Office of Science and Energy, the Office of Nuclear Energy, and the Office of Environmental Management have properties located at Y-12 that must be taken into consideration. The HPP also recognizes that the challenge for cultural resource management is incorporating the requirements of NNSA, SC, NE, and EM missions while preserving and protecting its historic resources. The HPP seeks to find an effective way to meet the obligations at Y-12 for historic and archeological protection while at the same time facilitating effective completion of ongoing site mission activities, including removal of obsolete or contaminated facilities, adaptive reuse of existing facilities whenever feasible, and construction of new facilities in order to meet site mission needs. The Y-12 Historic Preservation Plan (HPP) defines the preservation strategy for the Y-12 National Security Complex and will direct efficient compliance with the NHPA and federal archaeological protection legislation at Y-12 as DOE and NNSA continues mission activities of the site.

Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. Reference Manual (Arabic Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The possibility that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used for malicious purposes cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. States have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material and to respond effectively to nuclear security events. States have agreed to strengthen existing instruments and have established new international legal instruments to enhance nuclear security worldwide. Nuclear security is fundamental in the management of nuclear technologies and in applications where nuclear or other radioactive material is used or transported. Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security regime. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. This recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of and response to trafficking in such material; national response plans; and contingency measures. With its Nuclear Security Series, the IAEA aims to assist States in implementing and sustaining such a regime in a coherent and integrated manner. The IAEA Nuclear Security Series comprises Nuclear Security Fundamentals, which include objectives and essential elements of a State's nuclear security regime; Recommendations; Implementing Guides; and Technical Guidance. Each State carries the full responsibility for nuclear security, specifically: to provide for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities; to ensure the security of such material in use, storage or in transport; to combat illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movement of such material; and to be prepared to respond to a nuclear security event. This publication is in the Technical Guidance

Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. Reference Manual (Russian Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The possibility that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used for malicious purposes cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. States have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material and to respond effectively to nuclear security events. States have agreed to strengthen existing instruments and have established new international legal instruments to enhance nuclear security worldwide. Nuclear security is fundamental in the management of nuclear technologies and in applications where nuclear or other radioactive material is used or transported. Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security regime. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. This recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of and response to trafficking in such material; national response plans; and contingency measures. With its Nuclear Security Series, the IAEA aims to assist States in implementing and sustaining such a regime in a coherent and integrated manner. The IAEA Nuclear Security Series comprises Nuclear Security Fundamentals, which include objectives and essential elements of a State's nuclear security regime; Recommendations; Implementing Guides; and Technical Guidance. Each State carries the full responsibility for nuclear security, specifically: to provide for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities; to ensure the security of such material in use, storage or in transport; to combat illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movement of such material; and to be prepared to respond to a nuclear security event. This publication is in the Technical Guidance

Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. Reference Manual (Chinese Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The possibility that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used for malicious purposes cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. States have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material and to respond effectively to nuclear security events. States have agreed to strengthen existing instruments and have established new international legal instruments to enhance nuclear security worldwide. Nuclear security is fundamental in the management of nuclear technologies and in applications where nuclear or other radioactive material is used or transported. Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security regime. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. This recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of and response to trafficking in such material; national response plans; and contingency measures. With its Nuclear Security Series, the IAEA aims to assist States in implementing and sustaining such a regime in a coherent and integrated manner. The IAEA Nuclear Security Series comprises Nuclear Security Fundamentals, which include objectives and essential elements of a State's nuclear security regime; Recommendations; Implementing Guides; and Technical Guidance. Each State carries the full responsibility for nuclear security, specifically: to provide for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities; to ensure the security of such material in use, storage or in transport; to combat illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movement of such material; and to be prepared to respond to a nuclear security event. This publication is in the Technical Guidance

Facility effluent monitoring plan for 242-A evaporator facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crummel, G.M.; Gustavson, R.D.

1995-02-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could affect employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation showed the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-1. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, as a minimum, every three years

Security issues in a parking facility.

Science.gov (United States)

Gutman, Abraham; Lew, I Paul

2009-01-01

Active security supported by passive security measures which are part of the physical design of a parking facility are essential to preventing crimes from happening wherever and whenever possible, the authors maintain. In the article, they focus on design elements which can be most effective in discouraging potential perpetrators.

Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the 202-S Reduction Oxidation (REDOX) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McGuire, J.J.

1999-01-01

This document provides a plan for implementing surveillance and maintenance (S and M) activities to ensure the 202-S Reduction Oxidation (REDOX) Facility is maintained in a safe, environmentally secure, and cost effective manner until subsequent closure during the final disposition phase of decommissioning. Specific objectives of the S and M program are to ensure adequate confinement of hazardous substances, to provide physical safety and security controls, to maintain the facilities in a manner that will minimize potential hazards to the public and workers, to provide adequate frequency of inspections to identify potential hazards, to maintain selected systems or equipment that will be essential for decommissioning activities in a shutdown but standby or operational mode, if economically justified, and to provide a mechanism for the identification and compliance with applicable environmental, safety and health, and safeguard and security requirements

Nuclear Station Facilities Improvement Planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hooks, R. W.; Lunardini, A. L.; Zaben, O.

1991-01-01

An effective facilities improvement program will include a plan for the temporary relocation of personnel during the construction of an adjoining service building addition. Since the smooth continuation of plant operation is of paramount importance, the phasing plan is established to minimize the disruptions in day-to-day station operation and administration. This plan should consider the final occupancy arrangements and the transition to the new structure; for example, computer hookup and phase-in should be considered. The nuclear industry is placing more emphasis on safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. In order to do this, more emphasis is placed on operations and maintenance. This results in increased size of managerial, technical and maintenance staffs. This in turn requires improved office and service facilities. The facilities that require improvement may include training areas, rad waste processing and storage facilities, and maintenance facilities. This paper discusses an approach for developing an effective program to plan and implement these projects. These improvement projects can range in magnitude from modifying a simple system to building a new structure to allocating space for a future project. This paper addresses the planning required for the new structures with emphasis on site location, space allocation, and internal layout. Since facility planning has recently been completed by Sargent and Leyden at six U. S. nuclear stations, specific examples from some of those plants are presented. Site planning and the establishment of long-range goals are of the utmost importance when undertaking a facilities improvement program for a nuclear station. A plan that considers the total site usage will enhance the value of both the new and existing facilities. Proper planning at the beginning of the program can minimize costs and maximize the benefits of the program

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.; Geiger, J.L.

1992-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation requires the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified. in. A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

The Security Plan for the Joint Euratom/IAEA Remote Monitoring Network

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stronkhorst, J.; Schoop, K.; Ruuska, K.; Kurek, S.; Levert, J.F.

2015-01-01

The European Commission and the IAEA have installed surveillance systems in all larger civil European nuclear facilities. The monitoring data is gathered by optical surveillance systems, electronic sealing systems and numerous measuring devices. The on-site joint Euratom/IAEA monitoring networks operate in general completely isolated from the operator's IT systems. To largely improve data security and reliability, remote data transmission (RDT) is installed on a growing number of sites, and the inspection data is daily transferred to the Data Collect Servers in Luxembourg and Vienna. A growing number of RDT connections and a growing number of security threats require an IT security policy that is pro-active as well as reactive in an efficient way. The risk based approach used in setting up the security plans assesses all elements of the monitoring network, from the implemented technical solution and the assessment of the security needs and threats, up to the incident handling and lessons learned. The results of the assessments are, for each individual RDT connection, described in the technical paragraphs and annexes, including system descriptions, network plans and contact information. The principles of secure data handling as implemented in the shared Euratom /IAEA monitoring network can apply to a broad range of industrial monitoring systems, where human interaction is in general the largest security risk. (author)

Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cavina, A.

2013-01-01

This series of slides presents the IAEA policy concerning the development of recommendations and guidelines for computer security at nuclear facilities. A document of the Nuclear Security Series dedicated to this issue is on the final stage prior to publication. This document is the the first existing IAEA document specifically addressing computer security. This document was necessary for 3 mains reasons: first not all national infrastructures have recognized and standardized computer security, secondly existing international guidance is not industry specific and fails to capture some of the key issues, and thirdly the presence of more or less connected digital systems is increasing in the design of nuclear power plants. The security of computer system must be based on a graded approach: the assignment of computer system to different levels and zones should be based on their relevance to safety and security and the risk assessment process should be allowed to feed back into and influence the graded approach

National Security Technology Incubation Project Continuation Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2008-09-30

This document contains a project continuation plan for the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI). The plan was developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP) funded by a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. This continuation plan describes the current status of NSTI (staffing and clients), long-term goals, strategies, and long-term financial solvency goals.The Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University (NMSU) is the operator and manager of the NSTI. To realize the NSTI, Arrowhead Center must meet several performance objectives related to planning, development, execution, evaluation, and sustainability. This continuation plan is critical to the success of NSTI in its mission of incubating businesses with security technology products and services.

10 CFR 95.21 - Withdrawal of requests for facility security clearance.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Withdrawal of requests for facility security clearance. 95.21 Section 95.21 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FACILITY SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND RESTRICTED DATA Physical Security § 95.21 Withdrawal of...

Quality Assurance Project Plan for Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazier, T.P.

1994-01-01

This Quality Assurance Project Plan addresses the quality assurance requirements for the activities associated with the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, which are part of the overall Hanford Site Environmental Protection Plan. This plan specifically applies to the sampling and analysis activities and continuous monitoring performed for all Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan activities conducted by Westinghouse Hanford Company. It is generic in approach and will be implemented in conjunction with the specific requirements of the individual Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the fast flux test facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.; Dahl, N.R.

1992-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in US Department of Energy Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could affect employee or public safety or the environment. A Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan determination was performed during calendar year 1991 and the evaluation requires the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

77 FR 61771 - Facility Security Officer Training Requirements

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-11

... following: (1) Draft model FSO training course; (2) Computer-based training and distance learning; (3... DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Coast Guard [Docket No. USCG-2012-0908] Facility Security Officer... Security Officer training program, with the primary focus on developing the curriculum for such a program...

303-K Storage Facility closure plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 303-K Storage Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 303-K Storage Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 303-K Storage Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 303-K Storage Facility. The 303-K Storage Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5

Security Culture in Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Susyanta-Widyatmaka; Koraag, Venuesiana-Dewi; Taswanda-Taryo

2005-01-01

In nuclear related field, there are three different cultures: safety, safeguards and security culture. Safety culture has established mostly in nuclear industries, meanwhile safeguards and security culture are relatively new and still developing. The latter is intended to improve the physical protection of material and nuclear facility. This paper describes concept, properties and factors affecting security culture and interactions among these cultures. The analysis indicates that anybody involving in nuclear material and facility should have strong commitment and awareness of such culture to establish it. It is concluded that the assessment of security culture outlined in this paper is still preliminary for developing and conduction rigorous security culture implemented in a much more complex facility such as nuclear power plant

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the 327 Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-11-01

The 327 Facility [Post-Irradiation Testing Laboratory] provides office and laboratory space for Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) scientific and engineering staff conducting multidisciplinary research in the areas of post-irradiated fuels and structural materials. The facility is designed to accommodate the use of radioactive and hazardous materials in the conduct of these activities. This report summarizes the airborne emissions and liquid effluents and the results of the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan (FEMP) determination for the facility. The complete monitoring plan includes characterization of effluent streams, monitoring/sampling design criteria, a description of the monitoring systems and sample analysis, and quality assurance requirements

Designing and constructing/installing technical security countermeasures (TSCM) into supersensitive facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Davis, D.L.

1988-01-01

The design and construction of supersensitive facilities and the installation of systems secure from technical surveillance and sabotage penetration involve ''TSCM'' in the broad sense of technical ''security'' countermeasures. When the technical threat was at a lower level of intensity and sophistication, it was common practice to defer TSCM to the future facility occupant. However, the New Moscow Embassy experience has proven this course of action subject to peril. Although primary concern with the embassy was audio surveillance, elsewhere there are other threats of equal or greater concern, e.g., technical implants may be used to monitor readiness status or interfere with the operation of C3I and weapons systems. Present and future technical penetration threats stretch the imagination. The Soviets have committed substantial hard scientific resources to a broad range of technical intelligence, even including applications or parapsychology. Countering these threats involves continuous TSCM precautions from initial planning to completion. Designs and construction/installation techniques must facilitate technical inspections and preclude the broadest range of known and suspected technical penetration efforts

Designing and constructing/installing technical security countermeasures (TSCM) into supersensitive facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Davis, D.L.

1988-01-01

The design and construction of supersensitive facilities and the installation of systems secure from technical surveillance and sabotage penetration involve ''TSCM'' in the broad sense of technical ''security'' countermeasures. When the technical threat was at a lower level of intensity and sophistication, it was common practice to defer TSCM to the future facility occupant. However, the New Moscow Embassy experience has proven this course of action subject to peril. Although primary concern with the embassy was audio surveillance, elsewhere there are other threats of equal or greater concern, e.g., technical implants may be used to monitor readiness status or interfere with the operation of C3I and weapons systems. Present and future technical penetration threats stretch the imagination. The Soviets have committed substantial hard scientific resources to a broad range of technical intelligence, even including applications or parapsychology. Countering these threats involves continuous TSCM precautions from initial planning to completion. Designs and construction/installation techniques must facilitate technical inspections and preclude the broadest range of known and suspected technical penetration efforts.

Post 9-11 Security Issues for Non-Power Reactor Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zaffuts, P. J.

2003-01-01

This paper addresses the legal and practical issues arising out of the design and implementation of a security-enhancement program for non power reactor nuclear facilities. The security enhancements discussed are derived from the commercial nuclear power industry's approach to security. The nuclear power industry's long and successful experience with protecting highly sensitive assets provides a wealth of information and lessons that should be examined by other industries contemplating security improvements, including, but not limited to facilities using or disposing of nuclear materials. This paper describes the nuclear industry's approach to security, the advantages and disadvantages of its constituent elements, and the legal issues that facilities will need to address when adopting some or all of these elements in the absence of statutory or regulatory requirements to do so

Post 9-11 Security Issues for Non-Power Reactor Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zaffuts, P. J.

2003-02-25

This paper addresses the legal and practical issues arising out of the design and implementation of a security-enhancement program for non power reactor nuclear facilities. The security enhancements discussed are derived from the commercial nuclear power industry's approach to security. The nuclear power industry's long and successful experience with protecting highly sensitive assets provides a wealth of information and lessons that should be examined by other industries contemplating security improvements, including, but not limited to facilities using or disposing of nuclear materials. This paper describes the nuclear industry's approach to security, the advantages and disadvantages of its constituent elements, and the legal issues that facilities will need to address when adopting some or all of these elements in the absence of statutory or regulatory requirements to do so.

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the tank farm facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Crummel, G.M.

1998-05-18

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements.

78 FR 48076 - Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-07

...-2011-0268] RIN 3150-AJ07 Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information..., Classified National Security Information. The rule would allow licensees flexibility in determining the means... licensee security education and training programs and enhances the protection of classified information...

Waste Receiving and Processing Facility PMS Test Report/DMS-Y2K/System Security DMS (Data Management System)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PALMER, M.E.

1999-01-01

Test Plan HNF-4351 defines testing requirements for installation of a new server in the WRAP Facility. This documents shows the results of the test reports on the DMS-Y2K and DMS-F81 (Security) systems

Facility planning and site development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reisman, R.C.; Handmaker, H.

1986-01-01

Planning for a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) facility should provide for the efficient operation of current and future MRI devices and must also take into consideration a broad range of general planning principles. Control of budgeted facility costs and construction schedules is of increasing importance due to the magnitude of expense of MRI facility development as well as the need to protect institutional or entrepreneurial investment. In a competitive environment facility costs may be the determining factor in a project's success

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the uranium trioxide facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L.; De Lorenzo, D.S.

1993-12-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

Hanford Surplus Facilities Program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hughes, M.C.; Wahlen, R.K.; Winship, R.A.

1989-09-01

The Hanford Surplus Facilities Program is responsible for the safe and cost-effective surveillance, maintenance, and decommissioning of surplus facilities at the Hanford Site. The management of these facilities requires a surveillance and maintenance program to keep them in a safe condition and development of a plan for ultimate disposition. Criteria used to evaluate each factor relative to decommissioning are based on the guidelines presented by the US Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office, Defense Facilities Decommissioning Program Office, and are consistent with the Westinghouse Hanford Company commitment to decommission the Hanford Site retired facilities in the safest and most cost-effective way achievable. This document outlines the plan for managing these facilities to the end of disposition

105-C Facility characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, R.L.

1997-01-01

This facility characterization plan is a site-specific document that describes how quantification and qualification of the radiological sources and the radioactive contamination in the 105-C Building will be accomplished. Characterization of hazardous materials will be addressed in a separate plan. This plan was developed from review of video tapes, photographs, and records. The purpose of this characterization plan is to provide an efficient and cost-effective method for determining the distribution of radioactive contamination at the 105-C Facility

340 Facility maintenance implementation plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-03-01

This Maintenance Implementation Plan (MIP) has been developed for maintenance functions associated with the 340 Facility. This plan is developed from the guidelines presented by Department of Energy (DOE) Order 4330.4B, Maintenance Management Program (DOE 1994), Chapter II. The objective of this plan is to provide baseline information for establishing and identifying Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) conformance programs and policies applicable to implementation of DOE order 4330.4B guidelines. In addition, this maintenance plan identifies the actions necessary to develop a cost-effective and efficient maintenance program at the 340 Facility. Primary responsibility for the performance and oversight of maintenance activities at the 340 Facility resides with Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). Maintenance at the 340 Facility is performed by ICF-Kaiser Hanford (ICF-KH) South Programmatic Services crafts persons. This 340 Facility MIP provides interface requirements and responsibilities as they apply specifically to the 340 Facility. This document provides an implementation schedule which has been developed for items considered to be deficient or in need of improvement. The discussion sections, as applied to implementation at the 340 Facility, have been developed from a review of programs and practices utilizing the graded approach. Biennial review and additional reviews are conducted as significant programmatic and mission changes are made. This document is revised as necessary to maintain compliance with DOE requirements

340 Facility maintenance implementation plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-03-01

This Maintenance Implementation Plan (MIP) has been developed for maintenance functions associated with the 340 Facility. This plan is developed from the guidelines presented by Department of Energy (DOE) Order 4330.4B, Maintenance Management Program (DOE 1994), Chapter II. The objective of this plan is to provide baseline information for establishing and identifying Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) conformance programs and policies applicable to implementation of DOE order 4330.4B guidelines. In addition, this maintenance plan identifies the actions necessary to develop a cost-effective and efficient maintenance program at the 340 Facility. Primary responsibility for the performance and oversight of maintenance activities at the 340 Facility resides with Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). Maintenance at the 340 Facility is performed by ICF-Kaiser Hanford (ICF-KH) South Programmatic Services crafts persons. This 340 Facility MIP provides interface requirements and responsibilities as they apply specifically to the 340 Facility. This document provides an implementation schedule which has been developed for items considered to be deficient or in need of improvement. The discussion sections, as applied to implementation at the 340 Facility, have been developed from a review of programs and practices utilizing the graded approach. Biennial review and additional reviews are conducted as significant programmatic and mission changes are made. This document is revised as necessary to maintain compliance with DOE requirements.

Seven layers of security to help protect biomedical research facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

Mortell, Norman

2010-04-01

In addition to risks such as theft and fire that can confront any type of business, the biomedical research community often faces additional concerns over animal rights extremists, infiltrations, data security and intellectual property rights. Given these concerns, it is not surprising that the industry gives a high priority to security. This article identifies security threats faced by biomedical research companies and shows how these threats are ranked in importance by industry stakeholders. The author then goes on to discuss seven key 'layers' of security, from the external environment to the research facility itself, and how these layers all contribute to the creation of a successfully secured facility.

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the 2724-W Protective Equipment Decontamination Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.; Lavey, G.H.

1992-12-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1* for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation requires the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438**. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

Planning Security Services for IT Systems

OpenAIRE

Henderson, Marie; Page, Howard Philip

2014-01-01

Often the hardest job is to get business representatives to look at security as something that makes managing their risks and achieving their objectives easier, with security compliance as just part of that journey. This paper addresses that by making planning for security services a 'business tool'.

ICT security- aspects important for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thunem, Atoosa P-J.

2005-09-01

Rapid application growth of complex Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in every society and state infrastructure as well as industry has revealed vulnerabilities that eventually have given rise to serious security breaches. These vulnerabilities together with the course of the breaches from cause to consequence are gradually about to convince the field experts that ensuring the security of ICT-driven systems is no longer possible by only relying on the fundaments of computer science, IT, or telecommunications. Appropriating knowledge from other disciplines is not only beneficial, but indeed very necessary. At the same time, it is a common observation today that ICT-driven systems are used everywhere, from the nuclear, aviation, commerce and healthcare domains to camera-equipped web-enabled cellular phones. The increasing interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral aspects of ICT security worldwide have been providing updated and useful information to the nuclear domain, as one of the emerging users of ICT-driven systems. Nevertheless, such aspects have also contributed to new and complicated challenges, as ICT security for the nuclear domain is in a much more delicate manner than for any other domains related to the concept of safety, at least from the public standpoint. This report addresses some important aspects of ICT security that need to be considered at nuclear facilities. It deals with ICT security and the relationship between security and safety from a rather different perspective than usually observed and applied. The report especially highlights the influence on the security of ICT-driven systems by all other dependability factors, and on that basis suggests a framework for ICT security profiling, where several security profiles are assumed to be valid and used in parallel for each ICT-driven system, sub-system or unit at nuclear facilities. The report also covers a related research topic of the Halden Project with focus on cyber threats and

49 CFR 659.21 - System security plan: general requirements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false System security plan: general requirements. 659.21... State Oversight Agency § 659.21 System security plan: general requirements. (a) The oversight agency shall require the rail transit agency to implement a system security plan that, at a minimum, complies...

Bio-inspired motion planning algorithms for autonomous robots facilitating greater plasticity for security applications

Science.gov (United States)

Guo, Yi; Hohil, Myron; Desai, Sachi V.

2007-10-01

Proposed are techniques toward using collaborative robots for infrastructure security applications by utilizing them for mobile sensor suites. A vast number of critical facilities/technologies must be protected against unauthorized intruders. Employing a team of mobile robots working cooperatively can alleviate valuable human resources. Addressed are the technical challenges for multi-robot teams in security applications and the implementation of multi-robot motion planning algorithm based on the patrolling and threat response scenario. A neural network based methodology is exploited to plan a patrolling path with complete coverage. Also described is a proof-of-principle experimental setup with a group of Pioneer 3-AT and Centibot robots. A block diagram of the system integration of sensing and planning will illustrate the robot to robot interaction to operate as a collaborative unit. The proposed approach singular goal is to overcome the limits of previous approaches of robots in security applications and enabling systems to be deployed for autonomous operation in an unaltered environment providing access to an all encompassing sensor suite.

49 CFR 659.25 - Annual review of system safety program plan and system security plan.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... system security plan. 659.25 Section 659.25 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation... and system security plan. (a) The oversight agency shall require the rail transit agency to conduct an annual review of its system safety program plan and system security plan. (b) In the event the rail...

A nuclear facility Security Analyzer written in Prolog

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zimmerman, B.D.

1987-01-01

The Security Analyzer project was undertaken to use the Prolog artificial intelligence programming language and Entity-Relationship database construction techniques to produce an intelligent database computer program capable of analyzing the effectiveness of a nuclear facility's security systems. The Security Analyzer program can search through a facility to find all possible surreptitious entry paths that meet various user-selected time and detection probability criteria. The program can also respond to user-formulated queries concerning the database information. The intelligent database approach allows the program to perform a more comprehensive path search than other programs that only find a single optimal path. The program also is more flexible in that the database, once constructed, can be interrogated and used for purposes independent of the searching function

A nuclear facility Security Analyzer written in PROLOG

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zimmerman, B.D.

1987-08-01

The Security Analyzer project was undertaken to use the Prolog ''artificial intelligence'' programming language and Entity-Relationship database construction techniques to produce an intelligent database computer program capable of analyzing the effectiveness of a nuclear facility's security systems. The Security Analyzer program can search through a facility to find all possible surreptitious entry paths that meet various user-selected time and detection probability criteria. The program can also respond to user-formulated queries concerning the database information. The intelligent database approach allows the program to perform a more comprehensive path search than other programs that only find a single ''optimal'' path. The program also is more flexible in that the database, once constructed, can be interrogated and used for purposes independent of the searching function

40 CFR 35.925-1 - Facilities planning.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Facilities planning. 35.925-1 Section... Facilities planning. That, if the award is for step 2, step 3, or step 2=3 grant assistance, the facilities planning requirements in § 35.917 et seq. have been met. ...

Information Security: USDA Needs to Implement Its Departmentwide Information Security Plan

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2000-01-01

USDA has taken positive steps to begin improving its information security by developing its August 1999 Action Plan with recommendations to strengthen department-wide information security and hiring...

Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moore, G.M.

2010-01-01

Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) purposes the framework for a comprehensive approach to addressing specific national security needs. It provides means for coordinating nuclear security assistance to member states. Identifies responsible parties for completion of nuclear security activities which are necessary to build sustainable nuclear security programs. International Atomic Energy Agency INSSP development process is based on findings and recommendations from a range of nuclear security missions and other information needs assessments. Takes into account of the ongoing work activities of other bilateral assistance.

