WorldWideScience

Sample records for energy nuclear proliferation

  1. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    A summary of the report dispatched in the middle of 1978 by the Atlantic Council of United States, organized by North American citizens, is presented. The report considers the relation between the production of nucleoelectric energy and the capacity of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The factors which affect the grade of proliferation risk represented by the use of nuclear energy in the world comparing this risk with the proliferation risks independently of nuclear energy, are examined. (M.C.K.) [pt

  2. Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gsponer, A.; Sahin, S.; Jasani, B.

    1983-01-01

    Generally when considering problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussions are focused on horizontal proliferation. However, the emerging nuclear energy systems currently have an impact mainly on vertical proliferation. The paper indicates that technologies connected with emerging nuclear energy systems, such as fusion reactors and accelerators, enhance the knowledge of thermonuclear weapon physics and will enable production of military useful nuclear materials (including some rare elements). At present such technologies are enhancing the arsenal of the nuclear weapon states. But one should not forget the future implications for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as some of the techniques will in the near future be within the technological and economic capabilities of non-nuclear weapon states. Some of these systems are not under any international control. (orig.) [de

  3. Nuclear energy and proliferation: A longer perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weinberg, A.M.

    1985-01-01

    Nuclear power has expanded slowly; and it is largely based on reactors that require no recycle. The original basis for concern about proliferation - that nuclear power would be used very widely and that it would be based on systems that required reprocessing - has been shaken. The present world nuclear energy system, which is small and based on no-recycle reactors, is relatively resistant to proliferation via diversion from power reactors. Though worry about proliferation can never be eliminated, the perceived connection between power and bombs can be slowly reduced. The proposal to link fuel take-back with waste disposal poses a dilemma for the ''nuclear environmental'' activists. This group objects to nuclear power because, in their view, reactor wastes threaten the environment, and because bombs and reactors are connected. Both objections are held, often passionately; it would be difficult to assess which takes primacy. This proposal further breaks the ''Nuclear Connection,'' but at the expense of adding a little to the volume of wastes the United States would have to dispose of. We are in effect saying that the loosening of the nuclear connection through the take-back scheme should take precedence over the tiny environmental burden incurred by the addition of a few percent to the total wastes the U.S. already must dispose of. It is hoped that the nuclear environmental community will recognize this trade-off, and will help create the atmosphere of public understanding necessary if fuel take-back is to be accepted in the United States

  4. Proliferation: does the peaceful use of nuclear energy have to lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muench, E.; Stein, G.

    The question of whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons is promoted by an increasing use of peaceful nuclear energy can be answered with a well-founded no. Even a regional renouncing of the peaceful use of nuclear energy would not reduce the worldwide problem of nuclear weapons' proliferation. Therefore, joint efforts must be aimed at promoting trust between peoples in the nuclear sphere and the political reasons for the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be reduced in order also to promote international harmony

  5. Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such ''linkage''. It does not deal with the linkages that exist between nuclear weapons and other industries and activities - for example, those involved in weapons delivery systems -since these are not within the Uranium Institute's area of competence. Linkage concerns regarding civil nuclear programmes arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. The technologies which can give rise directly to these materials are therefore ''sensitive'' in proliferation terms. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First, important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (author)

  6. Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such 'linkage'. Linkage concerns arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Even enrichment and reprocessing, as normally used in electricity programmes, do not give rise to the materials used in weapons. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (Author)

  7. Technical features to enhance proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    It is generally accepted that proliferation resistance is an essential issue for the continued development and sustainability of nuclear energy. Several comprehensive assessment activities on the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle have previously been completed, notably the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) carried out under the auspices of the IAEA, and the Non-proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) review carried out by the USA. There have been, however, relatively few comprehensive treatments of the issue following these efforts in the 1970s. However, interest in and concern about this issue have increased recently, particularly because of greater interest in innovative nuclear fuel cycles and systems. In 2000, the IAEA initiated the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and the US Department of Energy initiated the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). These projects are aimed at the selection and development of concepts of innovative nuclear energy systems and fuel cycles. Proliferation resistance is one of the fundamental considerations for both projects. In this context, the IAEA in 2001 initiated a study entitled 'Technical Aspects of Increasing Proliferation Resistance of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle'. This task is not intended as an effort to assess the merits of a particular fuel cycle system for the future, but to describe a qualitative framework for an examination of the proliferation resistance provided by the intrinsic features of an innovative nuclear energy system and fuel cycle. This task also seeks to provide a high level survey of a variety of innovative nuclear energy systems and fuel cycles with respect to that framework. The concept of proliferation resistance is considered in terms of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures. The intrinsic features, sometimes referred to as the physical/technical aspects, are those features that result from the

  8. MEHODOLOGY FOR PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE FOR ADVANCE NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    YUE, M.; CHANG, L.Y.; BARI, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Technology Goals for Generation IV nuclear energy systems highlight Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRandPP) as one of the four goal areas for Generation 1V nuclear technology. Accordingly, an evaluation methodology is being developed by a PRandPP Experts Group. This paper presents a possible approach, which is based on Markov modeling, to the evaluation methodology for Generation IV nuclear energy systems being developed for PRandPP. Using the Markov model, a variety of proliferation scenarios can be constructed and the proliferation resistance measures can be quantified, particularly the probability of detection. To model the system with increased fidelity, the Markov model is further developed to incorporate multiple safeguards approaches in this paper. The approach to the determination of the associated parameters is presented. Evaluations of diversion scenarios for an example sodium fast reactor (ESFR) energy system are used to illustrate the methodology. The Markov model is particularly useful because it can provide the probability density function of the time it takes for the effort to be detected at a specific stage of the proliferation effort

  9. Energy in debate. Civil nuclear and proliferation. Energy scenarios and freedom latitudes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication first gives a presentation of a European colloquium on energy strategies between the nuclear risk and the greenhouse effect. Then dealing with the relationship between nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation, a contribution comments the relationship between the civil use of nuclear energy (notably for electricity production) and the use of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons (posture of the five nuclear States, development of the counter-proliferation policy, proliferating countries and actors, evolution of the political context after the fall of the USSR). The next article discusses the rooms to manoeuvre when defining energy strategies, notably with respect to nuclear energy. It also outlines the challenge of energy efficiency improvement in France, particularly for electricity uses, and by limiting the road traffic dramatic increase. A last article is an answer to critics by the author of a book on the greenhouse effect

  10. Nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stencel, S.

    1978-01-01

    The terms and reactions to President Carter's nuclear policy, culminating in the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, are reviewed and analyzed. The new law increases restrictions on nuclear exports, encourages continued use of light water reactors in preference to plutonium-fueled reactors, and emphasizes technical solutions to proliferation problems. Critics of the law point out that it will hurt U.S. trade unfairly, that other countries do not have as many fuel options as the U.S. has, and that nuclear sales have as many political and economic as technical solutions. Compromise areas include new international safety guidelines, the possibility of an international nuclear fuel bank, and a willingness to consider each case on its merits. 21 references

  11. Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

    2012-02-01

    International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

  12. Nuclear energy and non proliferation. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooley, J.; Rauf, T.

    2008-01-01

    This article discusses the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA verifies States compliance with their non-proliferation commitments through the application of safeguards on their civilian nuclear programmes to ensure that they are being used solely for peaceful purposes. The IAEA safeguards have evolved in the course of five decades and have become an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and the global security system. To continue to serve the international community, they need to continue to move with the times, especially in light of the renewed interest in nuclear energy. (Author)

  13. Modeling and evaluating proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems for strategy switching proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yue, M.; Cheng, L.-Y.; Bari, R.A.

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: ► Sensitivity analysis is carried out for the model and physical input parameters. ► Interphase drag has minor effect on the dryout heat flux (DHF) in 1D configuration. ► Model calibration on pressure drop experiments fails to improve prediction of DHF. ► Calibrated classical model provides the best agreement with DHF data from 1D tests. ► Further validation of drag models requires data from 2D and 3D experiments on DHF. - Abstract: This paper reports a Markov model based approach to systematically evaluating the proliferation resistance (PR) of nuclear energy systems (NESs). The focus of the study is on the development of the Markov models for a class of complex PR scenarios, i.e., mixed covert/overt strategy switching proliferation, for NESs with two modes of material flow, batch and continuous. In particular, a set of diversion and/or breakout scenarios and covert/overt misuse scenarios are studied in detail for an Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR) system. Both probabilistic and deterministic PR measures are calculated using a software tool that implements the proposed approach and can be used to quantitatively compare proliferation resistant characteristics of different scenarios for a given NES, according to the computed PR measures

  14. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  15. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  16. Achieving competitive excellence in nuclear energy: The threat of proliferation; the challenge of inertial confinement fusion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuckolls, J.H.

    1994-06-01

    Nuclear energy will have an expanding role in meeting the twenty-first-century challenges of population and economic growth, energy demand, and global warming. These great challenges are non-linearly coupled and incompletely understood. In the complex global system, achieving competitive excellence for nuclear energy is a multi-dimensional challenge. The growth of nuclear energy will be driven by its margin of economic advantage, as well as by threats to energy security and by growing evidence of global warming. At the same time, the deployment of nuclear energy will be inhibited by concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear waste and nuclear reactor safety. These drivers and inhibitors are coupled: for example, in the foreseeable future, proliferation in the Middle East may undermine energy security and increase demand for nuclear energy. The Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories are addressing many of these challenges, including nuclear weapons builddown and nonproliferation, nuclear waste storage and burnup, reactor safety and fuel enrichment, global warming, and the long-range development of fusion energy. Today I will focus on two major program areas at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL): the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of inertial confinement fusion (ICF) energy

  17. Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armanet, P.

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

  18. Proliferation resistance characteristics of advanced nuclear energy systems: a safeguard ability point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevini, F.; Cojazzi, G.G.M.; Renda, G.

    2008-01-01

    Among the international community there is a renewed interest in nuclear power systems as a major source for energy production in the near to mid future. This is mainly due to concerns connected with future availability of conventional energy resources, and with the environmental impact of fossil fuels. International initiatives have been set up like the Generation 4. International Forum (GIF), the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (IAEA-INPRO), and, partially, the US driven Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aimed at defining and evaluating the characteristics, in which future innovative nuclear energy systems (INS) will have to excel. Among the identified characteristics, Proliferation Resistance plays an important role for being able to widely deploy nuclear technology worldwide in a secure way. Studies having the objective to assess Proliferation Resistance of nuclear fuel cycles have been carried out since the nineteen seventies, e.g., the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the Non-proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) initiatives, and all agree in stating that absolute intrinsic proliferation resistance, although desirable, is not achievable in the foreseeable future. The above finding is still valid; as a consequence, every INS will have to comply with agreements related to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and will require safeguards measures, implemented through extrinsic measures. This consideration led to a renewed interest in the Safeguard ability concept which can be seen as a bridge between intrinsic features and extrinsic features and measures.

  19. A strategic framework for proliferation resistance: a systematic approach for the identification and evaluation of technology opportunities to enhance the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hassberger, J.A.; Isaac, T.; Schock, R.N.

    2001-01-01

    The United State Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee recently completed a study ''Technological Opportunities To Increase The Proliferation Resistance Of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS)''. That effort included the development of a set of both intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation that technologies can directly impact. In this paper we will review these barriers as and framework for assisting in the evaluation of the relative proliferation resistance of various nuclear fuel cycles, technologies and alternatives. (author)

  20. A study on the proliferation resistance evaluation methodology for nuclear energy system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min Su

    2007-02-01

    The framework of proliferation resistance evaluation methodology, based on attribute analysis and scenario analysis, for nuclear energy system is suggested in order to allow for the comprehensive assessment of proliferation resistance by addressing the intrinsic and extrinsic features of nuclear energy system. Proliferation resistance is viewed within the context of the success tree model of proliferator's diversion attempt and expressed by the value of top event probability of the success tree model. This study focused on the method that the value of top event is estimated. The methodology uses two different methods to quantify the likelihood of basic events constituting the top event. The likelihood of basic event success affected by intrinsic feature of nuclear energy system was assessed by using multi-attribute utility theory and likelihood of basic event related to the diversion detection measures was assessed by direct expert elicitation. The value of top event was calculated based on the intersection of probabilities of basic event success. Feasibility of the methodology was explored by applying it to selected reference nuclear energy systems. System-Integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART) system and Light Water Reactor (LWR) were chosen as reference systems and the value proliferation resistance of SMART and LWR were evaluated. Characteristics of inherent features and hypothesized safeguards measures of both systems were identified and used as input data to evaluate proliferation resistance. The results and conclusions are applicable only within the context of subjectivity of this methodology

  1. Nuclear proliferation and terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    This section of the book, Part III, has two chapters (9 and 10). Chapter 9, Nuclear Power and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is disucssed under these subjects: nuclear nonproliferation: origins and status; requirements for nuclear weapons manufacture; current nuclear programs and proliferation capabilities; encouraging decisions to forego weapons; arms control; safeguards; attitudes and expectations. Chapter 10, Nuclear Terrorism, discusses these areas: theft of nuclear materials; attacks on nuclear reactors; responding to nuclear terrorism; security and civil liberties

  2. The International Atomic Energy Agency shows keen interest. Innovative warning system for nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smet, S.; Van der Meer, K.

    2011-01-01

    In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, nuclear fuels and other strategic materials have to be responsibly managed. Non-proliferation aims to counteract the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear materials worldwide. SCK-CEN is developing an innovative nuclear warning system based on political and economic indicators. Such a system should allow the early detection of the development of a nuclear weapons programme.

  3. Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

    2000-01-01

    The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

  4. Multi-component Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System: On proliferation resistance aspect

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shmelev, A.; Saito, M; Artisyuk, V.

    2000-01-01

    Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES) that simultaneously meets four requirements: energy production, fuel production, burning of radionuclides and safety is targeted at harmonization of nuclear energy technology with human environment. The main bulk of SCNES studies focus on a potential of fast reactor (FR) in generating neutron excess to keep suitable neutron balance. Proliferation resistance was implicitly anticipated in a fuel cycle with co-processing of Pu, minor actinides (MA) and some relatively short-lived fission products (FP). In a contrast to such a mono-component system, the present paper advertises advantage of incorporating accelerator and fusion driven neutron sources which could drastically improve characteristics of nuclear waste incineration. What important is that they could help in creating advanced Np and Pa containing fuels with double protection against uncontrolled proliferation. The first level of protection deals with possibility to approach long life core (LLC) in fission reactors. Extending the core life-time to reactor-time is beneficial from the proliferation resistance viewpoint since LLC would not necessarily require fuel management at energy producing site, with potential advantage of being moved to vendor site for spent fuel refabrication. Second level is provided by the presence of substantial amounts of 238 Pu and 232 U in these fuels that makes fissile nuclides in them isotopically protected. All this reveals an important advantage of a multi-component SCNES that could draw in developing countries without elaborated technological infrastructure. (author)

  5. International proliferation on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, J.

    1977-01-01

    The subject is dealt with under the following headings: introduction; routes to proliferation (preparation of U 235 , Pu 239 , U 233 ); nuclear power fuel cycles and proliferation; the fast reactor fuel cycle; security aspects of the existing fuel cycle; the IAEA and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is concluded that 'the basis for sound international control exists, and taken together with the further technical steps which will be taken to make the existing fuel cycles more robust against the diversion of materials by terrorists and the abuse of civil nuclear power programmes by governments, we have good reason to proceed now with the orderly exploitation of ...nuclear energy...'. (U.K.)

  6. Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

  7. The encapsulated nuclear heat source reactor for proliferation-resistant nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, N.W.; Hossain, Q.; Carelli, M.D.; Conway, L.; Dzodzo, M.; Greenspan, E.; Saphier, D.

    2001-01-01

    The encapsulated nuclear heat source (ENHS) is a modular reactor that was selected by the 1999 DOE NERI program as a candidate ''Generation-IV'' reactor concept. It is a fast neutron spectrum reactor cooled by Pb-Bi using natural circulation. It is designed for passive load following, for high level of passive safety, and for 15 years without refueling. One of the unique features of the ENHS is that the fission-generated heat is transferred from the primary coolant to the secondary coolant across the reactor vessel wall by conduction-providing for an essentially sealed module that is easy to install and replace. Because the fuel is encapsulated within a heavy steel container throughout its life it provides a unique improvement to the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle. This paper presents the innovative technology of the ENHS. (author)

  8. Controlling nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sweet, W.

    1981-01-01

    Nuclear non-proliferation policy depends on the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which countries promise not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for open access to peaceful nuclear technology, and a system of international safeguards that are imposed on exported nuclear equipment and facilities operated by parties to the treaty. Critics have feared all along that non-nuclear countries might circumvent or exploit the system to obtain nuclear weapons and that the Atoms for Peace plan would spread the very technology it sought to control. The nuclear weapons states would like everyone else to believe that atomic bombs are undesirable, but they continue to rely on the bombs for their own defense. Israel's raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor focused world attention on the proliferation problem and helped to broaden and sterengthen its prospects. It also highlighted the weakness that there are no effective sanctions against violators. Until the international community can ageee on enforcement measures powerful enough to prevent nuclear proliferation, individual countries may be tempted to follow Israel's example, 19 references

  9. Dynamics of nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyer, S.M.

    1984-01-01

    This book looks beyond policy disputes to make a systematic examination of the assumptions and contending hypotheses that constitute contemporary thinking on nuclear proliferation. Rather than determine who is right or wrong, the intent is to develop a better picture by using the various schools of thought as analytic windows. A better understanding of how the process operates should offer better guidance for predicting future nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, for controlling it. Separate chapters deal with the contending views, the technological and motivational bases of nuclear proliferation, the presence of a technological imperative, testing the motivational hypothesis, the dynamics of the process, and forecasting. Four appendices present historical decisions, the technical model, cost-estimating procedures, and procedures for estimating nuclear propensities. 288 references, 17 figures, 26 tables

  10. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  11. Non Proliferation of Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambang S Irawan

    2004-01-01

    Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons is the international community's efforts to maintain the security of the world, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation for the use of nuclear peaceful purposes, build mutual trust (Confidence Building Measures) as well as to achieve the ultimate goal of disarmament overall (General and Complete Disarmament). Addressing the post-WTC tragedy, 11 September 2001, the Indonesian government should set up a National Measures (National Action Plan), among others formed the National Security Council and NBC Counter Proliferation Unit, or the National Authority for Nuclear Treaty, preparing national legislation, to prevent the abuse nuclear materials for terrorist acts, prevent Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear materials, developed a National Preparedness and Emergency Response Management in the event of a nuclear accident or attack by the use of nuclear terrorism. Importance of a National Action Plan meant the existence of a national commitment in the context of compliance with treaties and conventions which have been ratified relating to safety, security, safeguards towards a general and complete disarmament, to safeguard national security and maintain peace (safeguards) international

  12. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  13. The nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gere, F.

    1995-04-01

    In this book is detailed the beginning of nuclear military power, with the first bomb of Hiroshima, the different ways of getting uranium 235 and plutonium 239, and how the first countries (Usa, Ussr, China, United kingdom, France) got nuclear weapons. Then the most important part is reviewed with the details of non-proliferation treaty and the creation of IAEA to promote civilian nuclear power in the world and to control the use of plutonium and uranium in nuclear power plants. The cases of countries who reached the atom mastery, such Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Algeria, Taiwan and the reasons which they wanted nuclear weapon for or why they gave up, are exposed

  14. The self-consistent energy system with an enhanced non-proliferated core concept for global nuclear energy utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawashima, Masatoshi; Arie, Kazuo; Araki, Yoshio; Sato, Mitsuyoshi; Mori, Kenji; Nakayama, Yoshiyuki; Nakazono, Ryuichi; Kuroda, Yuji; Ishiguma, Kazuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    2008-01-01

    A sustainable nuclear energy system was developed based on the concept of Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES). Our study that trans-uranium (TRU) metallic fuel fast reactor cycle coupled with recycling of five long-lived fission products (LLFP) as well as actinides is the most promising system for the sustainable nuclear utilization. Efficient utilization of uranium-238 through the SCNES concept opens the doors to prolong the lifetime of nuclear energy systems towards several tens of thousand years. Recent evolution of the concept revealed compatibility of fuel sustainability, minor actinide (MA) minimization and non-proliferation aspects for peaceful use of nuclear energy systems through the discussion. As for those TRU compositions stabilized under fast neutron spectra, plutonium isotope fractions are remained in the range of reactor grade classification with high fraction of Pu240 isotope. Recent evolution of the SCNES concept has revealed that TRU recycling can cope with enhancing non-proliferation efforts in peaceful use with the 'no-blanket and multi-zoning core' concept. Therefore, the realization of SCNES is most important. In addition, along the process to the goals, a three-step approach is proposed to solve concurrent problems raised in the LWR systems. We discussed possible roles and contribution to the near future demand along worldwide expansion of LWR capacities by applying the 1st generation SCNES. MA fractions in TRU are more than 10% from LWR discharged fuels and even higher up to 20% in fuels from long interim storages. TRU recycling in the 1st generation SCNES system can reduce the MA fractions down to 4-5% in a few decades. This capability significantly releases 'MA' pressures in down-stream of LWR systems. Current efforts for enhancing capabilities for energy generation by LWR systems are efficient against the global warming crisis. In parallel to those movements, early realization of the SCNES concept can be the most viable decision

  15. Nuclear dilemma: power, proliferation, and development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.

    1979-01-01

    Debate over President Carter's nuclear energy policy centers on how to develop nuclear power for civilian use and prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials for weapons. Both supporters and opponents of nuclear energy have been critical of Carter's policies because each side fails to see the linkage between the two concerns as codified in the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act. The author uses a dialogue format to illustrate the arguments for resisting proliferation and recognizing nuclear energy as an appropriate technology. The consequences of a nuclear moratorium are explored along with implications for foreign policy. U.S. leadership in developing energy technologies that can meet a broad range of appropriate applications, combined with leadership in building appropriate political frameworks, is needed if nuclear energy is to make a positive contribution toward world peace and acceptable living standards. 8 references

  16. Position paper on nuclear proliferation issues preventing nuclear proliferation. A duty for the nuclear community

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre; Bonin, Bernard [ENS High Scientific Council, Brussels (Belgium)

    2010-06-15

    The production of electricity from nuclear power plants is widely seen today as having an increasing role to play in meeting global energy requirements in a sustainable manner. Conscious of the inherently sensitive nature of nuclear technology and materials the ENS-HSC (European Nuclear Society - High Scientific Council) is well aware that a severe safety, security, environmental or proliferation mishap stemming from nuclear energy anywhere in the world would undermine the potential for nuclear energy to contribute to the global energy supply and the minimization of harmful carbon emissions. While the safety of nuclear power plants has continuously improved over the last three decades, the same degree of success cannot be claimed when it comes to the achievements of the international community in stemming the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. This unfortunate situation is due to both technical and political reasons. The European nuclear industry is committed to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and to export nuclear facilities and related materials, equipment and technology solely in accordance with relevant national export laws and regulations, Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and pertinent United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The ENS-HSC considers that, as a manifestation of their strong commitment to nonproliferation, it is important for the nuclear industry to pay special attention to and promote proliferation-resistant designs and to take IAEA safeguards requirements into account at the design stage. Preventing nuclear proliferation is primarily the responsibility of states but, as major stakeholders, the nuclear industry and scientific community should actively support nuclear disarmament as foreseen in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and measures necessary to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, particularly the international control of the flux of nuclear material and technology. (orig.)

  17. Position paper on nuclear proliferation issues preventing nuclear proliferation. A duty for the nuclear community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre; Bonin, Bernard

    2010-01-01

    The production of electricity from nuclear power plants is widely seen today as having an increasing role to play in meeting global energy requirements in a sustainable manner. Conscious of the inherently sensitive nature of nuclear technology and materials the ENS-HSC (European Nuclear Society - High Scientific Council) is well aware that a severe safety, security, environmental or proliferation mishap stemming from nuclear energy anywhere in the world would undermine the potential for nuclear energy to contribute to the global energy supply and the minimization of harmful carbon emissions. While the safety of nuclear power plants has continuously improved over the last three decades, the same degree of success cannot be claimed when it comes to the achievements of the international community in stemming the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. This unfortunate situation is due to both technical and political reasons. The European nuclear industry is committed to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and to export nuclear facilities and related materials, equipment and technology solely in accordance with relevant national export laws and regulations, Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and pertinent United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The ENS-HSC considers that, as a manifestation of their strong commitment to nonproliferation, it is important for the nuclear industry to pay special attention to and promote proliferation-resistant designs and to take IAEA safeguards requirements into account at the design stage. Preventing nuclear proliferation is primarily the responsibility of states but, as major stakeholders, the nuclear industry and scientific community should actively support nuclear disarmament as foreseen in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and measures necessary to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, particularly the international control of the flux of nuclear material and technology. (orig.)

  18. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  19. Methodology for proliferation resistance and physical protection of Generation IV nuclear energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bari, R.; Peterson, P.; Nishimura, R.; Roglans-Ribas, J.

