The effect of uncertainty and cooperative behavior on operational performance: Evidence from Brazilian firms

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Eliane Pereira Zamith Brito

2017-12-01

Full Text Available This study aims to examine the effect of managers’ uncertainty on cooperative behavior in interorganizational relationships, and how this affects operational performance. We conducted a survey with 225 Brazilian managers, and analyzed data using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling. Results present: a a negative influence of uncertainty of state on operational performance; b a positive influence of uncertainty of effect on uncertainty of response; c a significant influence of uncertainty of response on cooperative behavior; and d a positive influence of cooperative behavior on performance. The results indicated that cooperation and uncertainty accounted for 18.8% of the variability of operational performance. Considering the uncertainty that plagues Latin societies, this study can help to create more efficient ways to deal with the phenomenon. Rather than turning a blind eye to uncertainty, our study underscores it and treats it like another business environment issue.

Explaining Helping Behavior in a Cooperative Learning Classroom Setting Using Attribution Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Ahles, Paula M.; Contento, Jann M.

2006-01-01

This recently completed study examined whether attribution theory can explain helping behavior in an interdependent classroom environment that utilized a cooperative-learning model. The study focused on student participants enrolled in 6 community college communication classes taught by the same instructor. Three levels of cooperative-learning…

Impact of Social Punishment on Cooperative Behavior in Complex Networks

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Xia, Cheng-Yi; Meloni, Sandro; Zhou, Chang-Song; Moreno, Yamir

2013-10-01

Social punishment is a mechanism by which cooperative individuals spend part of their resources to penalize defectors. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2-person evolutionary games on networks when a mechanism for social punishment is introduced. Specifically, we introduce a new kind of role, punisher, which is aimed at reducing the earnings of defectors by applying to them a social fee. Results from numerical simulations show that different equilibria allowing the three strategies to coexist are possible as well as that social punishment further enhance the robustness of cooperation. Our results are confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. In addition, we analyze the microscopic mechanisms that give rise to the observed macroscopic behaviors in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. Our conclusions might provide additional insights for understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems.

The Effects of Interdependence and Cooperative Behaviors on Buyer’s Satisfaction in the Semiconductor Component Supply Chain

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Fan-Yun Pai

2015-12-01

Full Text Available The semiconductor industry is characterized by extreme competition in price and product features. Firms need to acquire or exchange resources with their supplier or buyer partners to stay at the leading edge of technology. Cooperation between buyers and suppliers is important and power is the mechanism that can explain the cooperative behaviors. This study aims to investigate how the power structure between the buyer and supplier influences the extent of suppliers’ cooperative behaviors, and the effects of these on buyer satisfaction with the buyer-supplier relationship. Opinions from firms in semiconductor manufacturing supply chain were used to investigate the proposed model. It is found that mutual interdependence between a supplier and its buyer can enhance cooperative behaviors and power asymmetry hurt firms’ investment in cooperative behaviors. Suggestions are then provided to semiconductor supply chain members based on the findings of this work.

Behavior of Collective Cooperation Yielded by Two Update Rules in Social Dilemmas: Combining Fermi and Moran Rules

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xia Chengyi; Wang Lei; Wang Jinsong; Wang Juan

2012-01-01

We combine the Fermi and Moran update rules in the spatial prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games to investigate the behavior of collective cooperation among agents on the regular lattice. Large-scale simulations indicate that, compared to the model with only one update rule, the cooperation behavior exhibits the richer phenomena, and the role of update dynamics should be paid more attention in the evolutionary game theory. Meanwhile, we also observe that the introduction of Moran rule, which needs to consider all neighbor's information, can markedly promote the aggregate cooperation level, that is, randomly selecting the neighbor proportional to its payoff to imitate will facilitate the cooperation among agents. Current results will contribute to further understand the cooperation dynamics and evolutionary behaviors within many biological, economic and social systems.

Behavior of Collective Cooperation Yielded by Two Update Rules in Social Dilemmas: Combining Fermi and Moran Rules

Science.gov (United States)

Xia, Cheng-Yi; Wang, Lei; Wang, Juan; Wang, Jin-Song

2012-09-01

We combine the Fermi and Moran update rules in the spatial prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games to investigate the behavior of collective cooperation among agents on the regular lattice. Large-scale simulations indicate that, compared to the model with only one update rule, the cooperation behavior exhibits the richer phenomena, and the role of update dynamics should be paid more attention in the evolutionary game theory. Meanwhile, we also observe that the introduction of Moran rule, which needs to consider all neighbor's information, can markedly promote the aggregate cooperation level, that is, randomly selecting the neighbor proportional to its payoff to imitate will facilitate the cooperation among agents. Current results will contribute to further understand the cooperation dynamics and evolutionary behaviors within many biological, economic and social systems.

Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.

Science.gov (United States)

Ito, Hiromu; Yoshimura, Jin

2015-08-04

Why cooperation is well developed in human society is an unsolved question in biological and human sciences. Vast studies in game theory have revealed that in non-cooperative games selfish behavior generally dominates over cooperation and cooperation can be evolved only under very limited conditions. These studies ask the origin of cooperation; whether cooperation can evolve in a group of selfish individuals. In this paper, instead of asking the origin of cooperation, we consider the enhancement of cooperation in a small already cooperative society. We ask whether cooperative behavior is further promoted in a small cooperative society in which social penalty is devised. We analyze hawk-dove game and prisoner's dilemma introducing social penalty. We then expand it for non-cooperative games in general. The results indicate that cooperation is universally favored if penalty is further imposed. We discuss the current result in terms of the moral, laws, rules and regulations in a society, e.g., criminology and traffic violation.

The role of emotions in the maintenance of cooperative behaviors

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Zhang, Chunyan; Zhang, Jianlei; Weissing, Franz J.

2014-04-01

Our attention is focused on how individual emotions influence collective behaviors, which captures an aspect of reality missing from past studies: free riders may suffer some stress, which could adapt jointly with the individual stress intensity and size of the gaming group. With an evolutionary game theoretical approach, we gain the fixation probability for one mutant cooperator to invade and dominate the whole defecting population. When the stress intensity exceeds a threshold, natural selection favors cooperators replacing defectors in a finite population. We further infer that lower stress intensity is sufficient for one mutant cooperator to become fixed with an advantageous probability in a larger population. Moreover, when the gaming group is smaller than the population size, the more the return from the public goods, the lower the threshold of stress intensity required to facilitate the full dominance of cooperators. We hope our studies may show that individual sentiments or psychological activities will open up novel explanations for the puzzle of collective actions.

Social Background, Cooperative Behavior, and Norm Enforcement

OpenAIRE

Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine

2009-01-01

Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use of and the reaction to the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have recently been documented in cross-cultural studies. We present data that prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town. For this end, we created a unique data set, based on one-shot public goods experiments conducted in South Africa. Most of our group differ...

Co-operation and Phase Behavior under the Mixed Updating Rules

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Wen; Li Yao-Sheng; Xu Chen

2015-01-01

We present a model by considering two updating rules when the agents play prisoner's dilemma on a square lattice. Agents can update their strategies by referencing one of his neighbors of higher payoffs under the imitation updating rule or directly replaced by one of his neighbors according to the death-birth updating rule. The frequency of co-operation is related to the probability q of occurrence of the imitation updating or the death-birth updating and the game parameter b. The death-birth updating rule favors the co-operation while the imitation updating rule favors the defection on the lattice, although both rules suppress the co-operation in the well-mixed population. Therefore a totally co-operative state may emerge when the death-birth updating is involved in the evolution when b is relatively small. We also obtain a phase diagram on the q-b plane. There are three phases on the plane with two pure phases of a totally co-operative state and a totally defective state and a mixing phase of mixed strategies. Based on the pair approximation, we theoretically analyze the phase behavior and obtain a quantitative agreement with the simulation results. (paper)

Mathematic anxiety, help seeking behavior and cooperative learning

OpenAIRE

Masoud Gholamali Lavasani; Farah Khandan

2011-01-01

Present project assess the effectiveness of cooperative learning over the mathematic anxiety and review the behavior of help seeking in first grade high school girl students. The experimental research procedure was in the form of pre-post tests after a period of 8 sessions of teaching. To measure the variables, the questionnaire of mathematic anxiety (Shokrani, 2002) and the questionnaire of help seeking technique (Ghadampour, 1998) were practiced (accepting or avoiding help seeking).To perfo...

The effect of juvenile hormone on Polistes wasp fertility varies with cooperative behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Tibbetts, Elizabeth A; Sheehan, Michael J

2012-04-01

Social insects provide good models for studying how and why the mechanisms that underlie reproduction vary, as there is dramatic reproductive plasticity within and between species. Here, we test how the effect of juvenile hormone (JH) on fertility covaries with cooperative behavior in workers and nest-founding queens in the primitively eusocial wasp Polistes metricus. P. metricus foundresses and workers appear morphologically similar and both are capable of reproduction, though there is variation in the extent of social cooperation and the probability of reproduction across castes. Do the endocrine mechanisms that mediate reproduction co-vary with cooperative behavior? We found dramatic differences in the effect of JH on fertility across castes. In non-cooperative nest-founding queens, all individuals responded to JH by increasing their fertility. However, in cooperative workers, the effect of JH on fertility varies with body weight; large workers increase their fertility in response to JH while small workers do not. The variation in JH response may be an adaptation to facilitate resource allocation based on the probability of independent reproduction. This work contrasts with previous studies in closely related Polistes dominulus paper wasps, in which both foundresses and workers form cooperative associations and both castes show similar, condition-dependent JH response. The variation in JH responsiveness within and between species suggests that endocrine responsiveness and the factors influencing caste differentiation are surprisingly evolutionarily labile. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A Cooperative Training Program for Students with Severe Behavior Problems: Description and Comparative Evaluation.

Science.gov (United States)

Reganick, Karol A.

The Cooperative Training Program was implemented with 20 students having severe behavior problems, to augment a classroom employability curriculum. Educators and business managers at a local Perkins restaurant worked cooperatively to design a new curriculum and recruitment procedure to benefit both students and the business. A continuous and…

On Cooperative Behavior in Distributed Teams: The Influence of Organizational Design, Media Richness, Social Interaction, and Interaction Adaptation

OpenAIRE

H?konsson, Dorthe D.; Obel, B?rge; Eskildsen, Jacob K.; Burton, Richard M.

2016-01-01

Self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental dilemma in animal behavior as well as in human and organizational behavior. In organizations, how to get people to cooperate despite or in conjunction with their self-interest is fundamental to the achievement of a common goal. While both organizational designs and social interactions have been found to further cooperation in organizations, some of the literature has received contradictory support, just as very little research, if any, has examin...

Attraction and cooperative behavior

OpenAIRE

Donja Darai; Silvia Grätz

2012-01-01

Being good-looking seems to generate substantial benefits in many social interactions, making the "beauty premium" a not to be underrated economic factor. This paper investigates how physical attractiveness enables people to generate these benefits in the case of cooperation, using field data from a modified one-shot prisoner's dilemma played in a high-stakes television game show. While attractive contestants are not more or less cooperative than less attractive ones, facial attractiveness pr...

Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Science.gov (United States)

Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Li, Yuting; Yang, Junzhong

2010-11-01

We investigate the effects of double-dealing behavior on cooperation in evolutionary games. Each individual in a population has two attributes: character and action. One's action may be consistent with one's character or not. We provide analytical results by a mean-field description of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs). Moreover, we give numerical results on different networks, ranging from square lattices to scale-free networks (SFNs). Two important conclusions have been drawn from the results on SFNs. Firstly, if only non-influential individuals (those with low degrees) have chances of becoming double-dealers, cooperation is certain to deteriorate. Secondly, when influential individuals (those with high degrees) adopt double-dealing behavior moderately, cooperation would be enhanced, which is in opposition to the traditional belief. These results help us to understand better the social phenomenon of the existence of double-dealers. In addition to the PDG, other types of games including the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game and the harmony game have also been studied on our model. The results for these three games are also presented, which are consistent with the results for the PDG qualitatively. Furthermore, we consider our model under the co-evolution framework, in which the probability of an individual changing into a double-dealer and the individual strategy both could evolve during the evolutionary process.

Cooperative microbial tolerance behaviors in host-microbiota mutualism

Science.gov (United States)

Ayres, Janelle S.

2016-01-01

Animal defense strategies against microbes are most often thought of as a function of the immune system, the primary function of which is to sense and kill microbes through the execution of resistance mechanisms. However, this antagonistic view creates complications for our understanding of beneficial host-microbe interactions. Pathogenic microbes are described as employing a few common behaviors that promote their fitness at the expense of host health and fitness. Here, a complementary framework is proposed to suggest that in addition to pathogens, beneficial microbes have evolved behaviors to manipulate host processes in order to promote their own fitness and do so through the promotion of host health and fitness. In this Perspective, I explore the idea that patterns or behaviors traditionally ascribed to pathogenic microbes are also employed by beneficial microbes to promote host tolerance defense strategies. Such strategies would promote host health without having a negative impact on microbial fitness and would thereby yield cooperative evolutionary dynamics that are likely required to drive mutualistic co-evolution of hosts and microbes. PMID:27259146

Monitoring emotions and cooperative behavior

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Gorbunov, R.D.

2013-01-01

Cooperation among people in teams that are bound to perform a common goal is one of the main factors determining success of these teams. Cooperation becomes even more important for small teams performing long-term missions in isolation. Examples of such missions include missions performed on the

The collective benefits of feeling good and letting go: positive emotion and (disinhibition interact to predict cooperative behavior.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

David G Rand

Full Text Available Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process and positive emotion (an intuitive process in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218 or during (Study 2, N = 236 the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion.

Pillars of cooperation: Honesty-Humility, social value orientations, and economic behavior

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hilbig, B.E.; Zettler, Ingo

2009-01-01

The current work explores the predictive power of the recently proposed sixth personality dimension, Honesty-Humility, with respect to economic and cooperative behavior. It was expected that this factor should explain how decision makers allocate a valued good to themselves vs. another in the dic......The current work explores the predictive power of the recently proposed sixth personality dimension, Honesty-Humility, with respect to economic and cooperative behavior. It was expected that this factor should explain how decision makers allocate a valued good to themselves vs. another...... in the dictator and the ultimatum game. More importantly, we predicted that Honesty-Humility would explain differences between these games in which the power of the recipient to retaliate is varied. Both conjectures were corroborated in a semi-experimental study with N = 134 participants: individuals low...... in Honesty-Humility made more selfish decisions and only shifted towards a more fair allocation whenever the other was empowered to punish defection. Those high in Honesty-Humility, on the other hand, displayed a stable tendency for choosing a more fair solution - even when they could have defected without...

Do Women Socialize Better? Evidence from a Study on Sociality Effects on Gender Differences in Cooperative Behavior

OpenAIRE

Peshkovskaya, Anastasia; Myagkov, Mikhail; Babkina, Tatiana; Lukinova, Evgeniya

2017-01-01

Human behavior is greatly influenced by the social context. The currrent study on men’ and women’s cooperative behavior investigated the influence of long-term and short-term effects of socializing in group. The repeated Prisoner’s dilemma carried out in groups of 6 participants was used as the main experimental situation. The differences were found in changes in the level of cooperation, taking in to account the effects of mixing social and gender variables. Socialization made ...

Emergent behaviors of the Schrödinger-Lohe model on cooperative-competitive networks

Science.gov (United States)

Huh, Hyungjin; Ha, Seung-Yeal; Kim, Dohyun

2017-12-01

We present several sufficient frameworks leading to the emergent behaviors of the coupled Schrödinger-Lohe (S-L) model under the same one-body external potential on cooperative-competitive networks. The S-L model was first introduced as a possible phenomenological model exhibiting quantum synchronization and its emergent dynamics on all-to-all cooperative networks has been treated via two distinct approaches, Lyapunov functional approach and the finite-dimensional reduction based on pairwise correlations. In this paper, we further generalize the finite-dimensional dynamical systems approach for pairwise correlation functions on cooperative-competitive networks and provide several sufficient frameworks leading to the collective exponential synchronization. For small systems consisting of three and four quantum subsystem, we also show that the system for pairwise correlations can be reduced to the Lotka-Volterra model with cooperative and competitive interactions, in which lots of interesting dynamical patterns appear, e.g., existence of closed orbits and limit-cycles.

Effect of initial fraction of cooperators on cooperative behavior in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Keizo Shigaki

Full Text Available We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games. Compared with the results of heterogeneous networks, we find that there is a relatively low initial fraction of cooperators to guarantee higher equilibrium cooperative level. While this interesting phenomenon is contrary to the commonly shared knowledge that higher initial fraction of cooperators can provide better environment for the evolution of cooperation. To support our outcome, we explore the time courses of cooperation and find that the whole course can be divided into two sequent stages: enduring (END and expanding (EXP periods. At the end of END period, thought there is a limited number of cooperator clusters left for the case of low initial setup, these clusters can smoothly expand to hold the whole system in the EXP period. However, for high initial fraction of cooperators, superfluous cooperator clusters hinder their effective expansion, which induces many remaining defectors surrounding the cooperator clusters. Moreover, through intensive analysis, we also demonstrate that when the tendency of three cooperation cluster characteristics (cluster size, cluster number and cluster shape are consistent within END and EXP periods, the state that maximizes cooperation can be favored.

Generic strong coupling behavior of Cooper pairs in the surface of superfluid nuclei

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillet, N.; Sandulescu, N.; Schuck, P.

2007-01-01

With realistic HFB calculations, using the D1S Gogny force, we reveal a generic behavior of concentration of small sized Cooper pairs (2-3 fm) in the surface of superfluid nuclei. This study confirms and extends previous results given in the literature that use more schematic approaches. It is shown that the strong concentration of pair probability of small Cooper pairs in the nuclear surface is a quite general and generic feature and that nuclear pairing is much closer to the strong coupling regime than previously assumed

Generic strong coupling behavior of Cooper pairs in the surface of superfluid nuclei

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pillet, N. [DPTA/Service de Physique nucleaire, CEA/DAM Ile de France, BP12, F-91680 Bruyeres-le-Chatel (France); Sandulescu, N. [DPTA/Service de Physique nucleaire, CEA/DAM Ile de France, BP12, F-91680 Bruyeres-le-Chatel (France)]|[Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering, 76900 Bucharest (Romania)]|[Institut de Physique Nucleaire, CNRS, UMR 8608, Orsay, F-91406 (France); Schuck, P. [Institut de Physique Nucleaire, CNRS, UMR 8608, Orsay, F-91406 (France)]|[Universite Paris-Sud, Orsay, F-91505 (France)

2007-01-15

With realistic HFB calculations, using the D1S Gogny force, we reveal a generic behavior of concentration of small sized Cooper pairs (2-3 fm) in the surface of superfluid nuclei. This study confirms and extends previous results given in the literature that use more schematic approaches. It is shown that the strong concentration of pair probability of small Cooper pairs in the nuclear surface is a quite general and generic feature and that nuclear pairing is much closer to the strong coupling regime than previously assumed.

The collective benefits of feeling good and letting go: positive emotion and (dis)inhibition interact to predict cooperative behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Rand, David G; Kraft-Todd, Gordon; Gruber, June

2015-01-01

Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process) and positive emotion (an intuitive process) in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218) or during (Study 2, N = 236) the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing) may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion.

Deciding to defect: the effects of video-game violence on cooperative behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Sheese, Brad E; Graziano, William G

2005-05-01

This experiment examined the effect of video-game violence on cooperative decision making. Participants (N= 48) were randomly assigned to play either a violent or a nonviolent version of the video game Doom in dyads. Following the video-game task, participants were separated and given an opportunity to choose to cooperate with their partner for mutual gain, withdraw from the interaction, or exploit their partner for their own benefit. Participants in the violent condition were significantly more likely to choose to exploit their partners than participants in the nonviolent condition. These findings suggest that playing violent video games may undermine prosocial motivation and promote exploitive behavior in social interactions.

Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games

Science.gov (United States)

Lu, Peng

2015-10-01

Cooperation is vital in human societies and therefore is widely investigated in the evolutionary game theory. Varieties of mechanisms have been proposed to overcome temptation and promote cooperation. Existing studies usually believe that agents are rational, but irrationalism such as emotions and feelings matters as well. Winner and loser are defined by their payoffs. In addition to admiring and imitating winners, the mechanism of sympathizing and imitating losers is introduced into the model as an alternative action rule, and each one plays the prisoners' dilemma game with eight neighbors under the influence of both irrationalism and rationalism. Rationalism refers to imitating winner to get highest payoff, and irrationalism means that people sympathize and adopt the actions of losers. As it is widely recognized that temptation reduces cooperation, this study focuses on the effect of sympathy on cooperation within a certain group or society. If it overcomes temptation that leads to defection, sympathy will be a powerful mechanism to promote cooperative behavior. Simulation results indicate that sympathy and temptation shares similar quadratic relationships with cooperation. Both sympathy and temptation undermine cooperation below their thresholds, and they both promote cooperation above their thresholds. Temptation not only reduces cooperation but also promote it as temptation goes beyond the threshold. Although sympathy is a good merit or human nature that is beneficial to society, a crisis or collapse of cooperation is inevitable when the sympathy propensity is relatively smaller. After cooperation reaches a minimal bottom, it then rises increasingly and dramatically, which brings a much brighter future of the society.

Extending the Cooperative Phenotype: Assessing the Stability of Cooperation across Countries.

Science.gov (United States)

Reigstad, Amanda G; Strømland, Eirik A; Tinghög, Gustav

2017-01-01

This paper studies whether individual cooperation is stable across settings and over time. Involving more than 7,000 subjects on two different continents, this study documents positive correlation in cooperative behavior across economic games in Norway, Sweden, Austria, and the United States. The game measures also correlate with a tendency to make deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, and display of general trust toward strangers. Using time-variation in the data, we test whether temporal stability of behavior is similar in the United States and Norway, and find similar stability estimates for both the American and Norwegian samples. The findings here provide further evidence of the existence of a stable behavioral inclination toward prosociality - a "cooperative phenotype," as it has recently been termed. Also in line with previous research, we find that punishment and cooperation seem to be uncorrelated.

Cooperative Intelligence in Roundabout Intersections Using Hierarchical Fuzzy Behavior Calculation of Vehicle Speed Profile

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bosankić Ivan

2016-01-01

Full Text Available In this paper, a new fuzzy-behavior-based algorithm for roundabout intersection management is presented. The algorithm employs cooperative intelligence and includes intelligent vehicles and infrastructure to calculate speed profiles for different vehicles, in order to achieve more comfortable driving profiles, as well to reduce congestion and CO2 emissions. The algorithm uses adaptive spatio-temporal reservation technique and was tested in MATLAB/Simulink environment. The algorithm is designed to function in different scenarios with both cooperative and non-cooperative vehicles, as well as optional intersection infrastructure. Results have show that using the proposed algorithm different vehicle communication types can be successfully combined in order to increase traffic flow through roundabout intersections.

Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Lergetporer, Philipp; Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias

2014-05-13

The human ability to establish cooperation, even in large groups of genetically unrelated strangers, depends upon the enforcement of cooperation norms. Third-party punishment is one important factor to explain high levels of cooperation among humans, although it is still somewhat disputed whether other animal species also use this mechanism for promoting cooperation. We study the effectiveness of third-party punishment to increase children's cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game. Based on an experiment with 1,120 children, aged 7 to 11 y, we find that the threat of third-party punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, despite the fact that children are rarely willing to execute costly punishment. We can show that the higher cooperation levels with third-party punishment are driven by two components. First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about the punishment behavior of third parties. Second, cooperation is a conditionally cooperative reaction to correct beliefs that third party punishment will increase a partner's level of cooperation.

Extending the Cooperative Phenotype: Assessing the Stability of Cooperation across Countries

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Amanda G. Reigstad

2017-11-01

Full Text Available This paper studies whether individual cooperation is stable across settings and over time. Involving more than 7,000 subjects on two different continents, this study documents positive correlation in cooperative behavior across economic games in Norway, Sweden, Austria, and the United States. The game measures also correlate with a tendency to make deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, and display of general trust toward strangers. Using time-variation in the data, we test whether temporal stability of behavior is similar in the United States and Norway, and find similar stability estimates for both the American and Norwegian samples. The findings here provide further evidence of the existence of a stable behavioral inclination toward prosociality – a “cooperative phenotype,” as it has recently been termed. Also in line with previous research, we find that punishment and cooperation seem to be uncorrelated.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Cronin, Katherine A; Acheson, Daniel J; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2015-12-22

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it was earned or arbitrary. These findings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate findings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controlled way to investigate the social influences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of human behavior with other primate species.

Cooperation in wireless networks principles and applications : real egoistic behavior is to cooperate!

CERN Document Server

Fitzek, Frank HP

2006-01-01

Covers the underlying principles of cooperative techniques as well as several applications demonstrating the use of such techniques in practical systems. This book also summarizes the strength of cooperation for wireless communication systems, motivating the use of cooperative techniques.

On Cooperative Behavior in Distributed Teams: The Influence of Organizational Design, Media Richness, Social Interaction, and Interaction Adaptation.

Science.gov (United States)

Håkonsson, Dorthe D; Obel, Børge; Eskildsen, Jacob K; Burton, Richard M

2016-01-01

Self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental dilemma in animal behavior as well as in human and organizational behavior. In organizations, how to get people to cooperate despite or in conjunction with their self-interest is fundamental to the achievement of a common goal. While both organizational designs and social interactions have been found to further cooperation in organizations, some of the literature has received contradictory support, just as very little research, if any, has examined their joint effects in distributed organizations, where communication is usually achieved via different communication media. This paper reviews the extant literature and offers a set of hypotheses to integrate current theories and explanations. Further, it discusses how future research should examine the joint effects of media, incentives, and social interactions.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Cronin, Katherine A.; Acheson, Daniel J.; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2015-01-01

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it was earned or arbitrary. These findings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate findings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controlled way to investigate the social influences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of human behavior with other primate species. PMID:26692287

On Cooperative Behavior in Distributed Teams: The Influence of Organizational Design, Media Richness, Social Interaction, and Interaction Adaptation

Science.gov (United States)

Håkonsson, Dorthe D.; Obel, Børge; Eskildsen, Jacob K.; Burton, Richard M.

2016-01-01

Self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental dilemma in animal behavior as well as in human and organizational behavior. In organizations, how to get people to cooperate despite or in conjunction with their self-interest is fundamental to the achievement of a common goal. While both organizational designs and social interactions have been found to further cooperation in organizations, some of the literature has received contradictory support, just as very little research, if any, has examined their joint effects in distributed organizations, where communication is usually achieved via different communication media. This paper reviews the extant literature and offers a set of hypotheses to integrate current theories and explanations. Further, it discusses how future research should examine the joint effects of media, incentives, and social interactions. PMID:27242605

Understanding the nature of cooperation variability

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland

2014-01-01

effects and the heterogeneity of cooperation behavior. We find that framing only has a small effect on the average level of cooperation but a substantial effect on behavioral heterogeneity explained almost exclusively by a corresponding change in the heterogeneity of beliefs about other subjects' behavior...

Cooperative games and network structures

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Musegaas, Marieke

2017-01-01

This thesis covers various research topics involving cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool to analyze the cooperative behavior within a group of players. The focus is mainly on interrelations between operations research and cooperative game theory by analyzing specific types of cooperative

Analysis of Behavioral Economics in Crowdsensing: A Loss Aversion Cooperation Model

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Deng Li

2018-01-01

Full Text Available The existing incentive mechanisms of crowdsourcing construct the expected utility function based on the assumption of rational people in traditional economics. A large number of studies in behavioral economics have demonstrated the defects of the traditional utility function and introduced a new parameter called loss aversion coefficient to calculate individual utility when it suffers a loss. In this paper, combination of behavioral economics and a payment algorithm based on the loss aversion is proposed. Compared with usual incentive mechanisms, the node utility function is redefined by the loss aversion characteristic of the node. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can get a higher rate of cooperation with a lower payment price and has good scalability compared with the traditional incentive mechanism.

Technology and Cooperation: The Behaviors of Networking.

Science.gov (United States)

Martin, Susan K.

1987-01-01

Discusses the pros and cons of library cooperation as exemplified by interlibrary loan and OCLC. Moving away from cooperation toward the more intensive use of local systems is suggested as one alternative for the future. (MES)

Siblings, Birth Order, and Cooperative-Competitive Social Behavior: A Comparison of Anglo-American and Mexican-American Children.

Science.gov (United States)

Knight, George P.; Kagan, Spencer

1982-01-01

Tested the hypothesis that differences in cooperative-competitive social behavior between Anglo-Americans and Mexican Americans is a result of larger family size among the latter group. Found that, even after controlling for number of siblings and birth order, statistically significant differences in such behavior remained between the two groups.…

Cognitive Load Does Not Affect the Behavioral and Cognitive Foundations of Social Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Mieth, Laura; Bell, Raoul; Buchner, Axel

2016-01-01

The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners' cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants' positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect-that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners-depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load.

The Role of Inhibitory Control in Children's Cooperative Behaviors during a Structured Puzzle Task

Science.gov (United States)

Giannotta, Fabrizia; Burk, William J.; Ciairano, Silvia

2011-01-01

This study examined the role of inhibitory control (measured by Stroop interference) in children's cooperative behaviors during a structured puzzle task. The sample consisted of 250 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds (117 girls and 133 boys) attending classrooms in three primary schools in Northern Italy. Children individually completed an elaborated…

States, Social Capital and Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Anthony, Denise L.; Campbell, John L.

2011-01-01

This paper reflects on Elinor Ostrom’s classic book, Governing the Commons, and much work in sociology, political science and organization studies that has appeared since its publication. We do so in order to expand our understanding of the conditions under which cooperation occurs resulting...... in the production of collective goods. We explore two issues that were underdeveloped in her book that have subsequently received much attention. First, we discuss how states can facilitate cooperative behavior short of coercively imposing it on actors. Second, we discuss how social capital can facilitate...... or undermine cooperative behavior. In both cases we focus on the important mechanisms by which each one contributes to the development of cooperative behavior and collective goods. We conclude by extending our arguments to a brief analysis of one of the world’s newest and largest collective goods...

Conditional cooperation on three continents

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kocher, M.G.; Cherry, T.; Kroll, S.; Netzer, R.; Sutter, M.

2007-01-01

We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.

Cognitive load does not affect the behavioral and cognitive foundations of social cooperation

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Laura Mieth

2016-08-01

Full Text Available The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners’ cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias towards guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants’ positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect—that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners—depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load.□

Subgame consistent cooperation a comprehensive treatise

CERN Document Server

Yeung, David W K

2016-01-01

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution tec...

Environmental concern and cooperative-competitive behavior in a simulated commons dilemma.

Science.gov (United States)

Smith, J M; Bell, P A

1992-08-01

Commons-dilemma simulation games are designed to examine behavior associated with preservation and destruction of slowly regenerating natural resources. In Experiment 1, 120 introductory psychology students in the United States were assigned to high- or low-environmental-concern conditions based on a median split of their scores from a pretest. They then played either a points game, in which they selected numerical points from a slowly regenerating pool, or a tree game, in which they harvested trees from a jointly managed forest. After the game, subjects were asked to sign a petition for an environmental cause, to participate in a litter pick-up, and to participate in a recycling drive. Neither environmental concern nor proenvironmental behaviors were related to commons dilemma performance. In Experiment 2, 57 other introductory psychology students were assessed on environmental concern and Machiavellian personality, size of other players' harvesting choices, and other players' altruistic choices, all correlated with subjects' outcomes in the game. Overall, cooperation and competition were more important than environmental concern in predicting behavior in the commons dilemma simulation game.

Heart rate, salivary α-amylase activity, and cooperative behavior in previously naïve children receiving dental local anesthesia.

Science.gov (United States)

Arhakis, Aristidis; Menexes, George; Coolidge, Trilby; Kalfas, Sotirios

2012-01-01

Psychosomatic indicators, such as heart rate (HR), salivary alpha amylase (sAA) activity, and behavior, can be used to determine stress. This study's aim was to assess the pattern of changes of salivary alpha amylase, heart rate, and cooperative behavior in previously naïve children receiving dental treatment under local anesthesia. Included were 30 children with no prior dental experience who needed 4 or more sessions of dental treatment involving local anesthesia. In each session, sAA, HR, and behavior were assessed before and during the application of local anesthesia and at the end of the treatment. The highest sAA value was always observed at the end of each session; overall, the value was lower in the fourth session. HR always increased during the local anesthesia, and did not vary across sessions. No significant relationship was found between child cooperation and either sAA or HR. In this sample, child cooperation may not be an accurate indicator of stress. Based on salivary alpha amylase activity changes, dental treatment involving local anesthesia in naïve children appeared to be less stressful after 3 sessions.

Predicting Human Cooperation.

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John J Nay

Full Text Available The Prisoner's Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma (defection, when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner's Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner's Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational model of human behavior in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. We demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.

Social rank and social cooperation: Impact of social comparison processes on cooperative decision-making.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xu Gong

Full Text Available Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize and judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of great importance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn potentially motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in detail how social comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect of social decision-making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and identifying means of maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public goods is of vital interest to society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading performance rankings on a reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions via a modified Public Goods Game (PGG. Findings revealed that individuals ranked highest tended to be more cooperative as compared to those who placed in the bottom rank. Interestingly, this effect was regardless of whether the comparison group members were the subsequent players in the PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with higher social orientation. In summary, the present research shows how different social comparison processes (assessed via social rankings can operate in our daily interaction with others, demonstrating an important effect on cooperative behavior.

Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness.

Science.gov (United States)

Eshel, I; Cavalli-Sforza, L L

1982-02-01

The method of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), in its current form, is confronted with a difficulty when it tries to explain how some social behaviors initiate their evolution. We show that this difficulty may be removed by changing the assumption made tacitly in game theory (and in ESS) of randomness of meetings or encounters. In reality, such randomness seems to be rare in nature. Family, population and social structure, customs, and habits impose various types of deviation from randomness. Introducing nonrandomness of meeting in a way formally similar to assortative mating, we show that the bar to initial increase of inherited cooperative or altruistic behaviors can be removed, provided there is sufficient assortment of meetings. Family structure may cause contacts predominantly between certain types of relatives, and one can reconstruct some results of classical kin selection in terms of evolutionary stable strategy with assortative meetings. Neighbor effects and group selection might be similarly treated. Assortment need not be a passive consequence of population and social structure, but it can also be actively pursued. Behaviors favoring the choice of cooperative companions will have the effect of favoring the evolution of cooperativeness. It can be shown that discrimination in the choice of companions, especially if combined with assortment, can favor the development of cooperativeness, making initial increase of cooperative behavior possible even at levels of assortment passively imposed which would not be adequate, per se, to guarantee the increase of cooperativeness. It is possible that, in some cases, cooperativeness and behavior favoring some type of assortment are coselected.

Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment.

Science.gov (United States)

Niella, Tamara; Stier-Moses, Nicolás; Sigman, Mariano

2016-01-01

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.

Small groups and long memories promote cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Stewart, Alexander J; Plotkin, Joshua B

2016-06-01

Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists the question is often how group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, can emerge and persist in an evolving system. Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. We construct a coordinate system for memory-m strategies in iterated n-player games that permits us to characterize all cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that, especially when groups are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. We also explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory. We find that even when memory has a cost, longer-memory strategies often evolve, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation, even when the benefits for cooperation are low.

Heuristics for Cooperative Problem Solving

Science.gov (United States)

1989-02-01

behaviors of cooperating humans are not necessary for simple tasks. Those of cooperating wolves or wasps might perform more reliably and could be...observed in wolves (Mech 1970), lions (Schaller 1972), and coyotes (Robinson 1952, Hamlin 1979). In coyotes this behavior seems to be directed toward...predation in Yellowstone National Park. J. Mammal. 33:470-476. value - low Schaller, G. B. 1972. The Serengeti lion: a study of predator-prey relationships

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation

OpenAIRE

Cronin, Katherine A.; Acheson, Daniel J.; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2016-01-01

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was ac...

The evolution of cooperation by the Hankshaw effect.

Science.gov (United States)

Hammarlund, Sarah P; Connelly, Brian D; Dickinson, Katherine J; Kerr, Benjamin

2016-06-01

The evolution of cooperation-costly behavior that benefits others-faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the benefits, but evade the cost of cooperation. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperation becomes linked to a beneficial mutation, allowing cooperation to rise in abundance. Here, we explore hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more mutational opportunities than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the "Hankshaw effect" after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent-based model, we reveal a broad set of conditions that allow the evolution of cooperation through this effect. Additionally, we show that spite, a costly behavior that harms others, can evolve by the Hankshaw effect. While in an unchanging environment these costly social behaviors have transient success, in a dynamic environment, cooperation and spite can persist indefinitely. © 2016 The Author(s). Evolution © 2016 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

Competitive Aggression without Interaction: Effects of Competitive versus Cooperative Instructions on Aggressive Behavior in Video Games.