Security of radioactive sources in radiation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-03-01

Safety codes and safety standards are formulated on the basis of internationally accepted safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specific equipment, systems, structures and components of nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety guides and guidelines elaborate various requirements and furnish approaches for their implementation. Safety manuals deal with specific topics and contain detailed scientific and technical information on the subject. These documents are prepared by experts in the relevant fields and are extensively reviewed by advisory committees of the Board before they are published. The documents are revised when necessary, in the light of experience and feedback from users as well as new developments in the field. In India, radiation sources are being widely used for societal benefits in industry, medical practices, research, training and agriculture. It has been reported from all over the world that unsecured radioactive sources caused serious radiological accidents involving radiation injuries and fatalities. Particular concern was expressed regarding radioactive sources that have become orphaned (not under regulatory control) or vulnerable (under weak regulatory control and about to be orphaned). There is a concern about safety and security of radioactive sources and hence the need of stringent regulatory control over the handling of the sources and their security. In view of this, this guide is prepared which gives provisions necessary to safeguard radiation installations against theft of radioactive sources and other malevolent acts that may result in radiological consequences. It is, therefore, required that the radiation sources are used safely and managed securely by only authorised personnel. This guide is intended to be used by users of radiation sources in developing the necessary security plan for

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L.; De Lorenzo, D.S.

1993-12-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wiegand, D.L.

1994-09-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wiegand, D.L.

1994-09-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Greager, E.M.

1997-01-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); De Lorenzo, D.S. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, NM (United States)

1993-12-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

78 FR 69433 - Executive Order 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-19

... Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions AGENCY: National Protection and Programs... from stakeholders on issues pertaining to Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (Executive... regulations, guidance, and policies; and identifying best practices in chemical facility safety and security...

Security-by-design handbook.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Snell, Mark Kamerer; Jaeger, Calvin Dell; Scharmer, Carol; Jordan, Sabina Erteza; Tanuma, Koji [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan; Ochiai, Kazuya [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan; Iida, Toru [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan

2013-01-01

This document is a draft SecuritybyDesign (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to %E2%80%9Cencourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.%E2%80%9D The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PASPP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessonslearned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the systemlevel incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A fourelement strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

Nuclear Security Management for Research Reactors and Related Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-03-01

This publication provides a single source guidance to assist those responsible for the implementation of nuclear security measures at research reactors and associated facilities in developing and maintaining an effective and comprehensive programme covering all aspects of nuclear security on the site. It is based on national experience and practices as well as on publications in the field of nuclear management and security. The scope includes security operations, security processes, and security forces and their relationship with the State’s nuclear security regime. The guidance is provided for consideration by States, competent authorities and operators

Designing a Physical Security System for Risk Reduction in a Hypothetical Nuclear Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saleh, A.A.; Abd Elaziz, M.

2017-01-01

Physical security in a nuclear facility means detection, prevention and response to threat, the ft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer involving radioactive and nuclear material. This paper proposes a physical security system designing concepts to reduce the risk associated with variant threats to a nuclear facility. This paper presents a study of the unauthorized removal and sabotage in a hypothetical nuclear facility considering deter, delay and response layers. More over, the study involves performing any required upgrading to the security system by investigating the nuclear facility layout and considering all physical security layers design to enhance the weakness for risk reduction

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thompson, R.J.; Sontage, S.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years

Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility PMS Test Report For Data Management System (DMS) Security Test DMS-Y2K

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

PALMER, M.E.

1999-09-21

Test Plan HNF-4351 defines testing requirements for installation of a new server in the WRAP Facility. This document shows the results of the test reports on the DMS-Y2K and DMS-F81 (Security) systems.

Corporate strategic plan for safeguards and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-06-01

Department of Energy (DOE) safeguards and security (S and S) is a team effort, consisting of Field, National Laboratories, Program Office, and Headquarters units cooperating to support the Department's diverse security needs. As an integral part of the nation's security structure, the DOE S and S Program regularly supports and works in cooperation with other US Government agencies and private industry to improve the national security posture. Thus, inter- and intra-agency partnerships play an invaluable role in the continuing efforts to integrate and implement improved ways of doing business. Their Corporate Strategic Plan provides a road map to guide, track, and provide feedback for the incorporation and implementation of S and S activities within DOE. Part 1 Planning Framework, describes those overarching factors which influence the planning endeavors. Part 2, Strategic Perspective, outlines where the S and S Program has been and how they will move to the future through core competencies, changing cultural thinking, and implementing their strategies. Part 3, Strategic and Operational Integration, details critical focus areas, strategies, and success indicators designed to enhance inter-agency S and S integration and promote cooperation with external agencies. This Plan will be reviewed annually to ensure it remains supportive and fully-engaged with the nation's and international security environments

Strategic facility planning improves capital decision making.

Science.gov (United States)

Reeve, J R

2001-03-01

A large, Midwestern IDS undertook a strategic facility-planning process to evaluate its facility portfolio and determine how best to allocate future investments in facility development. The IDS assembled a facility-planning team, which initiated the planning process with a market analysis to determine future market demands and identify service areas that warranted facility expansion. The team then analyzed each of the IDS's facilities from the perspective of uniform capacity measurements, highest and best use compared with needs, building condition and investment-worthiness, and facility growth and site development opportunities. Based on results of the analysis, the strategy adopted entailed, in part, shifting some space from inpatient care to ambulatory care services and demolishing and replacing the 11 percent of facilities deemed to be in the worst condition.

40 CFR 35.917 - Facilities planning (step 1).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Facilities planning (step 1). 35.917... Facilities planning (step 1). (a) Sections 35.917 through 35.917-9 establish the requirements for facilities... the facilities planning provisions of this subpart before award of step 2 or step 3 grant assistance...

15 CFR 923.13 - Energy facility planning process.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... facility planning process. The management program must contain a planning process for energy facilities... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Energy facility planning process. 923... affected public and private parties will be involved in the planning process. [61 FR 33806, June 28, 1996...

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the tank farms facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bachand, D.D.; Crummel, G.M.

1995-05-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using specific guidelines. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years.

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

2011-07-01

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

Industrial Control System Cyber Security: Questions And Answers Relevant To Nuclear Facilities, Safeguards And Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, Robert S.; Schanfein, Mark; Bjornard, Trond; Moskowitz, Paul

2011-01-01

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION... approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. The requirements for...

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the tank farms facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crummel, G.M.; Gustavson, R.D.; Kenoyer, J.L.; Moeller, M.P.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum three years. A variety of liquid wastes are generated in processing treatment, and disposal operations throughout the Hanford Site. The Tank Farms Project serves a major role in Hanford Site waste management activities as the temporary repository for these wastes. Stored wastes include hazardous components regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) and as by-product material regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. A total of 177 single- and double-shell tanks (SST and DST) have been constructed in the 200 East and 200 West Areas of the Hanford Site. These facilities were constructed to various designs from 1943 to 1986. The Tank Farms Project is comprised of these tanks along with various transfer, receiving, and treatment facilities

303-K Storage Facility closure plan. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1993-12-15

Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 303-K Storage Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 303-K Storage Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 303-K Storage Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 303-K Storage Facility. The 303-K Storage Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5.

33 CFR 105.305 - Facility Security Assessment (FSA) requirements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... evacuation routes and assembly stations; and (viii) Existing security and safety equipment for protection of... protection systems; (iv) Procedural policies; (v) Radio and telecommunication systems, including computer... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Facility Security Assessment (FSA...

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the 324 Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-11-01

The 324 Facility [Waste Technology Engineering Laboratory] in the 300 Area primarily supports the research and development of radioactive and nonradioactive waste vitrification technologies, biological waste remediation technologies, spent nuclear fuel studies, waste mixing and transport studies, and tritium development programs. All of the above-mentioned programs deal with, and have the potential to, release hazardous and/or radioactive material. The potential for discharge would primarily result from (1) conducting research activities using the hazardous materials, (2) storing radionuclides and hazardous chemicals, and (3) waste accumulation and storage. This report summarizes the airborne and liquid effluents, and the results of the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan (FEMP) determination for the facility. The complete monitoring plan includes characterizing effluent streams, monitoring/sampling design criteria, a description of the monitoring systems and sample analysis, and quality assurance requirements

Emergency planning for fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lacey, L.R.

1991-01-01

In April 1989, NRC published new emergency planning regulations which apply to certain by-product, source, and special nuclear materials licensees including most fuel cycle facilities. In addition to these NRC regulations, other regulatory agencies such as EPA, OSHA, and DOT have regulations concerning emergency planning or notification that may apply to fuel cycle facilities. Emergency planning requirements address such areas as emergency classification, organization, notification and activation, assessment, corrective and protective measures, emergency facilities and equipment, maintaining preparedness, records and reports, and recovery. This article reviews applicable regulatory requirements and guidance, then concentrates on implementation strategies to produce an effective emergency response capability

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the 325 Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The Applied Chemistry Laboratory (325 Facility) houses radiochemistry research, radioanalytical service, radiochemical process development, and hazardous and mixed hazardous waste treatment activities. The laboratories and specialized facilities enable work ranging from that with nonradioactive materials to work with picogram to kilogram quantities of fissionable materials and up to megacurie quantities of other radionuclides. The special facilities include two shielded hot-cell areas that provide for process development or analytical chemistry work with highly radioactive materials, and a waste treatment facility for processing hazardous, mixed, low-level, and transuranic wastes generated by Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Radioactive material storage and usage occur throughout the facility and include a large number of isotopes. This material is in several forms, including solid, liquid, particulate, and gas. Some of these materials are also heated during testing which can produce vapors. The research activities have been assigned to the following activity designations: High-Level Hot Cell, Hazardous Waste Treatment Unit, Waste Form Development, Special Testing Projects, Chemical Process Development, Analytical Hot Cell, and Analytical Chemistry. The following summarizes the airborne and liquid effluents and the results of the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan (FEMP) determination for the facility. The complete monitoring plan includes characterization of effluent streams, monitoring/sampling design criteria, a description of the monitoring systems and sample analysis, and quality assurance requirements

202-S Hexone Facility supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ingle, S.J.

1996-03-01

This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 202-S Hexone Facility and is intended to be used as a supplement to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan. This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of WAC 173-303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) waste management units. The 202-S Hexone Facility is not used to process radioactive or nonradioactive hazardous material. Radioactive, dangerous waste material is contained in two underground storage tanks, 276-S-141 and 276-S-142. These tanks do not present a significant hazard to adjacent facilities, personnel, or the environment. Currently, dangerous waste management activities are not being applied at the tanks. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the 202-S Hexone Facility

National Security Technology Incubator Business Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None, None

2007-12-31

This document contains a business plan for the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI), developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP) and performed under a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. This business plan describes key features of the NSTI, including the vision and mission, organizational structure and staffing, services, evaluation criteria, marketing strategies, client processes, a budget, incubator evaluation criteria, and a development schedule. The purpose of the NSPP is to promote national security technologies through business incubation, technology demonstration and validation, and workforce development. The NSTI will focus on serving businesses with national security technology applications by nurturing them through critical stages of early development. The vision of the NSTI is to be a successful incubator of technologies and private enterprise that assist the NNSA in meeting new challenges in national safety, security, and protection of the homeland. The NSTI is operated and managed by the Arrowhead Center, responsible for leading the economic development mission of New Mexico State University (NMSU). The Arrowhead Center will recruit business with applications for national security technologies recruited for the NSTI program. The Arrowhead Center and its strategic partners will provide business incubation services, including hands-on mentoring in general business matters, marketing, proposal writing, management, accounting, and finance. Additionally, networking opportunities and technology development assistance will be provided.

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the 300 Area Fuels Fabrication Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.; Brendel, D.F.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP- 0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring system by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years. The Fuel Fabrication Facility in the Hanford 300 Area supported the production reactors from the 1940's until they were shut down in 1987. Prior to 1987 the Fuel Fabrication Facility released both airborne and liquid radioactive effluents. In January 1987 the emission of airborne radioactive effluents ceased with the shutdown of the fuels facility. The release of liquid radioactive effluents have continued although decreasing significantly from 1987 to 1990

A Practice of Secure Development and Operational Environment Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Jaekwan; Seo, Sangmun; Suh, Yongsukl; Park, Cheol

2017-01-01

This paper suggests a practice of plan for SDOE establishment in a nuclear I and C. First, it is necessary to perform a requirements analysis to define key regulatory issues and determine the target systems. The analysis includes a survey to find out the applicable measures credited internationally. Based on the analysis results, this paper proposes an implementation plan including a process harmonizing security activities with legacy software activities and applicable technical, operational, and management measures for target systems. Recently, nuclear I and C has been faced with two security issues, cyber security (CS) and secure development and operational environment (SDOE). Unlike cyber security, few studies on planning SDOE have been presented. This paper suggests a plan for establishing an SDOE in a nuclear I and C. This paper defines three key considerations to comply with the regulatory position of RG. 1.152(R3) and proposes a process harmonizing the security activities with legacy software activities. In addition, this paper proposes technical, operational, and management measures applicable for SDOE.

Using Common Sense to Effectively Integrate Security Technologies within a School's Security Strategy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gree, M.W.

1998-11-03

Security technologies are not the answer to all school security problems. However, they can be an excellent tool for school administrators and security personnel when incorporated into a total security strategy involving personnel, procedures, and facility layout. Unfortunately, very few of the tougher security problems in schools have solutions that are affordable, effective, and acceptable. Like any other type of facility, a school's security staff must understand the strengths and limitations of the security measures they are csecurity practices, which will rarely increase new building costs if included in the initial planning.

Security-Constrained Resource Planning in Electricity Market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roh, Jae Hyung; Shahidehpour, Mohammad; Yong Fu

2007-06-01

We propose a market-based competitive generation resource planning model in electricity markets. The objective of the model is to introduce the impact of transmission security in a multi-GENCO generation resource planning. The proposed approach is based on effective decomposition and coordination strategies. Lagrangian relaxation and Benders decomposition like structure are applied to the model. Locational price signal and capacity signal are defined for the simulation of competition among GENCOs and the coordination of security between GENCOs and the regulatory body (ISO). The numerical examples exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed generation planning model in electricity markets.

78 FR 51754 - Request To Modify License by Replacing Security Plan With New Radiation Safety Plan; U.S...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-21

... Replacing Security Plan With New Radiation Safety Plan; U.S. Department of the Army, Jefferson Proving... security plan with a new radiation safety plan. DATES: Submit comments by September 20, 2013. Requests for.... The proposed change is to modify License Condition No. 12 D which refers to the security plan of...

Report on emergency electrical power supply systems for nuclear fuel cycle and reactor facilities security systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The report includes information that will be useful to those responsible for the planning, design and implementation of emergency electric power systems for physical security and special nuclear materials accountability systems. Basic considerations for establishing the system requirements for emergency electric power for security and accountability operations are presented. Methods of supplying emergency power that are available at present and methods predicted to be available in the future are discussed. The characteristics of capacity, cost, safety, reliability and environmental and physical facility considerations of emergency electric power techniques are presented. The report includes basic considerations for the development of a system concept and the preparation of a detailed system design

Report on emergency electrical power supply systems for nuclear fuel cycle and reactor facilities security systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1977-01-01

The report includes information that will be useful to those responsible for the planning, design and implementation of emergency electric power systems for physical security and special nuclear materials accountability systems. Basic considerations for establishing the system requirements for emergency electric power for security and accountability operations are presented. Methods of supplying emergency power that are available at present and methods predicted to be available in the future are discussed. The characteristics of capacity, cost, safety, reliability and environmental and physical facility considerations of emergency electric power techniques are presented. The report includes basic considerations for the development of a system concept and the preparation of a detailed system design.

Site and facility transportation services planning documents

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ratledge, J.E. (Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (USA)); Danese, L.; Schmid, S. (Science Applications International Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (USA))

1990-01-01

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) will eventually ship Purchasers' (10 CFR 961.3) spent nuclear fuel from approximately 122 commercial nuclear facilities. The preparation and processing of Site and Facility Specific Transportation Services Planning Documents (SPDs) and Site Specific Servicing Plans (SSSPs) provides a focus for advanced planning and the actual shipping of waste, as well as the overall development of transportation requirements for the waste transportation system. SPDs will be prepared for each of the affected nuclear waste facilities over the next 2 years with initial emphasis on facilities likely to be served during the earliest years of the Federal Waste Management System (FWMS) operations. 3 figs., 1 tab.

Site and facility transportation services planning documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ratledge, J.E.; Danese, L.; Schmid, S.

1990-01-01

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) will eventually ship Purchasers' (10 CFR 961.3) spent nuclear fuel from approximately 122 commercial nuclear facilities. The preparation and processing of Site and Facility Specific Transportation Services Planning Documents (SPDs) and Site Specific Servicing Plans (SSSPs) provides a focus for advanced planning and the actual shipping of waste, as well as the overall development of transportation requirements for the waste transportation system. SPDs will be prepared for each of the affected nuclear waste facilities over the next 2 years with initial emphasis on facilities likely to be served during the earliest years of the Federal Waste Management System (FWMS) operations. 3 figs., 1 tab

Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan - TA-60 Material Recycling Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sandoval, Leonard Frank [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2018-01-31

This Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) was developed in accordance with the provisions of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§1251 et seq., as amended), and the Multi-Sector General Permit for Storm Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity (U.S. EPA, June 2015) issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and using the industry specific permit requirements for Sector P-Land Transportation and Warehousing as a guide. This SWPPP applies to discharges of stormwater from the operational areas of the TA- 60 Material Recycling Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos National Laboratory (also referred to as LANL or the “Laboratory”) is owned by the Department of Energy (DOE), and is operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS). Throughout this document, the term “facility” refers to the TA-60 Material Recycling Facility. The current permit expires at midnight on June 4, 2020.

Nuclear security of Cuba’s medical facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dahlstrom, Danielle

2016-01-01

Cuba is a leading hub for medical research and cancer treatment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Physical protection is installed at radiotherapy facilities to detect entry of and delay access to an intruder. This minimizes the likelihood of unauthorized access and maximizes nuclear security.

A different paradigm for security planning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hagengruber, R.

2002-01-01

Full text: Security costs at nuclear facilities have been relatively high for many years. Since the 1970s, these expenditures in the United States have grown much faster than inflation. After the tragedy of September 11, the rate of increase appears to be exponential. Within the National Nuclear Security Administration, the cost of security now is about 10 % of the entire budget. Research and Development (R and D) has played a role in modern security, but the rate of advancement of security technology has not been sufficient to moderate the increasing costs and performance demands. Part of this problem is associated with both an inadequate investment level and the lack of a visionary roadmap for security technology. The other element of the problem is the lack of a strategic framework or architecture that would allow security technology to be effectively placed in an overall context of functionality. A new concept for an architecture for security will be presented. Within this architecture, a different approach to design, use of technology, and evaluation of effectiveness will be offered. Promising areas of technology and design will be illustrated by specific examples and suggestions for advanced R and D will be made. (author)

Developing standardized facility contingency plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Davidson, D.A.

1993-01-01

Texaco consists of several operating departments that are, in effect, independent companies. Each of these departments is responsible for complying with all environmental laws and regulations. This includes the preparation by each facility to respond to an oil spill at that location. For larger spills, however, management of the response will rest with corporate regional response teams. Personnel from all departments make up the regional teams. In 1990, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act. In 1991, the US Coast Guard began developing oil spill response contingency plan regulations, which they are still working on. Meanwhile, four of the five west coast states have also passed laws requiring contingency plans. (Only Hawaii has chosen to wait and see what the federal regulations will entail). Three of the states have already adopted regulations. Given these laws and regulations, along with its corporate structure, Texaco addressed the need to standardize local facility plans as well as its response organization. This paper discusses how, by working together, the Texaco corporate international oil spill response staff and the Texaco western region on-scene commander developed: A standard contingency plan format crossing corporate boundaries and meeting federal and state requirements. A response organization applicable to any size facility or spill. A strategy to sell the standard contingency plan and response organization to the operating units

Energy Systems Integration Facility (ESIF) Facility Stewardship Plan: Revision 2.1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Torres, Juan [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Anderson, Art [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

2018-01-02

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), has established the Energy Systems Integration Facility (ESIF) on the campus of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and has designated it as a DOE user facility. This 182,500-ft2 research facility provides state-of-the-art laboratory and support infrastructure to optimize the design and performance of electrical, thermal, fuel, and information technologies and systems at scale. This Facility Stewardship Plan provides DOE and other decision makers with information about the existing and expected capabilities of the ESIF and the expected performance metrics to be applied to ESIF operations. This plan is a living document that will be updated and refined throughout the lifetime of the facility.

Planning Tool for Strategic Evaluation of Facility Plans - 13570

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Magoulas, Virginia; Cercy, Michael [Savannah River National Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States); Hall, Irin [Newport News Shipbuilding, 4101 Washington Ave., Newport News, VA 23607 (United States)

2013-07-01

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed a strategic planning tool for the evaluation of the utilization of its unique resources for processing and research and development of nuclear materials. The Planning Tool is a strategic level tool for assessing multiple missions that could be conducted utilizing the SRNL facilities and showcasing the plan. Traditional approaches using standard scheduling tools and laying out a strategy on paper tended to be labor intensive and offered either a limited or cluttered view for visualizing and communicating results. A tool that can assess the process throughput, duration, and utilization of the facility was needed. SRNL teamed with Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, to create the next generation Planning Tool. The goal of this collaboration was to create a simulation based tool that allows for quick evaluation of strategies with respect to new or changing missions, and clearly communicates results to the decision makers. This tool has been built upon a mature modeling and simulation software previously developed by NNS. The Planning Tool provides a forum for capturing dependencies, constraints, activity flows, and variable factors. It is also a platform for quickly evaluating multiple mission scenarios, dynamically adding/updating scenarios, generating multiple views for evaluating/communicating results, and understanding where there are areas of risks and opportunities with respect to capacity. The Planning Tool that has been developed is useful in that it presents a clear visual plan for the missions at the Savannah River Site (SRS). It not only assists in communicating the plans to SRS corporate management, but also allows the area stakeholders a visual look at the future plans for SRS. The design of this tool makes it easily deployable to other facility and mission planning endeavors. (authors)

Planning Tool for Strategic Evaluation of Facility Plans - 13570

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Magoulas, Virginia; Cercy, Michael; Hall, Irin

2013-01-01

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed a strategic planning tool for the evaluation of the utilization of its unique resources for processing and research and development of nuclear materials. The Planning Tool is a strategic level tool for assessing multiple missions that could be conducted utilizing the SRNL facilities and showcasing the plan. Traditional approaches using standard scheduling tools and laying out a strategy on paper tended to be labor intensive and offered either a limited or cluttered view for visualizing and communicating results. A tool that can assess the process throughput, duration, and utilization of the facility was needed. SRNL teamed with Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, to create the next generation Planning Tool. The goal of this collaboration was to create a simulation based tool that allows for quick evaluation of strategies with respect to new or changing missions, and clearly communicates results to the decision makers. This tool has been built upon a mature modeling and simulation software previously developed by NNS. The Planning Tool provides a forum for capturing dependencies, constraints, activity flows, and variable factors. It is also a platform for quickly evaluating multiple mission scenarios, dynamically adding/updating scenarios, generating multiple views for evaluating/communicating results, and understanding where there are areas of risks and opportunities with respect to capacity. The Planning Tool that has been developed is useful in that it presents a clear visual plan for the missions at the Savannah River Site (SRS). It not only assists in communicating the plans to SRS corporate management, but also allows the area stakeholders a visual look at the future plans for SRS. The design of this tool makes it easily deployable to other facility and mission planning endeavors. (authors)

Healthcare security staffing for smaller facilities: where science meets art.

Science.gov (United States)

Warren, Bryan

2013-01-01

Obtaining effective security resourcing and staffing for smaller healthcare facilities presents many difficulties, according to the author In this article, he provides guidance to security practitioners on taking existing data and translating it into a language that administration will understand and appreciate.

The preliminary planning for decommissioning nuclear facilities in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li, K.K.

1993-01-01

During the congressional hearing in 1992 for a $7 billion project for approval of the fourth nuclear power plant, the public was concerned about the decommissioning of the operating plants. In order to facilitate the public acceptance of nuclear energy and to secure the local capability for appropriate nuclear backend management, both technologically and financially, it is important to have preliminary planning for decommissioning the nuclear facilities. This paper attempted to investigate the possible scope of decommissioning activities and addressed the important regulatory, financial, and technological aspects. More research and development works regarding the issue of decommissioning are needed to carry out the government's will of decent management of nuclear energy from the cradle to the grave

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the 2724-W Protective Equipment Decontamination Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carter, G.J.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1* for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updates as a minimum every three years

49 CFR 172.802 - Components of a security plan.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... from origin to destination, including shipments stored incidental to movement. (b) The security plan must also include the following: (1) Identification by job title of the senior management official... business and must make the security plan available upon request, at a reasonable time and location, to an...

IAEA puts cyber security in focus for nuclear facilities in 2015

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shepherd, John

2015-01-01

Later in 2015 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will convene a special conference to discuss computer security, in the wake of cyber attacks on global financial institutions and government agencies that were increasingly in the news. According to the IAEA, the prevalence of IT security incidents in recent years involving the Stuxnet malware 'demonstrated that nuclear facilities can be susceptible to cyber attack'. The IAEA said this and other events have significantly raised global concerns over potential vulnerabilities and the possibility of a cyber attack, or a joint cyber-physical attack, that could impact on nuclear security. The IAEA has correctly identified that the use of computers and other digital electronic equipment in physical protection systems at nuclear facilities, as well as in facility safety systems, instrumentation, information processing and communication, 'continues to grow and presents an ever more likely target for cyber attack'. The agency's Vienna conference, to be held in June, will review emerging trends in computer security and areas that may still need to be addressed. The meeting follows a declaration of ministers of IAEA member states in 2013 that called on the agency to help raise awareness of the growing threat of cyber attacks and their potential impact on nuclear security. The conference is being organised 'to foster international cooperation in computer security as an essential element of nuclear security', the IAEA said. Details of the IAEA's 'International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World: Expert Discussion and Exchange' are on the 'meetings' section of the agency's web site.