    2005-01-01

    Enhanced proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) is one of the technology goals for advanced nuclear concepts. Under the auspices of the Generation IV International Forum an international experts group has been chartered to develop an evaluation methodology for PR and PP. This methodology will permit an objective PR and PP comparison between alternative nuclear systems and support design optimization to enhance robustness against proliferation, theft and sabotage. The assessment framework consists of identifying the threats to be considered, defining the PR and PP measures required to evaluate the resistance of a nuclear system to proliferation, theft or sabotage, and establishing quantitative methods to evaluate the proposed measures. The defined PR and PP measures are based on the design of the system (e.g., materials, processes, facilities), and institutional measures (e.g., safeguards, access control). The assessment methodology uses analysis of pathways' with respect to specific threats to determine the PR and PP measures. Analysis requires definition of the threats (i.e. objective, capability, strategy), decomposition of the system into its relevant elements (e.g., reactor core, fuel recycle facility, fuel storage), and identification of targets. (author)

  20. Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

    2005-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

  1. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1983-06-01

    David Lilienthal, a Harvard Law graduate and director of the Tenne- see Valley Authority, as chairman of the board of consul- tants. Their job, as...Nuclear Age, pp. 81-83, The MIT Press, 1974. Paul C. Szasz , "International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards," in International Safeguards and Nuclear...princi- ple of national sovereignty as embodied in international law , As stated earlier, the NPT safeguards system included the whole range of a

  2. Can we predict nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2011-01-01

    The author aims at improving nuclear proliferation prediction capacities, i.e. the capacities to identify countries susceptible to acquire nuclear weapons, to interpret sensitive activities, and to assess nuclear program modalities. He first proposes a retrospective assessment of counter-proliferation actions since 1945. Then, based on academic studies, he analyzes what causes and motivates proliferation, with notably the possibility of existence of a chain phenomenon (mechanisms driving from one program to another). He makes recommendations for a global approach to proliferation prediction, and proposes proliferation indices and indicators

  3. Separation of nuclear power from nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Starr, C.

    1978-01-01

    A successful development of the proposed combination of the Fast Breeder Reactor and the CIVEX fuel reprocessing facility would provide an economical nuclear power source for many centuries which inherently separates nuclear power from the issue of weapons material diversion and proliferation. Further, by so doing, it permits great flexibility in international and national planning for nuclear power, as the issues of fuel dependence and terrorist and subnational diversions disappear. In addition, the expansion of the FBR/CIVEX system would eat into the LWR spent fuel stockpile, diminishing steadily this relatively accessible plutonium source. And finally, a rapid development of the FBR/CIVEX for the above reasons would substantially reduce the worldwide concern as to the adequacy of uranium ore supply. From a historical view, it would restore fast reactor development to the path originally foreseen in the programs of worldwide nuclear energy authorities, including the Atomic Energy Commission during its first two decades of existence

  4. Methodological considerations in evaluating a proliferation resistance of innovative nuclear energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Takaki, Naoyuki; Murajiri, Masahiro; Nakagome, Yoshihiro; Tokiwai, Moriyasu

    2004-01-01

    Over 25 years ago, INFCE studied the evaluation methodology of proliferation resistance. Recently, INPRO and GEN-IV coordinated by the IAEA and the USDOE respectively seek an appropriate innovative fuel cycle system for next generation that is furnished safer, sustainable, economical and reliable features. The evaluation methodology of the proliferation resistance is also assigned as an essential part of both studies. The IAEA established and has been strictly implementing the verification measures with accurate material accountancy system from the early of the 1970s in order to detect diversion of plutonium that is individually separated from irradiated nuclear material and recycled as MOX fuel. This paper firstly identifies the impedibility of intrinsic features of innovative fuel cycles and the safeguardability of selected nonproliferation measures as two individual essential parameters for evaluation of a proliferation resistance capability. As a next step, this paper also shows methodological considerations in evaluating the proliferation resistance levels as a multiple model of several clusters that are identified the ability of each parameter. (author)

  5. Uncertainties in Nuclear Proliferation Modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Chul Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok

    2015-01-01

    There have been various efforts in the research community to understand the determinants of nuclear proliferation and develop quantitative tools to predict nuclear proliferation events. Such systematic approaches have shown the possibility to provide warning for the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation activities. However, there are still large debates for the robustness of the actual effect of determinants and projection results. Some studies have shown that several factors can cause uncertainties in previous quantitative nuclear proliferation modeling works. This paper analyzes the uncertainties in the past approaches and suggests future works in the view of proliferation history, analysis methods, and variable selection. The research community still lacks the knowledge for the source of uncertainty in current models. Fundamental problems in modeling will remain even other advanced modeling method is developed. Before starting to develop fancy model based on the time dependent proliferation determinants' hypothesis, using graph theory, etc., it is important to analyze the uncertainty of current model to solve the fundamental problems of nuclear proliferation modeling. The uncertainty from different proliferation history coding is small. Serious problems are from limited analysis methods and correlation among the variables. Problems in regression analysis and survival analysis cause huge uncertainties when using the same dataset, which decreases the robustness of the result. Inaccurate variables for nuclear proliferation also increase the uncertainty. To overcome these problems, further quantitative research should focus on analyzing the knowledge suggested on the qualitative nuclear proliferation studies

  6. Nuclear power proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, B.

    1977-01-01

    The nuclear industry is experiencing a multiple crisis in which economic, technical and ethical aspects are blended inextricably. Nuclear hardware costs have everywhere soared far beyond inflation in the last five years, largely as a result of delays in programme completion arising from problems of reactor and fuel cycle. Meanwhile, partly as a result of this cost escalation, there is widespread and growing doubt as to whether capital will be available to finance the electricity generating levels projected by the industry and by governments for the 1990s. The nuclear industry is now in trouble at every stage of the fuel cycle. The industry's difficulties have also revealed a lack of overall - but particularly nuclear - energy strategy at either national or international levels, and a lack of will to create regulations and institutional machinery at either of these levels which might reassure both concerned publics and the energy industries themselves. This paper appraises some of the present limitations of international institutions in achieving control and management of nuclear power. (author)

  7. Energy: nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lung, M.

    2000-11-01

    Convinced that the nuclear energy will be the cleaner, safer, more economical and more respectful of the environment energy of the future, the author preconizes to study the way it can be implemented, to continue to improve its production, to understand its virtues and to better inform the public. He develops this opinion in the presentation of the principal characteristics of the nuclear energy: technology, radioactive wastes, radiation protection, the plutonium, the nuclear accidents, the proliferation risks, the economics and nuclear energy and competitiveness, development and sustainability. (A.L.B.)

  8. Key Issues on Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo; Whang, Joo Ho; Lee, Un Chul

    2005-01-01

    Energy demand in East Asia casts a significant challenge to sustainable economy development and socio-political stability in the region which has experienced tensions throughout the history. The energy demand in this region has been dramatically increased since the start of reform in PRC. DPRK is another challenge. The current electricity consumption in DPRK is around 10% of that in ROK. If the economy of PRC continuously grows to the level of neighboring states and if the living standard of DPRK reaches that of ROK, the energy and electricity demand in the region will certainly be out of control unless the proper measures are taken into actions from today. The only feasible energy option is the nuclear one. PRC already proclaimed its ambitious plan to deploy more than 30 reactors in the near future. In addition, a couple of the South Eastern Asian states expressed their willingness to introduce nuclear power plants in the future. The increase in the use of nuclear energy is expected to bring up the nuclear renaissance in the region. However, without the proper mechanisms to supply fresh fuels and to manage spent nuclear fuels with full compliance of nuclear energy nonproliferation, the new development will inevitably cause the instability in the region. So far many interesting proposals on nuclear cooperation in East Asia were announced. Unfortunately, none of them works out properly yet, partly because the old proposals were too political. To restart the engine of the nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation in the region, it is necessary to find out what would be the common interests of the region not so much related to politics. In this paper, some key technical issues are addressed for future regional joint studies

  9. Nuclear power and weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwood, T.; Rathjens, C.W.; Ruina, J.

    1977-01-01

    The relationship between nuclear weapons development and nuclear electric power is examined. A brief description of nuclear weapons design is first given. This is then followed by a discussion of various aspects of nuclear power technology and of how they affect a nuclear weapon programme. These include fuel cycles, chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment, and the control of dissemination of nuclear technology. In conclusion there is a discussion of possible political and institutional controls for limiting nuclear proliferation. (U.K.)

  10. Brexit, Euratom and nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soedersten, Anna

    2016-01-01

    One of the issues absent from the academic (and public) debate on the United Kingdom's (UK) referendum vote to withdraw from the European Union (EU) (commonly referred to as 'Brexit') is what will happen to the UK's membership in the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Euratom Treaty was signed in Rome in 1957, together with the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It was concluded for an unlimited period and it establishes a Community that has a separate legal personality from the EU. Thus, the EU and Euratom form two separate, although closely linked entities. Euratom's principal mission is related to the economy, tasked with 'creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries'; in other words, to promote the nuclear industry. This reflects the high expectations for nuclear energy in the 1950's. Some even believed that the development of nuclear energy would trigger an industrial revolution; however, Euratom only came to play a minor role in the European integration process. Despite this, the Euratom Treaty has remained, almost unchanged, since its adoption and is still frequently applied, although it is unclear to what extent it has boosted the nuclear industry. This article has a two-fold purpose. The first purpose is to address the constitutional issue of 'partial membership'. All EU member states are also members of Euratom. It has always been assumed that with membership in the EU also comes a membership in Euratom. But, what about withdrawal? What are the arguments for 'partial membership'? The second purpose of this article is to shed light on some implications of Brexit as it relates to Euratom. The most serious consequences are perhaps found in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. The United Kingdom is one of two nuclear weapon states in the EU (France being the other one). Withdrawal from Euratom means withdrawal from its control system, the system of so-called nuclear safeguards. Under

  11. Energy efficiency and proliferation assessment factors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    The objective of INFCE is to evaluate the nuclear fuel cycles from the point of view of their ability to satisfy the worldwide nuclear energy needs, while minimizing the proliferation risks. Accordingly, the different working groups have to take into consideration as well the energy-efficiency and the proliferation-resistance of these nuclear fuel cycles. The present working paper is aimed at suggesting the main assessment factors which should be taken into consideration

  12. Nuclear experts and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1979-01-01

    In Germany the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation has attracted scant attention. Most potential nuclear weapon states are important trade partners of the FRG and, since further proliferation of nuclear weapons could worsen conflicts involving these, it should be in the FRG's interest to limit proliferation. The security of the FRG is also dependent on the common interest of the great powers to avoid nuclear war. The contradictory positions of Usa and the USSR on nuclear weapons policy regarding themselves and non-nuclear weapon states encourages less developed countries to see nuclear weaponry as useful. The NPT and IAEA safeguards have only limited inhibiting effect. The nuclear export policy of the FRG has been dominated by short term economic advantage, neglecting the negative long term effects of decreased political stability. The FRG should formulate a policy based on self-restraint, positive stimuli and extension of controls, using its economic strength to deter proliferation. (JIW)

  13. Theoretical Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Konstantin S. Tarasov

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available This article analyses discussions between representatives of three schools in the theory of international relations - realism, liberalism and constructivism - on the driving factors of nuclear proliferation. The paper examines major theoretical approaches, outlined in the studies of Russian and foreign scientists, to the causes of nuclear weapons development, while unveiling their advantages and limitations. Much of the article has been devoted to alternative approaches, particularly, the role of mathematical modeling in assessing proliferation risks. The analysis also reveals a variety of different approaches to nuclear weapons acquisition, as well as the absence of a comprehensive proliferation theory. Based on the research results the study uncovers major factors both favoring and impeding nuclear proliferation. The author shows that the lack of consensus between realists, liberals and constructivists on the nature of proliferation led a number of scientists to an attempt to explain nuclear rationale by drawing from the insights of more than one school in the theory of IR. Detailed study of the proliferation puzzle contributes to a greater understating of contemporary international realities, helps to identify mechanisms that are most likely to deter states from obtaining nuclear weapons and is of the outmost importance in predicting short- and long-term security environment. Furthermore, analysis of the existing scientific literature on nuclear proliferation helps to determine future research agenda of the subject at hand.

  14. Domestic Politics and Nuclear Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Chul Min; Yim, Man Sung

    2016-01-01

    The external security threat is known as the most important factor of nuclear weapons program, the domestic politics situation can also affect the nuclear proliferation decision of a country. For example, when a leader wants nuclear weapons as an ultimate weapon, the domestic politics situation can determine the effectiveness of the weapons program of a country. This study analyzes the current knowledge of the relationship between domestic politics and nuclear proliferation and suggests the main challenges of the quantitative models trying to calculate nuclear proliferation risk of countries. The domestic politics status is one of the most important indicators of nuclear program. However, some variables have never been used in quantitative analyses; for example, number of veto players and the public opinion on nuclear weapons; despite they are considered to be important in various qualitative studies. Future studies should focus on how should they be coded and how can they be linked with existing domestic politics variables

  15. Domestic Politics and Nuclear Proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Chul Min; Yim, Man Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The external security threat is known as the most important factor of nuclear weapons program, the domestic politics situation can also affect the nuclear proliferation decision of a country. For example, when a leader wants nuclear weapons as an ultimate weapon, the domestic politics situation can determine the effectiveness of the weapons program of a country. This study analyzes the current knowledge of the relationship between domestic politics and nuclear proliferation and suggests the main challenges of the quantitative models trying to calculate nuclear proliferation risk of countries. The domestic politics status is one of the most important indicators of nuclear program. However, some variables have never been used in quantitative analyses; for example, number of veto players and the public opinion on nuclear weapons; despite they are considered to be important in various qualitative studies. Future studies should focus on how should they be coded and how can they be linked with existing domestic politics variables.

  16. Non-proliferation and nuclear data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sowerby, M.G.

    1978-01-01

    A review is made of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons with particular emphasis on proliferation and nuclear power. Some indications of the nuclear data requirements associated with methods of reducing proliferation risks are presented

  17. Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

    1978-01-01

    Concern over the risk of nuclear proliferation has led to extensive reexamination of the technical, economic, and political assumptions underlying both national and international nuclear policies. An attempt is made in the present article to clarify the basic technical and political issues. The connections between various fuel cycles and their possible proliferation risks are discussed. As the resolution of the existing differing views on proliferation risks will be largely a political process, solutions to the problem are not proposed

  18. Nuclear proliferation: linkages and solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quester, G.H.

    1979-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation must be periodically re-examined as a moral as well as a practical foreign policy dilemma. The question is asked whether proliferation precludes a safe and peaceful world, or if a halt to proliferation is adequate without other arms control. The moral dilemma in foreign policy arises over the need to make practical choices which often serve one goal while sacrificing another. The ramifications of nuclear proliferation are examined and the conclusions reached that it is not an acceptable option. It is also decided that, because general disarmament steps will be more difficult to achieve, the world may have to accept a small number of nuclear arsenals as the price of state sovereignties. A high priority for making the effort to prevent proliferation is advised. 8 references

  19. Nuclear proliferation and safeguards. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    This comprehensive analysis of the technological, economic, and political factors affecting the potential spread of nuclear weapons proved useful in the congressional debate which culminated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The report was subsequently published commercially and has been a frequently cited reference in the literature on proliferation and nuclear power. Despite developments since 1977, the information in the OTA report is still useful to those wishing to obtain an indepth understanding of the issues. Included is an analysis of why a nation might want nuclear weapons development program and the various sources of nuclear material are discussed. The control of proliferation is considered as well as its relation to the nuclear industry

  20. Nuclear war nuclear proliferation and their consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aga Khan, Sadruddin

    1986-01-01

    The paper concerns the proceedings of a conference hosted by the Groupe de Bellerive to explore and discuss the implications for humanity of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation and their consequences, Geneva 1985. The conference was divided into five sessions, headed by the subject titles: the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and its future, the spread of nuclear weapons among nations, global effects of a nuclear war, the nuclear arms race and arms control, the NPT and its future. Twenty eight papers were presented in the five sessions. (UK)

  1. E-cadherin expression increases cell proliferation by regulating energy metabolism through nuclear factor-κB in AGS cells.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Song Yi; Shin, Jee-Hye; Kee, Sun-Ho

    2017-09-01

    β-Catenin is a central player in Wnt signaling, and activation of Wnt signaling is associated with cancer development. E-cadherin in complex with β-catenin mediates cell-cell adhesion, which suppresses β-catenin-dependent Wnt signaling. Recently, a tumor-suppressive role for E-cadherin has been reconsidered, as re-expression of E-cadherin was reported to enhance the metastatic potential of malignant tumors. To explore the role of E-cadherin, we established an E-cadherin-expressing cell line, EC96, from AGS cells that featured undetectable E-cadherin expression and a high level of Wnt signaling. In EC96 cells, E-cadherin re-expression enhanced cell proliferation, although Wnt signaling activity was reduced. Subsequent analysis revealed that nuclear factor-κB (NF-κB) activation and consequent c-myc expression might be involved in E-cadherin expression-mediated cell proliferation. To facilitate rapid proliferation, EC96 cells enhance glucose uptake and produce ATP using both mitochondria oxidative phosphorylation and glycolysis, whereas AGS cells use these mechanisms less efficiently. These events appeared to be mediated by NF-κB activation. Therefore, E-cadherin re-expression and subsequent induction of NF-κB signaling likely enhance energy production and cell proliferation. © 2017 The Authors. Cancer Science published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of Japanese Cancer Association.

  2. Nuclear energy. Selective bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-07-01

    This bibliography gathers articles and books from the French National Library about civil nuclear energy, its related risks, and its perspectives of evolution: general overview (figures, legal framework, actors and markets, policies); what price for nuclear energy (environmental and health risks, financing, non-proliferation policy); future of nuclear energy in energy policies (nuclear energy versus other energies, nuclear phase-out); web sites selection

  3. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rippon, S.

    1984-01-01

    Do we need nuclear energy. Is it safe. What are the risks. Will it lead to proliferation. The questions are endless, the answers often confused. In the vigorous debates that surround the siting and operation of nuclear power plants, it is all too easy to lose sight of the central issues amid the mass of arguments and counter-arguments put forward. And there remains the doubt, who do we believe. This book presents the facts, simply, straightforwardly, and comprehensibly. It describes the different types of nuclear reactor, how they work, how energy is produced and transformed into usable power, how nuclear waste is handled, what safeguards are built in to prevent accident, contamination and misuse. More important, it does this in the context of the real world, examining the benefits as well as the dangers of a nuclear power programme, quantifying the risks, and providing an authoritative account of the nuclear industry worldwide. Technically complex and politically controversial, the contribution of nuclear energy to our future energy requirements is a crucial topic of our time. (author)

  4. Proliferation risks from nuclear power infrastructure

    Science.gov (United States)

    Squassoni, Sharon

    2017-11-01

    Certain elements of nuclear energy infrastructure are inherently dual-use, which makes the promotion of nuclear energy fraught with uncertainty. Are current restraints on the materials, equipment, and technology that can be used either to produce fuel for nuclear electricity generation or material for nuclear explosive devices adequate? Technology controls, supply side restrictions, and fuel market assurances have been used to dissuade countries from developing sensitive technologies but the lack of legal restrictions is a continued barrier to permanent reduction of nuclear proliferation risks.

  5. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  6. Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2015-10-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

  7. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  8. Regulation of Liver Energy Balance by the Nuclear Receptors Farnesoid X Receptor and Peroxisome Proliferator Activated Receptor α.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Kang Ho; Moore, David D

    2017-01-01

    The liver undergoes major changes in substrate utilization and metabolic output over the daily feeding and fasting cycle. These changes occur acutely in response to hormones such as insulin and glucagon, with rapid changes in signaling pathways mediated by protein phosphorylation and other post-translational modifications. They are also reflected in chronic alterations in gene expression in response to nutrient-sensitive transcription factors. Among these, the nuclear receptors farnesoid X receptor (FXR) and peroxisome proliferator activated receptor α (PPARα) provide an intriguing, coordinated response to maintain energy balance in the liver. FXR is activated in the fed state by bile acids returning to the liver, while PPARα is activated in the fasted state in response to the free fatty acids produced by adipocyte lipolysis or possibly other signals. Key Messages: Previous studies indicate that FXR and PPARα have opposing effects on each other's primary targets in key metabolic pathways including gluconeogenesis. Our more recent work shows that these 2 nuclear receptors coordinately regulate autophagy: FXR suppresses this pathway of nutrient and energy recovery, while PPARα activates it. Another recent study indicates that FXR activates the complement and coagulation pathway, while earlier studies identify this as a negative target of PPARα. Since secretion is a very energy- and nutrient-intensive process for hepatocytes, it is possible that FXR licenses it in the nutrient-rich fed state, while PPARα represses it to spare resources in the fasted state. Energy balance is a potential connection linking FXR and PPARα regulation of autophagy and secretion, 2 seemingly unrelated aspects of hepatocyte function. FXR and PPARα act coordinately to promote energy balance and homeostasis in the liver by regulating autophagy and potentially protein secretion. It is quite likely that their impact extends to additional pathways relevant to hepatic energy balance, and

  9. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  10. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  11. Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zentner, Michael D.; Coles, Garill A.; Talbert, Robert J.

    2005-10-04

    A process is underway to develop mature, integrated methodologies to address nonproliferation issues. A variety of methodologies (both qualitative and quantitative) are being considered. All have one thing in common, a need for a consistent set of proliferation related data that can be used as a basis for application. One approach to providing a basis for predicting and evaluating future proliferation events is to understand past proliferation events, that is, the different paths that have actually been taken to acquire or attempt to acquire special nuclear material. In order to provide this information, this report describing previous material acquisition activities (obtained from open source material) has been prepared. This report describes how, based on an evaluation of historical trends in nuclear technology development, conclusions can be reached concerning: (1) The length of time it takes to acquire a technology; (2) The length of time it takes for production of special nuclear material to begin; and (3) The type of approaches taken for acquiring the technology. In addition to examining time constants, the report is intended to provide information that could be used to support the use of the different non-proliferation analysis methodologies. Accordingly, each section includes: (1) Technology description; (2) Technology origin; (3) Basic theory; (4) Important components/materials; (5) Technology development; (6) Technological difficulties involved in use; (7) Changes/improvements in technology; (8) Countries that have used/attempted to use the technology; (9) Technology Information; (10) Acquisition approaches; (11) Time constants for technology development; and (12) Required Concurrent Technologies.

  12. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  13. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  14. Nuclear proliferation. II. Monopoly or cartel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baker, S.J.

    1976-01-01

    Increasing competition between a growing number of nations exporting nuclear technology and recent exporting of full fuel-cycle facilities raise fears of nuclear proliferation and widespread nuclear weapons. As a result of the 1973 oil crisis, industrial nations seeking a share in the international nuclear market in order to protect their economic interests must also cooperate to protect these same interests from nuclear risks. Disagreement over the form of cooperation centers on the competing exporters' tactics of undercutting safeguards and political restrictions. Monopoly was never an option for even the United States. Government intervention in the international nuclear market in the form of subsidies and financial incentives is a more practical approach than a free market. A cartel arrangement is appropriate to nuclear energy in the sense of reducing economic uncertainties, but political objections would be strong and there would be some risk of independent nuclear development. As a strategy to forestall proliferation, however, the cartel can control exports of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and make it more expensive for nations to independently develop nuclear weapons. An enlargement of safeguards arrangements by nuclear suppliers will require nations to trade some of their economic interests in order to achieve international political objectives

  15. Gas Centrifuges and Nuclear Proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Albright, David

    2004-09-15

    Gas centrifuges have been an ideal enrichment method for a wide variety of countries. Many countries have built gas centrifuges to make enriched uranium for peaceful nuclear purposes. Other countries have secretly sought centrifuges to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In more recent times, several countries have secretly sought or built gas centrifuges in regions of tension. The main countries that have been of interest in the last two decades have been Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Currently, most attention is focused on Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. These states did not have the indigenous abilities to make gas centrifuges, focusing instead on illicit and questionable foreign procurement. The presentation covered the following main sections: Spread of centrifuges through illicit procurement; Role of export controls in stopping proliferation; Increasing the transparency of gas centrifuge programs in non-nuclear weapon states; and, Verified dismantlement of gas centrifuge programs. Gas centrifuges are important providers of low enriched uranium for civil nuclear power reactors. They also pose special nuclear proliferation risks. We all have special responsibilities to prevent the spread of gas centrifuges into regions of tension and to mitigate the consequences of their spread into the Middle East, South Asia, and North Asia.

  16. The challenges of nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-01-01

    The author of this article first outlines that the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a tool of domination used by nuclear powers: they can keep and even develop their own nuclear arsenal, while other countries who sign this treaty commit themselves not to try to acquire nuclear weapons. The USA and USSR kept on persuading various countries to sign this treaty, but eventually let some countries develop their military nuclear programme (Israel, Pakistan, or India). He evokes technical difficulties in the application of the Treaty, notably for the control of centrifugation activities. He outlines that the USA have now a dominant position with respect to this Treaty and its application, but that the Treaty remains a major safety element for the world. He evokes more recent and negative evolutions: the withdrawal of North Korea from the Treaty, the destruction of an Iraqi nuclear reactor by Israel (i.e. the destruction of a nuclear installation belonging to a country who signed the NPT by a country who did not sign it). He proposes an overview of the Iranian issue (history of the Iranian nuclear programme, of the nuclear crisis, of the still going on negotiations), and describes what could be the worst possible scenario

  17. Nuclear power and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apold, A.

    1978-01-01

    The theme of Dr. Marshall's lecture was that it is, from the viewpoint of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons,preferable to use plutonium as a fuel in FBR reactors rather than store it in what, in effect, would be plutonium mines. The true threat of proliferation lies in uranium enrichment. The FBR reactor is misunderstood and the US policy is not against breeders as such. Safeguards against the misuse of plutonium by leaving a residue of radioactivity after reprocessing is quite feasible, despite certain practical problems and extra costs. Weapon proliferation is subject to political objectives and intentions. Definite proposals are, (a) a limited number of reprocessing centres, (b) an accelerated development of FBR reactors, (c) a new FBR fuel cycle, (d) stop storage of spent thermal reactor fuel, (e) reinforced safeguards. (JIW)

  18. Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation: Magnitude Matters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert J. Goldston

    2010-03-03

    Integrated energy, environment and economics modeling suggests electrical energy use will increase from 2.4 TWe today to 12 TWe in 2100. It will be challenging to provide 40% of this electrical power from combustion with carbon sequestration, as it will be challenging to provide 30% from renewable energy sources. Thus nuclear power may be needed to provide ~30% by 2100. Calculations of the associated stocks and flows of uranium, plutonium and minor actinides indicate that the proliferation risks at mid-century, using current light-water reactor technology, are daunting. There are institutional arrangements that may be able to provide an acceptable level of risk mitigation, but they will be difficult to implement. If a transition is begun to fast-spectrum reactors at mid-century, without a dramatic change in the proliferation risks of such systems, at the end of the century proliferation risks are much greater, and more resistant to mitigation. The risks of nuclear power should be compared with the risks of the estimated 0.64oC long-term global surface-average temperature rise predicted if nuclear power were replaced with coal-fired power plants without carbon sequestration. Fusion energy, if developed, would provide a source of nuclear power with much lower proliferation risks than fission.