Science.gov (United States)

Anderson, Craig A.; Morrow, Melissa

1995-01-01

Extended and tested Deutsch's theory of competition effects. Predicted that people view competitive situations as inherently more aggressive than cooperative ones. Predicted that leading people to think of an aggressive situation in competitive terms would increase aggressive behavior. Increase of kill ratio occurred in absence of changes in…

Multi-robot Cooperation Behavior Decision Based on Psychological Values

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jian JIANG

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The method based on psychology concept has been proved to be a successful tool used for human-robot interaction. But its related research in multi-robot cooperation has remained scarce until recent studies. To solve the problem, a decision-making mechanism based on psychological values is presented to be regarded as the basis of the multi-robot cooperation. Robots give birth to psychological values based on the estimations of environment, teammates and themselves. The mapping relationship between psychological values and cooperation tendency threshold values is set up with artificial neural network. Robots can make decision on the bases of these threshold values in cooperation scenes. Experiments show that the multi-robot cooperation method presented in the paper not only can ensure the rationality of robots’ decision-making, but also can ensure the speediness of robots’ decision-making.

Neural correlates of social cooperation and non-cooperation as a function of psychopathy.

Science.gov (United States)

Rilling, James K; Glenn, Andrea L; Jairam, Meeta R; Pagnoni, Giuseppe; Goldsmith, David R; Elfenbein, Hanie A; Lilienfeld, Scott O

2007-06-01

Psychopathy is a disorder involving a failure to experience many emotions that are necessary for appropriate social behavior. In this study, we probed the behavioral, emotional, and neural correlates of psychopathic traits within the context of a dyadic social interaction. Thirty subjects were imaged with functional magnetic resonance imaging while playing an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with human confederates who were outside the scanner. Subjects also completed two self-report psychopathy questionnaires. Subjects scoring higher on psychopathy, particularly males, defected more often and were less likely to continue cooperating after establishing mutual cooperation with a partner. Further, they experienced more outcomes in which their cooperation was not reciprocated (cooperate-defect outcome). After such outcomes, subjects scoring high in psychopathy showed less amygdala activation, suggesting weaker aversive conditioning to those outcomes. Compared with low-psychopathy subjects, subjects higher in psychopathy also showed weaker activation within orbitofrontal cortex when choosing to cooperate and showed weaker activation within dorsolateral prefrontal and rostral anterior cingulate cortex when choosing to defect. These findings suggest that whereas subjects scoring low on psychopathy have emotional biases toward cooperation that can only be overcome with effortful cognitive control, subjects scoring high on psychopathy have an opposing bias toward defection that likewise can only be overcome with cognitive effort.

Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games.

Science.gov (United States)

Antonioni, Alberto; Pereda, María; Cronin, Katherine A; Tomassini, Marco; Sánchez, Angel

2018-03-29

The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation.

Cooperation and cheating in microbes

Science.gov (United States)

Gore, Jeff

2011-03-01

Understanding the cooperative and competitive dynamics within and between species is a central challenge in evolutionary biology. Microbial model systems represent a unique opportunity to experimentally test fundamental theories regarding the evolution of cooperative behaviors. In this talk I will describe our experiments probing cooperation in microbes. In particular, I will compare the cooperative growth of yeast in sucrose and the cooperative inactivation of antibiotics by bacteria. In both cases we find that cheater strains---which don't contribute to the public welfare---are able to take advantage of the cooperator strains. However, this ability of cheaters to out-compete cooperators occurs only when cheaters are present at low frequency, thus leading to steady-state coexistence. These microbial experiments provide fresh insight into the evolutionary origin of cooperation.

Cooperativeness and competitiveness as two distinct constructs: validating the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale in a social dilemma context.

Science.gov (United States)

Lu, Su; Au, Wing-Tung; Jiang, Feng; Xie, Xiaofei; Yam, Paton

2013-01-01

The present research validated the construct and criterion validities of the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale (CCPS) in a social dilemma context. The results from three studies supported the notion that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two independent dimensions, challenging the traditional view that they are two ends of a single continuum. First, confirmatory factor analyses revealed that a two-factor structure fit the data significantly better than a one-factor structure. Moreover, cooperativeness and competitiveness were either not significantly correlated (Studies 1 and 3) or only moderately positively correlated (Study 2). Second, cooperativeness and competitiveness were differentially associated with Schwartz's Personal Values. These results further supported the idea that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two distinct constructs. Specifically, the individuals who were highly cooperative emphasized self-transcendent values (i.e., universalism and benevolence) more, whereas the individuals who were highly competitive emphasized self-enhancement values (i.e., power and achievement) more. Finally, the CCPS, which adheres to the trait perspective of personality, was found to be a useful supplement to more prevalent social motive measures (i.e., social value orientation) in predicting cooperative behaviors. Specifically, in Study 2, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in a public goods dilemma (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale contributed more to the public goods). In Study 3, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in commons dilemmas (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale requested fewer resources from the common resource pool). The practical implications of the CCPS in conflict resolution, as well as in recruitment and selection settings, are discussed.

Repercussions of behavior of Cooperative Teacher’s on health and attractiveness of Tunisian Student Teachers

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Zayed Wadii

2018-04-01

Full Text Available Purpose: This study was to explore the repercussions of the cooperative teacher’s (CT behavior on health and attractiveness of Physical Education student teachers (PE-ST believed to be important for a successful preparatory traineeship and training device in the professional life. The CT is considered a person of alternation between academia and training, contributing to the formation by advice and support. The Cooperative Teacher’s must have a style; develop a training contract, master interview techniques and make evaluation. However, questions remain as to how well Higher Education Institutions prepare the Student Teachers to meet the challenges and requirement of work environments. Material: Data were collected with 302 student teachers (202 males and 100 females before professional training. A descriptive/exploratory methodology based on a questionnaire consisting of eighteen questions was used. The value of Cronbach alpha index is 0.857. Results: globally supported the hypotheses. Male and female student teachers in the internship shared several perceptions. However, significant differences emerged. Student teachers perception of CT behavior and supports developed relatively professional skills, personal life as well as the feeling of discomfort which can lead to work stoppage. However, the repercussion of CT behavior on health and attractiveness was significant. The negative relationship between actors in the in professional life and several aspects of CT behavior are provided. In addition, data are provided indicating that overall there are more similarities than differences between male and female student teachers students over a response number. Data also suggest that females who participate in the internship may be at risk for discomfort and anxiety problems. Conclusions: This study will encourage Teacher’s to reflect on their own behaviors, support practices and to include them in the process of educational development.

Can we get some cooperation around here? The mediating role of group norms on the relationship between team personality and individual helping behaviors.

Science.gov (United States)

Gonzalez-Mulé, Erik; DeGeest, David S; McCormick, Brian W; Seong, Jee Young; Brown, Kenneth G

2014-09-01

Drawing on the group-norms theory of organizational citizenship behaviors and person-environment fit theory, we introduce and test a multilevel model of the effects of additive and dispersion composition models of team members' personality characteristics on group norms and individual helping behaviors. Our model was tested using regression and random coefficients modeling on 102 research and development teams. Results indicated that high mean levels of extraversion are positively related to individual helping behaviors through the mediating effect of cooperative group norms. Further, low variance on agreeableness (supplementary fit) and high variance on extraversion (complementary fit) promote the enactment of individual helping behaviors, but only the effects of extraversion were mediated by cooperative group norms. Implications of these findings for theories of helping behaviors in teams are discussed. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Use of Behavior and Influence Functions for Relay Selection in Cooperative Communications

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Craciunescu, Razvan; Mihovska, Albena Dimitrova; Prasad, Ramjee

2015-01-01

This paper uses a novel set of functions to model the relay selection process in a scenario of cooperative wireless communications. We define a utility function that reflects the behavior and influence that a selected relay may have on the quality of the link to be established for the forwarding...... of data. The utility function takes into account also the strategies of other players. To this end, we define a relay selection game and a supporting Nash Equilibrium (NE) algorithm for the choice of a relay during communication. The successful selection of a relay is evaluated by simulations in terms...

Benefits of cooperation with genetic kin in a subsocial spider

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Schneider, J.M.; Bilde, T.

2008-01-01

also promote helping behavior in many cooperatively breeding taxa. Investigating transitional systems is therefore particularly suitable for understanding the influence of kin selection on the initial spread of cooperative behaviors. Here we investigated the role of kinship in cooperative feeding. We...... in prey capture and feed communally. We provide clear experimental evidence for net benefits of cooperating with kin. Genetic relatedness within groups and not association with familiar individuals directly improved feeding efficiency and growth rates, demonstrating a positive effect of kin cooperation...

The hard problem of cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kimmo Eriksson

Full Text Available Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the "hard problem of cooperation" as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.

The hard problem of cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Eriksson, Kimmo; Strimling, Pontus

2012-01-01

Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the "hard problem of cooperation" as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior.

Cooperating for assisting intelligently operators

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brezillon, P.; Cases, E.; CEA Centre d'Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, 30 - Marcoule

1995-01-01

We are in the process of an intelligent cooperative system in a nuclear plant application. The system must cooperate with an operator who accomplishes a task of supervision of a real-world process. We point out in the paper that a cooperation between a cooperative system and an operator has two modes: a waking state and a participating state. During the waking state, the system observes the operator's behavior and the consequences on the process. During the participation state, the cooperative system builds jointly with the user a solution to the problem. In our approach, the cooperation depends on the system capabilities to explain, to incrementally acquire knowledge and to make explicit the context of the cooperation. We develop these ideas in the framework of the design of the cooperative system in the nuclear plant. (authors). 22 refs., 1 fig

Cooperative behavior, competition and operations research

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Estevez Fernandez, M.A.

2006-01-01

Game theory is the mathematical tool to study cooperation and competition. Since the beginnings of operations research and game theory both fields have been closely related. This thesis further investigates this relationship. Costs or rewards sharing problems arising from scheduling problems,

Health-seeking behavior and hospital choice in China's New Cooperative Medical System.

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Brown, Philip H; Theoharides, Caroline

2009-07-01

Since the dissolution of the Rural Cooperative Medical System at the end of the commune period, illness has emerged as a leading cause of poverty in rural China. To address the poor state of health care, the Chinese government unveiled the New Cooperative Medical System in 2002. Because local governments have been given significant control over program design, fundamental characteristics of the program vary from one county to the next. These differences may influence the decision to seek health care as well as the choice of hospital conditional on that initial decision. In this paper, we use a nested logit model to analyze household survey data from 25 counties to analyze the determinants of such health-seeking behavior. We find that age, the share of household expenditures allocated to food consumption (a measure of relative income), and the presence of other sick people in the household negatively affect the decision to seek health care while disability has a positive influence. Further, conditional on seeking treatment, the reimbursement scheme in place in each county and the average daily expenditure associated with hospitalization strongly influence hospital choice.

Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lu, Peng

2015-01-01

Highlights: •Cooperation macrocosmically refers to the overall cooperation rate, while reputation microcosmically records individual choices. •Therefore, reputation should be preferred in order to investigate how individual choices evolve. •Both the mean and standard deviation of reputation follow clear patterns, and some factors have quadratic effects on them. -- Abstract: Cooperation is vital for our society, but the temptation of cheating on cooperative partners undermines cooperation. The mechanism of reputation is raised to countervail this temptation and therefore promote cooperation. Reputation microcosmically records individual choices, while cooperation macrocosmically refers to the group or averaged cooperation level. Reputation should be preferred in order to investigate how individual choices evolve. In this work, we study the distribution of reputation to figure out how individuals make choices within cooperation and defection. We decompose reputation into its mean and standard deviation and inspect effects of their factors respectively. To achieve this goal, we construct a model where agents of three groups or classes play the prisoners’ dilemma game with neighbors on a square lattice. It indicates in outcomes that the distribution of reputation is distinct from that of cooperation and both the mean and standard deviation of reputation follow clear patterns. Some factors have negative quadratic effects on reputation's mean or standard deviation, and some have merely linear effects

Morning and Evening Oscillators Cooperate to Reset Circadian Behavior in Response to Light Input

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Pallavi Lamba

2014-05-01

Full Text Available Light is a crucial input for circadian clocks. In Drosophila, short light exposure can robustly shift the phase of circadian behavior. The model for this resetting posits that circadian photoreception is cell autonomous: CRYPTOCHROME senses light, binds to TIMELESS (TIM, and promotes its degradation, which is mediated by JETLAG (JET. However, it was recently proposed that interactions between circadian neurons are also required for phase resetting. We identify two groups of neurons critical for circadian photoreception: the morning (M and the evening (E oscillators. These neurons work synergistically to reset rhythmic behavior. JET promotes acute TIM degradation cell autonomously in M and E oscillators but also nonautonomously in E oscillators when expressed in M oscillators. Thus, upon light exposure, the M oscillators communicate with the E oscillators. Because the M oscillators drive circadian behavior, they must also receive inputs from the E oscillators. Hence, although photic TIM degradation is largely cell autonomous, neural cooperation between M and E oscillators is critical for circadian behavioral photoresponses.

Partner choice cooperation in prisoner's dilemma

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Wang, Qi; Xu, Zhaojin; Zhang, Lianzhong

2017-12-01

In this paper, we investigated the cooperative behavior in prisoner's dilemma when the individual behaviors and interaction structures could coevolve. Here, we study the model that the individuals can imitate the strategy of their neighbors and rewire their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on a fitness comparison. We find that the cooperation can be achieved if the time scale of network adaptation is large enough, even when the social dilemma strength is very strong. Detailed investigation shows that the presence or absence of the network adaptation has a profound impact on the collective behavior in the system.

Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.

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Genki Ichinose

Full Text Available Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals' cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by using the prisoner's dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First, cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility is preset to random or fixed. These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.

How the expanded crowd-funding mechanism of some southern rural areas in China affects cooperative behaviors in threshold public goods game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen, Qiao; Chen, Tong; Wang, Yongjie

2016-01-01

Highlights: • The influence of emotions on the public goods game can not be ignored. • Individuals’ emotions will be influenced by list and lobbyists’ words when making decisions. • Unless the synergy factor is larger than a certain value, it is necessary to encourage more people to act as lobbyists. • Whether and how to publish the list depend on the situation. - Abstract: The pursuit of high cooperation rates in public goods games has attracted many researchers. However, few researchers attach much weight to the influence of emotions on decision-making, especially on public goods games. From ancient to modern times, publishing the list of cooperators to stimulate cooperation has been a common phenomenon in some southern rural areas in China. Actually, the published list can influence individuals’ behaviors by affecting their emotions. Here we extend the method of publishing the list and optimize it by adding a lobbyist mechanism. Through numerical simulations, we find that the role of lobbyists can not be ignored unless the synergy factor is larger than a certain value. Additionally, we find that publishing the list certainly has a great effect on individual’s cooperative behavior. But whether to publish the list or not and how to publish the list depend on the situation.

Social Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma Games.

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Peng Lu

Full Text Available It has been a long-lasting pursuit to promote cooperation, and this study aims to promote cooperation via the combination of social stratification and the spatial prisoners' dilemma game. It is previously assumed that agents share the identical payoff matrix, but the stratification or diversity exists and exerts influences in real societies. Thus, two additional classes, elites and scoundrels, derive from and coexist with the existing class, commons. Three classes have different payoff matrices. We construct a model where agents play the prisoners' dilemma game with neighbors. It indicates that stratification and temptation jointly influence cooperation. Temptation permanently reduces cooperation; elites play a positive role in promoting cooperation while scoundrels undermine it. As the temptation getting larger and larger, elites play a more and more positive and critical role while scoundrels' negative effect becomes weaker and weaker, and it is more obvious when temptation goes beyond its threshold.

Reinforcement Learning Explains Conditional Cooperation and Its Moody Cousin.

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Takahiro Ezaki

2016-07-01

Full Text Available Direct reciprocity, or repeated interaction, is a main mechanism to sustain cooperation under social dilemmas involving two individuals. For larger groups and networks, which are probably more relevant to understanding and engineering our society, experiments employing repeated multiplayer social dilemma games have suggested that humans often show conditional cooperation behavior and its moody variant. Mechanisms underlying these behaviors largely remain unclear. Here we provide a proximate account for this behavior by showing that individuals adopting a type of reinforcement learning, called aspiration learning, phenomenologically behave as conditional cooperator. By definition, individuals are satisfied if and only if the obtained payoff is larger than a fixed aspiration level. They reinforce actions that have resulted in satisfactory outcomes and anti-reinforce those yielding unsatisfactory outcomes. The results obtained in the present study are general in that they explain extant experimental results obtained for both so-called moody and non-moody conditional cooperation, prisoner's dilemma and public goods games, and well-mixed groups and networks. Different from the previous theory, individuals are assumed to have no access to information about what other individuals are doing such that they cannot explicitly use conditional cooperation rules. In this sense, myopic aspiration learning in which the unconditional propensity of cooperation is modulated in every discrete time step explains conditional behavior of humans. Aspiration learners showing (moody conditional cooperation obeyed a noisy GRIM-like strategy. This is different from the Pavlov, a reinforcement learning strategy promoting mutual cooperation in two-player situations.

Stability Analysis of R&D Cooperation in a Supply Chain

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Luyun Xu

2015-01-01

Full Text Available R&D outsourcing becomes the often-adopted strategy for firms to innovate. However, R&D cooperation often ends up with failure because of its inherent quality of instability. One of the main reasons for cooperation failure is the opportunistic behavior. As the R&D contract between firms is inherently incomplete, opportunistic behavior always cannot be avoided in the collaborative process. R&D cooperation has been divided into horizontal and vertical types. This paper utilizes game theory to study opportunistic behavior in the vertical R&D cooperation and analyzes the equilibrium of the cooperation. Based on the equilibrium and numerical results, it is found that the vertical R&D cooperation is inherently unstable, and the downstream firm is more likely to break the agreement. The level of knowledge spillovers and the cost of R&D efforts have different effects on firms’ payoffs. When the level of knowledge spillover is low or the cost of R&D efforts is high, mechanisms such as punishment for opportunism may be more effective to guarantee the stability of cooperation.

Cooperative networks : The mobile tethering game

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Constantinescu, M.; Bouwman, H.; Djurica, M.; Durmus, Y.; Onur, E.; Reuver, M. de

2012-01-01

We propose an analysis of cooperation for data sharing and the behavioral aspects involved in the process of decision making. Starting with the tethering capabilities of recent devices we apply game theoretical principles and models, inquire what makes the cooperation work, and what are the

Strategies of inducing cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deutsch, M.

1986-01-01

The results of the four experiments described in this paper are very consistent, and they can be summarized as follows: (1) The ''nonpunitive'' strategy was most effective in eliciting cooperative behavior from the subjects and, overall, resulted in the highest joint outcomes as well as the highest outcomes for the accomplice. (2) The effectiveness of the turn-the-other-cheek strategy was very much influenced by the competitiveness of the situation; the more competitive the incentives of the subjects, the more massively they exploited the accomplice who employed this strategy. (3) The punitive deterrent strategy elicited more agressive and self-protective, as well as less cooperative, behavior from the subjects than did the other strategies

Simultaneous Cooperation and Competition in the Evolution of Musical Behavior: Sex-Related Modulations of the Singer's Formant in Human Chorusing

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Peter E. Keller

2017-09-01

Full Text Available Human interaction through music is a vital part of social life across cultures. Influential accounts of the evolutionary origins of music favor cooperative functions related to social cohesion or competitive functions linked to sexual selection. However, work on non-human “chorusing” displays, as produced by congregations of male insects and frogs to attract female mates, suggests that cooperative and competitive functions may coexist. In such chorusing, rhythmic coordination between signalers, which maximizes the salience of the collective broadcast, can arise through competitive mechanisms by which individual males jam rival signals. Here, we show that mixtures of cooperative and competitive behavior also occur in human music. Acoustic analyses of the renowned St. Thomas Choir revealed that, in the presence of female listeners, boys with the deepest voices enhance vocal brilliance and carrying power by boosting high spectral energy. This vocal enhancement may reflect sexually mature males competing for female attention in a covert manner that does not undermine collaborative musical goals. The evolutionary benefits of music may thus lie in its aptness as a medium for balancing sexually motivated behavior and group cohesion.

Gender, trust and cooperation in environmental social dilemmas.

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Irwin, Kyle; Edwards, Kimberly; Tamburello, Jeffrey A

2015-03-01

This research addresses gender differences in environmental protection efforts. Recent work indicates that, across a variety of domains, women are more generous, charitable, and prosocial than men. Despite above-average levels of these motivators for cooperation, considerable experimental research points to no difference in cooperation between genders. What can explain women's lower-than-expected cooperation levels? Prior research indicates that, compared to men, women are less trusting and respond to fear incentives in social dilemmas - they are concerned about being exploited. We test these arguments in the context of environmental behaviors and argue that lower trust and greater responses to fear incentives mean that women's cooperation is predicated on trust. For men, trust does not predict environmental cooperation. The current research represents the first empirical test of these arguments. Using data from the General Social Survey we focus on private sphere behaviors and political participation and predict an interaction between gender and trust on cooperation. Results support this prediction. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments.

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Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; El Mouden, Claire; West, Stuart A

2016-02-02

Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

Evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks.

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Pereda, María

2016-09-01

In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.

Cooperation and deception in primates.

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Hall, Katie; Brosnan, Sarah F

2017-08-01

Though competition and cooperation are often considered opposing forces in an arms race driving natural selection, many animals, including humans, cooperate in order to mitigate competition with others. Understanding others' psychological states, such as seeing and knowing, others' goals and intentions, and coordinating actions are all important for complex cooperation-as well as for predicting behavior in order to take advantage of others through tactical deception, a form of competition. We outline evidence of primates' understanding of how others perceive the world, and then consider how the evidence from both deception and cooperation fits this framework to give us a more complete understanding of the evolution of complex social cognition in primates. In experimental food competitions, primates flexibly manipulate group-mates' behavior to tactically deceive them. Deception can infiltrate cooperative interactions, such as when one takes an unfair share of meat after a coordinated hunt. In order to counter competition of this sort, primates maintain cooperation through partner choice, partner control, and third party punishment. Yet humans appear to stand alone in their ability to understand others' beliefs, which allows us not only to deceive others with the explicit intent to create a false belief, but it also allows us to put ourselves in others' shoes to determine when cheaters need to be punished, even if we are not directly disadvantaged by the cheater. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Effects of the family-school cooperation on student social behavior and academic achievement

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Milošević Nikoleta M.

2002-01-01

Full Text Available Cooperation between a family and school makes provisions for solving problems students face in their interpersonal relations and academic achievement. We are singling out a view of the effects of a micro-system on child's development, which states that immediate interrelations in a micro-system - a family - can effect interrelations in another micro-system -peer groups - or can effect academic achievement. The majority of authors agree that modes and spheres of influences that family exerts are numerous and diverse and that they depend on characteristics of a broader social and cultural community where a child is growing up as well as on parents' abilities and preparations. How successful the family-school cooperation will be is largely determined by teacher's personality and the way he/she is communicating with parents. A joint planning and implementation of decisions reached, identical norms of behavior, commonly adopted goals are a prerequisite for a child's normal development. It is pointed out that school should plan and organize its activities (courses, seminars, forums lectures, discussions, so as to popularize knowledge of pedagogy and psychology among parents as well as teacher training in communication competence.

Use of Peer Tutoring, Cooperative Learning, and Collaborative Learning: Implications for Reducing Anti-Social Behavior of Schooling Adolescents

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Eskay, M.; Onu, V. C.; Obiyo, N.; Obidoa, M.

2012-01-01

The study investigated the use of peer tutoring, cooperative learning, and collaborative learning as strategies to reduce anti-social behavior among schooling adolescents. The study is a descriptive survey study. The area of study was Nsukka education zone in Enugu State of Nigeria. The sample of the study was 200 teachers randomly sampled from…

Turn-taking in cooperative offspring care: by-product of individual provisioning behavior or active response rule?

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Savage, James L; Browning, Lucy E; Manica, Andrea; Russell, Andrew F; Johnstone, Rufus A

2017-01-01

For individuals collaborating to rear offspring, effective organization of resource delivery is difficult because each carer benefits when the others provide a greater share of the total investment required. When investment is provided in discrete events, one possible solution is to adopt a turn-taking strategy whereby each individual reduces its contribution rate after investing, only increasing its rate again once another carer contributes. To test whether turn-taking occurs in a natural cooperative care system, here we use a continuous time Markov model to deduce the provisioning behavior of the chestnut-crowned babbler ( Pomatostomus ruficeps ), a cooperatively breeding Australian bird with variable number of carers. Our analysis suggests that turn-taking occurs across a range of group sizes (2-6), with individual birds being more likely to visit following other individuals than to make repeat visits. We show using a randomization test that some of this apparent turn-taking arises as a by-product of the distribution of individual inter-visit intervals ("passive" turn-taking) but that individuals also respond actively to the investment of others over and above this effect ("active" turn-taking). We conclude that turn-taking in babblers is a consequence of both their individual provisioning behavior and deliberate response rules, with the former effect arising through a minimum interval required to forage and travel to and from the nest. Our results reinforce the importance of considering fine-scale investment dynamics when studying parental care and suggest that behavioral rules such as turn-taking may be more common than previously thought. Caring for offspring is a crucial stage in the life histories of many animals and often involves conflict as each carer typically benefits when others contribute a greater share of the work required. One way to resolve this conflict is to monitor when other carers contribute and adopt a simple "turn-taking" rule to ensure

Coevolution of network structure and cooperation in the public goods game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang Lei; Xia Chengyi; Wang Juan

2013-01-01

Recently, the emergence of cooperation has become a central topic in the evolutionary game field, and coevolution of game dynamics and network topology structure can give us a fresh viewpoint of how the network evolves and cooperation arises. In this paper, we show in detail a picture of the co-evolutionary behaviors between the microscopic structure of the network and cooperation promotion in the public goods game (PGG). Based on a mechanism named after evolutionary preferential attachment (EPA), in which the growth of the network depends on the outcome of PGG dynamics, we explore the structural properties of networks and cooperative behaviors taking place on the networks created by EPA rules. Extensive simulation results indicate that the structure of the resulting networks displays a transition from homogeneous to heterogeneous properties as the selection strength ϵ increases, and the cooperative behaviors have a non-trivial state in which cooperators and defectors can simultaneously occupy the hub nodes in the network. Current results are of interest for us to further understand the cooperation persistence and structure evolution in many natural, social and economical systems. (paper)

Separating conditional and unconditional cooperation in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game

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Mieth, Laura; Buchner, Axel

2017-01-01

Most theories of social exchange distinguish between two different types of cooperation, depending on whether or not cooperation occurs conditional upon the partner’s previous behaviors. Here, we used a multinomial processing tree model to distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity and cooperation bias in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In Experiments 1 and 2, the facial expressions of the partners were varied to manipulate cooperation bias. In Experiment 3, an extinction instruction was used to manipulate reciprocity. The results confirm that people show a stronger cooperation bias when interacting with smiling compared to angry-looking partners, supporting the notion that a smiling facial expression in comparison to an angry facial expression helps to construe a situation as cooperative rather than competitive. Reciprocity was enhanced for appearance-incongruent behaviors, but only when participants were encouraged to form expectations about the partners’ future behaviors. Negative reciprocity was not stronger than positive reciprocity, regardless of whether expectations were manipulated or not. Experiment 3 suggests that people are able to ignore previous episodes of cheating as well as previous episodes of cooperation if these turn out to be irrelevant for predicting a partner’s future behavior. The results provide important insights into the mechanisms of social cooperation. PMID:29121671

Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?

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Kurokawa, Shun; Ihara, Yasuo

2017-02-21

Group-wise cooperation, or cooperation among three or more individuals, is an integral part of human societies. It is likely that group-wise cooperation also played a crucial role in the survival of early hominins, who were confronted with novel environmental challenges, long before the emergence of Homo sapiens. However, previous theoretical and empirical studies, focusing mainly on modern humans, have tended to suggest that evolution of cooperation in sizable groups cannot be explained by simple direct reciprocity and requires some additional mechanisms (reputation, punishment, etc.), which are cognitively too demanding for early hominins. As a partial resolution of the paradox, our recent analysis of a stochastic evolutionary model, which considers the effect of random drift, has revealed that evolution of group-wise cooperation is more likely to occur in larger groups when an individual's share of the benefit produced by one cooperator does not decrease with increasing group size (i.e., goods are non-rivalrous). In this paper, we further extend our previous analysis to explore possible consequences of introducing rare mistakes in behavior or imperfect information about behavior of others on the model outcome. Analyses of the extended models show that evolution of group-wise cooperation can be facilitated by large group size even when individuals intending to cooperate sometimes fail to do so or when all the information about the past behavior of group members is not available. We argue, therefore, that evolution of cooperation in sizable groups does not necessarily require other mechanisms than direct reciprocity if the goods to be produced via group-wise cooperation are non-rivalrous. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cooperative Bacterial Foraging Optimization

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Hanning Chen

2009-01-01

Full Text Available Bacterial Foraging Optimization (BFO is a novel optimization algorithm based on the social foraging behavior of E. coli bacteria. This paper presents a variation on the original BFO algorithm, namely, the Cooperative Bacterial Foraging Optimization (CBFO, which significantly improve the original BFO in solving complex optimization problems. This significant improvement is achieved by applying two cooperative approaches to the original BFO, namely, the serial heterogeneous cooperation on the implicit space decomposition level and the serial heterogeneous cooperation on the hybrid space decomposition level. The experiments compare the performance of two CBFO variants with the original BFO, the standard PSO and a real-coded GA on four widely used benchmark functions. The new method shows a marked improvement in performance over the original BFO and appears to be comparable with the PSO and GA.

Is Cooperative Memory Special? The Role of Costly Errors, Context, and Social Network Size When Remembering Cooperative Actions

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Tim Winke

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies, such as tit-for-tat, that depend on remembering a partner’s last choices. Yet, an empirical study by Stevens et al. (2011 demonstrated that human memory may not meet the requirements that needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous behavior of simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed poorly, making errors in 10–24% of the trials. However, we do not know the extent to which this task taps specialized cognition for cooperation. It may be possible to engage participants in more cooperative, strategic thinking, which may improve memory. On the other hand, compared with other situations, a cooperative context may already engage improved memory via cheater detection mechanisms. This study investigated the specificity of memory in cooperative contexts by varying (1 the costs of errors in memory by making forgetting defection more costly and (2 whether the recall situation is framed as a cooperative or neutral context. Also, we investigated whether variation in participants’ social network size could account for individual differences observed in memory accuracy. We found that neither including differential costs for misremembering defection nor removing the cooperative context influenced memory accuracy for cooperation. Combined, these results suggest that memory accuracy is robust to differences in the cooperative context: Adding more strategic components does not help accuracy, and removing cooperative components does not hurt accuracy. Social network size, however, did correlate with memory accuracy: People with larger networks remembered the events better. These findings suggest that cooperative memory does not seem to be special compared with other forms of memory, which aligns with previous work demonstrating the domain generality of memory. However, the demands of interacting in a large social network may

Altruistic Behavior and Cooperation: The Role of Intrinsic Expectation When Reputational Information is Incomplete

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Jacintha Ellers

2010-01-01

Full Text Available Altruistic behavior is known to be conditional on the level of altruism of others. However, people often have no information, or incomplete information, about the altruistic reputation of others, for example when the reputation was obtained in a different social or economic context. As a consequence, they have to estimate the other's altruistic intentions. Using an economic game, we showed that without reputational information people have intrinsic expectations about the altruistic behavior of others, which largely explained their own altruistic behavior. This implies that when no information is available, intrinsic expectations can be as powerful a driver of altruistic behavior as actual knowledge about other people's reputation. Two strategies appeared to co-exist in our study population: participants who expected others to be altruistic and acted even more altruistically themselves, while other participants had low expected altruism scores and acted even less altruistically than they expected others to do. We also found evidence that generosity in economic games translates into benefits for other social contexts: a reputation of financial generosity increased the attractiveness of partners in a social cooperative game. This result implies that in situations with incomplete information, the fitness effects of indirect reciprocity are cumulative across different social contexts.

Evolution of cooperation driven by social-welfare-based migration

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Li, Yan; Ye, Hang; Zhang, Hong

2016-03-01

Individuals' migration behavior may play a significant role in the evolution of cooperation. In reality, individuals' migration behavior may depend on their perceptions of social welfare. To study the relationship between social-welfare-based migration and the evolution of cooperation, we consider an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which an individual's migration depends on social welfare but not on the individual's own payoff. By introducing three important social welfare functions (SWFs) that are commonly studied in social science, we find that social-welfare-based migration can promote cooperation under a wide range of parameter values. In addition, these three SWFs have different effects on cooperation, especially through the different spatial patterns formed by migration. Because the relative efficiency of the three SWFs will change if the parameter values are changed, we cannot determine which SWF is optimal for supporting cooperation. We also show that memory capacity, which is needed to evaluate individual welfare, may affect cooperation levels in opposite directions under different SWFs. Our work should be helpful for understanding the evolution of human cooperation and bridging the chasm between studies of social preferences and studies of social cooperation.

Learning to Cooperate: The Evolution of Social Rewards in Repeated Interactions.

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Dridi, Slimane; Akçay, Erol

2018-01-01

Understanding the behavioral and psychological mechanisms underlying social behaviors is one of the major goals of social evolutionary theory. In particular, a persistent question about animal cooperation is to what extent it is supported by other-regarding preferences-the motivation to increase the welfare of others. In many situations, animals adjust their behaviors through learning by responding to the rewards they experience as a consequence of their actions. Therefore, we may ask whether learning in social situations can be driven by evolved other-regarding rewards. Here we develop a mathematical model in order to ask whether the mere act of cooperating with a social partner will evolve to be inherently rewarding. Individuals interact repeatedly in pairs and adjust their behaviors through reinforcement learning. We assume that individuals associate with each game outcome an internal reward value. These perceived rewards are genetically evolving traits. We find that conditionally cooperative rewards that value mutual cooperation positively but the sucker's outcome negatively tend to be evolutionarily stable. Purely other-regarding rewards can evolve only under special parameter combinations. On the other hand, selfish rewards that always lead to pure defection are also evolutionarily successful. These findings are consistent with empirical observations showing that humans tend to display conditionally cooperative behavior and also exhibit a diversity of preferences. Our model also demonstrates the need to further integrate multiple levels of biological causation of behavior.

A hypothesis of coevolution between cooperation and responses to inequity

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Sarah F Brosnan

2011-04-01

Full Text Available Recent evidence demonstrates that humans are not the only species to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes which are to their disadvantage. Several species respond negatively if they subsequently receive a less good reward than a social partner for completing the same task. While these studies suggest that the negative response to inequity is not a uniquely human behavior, they do not provide a functional explanation for the emergence of these responses due to similar characteristics among these species. Emerging data support the hypothesis that an aversion to inequity is a mechanism to promote successful long-term cooperative relationships amongst non-kin. In this paper, I discuss several converging lines of evidence which illustrate the need to further evaluate this relationship. First, cooperation can survive modest inequity; in explicitly cooperative interactions, individuals are willing to continue to cooperate despite inequitable outcomes as long as the partner’s overall behavior is equitable. Second, the context of inequity affects reactions to it in ways which support the idea that joint efforts lead to an expectation of joint payoffs. Finally, comparative studies indicate a link between the degree and extent of cooperation between unrelated individuals in a species and that species’ response to inequitable outcomes. This latter line of evidence indicates that this behavior evolved in conjunction with cooperation and may represent an adaptation to increase the payoffs associated with cooperative interactions. Together these data inform a testable working hypothesis for understanding decision-making in the context of inequity and provide a new, comparative framework for evaluating decision-making behavior.

Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation.

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Levine, Emma E; Barasch, Alixandra; Rand, David; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A

2018-05-01

We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate-those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason. Third, individuals' behavioral responses towards signals of emotion and reason depend on their own decision mode: those who rely on emotion tend to conditionally cooperate (that is, cooperate only when they believe that their partner has cooperated), whereas those who rely on reason tend to defect regardless of their partner's signal. These findings shed light on how different decision processes, and lay theories about decision processes, facilitate and impede cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Variation in Behavioral Reactivity Is Associated with Cooperative Restraint Training Efficiency

OpenAIRE

Bliss-Moreau, Eliza; Moadab, Gilda

2016-01-01

Training techniques that prepare laboratory animals to participate in testing via cooperation are useful tools that have the potential to benefit animal wellbeing. Understanding how animals systematically vary in their cooperative training trajectories will help trainers to design effective and efficient training programs. In the present report we document an updated method for training rhesus monkeys to cooperatively participate in restraint in a ‘primate chair.’ We trained 14 adult male mac...