Global Security Program Management Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bretzke, John C. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2014-03-25

The Global Security Directorate mission is to protect against proliferant and unconventional nuclear threats –regardless of origin - and emerging new threats. This mission is accomplished as the Los Alamos National Laboratory staff completes projects for our numerous sponsors. The purpose of this Program Management Plan is to establish and clearly describe the GS program management requirements including instructions that are essential for the successful management of projects in accordance with our sponsor requirements. The detailed information provided in this document applies to all LANL staff and their subcontractors that are performing GS portfolio work. GS management is committed to a culture that ensures effective planning, execution, and achievement of measurable results in accordance with the GS mission. Outcomes of such a culture result in better communication, delegated authority, accountability, and increased emphasis on safely and securely achieving GS objectives.

Self-Assessment of Nuclear Security Culture in Facilities and Activities. Technical Guidance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

The IAEA has developed a comprehensive methodology for evaluating nuclear security culture. When implemented by a State, this methodology will help to make nuclear security culture sustainable. It will also promote cooperation and the sharing of good practices related to nuclear security culture. This publication is the first guidance for assessing nuclear security culture and analysing its strengths and weaknesses within a facility or activity, or an organization. It reflects, within the context of assessment, the nuclear security culture model, principles and criteria set out in the Implementing Guide, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7. This guidance will be useful for organizations and operating facilities in conducting the self-assessment of nuclear security culture by providing practical methods and tools. It will also help regulatory bodies and other competent authorities to understand the self-assessment methodology used by operators, encourage operators to start the self-assessment process or, if appropriate, conduct independent assessments of nuclear security culture.

Sites Requiring Facility Response Plans, Geographic NAD83, EPA (2006) [facility_response_plan_sites_la_EPA_2007

Data.gov (United States)

Louisiana Geographic Information Center — Locations of facilities in Louisiana requiring Oil Pollution Act (OPA) Facility Response Plans (FRP). The dataset was provided by the Region 6 OSCARS program....

6 CFR 27.205 - Determination that a chemical facility “presents a high level of security risk.”

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 6 Domestic Security 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Determination that a chemical facility âpresents... SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM STANDARDS Chemical Facility Security Program § 27.205 Determination that a chemical facility “presents a high level of security risk.” (a...

Regional Radiological Security Partnership in Southeast Asia - Increasing the Sustainability of Security Systems at the Site-Level by Using a Model Facility Approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chamberlain, Travis L.; Dickerson, Sarah; Ravenhill, Scott D.; Murray, Allan; Morris, Frederic A.; Herdes, Gregory A.

2009-01-01

In 2004, Australia, through the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), created the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources (RSRS) project and partnered with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to form the Southeast Asian Regional Radiological Security Partnership (RRSP). The intent of the RRSP is to cooperate with countries in Southeast Asia to improve the security of their radioactive sources. This Southeast Asian Partnership supports objectives to improve the security of high risk radioactive sources by raising awareness of the need and developing national programs to protect and control such materials, improve the security of such materials, and recover and condition the materials no longer in use. The RRSP has utilized many tools to meet those objectives including: provision of physical protection upgrades, awareness training, physical protection training, regulatory development, locating and recovering orphan sources, and most recently - development of model security procedures at a model facility. This paper discusses the benefits of establishing a model facility, the methods employed by the RRSP, and three of the expected outcomes of the Model Facility approach. The first expected outcome is to increase compliance with source security guidance materials and national regulations by adding context to those materials, and illustrating their impact on a facility. Second, the effectiveness of each of the tools above is increased by making them part of an integrated system. Third, the methods used to develop the model procedures establishes a sustainable process that can ultimately be transferred to all facilities beyond the model. Overall, the RRSP has utilized the Model Facility approach as an important tool to increase the security of radioactive sources, and to position facilities and countries for the long term secure management of those sources.

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the uranium trioxide facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thompson, R.J.; Sontag, S.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plant is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years. The UO 3 Plant is located in the south-central portion of the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. The plant consists of two primary processing buildings and several ancillary facilities. The purpose of the UO 3 Plant is to receive uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) from the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant, concentrate it, convert the UNH to uranium trioxide (UO 3 ) powder by calcination and package it for offsite shipment. The UO 3 Plant has been placed in a standby mode. There are two liquid discharges, and three gaseous exhaust stacks, and seven building exhausters that are active during standby conditions

33 CFR 105.205 - Facility Security Officer (FSO).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... training in the following, as appropriate: (i) Relevant international laws and codes, and recommendations... well as any plans to change the facility or facility infrastructure prior to amending the FSP; and (18...

Safeguards and security design guidelines for conceptual monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Byers, K.R.; Clark, R.G.; Harms, N.L.; Roberts, F.P.

1984-07-01

Existing safeguards/security regulations and licensing requirements that may be applicable to an MRS facility are not currently well-defined. Protection requirements consistent with the NRC-graded safeguards approach are identified, as a baseline safeguards system with a comparison of the impacts on safeguards and security of salient features of the different storage concepts. In addition, MRS facility design features and operational considerations are proposed that would enhance facility protection and provide additional assurance that protection systems and procedures would be effectively implemented. 3 figures

IAEA puts cyber security in focus for nuclear facilities in 2015

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shepherd, John [nuclear 24, Brighton (United Kingdom)

2015-01-15

Later in 2015 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will convene a special conference to discuss computer security, in the wake of cyber attacks on global financial institutions and government agencies that were increasingly in the news. According to the IAEA, the prevalence of IT security incidents in recent years involving the Stuxnet malware 'demonstrated that nuclear facilities can be susceptible to cyber attack'. The IAEA said this and other events have significantly raised global concerns over potential vulnerabilities and the possibility of a cyber attack, or a joint cyber-physical attack, that could impact on nuclear security. The IAEA has correctly identified that the use of computers and other digital electronic equipment in physical protection systems at nuclear facilities, as well as in facility safety systems, instrumentation, information processing and communication, 'continues to grow and presents an ever more likely target for cyber attack'. The agency's Vienna conference, to be held in June, will review emerging trends in computer security and areas that may still need to be addressed. The meeting follows a declaration of ministers of IAEA member states in 2013 that called on the agency to help raise awareness of the growing threat of cyber attacks and their potential impact on nuclear security. The conference is being organised 'to foster international cooperation in computer security as an essential element of nuclear security', the IAEA said. Details of the IAEA's 'International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World: Expert Discussion and Exchange' are on the 'meetings' section of the agency's web site.

IAEA Nuclear Security - Achievements 2002-2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-03-01

The possibility that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used for malicious purposes is real. This calls for a collective commitment to the control of, and accountancy for, material, as well as to adequate levels of protection in order to prevent criminal or unauthorized access to the material or associated facilities. Sharing of knowledge and experience, coordination among States and collaboration with other international organizations, initiatives and industries supports an effective international nuclear security framework. In 2001, the Board of Governors tasked the IAEA with improving nuclear security worldwide. The report that follows provides an overview of accomplishments over the last decade and reflects the importance that States assign to keeping material in the right hands. The IAEA has established a comprehensive nuclear security programme, described first in the Nuclear Security Plan of 2002-2005 and subsequently in the second plan of 2006- 2009. Activities included developing internationally accepted nuclear security guidance, supporting international legal instruments, protecting material and facilities, securing transport and borders, detecting and interdicting illicit nuclear trafficking, strengthening human resource capacity and preparing response plans should a nuclear security event occur. The IAEA has begun the implementation of its third Nuclear Security Plan, to be completed at the end of 2013. This approach to nuclear security recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on a number of factors: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; IAEA guidance and standards; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of, and response to, trafficking in such material; national response plans and contingency measures. Implemented in a systematic manner, these building blocks make up a sustainable national nuclear security regime and contribute to global

Site and facility waste transportation services planning documents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ratledge, J.E.; Schmid, S.; Danese, L.

1991-01-01

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) will eventually ship Purchasers' (10 CFR 961.3) spent nuclear fuel from approximately 122 commercial nuclear facilities. The preparation and maintenance of Site- and Facility-Specific Transportation Services Planning Documents (SPDs) and Site-Specific Servicing Plans (SSSPs) provides a focus for advanced planning and the actual shipping of waste, as well as the overall development of transportation requirements for the waste transportation system. SPDs will be prepared for each of the affected nuclear waste facilities, with initial emphasis on facilities likely to be served during the earliest years of the Federal Waste Management System (FWMS) operations

Establishing cyber security programs for I and C systems at nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waedt, Karl

2012-01-01

In recent years, across the international nuclear community, cyber security issues have quickly gained significant attention from safety authorities and plant designers alike. This increased attention was accelerated by news of the Stuxnet virus, which impaired control systems at Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, but is also fueled by regular news about cyber security breaches of data systems at large business corporations. This paper discusses key aspects of establishing a cyber security program for Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems at a nuclear facility, and identifies inherent aspects of nuclear power plant (NPP) design, that differentiate the needs of such a cyber security program from those of typical corporate data systems. (orig.)

Establishing cyber security programs for I and C systems at nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Waedt, Karl [AREVA NP GmbH (Germany)

2012-11-01

In recent years, across the international nuclear community, cyber security issues have quickly gained significant attention from safety authorities and plant designers alike. This increased attention was accelerated by news of the Stuxnet virus, which impaired control systems at Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, but is also fueled by regular news about cyber security breaches of data systems at large business corporations. This paper discusses key aspects of establishing a cyber security program for Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems at a nuclear facility, and identifies inherent aspects of nuclear power plant (NPP) design, that differentiate the needs of such a cyber security program from those of typical corporate data systems. (orig.)

National Ignition Facility (NIF) FY2015 Facility Use Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Folta, P. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Wisoff, Jeff [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2014-12-18

Major features of the FY2015 NIF Use Plan include: • Performing a record number of layered DT experiments with 28 planned compared with 15 in FY2014. Executing the first plutonium experiments on the NIF in support of the Science Campaigns. • Over 300 targets shots, a 57% increase compared to FY14. This is a stretch goal defined in the 120-Day Study document, and relies upon the success of many shot-rate improvement actions, as well as on the distribution of shot type selected by the users. While the Plan is consistent with this goal, the increased proportion of layered DT experiments described above reduces the margin against this goal. • Commissioning of initial ARC capability, which will support both SSP-HED and SSPICF programs. • Increase in days allocated to Discovery Science to a level that supports an ongoing program for academic use of NIF and an annual solicitation for new proposals. • Six Facility Maintenance and Reconfiguration (FM&R) periods totaling 30 days dedicated to major facility maintenance and modifications. • Utilization of the NIF Facility Advisory Schedule Committee (FASC) to provide stakeholder review and feedback on the NIF schedule. The Use Plan assumes a total FY2015 LLNL NIF Operations funding in MTE 10.7 of $229.465M and in MTE 10.3 of 47.0M. This Use Plan will be revised in the event of significant changes to the FY2015 funding or if NNSA provides FY2016 budget guidance significantly reduced compared to FY2015.

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lewis, C.J.

1995-10-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure lonq-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years

National Ignition Facility project acquisition plan revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clobes, A.R.

1996-01-01

The purpose of this National Ignition Facility Acquisition Plan is to describe the overall procurement strategy planned for the National Ignition Facility M Project. It was prepared for the NIP Prood Office by the NIF Procurement Manager

Security of water treatment facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forsha, C.A. [Univ. of Pittsburgh at Johnstown, Johnstowne, PA (United States)

2002-06-15

The safety of the nation's water supply is at risk. Although harm may or may not be done to water sources, the fear is definitely a factor. No matter what size system supplies water, the community will expect increased security. Decisions must be made as to how much will be spent on security and what measures will be taken with the money. Small systems often have a difficult time in finding a direction to focus on. Physical and electronic protection is less involved because of the scale of service. Biological contamination is difficult to prevent if the assailants are determined. Small-scale water storage and low magnitudes of flow increase a contamination threat. Large systems have a size advantage when dealing with biological contamination because of the dilution factor, but physical and electronic protection is more involved. Large-scale systems are more likely to overlook components. A balance is maintained through anything dealing with the public. Having greater assurance that water quality will be maintained comes at the cost of knowing less about how water is protected and treated, and being banned from public land within watersheds that supply drinking water. Whether good or bad ideas are being implemented, security of water treatment facilities is changing. (author)

Security of water treatment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsha, C.A.

2002-01-01

The safety of the nation's water supply is at risk. Although harm may or may not be done to water sources, the fear is definitely a factor. No matter what size system supplies water, the community will expect increased security. Decisions must be made as to how much will be spent on security and what measures will be taken with the money. Small systems often have a difficult time in finding a direction to focus on. Physical and electronic protection is less involved because of the scale of service. Biological contamination is difficult to prevent if the assailants are determined. Small-scale water storage and low magnitudes of flow increase a contamination threat. Large systems have a size advantage when dealing with biological contamination because of the dilution factor, but physical and electronic protection is more involved. Large-scale systems are more likely to overlook components. A balance is maintained through anything dealing with the public. Having greater assurance that water quality will be maintained comes at the cost of knowing less about how water is protected and treated, and being banned from public land within watersheds that supply drinking water. Whether good or bad ideas are being implemented, security of water treatment facilities is changing. (author)

Appendix E - Sample Production Facility Plan

Science.gov (United States)

This sample Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plan in Appendix E is intended to provide examples and illustrations of how a production facility could address a variety of scenarios in its SPCC Plan.

Future Direction of the Instrumentation and Control System for Security of Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Woo Jin; Kim, Jae Kwang

2014-01-01

Instrumentation and control systems are pervasively used as a vital component in modern industries. Nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs), originally use I and C systems for plant status monitoring, processes control, and many other purposes. After some events that raised security concerns, application areas of I and C systems have been expanded to physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. As nuclear policies over the world are strengthening security issues, the future direction of roles and technical requirements of security related I and C systems is described: An introduction of I and C systems, especially digitalized I and C systems, to security of nuclear facilities requires many careful considerations, such as system integration, verification and validation (V/V), etc. Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) established 'International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy, INSA' in 2014. One of the main achievements of INSA is test-bed implementation for technical criteria development of nuclear facilities' physical protection systems (PPSs) as well as for education and training of those systems. The test bed was modified and improved more suitably from the previous version to modern PPSs including state-of-the-art I and C technologies. KINAC is confident in the new test bed to become a fundamental technical basis of security related I and C systems in near future

ORNL Isotopes Facilities Shutdown Program Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gibson, S.M.; Patton, B.D.; Sears, M.B.

1990-10-01

This plan presents the results of a technical and economic assessment for shutdown of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) isotopes production and distribution facilities. On December 11, 1989, the Department of Energy (DOE), Headquarters, in a memorandum addressed to DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office (DOE-ORO), gave instructions to prepare the ORNL isotopes production and distribution facilities, with the exception of immediate facility needs for krypton-85, tritium, and yttrium-90, for safe shutdown. In response to the memorandum, ORNL identified 17 facilities for shutdown. Each of these facilities is located within the ORNL complex with the exception of Building 9204-3, which is located at the Y-12 Weapons Production Plant. These facilities have been used extensively for the production of radioactive materials by the DOE Isotopes Program. They currently house a large inventory of radioactive materials. Over the years, these aging facilities have inherited the problems associated with storing and processing highly radioactive materials (i.e., facilities' materials degradation and contamination). During FY 1990, ORNL is addressing the requirements for placing these facilities into safe shutdown while maintaining the facilities under the existing maintenance and surveillance plan. The day-to-day operations associated with the surveillance and maintenance of a facility include building checks to ensure that building parameters are meeting the required operational safety requirements, performance of contamination control measures, and preventative maintenance on the facility and facility equipment. Shutdown implementation will begin in FY 1993, and shutdown completion will occur by the end of FY 1994

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DAVIS, W.E.

2000-03-08

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee public safety, or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan ensures long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and must be updated, as a minimum, every 3 years.

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DAVIS, W.E.

2000-01-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee public safety, or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan ensures long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and must be updated, as a minimum, every 3 years

Using the safety/security interface to the security manager's advantage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stapleton, B.W.

1993-01-01

Two aspects of the safety/security interface are discussed: (1) the personal safety of nuclear security officers; and (2) how the security manager can effectively deal with the safety/security interface in solving today's requirements yet supporting the overall mission of the facility. The basis of this presentation is the result of interviews, document analyses, and observations. The conclusion is that proper planning and communication between the players involved in the security/safety interface can benefit the two programs and help achieve overall system integration, ultimately contributing to the bottom line. This is especially important in today's cost conscious environment

The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2006-01-01

... to the jurisdiction of the United States. The MIRP, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan, and the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan were developed in close coordination under the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS...

ADP Security Plan, Math Building, Room 1139

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Melton, R.

1985-08-27

This document provides the draft copy of an updated (ADP) Security Plan for an IBM Personal Computer to be used in the Math Building at PNL for classified data base management. Using the equipment specified in this document and implementing the administrative and physical procedures as outlined will provide the secure environment necessary for this work to proceed.

Nuclear security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-12-01

This paper reports that despite their crucial importance to national security, safeguards at the Department of Energy's (DOE) weapons facilities may be falling short. DOE security inspections have identified many weaknesses, including poor performance by members of DOE's security force, poor accountability for quantities of nuclear materials, and the inability of personnel to locate documents containing classified information. About 13 percent of the 2,100 identified weakness resulted in DOE inspectors giving out unsatisfactory security ratings; another 38 percent led to marginal ratings. In addition, DOE's centralized safeguards and security information tracking system lacks current data on whether DOE field offices have corrected the identified weaknesses. Without reliable information, DOE has no way of knowing whether timely action was taken to correct problems, nor can it determine whether weaknesses are systematic. DOE has tried to minimize the impact of these security weaknesses at its facilities by establishing multiple layers of protection measures and instituting interim and compensatory measures for identified weaknesses. DOE is planning enhancements to the centralized tracking system that should improve its reliability and increase its effectiveness

A guide for preparing Hanford Site facility effluent monitoring plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.

1992-06-01

This document provides guidance on the format and content of effluent monitoring plans for facilities at the Hanford Site. The guidance provided in this document is designed to ensure compliance with US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5400.1 (DOE 1988a), 5400.3 (DOE 1989a), 5400.4 (DOE 1989b), 5400.5 (DOE 1990a), 5480.1 (DOE 1982), 5480.11 (DOE 1988b), and 5484.1 (DOE 1981). These require environmental monitoring plans for each site, facility, or process that uses, generates, releases, or manages significant pollutants of radioactive or hazardous materials. In support of DOE Orders 5400.5 (Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment) and 5400.1 (General Environmental Protection Program), the DOE Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance (DOE 1991) should be used to establish elements of a radiological effluent monitoring program in the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan. Evaluation of facilities for compliance with the US Environmental Protection Agency Clean Air Act of 1977 requirements also is included in the airborne emissions section of the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans. Sampling Analysis Plans for Liquid Effluents, as required by the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), also are included in the Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans. The Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans shall include complete documentation of gaseous and liquid effluent sampling and monitoring systems

FORMATION OF FINANCIAL SECURITY OF THE ENTERPRISE BASED ON STRATEGIC PLANNING

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Nadiya Rushchyshyn

2017-09-01

Full Text Available The purpose of the study is to improve ways of forming financial security of the enterprise based onstrategic planning. The subject of the research: formation of financial security of the enterprise on the basis of strategicplanning. The methodological background of the research is a set of theoretical and general scientific methods:analysis and synthesis, theoretical and logical generalization, grouping, abstraction, and others. The paper providesa general description of the core approaches defining the concept of “financial security of the enterprise”. Functionalgoals of financial security of the enterprise are outlined, namely: ensuring financial stability and independence;achievement of high competitiveness in the market of goods, works, services; ensuring high efficiency of financialand economic activity; ensuring high liquidity of assets, and increasing the market value of the enterprise; supportfor the appropriate level of business activity and image; formation of information security and commercialsecrets; efficient organization of security of share capital and assets of the enterprise. The scheme of organizationof financial security organization is considered based on strategic planning. It is determined that the strategicplanning results in strategic plan (strategy for ensuring the financial security of the enterprise. Such a strategyshould be consistent with both financial and the company’s overall strategies, as well as main goals and objectives.For the most effective implementation of the chosen financial security strategy at the enterprise, it is expedientto develop and implement a system of plans covering all aspects of the strategic planning process, including thetarget program, strategic, tactical, calendar, and individual plans. The system of plans should specify: the purpose ofchanges in the functioning of internal systems of the enterprise; terms of making changes; the work that needs tobe done to make changes; their

Marketing Plan for the National Security Technology Incubator

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2008-03-31

This marketing plan was developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project by the Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University. The vision of the National Security Technology Incubator program is to be a successful incubator of technologies and private enterprise that assist the NNSA in meeting new challenges in national safety and security. The plan defines important aspects of developing the incubator, such as defining the target market, marketing goals, and creating strategies to reach the target market while meeting those goals. The three main marketing goals of the incubator are: 1) developing marketing materials for the incubator program; 2) attracting businesses to become incubator participants; and 3) increasing name recognition of the incubator program on a national level.

A demonstration of a low cost approach to security at shipping facilities and ports

Science.gov (United States)

Huck, Robert C.; Al Akkoumi, Mouhammad K.; Herath, Ruchira W.; Sluss, James J., Jr.; Radhakrishnan, Sridhar; Landers, Thomas L.

2010-04-01

Government funding for the security at shipping facilities and ports is limited so there is a need for low cost scalable security systems. With over 20 million sea, truck, and rail containers entering the United States every year, these facilities pose a large risk to security. Securing these facilities and monitoring the variety of traffic that enter and leave is a major task. To accomplish this, the authors have developed and fielded a low cost fully distributed building block approach to port security at the inland Port of Catoosa in Oklahoma. Based on prior work accomplished in the design and fielding of an intelligent transportation system in the United States, functional building blocks, (e.g. Network, Camera, Sensor, Display, and Operator Console blocks) can be assembled, mixed and matched, and scaled to provide a comprehensive security system. The following functions are demonstrated and scaled through analysis and demonstration: Barge tracking, credential checking, container inventory, vehicle tracking, and situational awareness. The concept behind this research is "any operator on any console can control any device at any time."

Development of a security-by-design handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olson, David L.; Snell, Mark Kamerer; Iida, Toru; Ochiai, Kazuya; Tanuma, Koji

2010-01-01

There is an increasing awareness that efficient and effective nuclear facility design is best achieved when requirements from the 3S disciplines Safety, Safeguards, and Security - are balanced and intrinsic to the facility design. This can be achieved when policy, processes, methods, and technologies are understood and applied in these areas during all phases of the design process. For the purposes of this paper, Security-by-design will be defined as the system level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new or retrofitted nuclear power plant (NPP) or nuclear facility (NF) resulting in intrinsic security. Security-by-design can also be viewed as a framework to achieve robust and durable security systems. This paper reports on work performed to date to create a Security-by-Design Handbook, under a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, specifically, a review of physical protection principles and best practices, and a decommissioning to better understand where these principles and practices can be applied. This paper describes physical protection principles and best practices to achieve security-by- design that were gathered from International, Japanese, and U.S. sources. Principles are included for achieving security early in the design process where security requirements are typically less costly and easier to incorporate. The paper then describes a generic design process that covers the entire facility lifecycle from scoping and planning of the project to decommissioning and decontamination. Early design process phases, such as conceptual design, offer opportunities to add security features intrinsic to the facility design itself. Later phases, including design engineering and construction, are important for properly integrating security features into a coherent design and for planning for and assuring the proper performance of the security system during the operation and decommissioning of the facility. The paper also

Cold Vacuum Dryer (CVD) Facility Security System Design Description. System 54

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WHITEHURST, R.

2000-01-01

This system design description (SDD) addresses the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility security system. The system's primary purpose is to provide reasonable assurance that breaches of security boundaries are detected and assessment information is provided to protective force personnel. In addition, the system is utilized by Operations to support reduced personnel radiation goals and to provide reasonable assurance that only authorized personnel are allowed to enter designated security areas

National Ignition Facility project acquisition plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Callaghan, R.W.