  19. Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation: Magnitude Matters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldston, Robert J.

    2010-01-01

    Integrated energy, environment and economics modeling suggests electrical energy use will increase from 2.4 TWe today to 12 TWe in 2100. It will be challenging to provide 40% of this electrical power from combustion with carbon sequestration, as it will be challenging to provide 30% from renewable energy sources. Thus nuclear power may be needed to provide ∼30% by 2100. Calculations of the associated stocks and flows of uranium, plutonium and minor actinides indicate that the proliferation risks at mid-century, using current light-water reactor technology, are daunting. There are institutional arrangements that may be able to provide an acceptable level of risk mitigation, but they will be difficult to implement. If a transition is begun to fast-spectrum reactors at mid-century, without a dramatic change in the proliferation risks of such systems, at the end of the century proliferation risks are much greater, and more resistant to mitigation. The risks of nuclear power should be compared with the risks of the estimated 0.64 C long-term global surface-average temperature rise predicted if nuclear power were replaced with coal-fired power plants without carbon sequestration. Fusion energy, if developed, would provide a source of nuclear power with much lower proliferation risks than fission.

  20. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuhn, W.

    1986-01-01

    This loose-leaf collection is made up of five didactically prepared units covering the following subjects: basic knowledge on nuclear energy, nuclear energy in relation to energy economy, site issues, environmental compatibility of nuclear energy, and nuclear energy in the focus of political and social action. To this was added a comprehensive collection of material: specific scientific background material, a multitude of tables, diagrams, charts etc. for copying, as well as 44 transparent charts, mostly in four colours. (orig./HP) [de

  1. Internationalization: an alternative to nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meller, E.

    1980-01-01

    Leading personalities in the field of nuclear energy worldwide assess possible improvements to the present nonproliferation regime and explore the possibilities for the internationalization of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Their studies address past and current nonproliferation policies, the current controversy between the United States and its European allies on the development of fast breeder reactors and plutonium recycling, implications of the recent US Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 upon US/Euratom relations, industrial government relationships, safety concerns, and the special needs of developing countries. Their conclusions stress the recognition of complex factors such as military security, technical competition, the spread of nuclear technology, and politics that will limit any mechanism to govern nonproliferation. They urge greater effort in educating the public to the political and economic complexities of nuclear power and recommend strengthening international agreements and other arrangements, including controls and safeguards, and the general rules for the international trade of nuclear fuel. 11 figures, 7 tables

  2. Outlook on non-proliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among Turkish speaking countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, great efforts were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the first Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join to European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasian Region. So, there are significant developments in cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owning to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's TAEK, besides the cooperation with various countries, has involved to cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for

  3. Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathjens, G.

    1979-01-01

    The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

  4. Nuclear energy and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blejwas, Thomas E.; Sanders, Thomas L.; Eagan, Robert J.; Baker, Arnold B.

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear power is an important and, the authors believe, essential component of a secure nuclear future. Although nuclear fuel cycles create materials that have some potential for use in nuclear weapons, with appropriate fuel cycles, nuclear power could reduce rather than increase real proliferation risk worldwide. Future fuel cycles could be designed to avoid plutonium production, generate minimal amounts of plutonium in proliferation-resistant amounts or configurations, and/or transparently and efficiently consume plutonium already created. Furthermore, a strong and viable US nuclear infrastructure, of which nuclear power is a large element, is essential if the US is to maintain a leadership or even participatory role in defining the global nuclear infrastructure and controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By focusing on new fuel cycles and new reactor technologies, it is possible to advantageously burn and reduce nuclear materials that could be used for nuclear weapons rather than increase and/or dispose of these materials. Thus, the authors suggest that planners for a secure nuclear future use technology to design an ideal future. In this future, nuclear power creates large amounts of virtually atmospherically clean energy while significantly lowering the threat of proliferation through the thoughtful use, physical security, and agreed-upon transparency of nuclear materials. The authors must develop options for policy makers that bring them as close as practical to this ideal. Just as Atoms for Peace became the ideal for the first nuclear century, they see a potential nuclear future that contributes significantly to power for peace and prosperity

  5. Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation: Magnitude Matters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldston, Robert J.

    2011-01-01

    Integrated energy, environment and economics modeling suggests that worldwide electrical energy use will increase from 2.4 TWe today to ∼12 TWe in 2100. It will be challenging to provide 40% of this electrical power from combustion with carbon sequestration, as it will be challenging to provide 30% from renewable energy sources derived from natural energy flows. Thus nuclear power may be needed to provide ∼30%, 3600 GWe, by 2100. Calculations of the associated stocks and flows of uranium, plutonium and minor actinides indicate that the proliferation risks at mid-century, using current light-water reactor technology, are daunting. There are institutional arrangements that may be able to provide an acceptable level of risk mitigation, but they will be difficult to implement. If a transition is begun to fast-spectrum reactors at mid-century, without a dramatic change in the proliferation risks of such systems, at the end of the century global nuclear proliferation risks are much greater, and more resistant to mitigation. Fusion energy, if successfully demonstrated to be economically competitive, would provide a source of nuclear power with much lower proliferation risks than fission.

  6. Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation: Magnitude Matters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert J. Goldston

    2011-04-28

    Integrated energy, environment and economics modeling suggests that worldwide electrical energy use will increase from 2.4 TWe today to ~12 TWe in 2100. It will be challenging to provide 40% of this electrical power from combustion with carbon sequestration, as it will be challenging to provide 30% from renewable energy sources derived from natural energy flows. Thus nuclear power may be needed to provide ~30%, 3600 GWe, by 2100. Calculations of the associated stocks and flows of uranium, plutonium and minor actinides indicate that the proliferation risks at mid-century, using current light-water reactor technology, are daunting. There are institutional arrangements that may be able to provide an acceptable level of risk mitigation, but they will be difficult to implement. If a transition is begun to fast-spectrum reactors at mid-century, without a dramatic change in the proliferation risks of such systems, at the end of the century global nuclear proliferation risks are much greater, and more resistant to mitigation. Fusion energy, if successfully demonstrated to be economically competitive, would provide a source of nuclear power with much lower proliferation risks than fission.

  7. Safety and proliferation concerns as constraints on nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gordon, L.

    1981-01-01

    Issues of safety and proliferation with respect to the nuclear option are discussed in this chapter. The basic premises underlying the author's analysis are: energy supply and use is a means to promote desired forms of development and not an end in itself; avoidance of nuclear mysticiam; avoidance of permanent discrimination; recognition of incommensurables; technological sophistication; and nuclear proliferation motivations apart from nuclear power development. A rational energy planner in a developing country will have to weigh carefully the interwoven factors of comparative costs and safety. Apart from cost considerations, the principal motivation for developing nuclear power is energy security

  8. The collection of the information on peaceful use of atomic energy and nuclear now proliferation and its summaries and analysis. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sato, S.; Takeda, Hiroshi [PESCO Co. Ltd., Tokyo (Japan)

    1999-03-01

    This report summarizes the monthly topics on peaceful uses of atomic energy and management of nuclear materials and its proliferation. The topics are based on the 127 related articles appeared in the newspapers of Japan; those are the Yomiuri, the Asahi, the Mainichi and the Sankei in ten months from May 1998 to February 1999. The most frequent topics are (1) nuclear inspection of Iraq and suspicion for nuclear weapon, (2) nuclear experiments, economic sanctions and CTBT in India and Pakistan, (3) underground nuclear facilities of North Korea and discussions on KEDO. The United Nations Security Council, IAEA and each country have responded on the issues of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, a resolution on suspension of nuclear test, reinforcement of IAEA security actions and an organization of NPT. The next topic is disarmament talks of nuclear weapon and nuclear waste disposal between USA and Russian Federation. Noteworthy issues are promotion of international cooperation on disposal of dismantled nuclear material of Russian Federation and supports for commercial use of plutonium. The fundamental concept is the timing of the pace between USA and Russian Federation on nuclear weapon disarmament. The point is how to realize the plan in the economical difficulty of Russian Federation. Other topics in the newspapers are disposal of Russian atomic submarines, sub-critical nuclear experiments of USA and Russian Federation, tritium production of USA, commercial uses of highly enriched uranium, nuclear of Iran, missile issues, transportation of plutonium. Technical terms and abbreviations are explained after the monthly topics with its background. The total 127 references of the newspaper articles are attached after the topics. (Y. Tanaka)

  9. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    An appropriate non-proliferation treaty should not discriminate among the non-weapon states, but should seek a cooperative approach with all countries seeking nuclear power and willing to accept international safeguards. Near-term proliferation problems, represented by nations already on the threshold of weapon capability, should not be confused with the long-term problem of world-wide nuclear development. The first can be handled with incentives and disincentives imposed on specific countries, while the latter involves the distribution of plutonium on the basis of alternative fuel cycles. To retain world leadership, U.S. efforts along these lines should be to encourage a dialogue between suppliers and recipients and to coordinate the economic and security issues of its own non-proliferation and foreign policies. One option is a U.S. commitment to a multinational fuel storage and reprocessing facility. Technical evaluation and demonstration of alternative fuel cycles to reach an international consensus would be a parallel activity

  10. Improved Technology To Prevent Nuclear Proliferation And Counter Nuclear Terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richardson, J; Yuldashev, B; Labov, S; Knapp, R

    2006-06-12

    As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation. As nuclear energy and hence nuclear materials become an increasingly global phenomenon, using local technologies and capabilities facilitate incorporation of enhanced monitoring and detection on the regional level. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation and countering radiological/nuclear terrorism. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, passive detection, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity many-fold at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Different detection algorithms enable fissile materials to be distinguished from other radioisotopes.

  11. Nuclear proliferation: prospects, problems, and proposals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    This issue of the ANNALS addresses itself to three aspects of nuclear proliferation: the prospect that new nuclear powers will come on the scene, the problems that their arrival may create, and ways of coping with those problems. In an introductory paper, ''Quo Vadimus,'' Joseph I. Coffey investigates the pros and cons of proliferation, concluding that it is not a question of whether there will be nuclear proliferation, but in what countries. Part I, Where We Are, contains five papers preceded by introductory comments by Joseph I. Coffey. The papers and their authors are: Why States Go--and Don't Go--Nuclear, William Epstein; How States Can ''Go Nuclear,'' Frank C. Barnaby; What Happens If. . .Terrorists, Revolutionaries, and Nuclear Weapons, David Kreiger; Safeguards Against Diversion of Nuclear Material: An Overview, Ryukichi Imai; and Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation, George H. Quester. Part II, And Where We May Go, again includes some introductory remarks by Joseph I. Coffey. The seven succeeding papers are: Nth Powers of the Future, Ashok Kapur; Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics, Lewis A. Dunn; Arms Control in a Nuclear Armed World, Colin Gray; The United Nations, the Superpowers, and Proliferation, Abraham Bargman; Proliferation and the Future: Destruction or Transformation, Frederick C. Thayer; Decision Making in a Nuclear Armed World, Michael Brenner; and The United States in a World of Nuclear Powers, Michael Nacht. This special report is concluded with a glossary

  12. Criteria for proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kiriyama, Eriko; Pickett, Susan; Suzuki, Tatsujiro

    2000-01-01

    In order to understand the concept of nuclear proliferation resistance, this paper examines the technical definitions of proliferation resistance. Although nuclear proliferation resistance is often included as one of the major goals of advanced reactor research and development, the criteria for nuclear proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycles is not defined clearly. The implied meaning of proliferation resistance was compared in proposals regarding the nuclear fuel cycle. Discrepancies amongst the proposals regarding the technical definition of proliferation resistance is found. While all these proposals indicate proliferation resistance, few clearly spell out exactly what criteria they are measuring themselves against. However we found there are also common feature in many proposals. They are; (1) Reduction of Pu, (2) Less separated Weapon Usable Materials, (3) Fewer steps, (4) Barrier for Weapon Usable Materials. Recognizing that there are numerous political and infrastructure measures that may also be taken to guard against proliferation risks, we have focused here on the definition of proliferation resistance in terms of technical characteristics. Another important conclusion is that in many proposals proliferation resistance is only one of the important criteria such as energy security, economical efficiency, and safety. (author)

  13. Nuclear power and the proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1978-02-01

    This lecture addresses the question of ''accessibility'' of plutonium as it would arise in fully commercial LMFBR and LWR once-through operations. It is pointed out that the storage of spent LWR fuel results in the progressive accumulation of plutonium which becomes increasingly accessible with time (the ''plutonium mine'') whereas with the LMFBR, economic considerations demand the rapid recycle of plutonium. Furthermore, the fast breeder reactor is primarily a plutonium incinerator, the net production of plutonium being rather small and controllable so as not to exceed society's needs for new energy supplies. An eight-point world nuclear development programme is suggested, taking full note of non-proliferation considerations

  14. Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Moody, K.J.; Bradley, K.S.; Lorenzana, H.E.

    2011-01-01

    Global appetite for fission power is projected to grow dramatically this century, and for good reason. Despite considerable research to identify new sources of energy, fission remains the most plentiful and practical alternative to fossil fuels. The environmental challenges of fossil fuel have made the fission power option increasingly attractive, particularly as we are forced to rely on reserves in ecologically fragile or politically unstable corners of the globe. Caught between a globally eroding fossil fuel reserve as well as the uncertainty and considerable costs in the development of fusion power, most of the world will most likely come to rely on fission power for at least the remainder of the 21st century. Despite inevitable growth, fission power faces enduring challenges in sustainability and security. One of fission power's greatest hurdles to universal acceptance is the risk of potential misuse for nefarious purposes of fissionable byproducts in spent fuel, such as plutonium. With this issue in mind, we have discussed intrinsic concepts in this report that are motivated by the premise that the utility, desirability, and applicability of nuclear materials can be reduced. In a general sense, the intrinsic solutions aim to reduce or eliminate the quantity of existing weapons usable material; avoid production of new weapons-usable material through enrichment, breeding, extraction; or employ engineering solutions to make the fuel cycle less useful or more difficult for producing weapons-usable material. By their nature, these schemes require modifications to existing fuel cycles. As such, the concomitants of these modifications require engagement from the nuclear reactor and fuel-design community to fully assess their effects. Unfortunately, active pursuit of any scheme that could further complicate the spread of domestic nuclear power will probably be understandably unpopular. Nevertheless, the nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues are paramount, and

  15. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wethe, Per Ivar

    2009-01-01

    Today we know two forms of nuclear energy: fission and fusion. Fission is the decomposition of heavy nuclei, while fusion is the melting together of light nuclei. Both processes create a large surplus of energy. Technologically, we can currently only use fission to produce energy in today's nuclear power plants, but there is intense research worldwide in order to realize a controlled fusion process. In a practical context, today's nuclear energy is a sustained source of energy since the resource base is virtually unlimited. When fusion technology is realized, the resource supply will be a marginal problem. (AG)

  16. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  17. Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hansen, Keith A.

    2011-09-01

    Intelligence agencies play a fundamental role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, as they help to understand other countries' intentions and assess their technical capabilities and the nature of their nuclear activities. The challenges in this area remain, however, formidable. Past experiences and the discoveries of Iraq's WMD programs, of North Korean nuclear weapon program, and of Iranian activities, have put into question the ability of intelligence to monitor small, clandestine proliferation activities from either states or non-state entities. This Proliferation Paper analyzes the complex challenges intelligence faces and the various roles it plays in supporting national and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and reviews its track record. In an effort to shed light on the role and contribution of intelligence in national and international efforts to halt, if not prevent, further nuclear weapon proliferation, this paper first analyzes the challenges intelligence faces in monitoring small, clandestine proliferation activities and the role it plays in supporting non-proliferation efforts. It then reviews the intelligence track record in monitoring proliferation including the lessons learned from Iraq. Finally, it addresses whether it is possible for intelligence to accurately monitor future clandestine proliferation efforts. (author)

  18. Panel on nuclear export and proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimel, W.R.

    1977-01-01

    Summaries of six panelists' remarks make the following points: one cannot suppress nuclear weapons by suppressing nuclear power; a proliferated world would be extremely dangerous; US supports IAEA safeguards; plutonium shouldn't be recycled in power reactors; and the problem of nonproliferation is a social and institutional problem, not a technological one. Viewographs showing the semantics of proliferation, ways to get nuclear weapons materials, etc. are included

  19. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  20. Deliberations about nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boskma, P.; Smit, W.A.; Vries, G.H. de; Dijk, G. van; Groenewold, H.J.; Jelsma, J.; Tans, P.P.; Doorn, W. van

    1975-01-01

    This report is a discussion of points raised in three safety studies dealing with nuclear energy. It reviews the problems that must be faced in order to form a safe and practical energy policy with regard to health and the environment (potential hazards, biological effects and radiation dose norms), the proliferation of nuclear weapons, reactor accidents (including their causes, consequences and evacuation problems that arise), the fallout and contamination problems, and security (both reactor security and national security)

  1. Which future for nuclear counter-proliferation?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duval, M.

    2010-01-01

    Dealing with the case of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear states (but not eventually by terrorists), the author first identifies the constants of counter-proliferation: it is linked to interest conflicts between those who try to preserve their monopoly and those who try to acquire a new weapon either because of a threat or for reasons of regional prestige, the evolution from use to deterrence, the appearance of new actors after the USA and Russia, the role of nuclear tactical weapons, and the future of Russian weapons and know-how. He presents the international counter-proliferation context: the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA and its controls, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the nuclear-free zones, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He describes how and why proliferation occurs: uranium enrichment and plutonium technology, political reasons in different parts of the world. Then, he gives an overview of the proliferation status by commenting the cases of Israel, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. He discusses the future of proliferation (involved countries, existence of a nuclear black market) and of counter-proliferation as far as Middle-East and North Korea are concerned. He tries finally to anticipate the consequences for nuclear deterrence strategy, and more particularly for Europe and France

  2. INCREASED PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE FOR 21ST CENTURY NUCLEAR POWER

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demuth, Scott F.; Thomas, Ken E.; Wallace, Richard K.

    2007-01-01

    World energy demand and greenhouse gases are expected to significantly increase in the near future. Key developing countries have identified nuclear power as a major contributor to their future energy sources. Consequently, the US and others are currently exploring the concept of a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to address the concerns of nuclear proliferation. This effort is also being encouraged by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While the IAEA currently provides the framework for monitoring of state sponsored nuclear proliferation by way of international treaties, a complimentary action is to promote more proliferation resistant fuel cycles and advanced safeguards technology. As such, it is the responsibility of current technology owners to increase their nuclear fuel cycle proliferation resistance. For those countries that have an active and well-developed fuel cycle, it will require future enhancements. For those countries with extensive nuclear energy experience, yet less active programs, it requires re-engagement for technology development and deployment. The following paper discusses potential fuel cycle and technology changes that affect proliferation resistance; and consequently, may form the basis of future technology development efforts.

  3. Nuclear electric power and the proliferation of nuclear weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1977-01-01

    Control and elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons held by the nuclear weapon states remains the central problem in the arms control and disarmament field. Whether the proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons can be stopped is dubious. A sovereign nation will launch a nuclear weapons program if it has the motivation and resource. Motivation depends on military and political considerations. The necessary resources are economic and technological. Conditions in some sovereign states explain this issue. A survey of commercial nuclear power programs outside the USA lists 45 countries using or planning to use nuclear reactors for power generation. There are currently 112 reactors now operating outside the United States, 117 more under construction, 60 on order, and 180 planned. The U. S. as of December 1976 has 64 operating reactors, 72 under construction, 84 on order, and 8 planned. Nuclear trade and export policies are discussed. In this article, Mr. Walske says that American industry is convinced that the need for nuclear energy abroad is more urgent than in the United States; that in the long run, the breeder reactor must be developed to enable the supply of nuclear fuel to last for centuries; and that the experience of American industry abroad has convinced it that emphasis on restrictive, denial type policies will almost certainly fail--a collapse of what has been gained through the test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty

  4. Nuclear proliferation and the near-nuclear countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, O.; Schulz, A.

    1975-01-01

    The process of nuclear proliferation and its consequences for the international political system is examined by focusing on the issues in the nuclear-strategic debate that divide first and second order states. Information is included on: the US-USSR arms race; SALT agreement; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the nuclear aspirations and policies of India, Middle Eastern countries, South Africa, Japan, Brazil, and Argentina; and assessment of the risks related to the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapons

  5. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hesketh, Ross.

    1985-01-01

    The subject is treated under the headings: nuclear energy -what is it; fusion (principles; practice); fission (principles); reactor types and systems (fast (neutron) reactors as breeders; fast reactors; thermal reactors; graphite-moderated thermal reactors; the CANDU reactor; light water reactors - the BWR and the PWR); the nuclear fuel cycle (waste storage; fuel element manufacture; enrichment processes; uranium mining); safety and risk assessment; the nuclear power industry and the economy (regulating authorities; economics; advantages and disadvantages). (U.K.)

  6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session on S. 897 and S. 1432

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced his nuclear power policy. The policy statement set forth seven specific objectives for the future use of nuclear energy in this country and the rest of the world. The two proposed instruments for implementing this policy are the revised fiscal year 1978 ERDA authorization draft bill and S. 1432, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. These legislative proposals are linked in that S. 1432 is designed to establish a non-proliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement those objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that non-proliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficient energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. The Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the costs and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. F or example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel-cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the non-proliferation objectives. At the June 10 hearing, the subcommittee received testimony on S. 1432, the bill prepared by the administration. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S. 897. Statements by many witnesses are included

  7. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    Several issues concerning nuclear energy in France during 1996 are presented: permission of a demand for installing underground laboratories in three sites (Marcoule, Bure and Chapelle-Baton); a report assessing the capacity of Superphenix plant to operate as a research tool; the project of merging between Framatome and Gec-Alsthom companies; the revision of a general report on nuclear energy in France; the issue of military plutonium management

  8. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  9. Nuclear Proliferation: A Historical Overview

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-03-01

    Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited approximately 1,410 nuclear warheads and the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test site . This placed Kazakhstan...Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited approximately 1,410 nuclear warheads and the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test site . See Mark D. Skootsky, “An...construction of a nuclear test site . This development moved Brazil into the Modest Weapons Potential category. In 1979 the Pilot Uranium Enrichment Plant

  10. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hladky, S.

    1985-01-01

    This booklet appeared in a series on technical history. It tries to communicate some of the scientific, technical and social stresses, which have been connected with the application of nuclear energy since its discovery. The individual sections are concerned with the following subjects: the search for the 'smallest particles'; the atomic nucleus; nuclear fission; the 'Manhattan Project'; the time after this - from the euphoria of the 1950's via disillusionment and change of opinion to the state of nuclear energy at the start of the 1980's. The booklet contains many details and is generously illustrated. (HSCH) [de

  11. Nuclear power and the proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1978-02-01

    The purpose of the lecture is to discuss nuclear proliferation, analyse which problems are real and which are a misapprehension, and to suggest a way forward which retains the benefits of nuclear power while providing a more certain protection against undesirable proliferation. After an introductory section the lecture continues under the following headings: plutonium production and accessibility; the use of plutonium; fast reactor fuel; the interim period; conclusions. (U.K.)

  12. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  13. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seidel, J.

    1990-01-01

    This set of questions is based on an inquiry from the years 1987 to 1989. About 250 people af all age groups - primarily, however, young people between 16 and 25 years of age - were asked to state the questions they considered particularly important on the subject of nuclear energy. The survey was carried out without handicaps according to the brain-storming principle. Although the results cannot claim to be representative, they certainly reflect the areas of interest of many citizens and also their expectations, hopes and fears in connection with nuclear energy. The greater part of the questions were aimed at three topic areas: The security of nuclear power-stations, the effects of radioactivity on people and the problem of waste disposal. The book centres around these sets of questions. The introduction gives a general survey of the significance of nuclear energy as a whole. After this follow questions to do with the function of nuclear power stations, for the problems of security and waste disposal - which are dealt with in the following chapters - are easier to explain and to understand if a few physical and technical basics are understood. In the final section of the book there are questions on the so-called rejection debate and on the possibility of replacing nuclear energy with other energy forms. (orig./HP) [de

  14. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Panait, A.