Special Agents Can Promote Cooperation in the Population

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Xin; Han, Jing; Han, Huawei

2011-01-01

Cooperation is ubiquitous in our real life but everyone would like to maximize her own profits. How does cooperation occur in the group of self-interested agents without centralized control? Furthermore, in a hostile scenario, for example, cooperation is unlikely to emerge. Is there any mechanism to promote cooperation if populations are given and play rules are not allowed to change? In this paper, numerical experiments show that complete population interaction is unfriendly to cooperation in the finite but end-unknown Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD). Then a mechanism called soft control is proposed to promote cooperation. According to the basic idea of soft control, a number of special agents are introduced to intervene in the evolution of cooperation. They comply with play rules in the original group so that they are always treated as normal agents. For our purpose, these special agents have their own strategies and share knowledge. The capability of the mechanism is studied under different settings. We find that soft control can promote cooperation and is robust to noise. Meanwhile simulation results demonstrate the applicability of the mechanism in other scenarios. Besides, the analytical proof also illustrates the effectiveness of soft control and validates simulation results. As a way of intervention in collective behaviors, soft control provides a possible direction for the study of reciprocal behaviors. PMID:22216202

Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games.

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Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; West, Stuart A

2013-01-02

It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have "prosocial preferences" that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games, rather than with direct experimental tests. Here, we test how behavior in a public-goods game is influenced by knowledge of the consequences of actions for other players. We found that (i) individuals cooperate at similar levels, even when they are not informed that their behavior benefits others; (ii) an increased awareness of how cooperation benefits others leads to a reduction, rather than an increase, in the level of cooperation; and (iii) cooperation can be either lower or higher than expected, depending on experimental design. Overall, these results contradict the suggested role of the prosocial preferences hypothesis and show how the complexity of human behavior can lead to misleading conclusions from controlled laboratory experiments.

Forgetting constrains the emergence of cooperative decision strategies

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Jeffrey R. Stevens

2011-01-01

Full Text Available Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies that depend on a partner's last choices. The findings from this work assume that players accurately remember past actions. The kind of memory that these strategies employ, however, does not reflect what we know about memory. Here, we show that human memory may not meet the requirements needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous behavior of simulated partners in a cooperative memory task, participants performed poorly, making errors in 10-24% of the trials. Participants made more errors when required to track more partners. We conducted agent-based simulations to evaluate how well cooperative strategies cope with error. These simulations suggest that, even with few errors, cooperation could not be maintained at the error rates demonstrated by our participants. Our results indicate that the strategies typically used in the study of cooperation likely do not reflect the underlying cognitive capacities used by humans and other animals in social interactions. By including unrealistic assumptions about cognition, theoretical models may have overestimated the robustness of the existing cooperative strategies. To remedy this, future models should incorporate what we know about cognition.

The International Research Training Group on "Brain-Behavior Relationship of Normal and Disturbed Emotions in Schizophrenia and Autism" as an Example of German-American Cooperation in Doctoral Training

Science.gov (United States)

Schneider, Frank; Gur, Ruben C.

2008-01-01

The International Research Training Group "Brain-Behavior Relationship of Normal and Disturbed Emotions in Schizophrenia and Autism" (IRTG 1328), funded by the German Research Council (DFG), is a German-American cooperation. Its major aims are interdisciplinary and international scientific cooperation and the support of young scientists…

Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups.

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Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb; Schultz, Michael

2014-03-01

The widespread existence of cooperation is difficult to explain because individuals face strong incentives to exploit the cooperative tendencies of others. In the research reported here, we examined how the spread of reputational information through gossip promotes cooperation in mixed-motive settings. Results showed that individuals readily communicated reputational information about others, and recipients used this information to selectively interact with cooperative individuals and ostracize those who had behaved selfishly, which enabled group members to contribute to the public good with reduced threat of exploitation. Additionally, ostracized individuals responded to exclusion by subsequently cooperating at levels comparable to those who were not ostracized. These results suggest that the spread of reputational information through gossip can mitigate egoistic behavior by facilitating partner selection, thereby helping to solve the problem of cooperation even in noniterated interactions.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Opportunistic Behavior Based on Cooperative Spillover%基于合作溢出的机会主义行为演化博弈分析

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

邢乐斌; 王旭

2011-01-01

Enterprises in the market economy and knowledge society are forming strategic alliance with each other in order to obtain necessary skills and capabilities. Strategic alliance opportunities inevitably create opportunistic and self-interest behaviors, thereby resulting in disorderly competition and reduced alliance profit. It is important to learn how to develop a healthy alliance by reducing opportunism behaviors and improving alliance profits. In reality, alliance members tend to take effective supervisory and preventive measures to avoid cooperative spillover of exclusion resource, and reduce or avoid the loss of their own interests. Therefore, research of alliance stability and alliance income should be based on at least two aspects: supervisory and preventive measures, as well as cooperative spillover of exclusion resource.The current research on alliance and opportunism behaviors of alliance members is mainly based on single factor, such as information symmetry, supervision and prevention, external environment, cooperative spillover effect of exclusion resource, trust or culture. Two or more influencing factors were rarely considered at the same time. According to the evolutionary game theory, this paper uses a replicator equation as our basic model to characterize the change of opportunist proportion and mutually beneficial proportion when cooperative spillover occurs. We also analyze evolution laws under stable alliance equilibrium, and potential influence of cooperative spillover on alliance profits.In the first part we construct an alliance system that is created by many individuals. The evolutionary game model is based on exclusion resources that takes opportunist proportion in alliance and mutually beneficial proportion. In the second part, we calculate the stable alliance equilibrium point and study the evolution law of opportunistic behavior according to the Jacobin matrix. Excessive prevention cost can stop cooperative spillover of mutually beneficial

Social Value Induction and Cooperation in the Centipede Game.

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Briony D Pulford

Full Text Available The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic interactions. Two experiments investigated psychological factors driving cooperation in 20 rounds of a Centipede game with significant monetary incentives and anonymous and random re-pairing of players after every round. The main purpose of the research was to determine whether the pattern of strategic choices observed when no specific social value orientation is experimentally induced--the standard condition in all previous investigations of behavior in the Centipede and most other experimental games--is essentially individualistic, the orthodox game-theoretic assumption being that players are individualistically motivated in the absence of any specific motivational induction. Participants in whom no specific state social value orientation was induced exhibited moderately non-cooperative play that differed significantly from the pattern found when an individualistic orientation was induced. In both experiments, the neutral treatment condition, in which no orientation was induced, elicited competitive behavior resembling behavior in the condition in which a competitive orientation was explicitly induced. Trait social value orientation, measured with a questionnaire, influenced cooperation differently depending on the experimentally induced state social value orientation. Cooperative trait social value orientation was a significant predictor of cooperation and, to a lesser degree, experimentally induced competitive orientation was a significant predictor of non-cooperation. The experimental results imply that the standard assumption of individualistic motivation in experimental games may not be valid, and that the results of such investigations need to take into account the possibility that players are competitively motivated.

The Perception of Cooperativeness Without Any Visual or Auditory Communication.

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Chang, Dong-Seon; Burger, Franziska; Bülthoff, Heinrich H; de la Rosa, Stephan

2015-12-01

Perceiving social information such as the cooperativeness of another person is an important part of human interaction. But can people perceive the cooperativeness of others even without any visual or auditory information? In a novel experimental setup, we connected two people with a rope and made them accomplish a point-collecting task together while they could not see or hear each other. We observed a consistently emerging turn-taking behavior in the interactions and installed a confederate in a subsequent experiment who either minimized or maximized this behavior. Participants experienced this only through the haptic force-feedback of the rope and made evaluations about the confederate after each interaction. We found that perception of cooperativeness was significantly affected only by the manipulation of this turn-taking behavior. Gender- and size-related judgments also significantly differed. Our results suggest that people can perceive social information such as the cooperativeness of other people even in situations where possibilities for communication are minimal.

The Perception of Cooperativeness Without Any Visual or Auditory Communication

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Dong-Seon Chang

2015-12-01

Full Text Available Perceiving social information such as the cooperativeness of another person is an important part of human interaction. But can people perceive the cooperativeness of others even without any visual or auditory information? In a novel experimental setup, we connected two people with a rope and made them accomplish a point-collecting task together while they could not see or hear each other. We observed a consistently emerging turn-taking behavior in the interactions and installed a confederate in a subsequent experiment who either minimized or maximized this behavior. Participants experienced this only through the haptic force-feedback of the rope and made evaluations about the confederate after each interaction. We found that perception of cooperativeness was significantly affected only by the manipulation of this turn-taking behavior. Gender- and size-related judgments also significantly differed. Our results suggest that people can perceive social information such as the cooperativeness of other people even in situations where possibilities for communication are minimal.

Game theory in communication networks cooperative resolution of interactive networking scenarios

CERN Document Server

Antoniou, Josephina

2012-01-01

A mathematical tool for scientists and researchers who work with computer and communication networks, Game Theory in Communication Networks: Cooperative Resolution of Interactive Networking Scenarios addresses the question of how to promote cooperative behavior in interactive situations between heterogeneous entities in communication networking scenarios. It explores network design and management from a theoretical perspective, using game theory and graph theory to analyze strategic situations and demonstrate profitable behaviors of the cooperative entities. The book promotes the use of Game T

Cooperation Dynamics on Mobile Crowd Networks of Device-to-Device Communications

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Yong Deng

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The explosive use of smart devices enabled the emergence of collective resource sharing among mobile individuals. Mobile users need to cooperate with each other to improve the whole network’s quality of service. By modeling the cooperative behaviors in a mobile crowd into an evolutionary Prisoner’s dilemma game, we investigate the relationships between cooperation rate and some main influence factors, including crowd density, communication range, temptation to defect, and mobility attributes. Using evolutionary game theory, our analysis on the cooperative behaviors of mobile takes a deep insight into the cooperation promotion in a dynamical network with selfish autonomous users. The experiment results show that mobile user’s features, including speed, moving probability, and reaction radius, have an obvious influence on the formation of a cooperative mobile social network. We also found some optimal status when the crowd’s cooperation rate reaches the best. These findings are important if we want to establish a mobile social network with a good performance.

Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks

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Iyer, Swami; Killingback, Timothy

2016-01-01

Cooperation in social dilemmas is essential for the functioning of systems at multiple levels of complexity, from the simplest biological organisms to the most sophisticated human societies. Cooperation, although widespread, is fundamentally challenging to explain evolutionarily, since natural selection typically favors selfish behavior which is not socially optimal. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in three exemplars of key social dilemmas, representing the prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-dove and coordination classes of games, in structured populations defined by complex networks. Using individual-based simulations of the games on model and empirical networks, we give a detailed comparative study of the effects of the structural properties of a network, such as its average degree, variance in degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and assortativity coefficient, on the promotion of cooperative behavior in all three classes of games. PMID:26928428

Cooperative synchronized assemblies enhance orientation discrimination.

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Samonds, Jason M; Allison, John D; Brown, Heather A; Bonds, A B

2004-04-27

There is no clear link between the broad tuning of single neurons and the fine behavioral capabilities of orientation discrimination. We recorded from populations of cells in the cat visual cortex (area 17) to examine whether the joint activity of cells can support finer discrimination than found in individual responses. Analysis of joint firing yields a substantial advantage (i.e., cooperation) in fine-angle discrimination. This cooperation increases to more considerable levels as the population of an assembly is increased. The cooperation in a population of six cells provides encoding of orientation with an information advantage that is at least 2-fold in terms of requiring either fewer cells or less time than independent coding. This cooperation suggests that correlated or synchronized activity can increase information.

States, social capital and cooperation: looking back on 'Governing the Commons'

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Denise L. Anthony

2011-09-01

Full Text Available This paper reflects on Elinor Ostrom’s classic book, Governing the Commons, and much work in sociology, political science and organization studies that has appeared since its publication. We do so in order to expand our understanding of the conditions under which cooperation occurs resulting in the production of collective goods. We explore two issues that were underdeveloped in her book that have subsequently received much attention. First, we discuss how states can facilitate cooperative behavior short of coercively imposing it on actors. Second, we discuss how social capital can facilitate or undermine cooperative behavior. In both cases we focus on the important mechanisms by which each one contributes to the development of cooperative behavior and collective goods. We conclude by extending our arguments to a brief analysis of one of the world’s newest and largest collective goods – the Internet.

Indirect reciprocity with negative assortment and limited information can promote cooperation.

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Brush, Eleanor; Brännström, Åke; Dieckmann, Ulf

2018-04-14

Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological and social systems, even though cooperative behavior is often costly and at risk of exploitation by non-cooperators. Several studies have demonstrated that indirect reciprocity, whereby some members of a group observe the behaviors of their peers and use this information to discriminate against previously uncooperative agents in the future, can promote prosocial behavior. Some studies have shown that differential propensities of interacting among and between different types of agents (interaction assortment) can increase the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity. No previous studies have, however, considered differential propensities of observing the behaviors of different types of agents (information assortment). Furthermore, most previous studies have assumed that discriminators possess perfect information about others and incur no costs for gathering and storing this information. Here, we (1) consider both interaction assortment and information assortment, (2) assume discriminators have limited information about others, and (3) introduce a cost for information gathering and storage, in order to understand how the ability of discriminators to stabilize cooperation is affected by these steps toward increased realism. We report the following findings. First, cooperation can persist when agents preferentially interact with agents of other types or when discriminators preferentially observe other discriminators, even when they have limited information. Second, contrary to intuition, increasing the amount of information available to discriminators can exacerbate defection. Third, introducing costs of gathering and storing information makes it more difficult for discriminators to stabilize cooperation. Our study is one of only a few studies to date that show how negative interaction assortment can promote cooperation and broadens the set of circumstances in which it is know that cooperation can be maintained. Copyright © 2018

Fitness consequences of cooperative breeding in the Seychelles warbler

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Komdeur, Jan; Richardson, David; Burke, Terry

2006-01-01

Inclusive fitness benefits have been suggested as the selective force behind the evolution of cooperative breeding. Assessing the benefits accrued to individual males and females is crucial to understanding the sex-specific helping behavior observed in many cooperatively breeding species. We

Cooperative Dynamics in Lattice-Embedded Scale-Free Networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shang Lihui; Zhang Mingji; Yang Yanqing

2009-01-01

We investigate cooperative behaviors of lattice-embedded scale-free networking agents in the prisoner's dilemma game model by employing two initial strategy distribution mechanisms, which are specific distribution to the most connected sites (hubs) and random distribution. Our study indicates that the game dynamics crucially depends on the underlying spatial network structure with different strategy distribution mechanism. The cooperators' specific distribution contributes to an enhanced level of cooperation in the system compared with random one, and cooperation is robust to cooperators' specific distribution but fragile to defectors' specific distribution. Especially, unlike the specific case, increasing heterogeneity of network does not always favor the emergence of cooperation under random mechanism. Furthermore, we study the geographical effects and find that the graphically constrained network structure tends to improve the evolution of cooperation in random case and in specific one for a large temptation to defect.

Parameter tuning and cooperative control for automated guided vehicles

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Stouten, B.

2005-01-01

For several practical control engineering applications it is desirable that multiple systems can operate independently as well as in cooperation with each other. Especially when the transition between individual and cooperative behavior and vice versa can be carried out easily, this results in

Multi-agent cooperation rescue algorithm based on influence degree and state prediction

Science.gov (United States)

Zheng, Yanbin; Ma, Guangfu; Wang, Linlin; Xi, Pengxue

2018-04-01

Aiming at the multi-agent cooperative rescue in disaster, a multi-agent cooperative rescue algorithm based on impact degree and state prediction is proposed. Firstly, based on the influence of the information in the scene on the collaborative task, the influence degree function is used to filter the information. Secondly, using the selected information to predict the state of the system and Agent behavior. Finally, according to the result of the forecast, the cooperative behavior of Agent is guided and improved the efficiency of individual collaboration. The simulation results show that this algorithm can effectively solve the cooperative rescue problem of multi-agent and ensure the efficient completion of the task.

Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations

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Kitts, James A.; Leal, Diego F.; Felps, Will; Jones, Thomas M.; Berman, Shawn L.

2016-01-01

Extensive interdisciplinary literatures have built on the seminal spatial dilemmas model, which depicts the evolution of cooperation on regular lattices, with strategies propagating locally by relative fitness. In this model agents may cooperate with neighbors, paying an individual cost to enhance their collective welfare, or they may exploit cooperative neighbors and diminish collective welfare. Recent research has extended the model in numerous ways, incorporating behavioral noise, implementing other network topologies or adaptive networks, and employing alternative dynamics of replication. Although the underlying dilemma arises from two distinct dimensions—the gains for exploiting cooperative partners (Greed) and the cost of cooperating with exploitative partners (Fear)–most work following from the spatial dilemmas model has argued or assumed that the dilemma can be represented with a single parameter: This research has typically examined Greed or Fear in isolation, or a composite such as the K-index of Cooperation or the ratio of the benefit to cost of cooperation. We challenge this claim on theoretical grounds—showing that embedding interaction in networks generally leads Greed and Fear to have divergent, interactive, and highly nonlinear effects on cooperation at the macro level, even when individuals respond identically to Greed and Fear. Using computational experiments, we characterize both dynamic local behavior and long run outcomes across regions of this space. We also simulate interventions to investigate changes of Greed and Fear over time, showing how model behavior changes asymmetrically as boundaries in payoff space are crossed, leading some interventions to have irreversible effects on cooperation. We then replicate our experiments on inter-organizational network data derived from links through shared directors among 2,400 large US corporations, thus demonstrating our findings for Greed and Fear on a naturally-occurring network. In closing

The coevolution of recognition and social behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Smead, Rory; Forber, Patrick

2016-05-26

Recognition of behavioral types can facilitate the evolution of cooperation by enabling altruistic behavior to be directed at other cooperators and withheld from defectors. While much is known about the tendency for recognition to promote cooperation, relatively little is known about whether such a capacity can coevolve with the social behavior it supports. Here we use evolutionary game theory and multi-population dynamics to model the coevolution of social behavior and recognition. We show that conditional harming behavior enables the evolution and stability of social recognition, whereas conditional helping leads to a deterioration of recognition ability. Expanding the model to include a complex game where both helping and harming interactions are possible, we find that conditional harming behavior can stabilize recognition, and thereby lead to the evolution of conditional helping. Our model identifies a novel hypothesis for the evolution of cooperation: conditional harm may have coevolved with recognition first, thereby helping to establish the mechanisms necessary for the evolution of cooperation.

Ethical Issues in Cooperative Education--The Practitioner's Perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Mark, Joan

2001-01-01

Raises issues of unethical student behavior in cooperative education, with examples of theft, abuse of workplace e-mail, fraudulent timesheets, and wrongful unemployment claims. Discusses new opportunities for unethical behavior created by technology and ways educators can respond. (SK)

Cooperation, framing and political attitudes

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public...... good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find...

Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas.

Science.gov (United States)

Sadowski, Jathan; Spierre, Susan G; Selinger, Evan; Seager, Thomas P; Adams, Elizabeth A; Berardy, Andrew

2015-10-01

Fundamental problems of environmental sustainability, including climate change and fisheries management, require collective action on a scale that transcends the political and cultural boundaries of the nation-state. Rational, self-interested neoclassical economic theories of human behavior predict tragedy in the absence of third party enforcement of agreements and practical difficulties that prevent privatization. Evolutionary biology offers a theory of cooperation, but more often than not in a context of discrimination against other groups. That is, in-group boundaries are necessarily defined by those excluded as members of out-groups. However, in some settings human's exhibit behavior that is inconsistent with both rational economic and group driven cooperation of evolutionary biological theory. This paper reports the results of a non-cooperative game-theoretic exercise that models a tragedy of the commons problem in which groups of players may advance their own positions only at the expense of other groups. Students enrolled from multiple universities and assigned to different multi-university identity groups participated in experiments that repeatedly resulted in cooperative outcomes despite intergroup conflicts and expressions of group identity. We offer three possible explanations: (1) students were cooperative because they were in an academic setting; (2) students may have viewed their instructors as the out-group; or (3) the emergence of a small number of influential, ethical leaders is sufficient to ensure cooperation amongst the larger groups. From our data and analysis, we draw out lessons that may help to inform approaches for institutional design and policy negotiations, particularly in climate change management.

Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Arne Traulsen

2007-03-01

Full Text Available The basic idea of tag-based models for cooperation is that individuals recognize each other via arbitrary signals, so-called tags. If there are tags of different colors, then cooperators can always establish new signals of recognition. The resulting "chromodynamics" is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators use a secret tag until they are discovered by defectors who then destroy cooperation based on this tag. Subsequently, a fraction of the population manages to establish cooperation based on a new tag.We derive a mathematical description of stochastic evolutionary dynamics of tag-based cooperation in populations of finite size. Benefit and cost of cooperation are given by b and c. We find that cooperators are more abundant than defectors if b/c > 1+2u/v, where u is the mutation rate changing only the strategy and v is the mutation rate changing strategy and tag. We study specific assumptions for u and v in two genetic models and one cultural model.In a genetic model, tag-based cooperation only evolves if a gene encodes both strategy and tag. In a cultural model with equal mutation rates between all possible phenotypes (tags and behaviors, the crucial condition is b/c > (K+1/(K-1, where K is the number of tags. A larger number of tags requires a smaller benefit-to-cost ratio. In the limit of many different tags, the condition for cooperators to have a higher average abundance than defectors becomes b > c.

Cooperation and charity in spatial public goods game under different strategy update rules

Science.gov (United States)

Li, Yixiao; Jin, Xiaogang; Su, Xianchuang; Kong, Fansheng; Peng, Chengbin

2010-03-01

Human cooperation can be influenced by other human behaviors and recent years have witnessed the flourishing of studying the coevolution of cooperation and punishment, yet the common behavior of charity is seldom considered in game-theoretical models. In this article, we investigate the coevolution of altruistic cooperation and egalitarian charity in spatial public goods game, by considering charity as the behavior of reducing inter-individual payoff differences. Our model is that, in each generation of the evolution, individuals play games first and accumulate payoff benefits, and then each egalitarian makes a charity donation by payoff transfer in its neighborhood. To study the individual-level evolutionary dynamics, we adopt different strategy update rules and investigate their effects on charity and cooperation. These rules can be classified into two global rules: random selection rule in which individuals randomly update strategies, and threshold selection rule where only those with payoffs below a threshold update strategies. Simulation results show that random selection enhances the cooperation level, while threshold selection lowers the threshold of the multiplication factor to maintain cooperation. When charity is considered, it is incapable in promoting cooperation under random selection, whereas it promotes cooperation under threshold selection. Interestingly, the evolution of charity strongly depends on the dispersion of payoff acquisitions of the population, which agrees with previous results. Our work may shed light on understanding human egalitarianism.

When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners’ dilemma game?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dai, Yu; Lu, Peng

2015-01-01

In evolutionary games, the temptation mechanism reduces cooperation percentage while the reputation mechanism promotes it. Inferring reputation theory proposes that agent's imitating neighbors with the highest reputation takes place with a probability. Although reputation promotes cooperation, when and how it enhances cooperation is still a question. This paper investigates the condition where the inferring reputation probability promotes cooperation. Hence, the effects of reputation and temptation on cooperation are explored under the spatial prisoners’ dilemma game, utilizing the methods of simulation and statistical analysis. Results show that temptation reduces cooperation unconditionally while reputation promotes it conditionally, i.e. reputation countervails temptation conditionally. When the inferring reputation probability is less than 0.5, reputation promotes cooperation substantially and thus countervails temptation. However, when the inferring reputation probability is larger than 0.5, its contribution to cooperation is relatively weak and cannot prevent temptation from undermining cooperation. Reputation even decreases cooperation together with temptation when the probability is higher than 0.8. It should be noticed that inferring reputation does not always succeed to countervail temptation and there is a specific interval for it to promote cooperation

A Perspective on Helmberger and Hoos' Theory of Cooperatives

OpenAIRE

Sexton, Richard J.

1995-01-01

Helmberger and Hoos' (HH) 1962 paper is a landmark in the economic theory of agricultural cooperatives, Along with the related work by Helmberger (1964), it represented the definitive treatment of marketing cooperative behavior and standard reading for graduate students in agricultural marketing for more than two decades, To understand fully HH's paper, appreciate its many strengths, and also recognize its weaknesses: one must interpret it both in the context of the work on cooperatives that ...

Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous population with influential individuals

Science.gov (United States)

Zhuang, Qian; Wang, Dong; Fan, Ying; Di, Zengru

2012-02-01

Influential individuals are introduced and integrated with the public goods game (PGG) to investigate their influence on the emergence and evolution of cooperation. In the model, some influential individuals whose behaviors can be controlled by us are introduced into a homogeneous population on a square lattice. The influential individuals can play three kinds of roles: I. exemplar, II. supervisor with the power to punish defectors, and III. supervisor with the power to reward cooperative co-players. It is found that the existence of influential individuals who play Role I turns out to be detrimental to cooperation and that the larger the number of influential individuals is, the more difficult it is for cooperation to be maintained. For those playing supervisory roles, both punishment and reward are found to be effective ways for the influential individuals to promote and stabilize cooperative behavior. By comparing the critical costs and the mean payoffs for a low multiplication factor under the role of punishment and the role of reward, it is found that reward is a more effective intervention measure than punishment for influential individuals seeking to improve cooperation and that reward leads to a higher mean payoff.

Cooperation induces other cooperation: Fruiting bodies promote the evolution of macrocysts in Dictyostelium discoideum.

Science.gov (United States)

Shibasaki, Shota; Shirokawa, Yuka; Shimada, Masakazu

2017-05-21

Biological studies of the evolution of cooperation are challenging because this process is vulnerable to cheating. Many mechanisms, including kin discrimination, spatial structure, or by-products of self-interested behaviors, can explain this evolution. Here we propose that the evolution of cooperation can be induced by other cooperation. To test this idea, we used a model organism Dictyostelium discoideum because it exhibits two cooperative dormant phases, the fruiting body and the macrocyst. In both phases, the same chemoattractant, cyclic AMP (cAMP), is used to collect cells. This common feature led us to hypothesize that the evolution of macrocyst formation would be induced by coexistence with fruiting bodies. Before forming a mathematical model, we confirmed that macrocysts coexisted with fruiting bodies, at least under laboratory conditions. Next, we analyzed our evolutionary game theory-based model to investigate whether coexistence with fruiting bodies would stabilize macrocyst formation. The model suggests that macrocyst formation represents an evolutionarily stable strategy and a global invader strategy under this coexistence, but is unstable if the model ignores the fruiting body formation. This result indicates that the evolution of macrocyst formation and maintenance is attributable to coexistence with fruiting bodies. Therefore, macrocyst evolution can be considered as an example of evolution of cooperation induced by other cooperation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Monopolizing sanctioning power under noise eliminates perverse punishment but does not increase cooperation

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Sven Fischer

2016-09-01

Full Text Available We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment. We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react.

Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Fischer, Sven; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Meier, Nicolas

2016-01-01

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react. PMID:27746725

The Neural Responses to Social Cooperation in Gain and Loss Context.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Peng Sun

Full Text Available Cooperation is pervasive and constitutes the core behavioral principle of human social life. Previous studies have revealed that mutual cooperation was reliably correlated with two reward-related brain regions, the ventral striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, this study sought to investigate how the loss and gain contexts modulated the neural responses to mutual cooperation. Twenty-five female participants were scanned when they played a series of one-shot prisoner's dilemma games in the loss and gain contexts. Specifically, participants and partners independently chose to either cooperate with each other or not, and each was awarded or deprived of (in the gain context or the loss context, respectively a sum of money which depended upon the interaction of their choices. Behavioral results indicated that participants cooperated in nearly half of the experiment trials and reported higher level of positive emotions for mutual cooperation in both contexts, but they cooperated more in the gain than in the loss context. At the neural level, stronger activities in the orbitofrontal cortex were observed for mutual cooperation compared with the other three outcomes in both contexts, while stronger activation in ventral striatum associated with mutual cooperation was observed in the gain context only. Together, our data indicated that, even in the one-shot interaction under loss context, participants still exhibited preference for cooperation and the rewarding experience from a mutually cooperative social interaction activated the ventral striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex, but the loss context weakened the association between the ventral striatum activation and mutual cooperation.

Information Behavior: A Socio-Cognitive Ability

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Amanda Spink

2007-04-01

Full Text Available How has human information behavior evolved? Our paper explores this question in the form of notions, models and theories about the relationship between information behavior and human evolution. Alexander's Ecological Dominance and Social Competition/Cooperation (EDSC model currently provides the most comprehensive overview of human traits in the development of a theory of human evolution and sociality. His model provides a basis for explaining the evolution of human socio-cognitive abilities, including ecological dominance, and social competition/cooperation. Our paper examines the human trait of information behavior as a socio-cognitive ability related to ecological dominance, and social competition/cooperation. The paper first outlines what is meant by information behavior from various interdisciplinary perspectives. We propose that information behavior is a socio-cognitive ability that is related to and enables other socio-cognitive abilities such as human ecological dominance, and social competition/cooperation. The paper reviews the current state of evolutionary approaches to information behavior and future directions for this research

Children's use of communicative intent in the selection of cooperative partners.

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Kristen A Dunfield

Full Text Available Within the animal kingdom, human cooperation represents an outlier. As such, there has been great interest across a number of fields in identifying the factors that support the complex and flexible variety of cooperation that is uniquely human. The ability to identify and preferentially interact with better social partners (partner choice is proposed to be a major factor in maintaining costly cooperation between individuals. Here we show that the ability to engage in flexible and effective partner choice behavior can be traced back to early childhood. Specifically, across two studies, we demonstrate that by 3 years of age, children identify effective communication as "helpful" (Experiments 1 & 2, reward good communicators with information (Experiment 1, and selectively reciprocate communication with diverse cooperative acts (Experiment 2. Taken together, these results suggest that even in early childhood, humans take advantage of cooperative benefits, while mitigating free-rider risks, through appropriate partner choice behavior.

Inequity aversion and the evolution of cooperation

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Ahmed, Asrar; Karlapalem, Kamalakar

2014-02-01

Evolution of cooperation is a widely studied problem in biology, social science, economics, and artificial intelligence. Most of the existing approaches that explain cooperation rely on some notion of direct or indirect reciprocity. These reciprocity based models assume agents recognize their partner and know their previous interactions, which requires advanced cognitive abilities. In this paper we are interested in developing a model that produces cooperation without requiring any explicit memory of previous game plays. Our model is based on the notion of inequity aversion, a concept introduced within behavioral economics, whereby individuals care about payoff equality in outcomes. Here we explore the effect of using income inequality to guide partner selection and interaction. We study our model by considering both the well-mixed and the spatially structured population and present the conditions under which cooperation becomes dominant. Our results support the hypothesis that inequity aversion promotes cooperative relationship among nonkin.

Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation.

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Chen Chu

Full Text Available Voluntary participation, demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to promote persistent cooperative behavior, has been extensively studied. It has also been verified that the aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule promotes the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by this well-known fact, we combine the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn updating rule with voluntary participation: Players maintain their strategies when they are satisfied, or players attempt to imitate the strategy of one randomly chosen neighbor. We find that this mechanism maintains persistent cooperative behavior, even further promotes the evolution of cooperation under certain conditions.

Spatial modes of cooperation based on bounded rationality

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Pan, Qiuhui; Wang, Lingxiao; Shi, Rongrong; Wang, Huan; He, Mingfeng

2014-12-01

Social factors, such as public opinion, values, ethics, moral standards, could guide people’s behavior to some degree. In this paper, we introduce social orientation as a motivator factor into the Nowak model, and discuss the variation of cooperation proportion under the function of motivator factor and betrayal temptation. Results show that motivator factors can promote cooperation proportion, and there is a motivator factor threshold. And a jump point is present in the value, on each side of which cooperation proportion has a small change. Reduction of betrayal temptation can also promote cooperation proportion, and there is a betrayal temptation threshold. And the value is corresponding with a jump point. And cooperation proportion changes very little on each side of the value. In addition, when betrayal temptation and motivator factor both play a role in a system, there are always cooperators and defectors in coexistence.

Market competition and efficient cooperation

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Brandts, J.; Riedl, A.M.

2016-01-01

We use laboratory experiments to study the causal effects of favorable and unfavorable competitive market experience on cooperation in a subsequent social dilemma game. The issues we study are part of the broader topic of whether there are behavioral spillovers between different spheres of social

Cooperating or competing in three languages : Cultural accommodation or alienation?

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Gargalianou, Vasiliki; Urbig, D.; van Witteloostuijn, Arjen

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of using foreign languages on cooperative behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma setting. The cultural accommodation hypothesis suggests that people are less cooperative in English, associated with the Anglophone cultural cluster, than in French,

Cooperating or competing in three languages : Cultural accommodation or alienation?

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Gargalianou, Vasiliki; Urbig, Diemo; Van Witteloostuijn, Arjen

2017-01-01

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of using foreign languages on cooperative behavior in a prisoner's dilemma setting. The cultural accommodation hypothesis suggests that people are less cooperative in English, associated with the Anglophone cultural cluster, than in French,

How feeling betrayed affects cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Ramazi, Pouria; Hessel, Jop; Cao, Ming

2015-01-01

For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.

How feeling betrayed affects cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pouria Ramazi

Full Text Available For a population of interacting self-interested agents, we study how the average cooperation level is affected by some individuals' feelings of being betrayed and guilt. We quantify these feelings as adjusted payoffs in asymmetric games, where for different emotions, the payoff matrix takes the structure of that of either a prisoner's dilemma or a snowdrift game. Then we analyze the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed population of agents, each of whom is associated with such a payoff matrix. At each time-step, an agent is randomly chosen from the population to update her strategy based on the myopic best-response update rule. According to the simulations, decreasing the feeling of being betrayed in a portion of agents does not necessarily increase the level of cooperation in the population. However, this resistance of the population against low-betrayal-level agents is effective only up to some extend that is explicitly determined by the payoff matrices and the number of agents associated with these matrices. Two other models are also considered where the betrayal factor of an agent fluctuates as a function of the number of cooperators and defectors that she encounters. Unstable behaviors are observed for the level of cooperation in these cases; however, we show that one can tune the parameters in the function to make the whole population become cooperative or defective.

Dynamic aggregation evolution of competitive societies of cooperative and noncooperative agents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lin Zhen-Quan; Ye Gao-Xiang

2013-01-01

We propose an evolution model of cooperative agent and noncooperative agent aggregates to investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors of the system and the effects of the competing microscopic reactions on the dynamic evolution. In this model, each cooperative agent and noncooperative agent are endowed with integer values of cooperative spirits and noncooperative spirits, respectively. The cooperative spirits of a cooperative agent aggregate and the noncooperative spirits of a noncooperative agent aggregate change via four competing microscopic reaction schemes: the win-win reaction between two cooperative agents, the lose-lose reaction between two noncooperative agents, the win-lose reaction between a cooperative agent and a noncooperative agent (equivalent to the migration of spirits from cooperative agents to noncooperative agents), and the cooperative agent catalyzed decline of noncooperative spirits. Based on the generalized Smoluchowski's rate equation approach, we investigate the dynamic evolution behaviors such as the total cooperative spirits of all cooperative agents and the total noncooperative spirits of all noncooperative agents. The effects of the three main groups of competition on the dynamic evolution are revealed. These include: (i) the competition between the lose-lose reaction and the win-lose reaction, which gives rise to respectively the decrease and increase in the noncooperative agent spirits; (ii) the competition between the win-win reaction and the win-lose reaction, which gives rise to respectively the increase and decrease in the cooperative agent spirits; (iii) the competition between the win-lose reaction and the catalyzed-decline reaction, which gives rise to respectively the increase and decrease in the noncooperative agent spirits. (interdisciplinary physics and related areas of science and technology)

Oxytocin is associated with infant-care behavior and motivation in cooperatively breeding marmoset monkeys.

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Finkenwirth, Christa; Martins, Eloisa; Deschner, Tobias; Burkart, Judith M

2016-04-01

The neurohormone oxytocin (OT) is positively involved in the regulation of parenting and social bonding in mammals, and may thus also be important for the mediation of alloparental care. In cooperatively breeding marmosets, infants are raised in teamwork by parents and adult and sub-adult non-reproductive helpers (usually older siblings). Despite high intrinsic motivation, which may be mediated by hormonal priming, not all individuals are always equally able to contribute to infant-care due to competition among care-takers. Among the various care-taking behaviors, proactive food sharing may reflect motivational levels best, since it can be performed ad libitum by several individuals even if competition among surplus care-takers constrains access to infants. Our aim was to study the link between urinary OT levels and care-taking behaviors in group-living marmosets, while taking affiliation with other adults and infant age into account. Over eight reproductive cycles, 26 individuals were monitored for urinary baseline OT, care-taking behaviors (baby-licking, -grooming, -carrying, and proactive food sharing), and adult-directed affiliation. Mean OT levels were generally highest in female breeders and OT increased significantly in all individuals after birth. During early infancy, high urinary OT levels were associated with increased infant-licking but low levels of adult-affiliation, and during late infancy, with increased proactive food sharing. Our results show that, in marmoset parents and alloparents, OT is positively involved in the regulation of care-taking, thereby reflecting the changing needs during infant development. This particularly included behaviors that are more likely to reflect intrinsic care motivation, suggesting a positive link between OT and motivational regulation of infant-care. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Unto Others: Illustrating the Human Capacity for Cooperation

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Morris, J. Andrew; Urbanski, John; Hunt, Jason

2011-01-01

Research in both evolutionary economics and evolutionary psychology provides strong evidence that human behavior can be, and is, a complex mix of hedonism and altruism with a strong inclination toward cooperation under certain conditions. In this article, behavioral assumptions made in mainstream business theory are compared and contrasted with…

Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ardi Tampuu

Full Text Available Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments.

Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning

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Kodelja, Dorian; Kuzovkin, Ilya; Korjus, Kristjan; Aru, Juhan; Aru, Jaan; Vicente, Raul

2017-01-01

Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments. PMID:28380078

Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning.

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Tampuu, Ardi; Matiisen, Tambet; Kodelja, Dorian; Kuzovkin, Ilya; Korjus, Kristjan; Aru, Juhan; Aru, Jaan; Vicente, Raul

2017-01-01

Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments.

Exploring the limits of cooperative phenomena using complex plasmas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schwabe, M.; Zhdanov, S.; Ivlev, A. V.; Thomas, H. M.; Morfill, G. E.

2011-01-01

With the advancing miniaturization of technological applications, processes on the mesoscale become increasingly important. This is the scale where the individual movement of particles transforms into cooperative behavior-behavior that cannot be explained by investigating the motion of individual particles alone.Complex plasmas are ideally suited to study the limits of cooperative behavior. The time scales of the dynamics of the microparticles embedded in the plasma are such that their movement can be fully resolved, and an investigation on the atomistic (kinetic) level is possible. In addition, complex plasmas can be considered a model system for ordinary fluids: The internal microparticle dynamics is basically undamped and is characterized by the similarity parameters matching those of other fluids. This similarity does not break down even at small scales: For instance, in [2], microparticle droplets comprised of only a few 1000-10000 particles were examined. In these experiments, the Weber number (the ratio of inertia to surface tension forces) matches that of falling water drops. As another example, the onset of a Rayleigh-Taylor instability in a complex plasma can be described by the ordinary dispersion relation, even at scales of only few particle layers. This allows investigating the 'nanoscale' of fluid flows, and, hence, the limits of cooperative behavior.

Adolescents' responses to marital conflict: The role of cooperative marital conflict.

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Zhou, Nan; Buehler, Cheryl

2017-10-01

Not all youth exposed to hostile marital interactions develop negative responses to marital conflict. Cooperative marital conflict has long been considered as an important way of managing conflict and may serve as an important context in which hostility might convey during marital interactions. In light of little prior attention placed on the positive side of conflict processes, the main and moderating effects of cooperative marital conflict on youth responses to marital conflict were examined in a sample of 416 2-parent families using a multimethod, 2-year prospective design. Cooperative marital conflict was associated with decreases in youth emotional dysregulation, perceived threat, and behavioral dysregulation, and increases in constructive family representations and coping efficacy. As a specific dimension of cooperation, effective conflict resolution was associated uniquely with elevated youth coping efficacy, and decreased emotional and behavioral dysregulation; marital warmth was associated uniquely with increased constructive family representations. Significant interactions between marital hostility and marital cooperation also were found. These findings highlight the importance of examining cooperation above and beyond hostility in studies of marital conflict in order to better understand youth development during early adolescence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations.

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Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert

2004-02-01

How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low level of genetic relatedness among group members? We suggest that many humans have a predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial norms, even when this imposes a fitness cost on the punisher. Such altruistic punishment is widely observed to sustain high levels of cooperation in behavioral experiments and in natural settings. We offer a model of cooperation and punishment that we call STRONG RECIPROCITY: where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, strong reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators, even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group members, such as selfish agents who violate the norm and do not punish, and pure cooperators who adhere to the norm but free-ride by never punishing. Our agent-based simulations show that, under assumptions approximating likely human environments over the 100000 years prior to the domestication of animals and plants, the proliferation of strong reciprocators when initially rare is highly likely, and that substantial frequencies of all three behavioral types can be sustained in a population. As a result, high levels of cooperation are sustained. Our results do not require that group members be related or that group extinctions occur.

Attractiveness and Cooperation in Social Exchange

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Chisato Takahashi

2006-01-01

Full Text Available We tested the hypothesis that physically more attractive men are less likely to cooperate in social exchange than less attractive men, while physical attractiveness has no effect on women's tendency toward cooperation, with four different experimental games (Prisoner's Dilemma with 99 players, Allocator Choice with 77 players, Faith with 16 players, and Trust with 21 players. Pictures of the game players were taken after they participated in one of the four games, and those pictures were presented to another set of participants (85 raters in Study 1 and 2, 36 raters in Study 3 for attractiveness ratings. Both male and female raters who were unaware of the photographed game players' actual behavior in the game judged the faces of male defectors (who defected in one of the four games to be more attractive than those of male cooperators, but they did not give differential attractiveness ratings to female defectors and female cooperators.

Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory

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Chalkiadakis, Georgios; Wooldridge, Michael

2011-01-01

Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representation

Cooperation percolation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Han-Xin; Rong, Zhihai; Wang, Wen-Xu

2014-01-01

The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that the cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective in protecting the cooperators against the invasion of defectors, we continue to lack the condition for the formation of a giant cooperator cluster that ensures the prevalence of cooperation in a system. Here, we study the dynamical organization of the cooperator clusters in spatial prisoner's dilemma game to offer the condition for the dominance of cooperation, finding that a phase transition characterized by the emergence of a large spanning cooperator cluster occurs when the initial fraction of the cooperators exceeds a certain threshold. Interestingly, the phase transition belongs to different universality classes of percolation determined by the temptation to defect b. Specifically, on square lattices, 1 < b < 4/3 leads to a phase transition pertaining to the class of regular site percolation, whereas 3/2 < b < 2 gives rise to a phase transition subject to invasion percolation with trapping. Our findings offer a deeper understanding of cooperative behavior in nature and society. (paper)

Diversity and Cooperation

OpenAIRE

Bruner, Justin Pearce

2014-01-01

The present dissertation is an exploration of the effect of diversity on social contract formation and the evolution of cooperation. This work stems from the pioneering efforts of economist Arthur Robson, who first explored the role of costless pre-game communication in strategic interactions. When communication is permitted, individuals playing a game can condition their behavior on the signal received from their counterpart. For my purposes, I interpret these signals as racial markers or cu...

Personality and Prosocial Behavior

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hilbig, Benjamin E; Glöckner, Andreas; Zettler, Ingo

2014-01-01

Concerning the dispositional determinants of prosocial behavior and cooperation, work based on the classic 5 personality factors, and especially Agreeableness, has turned out somewhat inconsistent. A clearer picture has emerged from consideration of the HEXACO model of personality-though supported......-Humility (and certain aspects of five-factor Agreeableness) account for prosocial behavior-thus explaining previous inconsistencies and providing a more nuanced understanding of the links between basic personality and prosocial or cooperative behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)....

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making.

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Declerck, Carolyn H; Boone, Christophe; Emonds, Griet

2013-02-01

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Minefield Mapping Using Cooperative Multirobot Systems

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Alaa Khamis

2012-01-01

Full Text Available This paper presents a team-theoretic approach to cooperative multirobot systems. The individual actions of the robots are controlled by the Belief-Desire-Intention model to endow the robots with the know-how needed to execute these actions deliberately. The cooperative behaviors between the heterogeneous robots are governed by the Team-Log theory to endow all the robots in the team with the know-how-to-cooperate and determine the team members’ commitments to each other despite their different types, properties, and goals. The proposed approach is tested for validity with the real life problem of minefield mapping. Different minefield sweeping strategies are studied to control the mobility of the mobile sweepers within the minefield in order to maximize the area coverage and improve picture compilation capability of the multirobot system.

Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust.

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Saavedra, Serguei; Smith, David; Reed-Tsochas, Felix

2010-10-27

Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating) does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors.

Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Serguei Saavedra

Full Text Available Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors.

Cooperation between referees and authors increases peer review accuracy.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jeffrey T Leek

Full Text Available Peer review is fundamentally a cooperative process between scientists in a community who agree to review each other's work in an unbiased fashion. Peer review is the foundation for decisions concerning publication in journals, awarding of grants, and academic promotion. Here we perform a laboratory study of open and closed peer review based on an online game. We show that when reviewer behavior was made public under open review, reviewers were rewarded for refereeing and formed significantly more cooperative interactions (13% increase in cooperation, P = 0.018. We also show that referees and authors who participated in cooperative interactions had an 11% higher reviewing accuracy rate (P = 0.016. Our results suggest that increasing cooperation in the peer review process can lead to a decreased risk of reviewing errors.

Cooperative networks overcoming defectors by social influence

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Gomez Portillo, Ignacio

2014-01-01

We address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the prisoner’s dilemma game as a metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation capacity. We present a new strategy update rule called democratic weighted update where the individual’s behavior is socially influenced by each one of their neighbors. In particular, the capacity of an individual to socially influence other ones is proportional to its accumulated payoff. When in a neighborhood there are cooperators and defectors, the focal player is contradictorily influenced by them and, therefore, the effective social influence is given by the difference of the accumulated payoff of each strategy in its neighborhood. First, by considering the growing process of the network and neglecting mutations, we show the evolution of highly cooperative systems. Then, we broadly show that the social influence allows to overcome the emergence of defectors into highly cooperative systems. In this way, we conclude that in a structured system formed by a growing process, the cooperation evolves if the individuals have an imitation capacity socially influenced by each one of their neighbors. Therefore, here we present a theoretical solution of the cooperation problem among genetically unrelated individuals.

Selective Cooperation in the Supermarket : Field Experimental Evidence for Indirect Reciprocity.

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Lange, Florian; Eggert, Frank

2015-12-01

Numerous laboratory experiments suggest that mechanisms of indirect reciprocity might account for human cooperation. However, conclusive field data supporting the predictions of indirect reciprocity in everyday life situations is still scarce. Here, we attempt to compensate for this lack by examining the determinants of cooperative behavior in a German supermarket. Our methods were as follows: Confederates of the experimenter lined up at the checkout, apparently to buy a single item. As an act of cooperation, the waiting person in front (the potential helper) could allow the confederate to go ahead. By this means, the potential helper could take a cost (additional waiting time) by providing the confederate with a benefit (saved waiting time). We recorded the potential helpers' behavior and the number of items they purchased as a quantitative measure proportional to the confederate's benefit. Moreover, in a field experimental design, we varied the confederates' image by manipulating the item they purchased (beer vs. water). As predicted, the more waiting time they could save, the more likely the confederates were to receive cooperation. This relationship was moderated by the confederates' image. Cost-to-benefit ratios were required to be more favorable for beer-purchasing individuals to receive cooperation. Our results demonstrate that everyday human cooperation can be studied unobtrusively in the field and that cooperation among strangers is selective in a way that is consistent with current models of indirect reciprocity.

Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of Social Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation.

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Rand, David G

2016-09-01

Does cooperating require the inhibition of selfish urges? Or does "rational" self-interest constrain cooperative impulses? I investigated the role of intuition and deliberation in cooperation by meta-analyzing 67 studies in which cognitive-processing manipulations were applied to economic cooperation games (total N = 17,647; no indication of publication bias using Egger's test, Begg's test, or p-curve). My meta-analysis was guided by the social heuristics hypothesis, which proposes that intuition favors behavior that typically maximizes payoffs, whereas deliberation favors behavior that maximizes one's payoff in the current situation. Therefore, this theory predicts that deliberation will undermine pure cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where there are few future consequences for one's actions, such that cooperating is not in one's self-interest) but not strategic cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where cooperating can maximize one's payoff). As predicted, the meta-analysis revealed 17.3% more pure cooperation when intuition was promoted over deliberation, but no significant difference in strategic cooperation between more intuitive and more deliberative conditions. © The Author(s) 2016.

Cooperation, networks and emotions: Three essays in behavioral economics

NARCIS (Netherlands)

van Leeuwen, B.

2015-01-01

This thesis contains three essays that study how people behave in a social context. The first two essays are on cooperation and networks. Chapter 2 investigates a mechanism to facilitate public good provision in networks. It relies on the idea that people compete for attractive network positions (or

Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas.

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Jeremy Cone

Full Text Available What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy. Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas.

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Cone, Jeremy; Rand, David G

2014-01-01

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

Social memory, social stress, and economic behaviors

OpenAIRE

Taiki Takahashi

2005-01-01

Social memory plays a pivotal role in social behaviors, from mating behaviors to cooperative behaviors based on reciprocal altruism. More specifically, social/person recognition memory is supposed, by behavioral-economic and game-theoretic analysis, to be required for tit- for-tat like cooperative behaviors to evolve under the N-person iterated prisoner fs dilemma game condition. Meanwhile, humans are known to show a social stress response during face-to-face social interactions, which might ...

Cooperation, cheating, and collapse in microbial populations

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Gore, Jeff

2012-02-01

Natural populations can suffer catastrophic collapse in response to small changes in environmental conditions, and recovery after such a collapse can be exceedingly difficult. We have used laboratory yeast populations to study proposed early warning signals of impending extinction. Yeast cooperatively breakdown the sugar sucrose, meaning that there is a minimum number of cells required to sustain the population. We have demonstrated experimentally that the fluctuations in the population size increase in magnitude and become slower as the population approaches collapse. The cooperative nature of yeast growth on sucrose suggests that the population may be susceptible to cheater cells, which do not contribute to the public good and instead merely take advantage of the cooperative cells. We have confirmed this possibility experimentally by using a cheater yeast strain that lacks the gene encoding the cooperative behavior [1]. However, recent results in the lab demonstrate that the presence of a bacterial competitor may drive cooperation within the yeast population.[4pt] [1] Gore et al, Nature 459, 253 -- 256 (2009)

Evolution of Cooperation in Adaptive Social Networks

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Segbroeck, Sven Van; Santos, Francisco C.; Traulsen, Arne; Lenaerts, Tom; Pacheco, Jorge M.

Humans are organized in societies, a phenomenon that would never have been possible without the evolution of cooperative behavior. Several mechanisms that foster this evolution have been unraveled over the years, with population structure as a prominent promoter of cooperation. Modern networks of exchange and cooperation are, however, becoming increasingly volatile, and less and less based on long-term stable structure. Here, we address how this change of paradigm aspects the evolution of cooperation. We discuss analytical and numerical models in which individuals can break social ties and create new ones. Interactions are modeled as two-player dilemmas of cooperation. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. This individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones can effectively change the nature of the game. We address random formation of new links and local linking rules as well as different individual capacities to maintain social interactions. We conclude by discussing how adaptive social networks can become an important step towards more realistic models of cultural dynamics.

Cooperation, norms, and revolutions: a unified game-theoretical approach.

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Dirk Helbing

Full Text Available BACKGROUND: Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. METHODOLOGY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors. These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE: Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well.

Multiple UAV Cooperation for Wildfire Monitoring

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Lin, Zhongjie

Wildfires have been a major factor in the development and management of the world's forest. An accurate assessment of wildfire status is imperative for fire management. This thesis is dedicated to the topic of utilizing multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to cooperatively monitor a large-scale wildfire. This is achieved through wildfire spreading situation estimation based on on-line measurements and wise cooperation strategy to ensure efficiency. First, based on the understanding of the physical characteristics of the wildfire propagation behavior, a wildfire model and a Kalman filter-based method are proposed to estimate the wildfire rate of spread and the fire front contour profile. With the enormous on-line measurements from on-board sensors of UAVs, the proposed method allows a wildfire monitoring mission to benefit from on-line information updating, increased flexibility, and accurate estimation. An independent wildfire simulator is utilized to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. Second, based on the filter analysis, wildfire spreading situation and vehicle dynamics, the influence of different cooperation strategies of UAVs to the overall mission performance is studied. The multi-UAV cooperation problem is formulated in a distributed network. A consensus-based method is proposed to help address the problem. The optimal cooperation strategy of UAVs is obtained through mathematical analysis. The derived optimal cooperation strategy is then verified in an independent fire simulation environment to verify its effectiveness.

Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation.

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Okada, Daijiro; Bingham, Paul M

2008-07-21

Humans are unique among all species of terrestrial history in both ecological dominance and individual properties. Many, or perhaps all, of the unique elements of this nonpareil status can be plausibly interpreted as evolutionary and strategic elements and consequences of the unprecedented intensity and scale of our social cooperation. Convincing explanation of this unique human social adaptation remains a central, unmet challenge to the scientific enterprise. We develop a hypothesis for the ancestral origin of expanded cooperative social behavior. Specifically, we present a game theoretic analysis demonstrating that a specific pattern of expanded social cooperation between conspecific individuals with conflicts of interest (including non-kin) can be strategically viable, but only in animals that possess a highly unusual capacity for conspecific violence (credible threat) having very specific properties that dramatically reduce the costs of coercive violence. The resulting reduced costs allow preemptive or compensated coercion to be an instantaneously self-interested behavior under diverse circumstances rather than in rare, idiosyncratic circumstances as in actors (animals) who do not have access to inexpensive coercive threat. Humans are apparently unique among terrestrial organisms in having evolved conspecific coercive capabilities that fulfill these stringent requirements. Thus, our results support the proposal that access to a novel capacity for projection of coercive threat might represent the essential initiating event for the evolution of a human-like pattern of social cooperation and the subsequent evolution of the diverse features of human uniqueness. Empirical evidence indicates that these constraints were, in fact, met only in our evolutionary lineage. The logic for the emergence of uniquely human cooperation suggested by our analysis apparently accounts simply for the human fossil record.

Cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game on interdependent networks

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Luo, Chao; Zhang, Xiaolin; Liu, Hong; Shao, Rui

2016-05-01

Memory or so-called experience normally plays the important role to guide the human behaviors in real world, that is essential for rational decisions made by individuals. Hence, when the evolutionary behaviors of players with bounded rationality are investigated, it is reasonable to make an assumption that players in system are with limited memory. Besides, in order to unravel the intricate variability of complex systems in real world and make a highly integrative understanding of their dynamics, in recent years, interdependent networks as a comprehensive network structure have obtained more attention in this community. In this article, the evolution of cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on interdependent networks composed by two coupled square lattices is studied. Herein, all or part of players are endowed with finite memory ability, and we focus on the mutual influence of memory effect and interdependent network reciprocity on cooperation of spatial PDG. We show that the density of cooperation can be significantly promoted within an optimal region of memory length and interdependent strength. Furthermore, distinguished by whether having memory ability/external links or not, each kind of players on networks would have distinct evolutionary behaviors. Our work could be helpful to understand the emergence and maintenance of cooperation under the evolution of memory-based players on interdependent networks.

A Cooperative Learning Classroom Intervention for Increasing Peer's Acceptance of Children With ADHD.

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Capodieci, Agnese; Rivetti, Thomas; Cornoldi, Cesare

2016-08-31

The hypothesis behind this study was that trained teachers using cooperative learning procedures with children in their classroom (aged from 6 to 10 years) can influence the social skills of children with ADHD symptoms and their acceptance by their peers. The study involved 30 children with ADHD symptoms attending 12 different classes, where cooperative learning was adopted in some, and standard practices in others. ADHD children's symptoms, social skills, and cooperative behavior were assessed by means of a teacher's questionnaire, and the social preferences of the children in their class were collected. Changes emerged in teachers' assessments of the children's cooperative behavior in the experimental classes. Improvements in the sociometric status of children with ADHD symptoms were only seen in the cooperative learning classes. These results show the importance of well-structured intervention in classes that include children with ADHD symptoms. Implications of these findings for future intervention are discussed. © The Author(s) 2016.

Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

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Liu, Yongkui; Zhang, Lin; Chen, Xiaojie; Ren, Lei; Wang, Long

2013-09-01

In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational individual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significantly promoted when individuals’ cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations.

Is cooperation viable in mobile organisms? Simple Walk Away rule favors the evolution of cooperation in groups

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Aktipis, C. Athena

2011-01-01

The evolution of cooperation through partner choice mechanisms is often thought to involve relatively complex cognitive abilities. Using agent-based simulations I model a simple partner choice rule, the ‘Walk Away’ rule, where individuals stay in groups that provide higher returns (by virtue of having more cooperators), and ‘Walk Away’ from groups providing low returns. Implementing this conditional movement rule in a public goods game leads to a number of interesting findings: 1) cooperators have a selective advantage when thresholds are high, corresponding to low tolerance for defectors, 2) high thresholds lead to high initial rates of movement and low final rates of movement (after selection), and 3) as cooperation is selected, the population undergoes a spatial transition from high migration (and a many small and ephemeral groups) to low migration (and large and stable groups). These results suggest that the very simple ‘Walk Away’ rule of leaving uncooperative groups can favor the evolution of cooperation, and that cooperation can evolve in populations in which individuals are able to move in response to local social conditions. A diverse array of organisms are able to leave degraded physical or social environments. The ubiquitous nature of conditional movement suggests that ‘Walk Away’ dynamics may play an important role in the evolution of social behavior in both cognitively complex and cognitively simple organisms. PMID:21666771

The Impact of the Depth of Cooperation in Establishing Regional Economic Cooperatives in Szekelyland

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Ferenc Ilyés

2015-10-01

Full Text Available The thesis of the research: The apparition and operation of regional economic partnerships is a precondition of regional cooperation. In the society of our age it is of major importance to strengthen the communities’ values, which represent belonging, standing and last but not least financial security. This supposition can be taken as a general statement, but it is essential from the point of view of Szekely people’s picture about future, and has its part in finding ourselves. Building a community does not only mean sharing the same values and thoughts, but can also mean a common resource management in case the participants would like a joint utilization of values. A condition for this is cooperation, depending on the attitude of people with different behavior and value system. The topic has been dealt with by several researchers in the last few years, thus substantially contributing to the development of communities by highlighting those problematic areas, which supposingly influence contribution in each community. To get to know these areas I have conducted a study in the region of Udvarhely, from the results of this I have stated real conclusions, which are preconditions of the appearance of the cooperation and operation of economical cooperation in Szekelyland.

Athletes Perception of Coaches’ Leadership Style and Tendency to Cooperate among Competitive Teams

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João Lameiras

Full Text Available Abstract The purpose of the present study was to discover the relationships between athletes’ perceived coach behaviors during training and competition, and cooperation via Bayesian network (BN. Professional male atheletes from several team sports (N = 158 completed the Portuguese version of the Leadership Scale for Sport and the Questionário de Cooperação Desportiva to assess cooperation. Relationships were identified between perceived coach behaviors in training and competition environments and with athletes tendency to cooperate. Overall, the findings support that in sports, coaching behaviours congruent with the athletes’ individual needs and adapted to the situational demands may promote prosocial behaviour.

Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks

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Battiston, Federico; Perc, Matjaž; Latora, Vito

2017-07-01

Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework within network science that allows us to mathematically describe the rich structure of interactions characterizing human societies. While research has shown that multiplex networks may enhance the resilience of cooperation, the interplay between the overlap in the structure of the layers and the control parameters of the corresponding games has not yet been investigated. With this aim, we consider here the public goods game on a multiplex network, and we unveil the role of the number of layers and the overlap of links, as well as the impact of different synergy factors in different layers, on the onset of cooperation. We show that enhanced public cooperation emerges only when a significant edge overlap is combined with at least one layer being able to sustain some cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. In the absence of either of these conditions, the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks is determined by the bounds of traditional network reciprocity with no enhanced resilience. These results caution against overly optimistic predictions that the presence of multiple social domains may in itself promote cooperation, and they help us better understand the complexity behind prosocial behavior in layered social systems.

Cooperative SIS epidemics can lead to abrupt outbreaks

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Ghanbarnejad, Fakhteh; Chen, Li; Cai, Weiran; Grassberger, Peter

2015-03-01

In this paper, we study spreading of two cooperative SIS epidemics in mean field approximations and also within an agent based framework. Therefore we investigate dynamics on different topologies like Erdos-Renyi networks and regular lattices. We show that cooperativity of two diseases can lead to strongly first order outbreaks, while the dynamics still might present some scaling laws typical for second order phase transitions. We argue how topological network features might be related to this interesting hybrid behaviors.

Graceful degradation of cooperative adaptive cruise control

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Ploeg, J.; Semsar-Kazerooni, E.; Lijster, G.; Wouw, N. van de; Nijmeijer, H.

2015-01-01

Cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) employs wireless intervehicle communication, in addition to onboard sensors, to obtain string-stable vehicle-following behavior at small intervehicle distances. As a consequence, however, CACC is vulnerable to communication impairments such as latency and

Spurious cooperativity in alkylated succinic acids

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Ben-Naim, A.

1998-03-01

The proton-proton correlation, as measured by the ratio between the second and the first dissociation constants of dibasic acid, is sometimes very large and far beyond what could be explained by electrostatic theories. We propose a novel interpretation of this phenomenon based on the idea of spurious cooperativity. The general theoretical framework underlying the onset of spurious cooperativity is developed first. The basic result is that whenever a binding (or dissociating) two-site (or more) system splits into a mixture of noninterconverting isomers the binding isotherm (or the titration curve) behaves as if it is more negatively cooperative compared with the genuine cooperativities of the individual isomer. The theory is applied to a specific system of α-α' dialkyl succinic acid. It is known that the Meso form of these alkylated derivatives show a normal correlation of the same order of magnitude as in succinic acid. On the other hand, the Racemic form of these alkylated derivatives shows anomalous strong negative correlations when the alkyl groups become large (e.g., isopropyl and tert butyl). It is shown that the theory of spurious cooperativity can explain the different behavior of the Racemic and the Meso forms, as well as the onset of anomalous strong negative correlations when the alkyl groups become large.

Cooperativity Leads to Temporally-Correlated Fluctuations in the Bacteriophage Lambda Genetic Switch

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Jacob Quinn Shenker

2015-04-01

Full Text Available Cooperative interactions are widespread in biochemical networks, providing the nonlinear response that underlies behavior such as ultrasensitivity and robust switching. We introduce a temporal correlation function—the conditional activity—to study the behavior of these phenomena. Applying it to the bistable genetic switch in bacteriophage lambda, we find that cooperative binding between binding sites on the prophage DNA lead to non-Markovian behavior, as quantified by the conditional activity. Previously, the conditional activity has been used to predict allosteric pathways in proteins; here, we show that it identifies the rare unbinding events which underlie induction from lysogeny to lysis.

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

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Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir

2009-12-01

Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

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Sintayehu Dehnie

2009-01-01

Full Text Available Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

No place to hide: when shame causes proselfs to cooperate.

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Declerck, Carolyn Henriette; Boone, Christophe; Kiyonari, Toko

2014-01-01

Shame is considered a social emotion with action tendencies that elicit socially beneficial behavior. Yet, unlike other social emotions, prior experimental studies do not indicate that incidental shame boosts prosocial behavior. Based on the affect as information theory, we hypothesize that incidental feelings of shame can increase cooperation, but only for self-interested individuals, and only in a context where shame is relevant with regards to its action tendency. To test this hypothesis, cooperation levels are compared between a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma (where "defect" may result from multiple motives) and a sequential prisoner's dilemma (where "second player defect" is the result of intentional greediness). As hypothesized, shame positively affected proselfs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Hence ashamed proselfs become inclined to cooperate when they believe they have no way to hide their greediness, and not necessarily because they want to make up for earlier wrong-doing.

The decline of cooperation, the rise of competition: developmental effects of long-term social change in Mexico.

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García, Camilo; Rivera, Natanael; Greenfield, Patricia M

2015-02-01

Using Greenfield's theory of sociocultural change and human development as a point of departure, we carried out two experimental studies exploring the implications of decades of globalised social change in Mexico for children's development of cooperation and competition. In rural San Vicente, Baja California, the baseline was 1970 and the historical comparison took place 40 years later. In Veracruz, the baseline was 1985 and the historical comparison took place 20 years later. In Veracruz, children were tested in both rural and urban settings. We hypothesized that cooperative behavior would decrease in all three settings as a result of the sociocultural transformations of the past decades in Mexico. The Madsen Marble Pull Game was used to assess cooperative and competitive behavior. As predicted by Greenfield's theory of social change and human development, the Marble Pull procedure revealed a striking decrease over time in levels of cooperative behavior, with a corresponding rise in competitive behavior, in all three settings. © 2015 International Union of Psychological Science.

The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions.

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Helbing, Dirk; Yu, Wenjian

2009-03-10

According to Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan [1651; 2008 (Touchstone, New York), English Ed], "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," and it would need powerful social institutions to establish social order. In reality, however, social cooperation can also arise spontaneously, based on local interactions rather than centralized control. The self-organization of cooperative behavior is particularly puzzling for social dilemmas related to sharing natural resources or creating common goods. Such situations are often described by the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we report the sudden outbreak of predominant cooperation in a noisy world dominated by selfishness and defection, when individuals imitate superior strategies and show success-driven migration. In our model, individuals are unrelated, and do not inherit behavioral traits. They defect or cooperate selfishly when the opportunity arises, and they do not know how often they will interact or have interacted with someone else. Moreover, our individuals have no reputation mechanism to form friendship networks, nor do they have the option of voluntary interaction or costly punishment. Therefore, the outbreak of prevailing cooperation, when directed motion is integrated in a game-theoretical model, is remarkable, particularly when random strategy mutations and random relocations challenge the formation and survival of cooperative clusters. Our results suggest that mobility is significant for the evolution of social order, and essential for its stabilization and maintenance.

Inducing Peer Pressure to Promote Cooperation

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Mani, Ankur; Rahwan, Iyad; Pentland, Alex

2013-04-01

Cooperation in a large society of self-interested individuals is notoriously difficult to achieve when the externality of one individual's action is spread thin and wide on the whole society. This leads to the `tragedy of the commons' in which rational action will ultimately make everyone worse-off. Traditional policies to promote cooperation involve Pigouvian taxation or subsidies that make individuals internalize the externality they incur. We introduce a new approach to achieving global cooperation by localizing externalities to one's peers in a social network, thus leveraging the power of peer-pressure to regulate behavior. The mechanism relies on a joint model of externalities and peer-pressure. Surprisingly, this mechanism can require a lower budget to operate than the Pigouvian mechanism, even when accounting for the social cost of peer pressure. Even when the available budget is very low, the social mechanisms achieve greater improvement in the outcome.

Inducing peer pressure to promote cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Mani, Ankur; Rahwan, Iyad; Pentland, Alex

2013-01-01

Cooperation in a large society of self-interested individuals is notoriously difficult to achieve when the externality of one individual's action is spread thin and wide on the whole society. This leads to the 'tragedy of the commons' in which rational action will ultimately make everyone worse-off. Traditional policies to promote cooperation involve Pigouvian taxation or subsidies that make individuals internalize the externality they incur. We introduce a new approach to achieving global cooperation by localizing externalities to one's peers in a social network, thus leveraging the power of peer-pressure to regulate behavior. The mechanism relies on a joint model of externalities and peer-pressure. Surprisingly, this mechanism can require a lower budget to operate than the Pigouvian mechanism, even when accounting for the social cost of peer pressure. Even when the available budget is very low, the social mechanisms achieve greater improvement in the outcome.

Cooperative Networks: Altruism, Group Solidarity, Reciprocity, and Sanctioning in Ugandan Producer Organizations.

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Baldassarri, Delia

2015-09-01

Repeated interaction and social networks are commonly considered viable solutions to collective action problems. This article identifies and systematically measures four general mechanisms--that is, generalized altruism, group solidarity, reciprocity, and the threat of sanctioning--and tests which of them brings about cooperation in the context of Ugandan producer organizations. Using an innovative methodological framework that combines "lab-in-the-field" experiments with survey interviews and complete social networks data, the article goes beyond the assessment of a relationship between social networks and collective outcomes to study the mechanisms that favor cooperative behavior. The article first establishes a positive relationship between position in the network structure and propensity to cooperate in the producer organization and then uses farmers' behavior in dictator and public goods games to test different mechanisms that may account for such a relationship. Results show that cooperation is induced by patterns of reciprocity that emerge through repeated interaction rather than other-regarding preferences like altruism or group solidarity.

Cooperative spreading processes in multiplex networks.

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Wei, Xiang; Chen, Shihua; Wu, Xiaoqun; Ning, Di; Lu, Jun-An

2016-06-01

This study is concerned with the dynamic behaviors of epidemic spreading in multiplex networks. A model composed of two interacting complex networks is proposed to describe cooperative spreading processes, wherein the virus spreading in one layer can penetrate into the other to promote the spreading process. The global epidemic threshold of the model is smaller than the epidemic thresholds of the corresponding isolated networks. Thus, global epidemic onset arises in the interacting networks even though an epidemic onset does not arise in each isolated network. Simulations verify the analysis results and indicate that cooperative spreading processes in multiplex networks enhance the final infection fraction.

Cooperative particle motion in complex (dusty) plasmas

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Zhdanov, Sergey; Morfill, Gregor

2014-05-01

Strongly coupled complex (dusty) plasmas give us a unique opportunity to go beyond the limits of continuous media and study various generic processes occurring in liquids or solids at the kinetic level. A particularly interesting and challenging topic is to study dynamic cooperativity at local and intermediate scales. As an important element of self-organization, cooperative particle motion is present in many physical, astrophysical and biological systems. As a rule, cooperative dynamics, bringing to life 'abnormal' effects like enhanced diffusion, self-dragging, or self-propelling of particles, hold aspects of 'strange' kinetics. The synergy effects are also important. Such kind of cooperative behavior was evidenced for string-like formations of colloidal rods, dynamics of mono- and di-vacancies in 2d colloidal crystals. Externally manipulated 'dust molecules' and self-assembled strings in driven 3d particle clusters were other noticeable examples. There is a certain advantage to experiment with complex plasmas merely because these systems are easy to manipulate in a controllable way. We report on the first direct observation of microparticle cooperative movements occurring under natural conditions in a 2d complex plasma.

Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects

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Guangdong Wu

2017-07-01

Full Text Available Considering the cooperative relationship between owners and contractors in sustainable construction projects, as well as the synergistic effects created by cooperative behaviors, a cooperative incentive model was developed using game theory. The model was formulated and analyzed under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations. Then, a numerical simulation and example were proposed to verify the conclusions derived from the model. The results showed that the synergistic effect increases the input intensity of one party’s resource transfer into the increase of marginal utility of the other party, thus the owner and contractor are willing to enhance their levels of effort. One party’s optimal benefit allocation coefficient is positively affected by its own output efficiency, and negatively affected by the other party’s output efficiency. The effort level and expected benefits of the owner and contractor can be improved by enhancing the cooperative relationship between the two parties, as well as enhancing the net benefits of a sustainable construction project. The synergistic effect cannot lower the negative effect of moral hazard behaviors during the implementation of sustainable construction projects. Conversely, the higher levels of the cooperative relationship, the wider the gaps amongst the optimal values under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations for the levels of effort, expected benefits and net project benefits. Since few studies to date have emphasized the effects of cooperative relationship on sustainable construction projects, this study constructed a game-based incentive model to bridge the gaps. This study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights into the management of cooperation amongst stakeholders, and into the enhancement of the overall benefits of sustainable construction projects.

Emotional decisions in structured populations for the evolution of public cooperation

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Wang, Yongjie; Chen, Tong; Chen, Qiao; Si, Guangrun

2017-02-01

The behaviors of humans are not always profit-driven in public goods games (PGG). In addition, social preference and decision-making might be influenced, even changed by heuristics and conformity in the real life. Motivated by the facts, we would like to investigate the role of emotional system in cooperative behaviors of structured population in PGG. Meantime, the effects of diffusion of influence are studied in structured population. Numerical simulation results are indicated that emotions play very significant role indeed in emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations in PGG. However, the influences of emotions on others are limited due to diminishing of influence diffusion and the existence of pure defectors. What is more, conformity, to some extent, could drive potentially more people to accept cooperative strategy with higher probability. Higher-level cooperation could be promoted as increasing values of synergy factors, but while the effects might diminish gradually as increasing number of positive heuristic players and conformist. Our work may be beneficial to address the social dilemmas in PGG.

Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.

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Bear, Adam; Rand, David G

2016-01-26

Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation's proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner's dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.

Monopolizing sanctioning power under noise eliminates perverse punishment but does not increase cooperation

OpenAIRE

Sven Fischer; Kristoffel Grechenig; Nicolas Meier

2016-01-01

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators ...

Swarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperation

OpenAIRE

Duan, Haibin; Sun, Changhao

2014-01-01

Many hostile scenarios exist in real-life situations, where cooperation is disfavored and the collective behavior needs intervention for system efficiency improvement. Towards this end, the framework of soft control provides a powerful tool by introducing controllable agents called shills, who are allowed to follow well-designed updating rules for varying missions. Inspired by swarm intelligence emerging from flocks of birds, we explore here the dependence of the evolution of cooperation on s...