1996-04-01

The purpose of this National Ignition Facility Acquisition Plan is to describe the overall procurement strategy planned for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) Project. The scope of the plan describes the procurement activities and acquisition strategy for the following phases of the NIF Project, each of which receives either plant and capital equipment (PACE) or other project cost (OPC) funds: Title 1 and 2 design and Title 3 engineering (PACE); Optics manufacturing facilitization and pilot production (OPC); Convention facility construction (PACE); Procurement, installation, and acceptance testing of equipment (PACE); and Start-up (OPC). Activities that are part of the base Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program are not included in this plan. The University of California (UC), operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lockheed-Martin, which operates Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and the University of Rochester Laboratory for Laser Energetics (UR-LLE), will conduct the acquisition of needed products and services in support of their assigned responsibilities within the NIF Project structure in accordance with their prime contracts with the Department of Energy (DOE). LLNL, designated as the lead Laboratory, will have responsibility for all procurements required for construction, installation, activation, and startup of the NIF

Pitfalls and Security Measures for the Mobile EMR System in Medical Facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

Yeo, Kiho; Lee, Keehyuck; Kim, Jong-Min; Kim, Tae-Hun; Choi, Yong-Hoon; Jeong, Woo-Jin; Hwang, Hee; Baek, Rong Min; Yoo, Sooyoung

2012-06-01

The goal of this paper is to examine the security measures that should be reviewed by medical facilities that are trying to implement mobile Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems designed for hospitals. The study of the security requirements for a mobile EMR system is divided into legal considerations and sectional security investigations. Legal considerations were examined with regard to remote medical services, patients' personal information and EMR, medical devices, the establishment of mobile systems, and mobile applications. For the 4 sectional security investigations, the mobile security level SL-3 from the Smartphone Security Standards of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) was used. From a compliance perspective, legal considerations for various laws and guidelines of mobile EMR were executed according to the model of the legal considerations. To correspond to the SL-3, separation of DMZ and wireless network is needed. Mobile access servers must be located in only the smartphone DMZ. Furthermore, security measures like 24-hour security control, WIPS, VPN, MDM, and ISMS for each section are needed to establish a secure mobile EMR system. This paper suggested a direction for applying regulatory measures to strengthen the security of a mobile EMR system in accordance with the standard security requirements presented by the Smartphone Security Guideline of the NIS. A future study on the materialization of these suggestions after their application at actual medical facilities can be used as an illustrative case to determine the degree to which theory and reality correspond with one another.

West Valley Demonstration Project facilities utilization plan for the existing facilities at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Skillern, C.G.

1986-05-01

In 1980, Congress passed Public Law 96-368, the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Act. As a primary objective, the Act authorized the US Department of Energy (DOE) to solidify the high-level waste (HLW) stored at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC) into a form suitable for transportation and disposal in a federal repository. This report will describe how WVDP proposes to use the existing WNYNSC Facilities in an efficient and technically effective manner to comply with Public Law 96-368. In support of the above cited law, the DOE has entered into a ''Cooperative agreement between the United States Department of Energy and the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority on the Western New York Nuclear Service Center at West Valley, New York.'' The state-owned areas turned over to the DOE for use are as follows: Process Plant, Waste Storage, Low-Level Waste Treatment Facility, Service Facilities, Plant Security, and Additional Facilities. The Facilities Utilization Plan (FUP) describes how the state-owned facilities will be utilized to complete the Project; it is divided into five sections as follows: Executive Summary - an overview; Introduction - the WVDP approach to utilizing the WNYNSC Facilities; WVDP Systems - a brief functional description of the system, list of equipment and components to be used and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) support; WVDP Support Facilities; and Caveats that could effect or change the potential usage of a particular area

Sport Facility Planning and Management. Sport Management Library.

Science.gov (United States)

Farmer, Peter J.; Mulrooney, Aaron L.; Ammon, Rob, Jr.

Students of sports facilities management will need to acquire a wide variety of managerial skills and knowledge in order to be adequately prepared to plan and manage these facilities. This textbook offers students a mix of practical examples and recognized theory to help them in the planning, constructing, promoting, and managing of sports…

PLANNING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN A DYNAMIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Anca Pavel

2016-10-01

Full Text Available The hypothesis introduced by this article is that, in order to perform intelligence missions and to obtain valuable intelligence for the consumers it is necessary to implement processes and tools to support planning activities. Today's challenges consist rather in the ability of intelligence organizations to identify and initiate new connections, processes and communication flows with other partners operating in the security environment than to plan in their own name secret operations. From this point of view, planning activities should focus on new procedures, at a much more extensive level in order to align institutional efforts beyond the boundaries of their own organization and the national community of information. Also, in order to coordinate intelligence activities, strategic planning must be anchored into a complex analysis of the potential impact of existing and possible future global phenomena that shape the security environment and thus identify better ways of improving results.

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the 222-S Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Robinson, A.V.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems against applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. The current operation of the 222-S facilities includes the provision of analytical and radiological chemistry services in support of Hanford Site processing plants. The emphasis is on waste management, chemical processing, environmental monitoring effluent programs at B Plant, the Uranium Oxide Plant, Tank Farms, the 242-A Evaporator, the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility, the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Facility, the Plutonium Finishing Plant, process development/impact activities, and essential materials. The laboratory also supplies analytical services in support of ongoing waste tank characterization

Pitfalls and Security Measures for the Mobile EMR System in Medical Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

Yeo, Kiho; Lee, Keehyuck; Kim, Jong-Min; Kim, Tae-Hun; Choi, Yong-Hoon; Jeong, Woo-Jin; Hwang, Hee; Baek, Rong Min

2012-01-01

Objectives The goal of this paper is to examine the security measures that should be reviewed by medical facilities that are trying to implement mobile Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems designed for hospitals. Methods The study of the security requirements for a mobile EMR system is divided into legal considerations and sectional security investigations. Legal considerations were examined with regard to remote medical services, patients' personal information and EMR, medical devices, the establishment of mobile systems, and mobile applications. For the 4 sectional security investigations, the mobile security level SL-3 from the Smartphone Security Standards of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) was used. Results From a compliance perspective, legal considerations for various laws and guidelines of mobile EMR were executed according to the model of the legal considerations. To correspond to the SL-3, separation of DMZ and wireless network is needed. Mobile access servers must be located in only the smartphone DMZ. Furthermore, security measures like 24-hour security control, WIPS, VPN, MDM, and ISMS for each section are needed to establish a secure mobile EMR system. Conclusions This paper suggested a direction for applying regulatory measures to strengthen the security of a mobile EMR system in accordance with the standard security requirements presented by the Smartphone Security Guideline of the NIS. A future study on the materialization of these suggestions after their application at actual medical facilities can be used as an illustrative case to determine the degree to which theory and reality correspond with one another. PMID:22844648

48 CFR 652.239-70 - Information Technology Security Plan and Accreditation.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Information Technology... Clauses 652.239-70 Information Technology Security Plan and Accreditation. As prescribed in 639.107-70(a), insert the following provision: Information Technology Security Plan and Accreditation (SEP 2007) All...

48 CFR 1252.239-71 - Information technology security plan and accreditation.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Information technology... Provisions and Clauses 1252.239-71 Information technology security plan and accreditation. As prescribed in (TAR) 48 CFR 1239.70, insert the following provision: Information Technology Security Plan and...

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the B plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lesser, J.E.

1994-09-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-1. This facility effluent monitoring plant assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated every three years

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NSTec Environmental Restoration

2011-09-29

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility.

Power facility plan and power supply plan of Japan in 1988

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yoshino, Shoji; Makino, Masao

1988-06-01

The power facility plan and the power supply plan for 1988 are described. The demand by non-industrial use will grow at an average of 3.8% for the 1986-97 period due to changes in the life style, construction and extension of buildings and increasing use of OA equipment although the power conservation is promoted. The industrial consumption will increase at only 1.2% a year due to the slowed growth and energy saving. As a result, the total demand will be 778,200 million kWh in 1997 with annual growth of 2.4%. The maximum demand will be 151,210 kW in 1997 with annual growth of 2.9%. The annual load rate will decrease to 56.9%, showing a continuously worsening utilization efficiency of power facilities. The development of 29 power units with total capacity of 2,760 MW is planned in 1988 for a stable power supply with a sufficient margin regarding maximum demand. The plan requires the investment of 3,700 billion yen, including the power transmission systems and substations. The power supply plan in 1988 is aimed at the effective operation of facilities and cost reduction by regional management under proper recognition of local characteristics of each power source, while maintaining a stable power supply with specified margins. (1 fig, 11 tabs)

Security administration plan for HANDI 2000 business management system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wilson, D.

1998-09-29

This document encompasses and standardizes the integrated approach for security within the PP and Ps applications, It also identifies the security tools and methods to be used. The Security Administration Plan becomes effective as of this document`s acceptance and will provide guidance through implementation efforts and, as a ``living document`` will support the operations and maintenance of the system.

WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII,Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a). This work plan describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility's's Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit. The scope of work for the RFI Work Plan or SAP is being developed by the Permittees. The final content of the RFI Work Plan or SAP will be coordinated with the NMED for submittal on May 24, 2000. Specific project-related planning information will be included in the RFI Work Plan or SAP. The SWMU program at WIPP began in 1994 under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority. NMED subsequently received regulatory authority from EPA. A

LMFBR safety experiment facility planning and analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevenson, M.G.; Scott, J.H.

1976-01-01

In the past two years considerable effort has been placed on the planning and design of new facilities for the resolution of LMFBR safety issues. The paper reviews the key issues, the experiments needed to resolve them, and the design aspects of proposed new facilities. In addition, it presents a decision theory approach to selecting an optimal combination of modified and new facilities

ICT security- aspects important for nuclear facilities; Information and Communication Technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thunem, Atoosa P-J.

2005-09-15

Rapid application growth of complex Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in every society and state infrastructure as well as industry has revealed vulnerabilities that eventually have given rise to serious security breaches. These vulnerabilities together with the course of the breaches from cause to consequence are gradually about to convince the field experts that ensuring the security of ICT-driven systems is no longer possible by only relying on the fundaments of computer science, IT, or telecommunications. Appropriating knowledge from other disciplines is not only beneficial, but indeed very necessary. At the same time, it is a common observation today that ICT-driven systems are used everywhere, from the nuclear, aviation, commerce and healthcare domains to camera-equipped web-enabled cellular phones. The increasing interdisciplinary and inter-sectoral aspects of ICT security worldwide have been providing updated and useful information to the nuclear domain, as one of the emerging users of ICT-driven systems. Nevertheless, such aspects have also contributed to new and complicated challenges, as ICT security for the nuclear domain is in a much more delicate manner than for any other domains related to the concept of safety, at least from the public standpoint. This report addresses some important aspects of ICT security that need to be considered at nuclear facilities. It deals with ICT security and the relationship between security and safety from a rather different perspective than usually observed and applied. The report especially highlights the influence on the security of ICT-driven systems by all other dependability factors, and on that basis suggests a framework for ICT security profiling, where several security profiles are assumed to be valid and used in parallel for each ICT-driven system, sub-system or unit at nuclear facilities. The report also covers a related research topic of the Halden Project with focus on cyber threats and

Design impacts of safeguards and security requirements for a US MOX fuel fabrication facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Erkkila, B.H.; Rinard, P.M.; Thomas, K.E.; Zack, N.R.; Jaeger, C.D.

1998-01-01

The disposition of plutonium that is no longer required for the nation's defense is being structured to mitigate risks associated with the material's availability. In the 1997 Record of Decision, the US Government endorsed a dual-track approach that could employ domestic commercial reactors to effect the disposition of a portion of the plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuels. To support this decision, the Office of Materials Disposition requested preparation of a document that would review US requirements for safeguards and security and describe their impact on the design of a MOX fuel fabrication facility. The intended users are potential bidders for the construction and operation of the facility. The document emphasizes the relevant DOE Orders but also considers the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Where they are significantly different, the authors have highlighted this difference and provided guidance on the impact to the facility design. Finally, the impacts of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on facility design are discussed. Security and materials control and accountability issues that influence facility design are emphasized in each area of discussion. This paper will discuss the prepared report and the issues associated with facility design for implementing practical, modern safeguards and security systems into a new MOX fuel fabrication facility

Physical security at research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, R.A.

1977-01-01

Of the 84 non-power research facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50, 73 are active (two test reactors, 68 research reactors and three critical facilities) and are required by 10 CFR Part 73.40 to provide physical protection against theft of SNM and against industrial sabotage. Each licensee has developed a security plan required by 10 CFR Part 50.34(c) to demonstrate the means of compliance with the applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 73. In 1974, the Commission provided interim guidance for the organization and content of security plans for (a) test reactors, (b) medium power research and training reactors, and (c) low power research and training reactors. Eleven TRIGA reactors, with power levels greater than 250 kW and all other research and training reactors with power levels greater than 100 kW and less than or equal to 5,000 kW are designated as medium power research and training reactors. Thirteen TRIGA reactors with authorized power levels less than 250 kW are considered to be low power research and training reactors. Additional guidance for complying with the requirements of 73.50 and 73.60, if applicable, is provided in the Commission's Regulatory Guides. The Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement inspects each licensed facility to assure that an approved security plan is properly implemented with appropriate procedures and physical protection systems

A new Brazilian regulation for the security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tavares, Renato L.A.; Filho, Josélio S.M.; Torres, Luiz F.B.; Lima, Alexandre R., E-mail: renato.tavares@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: joselio@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: ltorres@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: alexandre.lima@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Diretoria de Radioproteção e Segurança Nuclear; Lima, Fabiano P.C., E-mail: fabianopetruceli@outlook.com [Presidência da República, Brasilia, DF (Brazil). Gabinete de Segurança Institucional

2017-07-01

The present paper aims to outline the challenges related to the elaboration and concepts involved in a regulatory transition from a purely prescriptive approach to a combined approach that mixes performance-based concepts and evaluation metrics based on statistical data of equipment and personnel. This methodology might represent an improvement compared to a purely prescriptive approach, in which the regulatory authority defines the measures to be taken by operators of nuclear facilities to prevent theft, sabotage events, and mitigate their consequences. The prescriptive approach, despite having the advantages of clarity in the definition of requirements, simplicity in regulatory terms (inspections to verify compliance), and homogeneity in relation to various facilities, does not allow a clear and effective performance measurement, may provide insufficient or excessive security measures (with excessive expenditure of material and human resources), and the possibility of providing a false sense of security. It is known that, in many countries, the state-sponsored nuclear security regime mixes elements of the two mentioned approaches, prescriptive and based on performance, which is not Brazilian practice nowadays. Such methodological developments happened globally due to the increase of threat level for nuclear facilities and materials. The currently regulation in force is CNEN-NE 2.01, which provides a set of measures intended to implement Physical Protection Systems in Nuclear, Radiological Facilities as well as Transport Operations, and all documents related to security of such issues. The new regulation, named CNEN-NN 2.01, will focus only on Nuclear Material and Facilities (two other regulations specific for Security of Radioactive Sources and Transport Operations are under elaboration process). CNEN NN 2.01 is intended to provide further adherence to new international recommendations, e.g, IAEA INFCIRC 225 Rev.5 (NSS 13), which is currently regarded as the �

A new Brazilian regulation for the security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tavares, Renato L.A.; Filho, Josélio S.M.; Torres, Luiz F.B.; Lima, Alexandre R.; Lima, Fabiano P.C.

2017-01-01

The present paper aims to outline the challenges related to the elaboration and concepts involved in a regulatory transition from a purely prescriptive approach to a combined approach that mixes performance-based concepts and evaluation metrics based on statistical data of equipment and personnel. This methodology might represent an improvement compared to a purely prescriptive approach, in which the regulatory authority defines the measures to be taken by operators of nuclear facilities to prevent theft, sabotage events, and mitigate their consequences. The prescriptive approach, despite having the advantages of clarity in the definition of requirements, simplicity in regulatory terms (inspections to verify compliance), and homogeneity in relation to various facilities, does not allow a clear and effective performance measurement, may provide insufficient or excessive security measures (with excessive expenditure of material and human resources), and the possibility of providing a false sense of security. It is known that, in many countries, the state-sponsored nuclear security regime mixes elements of the two mentioned approaches, prescriptive and based on performance, which is not Brazilian practice nowadays. Such methodological developments happened globally due to the increase of threat level for nuclear facilities and materials. The currently regulation in force is CNEN-NE 2.01, which provides a set of measures intended to implement Physical Protection Systems in Nuclear, Radiological Facilities as well as Transport Operations, and all documents related to security of such issues. The new regulation, named CNEN-NN 2.01, will focus only on Nuclear Material and Facilities (two other regulations specific for Security of Radioactive Sources and Transport Operations are under elaboration process). CNEN NN 2.01 is intended to provide further adherence to new international recommendations, e.g, IAEA INFCIRC 225 Rev.5 (NSS 13), which is currently regarded as the �

Near-facility environmental monitoring quality assurance project plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McKinney, S.M.

1997-01-01

This Quality Assurance Project Plan addresses the quality assurance requirements for the activities associated with the preoperational and near facility environmental monitoring performed by Waste Management Federal Services, Inc., Northwest Operations and supersedes WHC-EP-0538-2. This plan applies to all sampling and monitoring activities performed by waste management Federal Services, Inc., Northwest Operations in implementing facility environmental monitoring at the Hanford Site

Twenty-Five Year Site Plan FY2013 - FY2037

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jones, William H. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-07-12

Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) is the nation's premier national security science laboratory. Its mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the United States (U.S.) nuclear stockpile; reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism; and solve national problems in defense, energy, and the environment. The fiscal year (FY) 2013-2037 Twenty-Five Year Site Plan (TYSP) is a vital component for planning to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory's missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory's core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory's role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns. The Laboratory is aligned with Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) modernization activities outlined in the NNSA Strategic Plan (May 2011) which include: (1) ensuring laboratory plutonium space effectively supports pit manufacturing and enterprise-wide special nuclear materials consolidation; (2) constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF); (3) establishing shared user facilities to more cost effectively manage high-value, experimental, computational and production capabilities; and (4) modernizing enduring facilities while reducing the excess facility footprint. Th is TYSP is viewed by the Laboratory as a vital planning tool to develop an effi cient and responsive infrastructure. Long range facility and infrastructure development planning are critical to assure sustainment and modernization. Out-year re-investment is essential for sustaining existing facilities, and will be re-evaluated on an annual

Outline of electric power facility plan in fiscal year 1988

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

As to the electric power facility plan in fiscal year 1988, 15 designated electric power enterprises made the notification to the Minister of International Trade and Industry in March, 1988. This outline of the facility plan summarized the plans of 66 enterprises in total, including the plans of municipally operated, joint thermal power and other enterprises in addition to the above 15. In order to ensure the stable supply of electric power, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry considers that it is indispensable to purposefully develop electric power sources and the facilities for distribution along this facility plan. The forecast for fiscal year 1997 is : total electric power demand 778.2 billion kWh, maximum power demand 151.21 million kW, and yearly load factor 56.9 %. This is equivalent to the yearly growth of 2.4 %. In fiscal year 1988, it is planned to present 29 plants of 2760 MW to the Power Source Development Coordination Council. The breakdown is : hydroelectricity 140 MW, thermal power 2010 MW, and nuclear power 610 MW. The Ministry guides electric power enterprises so as to realize the diversification of electric power sources. Also the increase of transmission and transformation facilities, the plan of equipment investment and others are reported. (Kako, I.)

Standard Guide for Preparing Characterization Plans for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities

CERN Document Server

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2009-01-01

1.1 This standard guide applies to developing nuclear facility characterization plans to define the type, magnitude, location, and extent of radiological and chemical contamination within the facility to allow decommissioning planning. This guide amplifies guidance regarding facility characterization indicated in ASTM Standard E 1281 on Nuclear Facility Decommissioning Plans. This guide does not address the methodology necessary to release a facility or site for unconditional use. This guide specifically addresses: 1.1.1 the data quality objective for characterization as an initial step in decommissioning planning. 1.1.2 sampling methods, 1.1.3 the logic involved (statistical design) to ensure adequate characterization for decommissioning purposes; and 1.1.4 essential documentation of the characterization information. 1.2 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate saf...

Minimum dose method for walking-path planning of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu, Yong-kuo; Li, Meng-kun; Xie, Chun-li; Peng, Min-jun; Wang, Shuang-yu; Chao, Nan; Liu, Zhong-kun

2015-01-01

Highlights: • For radiation environment, the environment model is proposed. • For the least dose walking path problem, a path-planning method is designed. • The path-planning virtual–real mixed simulation program is developed. • The program can plan walking path and simulate. - Abstract: A minimum dose method based on staff walking road network model was proposed for the walking-path planning in nuclear facilities. A virtual–reality simulation program was developed using C# programming language and Direct X engine. The simulation program was used in simulations dealing with virtual nuclear facilities. Simulation results indicated that the walking-path planning method was effective in providing safety for people walking in nuclear facilities

Computer-Assisted School Facility Planning with ONPASS.

Science.gov (United States)

Urban Decision Systems, Inc., Los Angeles, CA.

The analytical capabilities of ONPASS, an on-line computer-aided school facility planning system, are described by its developers. This report describes how, using the Canoga Park-Winnetka-Woodland Hills Planning Area as a test case, the Department of City Planning of the city of Los Angeles employed ONPASS to demonstrate how an on-line system can…

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Balance-of-Plant Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ballinger, M.Y.; Shields, K.D.

1999-01-01

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operates a number of research and development (R and D) facilities for the Department of Energy on the Hanford Site. According to DOE Order 5400.1, a Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan is required for each site, facility, or process that uses, generates, releases, or manages significant pollutants or hazardous materials. Three of the R and D facilities: the 325, 331, and 3720 Buildings, are considered major emission points for radionuclide air sampling and thus individual Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans (FEMPs) have been developed for them. Because no definition of ''significant'' is provided in DOE Order 5400.1 or the accompanying regulatory guide DOE/EH-0173T, this FEMP was developed to describe monitoring requirements in the DOE-owned, PNNL-operated facilities that do not have individual FEMPs. The remainder of the DOE-owned, PNNL-operated facilities are referred to as Balance-of-Plant (BOP) facilities. Activities in the BOP facilities range from administrative to laboratory and pilot-scale R and D. R and D activities include both radioactive and chemical waste characterization, fluid dynamics research, mechanical property testing, dosimetry research, and molecular sciences. The mission and activities for individual buildings are described in the FEMP

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Balance-of-Plant Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ballinger, M.Y.; Shields, K.D.

1999-04-02

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operates a number of research and development (R and D) facilities for the Department of Energy on the Hanford Site. According to DOE Order 5400.1, a Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan is required for each site, facility, or process that uses, generates, releases, or manages significant pollutants or hazardous materials. Three of the R and D facilities: the 325, 331, and 3720 Buildings, are considered major emission points for radionuclide air sampling and thus individual Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans (FEMPs) have been developed for them. Because no definition of ''significant'' is provided in DOE Order 5400.1 or the accompanying regulatory guide DOE/EH-0173T, this FEMP was developed to describe monitoring requirements in the DOE-owned, PNNL-operated facilities that do not have individual FEMPs. The remainder of the DOE-owned, PNNL-operated facilities are referred to as Balance-of-Plant (BOP) facilities. Activities in the BOP facilities range from administrative to laboratory and pilot-scale R and D. R and D activities include both radioactive and chemical waste characterization, fluid dynamics research, mechanical property testing, dosimetry research, and molecular sciences. The mission and activities for individual buildings are described in the FEMP.

Planning Facilities for Athletics, Physical Education and Recreation. Revised.

Science.gov (United States)

American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation and Dance (AAHPERD).

This revised edition includes new material recommended by a panel of experts in the field of recreational planning. The following topics are covered: (1) the planning process; (2) indoor facilities; (3) outdoor facilities; (4) indoor and outdoor swimming pools; (5) encapsulated spaces and stadiums; (6) service areas; (7) recreation and park…

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) Design Reconstitution Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HERNANDEZ, R.

1999-01-01

The purpose of Design Reconstitution is to establish a Design Baseline appropriate to the current facility mission. The scope of this plan is to ensure that Systems, Structures and Components (SSC) identified in the WESF Basis for Interim Operation (HNF-SDWM-BIO-002) are adequately described and documented, in order to support facility operations. In addition the plan addresses the adequacy of selected Design Topics which are also crucial for support of the facility Basis for Interim Operation (BIO)

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the N Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Watson, D.J.; Brendel, D.F.; Shields, K.D.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP- 0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years. The primary purpose of the N Reactor Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan (FEMP), during standby, is to ensure that the radioactive effluents are properly monitored and evaluated for compliance with the applicable DOE orders and regulatory agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. A secondary purpose of the FEMP is to ensure that hazardous wastes are not released, in liquid effluents, to the environment even though the potential to do so is extremely low. The FEMP is to provide a monitoring system that collects representative samples in accordance with industry standards, performs analyses within stringent quality control (QC) requirements, and evaluates the data through the use of comparative analysis with the standards and acceptable environmental models

Near-Facility Environmental Monitoring Quality Assurance Project Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MCKINNEY, S.M.

2000-01-01

This Quality Assurance Project Plan addresses the quality assurance requirements for the activities associated with the preoperational and near-facility environmental monitoring directed by Waste Management Technical Services and supersedes HNF-EP-0538-4. This plan applies to all sampling and monitoring activities performed by Waste Management Technical Services in implementing near-facility environmental monitoring at the Hanford Site. This Quality Assurance Project Plan is required by U.S. Department of Energy Order 5400.1 (DOE 1990) as a part of the Environmental Monitoring Plan (DOE-RL 1997) and is used to define: Environmental measurement and sampling locations used to monitor environmental contaminants near active and inactive facilities and waste storage and disposal sites; Procedures and equipment needed to perform the measurement and sampling; Frequency and analyses required for each measurement and sampling location; Minimum detection level and accuracy; Quality assurance components; and Investigation levels. Near-facility environmental monitoring for the Hanford Site is conducted in accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy Orders 5400.1 (DOE 1990), 5400.5 (DOE 1993), 5484.1 (DOE 1990), and 435.1 (DOE 1999), and DOE/EH-O173T (DOE 1991). It is Waste Management Technical Services' objective to manage and conduct near-facility environmental monitoring activities at the Hanford Site in a cost-effective and environmentally responsible manner that is in compliance with the letter and spirit of these regulations and other environmental regulations, statutes, and standards

TECHNIQUE OF OPTIMAL AUDIT PLANNING FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

F. N. Shago

2014-03-01

Full Text Available Complication of information security management systems leads to the necessity of improving the scientific and methodological apparatus for these systems auditing. Planning is an important and determining part of information security management systems auditing. Efficiency of audit will be defined by the relation of the reached quality indicators to the spent resources. Thus, there is an important and urgent task of developing methods and techniques for optimization of the audit planning, making it possible to increase its effectiveness. The proposed technique gives the possibility to implement optimal distribution for planning time and material resources on audit stages on the basis of dynamics model for the ISMS quality. Special feature of the proposed approach is the usage of a priori data as well as a posteriori data for the initial audit planning, and also the plan adjustment after each audit event. This gives the possibility to optimize the usage of audit resources in accordance with the selected criteria. Application examples of the technique are given while planning audit information security management system of the organization. The result of computational experiment based on the proposed technique showed that the time (cost audit costs can be reduced by 10-15% and, consequently, quality assessments obtained through audit resources allocation can be improved with respect to well-known methods of audit planning.