    1994-01-01

    This is a general report presenting the section VII entitled Nuclear Power of the National Conference on Energy (CNE '94) held in Neptun, Romania, on 13-16 June 1994. The problems addressed were those relating to electric power produced by nuclear power plant, to heat secondary generation, to quality assurance, to safety, etc. A special attention was paid to the commissioning of the first Romanian nuclear power unit, the Cernavoda-1 reactor of CANDU type. The communications were grouped in four subsections. These were: 1. Quality assurance, nuclear safety, and environmental protection; 2. Nuclear power plant, commissioning, and operation; 3. Nuclear power plant inspection, maintenance, and repairs, heavy water technology; 4. Public opinion education. There were 22 reports, altogether

  15. Nuclear energy, the climate and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    1998-01-01

    The main concern of Pugwash, with very good reason, is nuclear disarmament, but a negative attitude towards nuclear energy is not only futile, but counterproductive as it misses opportunities to appropriately influence its development. Since nuclear energy cannot be abandoned for ecological (decrease in greenhouse gases emission) and economic reasons as a long term energy source, then efforts should be devoted to make it safe from proliferation, which is possible from scientific and technological point of view

  16. Nuclear energy and the nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    These notes have been prepared by the Department of Energy to provide information and to answer questions often raised about nuclear energy and the nuclear industry and in the hope that they will contribute to the public debate about the future of nuclear energy in the UK. The subject is dealt with under the headings; contribution of nuclear power, energy forecasts, nuclear fuels and reactor types, cost, thermal reactor strategy, planning margin, safety, nuclear licensing, unlike an atomic bomb, radiation, waste disposal, transport of nuclear materials, emergency arrangements at nuclear sites, siting of nuclear stations, security of nuclear installations, world nuclear programmes, international regulation and non-proliferation, IAEA safeguards arrangements in the UK, INFCE, and uranium supplies. (U.K.)

  17. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reuss, Paul

    2012-01-01

    With simple and accessible explanations, this book presents the physical principles, the history and industrial developments of nuclear energy. More than 25 years after the Chernobyl accidents and few months only after the Fukushima one, it discusses the pros and cons of this energy source with its assets and its risks. (J.S.)

  18. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luxo, Armand.

    1977-01-01

    The reasons and conditions of utilizing nuclear power in developing countries are examined jointly with the present status and future uses already evaluated by some organizations. Some consequences are deduced in the human, financial scientific and technological fields, with provisional suggestions for preparing the nuclear industry development in these countries. As a conclusion trends are given to show how the industrialized countries having gained a long scientific and technological experience in nuclear energy can afford their assistance in this field, to developing countries [fr

  19. Strategies for managing nuclear proliferation: economic and political issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brito, D.L.; Intriligator, M.D.; Wick, A.E.

    1983-01-01

    Several new ways of approaching nuclear-weapons proliferation emerged at an April 1982 conference at Tulane University. The new ideas use statistical techniques to emphasize political and economic rather than technological determinants, recognize the possibility that proliferation could have a stabilizing influence, shift their emphasis from eliminating to managing proliferation, and focus on regional factors. The four divisions of this book reflect these new trends. Separate abstracts were prepared for the 18 individual papers selected for the Energy Data Base (EDB) and Energy Abstracts for Policy Analysis (EAPA). 6 figures, 23 tables

  20. Nuclear proliferation: present, past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alonso, M.; Zaleski, P.

    1993-01-01

    Since the end of WW II one of the more, if not the most, serious concerns of all people in the world has been to preserve this planet avoiding a nuclear war. On the positive side, in spite of the huge arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (NW) accumulated over the years by the US and the former SU and the innumerable military conflicts we have witnessed since WW II, no NW have been used again. But this should not be a great consolation: the fact that countries have refrained from using NW does not necessarily mean that it will always be that way. As long as countries try to solve their differences by the use of force the danger of a nuclear confrontation remains, and nuclear disarmament and proliferation should cotinue to be a serious concern. This concern has profound political, social and ethical components that have been analyzed extensively and profusely. The purpose of this paper is more limited: to provide an overview of the national and international efforts to minimize the risk of a nuclear war by regulating, restricting and containing the development and possession of NW. This is what has become know as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Any nuclear non-proliferation regime must have two essential goals: achieving nuclear disarmament by the NWS (and thereby eliminating vertical proliferation). To make a regime effective it must rely on international agreements, a system of safeguards coupled with inspection and verification procedures, and above all on the good faith of all nations involved. It should be stated from the very beginning that nuclear non-proliferation efforts, like all disarmament efforts, are essentially of political nature, albeit having an important scientific and technological component. They are effective only to the extent that countries really renounce NW and are prepared to severely sanction those who do not. (Author) 31 refs

  1. Nuclear weapons proliferation problem: can we lead without leadership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stathakis, G.J.

    1977-01-01

    The immediate problem facing us with respect to proliferation and nuclear power involves reprocessing and the availability of plutonium from reprocessing plants. One solution supported by the Atomic Industrial Forum is that reprocessing centers be restricted to locations in those industrial nations already having weapons capability and that the energy of the reprocessed plutonium be returned to the user nation in the form of low enriched uranium. Thus, the plutonium would remain where it would not add to problems of proliferation

  2. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  3. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  4. Analysis of nuclear proliferation resistance reprocessing and recycling technologies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patricia Paviet-Hartmann; Gary Cerefice; Marcela Stacey; Steven Bakhtiar

    2011-05-01

    The PUREX process has been progressively and continuously improved during the past three decades, and these improvements account for successful commercialization of reprocessing in a few countries. The renewed interest in nuclear energy and the international growth of nuclear electricity generation do not equate – and should not be equated -with increasing proliferation risks. Indeed, the nuclear renaissance presents a unique opportunity to enhance the culture of non-proliferation. With the recent revival of interest in nuclear technology, technical methods for prevention of nuclear proliferation are being revisited. Robust strategies to develop new advanced separation technologies are emerging worldwide for sustainability and advancement of nuclear energy with enhanced proliferation resistance. On the other hand, at this moment, there are no proliferation resistance advanced technologies. . Until now proliferation resistance as it applies to reprocessing has been focused on not separating a pure stream of weapons-usable plutonium. France, as an example, has proposed a variant of the PUREX process, the COEX TM process, which does not result on a pure plutonium product stream. A further step is to implement a process based on group extraction of actinides and fission products associated with a homogeneous recycling strategy (UNEX process in the US, GANEX process in France). Such scheme will most likely not be deployable on an industrial scale before 2030 or so because it requires intensive R&D and robust flowsheets. Finally, future generation recycling schemes will handle the used nuclear fuel in fast neutron reactors. This means that the plutonium throughput of the recycling process may increase. The need is obvious for advanced aqueous recycling technologies that are intrinsically more proliferation resistant than the commercial PUREX process. In this paper, we review the actual PUREX process along with the advanced recycling technologies that will enhance

  5. Analysis of nuclear proliferation resistance reprocessing and recycling technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paviet-Hartmann, Patricia; Cerefice, Gary; Stacey, Marcela; Bakhtiar, Steven

    2011-01-01

    The PUREX process has been progressively and continuously improved during the past three decades, and these improvements account for successful commercialization of reprocessing in a few countries. The renewed interest in nuclear energy and the international growth of nuclear electricity generation do not equate - and should not be equated - with increasing proliferation risks. Indeed, the nuclear renaissance presents a unique opportunity to enhance the culture of non-proliferation. With the recent revival of interest in nuclear technology, technical methods for prevention of nuclear proliferation are being revisited. Robust strategies to develop new advanced separation technologies are emerging worldwide for sustainability and advancement of nuclear energy with enhanced proliferation resistance. On the other hand, at this moment, there are no proliferation resistance advanced technologies. Until now proliferation resistance as it applies to reprocessing has been focused on not separating a pure stream of weapons-usable plutonium. France, as an example, has proposed a variant of the PUREX process, the COEX TM process, which does not result on a pure plutonium product stream. A further step is to implement a process based on group extraction of actinides and fission products associated with a homogeneous recycling strategy (UNEX process in the US, GANEX process in France). Such scheme will most likely not be deployable on an industrial scale before 2030 or so because it requires intensive R and D and robust flowsheets. Finally, future generation recycling schemes will handle the used nuclear fuel in fast neutron reactors. This means that the plutonium throughput of the recycling process may increase. The need is obvious for advanced aqueous recycling technologies that are intrinsically more proliferation resistant than the commercial PUREX process. In this paper, we review the actual PUREX process along with the advanced recycling technologies that will enhance

  6. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1969-01-01

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  7. Nuclear energy today

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Energy is the power of the world's economies, whose appetite for this commodity is increasing as the leading economies expand and developing economies grow. How to provide the energy demanded while protecting our environment and conserving natural resources is a vital question facing us today. Many parts of our society are debating how to power the future and whether nuclear energy should play a role. Nuclear energy is a complex technology with serious issues and a controversial past. Yet it also has the potential to provide considerable benefits. In pondering the future of this imposing technology, people want to know. - How safe is nuclear energy? - Is nuclear energy economically competitive? - What role can nuclear energy play in meeting greenhouse gas reduction targets? - What can be done with the radioactive waste it generates? - Does its use increase the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons? - Are there sufficient and secure resources to permit its prolonged exploitation? - Can tomorrow's nuclear energy be better than today's? This publication provides authoritative and factual replies to these questions. Written primarily to inform policy makers, it will also serve interested members of the public, academics, journalists and industry leaders. (author)

  8. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  9. Plutonium and latent nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quester, G.H.

    1992-01-01

    A country producing nuclear electric power acquires an ability to produce atomic bombs quite easily and without taking many steps beyond that which would be perfectly normal for civilian purposes. The role of plutonium in the three fold list of the gains that must be sought in arms control formulated by Schelling and Halpevin are discussed. On the first, that we should seek to reduce the likelihood of war, it can be argued that plutonium reduces the likelihood in some cases. The second, that we should seek to reduce the destruction in war, is made worse by plutonium. On the third criterion, that we should seek to reduce the burdens in peacetime of everyone's being prepared for war, the situation is confusing and depends on the prospects for nuclear electrical power. It is concluded that latent capability to produce nuclear weapons may be sufficient without the need for actual detonations and deployment of bombs. (UK)

  10. Energy: nuclear energy; Energies: l'energie nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lung, M. [Societe Generale pour les Techniques Nouvelles (SGN), 78 - Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines (France)

    2000-11-01

    Convinced that the nuclear energy will be the cleaner, safer, more economical and more respectful of the environment energy of the future, the author preconizes to study the way it can be implemented, to continue to improve its production, to understand its virtues and to better inform the public. He develops this opinion in the presentation of the principal characteristics of the nuclear energy: technology, radioactive wastes, radiation protection, the plutonium, the nuclear accidents, the proliferation risks, the economics and nuclear energy and competitiveness, development and sustainability. (A.L.B.)

  11. Proliferation Persuasion. Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Volpe, Tristan A. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States)

    2015-08-31

    Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits? My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the

  12. Clean energy : nuclear energy world

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-10-15

    This book explains the nuclear engineering to kids with easy way. There are explanations of birth of nuclear energy such as discover of nuclear and application of modern technology of nuclear energy, principles and structure of nuclear power plant, fuel, nuclear waste management, use of radiation for medical treatment, food supplies, industry, utilization of neutron. It indicates the future of nuclear energy as integral nuclear energy and nuclear fusion energy.

  13. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  14. Model for nuclear proliferation resistance analysis using decision making tools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Kim, Ho Dong; Yang, Myung Seung

    2003-06-01

    The nuclear proliferation risks of nuclear fuel cycles is being considered as one of the most important factors in assessing advanced and innovative nuclear systems in GEN IV and INPRO program. They have been trying to find out an appropriate and reasonable method to evaluate quantitatively several nuclear energy system alternatives. Any reasonable methodology for integrated analysis of the proliferation resistance, however, has not yet been come out at this time. In this study, several decision making methods, which have been used in the situation of multiple objectives, are described in order to see if those can be appropriately used for proliferation resistance evaluation. Especially, the AHP model for quantitatively evaluating proliferation resistance is dealt with in more detail. The theoretical principle of the method and some examples for the proliferation resistance problem are described. For more efficient applications, a simple computer program for the AHP model is developed, and the usage of the program is introduced here in detail. We hope that the program developed in this study could be useful for quantitative analysis of the proliferation resistance involving multiple conflict criteria

  15. Model for nuclear proliferation resistance analysis using decision making tools

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ko, Won Il; Kim, Ho Dong; Yang, Myung Seung

    2003-06-01

    The nuclear proliferation risks of nuclear fuel cycles is being considered as one of the most important factors in assessing advanced and innovative nuclear systems in GEN IV and INPRO program. They have been trying to find out an appropriate and reasonable method to evaluate quantitatively several nuclear energy system alternatives. Any reasonable methodology for integrated analysis of the proliferation resistance, however, has not yet been come out at this time. In this study, several decision making methods, which have been used in the situation of multiple objectives, are described in order to see if those can be appropriately used for proliferation resistance evaluation. Especially, the AHP model for quantitatively evaluating proliferation resistance is dealt with in more detail. The theoretical principle of the method and some examples for the proliferation resistance problem are described. For more efficient applications, a simple computer program for the AHP model is developed, and the usage of the program is introduced here in detail. We hope that the program developed in this study could be useful for quantitative analysis of the proliferation resistance involving multiple conflict criteria.

  16. Dossier nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-11-01

    The present Dutch government compiled the title document to enable the future Dutch government to declare its opinion on the nuclear energy problemacy. The most important questions which occupy the Dutch society are discussed: safe application and risks of nuclear energy, radioactive wastes and other environmental aspects, and the possible danger of misusing nuclear technology. In chapter two attention is paid to the policy, as formulated by the Dutch government, with regard to risks of nuclear power plants. Next the technical safety regulations that have to be met are dealt with. A brief overview is given of the state of the art of commercially available nuclear reactors, as well as reactors under development. The nuclear waste problem is the subject of chapter three. Attention is paid to the Dutch policy that has been formulated and is executed, the OPLA-program, in which the underground storage of radioactive wastes is studied, the research on the conversion of long-lived radioactive isotopes to short-lived radioactive isotopes, and planned research programs. In chapter four, other environmental effects of the use of nuclear power are taken into consideration, focusing on the nuclear fuel cycle. International obligations and agreements to guarantee the peaceful use of nuclear energy (non-proliferation) are mentioned and discussed in chapter four. In chapter six the necessity to carry out surveys to determine public support for the use of nuclear energy is outlined. In the appendices nuclear energy reports in the period 1986-present are listed. Also the subject of uranium supplies is discussed and a brief overview of the use of nuclear energy in several other countries is given. 2 tabs., 5 annexes, 63 refs

  17. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  18. Nuclear energy - a professional assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1984-01-01

    The report falls under the headings: the role of the Watt Committee in nuclear energy; supply and demand, and economics of nuclear power; technical means (types of reactor; fuel cycle; nuclear energy for applications other than large-scale electricity generation); availability of resources (nuclear fuel; British industrial capacity; manpower requirements for a British nuclear power programme); environment (environmental issues; disposal of radioactive wastes); balance of risk and advantage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy (proliferation; safety and risk; benefits; public acceptability, awareness, education); summary and general comments.

  19. Nuclear energy - a professional assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The report falls under the headings: the role of the Watt Committee in nuclear energy; supply and demand, and economics of nuclear power; technical means (types of reactor; fuel cycle; nuclear energy for applications other than large-scale electricity generation); availability of resources (nuclear fuel; British industrial capacity; manpower requirements for a British nuclear power programme); environment (environmental issues; disposal of radioactive wastes); balance of risk and advantage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy (proliferation; safety and risk; benefits; public acceptability, awareness, education); summary and general comments. (U.K.)

  20. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    2 1/2 years ago a consultation group was formed to help the Section for Social Questions of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands, to answer questions in the area of nuclear energy. During this time the character of the questions has changed considerably. In the beginning people spoke of fear and anxiety over the plans for the application of this new technical development but later this fear and anxiety turned to protest and opposition. This brochure has been produced to enlighten people and try and answer their alarm, by exploring the many facets of the problems. Some of these problems are already being deeply discussed by the public, others play no role in the forming of public opinion. The points of view of the churches over nuclear energy are not expressed, the brochure endeavours to express that nuclear energy problems are a concern for the churches. Technical and economic information and the most important social questions are discussed. (C.F.)

  1. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  2. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  3. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-07-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  4. Proliferation resistance assessment of nuclear systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    The paper focuses on examining the degree to which nuclear systems could be used to acquire nuclear weapons material. It establishes a framework for proliferation resistance assessment and illustrates its applicability through an analysis of reference systems for once-through cycles, breeder cycles and thermal recycle. On a more tentative basis, the approach is applied to various alternative technical and institutional measures. This paper was also submitted to Working Groups 5 and 8

  5. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  6. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  7. A Study on Introduction of Nuclear Power Plants in India and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Seung Hyo; Lim, Dong Hyuk

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was formed to build nuclear export control has been accepting the nuclear cooperation for the member nation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Korea exported nuclear power plants to United Arab Emirates in 2009 and research and training reactor to Jordan in 2010 based on the forcible non-proliferation regime as a member nation of NSG, so it is strengthening its position in the atomic energy industry. In addition, Korea concluded an agreement with India which is planning the construction of 25.based or more nuclear power plants for the next 20 years in last July, 25, so it will enter the atomic energy market in India. But India has been accepted the exceptionally civilian nuclear cooperation as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and non-member state of NPT, so concerns about nuclear proliferation has been raised. This study aims to introduce the allowance of exceptions background in India, to analyze its effect on the non-proliferation regime and to find nuclear non-proliferation conditions

  8. Assessment of nuclear fuel cycles with respect to assurance of energy supply; economic aspects; environmental aspects; non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This paper, which was presented to all INFCE Working Groups gives a broad qualitative assessment in tabular form of the following five fuel cycles: LWR once-through, LWR with thermal recycle, HWR once-through, HTR with uranium recycle, fast breeder reactor. The assessment is given of the assurance of supply aspects, the macro- and micro-economic aspects, the environmental aspects, and the non-proliferation, including safeguards, aspects of each fuel cycle

  9. Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

    2010-01-01

    In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

  10. The separation of nuclear power from nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Starr, C.

    1979-01-01

    There exists world wide a strong common desire to limit nuclear weapons proliferation so as to inhibit or remove the threat of nuclear warfare. While this is a primary international political objective, there has also developed a secondary objective to limit any potential contribution to such nuclear weapons proliferation which might arise by the diversion of weapons material from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. This secondary objective is the basis of the present US government policy to defer the reprocessing of nuclear fuels anywhere. This policy has been generally recognized as a temporary expedient to provide time for international reexamination of the problems of weapons proliferation associated with nuclear power. A successful development of the proposed combination of the Fast Breeder Reactor and the Civex fuel reprocessing facility would provide an economical nuclear power source for many centuries which inherently separates nuclear power from the issue of weapons material diversion and proliferation. Further, by so doing, it permits great flexibility in international and national planning for nuclear power, as the issues of fuel dependence and terrorist and subnational diversions disappear. In addition, the expansion of the FBR/Civex system would eat into the LWR spent fuel stockpile, diminishing steadily this relatively accessible plutonium source. And finally, a rapid development of the FBR/Civex for the above reasons would substantially reduce the worldwide concern as to the adequacy of uranium ore supply. (Auth.)

  11. Conference day - Dissuasion, proliferation, disarmament: the nuclear debate beyond 2010. Conference proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-09-01

    A first set of contributions (round tables) addresses the relationship between NATO, nuclear deterrence and antimissile defence. The second set of contributions addresses nuclear policies of emerging powers (Russia, China, Iran...) and proliferation risks. The third one addresses the perspectives of non proliferation, civil nuclear energy actors, and disarmament

  12. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  13. Pathway Aggregation in the Risk Assessment of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) of Nuclear Energy Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR & PP) evaluation is to define a set of challenges, to obtain the system responses, and to assess the outcomes. The assessment of outcomes heavily relies on pathways, defined as sequences of events or actions that could potentially be followed by a State or a group of individuals in order to achieve a proliferation objective, with the defined threats as initiating events. There may be large number of segments connecting pathway stages (e.g. acquisition, processing, and fabrication for PR) which can lead to even larger number of pathways or scenarios through possible different combinations of segment connections, each with associated probabilities contributing to the overall risk. Clustering of these scenarios in specified stage attribute intervals is important for their tractable analysis and outcome assessment. A software tool for scenario generation and clustering (OSUPR) is developed that utilizes the PRCALC code developed at the Brookhaven National Laboratory for scenario generation and the K- means, mean shift and adaptive mean shift algorithms as possible clustering schemes. The results of the study using the Example Sodium Fast Breeder as an example system show that clustering facilitates the probabilistic or deterministic analysis of scenarios to identify system vulnerabilities and communication of the major risk contributors to stakeholders. The results of the study also show that the mean shift algorithm has the most potential for assisting the analysis of the scenarios generated by PRCALC.

  14. Pathway Aggregation in the Risk Assessment of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) of Nuclear Energy Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aldemir, Tunc [Ohio State Univ., Columbus, OH (United States); Denning, Richard [Ohio State Univ., Columbus, OH (United States); Catalyurek, Umit [Ohio State Univ., Columbus, OH (United States); Yilmaz, Alper [Ohio State Univ., Columbus, OH (United States); Yue, Meng [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Cheng, Lap-Yan [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-01-23

    The framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR & PP) evaluation is to define a set of challenges, to obtain the system responses, and to assess the outcomes. The assessment of outcomes heavily relies on pathways, defined as sequences of events or actions that could potentially be followed by a State or a group of individuals in order to achieve a proliferation objective, with the defined threats as initiating events. There may be large number of segments connecting pathway stages (e.g. acquisition, processing, and fabrication for PR) which can lead to even larger number of pathways or scenarios through possible different combinations of segment connections, each with associated probabilities contributing to the overall risk. Clustering of these scenarios in specified stage attribute intervals is important for their tractable analysis and outcome assessment. A software tool for scenario generation and clustering (OSUPR) is developed that utilizes the PRCALC code developed at the Brookhaven National Laboratory for scenario generation and the K- means, mean shift and adaptive mean shift algorithms as possible clustering schemes. The results of the study using the Example Sodium Fast Breeder as an example system show that clustering facilitates the probabilistic or deterministic analysis of scenarios to identify system vulnerabilities and communication of the major risk contributors to stakeholders. The results of the study also show that the mean shift algorithm has the most potential for assisting the analysis of the scenarios generated by PRCALC.

  15. Suggested non-proliferation criteria for commercial nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laney, R.V.; Heubotter, P.R.

    1978-01-01

    Based on the Administration's policy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through diversion of fuel from commercial reactor fuel cycles, a ''benchmark'' set of nonproliferation criteria was prepared for the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. These criteria should eliminate incremental risks of proliferation beyond those inherent in the present generation of low-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors operating in a once-through mode, with internationally safeguarded storage of spent fuel. They focus on the balanced application of technical constraints consistent with the state of the technology, with minimal requirements for institutional constraints, to provide a basis for assessing the proliferation resistance of proposed fission power systems. The paper contains: (1) our perception of the nuclear energy policy and of the baseline proliferation risk accepted under this policy; (2) objectives for a reactor and fuel cycle strategy which address the technical, political, and institutional aspects of diversion and proliferation and, at the same time, satisfy the Nation's needs for efficient, timely, and economical utilization of nuclear fuel resources; (3) criteria which are responsive to these objectives and can therefore be used to screen proposed reactor and fuel cycle strategies; and (4) a rationale for these criteria

  16. Nuclear fuel cycle and no proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villagra Delgado, Pedro

    2005-01-01

    The worry produced by the possibility of new countries acquiring nuclear weapons through the forbidden use of sensitive installations for the production of fissionable materials, had arisen proposals intended to restrict activities related to the full nuclear fuel cycle, even when these activities are allowed in the frame of rules in force for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (author) [es

  17. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oelgaard, P.L.