Developing Digital Dashboard Management for Learning System Dynamic Cooperative Simulation Behavior of Indonesia. (Study on Cooperative Information Organization in the Ministry of Cooperatives and SME)

Science.gov (United States)

Eni, Yuli; Aryanto, Rudy

2014-03-01

There are problems being experienced by the Ministry of cooperatives and SME (Small and Medium Enterprise) including the length of time in the decision by the Government to establish a policy that should be taken for local cooperatives across the province of Indonesia. The decision-making process is still analyzed manually, so that sometimes the decisions taken are also less appropriate, effective and efficient. The second problem is the lack of monitoring data cooperative process province that is too much, making it difficult for the analysis of dynamic information to be useful. Therefore the authors want to fix the system that runs by using digital dashboard management system supported by the modeling of system dynamics. In addition, the author also did the design of a system that can support the system. Design of this system is aimed to ease the experts, head, and the government to decide (DSS - Decision Support System) accurately effectively and efficiently, because in the system are raised alternative simulation in a description of the decision to be taken and the result from the decision. The system is expected to be designed dan simulated can ease and expedite the decision making. The design of dynamic digital dashboard management conducted by method of OOAD (Objects Oriented Analysis and Design) complete with UML notation.

Friendship-based partner switching promotes cooperation in heterogeneous populations

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Wei; Wu, Te; Li, Zhiwu; Wang, Long

2016-02-01

The forming of human social ties tends to be with similar individuals. This study concentrates on the emergence of cooperation among heterogeneous populations. A simple model is proposed by considering the impact of interplay between the evolution of strategies and that of social partnerships on cooperation dynamics. Whenever two individuals acquire the rewards by playing prisoner's dilemma game with each other, the friendship (friendship is quantified as the weight of a link) between the two individuals deepens. Individuals can switch off the social ties with the partners who are unfriendly and rewire to similar new ones. Under this partner switching mechanism, population structure is divided into several groups and cooperation can prevail. It is observed that the frequent tendency of partner switching can lead to the enhancement of cooperative behavior under the enormous temptation to defect. Moreover, the influence of discounting the relationship between different individuals is also investigated. Meanwhile, the cooperation prevails when the adjustment of friendships mainly depends on the incomes of selected individuals rather than that of their partners. Finally, it is found that too similar population fail to maximize the cooperation and there exists a moderate similarity that can optimize cooperation.

Moderate intra-group bias maximizes cooperation on interdependent populations.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Changbing Tang

Full Text Available Evolutionary game theory on spatial structures has received increasing attention during the past decades. However, the majority of these achievements focuses on single and static population structures, which is not fully consistent with the fact that real structures are composed of many interactive groups. These groups are interdependent on each other and present dynamical features, in which individuals mimic the strategy of neighbors and switch their partnerships continually. It is however unclear how the dynamical and interdependent interactions among groups affect the evolution of collective behaviors. In this work, we employ the prisoner's dilemma game to investigate how the dynamics of structure influences cooperation on interdependent populations, where populations are represented by group structures. It is found that the more robust the links between cooperators (or the more fragile the links between cooperators and defectors, the more prevalent of cooperation. Furthermore, theoretical analysis shows that the intra-group bias can favor cooperation, which is only possible when individuals are likely to attach neighbors within the same group. Yet, interestingly, cooperation can be even inhibited for large intra-group bias, allowing the moderate intra-group bias maximizes the cooperation level.

A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ping Zhang

2009-01-01

Full Text Available This paper proposes a user cooperation stimulating strategy among rational users. The strategy is based on cooperative game theory and enacted in the context of cooperative relay networks. Using the pricing-based mechanism, the system is modeled initially with two nodes and a Base Station (BS. Within this framework, each node is treated as a rational decision maker. To this end, each node can decide whether to cooperate and how to cooperate. Cooperative game theory assists in providing an optimal system utility and provides fairness among users. Under different cooperative forwarding modes, certain questions are carefully investigated, including “what is each node's best reaction to maximize its utility?” and “what is the optimal reimbursement to encourage cooperation?” Simulation results show that the nodes benefit from the proposed cooperation stimulating strategy in terms of utility and thus justify the fairness between each user.

A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jiang Fan

2009-01-01

Full Text Available This paper proposes a user cooperation stimulating strategy among rational users. The strategy is based on cooperative game theory and enacted in the context of cooperative relay networks. Using the pricing-based mechanism, the system is modeled initially with two nodes and a Base Station (BS. Within this framework, each node is treated as a rational decision maker. To this end, each node can decide whether to cooperate and how to cooperate. Cooperative game theory assists in providing an optimal system utility and provides fairness among users. Under different cooperative forwarding modes, certain questions are carefully investigated, including "what is each node's best reaction to maximize its utility?" and "what is the optimal reimbursement to encourage cooperation?" Simulation results show that the nodes benefit from the proposed cooperation stimulating strategy in terms of utility and thus justify the fairness between each user.

The risk of predation favors cooperation among breeding prey

Science.gov (United States)

Krama, Tatjana; Berzins, Arnis; Rantala, Markus J

2010-01-01

Empirical studies have shown that animals often focus on short-term benefits under conditions of predation risk, which reduces the likelihood that they will cooperate with others. However, some theoretical studies predict that animals in adverse conditions should not avoid cooperation with their neighbors since it may decrease individual risks and increase long-term benefits of reciprocal help. We experimentally tested these two alternatives to find out whether increased predation risk enhances or diminishes the occurrence of cooperation in mobbing, a common anti-predator behavior, among breeding pied flycatchers, Ficedula hypoleuca. Our results show that birds attended mobs initiated by their neighbors more often, approached the stuffed predator significantly more closely, and mobbed it at a higher intensity in areas where the perceived risk of predation was experimentally increased. This study demonstrates a positive impact of predation risk on cooperation in breeding songbirds, which might help to explain the emergence and evolution of cooperation. PMID:20714404

Study on a cooperative active sensing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsukune, Hideo; Kita, Nobuyuki; Kuniyoshi, Yasuo; Hara, Isao; Matsui, Toshihiro; Matsushita, Toshio; Nagata, Kazuyuki; Nagakubo, Akihiko

1997-01-01

This study was made as a part of the research project ''Study on the evaluation of applicability of information collection·processing system to autonomous plant''. Previously, the basic techniques for 3-dimensional geometric modeling of working environments and for systemizing of information collection and processing have been developed. Thus, this study aimed to establish the techniques for a decentralized and cooperatively intellectualized system which allows to automatically perform patrol for inspection and maintenance in complicated plants. First, developments of cooperative active sensing for functioning in a multi-robot system and real-time active visual sensing were attempted and then the both were integrated to produce a prototype system for cooperative active sensing. The outcomes of the project in this year were as follows; a mobile platform with expanded functions, acoustic information processing, parallel EusLisp, a simulator for moving robot's behaviors, a visual monitoring system for moving objects, etc. All of these were usable for general purpose. (M.N.)

Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner's dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Dijkstra, Jacob; van Assen, Marcel A. L. M.

2017-01-01

Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We

Conditional cooperation in public goods experiments and its behavioral foundations

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kocher, M.G.

2006-01-01

With the help of a novel design we explicitly test for the extent of conditional cooperation in a repeated public goods game. Participants in the experiment can decide whether they want to condition their voluntary contribution on the average contribution of other group members or not. About 35% of

Social dilemma cooperation (unlike Dictator Game giving) is intuitive for men as well as women.

Science.gov (United States)

Rand, David G

2017-11-01

Does intuition favor prosociality, or does prosocial behavior require deliberative self-control? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that intuition favors typically advantageous behavior - but which behavior is typically advantageous depends on both the individual and the context. For example, non-zero-sum cooperation (e.g. in social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma) typically pays off because of the opportunity for reciprocity. Conversely, reciprocity does not promote zero-sum cash transfers (e.g. in the Dictator Game, DG). Instead, DG giving can be long-run advantageous because of reputation concerns: social norms often require such behavior of women but not men. Thus, the SHH predicts that intuition will favor social dilemma cooperation regardless of gender, but only favor DG giving among women. Here I present meta-analytic evidence in support of this prediction. In 31 studies examining social dilemma cooperation (N=13,447), I find that promoting intuition increases cooperation to a similar extent for both men and women. This stands in contrast to the results from 22 DG studies (analyzed in Rand et al., 2016) where intuition promotes giving among women but not men. Furthermore, I show using meta-regression that the interaction between gender and intuition is significantly larger in the DG compared to the cooperation games. Thus, I find clear evidence that the role of intuition and deliberation varies across both setting and individual as predicted by the SHH.

To cooperate or not to cooperate

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Wessels, Josepha Ivanka

To Cooperate or not to Cooperate...? discusses results of a research project to study the rehabilitation of 1500-year old water tunnels, so called "qanats", in Syria. Communities all over the world are using traditional technologies to extract drinkingwater, irrigate their lands and feed...... their livestock. But these often sustainable and ancient ways to make use of groundwater are in rapid decline worldwide. A research project started in 1999 to study the rehabilitation of 1500-year old water tunnels called "qanats"in Syria. To Cooperate or not to Cooperate...? discusses results and outcomes...

Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas.

Science.gov (United States)

Bouas, Kelly S.; Komorita, S. S.

1996-01-01

Face-to-face discussion has been shown to increase cooperation behavior in social dilemmas. Two general explanations of this effect were tested: group identity and perception of consensus. Female undergraduate students (N=160) participated in four-person groups in one of four experimental conditions. Findings indicate the most plausible…

Socially cooperative choices: An approach to achieving resource sustainability in the coastal zone

Science.gov (United States)

Crance, Colin; Draper, Dianne

1996-03-01

Achieving resource sustainability, particularly in the coastal zone, is complicated by a variety of interdependencies and trade-offs between economic, social, and ecological variables. Although trade-offs between each of these variables are important, this paper emphasizes the social components of resource management. In this regard a distinction is made between individual and cooperative choices. Individual choices frequently are made from a shortterm, self-interested perspective, whereas cooperative choices are made from a long-term, community and resource-sustainability perspective. Typically, when presented with a spectrum of resource management decisions, individuals have a tendency to act in a self-interested manner. Thus, cooperative benefits, such as reduced conflict and improved resource certainty, are not realized. An overview of selected aspects of social dilemma theory suggests that socially cooperative choice outcomes are attainable in coastal zone management by integrating structural and behavioral solutions in resource use decision making. Three barriers to successful integration of structural and behavioral solutions are identified as self-interest, mistrust, and variable perceptions of resource amenities. Examples from coastal zone management indicate that these barriers may be overcome using approaches such as scopereduction, co-management, community education, and local participation. The paper also provides comment on the potential benefits of integrating structural and behavioral solutions in international coastal zone management efforts.

75 FR 10319 - Cooper Tools-Sumter, Cooper Tools Divisions, a Subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc., Including...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-05

... DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Employment and Training Administration [TA-W-71,602] Cooper Tools--Sumter, Cooper Tools Divisions, a Subsidiary of Cooper Industries, Inc., Including On-Site Leased Workers From... January 26, 2010, applicable to workers of Cooper Tools--Sumter, Cooper Tools Division, a subsidiary of...

Decoherence Effects on Multiplayer Cooperative Quantum Games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khan, Salman; Ramzan, M.; Khan, M. Khalid.

2011-01-01

We study the behavior of cooperative multiplayer quantum games [Q. Chen, Y. Wang, J.T. Liu, and K.L. Wang, Phys. Lett. A 327 (2004) 98; A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Quantum Inf. Comput. 7 (2007) 111] in the presence of decoherence using different quantum channels such as amplitude damping, depolarizing and phase damping. It is seen that the outcomes of the games for the two damping channels with maximum values of decoherence reduce to same value. However, in comparison to phase damping channel, the payoffs of cooperators are strongly damped under the influence amplitude damping channel for the lower values of decoherence parameter. In the case of depolarizing channel, the game is a no-payoff game irrespective of the degree of entanglement in the initial state for the larger values of decoherence parameter. The decoherence gets the cooperators worse off. (general)

Tactile communication, cooperation, and performance: an ethological study of the NBA.

Science.gov (United States)

Kraus, Michael W; Huang, Cassey; Keltner, Dacher

2010-10-01

Tactile communication, or physical touch, promotes cooperation between people, communicates distinct emotions, soothes in times of stress, and is used to make inferences of warmth and trust. Based on this conceptual analysis, we predicted that in group competition, physical touch would predict increases in both individual and group performance. In an ethological study, we coded the touch behavior of players from the National Basketball Association (NBA) during the 2008-2009 regular season. Consistent with hypotheses, early season touch predicted greater performance for individuals as well as teams later in the season. Additional analyses confirmed that touch predicted improved performance even after accounting for player status, preseason expectations, and early season performance. Moreover, coded cooperative behaviors between teammates explained the association between touch and team performance. Discussion focused on the contributions touch makes to cooperative groups and the potential implications for other group settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Dijkstra, Jacob; Van Assen, M.A.L.M.

2017-01-01

Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We

Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Dijkstra, Jacob; van Assen, Marcel A L M

2016-01-01

Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We

Different mechanisms of risperidone result in improved interpersonal trust, social engagement and cooperative behavior in patients with schizophrenia compared to trifluoperazine.

Science.gov (United States)

Tse, Wai Shing; Wong, Ann Siu Wah; Chan, Fu; Pang, Alfred Hin Tat; Bond, Alyson Jane; Chan, Chau Kiu Raymond

2016-05-01

Atypical antipsychotic treatment (e.g. risperidone) has been found to improve social functioning more than standard antipsychotic treatment. However, it is unclear which specific social behaviors are implicated in this improvement. The current study employed an interactive puzzle game to examine how social behaviors contribute to the improvement of social functioning by comparing patients receiving risperidone with those receiving trifluoperazine. Scores on the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, executive functioning, and social functioning were obtained from 24 patients with schizophrenia receiving either risperidone (n = 12) or trifluoperazine (n = 12), before their social behavior was measured in the interactive Tangrams Game. Immediately after the Tangrams Game, participants filled in two questionnaires measuring their interpersonal trust and rejection toward their game partner. Patients receiving risperidone showed more social engagement, cooperative behavior and interpersonal trust toward their game partners than those receiving trifluoperazine. Additional multivariate analysis of variance revealed that lower affiliative behavior was a function of positive symptoms; interpersonal trust had an impact on social engagement but executive functioning did not explain lower interpersonal trust or social disengagement. Improvement of social competence by risperidone might be related to the enhancement of both social behaviors and interpersonal trust as well as better symptom resolution. © 2016 The Authors. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences © 2016 Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology.

Local Reasons to Give Globally: Identity Extension and Global Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Buchan, Nancy R; Jeong, Sophia Soyoung; Ward, A K

2017-11-14

Recent political events across the world suggest a retrenchment from globalization and a possible increase in parochialism. This inward-looking threat from parochialism occurs just as the global community faces growing challenges that require trans-national cooperation. In this research, we question if strong identification with an in-group necessarily leads to parochialism and ultimately is detrimental to global cooperation. Building on research on global social identification, we explore whether strong local identification can expand in inclusiveness to global identification, and among whom this is likely to happen. The results of our global public goods study - conducted in South Korea and the United States - show that high levels of social identification with a local group can extend to the global collective, particularly for individuals who are also high in concern-for-others. Furthermore, this identification translates into behavior that benefits the global, anonymous group at a cost to oneself. These results shed light on how to avoid the trap of parochialism and instead engender cooperative behavior with the broader global community.

Conditional imitation might promote cooperation under high temptations to defect

Science.gov (United States)

Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Qian, Xiaolan; Zhang, Mei; Yang, Junzhong

2012-07-01

In this paper we introduce a conditional imitation rule into an evolutionary game, in which the imitation probabilities of individuals are determined by a function of payoff difference and two crucial parameters μ and σ. The parameter μ characterizes the most adequate goal for individuals and the parameter σ characterizes the tolerance of individuals. By using the pair approximation method and numerical simulations, we find an anomalous cooperation enhancement in which the cooperation level shows a nonmonotonic variation with the increase of temptation. The parameter μ affects the regime of the payoff parameter which supports the anomalous cooperation enhancement, whereas the parameter σ plays a decisive role on the appearance of the nonmonotonic variation of the cooperation level. Furthermore, to give explicit implications for the parameters μ and σ we present an alterative form of the conditional imitation rule based on the benefit and the cost incurred to individuals during strategy updates. In this way, we also provide a phenomenological interpretation for the nonmonotonic behavior of cooperation with the increase of temptation. The results give a clue that a higher cooperation level could be obtained under adverse environments for cooperation by applying the conditional imitation rule, which is possible to be manipulated in real life. More generally, the results in this work might point out an efficient way to maintain cooperation in the risky environments to cooperators.

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Isamu Okada

2015-05-01

Full Text Available Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards and negative incentives (punishments with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1 second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2 a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3 a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4 a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

2015-05-01

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.

Mechanisms and dynamics of cooperation and competition emergence in complex networked systems

Science.gov (United States)

Gianetto, David A.

Cooperative behavior is a pervasive phenomenon in human interactions and yet how it can evolve and become established, through the selfish process of natural selection, is an enduring puzzle. These behaviors emerge when agents interact in a structured manner; even so, the key structural factors that affect cooperation are not well understood. Moreover, the literature often considers cooperation a single attribute of primitive agents who do not react to environmental changes but real-world actors are more perceptive. The present work moves beyond these assumptions by evolving more realistic game participants, with memories of the past, on complex networks. Agents play repeated games with a three-part Markovian strategy that allows us to separate the cooperation phenomenon into trust, reciprocity, and forgiveness characteristics. Our results show that networks matter most when agents gain the most by acting in a selfish manner, irrespective of how much they may lose by cooperating; since the context provided by neighborhoods inhibits greedy impulses that agents otherwise succumb to in isolation. Network modularity is the most important driver of cooperation emergence in these high-stakes games. However, modularity fails to tell the complete story. Modular scale-free graphs impede cooperation when close coordination is required, partially due to the acyclic nature of scale-free network models. To achieve the highest cooperation in diverse social conditions, both high modularity, low connectivity within modules, and a rich network of long cycles become important. With these findings in hand, we study the influence of networks on coordination and competition within the federal health care insurance exchange. In this applied study, we show that systemic health care coordination is encouraged by the emergent insurance network. The network helps underpin the viability of the exchange and provides an environment of stronger competition once a critical-mass of insurers have

Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bo-Yu Zhang

2010-03-01

Full Text Available Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual cooperation (which corresponds to the best outcome from the population perspective can evolve when the only individually rational choice is to defect, illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD game, and how individuals can randomize between two strategies when neither is individually rational, illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes (BS game that models male-female conflict over parental investment in offspring. We examine these questions from an evolutionary perspective where the evolutionary dynamics includes an impulsive effect that models sudden changes in collective population behavior. For the PD game, we show analytically that cooperation can either coexist with defection or completely take over the population, depending on the strength of the impulse. By extending these results for the PD game, we also show that males and females each evolve to a single strategy in the BS game when the impulsive effect is strong and that weak impulses stabilize the randomized strategies of this game.

Promotion of cooperation induced by two-sided players in prisoner's dilemma game

Science.gov (United States)

Su, Zhen; Li, Lixiang; Xiao, Jinghua; Podobnik, B.; Stanley, H. Eugene

2018-01-01

We examine how real-world individuals and companies can either reach an agreement or fail to reach an agreement after several stages of negotiation. We use a modified prisoner's dilemma game with two-sided players who can either cooperate or not cooperate with their neighbors. We find that the presence of even a small number of these two-sided players substantially promotes the cooperation because, unlike the rock-paper-scissors scenario, when the cooperators change to the non-cooperators to gain a payoff, they can turn to the two-sided players and continue negotiating. We find that the network structure influences the spread of strategies. Lattice and regular-random (RR) networks benefit the spread of both non-cooperation and two-sided strategies, but scale-free (SF) networks stop both strategies. We also find that the Erdös-R e ´ nyi (ER) network promotes the two-sided strategy and blocks the spread of non-cooperation. As the ER network density decreases, and the network degree is lowered the lifetime of non-cooperators increases. Our results expand our understanding of the role played by the two-sided strategy in the growth of the cooperative behavior in networks.

Critical mass of public goods and its coevolution with cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Shi, Dong-Mei; Wang, Bing-Hong

2017-07-01

In this study, the enhancing parameter represented the value of the public goods to the public in public goods game, and was rescaled to a Fermi-Dirac distribution function of critical mass. Public goods were divided into two categories, consumable and reusable public goods, and their coevolution with cooperative behavior was studied. We observed that for both types of public goods, cooperation was promoted as the enhancing parameter increased when the value of critical mass was not very large. An optimal value of critical mass which led to the best cooperation was identified. We also found that cooperations emerged earlier for reusable public goods, and defections became extinct earlier for the consumable public goods. Moreover, we observed that a moderate depreciation rate for public goods resulted in an optimal cooperation, and this range became wider as the enhancing parameter increased. The noise influence on cooperation was studied, and it was shown that cooperation density varied non-monotonically as noise amplitude increased for reusable public goods, whereas decreased monotonically for consumable public goods. Furthermore, existence of the optimal critical mass was also identified in other three regular networks. Finally, simulation results were utilized to analyze the provision of public goods in detail.

Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Science.gov (United States)

Pan, Qiuhui; Liu, Xuesong; Bao, Honglin; Su, Yu; He, Mingfeng

2018-02-01

In this paper, we study the effect of adaptive interaction on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The connections of players are co-evolutionary with cooperation; whether adjacent players can play the prisoner's dilemma game is associated with the strategies they took in the preceding round. If a player defected in the preceding round, his neighbors will refuse to play the prisoner's dilemma game with him in accordance with a certain probability distribution. We use the disconnecting strength to represent this probability. We discuss the evolution of cooperation with different values of temptation to defect, sucker's payoff and disconnecting strength. The simulation results show that cooperation can be significantly enhanced through increasing the value of the disconnecting strength. In addition, the increase in disconnecting strength can improve the cooperators' ability to resist the increase in temptation and the decrease in reward. We study the parameter ranges for three different evolutionary results: cooperators extinction, defectors extinction, cooperator and defector co-existence. Meanwhile, we recruited volunteers and designed a human behavioral experiment to verify the theoretical simulation results. The punishment of disconnection has a positive effect on cooperation. A higher disconnecting strength will enhance cooperation more significantly. Our research findings reveal some significant insights into efficient mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation.

When Rules Really Make a Difference : The Effect of Cooperation Rules and Self-Sacrificing Leadership on Moral Norms in Social Dilemmas

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Mulder, Laetitia B.; Nelissen, Rob M. A.

If self-interested behavior conflicts with the collective welfare, rules of cooperation are often installed to prevent egoistic behavior. We hypothesized that installing such rules may instigate personal moral norms of cooperation, but that they fail in doing so when installed by a leader who is

Special Education in General Education Classrooms: Cooperative Teaching Using Supportive Learning Activities.

Science.gov (United States)

Johnson, Robin R.; And Others

1995-01-01

Supportive learning activities were implemented in a multiple-baseline time series design across four fifth-grade classrooms to evaluate the effects of a cooperative teaching alternative (supportive learning) on teaching behavior, the behavior and grades of general and special education students, and the opinions of general education teachers.…

Egoism, altruism, and social justice : theory and experiments on cooperation in social dilemmas

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Vries, Sjerp de

1991-01-01

Cooperative or altruistic behavior in the absence of egoistic incentives is an issue that has puzzled many social scientists. In this book an attempt is made to gain more insight into such behavior for a specific type of situation: the social dilemma. ...

Non-cooperative planning theory

CERN Document Server

Bogetoft, Peter

1994-01-01

Planning in a general sense is concerned with the design of communication and decision making mechanisms in organizations where information and choice are decentralized. Non-cooperative planning theory as it is developed in this book treats the incentive aspects hereof. It stresses how strategic behavior and opportunism may impede planning, and how this can be coped with via the organization of communication and decision making, the design of information and control systems, and the development of incentive schemes. In particular, the book contains a thorough investigation of incentive provision in information production.

International cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

In this chapter international cooperation of the Division for Radiation Safety, NPP Decommissioning and Radwaste Management of the VUJE, a. s. is presented. Very important is cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This cooperation has various forms - national and regional projects of technical cooperation, coordinated research activities, participation of our experts in preparation of the IAEA documentation etc.

Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Gao, Lei; Wang, Zhen; Pansini, Riccardo; Li, Yao-Tang; Wang, Rui-Wu

2015-12-01

Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism. In the case of mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible.

Strategy changing penalty promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jin Qing; Wang Zhen; Wang Zhen; Wang Yiling

2012-01-01

Many classical studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas relative evidence in the research of spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is absent. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of strategy changing penalty, combining memory and penalty during the update process, into spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that increasing penalty rate or memory length is able to promote the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Compared with traditional version, recorded penalty could facilitate cooperation better. Moreover, through examining the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation for this promotion phenomenon, namely, the effect of promotion can be warranted by an evolution resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we validate our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in the society.

Cooperation in multicultural negotiations: How the cultures of people with low and high power interact.

Science.gov (United States)

Kopelman, Shirli; Hardin, Ashley E; Myers, Christopher G; Tost, Leigh Plunkett

2016-05-01

This study examined whether the cultures of low- and high-power negotiators interact to influence cooperative behavior of low-power negotiators. Managers from 4 different cultural groups (Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, and the United States) negotiated face-to-face in a simulated power-asymmetric commons dilemma. Results supported an interaction effect in which cooperation of people with lower power was influenced by both their culture and the culture of the person with higher power. In particular, in a multicultural setting, low-power managers from Hong Kong, a vertical-collectivist culture emphasizing power differences and group alignment, adjusted their cooperation depending on the culture of the high-power manager with whom they interacted. This study contributes to understanding how culture shapes behavior of people with relatively low power, illustrates how a logic of appropriateness informs cooperation, and highlights the importance of studying multicultural social interactions in the context of negotiations, work teams, and global leadership. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Payoff-related migration enhances cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cheng Hongyan; Dai Qionglin; Li Haihong; Zhu Yun; Yang Junzhong; Zhang Mei

2011-01-01

In reality, migration of an individual usually correlates with the individual's financial or social status. Here, we consider the situation where migration of a player depends on the player's payoff to an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game. When the mobility of a player is positively correlated with the player's normalized payoff, P i , where the mobility of player i is defined as μ i =P i α , we found that cooperation could be promoted strongly in the case of a high density of players because of the introduction of this kind of migration. Moreover, the system could reach a state of complete cooperation in a large region on the given parameter space. Interestingly, enhancement of cooperation shows a non-monotonic behavior with an increase in α. We also found that the positive effects of this kind of migration on cooperation are robust in the face of changes to the network structure and the strategy-updating rule. In addition, we consider another situation where the mobility of a player is anti-correlated with the player's normalized payoff, and we observe that cooperation enhancement still exists.

Coordination vs. voluntarism and enforcement in sustaining international environmental cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Barrett, Scott

2016-12-20

The fates of "transboundary" environmental systems depend on how nation states interact with one another. In the absence of a hegemon willing and able to coerce other states into avoiding a "tragedy of the commons," shared environments will be safeguarded if international cooperation succeeds and degraded or even destroyed if it fails. Treaties and related institutions of international law give form to these efforts to cooperate. Often, they implore states to act in their collective (as opposed to their national) interests. Sometimes, they impel cooperating states to punish free riders. A few agreements coordinate states' behavior. Here, I present simple game-theoretic models showing whether and how treaties and related institutions can change incentives, aligning states' self-interests with their collective interests. I show that, as a general matter, states struggle to cooperate voluntarily and enforce agreements to cooperate but that they find it relatively easy to coordinate actions. In some cases, the need for coordination is manifest. In other cases, it requires strategic thinking. Coordination may fall short of supporting an ideal outcome, but it nearly always works better than the alternatives.

Coevolution of Cooperation and Layer Selection Strategy in Multiplex Networks

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Katsuki Hayashi

2016-11-01

Full Text Available Recently, the emergent dynamics in multiplex networks, composed of layers of multiple networks, has been discussed extensively in network sciences. However, little is still known about whether and how the evolution of strategy for selecting a layer to participate in can contribute to the emergence of cooperative behaviors in multiplex networks of social interactions. To investigate these issues, we constructed a coevolutionary model of cooperation and layer selection strategies in which each an individual selects one layer from multiple layers of social networks and plays the Prisoner’s Dilemma with neighbors in the selected layer. We found that the proportion of cooperative strategies increased with increasing the number of layers regardless of the degree of dilemma, and this increase occurred due to a cyclic coevolution process of game strategies and layer selection strategies. We also showed that the heterogeneity of links among layers is a key factor for multiplex networks to facilitate the evolution of cooperation, and such positive effects on cooperation were observed regardless of the difference in the stochastic properties of network topologies.

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

Science.gov (United States)

Stojkoski, Viktor; Utkovski, Zoran; Basnarkov, Lasko; Kocarev, Ljupco

2018-05-01

We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is rooted in the principle "help anyone if helped by someone." Within this general framework, which applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation, and snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples. By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at the microscopic and macroscopic level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.

The effect of interviewer experience, attitudes, personality and skills on respondent co-operation with face-to-face surveys

OpenAIRE

Jäckle, Annette; Lynn, Peter; Sinibaldi, Jennifer; Tipping, Sarah

2013-01-01

"This paper examines the role of interviewers' experience, attitudes, personality traits and inter-personal skills in determining survey co-operation, conditional on contact. The authors take the perspective that these characteristics influence interviewers' behavior and hence influence the doorstep interaction between interviewer and sample member. Previous studies of the association between doorstep behavior and co-operation have not directly addressed the role of personality traits and int...

Selective Cooperation in Early Childhood - How to Choose Models and Partners.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jonas Hermes

Full Text Available Cooperation is essential for human society, and children engage in cooperation from early on. It is unclear, however, how children select their partners for cooperation. We know that children choose selectively whom to learn from (e.g. preferring reliable over unreliable models on a rational basis. The present study investigated whether children (and adults also choose their cooperative partners selectively and what model characteristics they regard as important for cooperative partners and for informants about novel words. Three- and four-year-old children (N = 64 and adults (N = 14 saw contrasting pairs of models differing either in physical strength or in accuracy (in labeling known objects. Participants then performed different tasks (cooperative problem solving and word learning requiring the choice of a partner or informant. Both children and adults chose their cooperative partners selectively. Moreover they showed the same pattern of selective model choice, regarding a wide range of model characteristics as important for cooperation (preferring both the strong and the accurate model for a strength-requiring cooperation tasks, but only prior knowledge as important for word learning (preferring the knowledgeable but not the strong model for word learning tasks. Young children's selective model choice thus reveals an early rational competence: They infer characteristics from past behavior and flexibly consider what characteristics are relevant for certain tasks.

NMR study of the cooperative behavior of thermotropic model polypeptides

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Kurková, Dana; Kříž, Jaroslav; Rodríguez-Cabello, J. C.; Arias, F. J.

2007-01-01

Roč. 56, č. 2 (2007), s. 186-194 ISSN 0959-8103 R&D Projects: GA AV ČR IAA400500604 Grant - others:Spanish Ministry of Science and Culture(ES) A002/02; MAT2000-1764-C02; MAT2001-1853-C02-01; MAT2003- Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z40500505 Keywords : thermotropic polymers * cooperativity * synthetic polypeptides Subject RIV: CD - Macromolecular Chemistry Impact factor: 1.557, year: 2007

Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

Science.gov (United States)

Yuan, Wu-Jie; Xia, Cheng-Yi

2014-01-01

Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter α. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of α (increment of heterogeneous investment) is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.

Correlates of cooperation in a one-shot high-stakes televised prisoners' dilemma.

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Maxwell N Burton-Chellew

Full Text Available Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when "playing" for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected.

Social dilemmas in an online social network: The structure and evolution of cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fu Feng; Chen Xiaojie; Liu Lianghuan; Wang Long

2007-01-01

We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation-Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network, obtained from a social networking site. By structural analysis, it is revealed that the empirical social network has small-world and scale-free properties. Besides, it exhibits assortative mixing pattern. Then, we study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It is found that cooperation is substantially promoted with small values of game matrix parameters in both games. Whereas the competent cooperators induced by the underlying network of contacts will be dramatically inhibited with increasing values of the game parameters. Further, we explore the role of assortativity in evolution of cooperation by random edge rewiring. We find that increasing amount of assortativity will to a certain extent diminish the cooperation level. We also show that connected large hubs are capable of maintaining cooperation. The evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network effects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society

Mesoscopic structure conditions the emergence of cooperation on social networks.

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Sergi Lozano

Full Text Available BACKGROUND: We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on two social networks substrates obtained from actual relational data. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We find very different cooperation levels on each of them that cannot be easily understood in terms of global statistical properties of both networks. We claim that the result can be understood at the mesoscopic scale, by studying the community structure of the networks. We explain the dependence of the cooperation level on the temptation parameter in terms of the internal structure of the communities and their interconnections. We then test our results on community-structured, specifically designed artificial networks, finding a good agreement with the observations in both real substrates. CONCLUSION: Our results support the conclusion that studies of evolutionary games on model networks and their interpretation in terms of global properties may not be sufficient to study specific, real social systems. Further, the study allows us to define new quantitative parameters that summarize the mesoscopic structure of any network. In addition, the community perspective may be helpful to interpret the origin and behavior of existing networks as well as to design structures that show resilient cooperative behavior.

Mesoscopic structure conditions the emergence of cooperation on social networks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lozano, S.; Arenas, A.; Sanchez, A.

2008-12-01

We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on two social networks substrates obtained from actual relational data. We find very different cooperation levels on each of them that cannot be easily understood in terms of global statistical properties of both networks. We claim that the result can be understood at the mesoscopic scale, by studying the community structure of the networks. We explain the dependence of the cooperation level on the temptation parameter in terms of the internal structure of the communities and their interconnections. We then test our results on community-structured, specifically designed artificial networks, finding a good agreement with the observations in both real substrates. Our results support the conclusion that studies of evolutionary games on model networks and their interpretation in terms of global properties may not be sufficient to study specific, real social systems. Further, the study allows us to define new quantitative parameters that summarize the mesoscopic structure of any network. In addition, the community perspective may be helpful to interpret the origin and behavior of existing networks as well as to design structures that show resilient cooperative behavior.

Probabilistic interconnection between interdependent networks promotes cooperation in the public goods game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang, Baokui; Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Long

2012-01-01

Most previous works study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population by commonly employing an isolated single network. However, realistic systems are composed of many interdependent networks coupled with each other, rather than an isolated single one. In this paper, we consider a system including two interacting networks with the same size, entangled with each other by the introduction of probabilistic interconnections. We introduce the public goods game into such a system, and study how the probabilistic interconnection influences the evolution of cooperation of the whole system and the coupling effect between two layers of interdependent networks. Simulation results show that there exists an intermediate region of interconnection probability leading to the maximum cooperation level in the whole system. Interestingly, we find that at the optimal interconnection probability the fraction of internal links between cooperators in two layers is maximal. Also, even if initially there are no cooperators in one layer of interdependent networks, cooperation can still be promoted by probabilistic interconnection, and the cooperation levels in both layers can more easily reach an agreement at the intermediate interconnection probability. Our results may be helpful in understanding cooperative behavior in some realistic interdependent networks and thus highlight the importance of probabilistic interconnection on the evolution of cooperation. (paper)

Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Feng Zhang

Full Text Available Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism, thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.

Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games.

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Zhen Wang

Full Text Available In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others' reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1-p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies

Non-cooperative game theory in biology and cooperative reasoning in humans.

Science.gov (United States)

Kabalak, Alihan; Smirnova, Elena; Jost, Jürgen

2015-06-01

The readiness for spontaneous cooperation together with the assumptions that others share this cooperativity has been identified as a fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from other animals, including the great apes. At the same time, cooperativity presents an evolutionary puzzle because non-cooperators do better in a group of cooperators. We develop here an analysis of the process leading to cooperation in terms of rationality concepts, game theory and epistemic logic. We are, however, not attempting to reconstruct the actual evolutionary process. We rather want to provide the logical structure underlying cooperation in order to understand why cooperation is possible and what kind of reasoning and beliefs would lead to cooperative decision-making. Game theory depends on an underlying common belief in non-cooperative rationality of the players, and cooperativity similarly can utilize a common belief in cooperative rationality as its basis. We suggest a weaker concept of rational decision-making in games that encompasses both types of decision-making. We build this up in stages, starting from simple optimization, then using anticipation of the reaction of others, to finally arrive at reflexive and cooperative reasoning. While each stage is more difficult than the preceding, importantly, we also identify a reduction of complexity achieved by the consistent application of higher stage reasoning.

Designing for cooperation - cooperating in design

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kyng, Morten

1991-01-01

This article will discuss how to design computer applications that enhance the quality of work and products, and will relate the discussion to current themes in the field of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW). Cooperation is a key element of computer use and work practice, yet here...... a specific "CSCW approach is not taken." Instead the focus is cooperation as an important aspect of work that should be integrated into most computer support efforts in order to develop successful computer support, however, other aspects such as power, conflict and control must also be considered....