Operating Nuclear Power Stations in a Regulated Cyber Security Environment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dorman, E.

2014-07-01

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued 10CFR73.54 to implement a regulated Cyber Security Program at each operating nuclear reactor facility. Milestones were implemented December 31, 2012 to mitigate the attack vectors for the most critical digital assets acknowledged by the industry and the NR C. The NRC inspections have begun. The nuclear Cyber Security Plan, implemented by the site Cyber Security Program (Program), is an element of the operating license at each facility. (Author)

Operating Nuclear Power Stations in a Regulated Cyber Security Environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dorman, E.

2014-01-01

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued 10CFR73.54 to implement a regulated Cyber Security Program at each operating nuclear reactor facility. Milestones were implemented December 31, 2012 to mitigate the attack vectors for the most critical digital assets acknowledged by the industry and the NR C. The NRC inspections have begun. The nuclear Cyber Security Plan, implemented by the site Cyber Security Program (Program), is an element of the operating license at each facility. (Author)

WIPP facility representative program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This plan describes the Department of Energy (DOE), Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) facility representative (FR) program at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It provides the following information: (1) FR and support organization authorities and responsibilities; (2) FR program requirements; and (3) FR training and qualification requirements

Timely integration of safeguards and security with projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Price, R.; Blount, P.M.; Garcia, S.W.; Gonzales, R.L.; Salazar, J.B.; Campbell, C.H.

2004-01-01

The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Requirements Integration Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed and implemented an innovative management process that will be described in detail. This process systematically integrates S and S planning into construction, facility modifications or upgrades, mission changes, and operational projects. It extends and expands the opportunities provided by the DOE project management manual, DOE M 413.3-1. Through a series of LANL documents, a process is defined and implemented that formally identifies an S and S professional to oversee, coordinate, facilitate, and communicate among the identified S and S organizations and the project organizations over the life cycle of the project. The derived benefits, namely (1) elimination/reduction of re-work or costly retrofitting, (2) overall project cost savings because of timely and improved planning, (3) formal documentation, and (4) support of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management at LANL, will be discussed. How many times, during the construction of a new facility or the modification of an existing facility, have the persons responsible for the project waited until the last possible minute or until after construction is completed to approach the security organizations for their help in safeguarding and securing the facility? It's almost like, 'Oh, by the way, do we need access control and a fence around this building and just what are we going to do with our classified anyway?' Not only is it usually difficult; it's also typically expensive to retrofit or plan for safeguards and security after the fact. Safeguards and security organizations are often blamed for budget overruns and delays in facility occupancy and program startup, but these problems are usually due to poor front-end planning. In an effort to help projects engage safeguards and security in the pre-conceptual or conceptual stages, we implemented a high level formality of operations. We

SURF II: Characteristics, facilities, and plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Madden, R.P.; Canfield, R.; Furst, M.; Hamilton, A.; Hughey, L.

1992-01-01

This facility report describes the Synchrotron Ultraviolet Radiation Facility (SURF II) operated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland. SURF II is a 300-MeV electron storage ring which provides well characterized continuum radiation from the far infrared to the soft x-ray region with the critical wavelength at 17.4 nm. Brief descriptions are given of the user facilities, the characteristics of the synchrotron radiation, the main storage ring, the injector system and each of the operating beam lines, and associated instruments. Further description is given of expansion plans for additional beam lines

Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? - An analysis of possible synergies

OpenAIRE

Hedlund, Frank Huess

2012-01-01

The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member States. This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which existing provisions that have been put into existence to advance safety objectives due to synergy effects could be expected advance security objectives as well.The paper provides a conceptual definition of...

Plan Colombia or development as security

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Juan Pablo Guevara Latorre

2015-01-01

the most relevant policy for the construction of the State in 21st-century Colombia from a critical standpoint. The document makes it possible to show that Plan Colombia is a privatized form of development, interpreted in terms of security based on an incomplete understanding of the Colombian conflict that prevails into our present

Waste analysis plan for the 200 area effluent treatment facility and liquid effluent retention facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ballantyne, N.A.

1995-01-01

This waste analysis plan (WAP) has been prepared for startup of the 200 Area Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) and operation of the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF), which are located on the Hanford Facility, Richland, Washington. This WAP documents the methods used to obtain and analyze representative samples of dangerous waste managed in these units, and of the nondangerous treated effluent that is discharged to the State-Approved Land Disposal System (SALDS). Groundwater Monitoring at the SALDS will be addressed in a separate plan

Realities of proximity facility siting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeMott, D.L.

1981-01-01

Numerous commercial nuclear power plant sites have 2 to 3 reactors located together, and a group of Facilities with capabilities for fuel fabrication, a nuclear reactor, a storage area for spent fuel, and a maintenance area for contaminated equipment and radioactive waste storage are being designed and constructed in the US. The proximity of these facilities to each other provides that the ordinary flow of materials remain within a limited area. Interactions between the various facilities include shared resources such as communication, fire protection, security, medical services, transportation, water, electrical, personnel, emergency planning, transport of hazardous material between facilities, and common safety and radiological requirements between facilities. This paper will explore the advantages and disadvantages of multiple facilities at one site. Problem areas are identified, and recommendations for planning and coordination are discussed

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

FRAZIER, T.P.

1999-01-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

Multi-site risk-based project planning, optimization, sequencing, & budgeting process and tool for the integrated facility disposition project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nelson, J.G.; Castillo, C.; Huntsman, J.; Killoy, S.; Lucek, H.; Marks, T.C.

2011-01-01

Faced with the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex Transformation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was tasked with developing an integrated plan for the decommissioning of over 400 facilities and 300 environmental remediation units, as well as the many reconfiguration and modernization projects at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12 Complex. Manual scheduling of remediation activities is time-consuming and inherently introduces bias of the scheduler or organization into the process. Clearly a well-defined process, quantitative risk-based tool was needed to develop an objective, unbiased baseline sequence and schedule with a sound technical foundation for the Integrated Facility Disposition Project (IFDP). Faced with limited available data, innovation was needed to extrapolate intelligent relative data for key risk parameters based on known data elements. The IFDP Supermodel was customized and expanded to provide this capability for conceptual planning of diverse project portfolios and multiple sites. (author)

Planning and implementing nuclear emergency response facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, D.H.

1983-01-01

After Three Mile Island, Arkansas Nuclear One produced a planning document called TMI-2 Response Program. Phase I of the program defined action plans in nine areas: safety assessment, training, organization, public information, communication, security, fiscal-governmental, technical and logistical support. Under safety assessment, the staff was made even better prepared to handle radioactive material. Under training, on site simulators for each unit at ANO were installed. The other seven topics interface closely with each other. An emergency control center is diagrammed. A habitable technical support system was created. A media center, with a large media area, and an auditorium, was built. Electric door strike systems increased security. Phone networks independently run via microwave were installed. Until Three Mile Island, logistical problems were guesswork. That incident afforded an opportunity to better identify and prepare for these problems

Gas supply planning for new gas-fired electricity generation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Slocum, J.C.

1990-01-01

This paper explores several key issues in gas supply planning for new gas fired electric generation facilities. This paper will have two main sections, as follows: developing the gas supply plan for a gas-fired electricity generation facility and exploring key gas supply contract pricing issues

Demonstration tools for the facility/land use planning process at Rocky Flats

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ryan, K.B.

1994-01-01

The new mission for the Rocky Flats Site states, open-quotes Manage waste and materials, clean up and convert the Rocky Flats Site to beneficial use in a manner that is safe, environmentally and socially responsible, physical secure, and cost-effective.close quotes. In addition, community recognition and support is encouraged and expected. To accomplish this ambitious mission of converting to another use and incorporating stakeholder input, many tools must be developed. These tools must be clearly understandable and readily available, with the hope and plan that similar outcomes will be much more apparent if the same or similar tools are applied by all decision markers, both internal and external. Since the task is monumental and extremely complex, establishing and understanding these available tools early in the planning process is important. All decision makers must be identified and the availability of the tools should be shared to eliminate redundancy and expedite the planning process. Most documents utilized for decision making are very technical in nature. Since numerous and varied stakeholders will be involved, these documents must be socialized or open-quotes detechnicalized.close quotes This paper discusses developing internal and universally acceptable demonstration tools for explaining how facilities and land will be analyzed for constraints and opportunities during the planning process

WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Washington TRU Solutions LLC

2001-02-25

This 2001 Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII, Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a), and incorporates comments from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) received on December 6, 2000 (NMED, 2000a). This February 2001 FWP describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. The permittees are evaluating data from previous investigations of the SWMUs and AOCs against the newest guidance proposed by the NMED. Based on these data, the permittees expect that no further sampling will be required and that a request for No Further Action (NFA) at the SWMUs and AOCs will be submitted to the NMED. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current NMED guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to the NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit.

Report to Congress on innovative safety and security technology solutions for alternative transportation facilities

Science.gov (United States)

2017-05-01

This research collected information on the frequency and impact of safety and security incidents (threats) at selected facilities and identified priority incidents at each facility. A customized all hazards approach was used to determine the ha...

Hanford Site waste tank farm facilities design reconstitution program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vollert, F.R.

1994-01-01

Throughout the commercial nuclear industry the lack of design reconstitution programs prior to the mid 1980's has resulted in inadequate documentation to support operating facilities configuration changes or safety evaluations. As a result, many utilities have completed or have ongoing design reconstitution programs and have discovered that without sufficient pre-planning their program can be potentially very expensive and may result in end-products inconsistent with the facility needs or expectations. A design reconstitution program plan is developed here for the Hanford waste tank farms facility as a consequence of the DOE Standard on operational configuration management. This design reconstitution plan provides for the recovery or regeneration of design requirements and basis, the compilation of Design Information Summaries, and a methodology to disposition items open for regeneration that were discovered during the development of Design Information Summaries. Implementation of this plan will culminate in an end-product of about 30 Design Information Summary documents. These documents will be developed to identify tank farms facility design requirements and design bases and thereby capture the technical baselines of the facility. This plan identifies the methodology necessary to systematically recover documents that are sources of design input information, and to evaluate and disposition open items or regeneration items discovered during the development of the Design Information Summaries or during the verification and validation processes. These development activities will be governed and implemented by three procedures and a guide that are to be developed as an outgrowth of this plan

WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Washington TRU Solutions LLC

2000-02-25

This Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII,Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a). This work plan describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to NMED’s guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit. The scope of work for the RFI Work Plan or SAP is being developed by the Permittees. The final content of the RFI Work Plan or SAP will be coordinated with the NMED for submittal on May 24, 2000. Specific project-related planning information will be included in the RFI Work Plan or SAP. The SWMU program at WIPP began in 1994 under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority. NMED subsequently received regulatory authority from EPA

Radiotherapy facilities: Master planning and concept design considerations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-08-15

This publication provides guidelines on how to plan a radiotherapy facility in terms of the strategic master planning process including the legal, technical and infrastructure requirements. It outlines a risk assessment methodology, a typical project work plan and describes the professional expertise required for the implementation of such a project. Generic templates for a block design are suggested, which include possibilities for future expansion. These templates can be overlaid onto the designated site such that the most efficient workflow between the main functional areas can be ensured. A sample checklist is attached to act as a guideline for project management and to indicate the critical stages in the process where technical expert assistance may be needed. The publication is aimed at professionals and administrators involved in infrastructure development, planning and facility management, as well as engineers, building contractors and radiotherapy professionals.

Radiotherapy facilities: Master planning and concept design considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This publication provides guidelines on how to plan a radiotherapy facility in terms of the strategic master planning process including the legal, technical and infrastructure requirements. It outlines a risk assessment methodology, a typical project work plan and describes the professional expertise required for the implementation of such a project. Generic templates for a block design are suggested, which include possibilities for future expansion. These templates can be overlaid onto the designated site such that the most efficient workflow between the main functional areas can be ensured. A sample checklist is attached to act as a guideline for project management and to indicate the critical stages in the process where technical expert assistance may be needed. The publication is aimed at professionals and administrators involved in infrastructure development, planning and facility management, as well as engineers, building contractors and radiotherapy professionals

1994 Site Development Plan: A plan with vision

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1994-07-01

The 1994 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site Development Plan has been developed during a period of great change and uncertainty. Our goal is to make possible the best use of the Laboratory`s resources to meet shifting national priorities in the post-Cold War world. Site Planning is an important component of the overall Laboratory strategic planning process. This plan focuses on opportunities for the Laboratory as well as on key site development issues including facility construction, redevelopment and reuse, site accessibility, and security. A major challenge is to achieve sufficient stability in the site planning and execution so that the processes of construction can occur efficiently while at the same time providing sufficient flexibility in site facilities so that a range of changing national needs can be accommodated. We are closely coupled to the DOE strategic planning process to meet this challenge.

Using virtual reality in the training of security staff and evaluation of physical protection barriers in nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Augusto, Silas C.; Mol, Antonio C.A.; Mol, Pedro C.; Sales, Douglas S. [Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), RJ (Brazil)], e-mail: silas@ien.gov.br, e-mail: mol@ien.gov.br, e-mail: pedro98@gmail.com, e-mail: dsales@ien.gov.br

2009-07-01

The physical security of facilities containing radioactive objects, an already important matter, now has a new aggravating factor: the existence of groups intending to obtain radioactive materials for the purpose of intentionally induce radioactive contamination incidents, as for example the explosion of dirty bombs in populated regions, damaging both people and environment. In this context, the physical security of such facilities must be reinforced so to reduce the possibilities of such incidents. This paper presents a adapted game engine used as a virtual reality system, enabling the modeling and simulation of scenarios of nuclear facilities containing radioactive objects. In these scenarios, the physical protection barriers, as fences and walls, are simulated along with vigilance screens. Using a computer network, several users can participate simultaneously in the simulation, being represented by avatars. Users can play the roles of both invaders and security staff. The invaders have as objective to surpass the facility's physical protection barriers to steal radioactive objects and flee. The security staff have as objective to prevent and stop the theft of radioactive objects from the facility. The system can be used to analysis simulated scenarios and train vigilance/security staff. A test scenario was already developed and used, and the preliminary tests had satisfactory results, as they enabled the evaluation of the physical protection barriers of the virtual facility, and the training of those who participated in the simulations in the functions of a security staff. (author)

Using virtual reality in the training of security staff and evaluation of physical protection barriers in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Augusto, Silas C.; Mol, Antonio C.A.; Mol, Pedro C.; Sales, Douglas S.

2009-01-01

The physical security of facilities containing radioactive objects, an already important matter, now has a new aggravating factor: the existence of groups intending to obtain radioactive materials for the purpose of intentionally induce radioactive contamination incidents, as for example the explosion of dirty bombs in populated regions, damaging both people and environment. In this context, the physical security of such facilities must be reinforced so to reduce the possibilities of such incidents. This paper presents a adapted game engine used as a virtual reality system, enabling the modeling and simulation of scenarios of nuclear facilities containing radioactive objects. In these scenarios, the physical protection barriers, as fences and walls, are simulated along with vigilance screens. Using a computer network, several users can participate simultaneously in the simulation, being represented by avatars. Users can play the roles of both invaders and security staff. The invaders have as objective to surpass the facility's physical protection barriers to steal radioactive objects and flee. The security staff have as objective to prevent and stop the theft of radioactive objects from the facility. The system can be used to analysis simulated scenarios and train vigilance/security staff. A test scenario was already developed and used, and the preliminary tests had satisfactory results, as they enabled the evaluation of the physical protection barriers of the virtual facility, and the training of those who participated in the simulations in the functions of a security staff. (author)

Fast Flux Test Facility, Sodium Storage Facility project-specific project management plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shank, D.R.

1994-01-01

This Project-Specific Project Management Plan describes the project management methods and controls used by the WHC Projects Department to manage Project 03-F-031. The Sodium Storage Facility provides for storage of the 260,000 gallons of sodium presently in the FFTF Plant. The facility will accept the molten sodium transferred from the FFTF sodium systems, and store the sodium in a solid state under an inert cover gas until such time as a Sodium Reaction Facility is available for final disposal of the sodium

Fast Flux Test Facility, Sodium Storage Facility project-specific project management plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shank, D.R.

1994-12-29

This Project-Specific Project Management Plan describes the project management methods and controls used by the WHC Projects Department to manage Project 03-F-031. The Sodium Storage Facility provides for storage of the 260,000 gallons of sodium presently in the FFTF Plant. The facility will accept the molten sodium transferred from the FFTF sodium systems, and store the sodium in a solid state under an inert cover gas until such time as a Sodium Reaction Facility is available for final disposal of the sodium.

Planning, Management and Organizational Aspects of the Decommissioning of a Hot Cell Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Strufe, N. [Danish Decommissioning, Roskilde (Denmark)

2013-08-15

This CRP project document ''Planning, Management and Organizational Aspects in Decommissioning of a Hot Cell Facility'' aims to describe the establishment of a management organization that ensures that the DD Hot Cell Project is properly and safely conducted and that staff members, who are seconded to the project, have a strong feeling of ownership and being an integral part of the project. The objectives of the decommissioning project of the hot cell facility is to decontaminate the facility and to remove items that cannot be decontaminated on site, in order for the entire hot cell building to become useable for other purposes without any radiological restrictions. The project requires proper communication and coordination with all stakeholders on-site, comprehensive work plans and strict control of the individual working areas and operations. A project of this type obviously requires a strong and well managed and coordinated project organization. DD has established a management system - KMS. The purposes of the KMS are twofold. The system aims to secure the fulfilment of the conditions and requirements of quality set by the nuclear authorities. The system also aims to provide the basis for a rational and economically feasible operation with a high level of safety. One of the main lessons learned in this project is clear that is to ensure that the necessary resources are available and the required expertise is allocated timely for the performance of the project(s) a strong coordination and great flexibility within the DD organization is required. This document describes the approach and considerations from the project management point of view. The document initially gives an introduction to the hot cell decommissioning project followed by issues of the general considerations and planning of the project within the DD, including aspects on organisation, quality assurance and coordination. (author)

105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility decontamination, sampling, and analysis plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Knaus, Z.C.

1995-01-01

This is the decontamination, sampling, and analysis plan for the closure activities at the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility at Hanford Reservation. This document supports the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility Closure Plan, DOE-RL-90-25. The 105-DR LSFF, which operated from about 1972 to 1986, was a research laboratory that occupied the former ventilation supply room on the southwest side of the 105-DR Reactor facility in the 100-D Area of the Hanford Site. The LSFF was established to investigate fire fighting and safety associated with alkali metal fires in the liquid metal fast breeder reactor facilities. The decontamination, sampling, and analysis plan identifies the decontamination procedures, sampling locations, any special handling requirements, quality control samples, required chemical analysis, and data validation needed to meet the requirements of the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility Closure Plan in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

NIF conventional facilities construction health and safety plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, D W

1998-01-01

The purpose of this Plan is to outline the minimum health and safety requirements to which all participating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and non-LLNL employees (excluding National Ignition Facility [NIF] specific contractors and subcontractors covered under the construction subcontract packages (e.g., CSP-9)-see Construction Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility [CSP] Section I.B. ''NIF Construction Contractors and Subcontractors'' for specifics) shall adhere to for preventing job-related injuries and illnesses during Conventional Facilities construction activities at the NIF Project. For the purpose of this Plan, the term ''LLNL and non-LLNL employees'' includes LLNL employees, LLNL Plant Operations staff and their contractors, supplemental labor, contract labor, labor-only contractors, vendors, DOE representatives, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, and others such as visitors, students, consultants etc., performing on-site work or services in support of the NIF Project. Based upon an activity level determination explained in Section 1.2.18, in this document, these organizations or individuals may be required by site management to prepare their own NIF site-specific safety plan. LLNL employees will normally not be expected to prepare a site-specific safety plan. This Plan also outlines job-specific exposures and construction site safety activities with which LLNL and non-LLNL employees shall comply

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the 3720 Building

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shields, K.D.; Ballinger, M.Y.

1999-04-02

This Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan (FEMP) has been prepared for the Environmental Science Laboratory (3720 Facility) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to meet the requirements in DOE Order 5400.1, ''General Environmental Protection Programs'' This FEMP has been prepared for the 3720 Facility primarily because it has a major (potential to emit >0.1 mrem/yr) emission point for radionuclide air emissions according to the annual National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) assessment performed. This section summarizes the airborne and liquid effluents and the inventory based NESHAP assessment for the facility. The complete monitoring plan includes characterization of effluent streams, monitoring/sampling design criteria, a description of the monitoring systems and sample analysis, and quality assurance requirements. The 3720 Facility provides office and laboratory space for PNNL scientific and engineering staff conducting multidisciplinary research in the areas of materials characterization and testing and waste management. The facility is designed to accommodate the use of radioactive and hazardous materials to conduct these activities. Radioactive material storage and usage occur throughout the facility and include a large number of isotopes. This material is in several forms, including solid, liquid, and dispersible particulate. The facility is in the process of being vacated for shutdown, but is considered a Major Emission Point as of the date of this document approval.

Particular intervention plan of the Areva La Hague facility - 2012 edition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Particular intervention plan (PPI in French) is an emergency plan which foresees the measures and means to be implemented to address the potential risks of the presence and operation of a nuclear facility. This plan is implemented and developed by the Prefect in case of nuclear accident (or incident leading to a potential accident), the impact of which extending beyond the facility perimeter. It represents a special section of the organisation plan for civil protection response (ORSEC plan). The PPI foresees the necessary measures and means for crisis management during the first hours following the accident and is triggered by the Department Prefect according to the information provided by the facility operator. Its aim is to protect the populations leaving within 10 km of the facility against a potential radiological hazard. The PPI describes: the facility, the intervention area, the protection measures for the population, the conditions of emergency plan triggering, the crisis organisation, the action forms of the different services, and the post-accident stage. This document is the public version of the Particular intervention plan of the Areva NC La Hague fuel reprocessing plant (located on the territories of Beaumont-Hague, Digulleville, Herqueville, Jobourg and Omonville-la-Petite towns, Manche, France) which comprises the totally decommissioned UP2 400 unit, and the UP2 800 production unit still in operation

Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Farnham, Irene

2018-03-01

The purpose is to provide a comprehensive, integrated approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the needs and objectives of the DOE/EM Nevada Program’s UGTA Activity. Implementation of this Plan will provide high-quality data required by the UGTA Activity for ensuring public protection in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (NNSA/NFO, 2015); Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended); and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2013). The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements relevant to assessing both the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing and impact of testing on water quality in downgradient communities. This Plan identifies locations to be sampled by CAU and location type, sampling frequencies, sample collection methodologies, and the constituents to be analyzed. In addition, the Plan defines data collection criteria such as well purging, detection levels, and accuracy requirements/recommendations; identifies reporting and data management requirements; and provides a process to ensure coordination between NNSS groundwater sampling programs for sampling analytes of interest to UGTA. Information used in the Plan development—including the rationale for selection of wells, sampling frequency, and the analytical suite—is discussed under separate cover (N-I, 2014) and is not reproduced herein. This Plan does not address compliance for those wells involved in a permitted activity. Sampling and analysis requirements associated with these wells are described in their respective permits and are discussed in NNSS environmental reports (see Section 5.2). In addition, sampling for UGTA CAUs that are in the Closure Report (CR) stage are not included in this Plan. Sampling requirements for these CAUs are described in the CR

Plan for 3-D full-scale earthquake testing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohtani, K.

2001-01-01

Based on the lessons learnt from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention plan to construct the 3-D Full-Scale Earthquake Testing Facility. This will be the world's largest and strongest shaking table facility. This paper describes the outline of the project for this facility. This facility will be completed in early 2005. (author)

Construction plan of ion irradiation facility in JAERI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tanaka, Ryuichi

1987-01-01

The Takasaki Radiation Chemistry Research Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) started the construction of an ion irradiation facility to apply ion beam to the research and development of radiation resistant materials for severe environment, the research on biotechnology and new functional materials. This project was planned as ion beam irradiation becomes an effective means for the research on fundamental physics and advanced technology, and the national guideline recently emphasizes the basic and pioneering field in research and development. This facility comprises an AVF cyclotron with an ECR ion source (maximum proton energy: 90 MeV), a 3 MV tandem accelerator, a 3 MV single end type Van de Graaf accelerator and a 400 kV ion implanter. In this report, the present status of planning the accelerators and the facility to be constructed, the outline of research plan, the features of the accelerators, and the beam characteristics are described. In this project, the research items are divided into the materials for space environment, the materials for nuclear fusion reactors, biotechnology, new functional materials, and ion beam technology. The ion beams required for the facility are microbeam, pulsed beam, multiple beam, neutron beam and an expanded irradiation field. (Kako, I.)