    1994-01-01

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235 U or 239 Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235 U and 239 Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  18. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  19. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

  20. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005 [es

  1. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

  2. Communication received from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Agency concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 13 September 2007 from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, attaching a declaration concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The letter and, as requested therein, the declaration, are herewith circulated for information

  3. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-01-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge

  4. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-03-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  5. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuno, Y. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan); University of Tokyo, Nuclear Engineering and Management, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656 (Japan)], E-mail: kuno.yusuke@jaea.go.jp; Inoue, N. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan); University of Tokyo, Nuclear Engineering and Management, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656 (Japan); Senzaki, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan)

    2009-03-15

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  6. Third Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference and 29th regular session of the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, November 20, 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    Ambassador Lewis A. Dunn of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Danny J. Boggs of DOE reported on two recent international conferences relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control. Dunn summarized the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference and its final declaration in which participants reaffirmed treaty principles and made recommendations for strengthening its efforts and enhancing its implementation. Boggs summarized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference, and noted the significance of China's recent entry into IAEA. They stressed that energy security is a key factor in the success of IAEA safeguards because it affects trade and international cooperation. US contributions to the success of non-proliferation policies depend upon our ability to share technological information with less advanced nations. Questions and responses and an appendix with the final declaration of the Review Conference follow the testimony

  7. Nuclear energy: a sensible alternative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ott, K.O.; Spinrad, B.I.

    1985-01-01

    This book presents information on energy futures; energy demand, energy supplies; exclusive paths and difficult choices--hard, soft, and moderate energy paths; an energy-deficient society; energy shortages; economics of light-water reactors; fast breeder reactor economics; international cooperation in the nuclear field; nuclear recycling; alternative fuels, fuel cycles, and reactors; the nuclear weapons proliferation issue; paths to a world with more reliable nuclear safeguards; the homemade bomb issue; LWR risk assessment; accident analysis and risk assessment; the waste disposal risk; radon problems; risks in our society; health effects of low-level radiation; routine releases of radioactivity from the nuclear industry; low-level radioactivity and infant mortality; the myth of plutonium toxicity; myths about high-level radioactive waste; the aging reactor myth; the police state myth; insurance and nuclear power--the Price-Anderson Act; and solar and nuclear power as partners

  8. US policies on combating proliferation of nuclear weapons after the cold war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tosaki, Hirofumi

    2005-01-01

    Combating nuclear proliferation has been one of the top priorities for the international community in the post post-Cold War era, and the United States has been taking initiative for tackling the problems. The current Bush administration has placed value high on the effective and concrete actions - including the use of military forces - for such efforts. It is imperative that such actions should be taken in resolving the nuclear proliferation. However, the United States has been criticized that it has disregarded the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that its non-proliferation policy has given negative implications to the regime. Combating nuclear proliferation should be pursued in balanced approach with legitimacy, in consideration of the discriminately nature of the regime as well as of its three pillars - nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. (author)

  9. Nuclear proliferation: past, present, and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bundy, M.

    1983-01-01

    Three things can be learned from the past and present that might tell us how to get a larger share of attention for nuclear nonproliferation. First, a decision to develop nuclear weapons has always been a conscious, serious, deliberate choice by the head of the government concerned. The complicated historical record of our and other country's efforts in this field suggests that no country can have a coherent policy on proliferation unless the subject enjoys the sustained attention of a leader, nearly always a head of government, who is able to make his purposes clearly understood and to ensure that they are persistently carried through. The most important contribution any one country can make is to exhibit understanding and restraint in its own appetite for nuclear solution, economic as well as military. The US is in a favorable position to take a lead, even a unilateral lead, in reducing the number of nuclear weapons. 1 reference

  10. Nuclear energy outlook 2008

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    With the launch today of its first Nuclear Energy Outlook, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) makes an important contribution to ongoing discussions of nuclear energy's potential role in the energy mixes of its member countries. As world energy demand continues to grow unabated, many countries face serious concerns about the security of energy supplies, rising energy prices and climate change stemming from fossil fuel consumption. In his presentation, the NEA Director-General Luis Echavarri is emphasizing the role that nuclear power could play in delivering cost-competitive and stable supplies of energy, while also helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In one Outlook scenario, existing nuclear power technologies could provide almost four times the current supply of nuclear-generated electricity by 2050. Under this scenario, 1400 reactors of the size commonly in use today would be in operation by 2050. But in order to accomplish such an expansion, securing political and societal support for the choice of nuclear energy is vital. An ongoing relationship between policy makers, the nuclear industry and society to develop knowledge building and public involvement will become increasingly important, the publication notes. Moreover, governments have a clear responsibility to maintain continued effective safety regulation, advance efforts to develop radioactive waste disposal solutions and uphold and reinforce the international non-proliferation regime. The authors find that the security of energy from nuclear power is more reliable than that for oil or gas. Additionally, uranium's high energy density means that transport is less vulnerable to disruption, and storing a large energy reserve is easier than for fossil fuels. One tonne of uranium produces the same energy as 10 000 to 16 000 tonnes of oil using current technology. Ongoing technological developments are likely to improve that performance even more. Until the middle of the century the dominant reactor

  11. I wonder nuclear energy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Eun Cheol

    2009-04-15

    This book consists seven chapters, which are powerful nuclear energy, principle of nuclear fission, nuclear energy in our daily life, is nuclear energy safe?, what is radiation?, radiation spread in pur daily life and radiation like a spy. It adds nuclear energy story through quiz. This book with pictures is for kids to explain nuclear energy easily.

  12. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  13. Nuclear proliferation: Some context and consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ford, C. A.

    2007-01-01

    The article addressed the importance of nonproliferation and supporting and reinforcing nonproliferation commitments. The most important benefit of the NPT has been in its contribution to the security of individual states party, as well as to regional and international security, through the obligations which help to prevent any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT therefore powerfully augments the national security of every state party, and not merely just the NPT nuclear weapons states. Indeed, it is the countries of the developing world, as well as many other non-nuclear weapon states, that could suffer the most in security terms if a non-nuclear weapons state in the developing world suddenly acquired T he Bomb a nd became emboldened to engage in threats and adventurism against its neighbors. The nonproliferation regime hinges upon the steps that all countries take on their own and with like-minded allies to further nonproliferation goals - and whether the international community can successfully shape the calculations of present-day and future would-be proliferation in useful ways. The nonproliferation regime, therefore, includes not just the NPT and other legally-binding obligations but complex dynamics of persuasion and deterrence that employ many different tools. The NPT helps establish the core nonproliferation obligations toward which many of the tools in the international community's tool kit are directed.

  14. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This digest document was written by members of the union of associations of ex-members and retired people of the Areva group (UARGA). It gives a comprehensive overview of the nuclear industry world, starting from radioactivity and its applications, and going on with the fuel cycle (front-end, back-end, fuel reprocessing, transports), the nuclear reactors (PWR, BWR, Candu, HTR, generation 4 systems), the effluents from nuclear facilities, the nuclear wastes (processing, disposal), and the management and safety of nuclear activities. (J.S.)

  15. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, June 10, September 13, 14, 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    Senator Frank Church presented the opening statement on the June 10, 1977 hearing concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, S.1432. S.1432 is designed to establish a nonproliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement these objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that nonproliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficent energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. Additionally, the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the cost and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. For example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the nonproliferation objectives. It is these and related questions to which the subcommittee seeks answers. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S.897, a bill to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation and to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal government to promote more efficient administration of such functions. Statements were presented by experts in government, private firms, and industrial sectors

  16. Nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia: South Korean perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo-Hang Lee

    1995-01-01

    Under new circumstances, that is after the end of the Cold War, the current security situation in Northeast Asia and Korean peninsula is reviewed. The South Korean Non-proliferation policy and its strong commitment to the NPT is embodied in the following: treaty commitments; government officials' statements; presidential declarations; North/South joint declarations; and domestic laws and regulations.Korea has made efforts towards denuclearisation of Korean peninsula. Its nuclear policy is based on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on maintaining a strong commitment to the NPT. The ultimate goal of its policy is to deter North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and thus secure a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. This could lay foundation for the ultimate creation of region-wide nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia

  17. Sensor Fusion for Nuclear Proliferation Activity Monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adel Ghanem, Ph D

    2007-03-30

    The objective of Phase 1 of this STTR project is to demonstrate a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) of the Geo-Rad system that integrates a location-aware SmartTag (made by ZonTrak) and a radiation detector (developed by LLNL). It also includes the ability to transmit the collected radiation data and location information to the ZonTrak server (ZonService). The collected data is further transmitted to a central server at LLNL (the Fusion Server) to be processed in conjunction with overhead imagery to generate location estimates of nuclear proliferation and radiation sources.

  18. Proliferation resistance assessment of nuclear systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    The first part of the present paper describes the basic assessment procedure that is adopted in the analysis of the three generic nuclear systems. Once-through, fast breeder, and thermal recycle systems are then treated in Sections II, III, and IV, respectively. In each of these sections, a reference system is examined, possible technical and institutional improvements are considered, and alternative system types are indicated. Section V then discusses the relative proliferation resistance of the three generic systems. Although this paper emphasizes the analysis and comparison of individual fuel cycle alternatives, Section V indicates briefly how these analyses then have to be considered in a broader context where systems coexist

  19. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This brochure is intended as a contribution to a better and more general understanding of one of the most urgent problems of present society. Emphasis is laid on three issues that are always raised in the nuclear debate: 1) Fuel cycle, 2) environmental effects of nuclear power plants, 3) waste disposal problems. (GL) [de

  20. Nuclear energy: a vital energy choice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pecqueur, Michel

    1980-01-01

    Speaking from the platform of the XIIIth annual session of the International Atomic Energy Agency, at New Delhi, AEC managing director Michel Pecqueur made a solemn appeal to the world community for the decisions which are needed on energy. The present energy crisis can lead the world to a recession and be a factor in grave troubles for peace and balance in the world. The crisis cannot be resolved without accrued recourse to the use of nuclear energy. Two essential themes were outlined: the development of nuclear energy in the world, and the increased reduction of proliferation risks. In concluding, he expressed the hop that with a greater effort in information media, the nuclear fact-of-life would be better accepted by the general public in future, for it is there that lies a brake which may hinder nuclear energy development [fr

  1. Glossary of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Du Hwan

    1987-01-01

    This book gives descriptions of explanations of terminologies concerning to nuclear energy such as analysis of financial safety of nuclear energy, radwaste disposal, fast breeder reactor, nuclear reactor and device, nuclear fuel and technique for concentration, using of nuclear energy radiation and measurement, plan for development of nuclear energy and international institution. This book includes 160 terms on nuclear energy and arranges in Korean alphabetical order.

  2. A handbook of nuclear energy. Vol. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michaelis, H.

    1982-01-01

    With this new edition of his book 'Nuclear energy', first edited in 1977, which is extremely enlarged and brought up to date, the author has given an overall picture of nuclear energy in which the physical and technical basis and the industrial, economic and environmental aspects of nuclear energy are discussed in a systematic outline. In this second volume the topics of nuclear fuel cycle, safety and environment, and international policies against the proliferation of nuclear weapons are discussed. (UA) [de

  3. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  4. Guidance for the application of an assessment methodology for innovative nuclear energy systems. INPRO manual - Proliferation resistance. Vol. 5 of the final report of phase 1 of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-11-01

    The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was initiated in the year 2000, based on a resolution of the IAEA General Conference (GC(44)/RES/21). The main objectives of INPRO are (1) to help to ensure that nuclear energy is available to contribute in fulfilling energy needs in the 21st century in a sustainable manner, (2) to bring together both technology holders and technology users to consider jointly the international and national actions required to achieve desired innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles; and (3) to create a forum to involve all relevant stakeholders that will have an impact on, draw from, and complement the activities of existing institutions, as well as ongoing initiatives at the national and international level. The INPRO manual is comprised of an overview volume (No. 1), and eight additional volumes covering the areas of economics (Volume 2), infrastructure (Volume 3), waste management (Volume 4), proliferation resistance (laid out in this report) (Volume 5), physical protection (Volume 6), environment (Volume 7), safety of nuclear reactors (Volume 8), and safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities (Volume 9). This volume of the INPRO manual is based on the results of an INPRO study on proliferation resistance of the DUPIC fuel cycle performed by the Republic of Korea during 2005 and 2006, recommendations from IAEA consultancy meetings, and on a special service agreement with G. Pshakin (Russian Federation). The INPRO Manual starts with an introduction in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, the necessary information is described to perform an INPRO assessment in the area of proliferation resistance. Explanatory notes on the INPRO basic principles (BP) and user requirements (UR) in the area of proliferation resistance, are reproduced in Chapter 3 to provide context for the assessor; additionally, background of each criterion (CR) and a corresponding procedure is described how to perform an INPRO assessment. The

  5. Agreement between Mexico and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in relation to the Latin America nuclear weapons non proliferation Treaty and the nuclear weapons non proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    Mexico hereby pledges to accept the application of safeguarding means to all basic or fissionable special materials in all nuclear activities carried out with peaceful purposes within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere. This comprises solely the purpose of verifying that these materials are not diverted to applications of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All safeguards stipulated within this Agreement are to be implemented in such a way that they do not impair the economic or technologic development of Mexico, or international cooperation regarding all nuclear activities with peaceful purposes, including the international exchange of nuclear materials, avoiding all unjustified intervention in the nuclear activities with peaceful goals in Mexico. That is particularly specific in the exploitation of the nuclear facilities, additionally promoting the fact that they adjust to the cautious practices necessary to develop nuclear activities in an economical as well as safe fashion

  6. Is nuclear energy acceptable

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weinberg, A.M.

    1977-01-01

    Nuclear hazards are assessed as being unique only in the sense of their unfamiliarity, with future development of nuclear energy dependent on overcoming public fears. Economics is clearly in favor of properly operated nuclear energy facilities for long-term power generation. Risks arise over the potential for human error to permit improper operation and for an industry shutdown because of a reactor accident. Attempts to ascertain accident probabilities have revealed that emergency core cooling systems and containment are not simply parallel, but operate in series and provide more safety than was thought. Insurance liability, resting on the small probability of very costly damage, is felt to be best placed on the utility with the government providing ultimate protection in the event of a potentially bankrupting accident. Problems of nuclear waste handling and low-level release are felt to be solvable with present technology. Proliferation is felt to be a political problem that is incidental to power plants. Public concern is blamed on possible diversion of materials for weapons, unfamiliarity with radiation, and the demand for meticulous handling of materials and operations. Burner reactors are projected to phase out and be replaced by breeder reactors that are operated in physical isolation under strict security by a professional cadre aware of its responsibility. A restructuring of the nuclear industry is called for so that the generation of power can be insulated from the distribution and marketing functions. (13 references)

  7. Nuclear energy and renewable energies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The nuclear energy and the renewable energies namely: solar energy, wind energy, geothermal energy and biomass are complementary. They are not polluting and they are expected to develop in the future to replace the fossil fuels

  8. Nuclear energy promise or peril?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van der Zwaan, B.C.C.; Hill, C.R.; Ripka, G.

    1999-01-01

    Nuclear energy will inevitably become an important worldwide issue in the 21. century. The authors are authorities in their own fields and their contributions have been read, discussed and criticized by a wide, international group of experts. The today status of nuclear power is exposed, the authors weigh the pros and cons of nuclear energy. In a near future nuclear energy could play a major role in preventing climate change and atmospheric pollution. The main challenges that put at risk nuclear energy are: nuclear safety, radiation protection, the management of radioactive wastes, the problem of plutonium stocks and the risk of proliferation. For each of these open questions, a specialist makes a precise survey of the situation

  9. Nuclear Energy, Long Term Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    2006-01-01

    There are serious warnings about depletion of oil and gas and even more serious warnings about dangers of climate change caused by emission of carbon dioxide. Should developed countries be called to replace CO2 emitting energy sources as soon as possible, and the time available may not be longer then few decades, can nuclear energy answer the call and what are the requirements? Assuming optimistic contribution of renewable energy sources, can nuclear energy expand to several times present level in order to replace large part of fossil fuels use? Paper considers intermediate and long-term requirements. Future of nuclear power depends on satisfactory answers on several questions. First group of questions are those important for near and intermediate future. They deal with economics and safety of nuclear power stations in the first place. On the same time scale a generally accepted concept for radioactive waste disposal is also required. All these issues are in the focus of present research and development. Safer and more economical reactors are targets of international efforts in Generation IV and INPRO projects, but aiming further ahead these innovative projects are also addressing issues such as waste reduction and proliferation resistance. However, even assuming successful technical development of these projects, and there is no reason to doubt it, long term and large-scale nuclear power use is thereby not yet secured. If nuclear power is to play an essential role in the long-term future energy production and in reduction of CO2 emission, than several additional questions must be replied. These questions will deal with long-term nuclear fuel sufficiency, with necessary contribution of nuclear power in sectors of transport and industrial processes and with nuclear proliferation safety. This last issue is more political then technical, thus sometimes neglected by nuclear engineers, yet it will have essential role for the long-term prospects of nuclear power. The

  10. Commercial Satellite Imagery Analysis for Countering Nuclear Proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Albright, David; Burkhard, Sarah; Lach, Allison

    2018-05-01

    High-resolution commercial satellite imagery from a growing number of private satellite companies allows nongovernmental analysts to better understand secret or opaque nuclear programs of countries in unstable or tense regions, called proliferant states. They include North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Israel. By using imagery to make these countries’ aims and capabilities more transparent, nongovernmental groups like the Institute for Science and International Security have affected the policies of governments and the course of public debate. Satellite imagery work has also strengthened the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency, thereby helping this key international agency build its case to mount inspections of suspect sites and activities. This work has improved assessments of the nuclear capabilities of proliferant states. Several case studies provide insight into the use of commercial satellite imagery as a key tool to educate policy makers and affect policy.

  11. Nuclear weapons proliferation: will US policy be counterproductive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wolfe, B.

    1979-01-01

    The Atoms for Peace Program started in 1954 is first discussed. As a result of the Indian test and plans by France and Germany to export enrichment and reprocessing facilities, US policy has veered from the Atoms for Peace approach. US policy now emphasizes technical abstinence rather than technical leadership. Dr. Wolfe concludes that the US, in attempting to discourage nuclear technologies it believes inimical to its non-proliferation objectives, has instead accelerated their independent development abroad. He states that the meaningful issue that must be faced in today's world is not whether the US can delay promising, but sensitive, technologies such as laser enrichment and reprocessing; rather, it is whether the US can play a lead role in determining the future institutional framework in which such technologies will be deployed. US ability to take this lead depends largely on its ability to maintain technological leadership. Thus, it is ironic to find US nuclear power capacity weakened in the name of non-proliferation objectives. Dr. Wolfe feels that technical leadership by the US in exploiting the immense energy-supply potential of nuclear energy can, as in the past, provide a means to help determine how nuclear technologies are utilized internationally. As an incidental benefit, such technological leadership may in the future help to solve our own energy-supply problem. 20 references

  12. Energy-efficiency and proliferation-resistance assessment factors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    Assessment factors suggested with regard to energy efficiency are: preservation of natural non-renewable resources: the degree of security of supply which can be achieved; the availability of necessary raw materials and technology; economic feasibility; and acceptability of a fuel cycle from environmental and safety views. In the area of proliferation resistance, it is suggested that the basic element is the political commitment by a Government not to use imported nuclear materials and equipment to manufacture nuclear explosives. 100% proliferation resistance is considered unattainable in practice. The role of international safeguards in detering possible diversion through the risk of early detection is described, and it is argued that efficient safeguards will force a Government willing to go nuclear to withdraw from its safeguards agreements. The second assessment factor, accordingly, is to consider different fuel cycles with regard to the efficient and rapid building up of a nuclear weapons capacity once the country has withdrawn from its safeguards commitments

  13. First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

  14. Nuclear energy by way of 110 questions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mandil, C.; Borotra, F.

    1996-01-01

    The main goal of this updated edition is to provide the general public with information on the civil nuclear policy in France. Twelve chapters deal with following topics: nuclear economy, nuclear industry, nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear waste, nuclear safety, radioactivity and health, nuclear accidents in the world, nuclear energy and environment, inspection planning, information, nuclear proliferation prevention, nuclear energy in the world and in the future. At the end of each chapter the authors answer a set of questions corresponding to the general pubic queries. (N.T.)

  15. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  16. Nuclear Proliferation Factbook. Prepared for the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 99th Congress, 1st session.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service.

    To provide a handy reference for those concerned with ways to avoid the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs have since 1977 sponsored periodic publication of the Nuclear Proliferation Factbook. This fourth edition of the factbook includes a…

  17. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lotter, A.C.

    1979-01-01

    The recent, terrifying threat of a major calamity at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island power plant near Harrisburg reverberated across practically the whole of the civilised world. An almost incredible sequence of human and mechanical failures at this installation had stopped just short of disaster and had brought the unthinkable perilously close to happening. The accident had sprayed radioactive waste into the air and had led to the large scale evacuation of people from the endangered area, disrupted hundreds of thousands of lives and caused a crippling setback to the nuclear industry. In this article the author discusses the impact the Harrisburg incident has had on the nuclear industry

  18. Energy in developing countries and the role of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldemberg, Jose

    1986-01-01

    The role of nuclear energy in developing countries is discussed with respect to energy consumption, energy needs and energy future. The application of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is examined for the developing countries. It is suggested that a revision of the NPT is needed to encourage effective nuclear disarmament. (UK)

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [fr

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [es

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [es

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria [es

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [es

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-09-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  9. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [es

  11. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-10-15

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-05-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000.

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000.

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-29

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999.

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-29

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date.

  17. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-28

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000.

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-09-14

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000.

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-06-20

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000.

  20. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-04-18

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000.

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000.

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-02-16

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998.

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

  19. Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna [es

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna [es

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010 [es

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [fr

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol entered into force on 28 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Armenia written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna [es

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-10-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  9. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  10. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  11. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-03-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  13. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  16. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  17. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-04-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977 [es

  3. Climatic change and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, M.

    2000-08-01

    The data presented in the different chapters lead to show that nuclear energy ids not a sustainable energy sources for the following reasons: investments in nuclear energy account financing that lacks to energy efficiency programmes. The nuclear programmes have negative effects such the need of great electric network, the need of highly qualified personnel, the freezing of innovation in the fields of supply and demand, development of small performing units. The countries resort to nuclear energy are among the biggest carbon dioxide emitters, because big size nuclear power plants lead to stimulate electric power consumption instead of inducing its rational use. Nuclear energy produces only electric power then a part of needs concerns heat (or cold) and when it is taken into account nuclear energy loses its advantages to the profit of cogeneration installations. Finally nuclear energy is a dangerous energy source, difficult to control as the accident occurring at Tokai MURA showed it in 1998. The problem of radioactive wastes is not still solved and the nuclear proliferation constitutes one of the most important threat at the international level. (N.C.)

  4. Evaluating the attractiveness of nuclear material for proliferation-resistance and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jor-Shan; Ikegame, Kou; Kuno, Yusuke

    2011-01-01

    The attractiveness of nuclear material, defined as a function of the isotopic composition of the nuclear material in formulas expressing the material's intrinsic properties, is of considerably debate in recent developments of proliferation-resistance measures of a nuclear energy system. A reason for such debate arises from the fact that the concept of nuclear material attractiveness can be confusing because the desirability of a material for nuclear explosive use depends on many tangible and intangible factors including the intent and capability of the adversary. In addition, a material that is unattractive to an advanced nation (in the case of proliferation) may be very attractive to a terrorist (in the case of physical protection and nuclear security). Hence, the concept of 'Nuclear Material Attractiveness' for different nuclear materials must be considered in the context of safeguards and security. The development of a ranking scheme on the attractiveness of nuclear materials could be a useful concept to start-off the strategies for safeguards and security on a new footing (i.e., why and how nuclear material is attractive, and what are the quantifiable basis). Japan may benefit from such concept regarding the attractiveness of nuclear materials when recovering nuclear materials from the damaged cores in Fukushima because safety, security, and safeguards (3S) would be a prominent consideration for the recovery operation, and it would be the first time such operation is performed in a non-nuclear weapons state. (author)

  5. Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-11-01

    A brief indication is given of the United Kingdom nuclear power programme including descriptions of the fission process, the Magnox, AGR and PWR type reactors, the recycling process, waste management and decommissioning, safety precautions, the prototype fast reactor at Dounreay, and the JET fusion experiment. (U.K.)

  6. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its role in world-wide security of nuclear fuels and facilities and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eklund, S.

    1976-01-01

    This article outlines the wide range of the Agency's concerns in both promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensuring that it is safely used with minimal risk of damage to man and his environment. This latter aspect includes measures against diversion to military purposes, theft or sabotage. There is a marked tendency to leave the promotion of nuclear energy to industry and commerce, and for many regional and national nuclear energy authorities to become increasingly absorbed in its safety and regulatory aspects--the ultimate aim being the establishment of a world nuclear law. This trend will certainly also be reflected in the Agency's program and will gain strength as time goes on. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency is sharply differentiated from national authorities in the industrial countries and from most regional nuclear energy authorities by the fact that its program must continue to reflect the needs of the developing nations which constitute a majority of its Member States. These nations--most of which are ''energy hungry''--need the Agency's help to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology

  7. Nuclear energy and energy security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mamasakhlisi, J.

    2010-01-01

    Do Georgia needs nuclear energy? Nuclear energy is high technology and application of such technology needs definite level of industry, science and society development. Nuclear energy is not only source of electricity production - application of nuclear energy increases year-by-year for medical, science and industrial use. As an energy source Georgia has priority to extend hydro-power capacity by reasonable use of all available water resources. In parallel regime the application of energy efficiency and energy conservation measures should be considered but currently this is not prioritized by Government. Meanwhile this should be taken into consideration that attempts to reduce energy consumption by increasing energy efficiency would simply raise demand for energy in the economy as a whole. The Nuclear energy application needs routine calculation and investigation. For this reason Government Commission is already established. But it seems in advance that regional nuclear power plant for South-Caucasus region would be much more attractive for future

  8. Innovative nuclear energy systems roadmap

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-12-01

    Developing nuclear energy that is sustainable, safe, has little waste by-product, and cannot be proliferated is an extremely vital and pressing issue. To resolve the four issues through free thinking and overall vision, research activities of 'innovative nuclear energy systems' and 'innovative separation and transmutation' started as a unique 21st Century COE Program for nuclear energy called the Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems for Sustainable Development of the World, COE-INES. 'Innovative nuclear energy systems' include research on CANDLE burn-up reactors, lead-cooled fast reactors and using nuclear energy in heat energy. 'Innovative separation and transmutation' include research on using chemical microchips to efficiently separate TRU waste to MA, burning or destroying waste products, or transmuting plutonium and other nuclear materials. Research on 'nuclear technology and society' and 'education' was also added in order for nuclear energy to be accepted into society. COE-INES was a five-year program ending in 2007. But some activities should be continued and this roadmap detailed them as a rough guide focusing inventions and discoveries. This technology roadmap was created for social acceptance and should be flexible to respond to changing times and conditions. (T. Tanaka)

  9. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  10. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  11. Nuclear energy: a master card

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garaud, M.F.