Conducting cancer control and survivorship research via cooperative groups: a report from the American Society of Preventive Oncology.

Science.gov (United States)

Palesh, Oxana; Demark-Wahnefried, Wendy; Mustian, Karen; Minasian, Lori; Rowland, Julia; Sprod, Lisa; Janelsins, Michelle; Peppone, Luke; Sloan, Jeff; Engquist, Karen Basen; Jones, Lee; Buist, Diana; Paskett, Electra D

2011-05-01

As the number of cancer survivors expands, the need for cancer control and survivorship research becomes increasingly important. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) Cooperative Groups may offer a viable platform to perform such research. Observational, preventive, and behavioral research can often be performed within the cooperative group setting, especially if resources needed for evaluation are fairly simple, if protocols are easily implemented within the typical clinical setting, and if interventions are well standardized. Some protocols are better suited to cooperative groups than are others, and there are advantages and disadvantages to conducting survivorship research within the cooperative group setting. Behavioral researchers currently involved in cooperative groups, as well as program staff within the NCI, can serve as sources of information for those wishing to pursue symptom management and survivorship studies within the clinical trial setting. The structure of the cooperative groups is currently changing, but going forward, survivorship is bound to be a topic of interest and one that perhaps may be more easily addressed using the proposed more centralized structure. ©2011 AACR.

Cooperation and defection at the crossroads.

Science.gov (United States)

Abramson, Guillermo; Semeshenko, Viktoriya; Iglesias, José Roberto

2013-01-01

We study a simple traffic model with a non-signalized road intersection. In this model the car arriving from the right has precedence. The vehicle dynamics far from the crossing are governed by the rules introduced by Nagel and Paczuski, which define how drivers behave when braking or accelerating. We measure the average velocity of the ensemble of cars and its flow as a function of the density of cars on the roadway. An additional set of rules is defined to describe the dynamics at the intersection assuming a fraction of drivers that do not obey the rule of precedence. This problem is treated within a game-theory framework, where the drivers that obey the rule are cooperators and those who ignore it are defectors. We study the consequences of these behaviors as a function of the fraction of cooperators and defectors. The results show that cooperation is the best strategy because it maximizes the flow of vehicles and minimizes the number of accidents. A rather paradoxical effect is observed: for any percentage of defectors the number of accidents is larger when the density of cars is low because of the higher average velocity.

[Prosocial personality. Why is cooperation and moral adjustment the rule?].

Science.gov (United States)

Kroeber, H-L

2011-01-01

Human beings are adapted for acting and thinking cooperatively in cultural groups and the most impressive cognitive achievements of humans are the products not of individuals acting alone but of individuals interacting. As they grow, human children are equipped to participate in this cooperative group thinking through a special kind of cultural intelligence, comprising species-unique social-cognitive skills and motivations for collaboration, communication, social learning and other forms of shared intentionality. Some mechanism of social learning and norm orientation are reported, leading to some presumptions about the roots of antisocial behavior.

Genetic architecture promotes the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Antoine Frénoy

Full Text Available When cooperation has a direct cost and an indirect benefit, a selfish behavior is more likely to be selected for than an altruistic one. Kin and group selection do provide evolutionary explanations for the stability of cooperation in nature, but we still lack the full understanding of the genomic mechanisms that can prevent cheater invasion. In our study we used Aevol, an agent-based, in silico genomic platform to evolve populations of digital organisms that compete, reproduce, and cooperate by secreting a public good for tens of thousands of generations. We found that cooperating individuals may share a phenotype, defined as the amount of public good produced, but have very different abilities to resist cheater invasion. To understand the underlying genetic differences between cooperator types, we performed bio-inspired genomics analyses of our digital organisms by recording and comparing the locations of metabolic and secretion genes, as well as the relevant promoters and terminators. Association between metabolic and secretion genes (promoter sharing, overlap via frame shift or sense-antisense encoding was characteristic for populations with robust cooperation and was more likely to evolve when secretion was costly. In mutational analysis experiments, we demonstrated the potential evolutionary consequences of the genetic association by performing a large number of mutations and measuring their phenotypic and fitness effects. The non-cooperating mutants arising from the individuals with genetic association were more likely to have metabolic deleterious mutations that eventually lead to selection eliminating such mutants from the population due to the accompanying fitness decrease. Effectively, cooperation evolved to be protected and robust to mutations through entangled genetic architecture. Our results confirm the importance of second-order selection on evolutionary outcomes, uncover an important genetic mechanism for the evolution and

Age structure and cooperation in coevolutionary games on dynamic network

Science.gov (United States)

Qin, Zilong; Hu, Zhenhua; Zhou, Xiaoping; Yi, Jingzhang

2015-04-01

Our proposed model imitates the growth of a population and describes the age structure and the level of cooperation in games on dynamic network with continuous changes of structure and topology. The removal of nodes and links caused by age-dependent attack, together with the nodes addition standing for the newborns of population, badly ruins Matthew effect in this coevolutionary process. Though the network is generated by growth and preferential attachment, it degenerates into random network and it is no longer heterogeneous. When the removal of nodes and links is equal to the addition of nodes and links, the size of dynamic network is maintained in steady-state, so is the low level of cooperation. Severe structure variation, homogeneous topology and continuous invasion of new defection jointly make dynamic network unsuitable for the survival of cooperator even when the probability with which the newborn players initially adopt the strategy cooperation is high, while things change slightly when the connections of newborn players are restricted. Fortunately, moderate interactions in a generation trigger an optimal recovering process to encourage cooperation. The model developed in this paper outlines an explanation of the cohesion changes in the development process of an organization. Some suggestions for cooperative behavior improvement are given in the end.

Conditional dissociation as a punishment mechanism in the evolution of cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Qu, Xinglong; Zhou, Changli; Cao, Zhigang; Yang, Xiaoguang

2016-05-01

Recent studies show that conditional dissociation, a.k.a. post-interaction partner-refusal, can promote the emergence and stability of cooperation. However, in most of these studies, players' strategies are restricted to pure ones, which is obviously inconsistent with many biological and economic situations. Another concern with line of these studies is that conditional dissociation is often combined with other mechanisms. These mechanisms may favor cooperation per se, leaving it unclear whether conditional dissociation is indeed a key factor. In this paper, we study a clean model, pruning all the factors other than conditional dissociation that may favor cooperation. We find that conditional dissociation, which could be viewed as a variant of peer punishment, does promote cooperation, no matter whether mixed strategies are allowed or not. This confirms the previous findings in the literature. In addition, compared with the pure strategy scenario, cooperators are less competitive when mixed strategies are allowed. Our main finding is supported by both the numerical simulations and the theoretical analysis of Neutrally Stable Strategy. We also find that cooperative behavior is favored when waiting time and/or the population's lifespan are longer.

Cooperation among mobile individuals with payoff expectations in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lin Hai; Yang Dongping; Shuai, J.W.

2011-01-01

Research highlights: → We model the evolution of cooperation in mobile individuals with payoff expectation. → Dissatisfied players in prisoner's dilemma game will migrate or change strategies. → Migration promotes cooperation in individuals with relatively low expectation. → Some interesting spatiotemporal patterns emerge under appropriate parameters. → Constant expectations induce higher cooperation levels than adaptive aspirations. - Abstract: We propose a model to address the problem how the evolution of cooperation in a social system depends on the spatial motion and the payoff expectation. In the model, if the actual payoff of an individual is smaller than its payoff expectation, the individual will either move to a new site or simply reverse its current strategy. It turns out that migration of dissatisfied individuals with relatively low expectation level leads to the aggregation of cooperators and promotion of cooperation. Moreover, under appropriate parameters migration leads to some interesting spatiotemporal patterns which seems not to have been reported in previously studied spatial games. Furthermore, it also found that a population with constant expectation can better favor cooperative behavior than a population with adaptive aspiration.

Analysis of Nonlinear Duopoly Game: A Cooperative Case

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S. S. Askar

2015-01-01

Full Text Available We make further attempts to investigate equilibrium stability of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly game. Our studies in this paper focus on the cooperation that may be obtained among duopolistic firms. Discrete time scales under the assumption of unknown inverse demand function and linear cost are used to build our models in the proposed games. We introduce and study here an adjustment dynamic strategy beside the so-called tit-for-tat strategy. For each model, the stability analysis of the fixed point is analyzed. Numerical simulations are carried out to show the complex behavior of the proposed models and to point out the impact of the models’ parameters on the cooperation.

Cooperation is fleeting in the world of transposable elements.

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Andreas Wagner

2006-12-01

Full Text Available Composite transposons are key vehicles for the worldwide spreading of genes that allow bacteria to survive toxic compounds. Composite transposons consist of two smaller transposable elements called insertion sequences (ISs, which flank the genes that permit such survival. Each IS in a composite transposon can either transpose alone, selfishly, or it can transpose cooperatively, jointly with the other IS. Cooperative transposition can enhance an IS's chance of survival, but it also carries the risk of transposon destruction. I use game theory to show that the conditions under which cooperative transposition is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS are not biologically realistic. I then analyze the distribution of thousands of ISs in more than 200 bacterial genomes to test the following prediction of the game-theoretical model: if cooperative transposition was an ESS, then the closely spaced ISs that characterize composite transposons should be more abundant in genomes than expected by chance. The data show that this is not the case. Cooperativity can only be maintained in a transitional, far-from-equilibrium state shortly after a selection pressure first arises. This is the case in the spreading of antibiotic resistance, where we are witnessing a fleeting moment in evolution, a moment in which cooperation among selfish DNA molecules has provided a means of survival. Because such cooperation does not pay in the long run, the vehicles of such survival will eventually disappear again. My analysis demonstrates that game theory can help explain behavioral strategies even for mobile DNA.

Cooperation, trust, and antagonism: How public goods are promoted

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Parks, C.D.; Joireman, J.; van Lange, P.A.M.

2013-01-01

One of the most continually vexing problems in society is the variability with which citizens support endeavors that are designed to help a great number of people. In this article, we examine the twin roles of cooperative and antagonistic behavior in this variability. We find that each plays an

Social dilemmas in an online social network: The structure and evolution of cooperation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fu Feng [Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China); Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China)], E-mail: fufeng@pku.edu.cn; Chen Xiaojie; Liu Lianghuan [Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China); Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China); Wang Long [Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China); Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 (China)], E-mail: longwang@pku.edu.cn

2007-11-05

We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation-Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network, obtained from a social networking site. By structural analysis, it is revealed that the empirical social network has small-world and scale-free properties. Besides, it exhibits assortative mixing pattern. Then, we study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It is found that cooperation is substantially promoted with small values of game matrix parameters in both games. Whereas the competent cooperators induced by the underlying network of contacts will be dramatically inhibited with increasing values of the game parameters. Further, we explore the role of assortativity in evolution of cooperation by random edge rewiring. We find that increasing amount of assortativity will to a certain extent diminish the cooperation level. We also show that connected large hubs are capable of maintaining cooperation. The evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network effects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.

Cooperation Is Not Enough—Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use

Science.gov (United States)

Wijermans, Nanda; Schlüter, Maja; Lindahl, Therese

2016-01-01

Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived environmental uncertainty. Recent behavioral experimental research indicates variation in the degree to which a group of users can identify a sustainable exploitation level. In this paper, we identify social-ecological micro-foundations that facilitate cooperative sustainable common-pool resource use. We do so by using an agent-based model (ABM) that is informed by behavioral common-pool resource experiments. In these experiments, groups that cooperate do not necessarily manage the resource sustainably, but also over- or underexploit. By reproducing the patterns of the behavioral experiments in a qualitative way, the ABM represents a social-ecological explanation for the experimental observations. We find that the ecological knowledge of each group member cannot sufficiently explain the relationship between cooperation and sustainable resource use. Instead, the development of a sustainable exploitation level depends on the distribution of ecological knowledge among the group members, their influence on each other’s knowledge, and the environmental uncertainty the individuals perceive. The study provides insights about critical social-ecological micro-foundations underpinning collective action and sustainable resource management. These insights may inform policy-making, but also point to future research needs regarding the mechanisms of social learning, the development of shared management strategies and the interplay of social and ecological uncertainty. PMID:27556175

Distributed control of multi-robot teams: Cooperative baton passing task

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parker, L.E.

1998-11-01

This research addresses the problem of achieving fault tolerant cooperation within small- to medium-sized teams of heterogeneous mobile robots. The author describes a novel behavior-based, fully distributed architecture, called ALLIANCE, that utilizes adaptive action selection to achieve fault tolerant cooperative control. The robots in this architecture possess a variety of high-level functions that they can perform during a mission, and must at all times select an appropriate action based on the requirements of the mission, the activities of other robots, the current environmental conditions, and their own internal states. Since such cooperative teams often work in dynamic and unpredictable environments, the software architecture allows the team members to respond robustly and reliably to unexpected environmental changes and modifications in the robot team that may occur due to mechanical failure, the learning of new skills, or the addition or removal of robots from the team by human intervention. After presenting ALLIANCE, they describe the implementation of this architecture on a team of physical mobile robots performing a cooperative baton passing task. These experiments illustrate the ability of ALLIANCE to achieve adaptive, fault-tolerant cooperative control amidst dynamic changes during the task.

Consistent strategy updating in spatial and non-spatial behavioral experiments does not promote cooperation in social networks.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jelena Grujić

Full Text Available The presence of costly cooperation between otherwise selfish actors is not trivial. A prominent mechanism that promotes cooperation is spatial population structure. However, recent experiments with human subjects report substantially lower level of cooperation then predicted by theoretical models. We analyze the data of such an experiment in which a total of 400 players play a Prisoner's Dilemma on a 4×4 square lattice in two treatments, either interacting via a fixed square lattice (15 independent groups or with a population structure changing after each interaction (10 independent groups. We analyze the statistics of individual decisions and infer in which way they can be matched with the typical models of evolutionary game theorists. We find no difference in the strategy updating between the two treatments. However, the strategy updates are distinct from the most popular models which lead to the promotion of cooperation as shown by computer simulations of the strategy updating. This suggests that the promotion of cooperation by population structure is not as straightforward in humans as often envisioned in theoretical models.

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making

OpenAIRE

DECLERCK, Carolyn H.; BOONE, Christophe; EMONDS, Griet

2011-01-01

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate is generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), and tha...

International cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

In 1995, Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (NRA SR) ensured foreign cooperation particularly in the frame of the Slovak Republic is membership in the IAEA, as well as cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD NEA), cooperation with European Union in the frame of PHARE programmes, and intergovernmental cooperation and cooperation among nuclear regulatory authorities. With respect to an international importance, prestige and a wide-scope possibilities of a technical assistance , either a direct one (expert assessments, technology supplies, work placement, scientific trips, training courses) or indirect one (participation at various conferences, seminars, technical committees, etc), the most important cooperation with the IAEA in Vienna. In 1994, the Slovak Republic, was elected to the Board Governors, the represent the group of Eastern European countries. The Slovak Government entrusted the NRA SR's Chairman with representing the Slovak Republic in the Board of Governors. Owing to a good name of Slovakia was elected to the one of two Vice-Chairmen of the Board of Governors at the 882-nd session on the Board. IAEA approved and developed 8 national projects for Slovakia in 1995. Generally, IAEA is contracting scientific contracts with research institutes, nuclear power plants and other organizations. Slovak organizations used these contracts as complementary funding of their tasks. In 1995, there were 12 scientific contracts in progress, or approved respectively. Other international activities of the NRA SR, international co-operations as well as foreign affairs are reported

Transient Cooperative Processes in Dewetting Polymer Melts.

Science.gov (United States)

Chandran, Sivasurender; Reiter, Günter

2016-02-26

We compare the high velocity dewetting behavior, at elevated temperatures, of atactic polystyrene (aPS) and isotactic polystyrene (iPS) films, with the zero shear bulk viscosity (η_{bulk}) of aPS being approximately ten times larger than iPS. As expected, for aPS the apparent viscosity of the films (η_{f}) derived from high-shear dewetting is less than η_{bulk}, displaying a shear thinning behavior. Surprisingly, for iPS films, η_{f} is always larger than η_{bulk}, even at about 50 °C above the melting point, with η_{f}/η_{bulk} following an Arrhenius behavior. The corresponding activation energy of ∼160±10  kJ/mol for iPS films suggests a cooperative motion of segments which are aligned and agglomerated by fast dewetting.

Brazil’s Soft-Power Strategy: The Political Aspirations of South–South Development Cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bry, Sandra

2017-01-01

By trading upon the principles of South-South cooperation, Brazil is widely viewed as having gained a positive image worldwide. Brazil’s South-South development cooperation was one of the foreign policy instruments it used to raise this profile. However, studies of the generation of soft power...... are still lacking in the international relations literature,and where empirical research exists it focuses more on the results of soft power strategies than on how soft power is created. Therefore,this article explores how Brazil’s soft power strategy is conceptualized in Brazil’s development cooperation...... of its cooperation agency and guided it towards sectors and targets that contribute to the creation of positive outcomes. This article contributes to the debate on the state’s behavior in soft power, that is, the ‘behavior’ of the Brazilian government in the design of its cooperation agency’s activities...

Bacterial Quorum Sensing Stabilizes Cooperation by Optimizing Growth Strategies.

Science.gov (United States)

Bruger, Eric L; Waters, Christopher M

2016-11-15

Communication has been suggested as a mechanism to stabilize cooperation. In bacteria, chemical communication, termed quorum sensing (QS), has been hypothesized to fill this role, and extracellular public goods are often induced by QS at high cell densities. Here we show, with the bacterium Vibrio harveyi, that QS provides strong resistance against invasion of a QS defector strain by maximizing the cellular growth rate at low cell densities while achieving maximum productivity through protease upregulation at high cell densities. In contrast, QS mutants that act as defectors or unconditional cooperators maximize either the growth rate or the growth yield, respectively, and thus are less fit than the wild-type QS strain. Our findings provide experimental evidence that regulation mediated by microbial communication can optimize growth strategies and stabilize cooperative phenotypes by preventing defector invasion, even under well-mixed conditions. This effect is due to a combination of responsiveness to environmental conditions provided by QS, lowering of competitive costs when QS is not induced, and pleiotropic constraints imposed on defectors that do not perform QS. Cooperation is a fundamental problem for evolutionary biology to explain. Conditional participation through phenotypic plasticity driven by communication is a potential solution to this dilemma. Thus, among bacteria, QS has been proposed to be a proximate stabilizing mechanism for cooperative behaviors. Here, we empirically demonstrate that QS in V. harveyi prevents cheating and subsequent invasion by nonproducing defectors by maximizing the growth rate at low cell densities and the growth yield at high cell densities, whereas an unconditional cooperator is rapidly driven to extinction by defectors. Our findings provide experimental evidence that QS regulation prevents the invasion of cooperative populations by QS defectors even under unstructured conditions, and they strongly support the role of

Cooperative spin decoherence and population transfer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Genes, C.; Berman, P. R.

2006-01-01

An ensemble of multilevel atoms is a good candidate for a quantum information storage device. The information is encrypted in the collective ground state atomic coherence, which, in the absence of external excitation, is decoupled from the vacuum and therefore decoherence free. However, in the process of manipulation of atoms with light pulses (writing, reading), one inadvertently introduces a coupling to the environment, i.e., a source of decoherence. The dissipation process is often treated as an independent process for each atom in the ensemble, an approach which fails at large atomic optical depths where cooperative effects must be taken into account. In this paper, the cooperative behavior of spin decoherence and population transfer for a system of two, driven multilevel atoms is studied. Not surprisingly, an enhancement in the decoherence rate is found, when the atoms are separated by a distance that is small compared to an optical wavelength; however, it is found that this rate increases even further for somewhat larger separations for atoms aligned along the direction of the driving field's propagation vector. A treatment of the cooperative modification of optical pumping rates and an effect of polarization swapping between atoms is also discussed, lending additional insight into the origin of the collective decay

The boundaries of cooperation: sharing and coupling from ethology to neuroscience

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Maria Elide Vanutelli

2016-04-01

Full Text Available Cooperation is usually described as a human tendency to act jointly that involves helping, sharing, and acting prosocially. Nonetheless clues of cooperative actions can be found also in non-humans animals, as described in the first section of the present work. Even if such behaviors have been conventionally attributed to the research of immediate benefits within the animal world, some recent experimental evidence highlighted that, in highly social species, the effects of cooperative actions on others’ wellbeing may constitute a reward per se, thus suggesting that a strictly economic perspective can’t exhaust the meaning of cooperative decisions in animals. Here we propose, in the second section, that a deeper explanation concerning cognitive and emotional abilities in both humans and animals should be taken into account. Finally, the last part of the paper will be devoted to the description of synchronization patterns in humans within complex neuroscientific experimental paradigms, such as hyperscanning.

Cooperation is enhanced by inhomogeneous inertia in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Science.gov (United States)

Chang, Shuhua; Zhang, Zhipeng; Wu, Yu'e.; Xie, Yunya

2018-01-01

Inertia is an important factor that cannot be ignored in the real world for some lazy individuals in the process of decision making. In this work, we introduce a simple classification mechanism of strategy changing in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on different topologies. In this model, a part of players update their strategies according to not only the payoff difference, but also the inertia factor, which makes nodes heterogeneous and the system inhomogeneous. Moreover, we also study the impact of the number of neighbors on the evolution of cooperation. The results show that the evolution of cooperation will be promoted to a high level when the inertia factor and the inhomogeneous system are combined. In addition, we find that the more neighbors one player has, the higher density of cooperators is sustained in the optimal position. This work could be conducive to understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperative behavior caused by the inertia factor in reality.

International cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prieto, F.E.

1984-01-01

It looks doubtless that the need for an international cooperation to solve the worldwide energy problems is already a concern of individuals, institutions, and governments. This is an improvement. But there is something lacking. The author refers to the Atoms for Peace speech, the origin of the IAEA and of the subsequent spreading of the nuclear option. He also refers back to the call made by the Mexican government for a worldwide energy cooperation. He stresses the need for governments to cooperate, so that this international cooperation on energy can be put into operation for the benefit of mankind

Stability Analysis of Cohesion Properties of Cooperative Agents with Limited Sensor Capability

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Liu, Yanfei

2003-01-01

.... Multiple robots can be designed to coordinate to accomplish certain tasks. Their cooperative behaviors resemble, to a certain extent, those of bacteria, bees and birds that work together for food in the biological world...

Effects of cooperative learning strategy on undergraduate kinesiology students' learning styles.

Science.gov (United States)

Meeuwsen, Harry J; King, George A; Pederson, Rockie

2005-10-01

A growing body of research supports cooperative learning as an effective teaching strategy. A specific cooperative learning strategy, Team-based Learning, was applied to a convenience sample of four undergraduate sophomore-level motor behavior courses over four semesters from Fall 2002 to Spring 2004 to examine whether this strategy would affect students' learning styles. The data from the Grasha-Reichmann Student Learning Style Scales indicated that this teaching strategy was associated with a significant decrease in the negative Avoidant and Dependent learning styles and an improvement in the positive Participant learning style.

Social influence promotes cooperation in the public goods game

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Te; Fu, Feng; Dou, Puxuan; Wang, Long

2014-11-01

Previous studies mainly consider the random selection pattern in which individuals randomly choose reference models from their neighbors for strategy updating. However, the random selection pattern is unable to capture all real world circumstances. We institute a spatial model to investigate the effects of influence-based reference selection pattern on the evolution of cooperation in the context of public goods games. Whenever experiencing strategy updating, all the individuals each choose one of its neighbors as a reference with the probability proportional to this neighbor’s influence. Levels of individuals’ influence are dynamical. When an individual is imitated, the level of its influence increases, thus constituting a positive feedback between the frequencies of individuals being imitated and the likelihood for them to be reference models. We find that the level of collective cooperation can be enhanced whenever the influence-based reference selection pattern is integrated into the strategy updating process. Results also show that the evolution of cooperation can be promoted when the increase in individuals’ frequency of being imitated upholds their influence in large magnitude. Our work may improve the understanding of how influence-based selection patterns promote cooperative behavior.

Promoting cooperation by preventing exploitation: The role of network structure

Science.gov (United States)

Utkovski, Zoran; Stojkoski, Viktor; Basnarkov, Lasko; Kocarev, Ljupco

2017-08-01

A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that social and cooperative behavior can be affected by cognitive and neurological factors, suggesting the existence of state-based decision-making mechanisms that may have emerged by evolution. Motivated by these observations, we propose a simple mechanism of anonymous network interactions identified as a form of generalized reciprocity—a concept organized around the premise "help anyone if helped by someone'—and study its dynamics on random graphs. In the presence of such a mechanism, the evolution of cooperation is related to the dynamics of the levels of investments (i.e., probabilities of cooperation) of the individual nodes engaging in interactions. We demonstrate that the propensity for cooperation is determined by a network centrality measure here referred to as neighborhood importance index and discuss relevant implications to natural and artificial systems. To address the robustness of the state-based strategies to an invasion of defectors, we additionally provide an analysis which redefines the results for the case when a fraction of the nodes behave as unconditional defectors.

Choosing the cooperative option

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

English, G. (National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (United States))

1999-06-01

Cooperatives do not ask to be exempted from the law. They do ask that laws and regulations be designed to allow them to meet the needs of their consumer-owners in accordance with cooperative principles, at a time that the marginal consumers being abandoned by for-profit utilities may be ready to gravitate toward cooperatives. The cooperative principles are worth reviewing because they explain the focus on the consumer and the cooperative concept of service: cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership; cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting policies and making decisions, the elected representatives are accountable to the membership; members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their cooperative; cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their members, if they enter into agreements with other organizations, including governments, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their cooperative autonomy; cooperatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their cooperatives, they inform the general public, particularly young people and opinion leaders, about the nature and benefits of cooperation; cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strength the cooperative movement by working together through local, national, regional, and international structures; and while focusing on member needs, cooperatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies accepted by their members.

Complex Cooperative Strategies in Group-Territorial African Lions

Science.gov (United States)

Heinsohn, Robert; Packer, Craig

1995-09-01

Female lions (Panthera leo) showed persistent individual differences in the extent to which they participated in group-territorial conflict. When intergroup encounters were simulated by playback of aggressive vocalizations, some individuals consistently led the approach to the recorded intruder, whereas others lagged behind and avoided the risks of fighting. The lead females recognized that certain companions were laggards but failed to punish them, which suggests that cooperation is not maintained by reciprocity. Modification of the "odds" in these encounters revealed that some females joined the group response when they were most needed, whereas other lagged even farther behind. The complexity of these responses emphasizes the great diversity of individual behavior in this species and the inadequacy of current theory to explain cooperation in large groups.

Cooperation Is Not Enough—Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use [corrected].

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Caroline Schill

Full Text Available Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived environmental uncertainty. Recent behavioral experimental research indicates variation in the degree to which a group of users can identify a sustainable exploitation level. In this paper, we identify social-ecological micro-foundations that facilitate cooperative sustainable common-pool resource use. We do so by using an agent-based model (ABM that is informed by behavioral common-pool resource experiments. In these experiments, groups that cooperate do not necessarily manage the resource sustainably, but also over- or underexploit. By reproducing the patterns of the behavioral experiments in a qualitative way, the ABM represents a social-ecological explanation for the experimental observations. We find that the ecological knowledge of each group member cannot sufficiently explain the relationship between cooperation and sustainable resource use. Instead, the development of a sustainable exploitation level depends on the distribution of ecological knowledge among the group members, their influence on each other's knowledge, and the environmental uncertainty the individuals perceive. The study provides insights about critical social-ecological micro-foundations underpinning collective action and sustainable resource management. These insights may inform policy-making, but also point to future research needs regarding the mechanisms of social learning, the development of shared management strategies and the interplay of social and ecological uncertainty.

Cooperation Is Not Enough—Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use [corrected].

Science.gov (United States)

Schill, Caroline; Wijermans, Nanda; Schlüter, Maja; Lindahl, Therese

2016-01-01

Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived environmental uncertainty. Recent behavioral experimental research indicates variation in the degree to which a group of users can identify a sustainable exploitation level. In this paper, we identify social-ecological micro-foundations that facilitate cooperative sustainable common-pool resource use. We do so by using an agent-based model (ABM) that is informed by behavioral common-pool resource experiments. In these experiments, groups that cooperate do not necessarily manage the resource sustainably, but also over- or underexploit. By reproducing the patterns of the behavioral experiments in a qualitative way, the ABM represents a social-ecological explanation for the experimental observations. We find that the ecological knowledge of each group member cannot sufficiently explain the relationship between cooperation and sustainable resource use. Instead, the development of a sustainable exploitation level depends on the distribution of ecological knowledge among the group members, their influence on each other's knowledge, and the environmental uncertainty the individuals perceive. The study provides insights about critical social-ecological micro-foundations underpinning collective action and sustainable resource management. These insights may inform policy-making, but also point to future research needs regarding the mechanisms of social learning, the development of shared management strategies and the interplay of social and ecological uncertainty.

International co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

In this part the are reviewed: Co-operation with IAEA; Participation of the Slovakia on the 41 st session of the General Conference; The comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; Co-operation with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; co-operation with the European Commission; Fulfillment of obligations resulting from the international contracting documents

The essential tension competition, cooperation and multilevel selection in evolution

CERN Document Server

Bahar, Sonya

2018-01-01

'The Essential Tension' explores how agents that naturally compete come to act together as a group. The author argues that the controversial concept of multilevel selection is essential to biological evolution, a proposition set to stimulate new debate. The idea of one collective unit emerging from the cooperative interactions of its constituent (and mutually competitive) parts has its roots in the ancient world. More recently, it has illuminated studies of animal behavior, and played a controversial role in evolutionary biology. In Part I, the author explores the historical development of the idea of a collectivity in biological systems, from early speculations on the sociology of human crowd behavior, through the mid-twentieth century debates over the role of group selection in evolution, to the notion of the selfish gene. Part II investigates the balance between competition and cooperation in a range of contemporary biological problems, from flocking and swarming to experimental evolution and the evolutio...

Children's Sympathy, Guilt, and Moral Reasoning in Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing: A 6-Year Longitudinal Study

Science.gov (United States)

Malti, Tina; Ongley, Sophia F.; Peplak, Joanna; Chaparro, Maria P.; Buchmann, Marlis; Zuffianò, Antonio; Cui, Lixian

2016-01-01

This study examined the role of sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning in helping, cooperation, and sharing in a 6-year, three-wave longitudinal study involving 175 children (M[subscript age] 6.10, 9.18, and 12.18 years). Primary caregivers reported on children's helping and cooperation; sharing was assessed behaviorally. Child sympathy was assessed…

Implementing Cooperative Behavior & Control Using Open Source Technology Across Heterogeneous Vehicles

Science.gov (United States)

2015-03-26

cooperative control algorithms used for multiple SUAS to perform surveillance using equal angular spacing from the ground target [16]. The algorithm...allows each SUAS in the surveillance mission to loiter around a target at an equal angular spacing from one another on the same loiter path. This...Planner has included. For instance, Mission Planner has the ability to run Python scripts. Python is a programming language like Java . With the

Coevolution of Synchronization and Cooperation in Costly Networked Interactions

Science.gov (United States)

Antonioni, Alberto; Cardillo, Alessio

2017-06-01

Despite the large number of studies on synchronization, the hypothesis that interactions bear a cost for involved individuals has seldom been considered. The introduction of costly interactions leads, instead, to the formulation of a dichotomous scenario in which an individual may decide to cooperate and pay the cost in order to get synchronized with the rest of the population. Alternatively, the same individual can decide to free ride, without incurring any cost, waiting for others to get synchronized to his or her state. Thus, the emergence of synchronization may be seen as the byproduct of an evolutionary game in which individuals decide their behavior according to the benefit-to-cost ratio they accrued in the past. We study the onset of cooperation and synchronization in networked populations of Kuramoto oscillators and report how topology is essential in order for cooperation to thrive. We also display how different classes of topology foster synchronization differently both at microscopic and macroscopic levels.

Evolution of cooperation driven by incremental learning

Science.gov (United States)

Li, Pei; Duan, Haibin

2015-02-01

It has been shown that the details of microscopic rules in structured populations can have a crucial impact on the ultimate outcome in evolutionary games. So alternative formulations of strategies and their revision processes exploring how strategies are actually adopted and spread within the interaction network need to be studied. In the present work, we formulate the strategy update rule as an incremental learning process, wherein knowledge is refreshed according to one's own experience learned from the past (self-learning) and that gained from social interaction (social-learning). More precisely, we propose a continuous version of strategy update rules, by introducing the willingness to cooperate W, to better capture the flexibility of decision making behavior. Importantly, the newly gained knowledge including self-learning and social learning is weighted by the parameter ω, establishing a strategy update rule involving innovative element. Moreover, we quantify the macroscopic features of the emerging patterns to inspect the underlying mechanisms of the evolutionary process using six cluster characteristics. In order to further support our results, we examine the time evolution course for these characteristics. Our results might provide insights for understanding cooperative behaviors and have several important implications for understanding how individuals adjust their strategies under real-life conditions.

Effect of self-interaction on the evolution of cooperation in complex topologies

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Yu'e.; Zhang, Zhipeng; Chang, Shuhua

2017-09-01

Self-interaction, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this text, we consider a new self-interaction mechanism in the two typical pairwise models including the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift games, where the cooperative agents will gain extra bonus for their selfless behavior. We find that under the mechanism the collective cooperation is elevated to a very high level especially after adopting the finite population analogue of replicator dynamics for evolution. The robustness of the new mechanism is tested for different complex topologies for the prisoner's dilemma game. All the presented results demonstrate that the enhancement effects are independent of the structure of the applied spatial networks and the potential evolutionary games, and thus showing a high degree of universality. Our conclusions might shed light on the understanding of the evolution of cooperation in the real world.

Cooperative Testing of Uncontrollable Timed Systems

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

David, Alexandre; Larsen, Kim Guldstrand; Li, Shuhao

2008-01-01

the SUT against the test purpose as long as the SUT reacts to our moves in a cooperative style. We present an operational framework of cooperative winning strategy generation, test case derivation and execution. The test method is proved to be sound and complete. Preliminary experimental results indicate......Abstract. This paper deals with targeted testing of timed systems with uncontrollable behavior. The testing activity is viewed as a game between the tester and the system under test (SUT) towards a given test purpose. The SUT is modeled as Timed Game Automaton and the test purpose is specified...... in Timed CTL formula. We can employ a timed game solver UPPAAL-TIGA to check if the test purpose is ture w.r.t. the model, and if yes, to generate a winning strategy and use it for black-box conformance testing. Specifically, we show that in case the checking yields a negative result, we can still test...

Does cooperation mean kinship between spatially discrete ant nests?

Science.gov (United States)

Procter, Duncan S; Cottrell, Joan E; Watts, Kevin; A'Hara, Stuart W; Hofreiter, Michael; Robinson, Elva J H

2016-12-01

Eusociality is one of the most complex forms of social organization, characterized by cooperative and reproductive units termed colonies. Altruistic behavior of workers within colonies is explained by inclusive fitness, with indirect fitness benefits accrued by helping kin. Members of a social insect colony are expected to be more closely related to one another than they are to other conspecifics. In many social insects, the colony can extend to multiple socially connected but spatially separate nests (polydomy). Social connections, such as trails between nests, promote cooperation and resource exchange, and we predict that workers from socially connected nests will have higher internest relatedness than those from socially unconnected, and noncooperating, nests. We measure social connections, resource exchange, and internest genetic relatedness in the polydomous wood ant Formica lugubris to test whether (1) socially connected but spatially separate nests cooperate, and (2) high internest relatedness is the underlying driver of this cooperation. Our results show that socially connected nests exhibit movement of workers and resources, which suggests they do cooperate, whereas unconnected nests do not. However, we find no difference in internest genetic relatedness between socially connected and unconnected nest pairs, both show high kinship. Our results suggest that neighboring pairs of connected nests show a social and cooperative distinction, but no genetic distinction. We hypothesize that the loss of a social connection may initiate ecological divergence within colonies. Genetic divergence between neighboring nests may build up only later, as a consequence rather than a cause of colony separation.

The effect of heterogeneous defectors on the evolution of public cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Tong; Hu, Xuezhi; Wang, Yongjie; Wang, Le

2018-06-01

In recent years,more and more private capital join the construction of cultural facilities and the organization of cultural activities in China. Actually, the organization of cultural activities by crowd-funding mechanism is a kind of multi-player game. Not all players who donate different amount of money are real cooperators. In fact, some cunning defectors may donate a little money to avoid the gossip and punishment. This part of people are very tricky. They could be seen as heterogeneous defectors. The role of heterogeneous defectors is investigated in cooperative behaviors of complex social network. Numerical results show that heterogeneous defectors could be a buffer for maintaining the public pool when synergy factor is low in public goods game (PGG). It is relatively easy to be cooperators for heterogeneous defectors when synergy factor is high in PGG. To better improve cooperation, punishment towards heterogeneous defectors and complete defectors is introduced. We are glad to find that when the defectors' loss is equal to or larger than the altruistic cooperators' punishment cost, the mechanism could make great effect. In addition, the role of heterogeneous defectors depends on the relationship between the punishment cost and the defectors' loss.