Bechtel Hanford, Inc. Network Security Plan for the Environmental Restoration Contract

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Slade, B.E.

2000-01-01

This document was created to address ERC computer security needs that are outlined by DOE Order 1360.2B, Unclassified Computer Security Program. DOE Order 1360.2B has been canceled and replaced with DOE Notice 205.1, Unclassified Cyber Security Program. The ERC response to DOE Notice 205.1 is to generate BHI-01343, Cyber Security Program Plan, which is not available for public access or viewing

The emergency plan implementing procedures for HANARO facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Jong Tai; Khang, Byung Oui; Lee, Goan Yup; Lee, Moon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

1999-04-01

The radiological emergency plan implementing procedures of HANARO (High-flux Advanced Neutron Application Reactor) facility is prepared based on the Korea Atomic Law, the Civil Defence Law, Disaster Protection Law and the emergency related regulatory guides such as Guidance for Evolution of Radiation Emergency Plans in Nuclear Research Facilities (KAERI/TR-956/98, Feb.1998) and the emergency plan of HANARO. These procedures is also prepared to ensure adequate response activities to the rediological events which would cause a significant risk to the KAERI staffs and the public nea to the site. Periodic trainning and exercise for the reactor operators and emergency staffs will reduce accident risks and the release of radioactivities to the environment. 61 refs., 81 tabs. (Author)

Acceptance criteria for the evaluation of nuclear power reactor security plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-08-01

This guidance document contains acceptance criteria to be used in the NRC license review process. It contains specific criteria for use in evaluating the acceptability of nuclear power reactor security programs as detailed in security plans

Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? An analysis of possible synergies

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hedlund, Frank Huess

2012-01-01

The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member States. This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which exist...

Implementing an Information Security Program

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Glantz, Clifford S.; Lenaeus, Joseph D.; Landine, Guy P.; O' Neil, Lori Ross; Leitch, Rosalyn; Johnson, Christopher; Lewis, John G.; Rodger, Robert M.

2017-11-01

The threats to information security have dramatically increased with the proliferation of information systems and the internet. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNe) facilities need to address these threats in order to protect themselves from the loss of intellectual property, theft of valuable or hazardous materials, and sabotage. Project 19 of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is designed to help CBRN security managers, information technology/cybersecurity managers, and other decision-makers deal with these threats through the application of cost-effective information security programs. Project 19 has developed three guidance documents that are publically available to cover information security best practices, planning for an information security management system, and implementing security controls for information security.

A guide for developing an ADP security plan for Navy Finance Center, Cleveland, Ohio

OpenAIRE

Barber, Daniel E.; Hodnett, Elwood Thomas, Jr.

1982-01-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited This paper is intended to be used as a guide by personnel at the Navy Finance Center (NFC) Cleveland, Ohio in developing an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Security Plan. An effort has been made to combine the requirements for an ADP security plan established by OPNAVINST5239.1A with pertinent information from other selected readings. The importance of the devotion of personnel, time and funds to ADP security planning has been emphas...

303-K Radioactive Mixed-Waste Storage Facility closure plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-11-01

The Hanford Site, located northwest of Richland, Washington, houses reactors chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production o special nuclear materials. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. The 303-K Radioactive Mixed-Waste Storage Facility (303-K Facility) has been used since 1943 to store various radioactive,and dangerous process materials and wastes generated by the fuel manufacturing processes in the 300 Area. The mixed wastes are stored in US Department of Transportation (DOT)-specification containers (DOT 1988). The north end of the building was used for storage of containers of liquid waste and the outside storage areas were used for containers of solid waste. Because only the north end of the building was used, this plan does not include the southern end of the building. This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of materials and wastes managed, and a description of the procedures that will be followed to chose the 303-K Facility as a greater than 90-day storage facility. The strategy for closure of the 303-K Facility is presented in Chapter 6.0

33 CFR 103.505 - Elements of the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plan.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... port in case of security threats or breaches of security; (j) Procedures for periodic plan review... (CSO), Vessel Security Officers (VSO), public safety officers, emergency response personnel, and crisis management organization representatives within the port, including 24-hour contact details; (m) Measures to...

Facility Operations 1993 fiscal year work plan: WBS 1.3.1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1992-11-01

The Facility Operations program is responsible for the safe, secure, and environmentally sound management of several former defense nuclear production facilities, and for the nuclear materials in those facilities. As the mission for Facility Operations plants has shifted from production to support of environmental restoration, each plant is making a transition to support the new mission. The facilities include: K Basins (N Reactor fuel storage); N Reactor; Plutonium-Uranium Reduction Extraction (PUREX) Plant; Uranium Oxide (UO{sub 3}) Plant; 300 Area Fuels Supply (N Reactor fuel supply); Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP).

Facility Operations 1993 fiscal year work plan: WBS 1.3.1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-11-01

The Facility Operations program is responsible for the safe, secure, and environmentally sound management of several former defense nuclear production facilities, and for the nuclear materials in those facilities. As the mission for Facility Operations plants has shifted from production to support of environmental restoration, each plant is making a transition to support the new mission. The facilities include: K Basins (N Reactor fuel storage); N Reactor; Plutonium-Uranium Reduction Extraction (PUREX) Plant; Uranium Oxide (UO 3 ) Plant; 300 Area Fuels Supply (N Reactor fuel supply); Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the 284-E and 284-W power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nickels, J.M.; Herman, D.R.

1992-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during calendar year 1991 and the evaluation requires the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

Tools for an effective annual review of the Security Management Plan.

Science.gov (United States)

Daniel, Matthew

2014-01-01

A hospital's Security Management Plan, required by the Joint Commission, can also be used by security management professionals, the author points out, to ensure that they are continually monitoring and improving the program in a changing healthcare environment.

Planning the School Food Service Facilities. Revised 1967.

Science.gov (United States)

Utah State Board of Education, Salt Lake City.

Evaluations of food service equipment, kitchen design and food service facilities are comprehensively reviewed for those concerned with the planning and equipping of new school lunchrooms or the remodeling of existing facilities. Information is presented in the form of general guides adaptable to specific local situations and needs, and is…

User's guide for evaluating physical security capabilities of nuclear facilities by the EASI method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bennett, H.A.

1977-06-01

This handbook is a guide for evaluating physical security of nuclear facilities using the ''Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI)'' method and a hand-held programmable calculator. The handbook is intended for use by personnel at facilities where special nuclear materials are used, processed, or stored. It may also be used as a design aid for such facilities by potential licensees

Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan, Revision 0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Marutzky, Sam; Farnham, Irene

2014-10-01

The purpose of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Integrated Sampling Plan (referred to herein as the Plan) is to provide a comprehensive, integrated approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the needs and objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. Implementation of this Plan will provide high-quality data required by the UGTA Activity for ensuring public protection in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP). The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements relevant to assessing the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing. This Plan identifies locations to be sampled by corrective action unit (CAU) and location type, sampling frequencies, sample collection methodologies, and the constituents to be analyzed. In addition, the Plan defines data collection criteria such as well-purging requirements, detection levels, and accuracy requirements; identifies reporting and data management requirements; and provides a process to ensure coordination between NNSS groundwater sampling programs for sampling of interest to UGTA. This Plan does not address compliance with requirements for wells that supply the NNSS public water system or wells involved in a permitted activity.

State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) environmental checklist forms for 304 Concretion Facility Closure Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-11-01

The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 304 Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 304 Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Facility. The 304 Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5

Development of Facilities Master Plan and Laboratory Renovation Project

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fox, Andrea D

2011-10-03

Funding from this grant has allowed Morehouse School of Medicine to complete its first professionally developed, comprehensive campus master plan that is in alignment with the recently completed strategic plan. In addition to master planning activities, funds were used for programming and designing research renovations, and also to supplement other research facility upgrades by providing lighting and equipment. The activities funded by this grant will provide the catalyst for substantial improvement in the School's overall facilities for biomedical education and research, and will also provide much of the information needed to conduct a successful campaign to raise funds for proposed buildings and renovations.

Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Darby, John L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Horak, Karl Emanuel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaChance, Jeffrey L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Tolk, Keith Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whitehead, Donnie Wayne [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2007-10-01

The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

Decommissioning plan depleted uranium manufacturing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bernhardt, D.E.; Pittman, J.D.; Prewett, S.V.

1987-01-01

Aerojet Ordnance Tennessee, Inc. (Aerojet) is decommissioning its California depleted uranium (DU) manufacturing facility. Aerojet has conducted manufacturing and research and development activities at the facility since 1977 under a State of California Source Materials License. The decontamination is being performed by a contractor selector for technical competence through competitive bid. Since the facility will be released for uncontrolled use it will be decontaminated to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). In order to fully apply the principles of ALARA, and ensure the decontamination is in full compliance with appropriate guides, Aerojet has retained Rogers and Associaties Engineering Corporation (RAE) to assist in the decommissioning. RAE has assisted in characterizing the facility and preparing contract bid documents and technical specifications to obtain a qualified decontamination contractor. RAE will monitor the decontamination work effort to assure the contractor's performance complies with the contract specifications and the decontamination plan. The specifications require a thorough cleaning and decontamination of the facility, not just sufficient cleaning to meet the numeric cleanup criteria

Nuclear security standard: Argentina approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bonet Duran, Stella M.; Rodriguez, Carlos E.; Menossi, Sergio A.; Serdeiro, Nelida H.

2007-01-01

Argentina has a comprehensive regulatory system designed to assure the security and safety of radioactive sources, which has been in place for more than fifty years. In 1989 the Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety branch of the National Atomic Energy Commission created the 'Council of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Installations' (CAPFMIN). This Council published in 1992 a Physical Protection Standard based on a deep and careful analysis of INFCIRC 225/Rev.2 including topics like 'sabotage scenario'. Since then, the world's scenario has changed, and some concepts like 'design basis threat', 'detection, delay and response', 'performance approach and prescriptive approach', have been applied to the design of physical protection systems in facilities other than nuclear installations. In Argentina, radioactive sources are widely used in medical and industrial applications with more than 1,600 facilities controlled by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (in spanish ARN). During 2005, measures like 'access control', 'timely detection of intruder', 'background checks', and 'security plan', were required by ARN for implementation in facilities with radioactive sources. To 'close the cycle' the next step is to produce a regulatory standard based on the operational experience acquired during 2005. ARN has developed a set of criteria for including them in a new standard on security of radioactive materials. Besides, a specific Regulatory Guide is being prepared to help licensees of facilities in design a security system and to fulfill the 'Design of Security System Questionnaire'. The present paper describes the proposed Standard on Security of Radioactive Sources and the draft of the Nuclear Security Regulatory Guidance, based on our regulatory experience and the latest international recommendations. (author)

200 area liquid effluent facility quality assurance program plan. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, N.J.

1995-01-01

Direct revision of Supporting Document WHC-SD-LEF-QAPP-001, Rev. 0. 200 Area Liquid Effluent Facilities Quality Assurance Program Plan. Incorporates changes to references in tables. Revises test to incorporate WHC-SD-LEF-CSCM-001, Computer Software Configuration Management Plan for 200 East/West Liquid Effluent Facilities

Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hammond, G.A.

1987-01-01

The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

190-C Facility <90 Day Storage Pad training plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Little, N.C.

1996-12-01

This is the Environmental Restoration Contractor (ERC) team training plan for the 190-C Facility <90 Day Storage Pad of Hazardous Waste. It is intended to meet the requirements of Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-330 and the Hanford Dangerous Waste Permit. Training unrelated to compliance with WAC 173-303-330 is not addressed in this training plan. WAC 173-303-330(1)(d)(ii, v, vi) requires that personnel be familiarized, where applicable, with waste feed cut-off systems, response to ground-water contamination incidents, and shutdown of operations. These are not applicable to 190-C Facility <90 Day Storage Pad, and are therefore not covered in this training plan

Double-shell tank waste transfer facilities integrity assessment plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hundal, T.S.

1998-01-01

This document presents the integrity assessment plan for the existing double-shell tank waste transfer facilities system in the 200 East and 200 West Areas of Hanford Site. This plan identifies and proposes the integrity assessment elements and techniques to be performed for each facility. The integrity assessments of existing tank systems that stores or treats dangerous waste is required to be performed to be in compliance with the Washington State Department of Ecology Dangerous Waste Regulations, Washington Administrative Code WAC-173-303-640 requirements

Security breaches: tips for assessing and limiting your risks.

Science.gov (United States)

Coons, Leeanne R

2011-01-01

As part of their compliance planning, medical practices should undergo a risk assessment to determine any vulnerability within the practice relative to security breaches. Practices should also implement safeguards to limit their risks. Such safeguards include facility access controls, information and electronic media management, use of business associate agreements, and education and enforcement. Implementation of specific policies and procedures to address security incidents is another critical step that medical practices should take as part of their security incident prevention plan. Medical practices should not only develop policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations, but should make sure that such policies and procedures are actually implemented in their everyday operations.

Emergency preparedness and response plan for nuclear facilities in Indonesia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nur Rahmah Hidayati; Pande Made Udiyani

2009-01-01

All nuclear facilities in Indonesia are owned and operated by the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN). The programs and activities of emergency planning and preparedness in Indonesia are based on the existing nuclear facilities, i.e. research reactors, research reactor fuel fabrication plant, radioactive waste treatment installation and radioisotopes production installation. The assessment is conducted to learn of status of emergency preparedness and response plan for nuclear facilities in Indonesia and to support the preparation of future Nuclear Power Plant. The assessment is conducted by comparing the emergency preparedness and response system in Indonesia to the system in other countries such as Japan and Republic of Korea, since the countries have many Nuclear Power Plants and other nuclear facilities. As a result, emergency preparedness response plan for existing nuclear facility in Indonesia has been implemented in many activities such as environmental monitoring program, facility monitoring equipment, and the continuous exercise of emergency preparedness and response. However, the implementation need law enforcement for imposing the responsibility of the coordinators in National Emergency Preparedness Plan. It also needs some additional technical support systems which refer to the system in Japan or Republic of Korea. The systems must be completed with some real time monitors which will support the emergency preparedness and response organization. The system should be built in NPP site before the first NPP will be operated. The system should be connected to an Off Site Emergency Center under coordination of BAPETEN as the regulatory body which has responsibility to control of nuclear energy in Indonesia. (Author)

200 Area Liquid Effluent Facilities -- Quality assurance program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fernandez, L.

1995-01-01

This Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) describes the quality assurance and management controls used by the 200 Area Liquid Effluent Facilities (LEF) to perform its activities in accordance with DOE Order 5700.6C. The 200 Area LEF consists of the following facilities: Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF); Treated Effluent Disposal Facility (TEDF); Liquid Effluent Retention facility (LERF); and Truck Loading Facility -- (Project W291). The intent is to ensure that all activities such as collection of effluents, treatment, concentration of secondary wastes, verification, sampling and disposal of treated effluents and solids related with the LEF operations, conform to established requirements

Compliance with federal and state regulations regarding the emergency response plan and physical security plan at the Oregon State TRIGA reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, A.G.; Ringle, J.C.; Anderson, T.V.

1976-01-01

Recent legislative actions within the State of Oregon have had a significant impact upon the OSU TRIGA Emergency Response Plan, and to a lesser extent upon the Physical Security Plan. These state imposed changes will be reviewed in light of existing federal requirements. With the upcoming acquisition of FLIP fuel in August 1976, NRC required several major changes to the existing Physical Security Plan. Within the limitations of public disclosure, these changes will be contrasted to the present plan. (author)

Energy secretary Spencer Abraham announces department of energy 20-year science facility plan

CERN Multimedia

2003-01-01

"In a speech at the National Press Club today, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham outlined the Department of Energy's Office of Science 20-year science facility plan, a roadmap for future scientific facilities to support the department's basic science and research missions. The plan prioritizes new, major scientific facilities and upgrades to current facilities" (1 page).

Plan for radiological security at a university health center

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huiaman Mendoza, G.M.; Sanchez Riojas, M.M.; Felix JImenez, D.

1998-01-01

This work shows a radiological security plan applied to a Basic Radiological Service at a university health center. Factors taken into account were installation designs, equipment operation parameters, work procedures, image system and responsibilities

9 CFR 93.412 - Ruminant quarantine facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... quarantined, as well as the expected size and frequency of shipments, and a contingency plan for the possible... provide a full view of the lot-holding areas. (H) Communication system. The medium security facility must...

3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility Closure Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-12-01

Since 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company has been a major contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office and has served as co-operator of the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility, the waste management unit addressed in this closure plan. The closure plan consists of a Part A Dangerous waste Permit Application and a RCRA Closure Plan. An explanation of the Part A Revision (Revision 1) submitted with this document is provided at the beginning of the Part A section. The closure plan consists of 9 chapters and 5 appendices. The chapters cover: introduction; facility description; process information; waste characteristics; groundwater; closure strategy and performance standards; closure activities; postclosure; and references

3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility Closure Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1991-12-01

Since 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company has been a major contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office and has served as co-operator of the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility, the waste management unit addressed in this closure plan. The closure plan consists of a Part A Dangerous waste Permit Application and a RCRA Closure Plan. An explanation of the Part A Revision (Revision 1) submitted with this document is provided at the beginning of the Part A section. The closure plan consists of 9 chapters and 5 appendices. The chapters cover: introduction; facility description; process information; waste characteristics; groundwater; closure strategy and performance standards; closure activities; postclosure; and references.

Federal Facilities Compliance Act, Draft Site Treatment Plan: Compliance Plan Volume. Part 2, Volume 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This document presents the details of the implementation of the Site Treatment Plan developed by Ames Laboratory in compliance with the Federal Facilities Compliance Act. Topics discussed in this document include: implementation of the plan; milestones; annual updates to the plan; inclusion of new waste streams; modifications of the plan; funding considerations; low-level mixed waste treatment plan and schedules; and TRU mixed waste streams

LASL experimental engineered waste burial facility: design considerations and preliminary plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DePoorter, G.L.

1980-01-01

The LASL Experimental Engineered Waste Burial Facility is a part of the National Low-Level Waste Management Program on Shallow-Land Burial Technology. It is a test facility where basic information can be obtained on the processes that occur in shallow-land burial operations and where new concepts for shallow-land burial can be tested on an accelerated basis on an appropriate scale. The purpose of this paper is to present some of the factors considered in the design of the facility and to present a preliminary description of the experiments that are initially planned. This will be done by discussing waste management philosophies, the purposes of the facility in the context of the waste management philosophy for the facility, and the design considerations, and by describing the experiments initially planned for inclusion in the facility, and the facility site

76 FR 45645 - 10-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Technology Security/Clearance Plans, Screening...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-07-29

...: Technology Security/Clearance Plans, Screening Records, and Non-Disclosure Agreements ACTION: Notice of... Information Collection: Technology Security/ Clearance Plans, Screening Records, and Non-Disclosure Agreements...: None. Respondents: Business and Nonprofit Organizations, Foreign Governments. Estimated Number of...

New fire and security rules change USA nuclear power plant emergency plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garrou, A.L.

1978-01-01

New safety and security rules for nuclear power plants have resulted from the Energy Reorganisation Act and also from a review following the Browns Ferry fire. The content of the emergency plan which covers personnel, plant, site, as well as a general emergency, is outlined. New fire protection rules, the plan for security, local and state government assistance are also discussed, with a brief reference to the impact of the new rules on continuity of operations. (author)

National Ignition Facility Configuration Management Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cabral, S G; Moore, T L

2002-01-01

This Configuration Management Plan (CMP) describes the technical and administrative management process for controlling the National Ignition Facility (NIF) Project configuration. The complexity of the NIF Project (i.e., participation by multiple national laboratories and subcontractors involved in the development, fabrication, installation, and testing of NIF hardware and software, as well as construction and testing of Project facilities) requires implementation of the comprehensive configuration management program defined in this plan. A logical schematic illustrating how the plan functions is provided in Figure 1. A summary of the process is provided in Section 4.0, Configuration Change Control. Detailed procedures that make up the overall process are referenced. This CMP is consistent with guidance for managing a project's configuration provided in Department of Energy (DOE) Order 430.1, Guide PMG 10, ''Project Execution and Engineering Management Planning''. Configuration management is a formal discipline comprised of the following four elements: (1) Identification--defines the functional and physical characteristics of a Project and uniquely identifies the defining requirements. This includes selection of components of the end product(s) subject to control and selection of the documents that define the project and components. (2) Change management--provides a systematic method for managing changes to the project and its physical and functional configuration to ensure that all changes are properly identified, assessed, reviewed, approved, implemented, tested, and documented. (3) Data management--ensures that necessary information on the project and its end product(s) is systematically recorded and disseminated for decision-making and other uses. Identifies, stores and controls, tracks status, retrieves, and distributes documents. (4) Assessments and validation--ensures that the planned configuration requirements match actual physical configurations and

Nuclear material facilities - security systems and technology R and D trends

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ellis, D.; Steele, B.

2002-01-01

Full text: In the US, physical security research and development (R and D) during the 1970s and 1980s created a body of technology and systems engineering that largely defined the industry for several decades. However, despite today's terrorists threats and risks, the overall funding of new and innovative physical security solutions is relatively very small. Such factors constraining physical security R and D include the expansion of overall security responsibilities, the emphasis on programmatic and business performance, in addition to evolving (mis)perceptions that 'the problem has been solved' or that 'anyone can do security'. Underlying these factors, the lack of robust standards and certifications has limited the development and application of physical security products, systems, and services. The research and development of new security technologies must be evaluated against very demanding constraints - including costs/benefits, emerging threats, and policies. Going forward, the goal will be to create a more comprehensive approach to physical security of nuclear material facilities that matches evolving threats and that will complement the transition to an integrated security/operations management environment. Such a management model evaluates the additional value of increasing security alternatives in addition to determining trade-offs between the programmatic mission and security issues. Correspondingly, more explicit and strategically useful measures must be developed to determine importance that, in turn, will influence security-related R and D efforts. The research and development of security technologies should be based upon identified needs and requirements resulting from a systematic analysis of the threat and other conditions. In particular, security technologies and systems must be evaluated in terms of current and long-term impacts. Such needs are (will be) diverse and will depend upon sustained research investments in a broad range of technologies

IAEA Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) Project for Regulated Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jang, Sung Soon

2016-01-01

Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) is a coordinate research project. The objectives of the NUSAM project is to establish a risk informed, performance-based methodological framework in a systematic, structured, comprehensive and appropriately transparent manner; to provide an environment for the sharing and transfer of knowledge and experience; and to provide guidance on, and practical examples of good practices in assessing the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials, as well as associated facilities and activities. The author worked as an IAEA scientific secretary of the NUAM project from 2013 to 2015. IAEA launched this project in 2013 and performed many activities: meetings, document development, table-top exercises and computer simulations. Now the project is in the final stage and will be concluded in the late 2016. The project will produce documents on NUSAM assessment methods and case study documents on NPP, Irradiator Facility and Transport. South Korea as a main contributor to this project will get benefits from the NUSAM. In 2014, South Korea introduced force-on-force exercises, which could be used as the assessment of physical protection system by the methods of NUSAM

IAEA Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) Project for Regulated Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jang, Sung Soon [Korea Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) is a coordinate research project. The objectives of the NUSAM project is to establish a risk informed, performance-based methodological framework in a systematic, structured, comprehensive and appropriately transparent manner; to provide an environment for the sharing and transfer of knowledge and experience; and to provide guidance on, and practical examples of good practices in assessing the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials, as well as associated facilities and activities. The author worked as an IAEA scientific secretary of the NUAM project from 2013 to 2015. IAEA launched this project in 2013 and performed many activities: meetings, document development, table-top exercises and computer simulations. Now the project is in the final stage and will be concluded in the late 2016. The project will produce documents on NUSAM assessment methods and case study documents on NPP, Irradiator Facility and Transport. South Korea as a main contributor to this project will get benefits from the NUSAM. In 2014, South Korea introduced force-on-force exercises, which could be used as the assessment of physical protection system by the methods of NUSAM.

The IAEA Assistance Training Programme for Transport Security

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Eriksson, Ann-Margret [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Rawl, Richard R [ORNL; Hawk, Mark B [ORNL; Anderson, Kimberly K [ORNL

2010-01-01

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

Implementation of safeguards and security for fissile materials disposition reactor alternative facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

1995-01-01

A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material

Hospital security and patient elopement: protecting patients and your healthcare facility.

Science.gov (United States)

Smith, Thomas A

2012-01-01

Regulatory and financial consequences of adverse events associated with patient elopements are bringing new challenges to healthcare security to develop policies and procedures to prevent and respond to such incidents. This article provides an overview of the problem of elopement in healthcare and what it means to the security function; gives a working knowledge of healthcare related standards and guidelines aimed at reducing patient elopement; and reviews the elements of an elopement prevention and response plan for your organization.

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HUNACEK, G.S.

2000-01-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document was prepared using the specific guidelines identified in Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC)-EP-0438-1, ''A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans'', and assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the third revision to the original annual report. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it is updated as necessary

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP); FINAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

FRAZIER, T.P.

1999-01-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

Grout Facilities standby plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Claghorn, R.D.; Kison, P.F.; Nunamaker, D.R.; Yoakum, A.K.

1994-09-29

This plan defines how the Grout Facilities will be deactivated to meet the intent of the recently renegotiated Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). The TPA calls for the use of the grout process as an emergency option only in the event that tank space is not available to resolve tank safety issues. The availability of new tanks is expected by 1997. Since a grout startup effort would take an estimated two years, a complete termination of the Grout Disposal Program is expected in December 1995. The former Tank Waste Remediation (TWRS) Strategy, adopted in 1988, called for the contents of Hanford`s 28 newer double-shell waste tanks to be separated into high-level radioactive material to be vitrified and disposed of in a geologic repository; low-level wastes were to be sent to the Grout Facility to be made into a cement-like-mixture and poured into underground vaults at Hanford for disposal. The waste in the 149 older single-shell tanks (SST) were to undergo further study and analysis before a disposal decision was made.