    1996-01-01

    Here are exposed the elements of the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The historical points, from the American deterrence to the actual situation are detailed. The political aspects, with the non proliferation, the ecologists pressure and the anti nuclear pacifism are evoked to precise the uncertainty of the actual French deterrence. 9 analysis are on the deterrence subject, then the civil aspect of nuclear energy is discussed, with the advantages and the disadvantages of the nuclear power plants and the reprocessing in two analysis; a special mention is noted for the reactor safety in Eastern Europe, in the last article. (N.C.)

  12. Nuclear energy worldwide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fertel, M.

    2000-01-01

    In this short paper the author provides a list of tables and charts concerning the nuclear energy worldwide, the clean air benefits of nuclear energy, the nuclear competitiveness and the public opinion. He shows that the nuclear energy has a vital role to play in satisfying global energy and environmental goals. (A.L.B)

  13. Nuclear power proliferation. Problems of international control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, B [International Inst. for Environment and Development, London (UK)

    1977-09-01

    The nuclear industry is experiencing a multiple crisis in which economic, technical and ethical aspects are blended inextricably. Nuclear hardware costs have everywhere soared far beyond inflation in the last five years, largely as a result of delays in programme completion arising from problems of reactor and fuel cycle. Meanwhile, partly as a result of this cost escalation, there is widespread and growing doubt as to whether capital will be available to finance the electricity generating levels projected by the industry and by governments for the 1990s. The nuclear industry is now in trouble at every stage of the fuel cycle. The industry's difficulties have also revealed a lack of overall - but particularly nuclear - energy strategy at either national or international levels, and a lack of will to create regulations and institutional machinery at either of these levels which might reassure both concerned publics and the energy industries themselves. This paper appraises some of the present limitations of international institutions in achieving control and management of nuclear power.

  14. Nuclear power proliferation: problems of international control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, B

    1977-09-01

    Some of the present limitations of international institutions in achieving control and management of nuclear power are reviewed and appraised. The nuclear industry is experiencing a multiple crisis in which economic, technical, and ethical aspects are blended. Nuclear hardware costs have increased faster than inflation in the last five years, largely as a result of delays in program completion arising from reactor and fuel-cycle safety problems. Meanwhile, there is a widespread and growing doubt, partly as a result of this cost escalation, as to whether capital will be available to finance the electricity-generating levels projected by the industry and by governments for the 1990s. The nuclear industry is now in trouble at every stage of the fuel cycle. The industry's difficulties have also revealed a lack of overall--but particularly nuclear--energy strategy at either national or international levels, and a lack of will to create regulations and institutional machinery at either of these levels that could reassure the concerned public and the energy industries.

  15. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  16. Nuclear energy: considerations about nuclear trade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goes Fischer, M.D. de.

    1988-01-01

    A general view of historical aspects of nuclear energy and the arrangements to assure its use for peaceful purposes are presented. Then the internal character of nuclear energy in a juride context is demonstrated; some consideration about the international organizations and conventions and the Brazilian Legislation in the nuclear area are examined. It also deals with the political aspects of nuclear trade and the function of IAEA in this are. Furthermore the restrictions imposed by Non-Proliferation Treaty-NPT, the objectures of the Tlatelolco Treaty and ''London Club'' guidelines. Afterwards the bilateral cooperation under taken by countries and its agreements are discussed. Besides some aspects of agreements made between United States, France Germany and Brazil are discussed [pt

  17. Nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    The Administrative Court of Braunschweig judges the Ordinance on Advance Funding of Repositories (EndlagervorausleistungsVO) to be void. The Hannover Regional Court passes a basic judgment concerning the Gorleben salt mine (repository) and an action for damages. The Federal Administrative Court dismisses actions against part-permits for the Hanau fuel element fabrication plant. The Koblenz Higher Administrative Court dismisses actions against a part-permit for the Muelheim-Kaerlich reactor. 31st Amendment of the German Criminal Code passed, involving amendments in environmental criminal code, defined in the 2nd amendment to the Act on Unlowful Practices Causing Damage to the Environment (UKG); here: Amendments to the law relating to the criminal code and penal provisions governing unlawful conduct in the operation of nuclear installations. (orig.) [de

  18. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robertson, J.A.L.

    1983-06-01

    We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

  19. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  20. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  1. Nuclear energy data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Data is the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of basic statistics on electricity generation and nuclear power in OECD countries. The reader will find quick and easy reference to the present status of and projected trends in total electricity generating capacity, nuclear generating capacity, and actual electricity production as well as on supply and demand for nuclear fuel cycle services [fr

  2. Nuclear energy data 2010

    CERN Document Server

    2010-01-01

    This 2010 edition of Nuclear Energy Data , the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of official statistics and country reports on nuclear energy, provides key information on plans for new nuclear plant construction, nuclear fuel cycle developments as well as current and projected nuclear generating capacity to 2035 in OECD member countries. This comprehensive overview provides authoritative information for policy makers, experts and other interested stakeholders.

  3. Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

    1993-01-01

    Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

  4. Review of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattila, L.; Anttila, M.; Pirilae, P.; Vuori, S.

    1997-05-01

    The report is an overview on the production of the nuclear energy all over the world. The amount of production at present and in future, availability of the nuclear fuel, development of nuclear technology, environmental and safety issues, radioactive waste management and commissioning of the plants and also the competitivity of nuclear energy compared with other energy forms are considered. (91 refs.)

  5. Nuclear energy data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This new edition of Nuclear Energy Data, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of essential statistics on nuclear energy in OECD countries, offers additional textual and graphical information as compared with previous editions. It provides the reader with a comprehensive but easy-to-access overview on the status of and trends in the nuclear power and fuel cycle sector. This publication is an authoritative information source of interest to policy makers, experts and academics involved in the nuclear energy field. (authors)

  6. Nuclear energy data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    This new edition of Nuclear Energy Data, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of essential statistics on nuclear energy in OECD countries, offers additional textual and graphical information as compared with previous editions. It provides the reader with a comprehensive but easy-to-access overview on the status of and trends in the nuclear power and fuel cycle sector. This publication is an authoritative information source of interest to policy makers, experts and academics involved in the nuclear energy field. (author)

  7. The Role of Nuclear Suppliers Group in Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilijas, B.; Cizmek, A.; Prah, M.; Medakovic, S.

    2008-01-01

    The non-proliferation regime today is a pretty heterogeneous system of measures and different ways of control of nuclear material production, transport and use, as well as nuclear activities and technology in general. In its basis are the Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-proliferation Treaty. However, the development of a nuclear technology and technological progress in the world in general, poses the need for more efficient and much more concrete systems of control of nuclear material and activities. One of organizations which covers these issues is Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), founded in 1991 with goal to assemble all states suppliers, regardless are they signatories of Non-proliferation Treaty or not. The important thing is that NSG do not rely only to the list of limitations for traffic of the equipment which is directly related to nuclear activities, but also to so call dual use equipment, i.e. equipment which could be, besides its primary purpose, converted to some nuclear activities. Concerning continuous technological development, and also the actual political situation in the world, these lists are continuously amended. In this presentation the principles and methods of work of NSG are analyzed, together with the role of the Republic of Croatia as its member as from 2005.(author)

  8. The role of nuclear suppliers group in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Medakovic, S.; Cizmek, A.; Horvatic, M.; Ilijas, B.

    2009-01-01

    The non-proliferation regime today is a pretty heterogeneous system of measures and different ways of control of nuclear material production, transport and use, as well as nuclear activities and technology in general. In its basis are the Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-proliferation Treaty. However, the development of a nuclear technology and technological progress in the world in general, poses the need for more efficient and much more concrete systems of control of nuclear material and activities. One of organizations which cover these issues is Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), founded in 1991 with goal to assemble all states suppliers, regardless are they signatories of Non-proliferation Treaty or not. The important thing is that NSG do not rely only to the list of limitations for traffic of the equipment which is directly related to nuclear activities, but also to so call dual use equipment, i.e. equipment which could be, besides its primary purpose, converted to some nuclear activities. Concerning continuous technological development, and also the actual political situation in the world, these lists are continuously amended. In this presentation the principles and methods of work of NSG are analyzed, together with the role of the Republic of Croatia as its member.(author)

  9. Nuclear Fuel Leasing, Recycling and proliferation: Modeling a Global View

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crozat, M P; Choi, J; Reis, V H; Hill, R

    2004-01-01

    On February 11, 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush, in a speech to the National Defense University stated: ''The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' This concept would require nations to choose one of two paths for civilian nuclear development: those that only have reactors and those that contain one or more elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including recycling. ''Fuel cycle'' states would enrich uranium, manufacture and lease fuel to ''reactor'' states and receive the reactor states' spent fuel. All parties would accede to stringent security and safeguard standards, embedded within a newly invigorated international regime. Reactor states would be relieved of the financial, environmental (and political) burden of enriching and manufacturing fuel and dealing with spent fuel. Fuel cycle states would potentially earn money on leasing the fuel and perhaps on sales of reactors to the reactor states. Such a leasing concept is especially interesting in scenarios which envision growth in nuclear power, and an important consideration for such a nuclear growth regime is the role of recycling of civilian spent fuel. Recycling holds promise for improved management of spent fuel and efficient utilization of resources, but continues to raise the specter of a world with uncontrolled nuclear weapons proliferation. If done effectively, a fuel-leasing concept could help create a political and economic foundation for significant growth of clean, carbon-free nuclear power while providing a mechanism for significant international cooperation to reduce proliferation concern. This

  10. Which future for nuclear counter-proliferation?; Quel avenir pour la contre-proliferation nucleaire?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duval, M.

    2010-07-15

    Dealing with the case of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear states (but not eventually by terrorists), the author first identifies the constants of counter-proliferation: it is linked to interest conflicts between those who try to preserve their monopoly and those who try to acquire a new weapon either because of a threat or for reasons of regional prestige, the evolution from use to deterrence, the appearance of new actors after the USA and Russia, the role of nuclear tactical weapons, and the future of Russian weapons and know-how. He presents the international counter-proliferation context: the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA and its controls, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the nuclear-free zones, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He describes how and why proliferation occurs: uranium enrichment and plutonium technology, political reasons in different parts of the world. Then, he gives an overview of the proliferation status by commenting the cases of Israel, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. He discusses the future of proliferation (involved countries, existence of a nuclear black market) and of counter-proliferation as far as Middle-East and North Korea are concerned. He tries finally to anticipate the consequences for nuclear deterrence strategy, and more particularly for Europe and France

  11. Nuclear energy and the nuclear energy industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bromova, E.; Vargoncik, D.; Sovadina, M.

    2013-01-01

    A popular interactive multimedia publication on nuclear energy in Slovak. 'Nuclear energy and energy' is a modern electronic publication that through engaging interpretation, combined with a number of interactive elements, explains the basic principles and facts of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Operation of nuclear power plants, an important part of the energy resources of developed countries, is frequently discussed topic in different social groups. Especially important is truthful knowledgeability of the general public about the benefits of technical solutions, but also on the risks and safety measures throughout the nuclear industry. According to an online survey 'Nuclear energy and energy' is the most comprehensive electronic multimedia publication worldwide, dedicated to the popularization of nuclear energy. With easy to understand texts, interactive and rich collection of accessories stock it belongs to modern educational and informational titles of the present time. The basic explanatory text of the publication is accompanied by history and the present time of all Slovak nuclear installations, including stock photos. For readers are presented the various attractions legible for the interpretation, which help them in a visual way to make a more complete picture of the concerned issue. Each chapter ends with a test pad where the readers can test their knowledge. Whole explanatory text (72 multimedia pages, 81,000 words) is accompanied by a lot of stock of graphic materials. The publication also includes 336 photos in 60 thematic photo galleries, 45 stock charts and drawings, diagrams and interactive 31 videos and 3D models.

  12. Nuclear energy in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The booklet provides and up-to-date overview of the use of nuclear energy in Finland as well as future plans regarding the nuclear energy sector. It is intended for people working in the nuclear or energy sector in other countries, as well as for those international audiences and decision-makers who would like to have extra information on this particular energy sector. In the booklet nuclear energy is described as part of the Finnish electricity market

  13. Nuclear energy in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guillemard, B.

    1978-01-01

    After having described the nuclear partners in Japan, the author analyzes the main aspects of Japan's nuclear energy: nuclear power plants construction program; developping of light water reactors; fuel cycle politics [fr

  14. Nuclear energy data 2011

    CERN Document Server

    2011-01-01

     . Nuclear Energy Data, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of statistics and country reports on nuclear energy, contains official information provided by OECD member country governments on plans for new nuclear plant construction, nuclear fuel cycle developments as well as current and projected nuclear generating capacity to 2035. For the first time, it includes data for Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia, which recently became OECD members. Key elements of this edition show a 2% increase in nuclear and total electricity production and a 0.5% increase in nuclear generating ca

  15. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  16. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-11-15

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  17. Nuclear energy data 2005

    CERN Document Server

    Publishing, OECD

    2005-01-01

    This 2005 edition of Nuclear Energy Data, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of essential statistics on nuclear energy in OECD countries, offers a projection horizon lengthened to 2025 for the first time.  It presents the reader with a comprehensive overview on the status and trends in nuclear electricity generation in OECD countries and in the various sectors of the nuclear fuel cycle.

  18. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  19. Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

  20. Nuclear proliferation: motivations, capabilities, and strategies for control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwood, T.; Feiveson, H.A.; Taylor, T.B.

    1977-01-01

    Two possible patterns of proliferation appear to involve the greatest risks for nuclear use or war. The first is proliferation to particular categories of states and the second dangerous possibility is proliferation at a rapid rate. But rapid proliferation could cause instabilities that might be too great for political systems and institutions to handle, making nuclear use of nuclear war more likely. Thus, any strategy for nonproliferation should especially attempt to prevent a rapid spread of nuclear weapons and to avert acquisition by states in the high-risk categories. Nuclear proliferation will also have important effects on world and regional stability for reasons not directly related to nuclear use. The mere possession of nuclear weapons by certain states could radically alter international perceptions and threaten global arrangements. The main concern in this discussion is to analyze the various incentives and disincentives--involving both security and political considerations--that will affect states' decisions about whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons. The discussion then turns to the means by which individual states and the international community can influence nuclear incentives and disincentives. The particularly important subject of the management of the international nuclear industry is addressed separately, followed by an analysis of nuclear acquisition, use, and threat by non-state entities. Finally, a general strategy for decreasing incentives and increasing disincentives is proposed and applied to four special categories of states

  1. The challenge of nuclear proliferation control in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mian, J.A.

    1996-01-01

    Prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation in South Asia is considered a a difficult challenge. The paper discusses the difficulties met in implementing the nuclear non-proliferation policy due to numerous disputes concerning China, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and the countries of former Soviet Union. Matters preventing proliferation are mentioned as well as obstacles to non-proliferation proposing that decisions whether voluntary or, eventually, compulsory would have to be consistently enforced by the Security Council, if states are to rely upon those methods for their security

  2. Act of 20 July 1978 establishing provisions enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to undertake inspections and verifications on Belgian territory, in implementation of the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 made in application of 1 and 4 paragraphs of Article III of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Belgium concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which enables the latter to verify the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Belgium in accordance with the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT enter into such agreements. (NEA) [fr

  3. Proliferating cell nuclear antigen (PCNA): a new marker to study human colonic cell proliferation.

    OpenAIRE

    Kubben, F J; Peeters-Haesevoets, A; Engels, L G; Baeten, C G; Schutte, B; Arends, J W; Stockbrügger, R W; Blijham, G H

    1994-01-01

    Immunohistochemistry of the S phase related proliferating cell nuclear antigen (PCNA) was studied as an alternative to ex-vivo bromodeoxyuridine (BrdU) immunohistochemistry for assessment of human colonic cell proliferation. From 16 subjects without colonic disease biopsy specimens were collected from five different sites along the colorectum and processed for BrdU and PCNA immunohistochemistry. The mean proliferation index of PCNA was significantly higher at 133% of the value obtained with B...

  4. Nuclear energy basic knowledge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Volkmer, Martin

    2013-11-01

    The following topics are dealt with: Atoms, nuclear decays and radioactivity, energy, nuclear fission and the chain reaction, controlled nuclear fission, nuclear power plants, safety installations in nuclear power plants, fuel supply and disposal, radiation measurement and radiation exposition of man. (HSI)

  5. Nuclear energy - some aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bandeira, Fausto de Paula Menezes

    2005-05-01

    This work presents a brief history of research and development concerning to nuclear technology worldwide and in Brazil, also information about radiations and radioactive elements as well; the nuclear technology applications; nuclear reactor types and functioning of thermonuclear power plants; the number of existing nuclear power plants; the nuclear hazards occurred; the national fiscalization of nuclear sector; the Brazilian legislation in effect and the propositions under proceduring at House of Representatives related to the nuclear energy

  6. Nuclear energy. Economical aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Legee, F.

    2010-01-01

    This document present 43 slides of a power point presentation containing detailed data on economical and cost data for nuclear energy and nuclear power plants: evolution from 1971 to 2007 of world total primary energy supply, development of nuclear energy in the world, nuclear power plants in the world in 2009, service life of nuclear power plants and its extension; nuclear energy market and perspectives at 2030, the EPR concept (generation III) and its perspectives at 2030 in the world; cost assessment (power generation cost, nuclear power generation cost, costs due to nuclear safety, comparison of investment costs for gas, coal and nuclear power generation, costs for building a nuclear reactor and general cost; cost for the entire fuel cycle, the case of the closed cycle with recycling (MOX); costs for radioactive waste storage; financial costs and other costs such as environmental impacts, strategic stocks, comparative evaluation of the competitiveness of nuclear versus coal and gas

  7. Technology Roadmaps: Nuclear Energy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-01

    This nuclear energy roadmap has been prepared jointly by the IEA and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). Unlike most other low-carbon energy sources, nuclear energy is a mature technology that has been in use for more than 50 years. The latest designs for nuclear power plants build on this experience to offer enhanced safety and performance, and are ready for wider deployment over the next few years. Several countries are reactivating dormant nuclear programmes, while others are considering nuclear for the first time. China in particular is already embarking on a rapid nuclear expansion. In the longer term, there is great potential for new developments in nuclear energy technology to enhance nuclear's role in a sustainable energy future.

  8. Sustainable nuclear energy dilemma

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Afgan Naim H.

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Sustainable energy development implies the need for the emerging potential energy sources which are not producing adverse effect to the environment. In this respect nuclear energy has gained the complimentary favor to be considered as the potential energy source without degradation of the environment. The sustainability evaluation of the nuclear energy systems has required the special attention to the criteria for the assessment of nuclear energy system before we can make firm justification of the sustainability of nuclear energy systems. In order to demonstrate the sustainability assessment of nuclear energy system this exercise has been devoted to the potential options of nuclear energy development, namely: short term option, medium term option, long term option and classical thermal system option. Criteria with following indicators are introduced in this analysis: nuclear indicator, economic indicator, environment indicator, social indicator... The Sustainability Index is used as the merit for the priority assessment among options under consideration.

  9. Electricity and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krafft, P.

    1987-01-01

    Consequences of getting out from nuclear energy are discussed. It is concluded that the Chernobyl accident is no reason to withdraw confidence from Swiss nuclear power plants. There are no sufficient economizing potential and other energies at disposal to substitute nuclear energy. Switching to coal, oil and gas would increase environmental damages. Economic and social cost of getting out would be too high

  10. From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    1998-01-01

    This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

  11. Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-12-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003.

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-12-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003.

  18. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  1. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-05-04

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001.

  2. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-03-28

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001.

  3. Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 16 April 2014 in Basseterre, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and on 19 May 2014 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 May 2014, upon signature by the representatives of Saint Kitts and Nevis and the Agency

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

  8. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol, which was applied provisionally from 12 June 1998, entered into force on 11 June 2004, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Ghana that Ghana's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. The text of the Additional Protocol is reproduced in document INFCIRC/226/Add.1

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  17. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  18. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  19. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  20. Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  1. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994.

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  4. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  5. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  7. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  8. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  9. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  11. Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  12. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995.

  13. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  15. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  16. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  18. Nuclear energy data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This new edition of Nuclear Energy Data, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of essential statistics on nuclear energy in OECD countries, offers additional graphical information as compared with previous editions allowing a rapid comparison between capacity and requirements in the various phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. It provides the reader with a comprehensive but easy-to-access overview on the status of and trends in the nuclear power and fuel cycle sector. This publication is an authoritative information source of interest to policy makers, experts and academics involved in the nuclear energy field. (author)

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [fr

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [es

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  4. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007 [es

  6. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  7. Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Honduras to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between the Republic of Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  8. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  9. Methodologies for evaluating the proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shiotani, Hiroki; Hori, Kei-ichiro; Takeda, Hiroshi

    2001-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) believes that the development of future nuclear fuel cycle technology should be conducted with careful consideration given to non-proliferation. JNC is studying methodologies for evaluating proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. However, it is difficult to establish the methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance since the results greatly depend on the assumption for the evaluation and the surrounding conditions. This study grouped factors of proliferation resistance into categories through reviewing past studies and studied the relationships between the factors. Then, this study tried to find vulnerable nuclear material (plutonium) in some FBR fuel cycles from the proliferation perspective, and calculated the time it takes to convert the materials from various nuclear fuel cycles into pure plutonium metal under some assumptions. The result showed that it would take a long time to convert the nuclear materials from the FBR fuel cycles without plutonium separation. While it is a preliminary attempt to evaluate a technical factor of proliferation resistance as the basis of the institutional proliferation resistance, the JNC hopes that it will contribute to future discussions in this area. (author)

  10. A collaboration on development of requirements and guidelines for proliferation resistance of future nuclear system in the IAEA INPRO

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Kim, Hyun Jun; Jeong, Ik; Yang, Myung Seung; Ko, Won Il

    2003-10-01

    This study surveyed and analyzed the existing activities and international status concerning proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems, reviewed the features of proliferation resistance, and derived the requirements of future innovative nuclear energy systems. In IAEA INPRO, guidance for the evaluation of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles on proliferation resistance was finalized through collaboration of member countries including Korea in reviewing technological status and developing the methodology for evaluation of proliferation resistance. This report, first, describes the progress of INPRO and the participation status of Korea in the project, and briefly summarizes the report of phase IA of INPRO. Next, features of proliferation resistance of nuclear systems, collaboration in the GIF and the INPRO for development of requirements and guidelines for proliferation resistance, and the final result of guidance for the evaluation of proliferation resistance were described. Finally, this study proposed measures for participation of further progress of the INPRO

  11. Nuclear energy - the way ahead

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fells, I.

    1981-01-01

    The subject is discussed, after a general introduction, under the headings: current situation; losses and accidents; safety factors; mistaken estimates (risks over-stated); licensing; transport and storage (of spent fuel and radioactive wastes); performance considerations; plant size; costs; developing countries; political considerations; OECD policy (energy policy, government policies, public relations); nuclear proliferation; media role; conclusions (mainly political, safety and public relations considerations). (U.K.)

  12. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kerr, Paul; Nikitin, Mary B

    2007-01-01

    Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles...

  13. Nuclear energy at the turning point

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weinberg, A.M.

    1977-07-01

    In deciding the future course of nuclear energy, it is necessary to re-examine man's long-term energy options, in particular solar energy and the breeder reactor. Both systems pose difficultiies: energy from the sun is likely to be expensive as well as limited, whereas a massive world-wide deployment of nuclear breeders will create problems of safety and of proliferation. Nuclear energy's long-term success depends on resolving both of these problems. Collocation of nuclear facilities with a system of resident inspectors are measures that ought to help increase the proliferation-resistance as well as the safety of a large-scale, long-term nuclear system based on breeders. In such a long-term system a strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is viewed as playing a central role.

  14. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  15. ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF INNOVATIVE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARI, R.; ROGLANS, J.; DENNING, R.; MLADINEO, S.

    2003-01-01

    The National Nuclear Security Administration is developing methods for nonproliferation assessments to support the development and implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. This paper summarizes the key results of that effort. Proliferation resistance is the degree of difficulty that a nuclear material, facility, process, or activity poses to the acquisition of one or more nuclear weapons. A top-level measure of proliferation resistance for a fuel cycle system is developed here from a hierarchy of metrics. At the lowest level, intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation are defined. These barriers are recommended as a means to characterize the proliferation characteristics of a fuel cycle. Because of the complexity of nonproliferation assessments, the problem is decomposed into: metrics to be computed, barriers to proliferation, and a finite set of threats. The spectrum of potential threats of nuclear proliferation is complex and ranges from small terrorist cells to industrialized countries with advanced nuclear fuel cycles. Two general categories of methods have historically been used for nonproliferation assessments: attribute analysis and scenario analysis. In the former, attributes of the systems being evaluated (often fuel cycle systems) are identified that affect their proliferation potential. For a particular system under consideration, the attributes are weighted subjectively. In scenario analysis, hypothesized scenarios of pathways to proliferation are examined. The analyst models the process undertaken by the proliferant to overcome barriers to proliferation and estimates the likelihood of success in achieving a proliferation objective. An attribute analysis approach should be used at the conceptual design level in the selection of fuel cycles that will receive significant investment for development. In the development of a detailed facility design, a scenario approach should be undertaken to reduce the potential for design vulnerabilities

  16. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    This NASAP assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improvng the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness

  17. Nuclear energy dictionary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-03-15

    This book is a dictionary for nuclear energy which lists the technical terms in alphabetical order. It adds four appendixes. The first appendix is about people involved with nuclear energy. The second one is a bibliography and the third one is a checklist of German, English and Korean. The last one has an index. This book gives explanations on technical terms of nuclear energy such as nuclear reaction and atomic disintegration.