Problems of integrated palliative care: a Dutch case study of routines and cooperation in the region of Arnhem.

Science.gov (United States)

van Raak, Arno; Paulus, Aggie; Cuijpers, Rianne; Te Velde, Clary

2008-12-01

Cooperation in networks of providers of palliative care in Europe is problematic. Based on the concept of routines (patterns of behavior) and data about a Dutch network, we developed an explanation of this problem, in order to better understand the conditions for cooperation. Although more research is needed, the study suggests that disparate matches (divergence) between routines of the network members hampers cooperation. To promote cooperation, divergence, and legislation that stabilizes existing routines, must be identified. Divergence must be overcome and negotiations and transformational leadership, which require power sources, may be useful for this.

An Examination of the Feasibility of Integrating Motivational Interviewing Techniques into FCS Cooperative Extension Programming

Science.gov (United States)

Radunovich, Heidi Liss; Ellis, Sarah; Spangler, Taylor

2017-01-01

Demonstrating program impact through behavior change is critical for the continued success of Family and Consumer Sciences (FCS) Cooperative Extension programming. However, the literature suggests that simply providing information to participants does not necessarily lead to behavior change. This study pilot tested the integration of Motivational…

Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

María Pereda

2017-01-01

Full Text Available In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG among themselves and the pay-off matrix of an individual changes according to the number of neighbors that are “vigilant”, i.e., how many neighbors watch out for her behavior. In particular, the temptation to defect decreases linearly with the number of vigilant neighbors. This model proved to support cooperation in specific conditions, and here we check its robustness with different topologies, microscopical update rules and initial conditions. By means of many numerical simulations and few theoretical considerations, we find in which situations the vigilance by the others is more effective in favoring cooperative behaviors and when its influence is weaker.

Effects of heterogeneous wealth distribution on public cooperation with collective risk

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Jing; Fu, Feng; Wang, Long

2010-07-01

The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or “80-20 rule.” How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public cooperation, when individuals, the rich and the poor, engage in a collective-risk enterprise, not to gain a profit but to avoid a potential loss? Here we address this issue by studying a simple but effective model based on threshold public goods games. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics for two distinct scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers versus defectors and the other with altruists versus defectors. For both scenarios, particularly, we in detail study the dynamics of the population with dichotomic initial wealth—the rich versus the poor. Moreover, we demonstrate the possible steady compositions of the population and provide the conditions for stability of these steady states. We prove that in a population with heterogeneous wealth distribution, richer individuals are more likely to cooperate than poorer ones. Participants with lower initial wealth may choose to cooperate only if all players richer than them are cooperators. The emergence of pubic cooperation largely relies on rich individuals. Furthermore, whenever the wealth gap between the rich and the poor is sufficiently large, cooperation of a few rich individuals can substantially elevate the overall level of social cooperation, which is in line with the well-known Pareto principle. Our work may offer an insight into the emergence of cooperative behavior in real social situations where heterogeneous distribution of wealth among individual is omnipresent.

Effects of heterogeneous wealth distribution on public cooperation with collective risk.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Jing; Fu, Feng; Wang, Long

2010-07-01

The distribution of wealth among individuals in real society can be well described by the Pareto principle or "80-20 rule." How does such heterogeneity in initial wealth distribution affect the emergence of public cooperation, when individuals, the rich and the poor, engage in a collective-risk enterprise, not to gain a profit but to avoid a potential loss? Here we address this issue by studying a simple but effective model based on threshold public goods games. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics for two distinct scenarios, respectively: one with fair sharers versus defectors and the other with altruists versus defectors. For both scenarios, particularly, we in detail study the dynamics of the population with dichotomic initial wealth-the rich versus the poor. Moreover, we demonstrate the possible steady compositions of the population and provide the conditions for stability of these steady states. We prove that in a population with heterogeneous wealth distribution, richer individuals are more likely to cooperate than poorer ones. Participants with lower initial wealth may choose to cooperate only if all players richer than them are cooperators. The emergence of pubic cooperation largely relies on rich individuals. Furthermore, whenever the wealth gap between the rich and the poor is sufficiently large, cooperation of a few rich individuals can substantially elevate the overall level of social cooperation, which is in line with the well-known Pareto principle. Our work may offer an insight into the emergence of cooperative behavior in real social situations where heterogeneous distribution of wealth among individual is omnipresent.

Sorting and sustaining cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Vikander, Nick

2013-01-01

This paper looks at cooperation in teams where some people are selfish and others are conditional cooperators, and where lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date. I show that the best way to sustain cooperation prior to the lay-offs is often in a sorting equilibrium, where conditional cooperators...... can identify and then work with one another. Changes to parameters that would seem to make cooperation more attractive, such as an increase in the discount factor or the fraction of conditional cooperators, can reduce equilibrium cooperation if they decrease a selfish player's incentive to sort....

Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tongyao Feng

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

Regional cooperation based on multilateral international agreements in nuclear field

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valcic, I.

1996-01-01

Multilateral international agreements have defined the framework of behavior and cooperation in various fields and aspects of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus, obligations have been defined in the following areas: nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, physical protection of nuclear material, liability for nuclear damage, nuclear safety, early notification about a nuclear accident and assistance in case of nuclear accident. Obligations regarding radioactive waste management should be defined soon. This paper gives a review of obligations from particular agreements with a special emphasis on those which are being realized through mutual cooperation of concerned countries and are important for safe use of nuclear energy. (author)

Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do

Science.gov (United States)

Hoffman, Moshe; Yoeli, Erez; Nowak, Martin A.

2015-01-01

Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to “look” at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love. PMID:25624473

Cooperate without looking: why we care what people think and not just what they do.

Science.gov (United States)

Hoffman, Moshe; Yoeli, Erez; Nowak, Martin A

2015-02-10

Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to "look" at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love.

Cooperatives as Entrants

OpenAIRE

Richard J. Sexton; Terri A. Sexton

1987-01-01

A potential shortcoming of game-theoretic models in industrial organization is their failure to consider consumers as players. We introduce a customer coalition --- a cooperative -- as a potential entrant and compare the cooperative entry threat with that posed by the usual for-profit entrant. We identify four fundamental distinctions between cooperative and for-profit entrants and demonstrate that the strategic interplay between a cooperative and an incumbent firm may differ markedly from th...

Sniffing the mood for cooperation: Personality and odor induced affective states effects

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Marchlewska Marta

2016-06-01

Full Text Available The paper explores situational and dispositional underpinnings of cooperative behavior. According to psychological research, cooperation is strongly related to affective states (Forgas, 1998 and personality dimensions (Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2011. In an experimental study we examined the conditions under which people cooperate with each other. The dispositional traits of co-workers (personality, the contribution to a collaborative effort, and a situational factor – ambient odor condition were taken into consideration. A one-way ANOVA revealed that compared to a malodorous condition, both the pleasant odor condition and the natural odor condition showed higher rates of cooperation. Further analysis indicated that only malodors influenced affective states which in turn determined social decisions. Although we found effects for the participants’ agreeableness and the coworker’s contribution to a joint work, they appeared to play a less critical role than affective states induced by the experimental odor conditions tested here.

Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Junhui; Balliet, Daniel; Van Lange, Paul A. M.

2016-01-01

Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members’ future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members’ outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation. PMID:27039896

Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Junhui; Balliet, Daniel; Van Lange, Paul A M

2016-04-04

Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members' future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members' outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation.

Alternative vision or utopian fantasy? Cooperation, empowerment and women's cooperative development in India.

Science.gov (United States)

Mayoux, L

1995-01-01

The discussion addresses the costs and benefits of working in cooperatives in India, imposed participation, methods for increasing incomes, preconceived models, the importance of meeting the actual needs of women, and participatory options. This author evaluated 10 producer cooperatives in West Bengal, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu during 1984-92. It is argued that more discussion is needed on how ideals of cooperation and empowerment of women can occur simultaneous with the context in which cooperatives must operate. The ten study cooperatives were all officially registered cooperatives. Cooperatives varied in size, organizational structure, and forms of support. Four were determined to be successful in economic and participatory terms. Three were successful because of the efforts of the women themselves. All three cases were based on earning goals that were higher than the women could have achieved on their own. Six failed in terms of participatory decision making and cooperative operations. Lack of sufficient support and/or excessive bureaucratic red tape were involved in the six failures, but to varying degrees. Type of support and means of implementation were important in the six failures. All women used cooperatives as a means of increasing income. Participation rules were imposed by outside agencies. Women were given "cooperative" training. Disputes occurred because women selected to power positions were powerful leaders outside the cooperative. Consensus was difficult to reach. There were conflicts of interest between different departments. Quality control was made difficult by women's inability to provide discipline. Personal conflicts from outside were carried on within the cooperative. Incomes could be improved by training women in local marketing and networking, insuring adequate resources and capital, and providing savings schemes. Gender inequalities were a key factor limiting income for women, but cooperatives did not address this issue. Gains for women

Economics and sociology: Between cooperation and intolerance

OpenAIRE

Stojanović Božo

2007-01-01

In social sciences two opposing tendencies act simultaneously: the growth of specialization and the need for synthesis. Similar tendencies are noticeable when economics and sociology are in question. The need for these two sciences to cooperate was noticed a long time ago. However, an increasingly intensive exchange has been achieved only recently, particularly in the explanation of individual and group behavior. The works of Mancur Olson are a good example how the results of economics can be...

ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY: BETWEN COOPERATION AND INTOLERANCE

OpenAIRE

Božo Stojanović

2007-01-01

In social sciences two opposing tendencies act simultaneously: the growth of specialisation and the need for synthesis. Similar tendencies are noticable when economics and sociology are in question. The need for these two sciences to cooperate was noticed a long time ago. However, an incresingly intensive exchange has been achieved only recently, particularly in the explanation of individual and group behavior. The works of Mancur Olson are a good example how the results of economics can be i...

Stochastic heterogeneous interaction promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ping Zhu

Full Text Available Previous studies mostly investigate player's cooperative behavior as affected by game time-scale or individual diversity. In this paper, by involving both time-scale and diversity simultaneously, we explore the effect of stochastic heterogeneous interaction. In our model, the occurrence of game interaction between each pair of linked player obeys a random probability, which is further described by certain distributions. Simulations on a 4-neighbor square lattice show that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted when stochastic heterogeneous interaction is considered. The results are then explained by investigating the mean payoffs, the mean boundary payoffs and the transition probabilities between cooperators and defectors. We also show some typical snapshots and evolution time series of the system. Finally, the 8-neighbor square lattice and BA scale-free network results indicate that the stochastic heterogeneous interaction can be robust against different network topologies. Our work may sharpen the understanding of the joint effect of game time-scale and individual diversity on spatial games.

Explaining Large-N Cooperation: Generalized Social Trust and the Social Exchange Heuristic

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Sønderskov, Kim Mannemar

2011-01-01

This article presents a new argument that links generalized social trust and collective action in situations with a large number of actors, who do not have specific information on each other. Generalized social trust enhances large-N cooperation through the social exchange heuristic, which...... stimulate conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. Using data from a survey in four countries and recycling behavior as an indicator of collective action, this explanation is tested with individual level data. While the relationship between generalized social trust and large-N collective action is often...... hypothesized, there is scant micro level evidence as it has mainly been tested at the macro level. The results show that people holding generalized social trust cooperate more readily in large-N dilemmas, and that they most likely do so because of the social exchange heuristic....

Multiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games

Science.gov (United States)

Jiang, Luo-Luo; Li, Wen-Jing; Wang, Zhen

2015-10-01

The social influence exists widely in the human society, where individual decision-making process (from congressional election to electronic commerce) may be affected by the attitude and behavior of others belonging to different social networks. Here, we couple the snowdrift (SD) game and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game on two interdependent networks, where strategies in both games are associated by social influence to mimick the majority rule. More accurately, individuals’ strategies updating refers to social learning (based on payoff difference) and above-mentioned social influence (related with environment of interdependent group), which is controlled by social influence strength s. Setting s = 0 decouples the networks and returns the traditional network game; while its increase involves the interactions between networks. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we find that such a mechanism brings multiple influence to the evolution of cooperation. Small s leads to unequal cooperation level in both games, because social learning is still the main updating rule for most players. Though intermediate and large s guarantees the synchronized evolution of strategy pairs, cooperation finally dies out and reaches a completely dominance in both cases. Interestingly, these observations are attributed to the expansion of cooperation clusters. Our work may provide a new understanding to the emergence of cooperation in intercorrelated social systems.

On cooperative and efficient overlay network evolution based on a group selection pattern.

Science.gov (United States)

Nakao, Akihiro; Wang, Yufeng

2010-04-01

In overlay networks, the interplay between network structure and dynamics remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we study dynamic coevolution between individual rational strategies (cooperative or defect) and the overlay network structure, that is, the interaction between peer's local rational behaviors and the emergence of the whole network structure. We propose an evolutionary game theory (EGT)-based overlay topology evolution scheme to drive a given overlay into the small-world structure (high global network efficiency and average clustering coefficient). Our contributions are the following threefold: From the viewpoint of peers' local interactions, we explicitly consider the peer's rational behavior and introduce a link-formation game to characterize the social dilemma of forming links in an overlay network. Furthermore, in the evolutionary link-formation phase, we adopt a simple economic process: Each peer keeps one link to a cooperative neighbor in its neighborhood, which can slightly speed up the convergence of cooperation and increase network efficiency; from the viewpoint of the whole network structure, our simulation results show that the EGT-based scheme can drive an arbitrary overlay network into a fully cooperative and efficient small-world structure. Moreover, we compare our scheme with a search-based economic model of network formation and illustrate that our scheme can achieve the experimental and analytical results in the latter model. In addition, we also graphically illustrate the final overlay network structure; finally, based on the group selection model and evolutionary set theory, we theoretically obtain the approximate threshold of cost and draw the conclusion that the small value of the average degree and the large number of the total peers in an overlay network facilitate the evolution of cooperation.

Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation.

Science.gov (United States)

Masuda, Naoki

2012-10-21

Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other players having good reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively large populations subjected to social dilemma situations. When the population has group structure, as is often found in social networks, players in experiments are considered to show behavior that deviates from existing theoretical models of indirect reciprocity. First, players often show ingroup favoritism (i.e., cooperation only within the group) rather than full cooperation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups), even though the latter is Pareto efficient. Second, in general, humans approximate outgroup members' personal characteristics, presumably including the reputation used for indirect reciprocity, by a single value attached to the group. Humans use such a stereotypic approximation, a phenomenon known as outgroup homogeneity in social psychology. I propose a model of indirect reciprocity in populations with group structure to examine the possibility of ingroup favoritism and full cooperation. In accordance with outgroup homogeneity, I assume that players approximate outgroup members' personal reputations by a single reputation value attached to the group. I show that ingroup favoritism and full cooperation are stable under different social norms (i.e., rules for assigning reputations) such that they do not coexist in a single model. If players are forced to consistently use the same social norm for assessing different types of interactions (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup interactions), only full cooperation survives. The discovered mechanism is distinct from any form of group selection. The results also suggest potential methods for reducing ingroup bias to shift the equilibrium from ingroup favoritism to full cooperation. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Molecular cooperativity and compatibility via full atomistic simulation

Science.gov (United States)

Kwan Yang, Kenny

Civil engineering has customarily focused on problems from a large-scale perspective, encompassing structures such as bridges, dams, and infrastructure. However, present day challenges in conjunction with advances in nanotechnology have forced a re-focusing of expertise. The use of atomistic and molecular approaches to study material systems opens the door to significantly improve material properties. The understanding that material systems themselves are structures, where their assemblies can dictate design capacities and failure modes makes this problem well suited for those who possess expertise in structural engineering. At the same time, a focus has been given to the performance metrics of materials at the nanoscale, including strength, toughness, and transport properties (e.g., electrical, thermal). Little effort has been made in the systematic characterization of system compatibility -- e.g., how to make disparate material building blocks behave in unison. This research attempts to develop bottom-up molecular scale understanding of material behavior, with the global objective being the application of this understanding into material design/characterization at an ultimate functional scale. In particular, it addresses the subject of cooperativity at the nano-scale. This research aims to define the conditions which dictate when discrete molecules may behave as a single, functional unit, thereby facilitating homogenization and up-scaling approaches, setting bounds for assembly, and providing a transferable assessment tool across molecular systems. Following a macro-scale pattern where the compatibility of deformation plays a vital role in the structural design, novel geometrical cooperativity metrics based on the gyration tensor are derived with the intention to define nano-cooperativity in a generalized way. The metrics objectively describe the general size, shape and orientation of the structure. To validate the derived measures, a pair of ideal macromolecules

The effect of oxytocin on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma depends on the social context and a person's social value orientation.

Science.gov (United States)

Declerck, Carolyn H; Boone, Christophe; Kiyonari, Toko

2014-06-01

The interactionist approach to the study of exogenous oxytocin (OT) effects on prosocial behavior has emphasized the need to consider both contextual cues and individual differences. Therefore, an experiment was set up to examine the joint effect of intranasal OT, a salient social cue and the personality trait social value orientation on cooperative behavior in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. The outcome of these mixed-motive games is known to be highly dependent on values and on social information that might reveal the partner's intent. Consistent with an a priori hypothesis, OT and social information interact significantly to affect the behavior of individuals with a proself value orientation: after prior contact with the game partner, OT enhances cooperative behavior, whereas in anonymous conditions, it exacerbates their intrinsic self-interested behavior. These effects of OT do not hold for individuals with a prosocial value orientation, whose cooperation levels appear to be more influenced by prior contact with the game partner. Follow-up hypotheses for why prosocial and proself individuals respond differently to exogenous OT were developed. © The Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Failures of Corporate Governance in Housing Cooperatives – Case Study

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Waldemar Walczak

2013-09-01

Full Text Available Purpose: The purpose of this paper is a discussion and in-depth analysis of the legal and organizational circumstances associated with the activities of Supervisory Boards in housing cooperatives.Methodology: A critical analysis of the existing legislation, own analytical analysis of the source documents, supplemented by conclusions and observations formulated on the basis of a case study, for the preparation of which information has been used obtained from primary sources in the form of documents of the analyzed housing cooperative and information obtained through participant observation.Findings: What has a decisive impact on the mechanisms of corporate governance in housing cooperatives are the direct behaviors of Supervisory Board members, as well as the lack of awareness and involvement of the residents, who do not want to actively participate in the life of the cooperative. A diagnosis is presented of the most important factors that infl uence the actual operations of the analyzed Supervisory Board. While the current legal regulations make it possible to ensure effective and proper control as well as adequate supervision over the activities of cooperatives.Originality: The paper enriches the theory of management sciences in terms of a wider perception of the term corporate governance in relation to other organizations than companies. The presented methodological approach that is the basis for a comprehensive and thorough inspection of the activities of the Management Board can be used in other cooperatives as well. In the literature on the subject no similar analysis, supported by the results of own analytical research, had been found.

International co-operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klinda, J.; Lieskovska, Z.

1998-01-01

Within the Union Nations (UN) framework, the Slovak Republic participated in following activities on environment protection co-operation: UN European Economic Commission, UN Industrial Development Organization, UN Development Programme, UN Human Habitat Organization, UN Environment Programme, and UN Commission on Sustainable Development. Relevant activities of the Slovak Republic in these co-operations as well as in European Union and OECD activities are reviewed. International conventions and other forms of multilateral co-operation, bilateral co-operation, and international programmes and projects in which the Slovak Republic took participate are presented

Cooperative behavior evolution of small groups on interconnected networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huang, Keke; Cheng, Yuan; Zheng, Xiaoping; Yang, Yeqing

2015-01-01

Highlights: • Small groups are modeled on interconnected networks. • Players face different dilemmas inside and outside small groups. • Impact of the ratio and strength of link on the behavioral evolution are studied. - Abstract: Understanding the behavioral evolution in evacuation is significant for guiding and controlling the evacuation process. Based on the fact that the population consists of many small groups, here we model the small groups which are separated in space but linked by other methods, such as kinship, on interconnected networks. Namely, the players in the same layer belong to an identical small group, while the players located in different layers belong to different small groups. And the players of different layers establish interaction by edge crossed layers. In addition, players face different dilemmas inside and outside small groups, in detail, the players in the same layer play prisoner’s dilemma, but players in different layers play harmony game. By means of numerous simulations, we study the impact of the ratio and strength of link on the behavioral evolution. Because the framework of this work takes the space distribution into account, which is close to the realistic life, we hope that it can provide a new insight to reveal the law of behavioral evolution of evacuation population.

Cooperatives between truth and validity

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Guilherme Krueger

2014-12-01

Full Text Available The current declaration of the International Cooperative Alliance on cooperative identity since its 1995 Centennial Conference (which was held in Manchester makes no distinction between cooperation and cooperative. The lack of distinction between cooperation and cooperative has caused the Decennial Cooperative Action Plan to define cooperatives as a form, while their materiality is regarded as managerial: a business (activity under a cooperative form. An identity that is close to us cannot be reduced to form, without this being a problem. Therefore, the value underlying this identity —cooperation— must have a substantial basis, even if it is idealised, if it is to affect us.Received: 27.03.2014Accepted: 12.05.2014

The effect of oxytocin on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma depends on the social context and a person’s social value orientation

Science.gov (United States)

Boone, Christophe; Kiyonari, Toko

2014-01-01

The interactionist approach to the study of exogenous oxytocin (OT) effects on prosocial behavior has emphasized the need to consider both contextual cues and individual differences. Therefore, an experiment was set up to examine the joint effect of intranasal OT, a salient social cue and the personality trait social value orientation on cooperative behavior in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games. The outcome of these mixed-motive games is known to be highly dependent on values and on social information that might reveal the partner’s intent. Consistent with an a priori hypothesis, OT and social information interact significantly to affect the behavior of individuals with a proself value orientation: after prior contact with the game partner, OT enhances cooperative behavior, whereas in anonymous conditions, it exacerbates their intrinsic self-interested behavior. These effects of OT do not hold for individuals with a prosocial value orientation, whose cooperation levels appear to be more influenced by prior contact with the game partner. Follow-up hypotheses for why prosocial and proself individuals respond differently to exogenous OT were developed. PMID:23588271

Conflictual cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Axel, Erik

2011-01-01

, cooperation appeared as the continuous reworking of contradictions in the local arrangement of societal con- ditions. Subjects were distributed and distributed themselves according to social privileges, resources, and dilemmas in cooperation. Here, the subjects’ activities and understandings took form from...

Impact of self interaction on the evolution of cooperation in social spatial dilemmas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ding, Chenxi; Wang, Juan; Zhang, Ying

2016-01-01

Highlights: • A self interaction mechanism is integrated into two classical game models (PDG and SDG). • An additional payoff will be awarded into the cooperative agents for the payoff calculation. • Beyond the fixed interaction strength, distributed interaction strength is considered. • The collective cooperation can be drastically elevated into a higher level. - Abstract: In this paper, a new self interaction mechanism is integrated into two typical pairwise models including the prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift games, where an additional payoff will be awarded into the cooperative agents. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, we take three types of additional payoffs into account, to be a fixed constant, a random value situated within the positive unilateral interval and a random one uniformly distributed within a bilateral interval. Large quantities of numerical simulations indicate the promotion of cooperation can be very noticeable whether in the case of von Neumann neighborhood or Moore neighborhood. In the meantime, the self interaction will also be extended into the snowdrift game in which two equilibria exist, and the outcomes clearly show that the collective cooperation is still drastically elevated into a higher level. Current results demonstrate that the self interaction might become a potential and effective means to enhance the behavior of cooperation, and be helpful for us to deeply understand the widespread persistence and emergence of cooperation within many animal and human being societies.

When cooperation begets cooperation: the role of key individuals in galvanizing support.

Science.gov (United States)

McAuliffe, Katherine; Wrangham, Richard; Glowacki, Luke; Russell, Andrew F

2015-12-05

Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in--and provide testable hypotheses of--two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation? © 2015 The Author(s).

Adaptive and bounded investment returns promote cooperation in spatial public goods games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xiaojie Chen

Full Text Available The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations.

Evolutionary Fuzzy Control and Navigation for Two Wheeled Robots Cooperatively Carrying an Object in Unknown Environments.

Science.gov (United States)

Juang, Chia-Feng; Lai, Min-Ge; Zeng, Wan-Ting

2015-09-01

This paper presents a method that allows two wheeled, mobile robots to navigate unknown environments while cooperatively carrying an object. In the navigation method, a leader robot and a follower robot cooperatively perform either obstacle boundary following (OBF) or target seeking (TS) to reach a destination. The two robots are controlled by fuzzy controllers (FC) whose rules are learned through an adaptive fusion of continuous ant colony optimization and particle swarm optimization (AF-CACPSO), which avoids the time-consuming task of manually designing the controllers. The AF-CACPSO-based evolutionary fuzzy control approach is first applied to the control of a single robot to perform OBF. The learning approach is then applied to achieve cooperative OBF with two robots, where an auxiliary FC designed with the AF-CACPSO is used to control the follower robot. For cooperative TS, a rule for coordination of the two robots is developed. To navigate cooperatively, a cooperative behavior supervisor is introduced to select between cooperative OBF and cooperative TS. The performance of the AF-CACPSO is verified through comparisons with various population-based optimization algorithms for the OBF learning problem. Simulations and experiments verify the effectiveness of the approach for cooperative navigation of two robots.

Game-theoretic cooperativity in networks of self-interested units

Science.gov (United States)

Barto, Andrew G.

1986-08-01

The behavior of theoretical neural networks is often described in terms of competition and cooperation. I present an approach to network learning that is related to game and team problems in which competition and cooperation have more technical meanings. I briefly describe the application of stochastic learning automata to game and team problems and then present an adaptive element that is a synthesis of aspects of stochastic learning automata and typical neuron-like adaptive elements. These elements act as self-interested agents that work toward improving their performance with respect to their individual preference orderings. Networks of these elements can solve a variety of team decision problems, some of which take the form of layered networks in which the ``hidden units'' become appropriate functional components as they attempt to improve their own payoffs.

Factors affecting athletes' motor behavior after the observation of scenes of cooperation and competition in competitive sport: the effect of sport attitude.

Science.gov (United States)

Stefani, Elisa De; De Marco, Doriana; Gentilucci, Maurizio

2015-01-01

This study delineated how observing sports scenes of cooperation or competition modulated an action of interaction, in expert athletes, depending on their specific sport attitude. In a kinematic study, athletes were divided into two groups depending on their attitude toward teammates (cooperative or competitive). Participants observed sport scenes of cooperation and competition (basketball, soccer, water polo, volleyball, and rugby) and then they reached for, picked up, and placed an object on the hand of a conspecific (giving action). Mixed-design ANOVAs were carried out on the mean values of grasping-reaching parameters. Data showed that the type of scene observed as well as the athletes' attitude affected reach-to-grasp actions to give. In particular, the cooperative athletes were speeded when they observed scenes of cooperation compared to when they observed scenes of competition. Participants were speeded when executing a giving action after observing actions of cooperation. This occurred only when they had a cooperative attitude. A match between attitude and intended action seems to be a necessary prerequisite for observing an effect of the observed type of scene on the performed action. It is possible that the observation of scenes of competition activated motor strategies which interfered with the strategies adopted by the cooperative participants to execute a cooperative (giving) sequence.

Ranking Features on Psychological Dynamics of Cooperative Team Work through Bayesian Networks

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pilar Fuster-Parra

2016-05-01

Full Text Available The aim of this study is to rank some features that characterize the psychological dynamics of cooperative team work in order to determine priorities for interventions and formation: leading positive feedback, cooperative manager and collaborative manager features. From a dataset of 20 cooperative sport teams (403 soccer players, the characteristics of the prototypical sports teams are studied using an average Bayesian network (BN and two special types of BNs, the Bayesian classifiers: naive Bayes (NB and tree augmented naive Bayes (TAN. BNs are selected as they are able to produce probability estimates rather than predictions. BN results show that the antecessors (the “top” features ranked are the team members’ expectations and their attraction to the social aspects of the task. The main node is formed by the cooperative behaviors, the consequences ranked at the BN bottom (ratified by the TAN trees and the instantiations made, the roles assigned to the members and their survival inside the same team. These results should help managers to determine contents and priorities when they have to face team-building actions.

From Scorecard to Social Learning: A Reflective Coassessment Approach for Promoting Multiagency Cooperation in Natural Resource Management

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Dirk J. Roux

2011-03-01

Full Text Available The responsibility for managing and conserving freshwater ecosystems is typically shared by multiple organizations with sometimes conflicting policy mandates. However, scorecard-based approaches for measuring management effectiveness in natural resource management are usually confined to single organizations. This paper describes a social learning approach which acknowledges cooperation as an essential precondition for effective management and that encourages reflective coassessment of cooperative relationships. The approach was pilot tested with eight participating organizations in one water management area in South Africa. It specifically aimed to allow for a multiagency reflective assessment of issues determining cooperative behavior, allow context-specific adaptations, and be embedded in adaptive management. It involved development of a spreadsheet-based scorecard-type tool that can be used to facilitate a multiagency workshop. This workshop serves to bring parties face-to-face and helps them codiscover their interdependence, shortcomings, and strengths. The spreadsheet structures reflection on their respective roles and effectiveness while the reflective coassessment motivates participants to address shortcomings. Overall, insights that emerged included: cooperation should be an explicit component of each organization's operational strategy; facilitation of appropriate cooperative behavior could be very effectively achieved by external "bridging organizations"; the reflective assessment process must be followed by purposefully adaptive interventions; the ability of the scorecard to be contextually adaptive was important; and institutional readiness requires investigation as the approach does sit somewhat uncomfortably with much current practice.

Proto-cooperation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Herbert-Read, James E; Romanczuk, Pawel; Krause, Stefan

2016-01-01

beneficial if the cost of attacking is high, and only then when waiting times are short. Our findings provide evidence that cooperative benefits can be realized through the facilitative effects of individuals' hunting actions without spatial coordination of attacks. Such 'proto-cooperation' may be the pre...

Team Cooperation in a Network of Multi-Vehicle Unmanned Systems Synthesis of Consensus Algorithms

CERN Document Server

Semsar-Kazerooni, Elham

2013-01-01

Team Cooperation in a Network of Multi-Vehicle Unmanned Systems develops a framework for modeling and control of a network of multi-agent unmanned systems in a cooperative manner and with consideration of non-ideal and practical considerations. The main focus of this book is the development of “synthesis-based” algorithms rather than on conventional “analysis-based” approaches to the team cooperation, specifically the team consensus problems. The authors provide a set of modified “design-based” consensus algorithms whose optimality is verified through introduction of performance indices. This book also: Provides synthesis-based methodology for team cooperation Introduces a consensus-protocol optimized performance index  Offers comparisons for use of proper indices in measuring team performance Analyzes and predicts  performance of  previously designed consensus algorithms Analyses and predicts team behavior in the presence of non-ideal considerations such as actuator anomalies and faults as wel...

The Asia-Pacific Region on the Paris Agreement against Climate Change: Geopolitics and Cooperation

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Ana Bertha Cuevas Tello

2017-11-01

Full Text Available Given the complexity surrounding climate change, it is argued that the willingness to cooperate on the part of the States is based on one of the faces that, for the climate field, can offer geopolitics: strengths or weaknesses (understood as vulnerability of geographical conditions, location and territory. That is, the physical, geographic, economic and demographic factors of each State influence the decision making of the foreign climate policy, which induces them to cooperate or the abstention of it. This paper will address, broadly speaking, the participation of the main economies of the Asia-Pacific region in the institutionalization of climate change in the International Agenda; the importance of the economies of the Asia-Pacific region with regard to the Paris Agreement; and the geopolitical strengths and weaknesses that explain the cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of the region in the fight against climate change.

Cooperating to learn teaching to cooperate: adviser processes for program implement CA/AC

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José Ramón LAGO

2011-11-01

Full Text Available The aim of this paper is present some results of advise strategy to introduce cooperative learning from the «Cooperating to Learn/ Learning to Cooperate» CL/LC Programme. The first part situates the research project and the research objective focused on how introduction of CL/LC program through a process of advice facilitates permanent improvements to the inclusion of students. In the second we analyzed the phases and tasks of an adviser process for the introduction of cooperative learning and three stages to build on cooperative learning in school: the introduction, generalization and consolidation. The third part is the central part. We describe five process of adviser to implement cooperative learning which we can observe different degrees and modalities of collaboration between teachers and counselors and between teachers. Is possible the first step of a network centers to work cooperatively.

The dynamic consequences of cooperation and competition in small-world networks.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Iván Y Fernández-Rosales

Full Text Available We present a study of the social dynamics among cooperative and competitive actors interacting on a complex network that has a small-world topology. In this model, the state of each actor depends on its previous state in time, its inertia to change, and the influence of its neighboring actors. Using numerical simulations, we determine how the distribution of final states of the actors and measures of the distances between the values of the actors at local and global levels, depend on the number of cooperative to competitive actors and the connectivity of the actors in the network. We find that similar numbers of cooperative and competitive actors yield the lowest values for the local and global measures of the distances between the values of the actors. On the other hand, when the number of either cooperative or competitive actors dominate the system, then the divergence is largest between the values of the actors. Our findings make new testable predictions on how the dynamics of a conflict depends on the strategies chosen by groups of actors and also have implications for the evolution of behaviors.

Competing irreversible cooperative reactions on polymer chains

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.W.; Hoffman, D.K.; Burgess, D.R.

1984-01-01

We analyze model processes involving competition between several irreversible reactions at the sites of a 1D, infinite, uniform polymer chain. These reactions can be cooperative, i.e., the corresponding rates depend on the state of the surrounding sites. An infinite hierarchy of rate equations is readily derived for the probabilities of various subconfigurations. By exploiting a shielding property of suitable blocks of unreacted sites, we show how exact hierarchy truncation and solution is sometimes possible. The behavior of solutions is illustrated in several cases by plotting families of ''reaction trajectories'' for varying ratios of reactant concentrations. As a specific application, we consider competition between coordination of ZnCl 2 to pairs of oxygen atoms and to single oxygen atoms in poly(propylene oxide). The observed glass transition temperature behavior is eludicated

Cooperative vehicles for robust traffic congestion reduction: An analysis based on algorithmic, environmental and agent behavioral factors.

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Prajakta Desai

Full Text Available Traffic congestion continues to be a persistent problem throughout the world. As vehicle-to-vehicle communication develops, there is an opportunity of using cooperation among close proximity vehicles to tackle the congestion problem. The intuition is that if vehicles could cooperate opportunistically when they come close enough to each other, they could, in effect, spread themselves out among alternative routes so that vehicles do not all jam up on the same roads. Our previous work proposed a decentralized multiagent based vehicular congestion management algorithm entitled Congestion Avoidance and Route Allocation using Virtual Agent Negotiation (CARAVAN, wherein the vehicles acting as intelligent agents perform cooperative route allocation using inter-vehicular communication. This paper focuses on evaluating the practical applicability of this approach by testing its robustness and performance (in terms of travel time reduction, across variations in: (a environmental parameters such as road network topology and configuration; (b algorithmic parameters such as vehicle agent preferences and route cost/preference multipliers; and (c agent-related parameters such as equipped/non-equipped vehicles and compliant/non-compliant agents. Overall, the results demonstrate the adaptability and robustness of the decentralized cooperative vehicles approach to providing global travel time reduction using simple local coordination strategies.

Cooperative vehicles for robust traffic congestion reduction: An analysis based on algorithmic, environmental and agent behavioral factors.

Science.gov (United States)

Desai, Prajakta; Loke, Seng W; Desai, Aniruddha

2017-01-01

Traffic congestion continues to be a persistent problem throughout the world. As vehicle-to-vehicle communication develops, there is an opportunity of using cooperation among close proximity vehicles to tackle the congestion problem. The intuition is that if vehicles could cooperate opportunistically when they come close enough to each other, they could, in effect, spread themselves out among alternative routes so that vehicles do not all jam up on the same roads. Our previous work proposed a decentralized multiagent based vehicular congestion management algorithm entitled Congestion Avoidance and Route Allocation using Virtual Agent Negotiation (CARAVAN), wherein the vehicles acting as intelligent agents perform cooperative route allocation using inter-vehicular communication. This paper focuses on evaluating the practical applicability of this approach by testing its robustness and performance (in terms of travel time reduction), across variations in: (a) environmental parameters such as road network topology and configuration; (b) algorithmic parameters such as vehicle agent preferences and route cost/preference multipliers; and (c) agent-related parameters such as equipped/non-equipped vehicles and compliant/non-compliant agents. Overall, the results demonstrate the adaptability and robustness of the decentralized cooperative vehicles approach to providing global travel time reduction using simple local coordination strategies.