Grout Facilities standby plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Claghorn, R.D.; Kison, P.F.; Nunamaker, D.R.; Yoakum, A.K.

1994-01-01

This plan defines how the Grout Facilities will be deactivated to meet the intent of the recently renegotiated Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). The TPA calls for the use of the grout process as an emergency option only in the event that tank space is not available to resolve tank safety issues. The availability of new tanks is expected by 1997. Since a grout startup effort would take an estimated two years, a complete termination of the Grout Disposal Program is expected in December 1995. The former Tank Waste Remediation (TWRS) Strategy, adopted in 1988, called for the contents of Hanford's 28 newer double-shell waste tanks to be separated into high-level radioactive material to be vitrified and disposed of in a geologic repository; low-level wastes were to be sent to the Grout Facility to be made into a cement-like-mixture and poured into underground vaults at Hanford for disposal. The waste in the 149 older single-shell tanks (SST) were to undergo further study and analysis before a disposal decision was made

Certification plan transuranic waste: Hazardous Waste Handling Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-06-01

The purpose of this plan is to describe the organization and methodology for the certification of transuranic (TRU) waste handled in the Hazardous Waste Handling Facility at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL). The plan incorporates the applicable elements of waste reduction, which include both up-front minimization and end-product treatment to reduce the volume and toxicity of the waste; segregation of the waste as it applies to certification; an executive summary of the Quality Assurance Implementing Management Plan (QAIMP) for the HWBF; and a list of the current and planned implementing procedures used in waste certification

Project summary plan for HTGR recycle reference facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baxter, B.J.

1979-11-01

A summary plan is introduced for completing conceptual definition of an HTGR Recycle Reference Facility (HRRF). The plan describes a generic project management concept, often referred to as the requirements approach to systems engineering. The plan begins with reference flow sheets and provides for the progressive evolution of HRRF requirements and definition through feasibility, preconceptual, and conceptual phases. The plan lays end-to-end all the important activities and elements to be treated during each phase of design. Identified activities and elements are further supported by technical guideline documents, which describe methodology, needed terminology, and where relevant a worked example

National Ignition Facility Site Management Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roberts, V.

1997-01-01

The purpose of the NIF Site Management Plan is to describe the roles, responsibilities, and interfaces for the major NIF Project organizations involved in construction of the facility, installation and acceptance testing of special equipment, and the NIF activation. The plan also describes the resolution of priorities and conflicts. The period covered is from Critical Decision 3 (CD3) through the completion of the Project. The plan is to be applied in a stepped manner. The steps are dependent on different elements of the project being passed from the Conventional Facilities (CF) Construction Manager (CM), to the Special Equipment (SE) CMs, and finally to the Activation/ Start-Up (AS) CM. These steps are defined as follows: The site will be coordinated by CF through Project Milestone 310, end of conventional construction. The site is defined as the fenced area surrounding the facility and the CF laydown and storage areas. The building utilities that are installed by CF will be coordinated by CF through the completion of Project Milestone 310, end of conventional construction. The building utilities are defined as electricity, compressed air, de-ionized water, etc. Upon completion of the CF work, the Optics Assembly Building/Laser and Target Area Building (OAB/LTAB) will be fully operational. At that time, an Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program building coordinator will become responsible for utilities and site activities. * Step 1. Mid-commissioning (temperature stable, +1 degree C) of an area (e.g., Laser Bay 2, OAB) will precipitate the turnover of that area (within the four walls) from CF to SE. * Step 2. Interior to the turned-over space, SE will manage all interactions, including those necessary by CF. * Step 3. As the SE acceptance testing procedures (ATPS) are completed, AS will take over the management of the area and coordinate all interactions necessary by CF and SE. For each step, the corresponding CMs for CF, SE, or AS will be placed in charge of

National Ignition Facility Site Management Plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Roberts, V.

1997-09-01

The purpose of the NIF Site Management Plan is to describe the roles, responsibilities, and interfaces for the major NIF Project organizations involved in construction of the facility, installation and acceptance testing of special equipment, and the NIF activation. The plan also describes the resolution of priorities and conflicts. The period covered is from Critical Decision 3 (CD3) through the completion of the Project. The plan is to be applied in a stepped manner. The steps are dependent on different elements of the project being passed from the Conventional Facilities (CF) Construction Manager (CM), to the Special Equipment (SE) CMs, and finally to the Activation/ Start-Up (AS) CM. These steps are defined as follows: The site will be coordinated by CF through Project Milestone 310, end of conventional construction. The site is defined as the fenced area surrounding the facility and the CF laydown and storage areas. The building utilities that are installed by CF will be coordinated by CF through the completion of Project Milestone 310, end of conventional construction. The building utilities are defined as electricity, compressed air, de-ionized water, etc. Upon completion of the CF work, the Optics Assembly Building/Laser and Target Area Building (OAB/LTAB) will be fully operational. At that time, an Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program building coordinator will become responsible for utilities and site activities. * Step 1. Mid-commissioning (temperature stable, +1{degree}C) of an area (e.g., Laser Bay 2, OAB) will precipitate the turnover of that area (within the four walls) from CF to SE. * Step 2. Interior to the turned-over space, SE will manage all interactions, including those necessary by CF. * Step 3. As the SE acceptance testing procedures (ATPS) are completed, AS will take over the management of the area and coordinate all interactions necessary by CF and SE. For each step, the corresponding CMs for CF, SE, or AS will be placed in charge of

29 CFR 2509.75-3 - Interpretive bulletin relating to investments by employee benefit plans in securities of...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... Interpretive bulletin relating to investments by employee benefit plans in securities of registered investment.... That section provides that an investment by an employee benefit plan in securities issued by an...

Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, R.M.; Wuschke, D.; Baumgartner, P.

1994-09-01

Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices

Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Smith, R M; Wuschke, D; Baumgartner, P

1994-09-01

Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices.

ORNL Surplus Facilities Management Program maintenance and surveillance plan for fiscal year 1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coobs, J.H.; Myrick, T.E.

1986-10-01

The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. The purpose and objectives of the national program are set forth in the current SFMP Program Plan and include (1) the maintenance and surveillance of facilities awaiting decommissioning, (2) planning for the orderly decommissioning of these facilities, and (3) implementation of a program to accomplish the facility disposition in a safe, cost-effective, and timely manner. As outlined in the national program plan, participating SFMP contractors are required to prepare a formal plan that documents the maintenance and surveillance (M and S) programs established for each site. This report has been prepared to provide this documentation for those facilties included in the ORNL SFMP

Major issues on establishing an emergency plan in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen, Zhu-zhou

1988-03-01

Several major issues on emergency planning and preparation in nuclear facilities were discussed -- such as the importance of emergency planning and preparation, basic principles of intervention and implementation of emergency plan and emergency training and drills to insure the effectiveness of the emergency plan. It is emphasized that the major key point of emergency planning and response is to avoid the occurrence of serious nonrandom effect. 12 refs., 3 tabs

Smart facility location planning for Smart Cities: using GIS technology and facility provision standards for pro-active planning of social facilities to support smart growth

CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

Green, Chéri

2016-08-01

Full Text Available step toward “smart” planning processes to support smart cities of the future. A case study application in Cape Town is used to illustrate the application of the methodology of spatially matching supply and demand for facilities using GIS tools...

Closure Plan for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cook, J.R.

2000-10-30

A closure plan has been developed to comply with the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy Order 435.2 Manual and Guidance. The plan is organized according to the specifications of the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans.

Closure Plan for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cook, J.R.

2000-01-01

A closure plan has been developed to comply with the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy Order 435.2 Manual and Guidance. The plan is organized according to the specifications of the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans

The IAEA Assistance and Training Programme for Transport Security

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hawk, Mark B [ORNL; Eriksson, Ann-Margret [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Rawl, Richard [Transport Security and Safety, Oak Ridge; Anderson, Kimberly K [ORNL

2010-01-01

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

Planning for off-site response to radiation accidents in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

The purpose of this publication is to give guidance to those who are responsible for the protection of the public in the event of an accident occurring at a land-based nuclear facility. This guidance should assist in the advance preparation of emergency response plans and implementing procedures. Basic principles of protective measures along with their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Other principles related to emergency planning and the operational response to an emergency are outlined. Although the guidance is primarily oriented towards land-based nuclear power facilities, the guidance does have general application to other types of nuclear facility

Planning for off-site response to radiation accidents in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

The purpose of this manual is to give guidance to those who are responsible for the protection of the public in the event of an accident occurring at a land-based nuclear facility. This guidance should assist in the advance preparation of emergency response plans and implementing procedures. Basic principles of protective measures along with their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Other principles related to emergency planning and the operational response to an emergency are outlined. Although the guidance is primarily oriented toward land-based nuclear power facilities, the guidance does have general application to other types of nuclear facilities

Security's role in morgue operations: needed--a foolproof plan.

Science.gov (United States)

White, John M

2012-01-01

If handling the remains of dead patients is a responsibility of your security department, or you are being pressured to take on the role because of budget cuts, the need to anticipate and plan for complications which may arise is critical, the author points out.

Straighttalk. The ideal master facility plan begins with business strategy and integrates operational improvement.

Science.gov (United States)

Powder, Scott; Brown, Richard E; Haupert, John M; Smith, Ryder

2007-04-02

Given the scarcity of capital to meet ever-growing demands for healthcare services, master facility planning has become more important than ever. Executives must align their master facility plans with their overall business strategy, incorporating the best in care- and service-delivery models. In this installment of Straight Talk, executives from two health systems--Advocate Health Care in Oak Brook, Ill. and Parkland Health & Hospital System in Dallas--discuss master facility planning. Modern Healthcare and PricewaterhouseCoopers present Straight Talk. The session on master facility planning was held on March 8, 2007 at Modern Healthcare's Chicago Headquarters. Charles Lauer, former vice president of publishing and editorial director at Modern Healthcare, was the moderator.

Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Balance-of-Plant Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ballinger, Marcel Y.; Gervais, Todd L.

2004-11-15

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) operates a number of Research & Development (R&D) facilities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on the Hanford Site. Facility effluent monitoring plans (FEMPs) have been developed to document the facility effluent monitoring portion of the Environmental Monitoring Plan (DOE 2000) for the Hanford Site. Three of PNNL’s R&D facilities, the 325, 331, and 3720 Buildings, are considered major emission points for radionuclide air sampling, and individual FEMPs were developed for these facilities in the past. In addition, a balance-of-plant (BOP) FEMP was developed for all other DOE-owned, PNNL-operated facilities at the Hanford Site. Recent changes, including shutdown of buildings and transition of PNNL facilities to the Office of Science, have resulted in retiring the 3720 FEMP and combining the 331 FEMP into the BOP FEMP. This version of the BOP FEMP addresses all DOE-owned, PNNL-operated facilities at the Hanford Site, excepting the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory, which has its own FEMP because of the unique nature of the building and operations. Activities in the BOP facilities range from administrative to laboratory and pilot-scale R&D. R&D activities include both radioactive and chemical waste characterization, fluid dynamics research, mechanical property testing, dosimetry research, and molecular sciences. The mission and activities for individual buildings are described in Appendix A. Potential radioactive airborne emissions in the BOP facilities are estimated annually using a building inventory-based approach provided in federal regulations. Sampling at individual BOP facilities is based on a potential-to-emit assessment. Some of these facilities are considered minor emission points and thus are sampled routinely, but not continuously, to confirm the low emission potential. One facility, the 331 Life Sciences Laboratory, has a major emission point and is sampled continuously. Sampling systems are

State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) environmental checklist forms for 304 Concretion Facility Closure Plan. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1993-11-01

The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 304 Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 304 Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Facility. The 304 Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5.

Analysis of impact of noncompliance with physical-security requirements at nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Green, J.N.

1982-03-01

Inspectors are required to analyze the impact of instances of noncompliance with physical security requirements at licensed nuclear facilities. A scoring procedure for components and a method for evaluating the effectiveness of the subsystems involved are proposed to reinforce an inspector's judgment about the remaining level of safeguards

Environmental Monitoring Plan, Nevada Test Site and support facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-11-01

This Operational Area Monitoring Plan for environmental monitoring, is for EG ampersand G Energy Measurements, Inc. (EG ampersand G/EM) which operates several offsite facilities in support of activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). These facilities include: (1) Amador Valley Operations (AVO), Pleasanton, California; (2) Kirtland Operations (KO), Kirtland Air Force base, Albuquerque, New Mexico (KAFB); (3) Las Vegas Area Operations (LVAO), Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL), and North Las Vegas (NLV) Complex at Nellis Air Force Base (NAFB), North Las Vegas, Nevada; (4) Los Alamos Operations (LAO), Los Alamos, New Mexico; (5) Santa Barbara Operations (SBO), Goleta, California; (6) Special Technologies Laboratory (STL), Santa Barbara, California; (7) Washington Aerial Measurements Department (WAMD), Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; and, (8) Woburn Cathode Ray Tube Operations (WCO), Woburn, Massachusetts. Each of these facilities has an individual Operational Area Monitoring Plan, but they have been consolidated herein to reduce redundancy

Radiotherapy Facilities: Master Planning and Concept Design Considerations (Russian Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This publication provides guidelines on how to plan a radiotherapy facility in terms of the strategic master planning process including the legal, technical and infrastructure requirements. It outlines a risk assessment methodology and a typical project work plan, and describes the professional expertise required for the implementation of such a project. Generic templates for a block design are suggested, which include possibilities for future expansion. These templates can be overlaid onto the designated site such that the most efficient workflow between the main functional areas can be ensured. A sample checklist is attached to act as a guideline for project management and to indicate the critical stages in the process where technical expert assistance may be needed. The publication is aimed at professionals and administrators involved in infrastructure development, planning and facility management, as well as engineers, building contractors and radiotherapy professionals

The public transportation system security and emergency preparedness planning guide

Science.gov (United States)

2003-01-01

Recent events have focused renewed attention on the vulnerability of the nation's critical infrastructure to major events, including terrorism. The Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide has been prepared to s...

Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility mitigation action plan. Annual report for 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haagenstad, T.

1999-01-01

This Mitigation Action Plan Annual Report (MAPAR) has been prepared as part of implementing the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) Mitigation Action Plan (MAP) to protect workers, soils, water, and biotic and cultural resources in and around the facility

Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility mitigation action plan. Annual report for 1998

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haagenstad, T.

1999-01-15

This Mitigation Action Plan Annual Report (MAPAR) has been prepared as part of implementing the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) Mitigation Action Plan (MAP) to protect workers, soils, water, and biotic and cultural resources in and around the facility.

2727-S Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Storage Facility Closure Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilczek, T.A.; Laws, J.R.; Izatt, R.D.

1992-01-01

This closure plan describes the activities for final closure of the 2727-S Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Storage (NRDWS) Facility at the Hanford Site. The 2727-S NRDWS Facility provided container storage for nonradioactive dangerous and extremely hazardous wastes generated in the research and development laboratories, process operations, and maintenance and transportation functions throughout the Hanford Site. Storage operations began at the 2727-S NRDWS Facility March 14, 1983, and continued until December 30, 1986, when the last shipment of materials from the facility took place. These storage operations have been moved to the new 616 NRDWS Facility, which is an interim status unit located between the 200 East and 200 West Areas of the Hanford Site

Long-term optimal energy mix planning towards high energy security and low GHG emission

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thangavelu, Sundar Raj; Khambadkone, Ashwin M.; Karimi, Iftekhar A.

2015-01-01

Highlights: • We develop long-term energy planning considering the future uncertain inputs. • We analyze the effect of uncertain inputs on the energy cost and energy security. • Conventional energy mix prone to cause high energy cost and energy security issues. • Stochastic and optimal energy mix show benefits over conventional energy planning. • Nuclear option consideration reduces the energy cost and carbon emissions. - Abstract: Conventional energy planning focused on energy cost, GHG emission and renewable contribution based on future energy demand, fuel price, etc. Uncertainty in the projected variables such as energy demand, volatile fuel price and evolution of renewable technologies will influence the cost of energy when projected over a period of 15–30 years. Inaccurate projected variables could affect energy security and lead to the risk of high energy cost, high emission and low energy security. The energy security is an ability of generation capacity to meet the future energy demand. In order to minimize the risks, a generic methodology is presented to determine an optimal energy mix for a period of around 15 years. The proposed optimal energy mix is a right combination of energy sources that minimize the risk caused due to future uncertainties related to the energy sources. The proposed methodology uses stochastic optimization to address future uncertainties over a planning horizon and minimize the variations in the desired performance criteria such as energy security and costs. The developed methodology is validated using a case study for a South East Asian region with diverse fuel sources consists of wind, solar, geothermal, coal, biomass and natural gas, etc. The derived optimal energy mix decision outperformed the conventional energy planning by remaining stable and feasible against 79% of future energy demand scenarios at the expense of 0–10% increase in the energy cost. Including the nuclear option in the energy mix resulted 26

Hanford Facility Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit General Inspection Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beagles, D.S.

1995-02-01

This inspection plan describes the activities that shall be conducted for a general inspection of the Hanford Facility. RCRA includes a requirement that general facility inspections be conducted of the 100, 200 East, 200 West, 300, 400, and 1100 areas and the banks of the Columbia River. This plan meets the RCRA requirements and also provides for scheduling of inspections and defines general and specific items to be noted during the inspections

Fast Flux Test Facility project plan. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hulvey, R.K.

1995-11-01

The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Transition Project Plan, Revision 2, provides changes to the major elements and project baseline for the deactivation activities necessary to transition the FFTF to a radiologically and industrially safe shutdown condition.

Fast Flux Test Facility project plan. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hulvey, R.K.

1995-11-01

The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Transition Project Plan, Revision 2, provides changes to the major elements and project baseline for the deactivation activities necessary to transition the FFTF to a radiologically and industrially safe shutdown condition

Environmental Control Plan for the Industrial Hygiene Field Services Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Donnelly, J.W.

2000-01-01

This environmental control plan is for the Hanford Site's Industrial Hygiene Field Services Facility, located in the 100-N Area. This facility is used for the maintenance and storage of respirators, respiratory equipment and testing, calibration and testing of industrial hygiene equipment, and asbestos fiber counting

Status of School Safety and Security among Elementary Schools in the Fifth Class Municipality

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cresente E. Glariana

2015-12-01

Full Text Available This study attempted to determine the status of school safety and security in terms of the school sites, school playground, school canteen services, water safety, fire safety, campus security, building security, and sanitary facilities situation in eight (8 elementary schools in Libertad town. The descriptive survey was used to find out the status of school safety and security in the elementary schools of Libertad, Misamis Oriental. A checklist on the standards of facilities as implemented by the Department of Education was used to gather the data. Checklist was based from the 2010 Educational Facilities Manual. Evaluation based on the checklist showed that some of standards on 2010 Educational Facilities Manual were not observed. The schools have not complied with the requirements and specifications. The evaluation showed further that most of the schools did not comply within the standards set by the 2010 Educational Facilities Manual. School authorities may review the standards in the 2010 Educational Facilities Manual. The school should try to meet the standard to ensure safety and security of the pupils. Action plan may be prepared to be implemented in case of emergency.

Grout Treatment Facility Land Disposal Restriction Management Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hendrickson, D.W.

1991-01-01

This document establishes management plans directed to result in the land disposal of grouted wastes at the Hanford Grout Facilities in compliance with Federal, State of Washington, and Department of Energy land disposal restrictions. 9 refs., 1 fig

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) Interim Status Closure Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SIMMONS, F.M.

2000-01-01

This document describes the planned activities and performance standards for closing the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF). WESF is located within the 225B Facility in the 200 East Area on the Hanford Facility. Although this document is prepared based on Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 265, Subpart G requirements, closure of the storage unit will comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 regulations pursuant to Section 5.3 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Action Plan (Ecology et al. 1996). Because the intention is to clean close WESF, postclosure activities are not applicable to this interim status closure plan. To clean close the storage unit, it will be demonstrated that dangerous waste has not been left onsite at levels above the closure performance standard for removal and decontamination. If it is determined that clean closure is not possible or environmentally is impracticable, the interim status closure plan will be modified to address required postclosure activities. WESF stores cesium and strontium encapsulated salts. The encapsulated salts are stored in the pool cells or process cells located within 225B Facility. The dangerous waste is contained within a double containment system to preclude spills to the environment. In the unlikely event that a waste spill does occur outside the capsules, operating methods and administrative controls require that waste spills be cleaned up promptly and completely, and a notation made in the operating record. Because dangerous waste does not include source, special nuclear, and by-product material components of mixed waste, radionuclides are not within the scope of this documentation. The information on radionuclides is provided only for general knowledge

Private sector's role in public school facility planning.

Science.gov (United States)

2009-03-01

This report explores the role of private consultants in the school facility planning process. : It focuses on such issues as school siting and local government and school district collaboration. : As such, it seeks to demonstrate the importance of th...

Family and Consumer Sciences: A Facility Planning and Design Guide for School Systems.

Science.gov (United States)

Maryland State Dept. of Education, Baltimore.

This document presents design concepts and considerations for planning and developing middle and high school family and consumer sciences education facilities. It includes discussions on family and consumer sciences education trends and the facility planning process. Design concepts explore multipurpose laboratories and spaces for food/nutrition…

Overview of planning process at FFTF [Fast Flux Test Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gadeken, A.D.

1986-03-01

The planning process at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is controlled through a hierarchy of documents ranging from a ten-year strategic plan to a weekly schedule. Within the hierarchy are a Near-Term (three-year) Operating Plan, a Cycle (six-month) Plan, and an Outage/Operating Phase Schedule. Coordination of the planning process is accomplished by a dedicated preparation team that also provides an overview of the formal planning timetable which identifies key action items required to be completed before an outage/operating phase can begin

Interim format and content for a physical security plan for nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-02-01

The document serves as interim guidance to assist the licensee or applicant in the preparation of a physical security plan. It is to be used in conjunction with interim acceptance criteria for physical security programs, which will be distributed at a later date

Systems security and functional readiness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bruckner, D.G.

1988-01-01

In Protective Programming Planning, it is important that every facility or installation be configured to support the basic functions and mission of the using organization. This paper addresses the process of identifying the key functional operations of our facilities in Europe and providing the security necessary to keep them operating in natural and man-made threat environments. Functional Readiness is important since many of our existing facilities in Europe were not constructed to meet the demands of today's requirements. There are increased requirements for real-time systems with classified terminals and stringent access control, tempest and other electronic protection devices. One must prioritize the operations of these systems so that essential functions are provided even when the facilities are affected by overt or covert hostile activities

Use of risk assessment methods for security design and analysis of nuclear and radioactive facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vasconcelos, Vanderley de; Andrade, Marcos C.; Jordao, Elizabete

2011-01-01

The objective of this work is to evaluate the applicability of risk assessment methods for analyzing the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive facilities. One of the important processes for physical protection in nuclear and radioactive facilities is the identifying of areas containing nuclear materials, structures, systems or components to be protected from sabotage, which could directly or indirectly lead to unacceptable radiological consequences. A survey of the international guidelines and recommendations about vital area identification, design basis threat (DBT), and the security of nuclear and radioactive facilities was carried out. The traditional methods used for quantitative risk assessment, like FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis), Event and Decision Trees, Fault and Success Trees, Vulnerability Assessment, Monte Carlo Simulation, Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Scenario Analysis, and Game Theory, among others, are highlighted. The applicability of such techniques to security issues, their pros and cons, the general resources needed to implement them, as data or support software, are analyzed. Finally, an approach to security design and analysis, beginning with a qualitative and preliminary examination to determine the range of possible scenarios, outcomes, and the systems to be included in the analyses, and proceeding to a progressively use of more quantitative techniques is presented. (author)

The development of mobile robot for security application and nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, B. S.; Lee, Y. B.; Choi, Y. S.; Seo, Y. C.; Park, Y. M

1999-12-01

The use of a mobile robot system in nuclear radioactive environments has the advantage of watching and inspecting the NPP safety-related equipment systematically and repairing damaged parts efficiently, thereby enhancing the safe operations of NPPs as well as reducing significantly personnel's dose rate to radioactive environment. Key technology achieved through the development of such robotic system can be used for security application and can offer new approaches to many of the tasks faced to the industry as well. The mobile robot system was composed of a mobile subsystem, a manipulator subsystem, a control subsystem, and a sensor subsystem to use in security application and nuclear radioactive environments. The mobile subsystem was adopted to synchro-drive method to improve the mobility of it. And the manipulator subsystem was developed to minimize the weight and easy to control at remote site. Finally, we developed the USB-based robot control system considering the expandability and modularity. The developed mobile robot for inspection and security was experimented for the collision avoidance and autonomous algorithm, and then it was confirmed that the mobile robot was very effective to the security application and inspection of nuclear facilities. (author)

The development of mobile robot for security application and nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, B. S.; Lee, Y. B.; Choi, Y. S.; Seo, Y. C.; Park, Y. M.