  18. Nuclear energy dictionary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    This book is a dictionary for nuclear energy which lists the technical terms in alphabetical order. It adds four appendixes. The first appendix is about people involved with nuclear energy. The second one is a bibliography and the third one is a checklist of German, English and Korean. The last one has an index. This book gives explanations on technical terms of nuclear energy such as nuclear reaction and atomic disintegration.

  19. Nuclear energy in Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villota, C. de

    2007-01-01

    Carlos Villota. Director of Nuclear Energy of UNESA gave an overview of the Spanish nuclear industry, the utility companies and the relevant institutions. Companies of the nuclear industry include firms that produce heavy components or equipment (ENSA), manufacturers of nuclear fuel (ENUSA), engineering companies, the National Company for Radioactive Waste Management (ENRESA), and nuclear power plants (nine units at seven sites). Nuclear energy is a significant component of the energy mix in Spain: 11% of all energy produced in Spain is of nuclear origin, whilst the share of nuclear energy in the total electricity generation is approximately 23%. The five main players of the energy sector that provide for the vast majority of electricity production, distribution, and supply have formed the Spanish Electricity Industry Association (UNESA). The latter carries out co-ordination, representation, management and promotion tasks for its members, as well as the protection of their business and professional interests. In the nuclear field, UNESA through its Nuclear Energy Committee co-ordinates aspects related to nuclear safety and radiological protection, regulation, NPP operation and R and D. Regarding the institutional framework of the nuclear industry, ENSA, ENUSA and ENRESA are controlled by the national government through the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Science and Technology. All companies of the nuclear industry are licensed by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade (MITYC), while the regulatory body is the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN). It is noteworthy that CSN is independent of the government, as it reports directly to Parliament. (author)

  20. Soft energy vs nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ando, Yoshio

    1981-01-01

    During the early 1960s, a plentiful, inexpensive supply of petroleum enabled Japanese industry to progress rapidly; however, almost all of this petroleum was imported. Even after the first oil crisis of 1973, the recent annual energy consumption of Japan is calculated to be about 360 million tons in terms of petroleum, and actual petroleum forms 73% of total energy. It is necessary for Japan to reduce reliance on petroleum and to diversify energy resources. The use of other fossil fuels, such as coal, LNG and LPG, and hydraulic energy, is considered as an established alternative. In this presentation, the author deals with new energy, namely soft energy and nuclear energy, and discusses their characteristics and problems. The following kinds of energy are dealt with: a) Solar energy, b) Geothermal energy, c) Ocean energy (tidal, thermal, wave), d) Wind energy, e) Biomass energy, f) Hydrogen, g) Nuclear (thermal, fast, fusion). To solve the energy problem in future, assiduous efforts should be made to develop new energy systems. Among them, the most promising alternative energy is nuclear energy, and various kinds of thermal reactor systems have been developed for practical application. As a solution to the long-term future energy problem, research on and development of fast breeder reactors and fusion reactors are going on. (author)

  1. Nuclear power, nuclear exports and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hildenbrand, G.

    1977-01-01

    Developed and developing countries alike unfortunately have no other options in replacing oil in electricity generation than to use coal or nuclear energy. As far as the supplier countries are concerned, there is no doubt that nobody is interested in adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the future electricity requirement in the developing countries, especially the need for nuclear power plants, represents a considerable market in the medium and long term which the supplier countries cannot simply ignore because they must seek to secure their export shares in order to protect jobs at home. For the receiver countries it is a matter of principle to achieve the highest possible degree of independence in energy generation so as to be able to guarantee continuity of supply. The interest in building up national fuel cycle activities is also closely linked with the creation of jobs in the receiver countries and with the efforts of these countries to straighten out their balance of payments situation. (orig.) [de

  2. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  3. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  4. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  5. Nuclear energy from radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwarzenberg, M.

    1998-01-01

    The global energy demand is increasing. Sound forecasts indicate that by the year 2020 almost eight thousand million people will be living on our planet, and generating their demand for energy will require conversion of about 20 thousand million tonnes of coal equivalents a year. Against this background scenario, a new concept for energy generation elaborated by nuclear scientists at CERN attracts particular interest. The concept describing a new nuclear energy source and technology intends to meet the following principal requirements: create a new energy source that can be exploited in compliance with extremely stringent safety requirements; reduce the amount of long-lived radioactive waste; substantially reduce the size of required radwaste repositories; use easily available natural fuels that will not need isotopic separation; prevent the risk of proliferation of radioactive materials; process and reduce unwanted actinides as are generated by the operation of current breeder reactors; achieve high efficiency both in terms of technology and economics. (orig./CB) [de

  6. Nuclear energy in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of the booklet is to provide an up-to-date overview of the use of nuclear energy in Finland as well as future plans regarding the nuclear energy sector. It is intended for people working in the nuclear energy or other energy sectors in other countries, as well as for those international audiences and decision-makers who would like to have extra information on this particular energy sector. Nuclear energy is described as part of the Finnish electricity market. (orig.)

  7. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  8. Nuclear energy and environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alves, R.N.

    1987-01-01

    A general view about the use of energy for brazilian development is presented. The international situation of the nuclear field and the pacific utilization of nuclear energy in Brazil are commented. The safety concepts used for reactor and nuclear facilities licensing, the environmental monitoring program and radiation protection program used in Brazil are described. (E.G.) [pt

  9. Nuclear energy data 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This new edition of Nuclear Energy Data, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of essential statistics on nuclear energy in OECD countries, offers projections lengthened to 2030 for the first time and information on the development of new centrifuge enrichment capacity in member countries. The compilation gives readers a comprehensive and easy-to-access overview of the current situation and expected trends in various sectors of the nuclear fuel cycle, providing authoritative information to policy makers, experts and academics working in the nuclear energy field

  10. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O [ed.

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  11. Dangerous deterrent: nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paul Kapur, S.

    2008-01-01

    This book discusses the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and its effect on security of the South Asian region. The author uses quantitative analysis to establish the relationship between nuclearization and conventional stability in the region between 1971 and 2002. He shows a positive correlation between nuclear proliferation and conventional instability during these three decades. Thus, this study affirms that nuclear weapons have failed to prevent conflict in South Asia. In fact, they have escalated tensions

  12. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  13. Exporting apocalypse: CANDU reactors and nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKay, Paul.

    The author believes that the peaceful use of nuclear technology leads inevitably to the production of nuclear weapons, and that CANDU reactors are being bought by countries that are likely to build bombs. He states that exports of reactors and nuclear materials cannot be defended and must be stopped

  14. Predicting Proliferation: High Reliability Forecasting Models of Nuclear Proliferation as a Policy & Analytical Aid

    OpenAIRE

    Center on Contemporary Conflict; Gartzke, Erik

    2015-01-01

    Performer: University of California at San Diego Project Lead: Erik Gartzke Project Cost: $121,000 FY15-16 Objective: Scholars have spent decades studying and explaining nuclear proliferation. This project will develop a model to predict the behavior of states regarding their pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons. An accurate prediction model will allow for action against potential suppliers, interdiction of nuclear trade, intelligence collection on covert nuclea...

  15. Nuclear energy for the 21. century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-03-01

    This document gathers 5 introductory papers to this conference about nuclear energy for the 21. century: the French energy policy during the last 30 years (situation of France with respect to the energy supply and demand, main trends of the French energy policy, future of the French nuclear policy); presentation of IAEA (technology transfer, nuclear safety, non-proliferation policy, structure and financial resources, council of governors, general conference, secretariat); nuclear power and sustainable development; promoting safety at nuclear facilities (promoting safety, basics of safety, safety at the design stage, risk management, regulatory control and efficiency of the regulation organization, role of IAEA); nuclear energy today (contribution to sustainable development, safety, best solution for the management of radioactive wastes, future of nuclear energy). (J.S.)

  16. Nuclear energy and society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakacs, Istvan; Czeizel, Endre; Hajdu, Janos; Marx, Gyoergy.

    1984-01-01

    The text of a round-table discussion held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the discovery of neutron is given. The participants were the Chief Engineer of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, the first nuclear power plant in Hungary started in November 1982, a geneticist treating the problems of genetic damages caused by nuclear and chemical effects, a nuclear physicist and a journalist interested in the social aspects of nuclear energy. They discussed the political, economical and social problems of nuclear energy in the context of its establishment in Hungary. (D.Gy.)

  17. Nuclear energy and international organizations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindemann, B.

    1975-01-01

    The historical perspectives of the international organizations' role concerning the development and spreading of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the national interests within and towards these organizations, are portrayed. The difference in political status between the so-called nuclear and non-nuclear States, lodged in Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important factor. The effects so far of these differences in status on the interest of nuclear States to participate in organizations and on factors which might possibly lead to conflict between these two groups are presented. The author skirts the cooperation between organizations (international bureaucracies, group-formation of states). (HP/LN) [de

  18. Nuclear energy and nuclear technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luescher, E.

    1982-01-01

    This book originated in the training courses for teachers of grammar- and secondary schools in Dillingen (Bavaria). The aim of these courses is to become informed about the latest state in one field of physics. The lectures are well-known experts in the respective fields. In the latest study (1980) of the National Academy of Sciences the experts came to the conclusion that without further development nuclear power plants the utilization of too much coal would become necessary and involve irreversible environmental damage (see chapter 6). There are two important obstacles impeding the further extension of nuclear energy. The first problem to be solved is the processing and storage of radioactive waste. This is a more technical task and can be treated in a satisfactory way. The second obstacle is less easy to take as the population has to be convinced that a nuclear power plant can be operated with almost unbelievable safety (see chapter 5) and be shut down safely in the case of incidents. The most promising possibility of controlled nuclear fusion as energy source is still many decades- if feasible at all- away from being performed (see chapter. 7). In the Soviet Union 25% of the electric energy production shall be proceed from nuclear power plants by the year 1990. (orig./GL) [de

  19. Nuclear energy questions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This work pack contains illustrated booklets entitled: 'Uranium mining'; 'Reactors and radiation'; 'Nuclear waste'; 'Work book on energy'; 'Alternatives now'; 'Future energy choices'; 'Resources handbook'; and 'Tutors' guidelines': a map entitled 'Nuclear power in Britain': and two coloured pictures entitled 'Nuclear prospects' and 'Safe energy'. A cover note states that the material has been prepared for use in schools and study groups. (U.K.)

  20. Germany bars nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gaullier, V.

    1999-01-01

    Germany wants a future without nuclear energy, the different steps about the going out of nuclear programs are recalled. The real choice is either fossil energies with their unquestionable safety levels but with an increase of the greenhouse effect or nuclear energy with its safety concerns and waste management problems but without pollutant emission. The debate will have to be set in most European countries. (A.C.)

  1. The nuclear energy policy challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanne, H.

    2009-01-01

    At a time when the nuclear question mobilizes attentions and when a new cycle of debates about non-proliferation opens up, the author recalls the constraints and challenges of a nuclear power generation policy. After a brief history of the development of nuclear energy in France and in the rest of the world, the author presents the risks linked with this energy source (TMI and Chernobyl accidents), the particularities of the fuel cycle with its safety and security aspects, and the promises of some past and future reactor technologies (FBR's and fusion reactors). Then, the author stresses on the importance of investments in this domain as illustrated by the launching of new nuclear programs in France, UK, Italy, Finland and in the US, and by the willing of some emerging countries to develop this energy source (China, India, United Arab Emirates, Jordan..). Finally, nuclear energy must not be considered as a privilege of developed countries but should benefit to the rest of the world as well since it promotes economic development thanks to an abundant and cheap energy. (J.S.)

  2. Nuclear Energy General Objectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    One of the IAEA's statutory objectives is to 'seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'. One way it achieves this objective is to issue publications in various series. Two of these series are the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series and the IAEA Safety Standards Series. According to Article III, paragraph A.6, of the IAEA Statute, the IAEA safety standards establish 'standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property.' The safety standards include the Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. These standards are primarily written in a regulatory style, and are binding on the IAEA for its own activities. The principal users are Member State regulatory bodies and other national authorities. The IAEA Nuclear Energy Series consists of reports designed to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, nuclear energy for peaceful uses. This includes practical examples to be used by owners and operators of utilities in Member States, implementing organizations, academia and politicians, among others. The information is presented in guides, reports on the status of technology and advances, and best practices for peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on inputs from international experts. The series complements the IAEA's safety standards, and provides detailed guidance, experience, good practices and examples on the five areas covered in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series. The Nuclear Energy Basic Principles is the highest level publication in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series and describes the rationale and vision for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It presents eight Basic Principles on which nuclear energy systems should be based to fulfil nuclear energy's potential to help meet growing global energy needs. The Nuclear Energy Series Objectives are the second level publications. They describe what needs to be

  3. Review of nuclear fuel cycle alternatives including certain features pertaining to weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, D.C.; Rosenstroch, B.

    1978-01-01

    Largely as a result of concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. program to develop and commercialize the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor has been slowed down; interest in alternative fuel cycles has increased. The report offers an informal review of the various nuclear fuel cycle options including some aspects relevant to weapon proliferation, although no complete review of the latter subject is attempted. Basic principles governing breeding, reactor safety, and efficient utilization of fission energy resources (thorium and uranium) are discussed. The controversial problems of weapon proliferation and its relation to fuel reprocessing (which is essential for efficient fuel cycles) are reviewed and a number of proposed approaches to reducing proliferation risks are noted. Some representative specific reactor concepts are described, with emphasis on their development status, their potentials for resource utilization, and their implications for proliferation

  4. History, framework and perspectives of international policy for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Czakainski, M.

    1985-12-01

    The study analyses the framework conditions, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime and their interlacement with international nuclear energy policies, and evaluates the results achieved so far on an international level by the efforts directed towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion to be drawn as stated by the author is that the classical tool of non-proliferation policy - denial of technology transfer - will lose in importance and give way to enhanced, controlled cooperation between countries of the Third World and the industrialised countries. Another instrument that will maintain its value for non-proliferation policy is cooperation for political stabilisation in those parts of the world where regional conflicts might aggravate. (orig./HP) [de

  5. Some remarks on rockbursts and nuclear proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McGarr, A. [Geological Survey, Menlo Park, CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    This report describes problems associated with non-proliferation verification. Issues are described which can arise in the course of monitoring test ban treaties, with an example of an occurrence in South Africa. A problem for most situations appears to be the seismic source.

  6. Model-Based Calculations of the Probability of a Country's Nuclear Proliferation Decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li, Jun; Yim, Man-Sung; McNelis, David N.

    2007-01-01

    The first nuclear weapon was detonated in August 1945 over Japan to end World War II. During the past six decades, the majority of the world's countries have abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, a number of countries have explored the nuclear weapons option, 23 in all. Among them, 14 countries have dropped their interest in nuclear weapons after initiating some efforts. And nine of them today possess nuclear weapons. These countries include the five nuclear weapons states - U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China - and the four non- NPT member states - Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Many of these countries initially used civilian nuclear power technology development as a basis or cover for their military program. Recent proliferation incidents in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea brought the world together to pay much attention to nuclear nonproliferation. With the expected surge in the use of nuclear energy for power generation by developing countries, the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime needs to be better prepared for potential future challenges. For the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime to effectively cope with any future proliferation attempts, early detection of potentially proliferation-related activities is highly desirable. Early detection allows the international community to respond and take necessary actions - ideally using political and diplomatic influences without resorting to harsh measures such as sanctions or military actions. In this regard, a capability to quantitatively predict the chance of a country's nuclear proliferation intent or activities is of significant interest. There have been various efforts in the research community to understand the determinants of nuclear proliferation and develop quantitative tools to predict nuclear proliferation events. These efforts have shown that information about the political issues surrounding a country's security along with economic development data can be useful to

  7. Nuclear energy and society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sobajima, Makoto; Shimooka, Hiroshi; Tanaka, Yasumasa; Fujii, Yasuhiko; Misima, Tsuyoshi

    2004-01-01

    Nuclear energy has a strong relation to a society. However, due to accidents and scandals having occurred in recent years, people's reliability to nuclear energy has significantly swayed and is becoming existence of a worry. Analyzing such a situation and grasping the problem contained are serious problems for people engaging in nuclear field. In order that nuclear energy is properly used in society, communication with general public and in nuclear power plant site area are increasingly getting important as well as grasping the situation and surveying measures for overcoming the problems. On the basis of such an analysis, various activities for betterment of public acceptance of nuclear energy by nuclear industry workers, researchers and the government are proposed. (J.P.N.)

  8. Which future for the nuclear counter-proliferation?; Quel avenir pour la contre-proliferation nucleaire?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duval, M

    2004-10-01

    After a recall of the permanent data about proliferation and of the safeguards implemented by the international community, the author demonstrates that proliferation has moved towards Asia where a real 'black market' has been created. Then he analyzes the consequences of this change on the future of nuclear deterrent. Finally, he expresses his nostalgia in front of this drift and worries about the future uselessness of the means devoted to this 'pacifying' strategy. (J.S.)

  9. Worldwide Report, Nuclear Development and Proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    1985-08-21

    Valindaba and the Nuclear Devel- case’ about 6 000 people might be opment Corporation ( Nucor ) since over-exposed,and die within the 1982. That year nuclear...Because of nnecessary duplica- that SA has the ability to enrich tion, Ucor’and Nucor have been uranium to 40% and, therefore, taken over by the AEC...many things - car- Nuclear Fuels Section. Nucor will pentry, electronics. I fix my owncontinue with research and devel- cars and work around the house

  10. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  11. International nuclear commerce: structure, trends and proliferation potentials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodgaard, S.

    1977-01-01

    In recent years a surge has taken place in international nuclear commerce and this paper analyses the new patterns that have emerged. Despite uncertainties in nuclear energy forecasting the market is huge. Projections for the industry for the period 1971-1985 estimate a worldwide investment of 250 billion dollars. Following an initial decade of cooperation, 1955-1965, the superpower monopoly has become eroded. The export market for power reactors is analysed and the growth and spread of reprocessing facilities is discussed. It is pointed out that while commercial scale reprocessing requires vast and complex chemical plant, reprocessing small amounts for bomb production may be done relatively simply. Enrichment capabilities are also becoming more generally available. The market is not only expanding, but becoming multipolar and diversified, and the entire fuel cycle is now involved. The cooperation network France - W. Germany - South Africa- Iran is discussed at some length. The role of international safeguards is also treated fairly extensively, leading to a discussion of the motives and paths in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is concluded that little is to be gained from the London talks on safeguard measures and commercial restraint and that the root causes of proliferation should be tackled by comprehensive disarmament schemes. (JIW)

  12. Utility of Social Modeling in Assessment of a State's Propensity for Nuclear Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Whitney, Paul D.; Dalton, Angela C.; Olson, Jarrod; White, Amanda M.; Cooley, Scott K.; Youchak, Paul M.; Stafford, Samuel V.

    2011-01-01

    This report is the third and final report out of a set of three reports documenting research for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Security Administration (NASA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program that investigates how social modeling can be used to improve proliferation assessment for informing nuclear security, policy, safeguards, design of nuclear systems and research decisions. Social modeling has not to have been used to any significant extent in a proliferation studies. This report focuses on the utility of social modeling as applied to the assessment of a State's propensity to develop a nuclear weapons program.

  13. Utility of Social Modeling in Assessment of a State’s Propensity for Nuclear Proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Whitney, Paul D.; Dalton, Angela C.; Olson, Jarrod; White, Amanda M.; Cooley, Scott K.; Youchak, Paul M.; Stafford, Samuel V.

    2011-06-01

    This report is the third and final report out of a set of three reports documenting research for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Security Administration (NASA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program that investigates how social modeling can be used to improve proliferation assessment for informing nuclear security, policy, safeguards, design of nuclear systems and research decisions. Social modeling has not to have been used to any significant extent in a proliferation studies. This report focuses on the utility of social modeling as applied to the assessment of a State's propensity to develop a nuclear weapons program.

  14. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament; Non-proliferation nucleaire et desarmement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  15. Man, environment and nuclear energy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gardan, J

    1978-10-01

    The acceptability of nuclear fission as energy source is governed by three factors, economic, ecological and sociological. the economic context the gradual exhaustion of fossil fuels is a result of ever-increasing demands. The biological risk concept which determines the acceptable industrial application level is the second factor to be considered. The danger of radioactive contamination is almost unexistent except in the accident hypothesis, and power stations are built with excessive safeguards against hypothetical accidents. The idea of systematic processing of all working effluent to reduce radioactive waste discharge by several orders of magnitude is being examined. The only serious problems seem to be the disposal of radioactive wastes and the plutonium non-proliferation question bound up with breeder reactors. Whereas vitrification offers some solution to the radioactive waste conditioning problem, responsibility for the proliferation of nuclear weapons rests with the human conscience alone. The development of nuclear power stations over several decades seems to present no inacceptable danger and offers the best compromise betweengrowth and minimum risk requirements. The third factor to be accounted for is the opposition displayed by a fraction of the population to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful applications.

  16. Man, environment and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gardan, Jacques.

    1978-10-01

    The acceptability of nuclear fission as energy source is governed by three factors, economic, ecological and sociological. It is necessary to account first for the economic context and for the state of natural resources: gradual exhaustion of fossil fuels as a result of ever-increasing demands. The biological risk concept which determines the acceptable industrial application level is the second factor to be considered. The danger of radioactive contamination is almost inexistent except in the accident hypothesis, and power stations are built with excessive safeguards against hypothetical accidents. The idea of systematic processing of all working effluent to reduce radioactive waste discharge by several orders of magnitude (zero release principle) is being examined. At present, the waste discharge levels are always well below the limits set by the CIPR and present no danger to the population. The only serious problems seem to be the disposal of radioactive wastes and the plutonium non-proliferation question bound up with breeder reactors. Whereas vitrification, the new 'Synroc' process, offer some solution to the radioactive waste conditioning problem, responsibility for the proliferation of nuclear weapons rests with the human conscience alone. The development of nuclear power stations over several decades seems to present no inacceptable danger and offers the best compromise between growth and minimum risk requirements. The third factor to be accounted for is the opposition displayed by a fraction of the population to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful applications [fr

  17. Hydrogen economy and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    2004-01-01

    Global energy outlooks based on present trends, such as WETO study, give little optimism about fulfilling Kyoto commitments in controlling CO2 emissions and avoiding unwanted climate consequences. Whilst the problem of radioactive waste has a prominence in public, in spite of already adequate technical solutions of safe storage for future hundreds and thousands of years, there s generally much less concern with influence of fossil fuels on global climate. In addition to electricity production, process heat and transportation are approximately equal contributors to CO2 emission. Fossil fuels in transportation present also a local pollution problem in congested regions. Backed by extensive R and D, hydrogen economy is seen as the solution, however, often without much thought where from the hydrogen in required very large quantities may come. With welcome contributions from alternative sources, nuclear energy is the only source of energy capable of producing hydrogen in very large amounts, without parallel production of CO2. Future high temperature reactors could do this most efficiently. In view of the fact that nuclear weapon proliferation is not under control, extrapolation from the present level of nuclear power to the future level required by serious attempts to reduce global CO2 emission is a matter of justified concern. Finding the sites for many hundreds of new reactors would, alone, be a formidable problem in developed regions with high population density. What is generally less well understood and not validated is that the production of nuclear hydrogen allows the required large increases of nuclear power without the accompanied increase of proliferation risks. Unlike electricity, hydrogen can be economically shipped or transported by pipelines to places very far from the place of production. Thus, nuclear production of hydrogen can be located and concentrated at few remote, controllable sites, far from the population centers and consumption regions. At such

  18. Introduction to nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    After some descriptions about atoms, fission and fusion, explanations are given about the functioning of a nuclear power plant. The safety with the different plans of emergency and factors that lead to a better nuclear safety are exposed, then comes a part for the environmental protection; the fuel cycle is tackled. Some historical aspects of nuclear energy finish this file. (N.C.)

  19. Nuclear energy technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Buden, David

    1992-01-01

    An overview of space nuclear energy technologies is presented. The development and characteristics of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG's) and space nuclear power reactors are discussed. In addition, the policy and issues related to public safety and the use of nuclear power sources in space are addressed.