1999-12-01

The use of a mobile robot system in nuclear radioactive environments has the advantage of watching and inspecting the NPP safety-related equipment systematically and repairing damaged parts efficiently, thereby enhancing the safe operations of NPPs as well as reducing significantly personnel's dose rate to radioactive environment. Key technology achieved through the development of such robotic system can be used for security application and can offer new approaches to many of the tasks faced to the industry as well. The mobile robot system was composed of a mobile subsystem, a manipulator subsystem, a control subsystem, and a sensor subsystem to use in security application and nuclear radioactive environments. The mobile subsystem was adopted to synchro-drive method to improve the mobility of it. And the manipulator subsystem was developed to minimize the weight and easy to control at remote site. Finally, we developed the USB-based robot control system considering the expandability and modularity. The developed mobile robot for inspection and security was experimented for the collision avoidance and autonomous algorithm, and then it was confirmed that the mobile robot was very effective to the security application and inspection of nuclear facilities. (author)

Readiness Assessment Plan, Hanford 200 areas treated effluent disposal facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ulmer, F.J.

1995-01-01

This Readiness Assessment Plan documents Liquid Effluent Facilities review process used to establish the scope of review, documentation requirements, performance assessment, and plant readiness to begin operation of the Treated Effluent Disposal system in accordance with DOE-RLID-5480.31, Startup and Restart of Facilities Operational Readiness Review and Readiness Assessments

Integrated social facility location planning for decision support: Accessibility studies provide support to facility location and integration of social service provision

CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

Green, Cheri A

2012-09-01

Full Text Available for two or more facilities to create an integrated plan for development Step 6 Costing of development plan Case Study Access norms and thresholds guidelines in accessibility analysis Appropriate norms/provision guidelines facilitate both service... access norms and threshold standards ?Test the relationship between service demand and the supply (service capacity) of the facility provision points within a defined catchment area ?Promote the ?right?sizing? of facilities relative to the demand...

Plan for reevaluation of NRC policy on decommissioning of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

The present decommissioning regulations contained in Sections 50.33(f) and 50.82 of 10 CFR part 50 require applicants for power reactor operating licenses to demonstrate that they can obtain the funds needed to meet both operating costs and estimated costs of shutdown and decommissioning. The development of detailed, specific decommissioning plans for nuclear power plants is not currently required until the licensee seeks to terminate his operating license. Recognizing that the current generation of large commercial reactors and supporting nuclear facilities would substantially increase the need for future decommissionings, the NRC staff began an in-depth review and reevaluation of NRC's regulatory approach to decommissioning in 1975. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now considering development of a more explicit overall policy for nuclear facility decommissioning and amending its regulations in 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 50, and 70 to include more specific guidance on decommissioning criteria for production and utilization facility licensees and byproduct, source, and special nuclear material licensees. In response to comments from the public and states, and to information gained during the initial stage of execution of the plan, several modifications of the plan are now required. The revised overall report sets forth in detail the current NRC staff plan for the development of an overall NRC policy on decommissioning of nuclear facilities

Hanford Facility resource conservation and recovery act permit general inspection plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beagles, D.B.

1995-12-01

The Hanford Facility Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit, General Inspection Requirements, includes a requirement that general facility inspections be conducted of the 100, 200 East, 200 West, 300, 400, and 1100 Areas and the banks of the Columbia River. This inspection plan describes the activities that shall be conducted for a general inspection of the Hanford Facility

Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koelzer, W.

1988-01-01

Nuclear installations are designed, constructed and operated in such a way that the probability for an incident or accident is very low and the probability for a severe accident with catastrophic consequences is extremely small. These accidents represent the residual risk of the nuclear installation, and this residual risk can be decreased on one hand by a better design, construction and operation and on the other hand by planning and taking emergency measures inside the facility and in the environment of the facility. By way of introduction and definition it may be indicated to define some terms pertaining to the subject in order to make for more uniform understanding. (orig./DG)

National Ignition Facility Title II Design Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kumpan, S

1997-01-01

This National Ignition Facility (NIF) Title II Design Plan defines the work to be performed by the NIF Project Team between November 1996, when the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reviewed Title I design and authorized the initiation of Title H design and specific long-lead procurements, and September 1998, when Title 11 design will be completed

Federal Facility Compliance Act, Proposed Site Treatment Plan: Background Volume. Executive Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This Federal Facility Compliance Act Site Treatment Plan discusses the options of radioactive waste management for Ames Laboratory. This is the background volume which discusses: site history and mission; framework for developing site treatment plans; proposed plan organization and related activities; characterization of mixed waste and waste minimization; low level mixed waste streams and the proposed treatment approach; future generation of TRU and mixed wastes; the adequacy of mixed waste storage facilities; and a summary of the overall DOE activity in the area of disposal of mixed waste treatment residuals

Standard Guide for Environmental Monitoring Plans for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

CERN Document Server

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2010-01-01

1.1 This guide covers the development or assessment of environmental monitoring plans for decommissioning nuclear facilities. This guide addresses: (1) development of an environmental baseline prior to commencement of decommissioning activities; (2) determination of release paths from site activities and their associated exposure pathways in the environment; and (3) selection of appropriate sampling locations and media to ensure that all exposure pathways in the environment are monitored appropriately. This guide also addresses the interfaces between the environmental monitoring plan and other planning documents for site decommissioning, such as radiation protection, site characterization, and waste management plans, and federal, state, and local environmental protection laws and guidance. This guide is applicable up to the point of completing D&D activities and the reuse of the facility or area for other purposes.

Design verification and validation plan for the cold vacuum drying facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NISHIKAWA, L.D.

1999-01-01

The Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) provides the required process systems, supporting equipment, and facilities needed for drying spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins. This document presents the both completed and planned design verification and validation activities

10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... contingency plans. (a) The licensee shall make no change that would decrease the safeguards effectiveness of... licensee safeguards contingency plan without prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make...

A conceptual model for barrier free facilities planning.

Science.gov (United States)

Bittencourt, R S; de M Guimarães, L B

2012-01-01

This paper presents the proposal of a model for planning a barrier free industrial facilities, considering the demands that inclusion requires, ranging from outside the factory (social environment), to the needs of the production system and the workstation. Along with literature review, the demands were identified in a shoe manufacturer that employs people with disabilities, and organized taxonomically in agreement with the structure for planning facilities. The results show that the problems are not primarily related to eliminating architectural barriers and factors aimed at preventing risks to people's health and safety but, rather, are related to the company's cultural environment, because the main hazards are managerial. In special cases, it is suggested there is a need to adjust those parts of tasks that the worker cannot do, or even to re-schedule work so as to make it possible for employees with disabilities to perform their tasks.

An integrated approach for facilities planning by ELECTRE method

Science.gov (United States)

Elbishari, E. M. Y.; Hazza, M. H. F. Al; Adesta, E. Y. T.; Rahman, Nur Salihah Binti Abdul

2018-01-01

Facility planning is concerned with the design, layout, and accommodation of people, machines and activities of a system. Most of the researchers try to investigate the production area layout and the related facilities. However, few of them try to investigate the relationship between the production space and its relationship with service departments. The aim of this research to is to integrate different approaches in order to evaluate, analyse and select the best facilities planning method that able to explain the relationship between the production area and other supporting departments and its effect on human efforts. To achieve the objective of this research two different approaches have been integrated: Apple’s layout procedure as one of the effective tools in planning factories, ELECTRE method as one of the Multi Criteria Decision Making methods (MCDM) to minimize the risk of getting poor facilities planning. Dalia industries have been selected as a case study to implement our integration the factory have been divided two main different area: the whole facility (layout A), and the manufacturing area (layout B). This article will be concerned with the manufacturing area layout (Layout B). After analysing the data gathered, the manufacturing area was divided into 10 activities. There are five factors that the alternative were compared upon which are: Inter department satisfactory level, total distance travelled for workers, total distance travelled for the product, total time travelled for the workers, and total time travelled for the product. Three different layout alternatives have been developed in addition to the original layouts. Apple’s layout procedure was used to study and evaluate the different alternatives layouts, the study and evaluation of the layouts was done by calculating scores for each of the factors. After obtaining the scores from evaluating the layouts, ELECTRE method was used to compare the proposed alternatives with each other and with

Environmental restoration plan for the transfer of surplus facilities to the Facility Transition Program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-08-01

This report will provide guidance on management, coordination, and integration of plans to transition facilities to the Facility Transition Program and activities as related to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Environmental Restoration Program facilities. This report gives (1) guidance on the steps necessary for identifying ORNL surplus facilities, (2) interfaces of Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M) and Isotope Facility Deactivation program managers, (3) roles and responsibilities of the facility managers, and (4) initial S and M requirements upon acceptance into the Facility Transition Program

Facility effluent monitoring plan for K area spent fuel storage basin

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hunacek, G.S.

1996-01-01

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400. 1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document was prepared using the specific guidelines identified in WHC-EP-0438-1, A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, and assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the second revision to the original annual report. Long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring system shall be ensured with updates of this report whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

Planning a radar system for protection from the airborne threat

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Greneker, E.F.; McGee, M.C.

1986-01-01

A planning methodology for developing a radar system to protect nuclear materials facilities from the airborne threat is presented. Planning for physical security to counter the airborne threat is becoming even more important because hostile acts by terrorists are increasing and airborne platforms that can be used to bypass physical barriers are readily available. The comprehensive system planning process includes threat and facility surveys, defense hardening, analysis of detection and early warning requirements, optimization of sensor mix and placement, and system implementation considerations

75 FR 43528 - Seeking Public Comment on Draft National Health Security Strategy Biennial Implementation Plan

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-26

... National Health Security Strategy Biennial Implementation Plan AGENCY: Department of Health and Human... National Health Security Strategy (NHSS) of the United States of America (2009) and build upon the NHSS Interim Implementation Guide for the National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America...

Planning for maintenance in radiochemical facilities [Paper No.: VB-2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balasubramanian, G.R.

1981-01-01

Reprocessing facilities in the earlier stages of development were planned mainly based on the concept of direct maintenance in view of the inherent advantage of man-machine interface and initial savings in the investment costs. With the mechanical processes finding a firm place in head-end operation and increase in down time necessary for elaborate decontamination efforts even for a minor modification has led to the review of the concept. For the same reason, the recent plants are based on the concept of harmonious blend of both direct and remote maintenance. The paper describes the planning needed from consideration of various aspects related to such concepts of maintenance during different phases of such type of facilities, highlighting some of the tools and special equipments to be developed for this purpose. A brief description of recent development in the field of remote maintenance is also given. Though the basic hot facility of reference is the one of reprocessing fast reactor fuels, the concepts and systems discussed are equally applicable to other radiochemical and radiometallurgical facilities also. (author)

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center at the Device Assembly Facility, Nevada National Security Site: Status and Capabilities, Summary Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragg-Sitton, S.; Bess, J.; Werner, J.

2011-01-01

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) was officially opened on August 29, 2011. Located within the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), the NCERC has become a consolidation facility within the United States for critical configuration testing, particularly those involving highly enriched uranium (HEU). The DAF is a Department of Energy (DOE) owned facility that is operated by the National Nuclear Security Agency/Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). User laboratories include the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Personnel bring their home lab qualifications and procedures with them to the DAF, such that non-site specific training need not be repeated to conduct work at DAF. The NNSS Management and Operating contractor is National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) and the NNSS Safeguards and Security contractor is Wackenhut Services. The complete report provides an overview and status of the available laboratories and test bays at NCERC, available test materials and test support configurations, and test requirements and limitations for performing sub-critical and critical tests. The current summary provides a brief summary of the facility status and the method by which experiments may be introduced to NCERC.

Five Recession-Driven Strategies for Planning and Managing Campus Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

Rudden, Michael S.

2010-01-01

Colleges and universities continue to face significant fiscal challenges in the current recession. A review of ongoing campus facilities planning projects, coupled with a review of more than 30 recent campus master planning requests for proposals and the relevant literature, indicates that colleges and universities are finding innovative ways to…

Standard format and content for emergency plans for fuel cycle and materials facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-09-01

This regulatory guides is being developed to provide guidance acceptable to the NRC staff on the information to be included in emergency plans and to establish a format for presenting the information. Use of a standard format will help ensure uniformity and completeness in the preparation of emergency plans. An acceptable emergency plan should describe the licensed activities conducted at the facility and the types of accidents that might occur. It should provide information on classifying postulated accidents and the licensee's procedures for notifying and coordinating with offsite authorities. The plan should provide information on emergency response measures that might be necessary, the equipment and facilities available to respond to an emergency, and how the licensee will maintain emergency preparedness capability. It should describe the records and reports that will be maintained. There should also be a section on recovery after an accident and plans for restoring the facility to a safe condition. 4 refs

Chemical Hygiene Plan for Onsite Measurement and Sample Shipping Facility Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Price, W.H.

1998-01-01

This chemical hygiene plan presents the requirements established to ensure the protection of employee health while performing work in mobile laboratories, the sample shipping facility, and at the onsite radiological counting facility. This document presents the measures to be taken to promote safe work practices and to minimize worker exposure to hazardous chemicals. Specific hazardous chemicals present in the mobile laboratories, the sample shipping facility, and in the radiological counting facility are presented in Appendices A through G

WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units and Areas of Concern

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This 2001 Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII, Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a), and incorporates comments from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) received on December 6, 2000 (NMED, 2000a). This February 2001 FWP describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. The permittees are evaluating data from previous investigations of the SWMUs and AOCs against the newest guidance proposed by the NMED. Based on these data, the permittees expect that no further sampling will be required and that a request for No Further Action (NFA) at the SWMUs and AOCs will be submitted to the NMED. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current NMED guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility's Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to the NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit.

Experimental area plans for an advanced hadron facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hoffman, E.W.; Macek, R.J.; Tschalear, C.

1986-01-01

A brief overview is presented of the current plans for an experimental area for a new advanced hadron facility for the exploration of nuclear and particle physics. The facility, LAMPF II, is presently visualized as consisting of the LAMPF linac sending 800 MeV protons to a 6 GeV booster ring followed by a 45 GeV main ring. Two experimental areas area planned. The first is intended to provide neutrinos via a pair of pulsed focusing horns. The other is designed to accommodate secondary beams that span the range of useful energies up to GeV/c. Beam specification goals are discussed with respect to source brightness, beam purity, and beam-line acceptance and length. The various beam lines are briefly described. Production cross sections and rates are estimated for antiproton production. Problems of thermal energy deposition in both components and targets and of effectiveness of particle separators are discussed. 9 refs. (LEW)

Experimental area plans for an advanced hadron facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffman, E.W.; Macek, R.J.; Tschalear, C.

1986-01-01

A brief overview is presented of the current plans for an experimental area for a new advanced hadron facility for the exploration of nuclear and particle physics. The facility, LAMPF II, is presently visualized as consisting of the LAMPF linac sending 800 MeV protons to a 6 GeV booster ring followed by a 45 GeV main ring. Two experimental areas area planned. The first is intended to provide neutrinos via a pair of pulsed focusing horns. The other is designed to accommodate secondary beams that span the range of useful energies up to GeV/c. Beam specification goals are discussed with respect to source brightness, beam purity, and beam-line acceptance and length. The various beam lines are briefly described. Production cross sections and rates are estimated for antiproton production. Problems of thermal energy deposition in both components and targets and of effectiveness of particle separators are discussed. 9 refs

Management plan -- Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fritz, R.L.

1995-01-01

This Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility (MWTF) Management Plan provides guidance for execution WHC MWTF Project activities related to design, procurement, construction, testing, and turnover. This Management Plan provides a discussion of organizational responsibilities, work planning, project management systems, quality assurance (QA), regulatory compliance, personnel qualifications and training, and testing and evaluations. Classified by the US Department of Energy (DOE) as a major systems acquisition (MSA), the MWTF mission is to provide a safe, cost-effective, and environmentally sound method for interim storage of Hanford Site high-level wastes. This Management Plan provides policy guidance and direction to the Project Office for execution of the project activities

Management plan -- Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility. Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fritz, R.L.

1995-01-11

This Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility (MWTF) Management Plan provides guidance for execution WHC MWTF Project activities related to design, procurement, construction, testing, and turnover. This Management Plan provides a discussion of organizational responsibilities, work planning, project management systems, quality assurance (QA), regulatory compliance, personnel qualifications and training, and testing and evaluations. Classified by the US Department of Energy (DOE) as a major systems acquisition (MSA), the MWTF mission is to provide a safe, cost-effective, and environmentally sound method for interim storage of Hanford Site high-level wastes. This Management Plan provides policy guidance and direction to the Project Office for execution of the project activities.

Decontamination and Decommissioning at Small Nuclear Facilities: Facilitating the Submission of Decommissioning Funding Plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Minor, D.A.; Grumbles, A.

2009-01-01

This paper describes the efforts of the Washington State Department of Health to ensure that small nuclear facilities have the tools each needs to submit Decommissioning Funding Plans. These Plans are required by both the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and in some states - in the case of Washington state, the Washington State Department of Health is the regulator of radioactive materials. Unfortunately, the guidance documents provided by the U.S. NRC pertain to large nuclear facilities, such as nuclear fuel fabrication plants, not the small nuclear laboratory nor small nuclear laundry that may also be required to submit such Plans. These small facilities are required to submit Decommissioning Funding Plans by dint of their nuclear materials inventory, but have only a small staff, such as a Radiation Safety Officer and few authorized users. The Washington State Department of Health and Attenuation Environmental Company have been working on certain tools, such as templates and spreadsheets, that are intended to assist these small nuclear facilities prepare compliant Decommissioning Funding Plans with a minimum of experience and effort. (authors)

Facility Response Plan (FRP) Points, Region 9, 2014, US EPA Region 9

Data.gov (United States)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — A Facility Response Plan (FRP) demonstrates a facility's preparedness to respond to a worst case oil discharge. Under the Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil...

Facility Response Plan (FRP) Points, Region 9, 2013, US EPA Region 9

Data.gov (United States)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — A Facility Response Plan (FRP) demonstrates a facility's preparedness to respond to a worst case oil discharge. Under the Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil...

Facility Response Plan (FRP) Points, Region 9, 2012, US EPA Region 9

Data.gov (United States)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — A Facility Response Plan (FRP) demonstrates a facility's preparedness to respond to a worst case oil discharge. Under the Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil...

Progress in safeguards by design (SBD) by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Long, J.D.

2013-01-01

The IAEA has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. Often, international safeguards features are added following completion of the facility design. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly re-designs or retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated a project in 2008 through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to establish a global norm for the use of SBD. The NGSI SBD program is evolving in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA, while taking into account the IAEA's SBD achievements and future plans. The NGSI program includes DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its planned use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. Consistent with this effort, the NGSI program has sponsored 'Lessons Learned' studies and the preparation of facility-specific SBD Guidance documents. The NGSI program also takes into account successes that the NNSA has had with implementing safeguards early into facility designs within the U.S. The purpose of this paper is the presentation of the most recent developments in SBD under NGSI within the U.S. as well as the presentation of 'Lessons Learned' integrating safeguards into new nuclear facility designs of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), namely the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and to discuss its relevance to international safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

Soil Management Plan for the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

2005-03-02

This Soil Management Plan applies to all activities conducted under the auspices of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that involve soil disturbance and potential management of waste soil. The plan was prepared under the direction of the Y-12 Environmental Compliance Department of the Environment, Safety, and Health Division. Soil disturbances related to maintenance activities, utility and building construction projects, or demolition projects fall within the purview of the plan. This Soil Management Plan represents an integrated, visually oriented, planning and information resource tool for decision making involving excavation or disturbance of soil at Y-12. This Soil Management Plan addresses three primary elements. (1) Regulatory and programmatic requirements for management of soil based on the location of a soil disturbance project and/or the regulatory classification of any contaminants that may be present (Chap. 2). Five general regulatory or programmatic classifications of soil are recognized to be potentially present at Y-12; soil may fall under one or more these classifications: (a) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) pursuant to the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) Federal Facilities Agreement; (b) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); (c) RCRA 3004(u) solid waste managements units pursuant to the RCRA Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments Act of 1984 permit for the ORR; (d) Toxic Substances and Control Act-regulated soil containing polychlorinated biphenyls; and (e) Radiologically contaminated soil regulated under the Atomic Energy Act review process. (2) Information for project planners on current and future planned remedial actions (RAs), as prescribed by CERCLA decision documents (including the scope of the actions and remedial goals), land use controls implemented to support or maintain RAs, RCRA post-closure regulatory requirements for

Environmental Control Plan for the Industrial Hygiene Field Services Facility; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

J. W. Donnelly

2001-01-01

This environmental control plan is for the Hanford Site's industrial hygiene field services facility, located in the 100-N Area. The facility is used for the maintenance and storage of respirators, respiratory equipment and testing, calibration and testing of industrial hygiene equipment, and asbestos fiber counting

CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility Site Integrated Stabilization Management Plan (SISMP), Volume I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Denney, R.D.

1995-10-01

The CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility (UFSF) Site Integrated Stabilization Management Plan (SISMP) has been constructed to describe the activities required for the relocation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the CPP-603 facility. These activities are the only Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) actions identified in the Implementation Plan developed to meet the requirements of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1 to the Secretary of Energy regarding an improved schedule for remediation in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex. As described in the DNFSB Recommendation 94-1 Implementation Plan, issued February 28, 1995, an INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Plan is currently under development to direct the placement of SNF currently in existing INEL facilities into interim storage, and to address the coordination of intrasite SNF movements with new receipts and intersite transfers that were identified in the DOE SNF Programmatic and INEL Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Environmental Impact Statement Record, of Decision. This SISMP will be a subset of the INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Plan and the activities described are being coordinated with other INEL SNF management activities. The CPP-603 relocation activities have been assigned a high priority so that established milestones will be meet, but there will be some cases where other activities will take precedence in utilization of available resources. The Draft INEL Site Integrated Stabilization Management Plan (SISMP), INEL-94/0279, Draft Rev. 2, dated March 10, 1995, is being superseded by the INEL Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Plan and this CPP-603 specific SISMP

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2015-01-06

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

Planning, Management and Organizational Aspects of the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-08-01

Many old reactors and other nuclear facilities worldwide are being actively dismantled or are candidates for decommissioning in the near term. A significant number of these facilities are located in Member States having little experience or expertise in planning and implementing state of the art decommissioning projects. Planning, management and organization are critical for the success of such projects. The main objective of IAEA technical activities related to decommissioning is to promote the exchange of lessons learned, thereby contributing to successful planning and implementation of decommissioning projects. Imperative for success is a better understanding of the decision making process, the comparison and selection of decommissioning plans and organizational provisions, and relevant issues affecting the entire decommissioning process. Topics addressed in this publication include details on development of the decommissioning plan, structuring of key project tasks, organizing the project management team, identifying key staffing positions and determining required workforce skills, and managing the transition from an operational phase to the decommissioning phase. It is expected that this project, and in particular the papers collected in this publication, will draw Member States' attention to the practicality and achievability of timely planning and smooth management of decommissioning projects, especially for smaller projects. Concluding reports summarizing the work undertaken under the aegis of a coordinated research project (CRP) on planning, management and organizational aspects in the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and presented at the third and final research coordination meeting (RCM) held in Da Lat, Vietnam, 5-9 September 2011, are included in this publication. Operating experience and lessons learned during full scale applications, as well as national programmes and plans, are among the most significant achievements of the CRP and have been

Planning, Management and Organizational Aspects of the Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2013-08-15

Many old reactors and other nuclear facilities worldwide are being actively dismantled or are candidates for decommissioning in the near term. A significant number of these facilities are located in Member States having little experience or expertise in planning and implementing state of the art decommissioning projects. Planning, management and organization are critical for the success of such projects. The main objective of IAEA technical activities related to decommissioning is to promote the exchange of lessons learned, thereby contributing to successful planning and implementation of decommissioning projects. Imperative for success is a better understanding of the decision making process, the comparison and selection of decommissioning plans and organizational provisions, and relevant issues affecting the entire decommissioning process. Topics addressed in this publication include details on development of the decommissioning plan, structuring of key project tasks, organizing the project management team, identifying key staffing positions and determining required workforce skills, and managing the transition from an operational phase to the decommissioning phase. It is expected that this project, and in particular the papers collected in this publication, will draw Member States' attention to the practicality and achievability of timely planning and smooth management of decommissioning projects, especially for smaller projects. Concluding reports summarizing the work undertaken under the aegis of a coordinated research project (CRP) on planning, management and organizational aspects in the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and presented at the third and final research coordination meeting (RCM) held in Da Lat, Vietnam, 5-9 September 2011, are included in this publication. Operating experience and lessons learned during full scale applications, as well as national programmes and plans, are among the most significant achievements of the CRP and have been

Integrated operations plan for the MFTF-B Mirror Fusion Test Facility. Volume II. Integrated operations plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1981-12-01

This document defines an integrated plan for the operation of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Mirror Fusion Test Facility (MFTF-B). The plan fulfills and further delineates LLNL policies and provides for accomplishing the functions required by the program. This plan specifies the management, operations, maintenance, and engineering support responsibilities. It covers phasing into sustained operations as well as the sustained operations themselves. Administrative and Plant Engineering support, which are now being performed satisfactorily, are not part of this plan unless there are unique needs.

Integrated operations plan for the MFTF-B Mirror Fusion Test Facility. Volume II. Integrated operations plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-12-01

This document defines an integrated plan for the operation of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Mirror Fusion Test Facility (MFTF-B). The plan fulfills and further delineates LLNL policies and provides for accomplishing the functions required by the program. This plan specifies the management, operations, maintenance, and engineering support responsibilities. It covers phasing into sustained operations as well as the sustained operations themselves. Administrative and Plant Engineering support, which are now being performed satisfactorily, are not part of this plan unless there are unique needs

Abbreviated sampling and analysis plan for planning decontamination and decommissioning at Test Reactor Area (TRA) facilities