  20. Nuclear energy: Promise and problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, B.

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear energy is having a renaissance driven by both old fashioned supply and demand, and environmental concerns. Oil and gas prices have exploded and show no signs of returning to the levels of only a few years ago. Coal is not in short supply, but the pollution it generates has severe economic and health consequences. Concern about greenhouse gases and global warming has caused the environmental movement to begin a reassessment of the role of nuclear in the world's energy portfolio. The full potential of nuclear energy will be achieved only if governments and the public are satisfied that it is safe, that the radioactive waste can be safely disposed of, and that the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is low. The first criterion has been met with designs that are inherently safer than current LWRs, primarily through design simplification, reducing the number of critical components, and advanced control and monitoring technologies. Operating safety has to be assured through good practices and a rigorous, independent inspection process. The second criterion, waste disposal, is a problem where the science and technology (S and T) communities have the primary role in a solution. Many believe that it is solved in principle, but there has as yet been no solution in practice. I will report on where I think we have gotten and what needs to be done. The third criterion, proliferation resistance, is one that the S and T communities cannot solve on their own. The best that S and T can do is to make proliferation difficult, and to make sure that any attempts are discovered early. The rest can be handled only by enforceable international agreements. Safeguards technology needs more attention. (author)

  1. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  2. Nuclear proliferation and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency emphasises that security strategies can no longer be effective based solely on the concept of national boundaries. The article describes the security problems which have grown along with the development of 'internationalism' and the author defines the need for cooperation, assistance, regional and international networks to combat the threat quoting the IAEA's nuclear security plan as an example of how this may be achieved. In stressing the urgency Dr ElBaradei concludes: 'May it not ultimately be said of our civilisation that we created the inventions that led to our own demise'. (author)

  3. Nuclear proliferation and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

    2005-01-15

    The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency emphasises that security strategies can no longer be effective based solely on the concept of national boundaries. The article describes the security problems which have grown along with the development of 'internationalism' and the author defines the need for cooperation, assistance, regional and international networks to combat the threat quoting the IAEA's nuclear security plan as an example of how this may be achieved. In stressing the urgency Dr ElBaradei concludes: 'May it not ultimately be said of our civilisation that we created the inventions that led to our own demise'. (author)

  4. Radioactivity and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffmann, J.; Kuczera, B.

    2001-05-01

    The terms radioactivity and nuclear energy, which have become words causing irritation in the political sphere, actually represent nothing but a large potential for innovative exploitation of natural resources. The contributions to this publication of the Karlsruhe Research Center examine more closely three major aspects of radioactivity and nuclear energy. The first paper highlights steps in the history of the discovery of radioactivity in the natural environment and presents the state of the art in health physics and research into the effects of exposure of the population to natural or artificial radionuclides. Following contributions focus on: Radiochemical methods applied in the medical sciences (diagnostic methods and devices, therapy). Nuclear energy and electricity generation, and the related safety policies, are an important subject. In this context, the approaches and pathways taken in the field of nuclear science and technology are reported and discussed from the angle of nuclear safety science, and current trends are shown in the elaboration of advanced safety standards relating to nuclear power plant operation and ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes. Finally, beneficial aspects of nuclear energy in the context of a sustainable energy policy are emphasized. In particular, the credentials of nuclear energy in the process of building an energy economy based on a balanced energy mix which combines economic and ecologic advantages are shown. (orig./CB) [de

  5. Nuclear energy in view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    This leaflet advertises the availability of the following from UKAEA: film and video titles (nuclear fuel cycle; energy for all; power from the atom; using radioactivity; fast reactor; energy - the nuclear option; principles of fission; radiation); slide-tape packs (16 titles); other information services. (U.K.)

  6. Nuclear energy in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gourievidis, G.

    1984-01-01

    Having first outlined the main problems China must resolve in the field of energy supply, this paper presents the nuclear option trends established by the government, recalls the different stages in the nuclear Chinese development programme, achievements and projects. The organization of nuclear research and industry, as also the fuel cycle situation and uranium resources are then described. Finally, the international nuclear cooperation policy carried out by the chinese government and more particularly the agreement settled with France are presented [fr

  7. Conference day - Dissuasion, proliferation, disarmament: the nuclear debate beyond 2010. Conference proceedings; Journee d'etude - Dissuasion, proliferation, desarmement: le debat nucleaire apres 2010. Actes de la conference

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    A first set of contributions (round tables) addresses the relationship between NATO, nuclear deterrence and antimissile defence. The second set of contributions addresses nuclear policies of emerging powers (Russia, China, Iran...) and proliferation risks. The third one addresses the perspectives of non proliferation, civil nuclear energy actors, and disarmament

  8. Nuclear energy, economy, ecology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stoffaes, C.

    1995-01-01

    As its operating role, its economic competitiveness and its technological control in the area of nuclear energy, the France has certainly to take initiatives in a nuclear renewal activity. The France is criticized in the world for its exclusive position about nuclear energy, but it is well situated to attract attention on the coal risks and particularly about its combustion for environment. (N.C.)

  9. Nuclear energy inquiries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robertson, J.A.L.

    1993-02-01

    Our choice of energy sources has important consequences for the economy and the environment. Nuclear energy is a controversial energy source, subject to much public debate. Most individuals find it difficult to decide between conflicting claims and allegations in a variety of technical subjects. Under these circumstances, knowledge of various relevant inquiries can be helpful. This publication summarizes the composition and major findings of more than thirty nuclear energy inquiries. Most of the these are Canadian, but others are included where they have relevance. The survey shows that, contrary to some claims, virtually every aspect of nuclear energy has been subject to detailed scrutiny. The inquiries' reports include many recommendations on how nuclear energy can be exploited safely, but none rejects it as an acceptable energy source when needed. (Author) 38 refs

  10. Nuclear Energy Data 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Data is the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of statistics and country reports documenting the status of nuclear power in the OECD area. Information provided by member country governments includes statistics on installed generating capacity, total electricity produced by all sources and by nuclear power, nuclear energy policies and fuel cycle developments, as well as projected generating capacity and electricity production to 2035, where available. Total electricity generation at nuclear power plants and the share of electricity production from nuclear power plants declined in 2012 as a result of operational issues at some facilities and suspended operation at all but two reactors in Japan. Nuclear safety was further strengthened in 2012 following safety reviews prompted by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. Governments committed to maintaining nuclear power in the energy mix pursued initiatives to increase nuclear generating capacity. In Turkey, plans were finalised for the construction of the first four reactors for commercial electricity production. Further details on these and other developments are provided in the publication's numerous tables, graphs and country reports. This publication contains 'Statlinks'. For each StatLink, the reader will find a URL which leads to the corresponding spreadsheet. These links work in the same way as an Internet link [fr

  11. The importance of the nuclear glutathione in the Cell Proliferation

    OpenAIRE

    Markovic, Jelena

    2009-01-01

    The present thesis offers an insight in the importance of nuclear GSH in cell proliferation. The research was performed in three different cellular models of diverse proliferating activity: immortalized mouse embryonic fibroblasts 3T3, mammary adenocarcinoma cell line MCF7 and primary embryonic neuralonal culture. The results presented here provide evidence that suggest that the relationship between GSH level and telomerase activity, previously described by our group for 3T3 fibroblasts is a ...

  12. Which future for the nuclear counter-proliferation?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duval, M.

    2004-01-01

    After a recall of the permanent data about proliferation and of the safeguards implemented by the international community, the author demonstrates that proliferation has moved towards Asia where a real 'black market' has been created. Then he analyzes the consequences of this change on the future of nuclear deterrent. Finally, he expresses his nostalgia in front of this drift and worries about the future uselessness of the means devoted to this 'pacifying' strategy. (J.S.)

  13. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia; La proliferation nucleaire en Asie du Sud

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lamballe, A

    2007-07-15

    Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.By carrying out tests in 1998, they therefore violated no international agreement but dealt a severe blow to non-proliferation by inciting other countries, including Iran, to develop nuclear weapons. The purpose of India strike force is to deter China; Pakistan hopes that with a credible strike force it will be able to deter any major attack by India. The nuclear phenomenon is now firmly entrenched in the minds of all those on the subcontinent, where the arms race continues without let-up on all fronts: witness the many launches of ballistic and cruise missiles by both countries. And now that radical Islamist movements are showing an interest in nuclear weapons systems there is a risk of tipping from the rational to the irrational world, with all its attendant dangers. (author)

  14. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  15. Is nuclear energy justifiable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roth, E.

    1988-01-01

    This is a comment on an article by Prof. Haerle a theologist, published earlier under the same heading, in which the use of nuclear energy is rejected for ethical reasons. The comment contents the claim mode by the first author that theologists, because they have general ethical competency, must needs have competency to decide on the fittest technique (of energy conversion) for satisfying, or potentially satisfying, the criteria of responsible action. Thus, an ethical comment on, for instance, nuclear energy is beyond the scope of the competency of the churches. One is only entitled as a private person to objecting to nuclear energy, not because of one's position in the church. (HSCH) [de

  16. Economical scale of nuclear energy application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear energy industry is supported by two wheels of radiation and energy applications. When comparing both, they have some different sides, such as numbers of employees and researchers, numbers and scales of works, effect on society, affecting effects and regions of industrial actions, problems on safety, viewpoint on nuclear proliferation protection and safety guarantee, energy security, relationship to environmental problem, efforts on wastes disposal, and so on. Here described on economical scale of radiation application in fields of industry, agriculture, and medicine and medical treatment, and on economical scale of energy application in nuclear power generation and its instruments and apparatus. (G.K.)

  17. Economic development and nuclear proliferation: an overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, G.W.; Soligo, R.

    1983-01-01

    The authors argue that the impact of nuclear-weapons programs on the development prospects of countries economically able to undertake such programs would likely be fairly small. The amounts involved and the backward linkages are usually sufficiently small that nuclear-weapons programs in most less-developed countries (LDCs) can be considered an enclave activity. On the other hand, economic development clearly facilitates bomb development. The chapter sets forth the main characteristics of economic growth that are likely to facilitate bomb development, then considers the ''bomb levy'' necessary for various types of countries to produce bombs on a scale considered appropriate for LDCs. It concludes that it will be policy-imposed costs rather than economic costs in themselves that will prevent determined LDC governments of moderate income and population from developing nuclear weapons. 16 references, 2 tables

  18. International nuclear proliferation: multilateral diplomacy and regional aspects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kapur, A.

    1979-01-01

    Confidential interviews with about 200 officials at 18 nuclear research sites around the world form the background for this discussion of the proliferation issues as they affect the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Critics of the NPT cite its narrow focus on horizontal proliferation and its failures in the areas of vertical proliferation, nuclear technology transfers, heavy-water-reactor systems, and safeguards. The international negotiations necessary to resolve these issues and the difficulty of reaching a global consensus indicate a need to restructure the U.S. decision process before diplomacy can progress. The book discusses the history and nature of proliferation and its relationship to multinational diplomacy; the problems of permanent and workable safeguards; and regional political ramifications in the creeping dependencies of South Asia, apartheid in South Africa, militarization in Japan, and the nuclearization of Brazil and Argentina. The analysis concludes that central issues were not settled by the NPT and that U.S. failures to speak without consulting allies may mean that a bilateral rather than multinational approach should be tried. 105 references, 5 figures, 12 tables. (DCK)

  19. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities

  20. Perspectives for nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baugnet, J.-M.; Abderrahim, H.A.; Dekeyser, J.; Meskens, G.

    1998-09-01

    In Belgium, approximately 60 percent of the produced electricity is generated by nuclear power. At present, nuclear power production tends to stagnate in Europe and North America but is still growing in Asia. The document gives an overview of the present status and the future energy demand with emphasis on electric power. Different evaluation criteria including factors hindering and factors promoting the expansion of nuclear power as well as requirements of new nuclear power plants are discussed. The extension of the lifetime of existing facilities as well as fuel supply are taken into consideration. A comparative assesment of nuclear power with other energy sources is made. The report concludes with estimating the contribution and the role of nuclear power in future energy demand as well as with an overview of future reactors and research and development programmes

  1. Nuclear Energy Data - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Data is the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of statistics and country reports documenting the status of nuclear power in the OECD area. Information provided by member country governments includes statistics on installed generating capacity, total electricity produced by all sources and by nuclear power, nuclear energy policies and fuel cycle developments, as well as projected generating capacity and electricity production to 2035, where available. Total electricity generation at nuclear power plants and the share of electricity production from nuclear power plants remained steady in 2013 despite the progressive shutdown of all reactors in Japan leading up to September and the permanent closure of six reactors in the OECD area. Governments committed to maintaining nuclear power in the energy mix advanced plans for increasing nuclear generating capacity, and progress was made in the development of deep geological repositories for spent nuclear fuel, with Finland expected to have the first such facility in operation in the early 2020's. Further details on these and other developments are provided in the publication's numerous tables, graphs and country reports. This publication contains 'StatLinks'. For each StatLink, the reader will find a URL which leads to the corresponding spreadsheet. These links work in the same way as an Internet link. (authors)

  2. Nuclear Energy Data - 2016

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Data is the Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of statistics and country reports documenting nuclear power status in NEA member countries and in the OECD area. Information provided by governments includes statistics on installed generating capacity, total electricity produced by all sources and by nuclear power, nuclear energy policies and fuel cycle developments, as well as projections of nuclear generating capacity and electricity production to 2035, where available. Total electricity generation at nuclear power plants and the share of electricity production from nuclear power plants increased slightly in 2015, by 0.2% and 0.1%, respectively. Two new units were connected to the grid in 2015, in Russia and Korea; two reactors returned to operation in Japan under the new regulatory regime; and seven reactors were officially shut down - five in Japan, one in Germany and one in the United Kingdom. Governments committed to having nuclear power in the energy mix advanced plans for developing or increasing nuclear generating capacity, with the preparation of new build projects progressing in Finland, Hungary, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Further details on these and other developments are provided in the publication's numerous tables, graphs and country reports. This publication contains 'Stat Links'. For each Stat Link, the reader will find a URL which leads to the corresponding spreadsheet. These links work in the same way as an Internet link. (authors)

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  5. Agreement Between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 22 February 1989. It was signed in Vienna on 22 November 1991. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on the date upon which the Agency received from Laos written notification that Laos' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 5 April 2001. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-03-12

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  10. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2005-03-07

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2005-03-11

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  12. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2005-02-23

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Agreement between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 September 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 10 May 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Bahrain written notification that Bahrain's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  1. Agreement between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 24 September 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 19 January 2009. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 21 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the State of Qatar written notification that Qatar's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. [es

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  13. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  15. Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 16 June 2005. 2. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 January 2009, the date upon which the Agency received from Saudi Arabia written notification that Saudi Arabia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  16. International nuclear energy guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    Separate abstracts are included for each of the papers presented concerning current technical and economical events in the nuclear field. Twelve papers have been abstracted and input to the data base. The ''international nuclear energy guide'' gives a general directory of the name, the address and the telephone number of the companies and bodies quoted in this guide; a chronology of the main events 1982. The administrative and professional organization, the nuclear courses and research centers in France are presented, as also the organization of protection and safety, and of nuclear fuel cycle. The firms concerned by the design and the construction of NSSS and the allied nuclear firms are also presented. The last part of this guide deals with the nuclear energy in the world: descriptive list of international organizations, and, the nuclear activities throughout the world (alphabetical order by countries) [fr

  17. Nuclear Energy Data - 2017

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Data is the Nuclear Energy Agency's annual compilation of statistics and country reports documenting nuclear power status in NEA member countries and in the OECD area. Information provided by governments includes statistics on total electricity produced by all sources and by nuclear power, fuel cycle capacities and requirements, and projections to 2035, where available. Country reports summarise energy policies, updates of the status in nuclear energy programs and fuel cycle developments. In 2016, nuclear power continued to supply significant amounts of low-carbon baseload electricity, despite strong competition from low-cost fossil fuels and subsidised renewable energy sources. Three new units were connected to the grid in 2016, in Korea, Russia and the United States. In Japan, an additional three reactors returned to operation in 2016, bringing the total to five under the new regulatory regime. Three reactors were officially shut down in 2016 - one in Japan, one in Russia and one in the United States. Governments committed to having nuclear power in the energy mix advanced plans for developing or increasing nuclear generating capacity, with the preparation of new build projects making progress in Finland, Hungary, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Further details on these and other developments are provided in the publication's numerous tables, graphs and country reports

  18. The nuclear energy debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hardy, D.

    1984-01-01

    We have not been able to obtain closure in the nuclear energy debate because the public perception of nuclear energy is out of sync with reality. The industry has not been about to deal with the concerns of those opposed to nuclear energy because its reaction has been to generate and disseminate more facts rather than dealing with the serious moral and ethical questions that are being asked. Nuclear proponents and opponents appeal to different moral communities, and those outside each community cannot concede that the other might be right. The Interfaith Program for Public Awareness of Nuclear Issues (IPPANI) has been formed, sponsored by members of the Jewish, Baha'i, Roman Catholic, United, and Anglican faiths, to provide for a balanced discussion of the ethical aspects of energy. (L.L.)

  19. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    completely stalled; there is now real uncertainty about US ratification of the New START treaty with the Russian Federation, and with it any major new round of arms reduction negotiations; there has been less movement than hoped for in reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrine; there has been no movement on the file of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); and concern about the intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) remain as strong as ever. About the only ray of real light for the year has been the substantial measure of agreement achieved at the Washington Summit on nuclear security issues and cooperative implementation of the global anti-terrorism agenda. In my own approach to difficult international policy issues, I usually err on the side of congenital optimism, and it is possible to see the glass as half full rather than half empty on most of the specific issues I have mentioned - and others as well, such as the question of multilateralization of sensitive stages of the fuel cycle on which the IAEA Board of Governors has already expended so much time and energy. The road ahead - as mapped in detail, for example, in the report last year by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), with which I hope you are familiar - was always going to be long and slow. But everything depends on some real momentum being sustained. If that momentum is lost, as it was during the fifteen years or so of sleepwalking that followed the initial flurry of disarmament activity in the early post-Cold War years, and looks in real danger right now of being completely lost again, it is not easy to see how it will ever be regained. And that is very bad news indeed for this planet. It is worth reminding ourselves on these occasions, although the facts and arguments are familiar enough to this audience, why such an outcome would be such bad news, and why it is that the work that is done at symposiums

  20. Nuclear energy and jobs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldfinger, N.

    1976-01-01

    Mr. Goldfinger, Research Director of AFL-CIO, examines the problem of energy in general, nuclear in particular, and the employment relationship. The energy shortages in the U.S. and its dependence on oil are cited. Directly connected with this serious problem relating to energy are jobs, income, and living standards. If energy is not available, industries will be unable to expand to meet the needs of the growing population; and prices of goods will rise. From an evaluation of what experts have said, Mr. Goldfinger concludes that increased coal production and better coal technology cannot meet energy demands; so the sharp increase both in volume and as a percentage of total energy needed in the future will have to come from nuclear power. Development of alternative sources is necessary, he feels, and intense research on these is needed now. The employment impact in the nuclear energy scenario is analyzed according to the trades involved. It is estimated that 1.5 million jobs in the nuclear industry would be open by the year 2000 if nuclear is to provide one-fourth of energy supplies. The employment picture, assuming abandonment of nuclear energy, is then discussed

  1. Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Towards a Simplified Recipe to Measure Proliferation Risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brogli, R.; Krakowski, R.A

    2001-08-01

    The primary goal of this study is to frame the problem of nuclear proliferation in the context of protection and risks associated with nuclear materials flowing in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The perspective adopted for this study is that of a nuclear utility and the flow of fresh and spent nuclear fuel with which that utility must deal in the course of providing economic, safe, and ecologically acceptable electrical power to the public. Within this framework quantitative approaches to a material-dependent, simplified proliferation-risk metric are identified and explored. The driving force behind this search for such a proliferation metric derives from the need to quantify the proliferation risk in the context of evaluating various commercial nuclear fuel cycle options (e.g., plutonium recycle versus once-through). While the formulation of the algebra needed to describe the desired, simplified metric(s) should be straight forward once a modus operandi is defined, considerable interaction with the user of any final product that results is essential. Additionally, a broad contextual review of the proliferation problem and past efforts in the quantification of associated risks was developed as part of this study. This extensive review was essential to setting perspectives and establishing (feasibility) limits to the search for a proliferation metric(s) that meets the goals of this study. Past analyses of proliferation risks associated with the commercial nuclear fuel cycle have generally been based on a range of decision-analysis, operations-research tools. Within the time and budget constraints, as well as the self-enforced (utility) customer focus, the more subjective and data-intensive decision-analysis methodologies where not pursued. Three simplified, less-subjective approaches were investigated instead: a) a simplified 'four-factor' formula expressing as a normalized product political, material-quantity, material-quality, and material

  2. Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Towards a Simplified Recipe to Measure Proliferation Risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brogli, R.; Krakowski, R.A.

    2001-08-01

    The primary goal of this study is to frame the problem of nuclear proliferation in the context of protection and risks associated with nuclear materials flowing in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The perspective adopted for this study is that of a nuclear utility and the flow of fresh and spent nuclear fuel with which that utility must deal in the course of providing economic, safe, and ecologically acceptable electrical power to the public. Within this framework quantitative approaches to a material-dependent, simplified proliferation-risk metric are identified and explored. The driving force behind this search for such a proliferation metric derives from the need to quantify the proliferation risk in the context of evaluating various commercial nuclear fuel cycle options (e.g., plutonium recycle versus once-through). While the formulation of the algebra needed to describe the desired, simplified metric(s) should be straight forward once a modus operandi is defined, considerable interaction with the user of any final product that results is essential. Additionally, a broad contextual review of the proliferation problem and past efforts in the quantification of associated risks was developed as part of this study. This extensive review was essential to setting perspectives and establishing (feasibility) limits to the search for a proliferation metric(s) that meets the goals of this study. Past analyses of proliferation risks associated with the commercial nuclear fuel cycle have generally been based on a range of decision-analysis, operations-research tools. Within the time and budget constraints, as well as the self-enforced (utility) customer focus, the more subjective and data-intensive decision-analysis methodologies where not pursued. Three simplified, less-subjective approaches were investigated instead: a) a simplified 'four-factor' formula expressing as a normalized product political, material-quantity, material-quality, and material-protection metrics; b

  3. Security environment and nuclear proliferation problems in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suh, Mark Byung-Moon

    1997-01-01

    East Asia was and still is divided into two conflicting ideological blocs. Because of the Cold War between these two blocs, two international wars were fought and tensions limited interactions among these countries. Despite these political constraints, in recent years East Asia has become economically one of the most dynamic regions in the world. Now that the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union is over, the danger of global nuclear war involving the nuclear powers in the region has been practically eliminated. Nonetheless, security has become more complex and demands a whole new set of arrangements. Yet the region lacks a cohesive multilateral framework for conflict resolution, and only recently have various attempts been made to create a political forum for the countries in the region. The problem and the danger of nuclear proliferation was vividly shown by the North Korean nuclear crisis in the last years. This issue not only halted the fragile process of normalization between the two Koreas, which started in 1988, but almost led to a new military conflict on the peninsula involving the two Koreas and the USA. It was defused only after the USA proved willing to offer security guarantees to North Korea. This problem still needs to be resolved, and it demands radical changes in the overall political environment in the region. Needless to say, proliferation in North Korea would have entailed grave consequences for the security of the region as well as for the international non-proliferation regime. This paper reviews the issue of nuclear proliferation of the three non-nuclear states in the region and deals with the non-introduction of nuclear weapons in the region by the nuclear powers. It discusses the prospects for a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula. Perspectives of a sustainable security environment in East Asia will be briefly discussed

  4. Nuclear proliferation: the U.S.-Indian conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chellaney, Brahma.

    1993-01-01

    The history of the present conflicting positions of U.S. and India on the issue of nuclear proliferation is narrated and various aspects of this U.S. India controversy are studied. These aspects are: U.S.-India cooperation in the nuclear field in the fifties and sixties; India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974 and U.S. policy of containment through denial of nuclear fuel and spare parts supply for Tarapur Atomic Power Station; and the political, technical and legal aspects of the nuclear conflict between U.S. and India. Since India's PNE in 1974, U.S. has made India a target of its non-proliferation strategy and is coordinating multinational efforts in erecting barriers in the flow of dual-use sensitive technologies to India. The recent instance is U.S. pressure on Russia to cancel the contract with India to sell cryogenic rocket engine technology required for India's civilian space programme. Even though apparently the conflict is over nuclear proliferation issue, in essence it is a conflict between U.S. determination to restrict high-technology transfer to India on one hand and India's resolve to maintain its nuclear independence on the other hand. The study is based on primary sources in the form of U.S. and Indian government documents. Texts of important government documents are given in appendices and bibliographies of primary and secondary sources used in the study are included. (M.G.B.)

  5. Worldwide Report, Nuclear Development and Proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    1986-07-09

    ACTIVITIES AT KIEV VEGETABLE MARKET Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 May 86 p 6 PARTY COMMITrEE ACTIVITIES AT C(1ERNOBYL Moscow PRAVDA in...Agreement (Martin F. Yriart; Buenos Aires AMBITO FINANCIERO , 12 May 86) 22 NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA BANGLADESH OBSERVER: Nuclear Technology Growth Playing...University physicists. Scanditronix began to market the product in earnest worldwide in the mid- seventies. At the same time, anxiety was growing within FOA

  6. European community energy policy and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacchia, E.

    1982-01-01

    The author discusses the lack of get-tough attitudes in political solutions of the proliferation threat but sees the recent scientific breakthrough in nuclear fusion as hope for a new political direction

  7. On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1996-01-01

    The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 December 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 22 March 2000

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-07-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001 [es

  15. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

  16. Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-28

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000.

  17. Axiology of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sawada, Tetsuo

    2003-01-01

    Nuclear energy was born in World War II and it has grown within the regime of Cold War. When the Cold War came to the end around early 1990 s, we who have benefited by the development of nuclear energy must have been challenged with a new tide of civilization change. Although it has not been so much closely questioned since then, such a new movement, that was submerging, abruptly manifested on September 11, 2001. Then, many of us realized that global circumstances, especially concerned with security, must have actually changed with the reordering of the world basic structures. This paper describes on the thoughts to reveal the cause and background of the event on September 11 with the linkage to nuclear energy development, or nuclear civilization in pursuit of the future regime of nuclear in harmonization with the global society in 21st century. (author)

  18. Development of nuclear energy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wakeham, John [Secretary of State for Energy, London (UK)

    1991-06-01

    The Government's views on the development of nuclear energy are outlined. In this country, we continue to see some important advantages in maintaining nuclear power generation. It increases diversity, and so helps to maintain security of energy supply. It does not produce greenhouse gases or contribute to acid rain. But it is equally clear that nuclear costs must be brought under control whilst at the same time maintaining the high standards of safety and environmental protection which we have come to expect in the UK. The three main elements which the nuclear industry must address in the future are summarized. First the costs of nuclear generation must be reduced. Secondly, once the feasibility and costings of PWRs have been established consideration must be given to the choices for the future energy policy and thirdly new reactor designs should be standardized so the benefits of replication can be realised. (author).

  19. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  20. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)