Interplay between cooperation-enhancing mechanisms in evolutionary games with tag-mediated interactions

Science.gov (United States)

Hadzibeganovic, Tarik; Stauffer, Dietrich; Han, Xiao-Pu

2018-04-01

Cooperation is fundamental for the long-term survival of biological, social, and technological networks. Previously, mechanisms for the enhancement of cooperation, such as network reciprocity, have largely been studied in isolation and with often inconclusive findings. Here, we present an evolutionary, multiagent-based, and spatially explicit computer model to specifically address the interactive interplay between such mechanisms. We systematically investigate the effects of phenotypic diversity, network structure, and rewards on cooperative behavior emerging in a population of reproducing artificial decision makers playing tag-mediated evolutionary games. Cooperative interactions are rewarded such that both the benefits of recipients and costs of donators are affected by the reward size. The reward size is determined by the number of cooperative acts occurring within a given reward time frame. Our computational experiments reveal that small reward frames promote unconditional cooperation in populations with both low and high diversity, whereas large reward frames lead to cycles of conditional and unconditional strategies at high but not at low diversity. Moreover, an interaction between rewards and spatial structure shows that relative to small reward frames, there is a strong difference between the frequency of conditional cooperators populating rewired versus non-rewired networks when the reward frame is large. Notably, in a less diverse population, the total number of defections is comparable across different network topologies, whereas in more diverse environments defections become more frequent in a regularly structured than in a rewired, small-world network of contacts. Acknowledging the importance of such interaction effects in social dilemmas will have inevitable consequences for the future design of cooperation-enhancing protocols in large-scale, distributed, and decentralized systems such as peer-to-peer networks.

Cooperative Trust Games

Science.gov (United States)

2013-01-01

the more widely recognized competitive (non-cooperative) game theory. Cooperative game theory focuses on what groups of self-interested agents can...provides immediate justification for using non-cooperative game theory as the basis for modeling the purely competitive agents. 2.4. Superadditive...the competitive and altruistic contributions of the subset team. Definition: Given a payoff function ( ) in a subset team game , the total marginal

Cooperative strategies European perspectives

CERN Document Server

Killing, J Peter

1997-01-01

Cooperative Strategies: European Perspectives is one of three geographically targeted volumes in which the contributors present the most current research on topics such as advances in theories of cooperative strategies, the formation of cooperative alliances, the dynamics of partner relationships, and the role of information and knowledge in cooperative alliances. Blending conceptual insights with empirical analyses, the contributors highlight commonalities and differences across national, cultural, and trade zones. The chapters in this volume are anchored in a wide set of theoretical approaches, conceptual frameworks, and models, illustrating how rich the area of cooperative strategies is for scholarly inquiry.

Analysis of Relay Selection Game in a Cooperative Communication Scenario

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Craciunescu, Razvan; Mihovska, Albena; Halunga, Simona

This paper analysis the performances of a proposed set of functions that model the relay selection process in a cooperative communication scenario. The behavior and influence proposed functions create a mechanism for selecting the best relays to be used to send certain types of data. The mechanism...... of comparison between the bit error rate of the proposed mechanism and the direct communication....

Modeling cooperating micro-organisms in antibiotic environment.

Science.gov (United States)

Book, Gilad; Ingham, Colin; Ariel, Gil

2017-01-01

Recent experiments with the bacteria Paenibacillus vortex reveal a remarkable strategy enabling it to cope with antibiotics by cooperating with a different bacterium-Escherichia coli. While P. vortex is a highly effective swarmer, it is sensitive to the antibiotic ampicillin. On the other hand, E. coli can degrade ampicillin but is non-motile when grown on high agar percentages. The two bacterial species form a shared colony in which E. coli is transported by P. vortex and E. coli detoxifies the ampicillin. The paper presents a simplified model, consisting of coupled reaction-diffusion equations, describing the development of ring patterns in the shared colony. Our results demonstrate some of the possible cooperative movement strategies bacteria utilize in order to survive harsh conditions. In addition, we explore the behavior of mixed colonies under new conditions such as antibiotic gradients, synchronization between colonies and possible dynamics of a 3-species system including P. vortex, E. coli and a carbon producing algae that provides nutrients under illuminated, nutrient poor conditions. The derived model was able to simulate an asymmetric relationship between two or three micro-organisms where cooperation is required for survival. Computationally, in order to avoid numerical artifacts due to symmetries within the discretizing grid, the model was solved using a second order Vectorizable Random Lattices method, which is developed as a finite volume scheme on a random grid.

Modeling cooperating micro-organisms in antibiotic environment.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gilad Book

Full Text Available Recent experiments with the bacteria Paenibacillus vortex reveal a remarkable strategy enabling it to cope with antibiotics by cooperating with a different bacterium-Escherichia coli. While P. vortex is a highly effective swarmer, it is sensitive to the antibiotic ampicillin. On the other hand, E. coli can degrade ampicillin but is non-motile when grown on high agar percentages. The two bacterial species form a shared colony in which E. coli is transported by P. vortex and E. coli detoxifies the ampicillin. The paper presents a simplified model, consisting of coupled reaction-diffusion equations, describing the development of ring patterns in the shared colony. Our results demonstrate some of the possible cooperative movement strategies bacteria utilize in order to survive harsh conditions. In addition, we explore the behavior of mixed colonies under new conditions such as antibiotic gradients, synchronization between colonies and possible dynamics of a 3-species system including P. vortex, E. coli and a carbon producing algae that provides nutrients under illuminated, nutrient poor conditions. The derived model was able to simulate an asymmetric relationship between two or three micro-organisms where cooperation is required for survival. Computationally, in order to avoid numerical artifacts due to symmetries within the discretizing grid, the model was solved using a second order Vectorizable Random Lattices method, which is developed as a finite volume scheme on a random grid.

Cooperative Antibiotic Resistance in a Multi-Drug Environment

Science.gov (United States)

Yurtsev, Eugene; Dai, Lei; Gore, Jeff

2013-03-01

The emergence of antibiotic resistance in bacteria is a significant health concern. A frequent mechanism of antibiotic resistance involves the production of an enzyme which inactivates the antibiotic. By inactivating the antibiotic, resistant cells can ``share'' their resistance with other cells in the bacterial population, suggesting that it may be possible to observe cooperation between strains that inactivate different antibiotics. Here, we experimentally track the population dynamics of two E. coli strains in the presence of two different antibiotics. We find that together the strains are able to grow in antibiotic concentrations that inhibit growth of either of the strains individually. We observe that even when there is stable coexistence between the two strains, the population size of each strain can undergo large oscillations. We expect that our results will provide insight into the evolution of antibiotic resistance and the evolutionary origin of phenotypic diversity and cooperative behaviors.

Competing while cooperating with the same others: The consequences of conflicting demands in co-opetition.

Science.gov (United States)

Landkammer, Florian; Sassenberg, Kai

2016-12-01

Numerous studies comparing the effects of competition and cooperation demonstrated that competition is detrimental on the social level. However, instead of purely competing, many social contexts require competing while cooperating with the same social target. The current work examined the consequences of such "co-opetition" situations between individuals. Because having to compete and to cooperate with the same social target constitutes conflicting demands, co-opetition should lead to more flexibility, such as (a) less rigid transfer effects of competitive behavior and (b) less rigidity/more flexibility in general. Supporting these predictions, Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated that co-opetition did not elicit competitive behavior in a subsequent task (here: enhanced deceiving of uninvolved others). Study 2 showed that adding conflicting demands (independent of social interdependence) to competition likewise elicits less competitive transfer than competition without such conflicting demands. Beyond that, co-opetition reduced rigid response tendencies during a classification task in Studies 3a and 3b and enhanced flexibility during brainstorming in Study 4, compared with other forms of interdependence. Together, these results suggest that co-opetition leads to more flexible behavior when individuals have to reconcile conflicting demands. Implications for research on social priming, interdependence and competition in everyday life are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Factors affecting athletes’ motor behavior after the observation of scenes of cooperation and competition in competitive sport: the effect of sport attitude

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elisa eDe Stefani

2015-10-01

Full Text Available AbstractAim: This study delineated how observing sports scenes of cooperation or competition modulated an action of interaction, in expert athletes, depending on their specific sport attitude. Method: In a kinematic study, athletes were divided into two groups depending on their attitude towards teammates (cooperative or competitive. Participants observed sport scenes of cooperation and competition (basketball, soccer, water polo, volleyball, and rugby and then they reached for, picked up, and placed an object on the hand of a conspecific (giving action. Mixed-design ANOVAs were carried out on the mean values of grasping-reaching parameters. Results: Data showed that the type of scene observed as well as the athletes’ attitude affected reach-to-grasp actions to give. In particular, the cooperative athletes were speeded during reach-to-grasp movements when they observed scenes of cooperation compared to when they observed scenes of competition. Discussion: Participants were speeded when executing a giving action after observing actions of cooperation. This occurred only when they had a cooperative attitude. A match between attitude and intended action seems to be a necessary prerequisite for observing an effect of the observed type of scene on the performed action. It is possible that the observation of scenes of competition activated motor strategies which interfered with the strategies adopted by the cooperative participants to execute a cooperative (giving sequence.

ALLIANCE: An architecture for fault tolerant, cooperative control of heterogeneous mobile robots

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parker, L.E.

1995-02-01

This research addresses the problem of achieving fault tolerant cooperation within small- to medium-sized teams of heterogeneous mobile robots. The author describes a novel behavior-based, fully distributed architecture, called ALLIANCE, that utilizes adaptive action selection to achieve fault tolerant cooperative control in robot missions involving loosely coupled, largely independent tasks. The robots in this architecture possess a variety of high-level functions that they can perform during a mission, and must at all times select an appropriate action based on the requirements of the mission, the activities of other robots, the current environmental conditions, and their own internal states. Since such cooperative teams often work in dynamic and unpredictable environments, the software architecture allows the team members to respond robustly and reliably to unexpected environmental changes and modifications in the robot team that may occur due to mechanical failure, the learning of new skills, or the addition or removal of robots from the team by human intervention. After presenting ALLIANCE, the author describes in detail experimental results of an implementation of this architecture on a team of physical mobile robots performing a cooperative box pushing demonstration. These experiments illustrate the ability of ALLIANCE to achieve adaptive, fault-tolerant cooperative control amidst dynamic changes in the capabilities of the robot team.

Cooperatives management evaluation of four Savings and Credit Cooperatives of Quito, Ecuador

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Richard Joel Alba Caluguillin

2017-07-01

Full Text Available The administrative management in cooperative enterprises develops in each of the stages of the administrative process of the traditional companies, which are planning, organization, direction and control, with the only difference that the savings and credit cooperatives comply with cooperative principles and values such as mutual aid, social responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. The objective of this research was to evaluate the process of administrative management in four selected savings and credit cooperatives from Quito city, Ecuador, were applied theoretical and empirical methods of research. From the empirical point of view, a survey was applied getting results from this process. In general, in the cooperatives evaluated, it was recognized the importance of comprehensive management, strategic planning, motivation as a key element for good job performance, the effectiveness of formal communication channels and other aspects inherent in administrative management, although there are certain deficiencies that limit the results of the cooperative activity.

NASA/RAE cooperation on a knowlede based flight status monitor

Science.gov (United States)

Butler, G. F.; Duke, E. L.

1989-01-01

As part of a US/UK cooperative aeronautical research pragram, a joint activity between the Dryden Flight Research Facility of the NASA Ames Research Center (Ames-Dryden) and the Royal Aerospace Establishment (RAE) on Knowledge Based Systems was established. Under the agreement, a Flight Status Monitor Knowledge base developed at Ames-Dryden was implemented using the real-time IKBS toolkit, MUSE, which was developed in the UK under RAE sponsorship. The Flight Status Monitor is designed to provide on-line aid to the flight test engineer in the interpretation of system health and status by storing expert knowledge of system behavior in an easily accessible form. The background to the cooperation is described and the details of the Flight Status Monitor, the MUSE implementation are presented.

Socio-environmental cooperation and conflict? A discursive understanding and its application to the case of Israel and Palestine

Science.gov (United States)

Ide, T.; Fröhlich, C.

2015-10-01

The existing literature faces difficulties when accounting for the simultaneity of socio-environmental conflict and cooperation. We suggest that this puzzle can be solved by more recent constructivist works, which argue that conflictive or cooperative behavior is driven by discursively constructed interests, identities and situation assessments. Based on a literature review and field interviews, we analyze and compare the dominant water discourses in Israel and Palestine with the discourse dominant among the activists of a water cooperation project between communities from Israel and the West Bank. Our main result is that discourses are indeed crucial for understanding water-related conflict and cooperation. This finding highlights the relevance of constructivist approaches in the study of socio-environmental conflict and cooperation as well as of practices of bottom-up discursive conflict transformation.

Inertia in Cooperative Remodeling

OpenAIRE

Nilsson, Jerker

1997-01-01

Which organization model is appropriate for a cooperative enterprise depends on the prerequisites in its business environment. When conditions are changing, the firm must adapt itself. The entry of Sweden, Finland, and Austria into the European Union led to radical changes for agricultural cooperation, especially for Swedish cooperatives since agricultural policy was not allowed a transitional period. After two years, Swedish cooperatives have still not adapted their organization model despit...

Cooperation or Competition: Does Game Theory Have Relevance for Public Health?

Science.gov (United States)

Westhoff, Wayne W.; Cohen, Cynthia F.; Cooper, Elizabeth Elliott; Corvin, Jaime; McDermott, Robert J.

2012-01-01

In this paper, we use game theory to understand decisions to cooperate or to compete in the delivery of public health services. Health care is a quasi-public good that is often associated with altruistic behavior, yet it operates in an increasingly competitive environment. With mounting health care regulation and changes in privatization,…

Importance of a species' socioecology: Wolves outperform dogs in a conspecific cooperation task.

Science.gov (United States)

Marshall-Pescini, Sarah; Schwarz, Jonas F L; Kostelnik, Inga; Virányi, Zsófia; Range, Friederike

2017-10-31

A number of domestication hypotheses suggest that dogs have acquired a more tolerant temperament than wolves, promoting cooperative interactions with humans and conspecifics. This selection process has been proposed to resemble the one responsible for our own greater cooperative inclinations in comparison with our closest living relatives. However, the socioecology of wolves and dogs, with the former relying more heavily on cooperative activities, predicts that at least with conspecifics, wolves should cooperate better than dogs. Here we tested similarly raised wolves and dogs in a cooperative string-pulling task with conspecifics and found that wolves outperformed dogs, despite comparable levels of interest in the task. Whereas wolves coordinated their actions so as to simultaneously pull the rope ends, leading to success, dogs pulled the ropes in alternate moments, thereby never succeeding. Indeed in dog dyads it was also less likely that both members simultaneously engaged in other manipulative behaviors on the apparatus. Different conflict-management strategies are likely responsible for these results, with dogs' avoidance of potential competition over the apparatus constraining their capacity to coordinate actions. Wolves, in contrast, did not hesitate to manipulate the ropes simultaneously, and once cooperation was initiated, rapidly learned to coordinate in more complex conditions as well. Social dynamics (rank and affiliation) played a key role in success rates. Results call those domestication hypotheses that suggest dogs evolved greater cooperative inclinations into question, and rather support the idea that dogs' and wolves' different social ecologies played a role in affecting their capacity for conspecific cooperation and communication. Published under the PNAS license.

Compulsive Buying Behavior: Clinical Comparison with Other Behavioral Addictions.

Science.gov (United States)

Granero, Roser; Fernández-Aranda, Fernando; Mestre-Bach, Gemma; Steward, Trevor; Baño, Marta; Del Pino-Gutiérrez, Amparo; Moragas, Laura; Mallorquí-Bagué, Núria; Aymamí, Neus; Gómez-Peña, Mónica; Tárrega, Salomé; Menchón, José M; Jiménez-Murcia, Susana

2016-01-01

Compulsive buying behavior (CBB) has been recognized as a prevalent mental health disorder, yet its categorization into classification systems remains unsettled. The objective of this study was to assess the sociodemographic and clinic variables related to the CBB phenotype compared to other behavioral addictions. Three thousand three hundred and twenty four treatment-seeking patients were classified in five groups: CBB, sexual addiction, Internet gaming disorder, Internet addiction, and gambling disorder. CBB was characterized by a higher proportion of women, higher levels of psychopathology, and higher levels in the personality traits of novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence, persistence, and cooperativeness compared to other behavioral addictions. Results outline the heterogeneity in the clinical profiles of patients diagnosed with different behavioral addiction subtypes and shed new light on the primary mechanisms of CBB.

Compulsive Buying Behavior: Clinical Comparison with Other Behavioral Addictions

Science.gov (United States)

Granero, Roser; Fernández-Aranda, Fernando; Mestre-Bach, Gemma; Steward, Trevor; Baño, Marta; del Pino-Gutiérrez, Amparo; Moragas, Laura; Mallorquí-Bagué, Núria; Aymamí, Neus; Gómez-Peña, Mónica; Tárrega, Salomé; Menchón, José M.; Jiménez-Murcia, Susana

2016-01-01

Compulsive buying behavior (CBB) has been recognized as a prevalent mental health disorder, yet its categorization into classification systems remains unsettled. The objective of this study was to assess the sociodemographic and clinic variables related to the CBB phenotype compared to other behavioral addictions. Three thousand three hundred and twenty four treatment-seeking patients were classified in five groups: CBB, sexual addiction, Internet gaming disorder, Internet addiction, and gambling disorder. CBB was characterized by a higher proportion of women, higher levels of psychopathology, and higher levels in the personality traits of novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence, persistence, and cooperativeness compared to other behavioral addictions. Results outline the heterogeneity in the clinical profiles of patients diagnosed with different behavioral addiction subtypes and shed new light on the primary mechanisms of CBB. PMID:27378999

The advantage of democratic peer punishment in sustaining cooperation within groups

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Pfattheicher, Stefan; Boehm, Robert; Kesberg, Rebekka

2018-01-01

(i.e., antisocial punishment) is possible. In the present work, we propose that a system of democratic peer punishment, that is, direct and equal participation of each individual in the punishment decision‐making process with punishment only executed when a majority has voted for its execution, can......In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behavior while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behavior and to increase cooperation is to establish a system of costly peer punishment, that is, the possibility for every...

Toward a behavioral theory of cooperation between managers and employee representatives in works councils

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Van der Brempt, O.; Boone, C.; van Witteloostuijn, A.; Van den Berg, A.

2017-01-01

This article builds a comprehensive behavioural framework of cooperation between management and employee representatives in a works council setting. The authors do so by applying insights from organizational behaviour in the works council setting in the belief that this discipline’s long-standing

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

Science.gov (United States)

Antonioni, Alberto; Sánchez, Angel; Tomassini, Marco

2016-06-01

In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction. Cheaters end up being better off than honest individuals, who not only keep their true reputation but are also more cooperative. In practice, this results in honest subjects paying the costs of fraud as cheaters earn the same as in a truthful environment. These findings point to the importance of ensuring the truthfulness of reputation for a more equitable and fair society.

Siblings and the Development of Prosocial Behavior.

Science.gov (United States)

Dunn, Judy; Munn, Penny

1986-01-01

Examines the capability and motivation of 18- and 24-month-old infants to share, help, comfort, and cooperate with their older siblings; the frequency of such prosocial behavior by both siblings; and the children's response to sibling distress. The relationship between prosocial and conflict behavior was also studied. (HOD)

How to keep punishment to maintain cooperation: Introducing social vaccine

Science.gov (United States)

Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Okada, Isamu

2016-02-01

Although there is much support for the punishment system as a sophisticated approach to resolving social dilemmas, more than a few researchers have also pointed out the limitations of such an approach. Second-order free riding is a serious issue facing the punishment system. Various pioneering works have suggested that an anti-social behavior or noise stemming from a mutation may, surprisingly, be helpful for avoiding second-order freeloaders. In this work, we show through mathematical analysis and an agent-based simulation of a model extending the meta-norms game that the coercive introduction of a small number of non-cooperators can maintain a cooperative regime robustly. This paradoxical idea was inspired by the effect of a vaccine, which is a weakened pathogen injected into a human body to create antibodies and ward off infection by that pathogen. Our expectation is that the coercive introduction of a few defectors, i.e., a social vaccine, will help maintain a highly cooperative regime because it will ensure that the punishment system works.

COOPERATIVITY, CAGE EFFECT AND HOPPING DIFFUSION IN SUPERCOOLED LIQUIDS AND GLASSES

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A.S.Bakai

2003-01-01

Full Text Available Molecular dynamic simulations of structure, thermodynamic and kinetic properties of model metallic Ag-Cu alloy are performed to elucidate its behavior at glass transition. In spite of small variations of inherent structure of the alloy the relaxation kinetics undergo dramatic changes at the glass transition. The time dependences of the mean square displacements and the non-Gaussianity parameter show the signs of anomalous diffusion in an intermediate time region. The analysis of time evolution of van Hove correlation function indicates the existence of both jump displacements and short-range cooperative atomic rearrangements. Below Tg these cooperative rearrangements do not contribute to a long-range diffusion but they still dominate the relaxation at short time.

Quantification of Cooperativity in Heterodimer-DNA Binding Improves the Accuracy of Binding Specificity Models*

Science.gov (United States)

Isakova, Alina; Berset, Yves; Hatzimanikatis, Vassily; Deplancke, Bart

2016-01-01

Many transcription factors (TFs) have the ability to cooperate on DNA elements as heterodimers. Despite the significance of TF heterodimerization for gene regulation, a quantitative understanding of cooperativity between various TF dimer partners and its impact on heterodimer DNA binding specificity models is still lacking. Here, we used a novel integrative approach, combining microfluidics-steered measurements of dimer-DNA assembly with mechanistic modeling of the implicated protein-protein-DNA interactions to quantitatively interrogate the cooperative DNA binding behavior of the adipogenic peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor γ (PPARγ):retinoid X receptor α (RXRα) heterodimer. Using the high throughput MITOMI (mechanically induced trapping of molecular interactions) platform, we derived equilibrium DNA binding data for PPARγ, RXRα, as well as the PPARγ:RXRα heterodimer to more than 300 target DNA sites and variants thereof. We then quantified cooperativity underlying heterodimer-DNA binding and derived an integrative heterodimer DNA binding constant. Using this cooperativity-inclusive constant, we were able to build a heterodimer-DNA binding specificity model that has superior predictive power than the one based on a regular one-site equilibrium. Our data further revealed that individual nucleotide substitutions within the target site affect the extent of cooperativity in PPARγ:RXRα-DNA binding. Our study therefore emphasizes the importance of assessing cooperativity when generating DNA binding specificity models for heterodimers. PMID:26912662

Quantification of Cooperativity in Heterodimer-DNA Binding Improves the Accuracy of Binding Specificity Models.

Science.gov (United States)

Isakova, Alina; Berset, Yves; Hatzimanikatis, Vassily; Deplancke, Bart

2016-05-06

Many transcription factors (TFs) have the ability to cooperate on DNA elements as heterodimers. Despite the significance of TF heterodimerization for gene regulation, a quantitative understanding of cooperativity between various TF dimer partners and its impact on heterodimer DNA binding specificity models is still lacking. Here, we used a novel integrative approach, combining microfluidics-steered measurements of dimer-DNA assembly with mechanistic modeling of the implicated protein-protein-DNA interactions to quantitatively interrogate the cooperative DNA binding behavior of the adipogenic peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor γ (PPARγ):retinoid X receptor α (RXRα) heterodimer. Using the high throughput MITOMI (mechanically induced trapping of molecular interactions) platform, we derived equilibrium DNA binding data for PPARγ, RXRα, as well as the PPARγ:RXRα heterodimer to more than 300 target DNA sites and variants thereof. We then quantified cooperativity underlying heterodimer-DNA binding and derived an integrative heterodimer DNA binding constant. Using this cooperativity-inclusive constant, we were able to build a heterodimer-DNA binding specificity model that has superior predictive power than the one based on a regular one-site equilibrium. Our data further revealed that individual nucleotide substitutions within the target site affect the extent of cooperativity in PPARγ:RXRα-DNA binding. Our study therefore emphasizes the importance of assessing cooperativity when generating DNA binding specificity models for heterodimers. © 2016 by The American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Inc.

Engineering co-operation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hryniszak, W

1981-06-01

A purposeful employment policy for human energy is basic to solving the energy dilemma, but a lack of understanding about human behavior has allowed man's exploitive characteristics to dominate during the Inductrial Revolution. England is dependent on trade to survive, but the importance of size in world competition is seen in the trend toward multinational and partnership enterprises. Reflecting this increasing competition, the engineering industries see a need for government policies that acknowledge the importance of technology and the effects of those policies on productivity. Engineering progress requires the creativity of optimistic idealism and the realism of implementing new ideas. The training and nurturing of human resources should begin by broadening the education of engineers to emphasize the concepts of quality and cooperation between government and industry. Engineers and scientists, who work within society, need to understand national demands and to operate in accordance with the highest moral standards. (DCK)

Prosocial Behavior and Subjective Insecurity in Violent Contexts: Field Experiments

Science.gov (United States)

Vélez, María Alejandra; Trujillo, Carlos Andres; Moros, Lina; Forero, Clemente

2016-01-01

Subjective insecurity is a key determinant of different forms of prosocial behavior. In Study 1, we used field experiments with farmers in Colombian villages exposed to different levels of violence to investigate how individual perceptions of insecurity affect cooperation, trust, reciprocity and altruism. To do so, we developed a cognitive-affective measure of subjective insecurity. We found that subjective insecurity has a negative effect on cooperation but influences trust and altruism positively. In Study 2, carried out three years after Study 1, we repeated the initial design with additional measures of victimization. Our goal was to relate subjective insecurity with actual victimization. The findings of Study 2 support the initial results, and are robust and consistent for cooperative behavior and trust when including victimization as a mediator. Different indicators of victimization are positively correlated with subjective insecurity and an aggregate index of victimization has a negative effect on cooperation but exerts a positive influence on trust. PMID:27472437

Prosocial Behavior and Subjective Insecurity in Violent Contexts: Field Experiments.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

María Alejandra Vélez

Full Text Available Subjective insecurity is a key determinant of different forms of prosocial behavior. In Study 1, we used field experiments with farmers in Colombian villages exposed to different levels of violence to investigate how individual perceptions of insecurity affect cooperation, trust, reciprocity and altruism. To do so, we developed a cognitive-affective measure of subjective insecurity. We found that subjective insecurity has a negative effect on cooperation but influences trust and altruism positively. In Study 2, carried out three years after Study 1, we repeated the initial design with additional measures of victimization. Our goal was to relate subjective insecurity with actual victimization. The findings of Study 2 support the initial results, and are robust and consistent for cooperative behavior and trust when including victimization as a mediator. Different indicators of victimization are positively correlated with subjective insecurity and an aggregate index of victimization has a negative effect on cooperation but exerts a positive influence on trust.

Prosocial Behavior and Subjective Insecurity in Violent Contexts: Field Experiments.

Science.gov (United States)

Vélez, María Alejandra; Trujillo, Carlos Andres; Moros, Lina; Forero, Clemente

2016-01-01

Subjective insecurity is a key determinant of different forms of prosocial behavior. In Study 1, we used field experiments with farmers in Colombian villages exposed to different levels of violence to investigate how individual perceptions of insecurity affect cooperation, trust, reciprocity and altruism. To do so, we developed a cognitive-affective measure of subjective insecurity. We found that subjective insecurity has a negative effect on cooperation but influences trust and altruism positively. In Study 2, carried out three years after Study 1, we repeated the initial design with additional measures of victimization. Our goal was to relate subjective insecurity with actual victimization. The findings of Study 2 support the initial results, and are robust and consistent for cooperative behavior and trust when including victimization as a mediator. Different indicators of victimization are positively correlated with subjective insecurity and an aggregate index of victimization has a negative effect on cooperation but exerts a positive influence on trust.

Fusing enacted and expected mimicry generates a winning strategy that promotes the evolution of cooperation.

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Fischer, Ilan; Frid, Alex; Goerg, Sebastian J; Levin, Simon A; Rubenstein, Daniel I; Selten, Reinhard

2013-06-18

Although cooperation and trust are essential features for the development of prosperous populations, they also put cooperating individuals at risk for exploitation and abuse. Empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that the solution to the problem resides in the practice of mimicry and imitation, the expectation of opponent's mimicry and the reliance on similarity indices. Here we fuse the principles of enacted and expected mimicry and condition their application on two similarity indices to produce a model of mimicry and relative similarity. Testing the model in computer simulations of behavioral niches, populated with agents that enact various strategies and learning algorithms, shows how mimicry and relative similarity outperforms all the opponent strategies it was tested against, pushes noncooperative opponents toward extinction, and promotes the development of cooperative populations. The proposed model sheds light on the evolution of cooperation and provides a blueprint for intentional induction of cooperation within and among populations. It is suggested that reducing conflict intensities among human populations necessitates (i) instigation of social initiatives that increase the perception of similarity among opponents and (ii) efficient lowering of the similarity threshold of the interaction, the minimal level of similarity that makes cooperation advisable.

Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hu, Menglong; Wang, Juan; Kong, Lingcong; An, Kang; Bi, Tao; Guo, Baohong; Dong, Enzeng

2015-01-01

Highlights: •A novel fitness evaluation method integrating environmental information is presented. •The introduction of neighbors’ payoff favors the promotion of cooperation in the PDG. •The role of direct neighbors becomes much more prominent. •In the SDG, the cooperative behavior is also improved by this new mechanism. -- Abstract: We propose an improved fitness evaluation method to investigate the evolution of cooperation in the spatial social dilemmas. In our model, a focal player’s fitness is calculated as the linear combination of his own payoff, the average payoffs of direct and indirect neighbors in which two independent selection parameters (α and β) are used to control the proportion of various payoff contribution to the current fitness. Then, the fitness-based strategy update rule is still Fermi-like, and asynchronous update is adopted here. A large plethora of numerical simulations are performed to validate the behaviors of the current model, and the results unambiguously demonstrate that the cooperation level is greatly enhanced by introducing the payoffs from the surrounding players. In particular, the influence of direct neighbors become more evident when compared with indirect neighbors since the correlation between focal players and their direct neighbors is much closer. Current outcomes are significant for us to further illustrate the origin and emergence of cooperation within a wide variety of natural and man-made systems

Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation.

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Rand, David G; Peysakhovich, Alexander; Kraft-Todd, Gordon T; Newman, George E; Wurzbacher, Owen; Nowak, Martin A; Greene, Joshua D

2014-04-22

Cooperation is central to human societies. Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Does cooperation require deliberate self-restraint? Or is spontaneous prosociality reined in by calculating self-interest? Here we present a theory of why (and for whom) intuition favors cooperation: cooperation is typically advantageous in everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions. Deliberation, by contrast, adjusts behaviour towards the optimum for a given situation. Thus, in one-shot anonymous interactions where selfishness is optimal, intuitive responses tend to be more cooperative than deliberative responses. We test this 'social heuristics hypothesis' by aggregating across every cooperation experiment using time pressure that we conducted over a 2-year period (15 studies and 6,910 decisions), as well as performing a novel time pressure experiment. Doing so demonstrates a positive average effect of time pressure on cooperation. We also find substantial variation in this effect, and show that this variation is partly explained by previous experience with one-shot lab experiments.

Games microbes play: The game theory behind cooperative sucrose metabolism in yeast

Science.gov (United States)

Gore, Jeff

2010-03-01

The origin of cooperation is a central challenge to our understanding of evolution. Microbial interactions can be manipulated in ways that animal interactions cannot, thus leading to growing interest in microbial models of cooperation and competition. In order for the budding yeast S. cerevisiae to grow on sucrose, the disaccharide must first be hydrolyzed by the enzyme invertase. This hydrolysis reaction is performed outside of the cytoplasm in the periplasmic space between the plasma membrane and the cell wall. Here we demonstrate that the vast majority (˜99%) of the monosaccharides created by sucrose hydrolysis diffuse away before they can be imported into the cell, thus making invertase production and secretion a cooperative behavior [1]. A mutant cheater strain that does not produce invertase is able to take advantage of and invade a population of wildtype cooperator cells. However, over a wide range of conditions, the wildtype cooperator can also invade a population of cheater cells. Therefore, we observe coexistence between the two strains in well-mixed culture at steady state resulting from the fact that rare strategies outperform common strategies---the defining features of what game theorists call the snowdrift game. A simple model of the cooperative interaction incorporating nonlinear benefits explains the origin of this coexistence. Glucose repression of invertase expression in wildtype cells produces a strategy which is optimal for the snowdrift game---wildtype cells cooperate only when competing against cheater cells. In disagreement with recent theory [2], we find that spatial structure always aids the evolution of cooperation in our experimental snowdrift game. [4pt] [1] Gore, J., Youk, H. & van Oudenaarden, A., Nature 459, 253 -- 256 (2009) [0pt] [2] Hauert, C. & Doebeli, M., Nature 428, 643 -- 646 (2004)

Cooperative and Competitive Contextual Effects on Social Cognitive and Empathic Neural Responses

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Minhye Lee

2018-06-01

Full Text Available We aimed to differentiate the neural responses to cooperative and competitive contexts, which are the two of the most important social contexts in human society. Healthy male college students were asked to complete a Tetris-like task requiring mental rotation skills under individual, cooperative, and competitive contexts in an fMRI scanner. While the participants completed the task, pictures of others experiencing pain evoking emotional empathy randomly appeared to capture contextual effects on empathic neural responses. Behavioral results indicated that, in the presence of cooperation, participants solved the tasks more accurately and quickly than what they did when in the presence of competition. The fMRI results revealed activations in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC related to executive functions and theory of mind when participants performed the task under both cooperative and competitive contexts, whereas no activation of such areas was observed in the individual context. Cooperation condition exhibited stronger neural responses in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC and dmPFC than competition condition. Competition condition, however, showed marginal neural responses in the cerebellum and anterior insular cortex (AIC. The two social contexts involved stronger empathic neural responses to other’s pain than the individual context, but no substantial differences between cooperation and competition were present. Regions of interest analyses revealed that individual’s trait empathy modulated the neural activity in the state empathy network, the AIC, and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC depending on the social context. These results suggest that cooperation improves task performance and activates neural responses associated with reward and mentalizing. Furthermore, the interaction between trait- and state-empathy was explored by correlation analyses between individual�

What drives cooperative breeding?

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Walter D Koenig

2017-06-01

Full Text Available Cooperative breeding, in which more than a pair of conspecifics cooperate to raise young at a single nest or brood, is widespread among vertebrates but highly variable in its geographic distribution. Particularly vexing has been identifying the ecological correlates of this phenomenon, which has been suggested to be favored in populations inhabiting both relatively stable, productive environments and in populations living under highly variable and unpredictable conditions. Griesser et al. provide a novel approach to this problem, performing a phylogenetic analysis indicating that family living is an intermediate step between nonsocial and cooperative breeding birds. They then examine the ecological and climatic conditions associated with these different social systems, concluding that cooperative breeding emerges when family living is favored in highly productive environments, followed secondarily by selection for cooperative breeding when environmental conditions deteriorate and within-year variability increases. Combined with recent work addressing the fitness consequences of cooperative breeding, Griesser et al.'s contribution stands to move the field forward by demonstrating that the evolution of complex adaptations such as cooperative breeding may only be understood when each of the steps leading to it are identified and carefully integrated.

Cooperation in Construction:

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Vogelius, Peter; Storgaard, Kresten

2016-01-01

The study presents a building project executed by a major Danish construction company, where cooperation and its staging were essential for achieving high productivity and competitiveness. The form of this cooperation is the main theme for the article. The contractor actively changed the communic......The study presents a building project executed by a major Danish construction company, where cooperation and its staging were essential for achieving high productivity and competitiveness. The form of this cooperation is the main theme for the article. The contractor actively changed...... the companies in the case can be understood as possessing a social capital which is enforced and united by initiatives of the main contractor. The social capital was built up and maintained through the actual constitution of cooperation already in the initial phase of bidding before the building process....... The management logic of the main contractor is interpreted as based on a sociology-inspired understanding focusing on norms and social values rather than on contractual (law) and functional (engineering) logic, which had hitherto been prevalent in Danish construction management....

Transnational Research Co-operation: Opportunities and Challenges for transnational research co-operation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

of the NGOs have a lot of international experience (mainly in Denmark and Germany) as partners in different co-operation projects. Almost all the NGOs have recognized the important role of the scientific information in their activity. NGOs also feel the need for an easy access to required information...... for transnational co-operation like: an investigation/project concerning the driving forces behind urban development,or a co-operation in the field of wastewater reuse and minimization of wastewater loads and discharge, or a service page (internet) to search for potential partners. The governmental institutions...... in order to improve transnational cooperation are identified to be: • Search for national/international project partners • Access to existent co-operation projects or networks • Develop in common project proposals on themes requested by community groups • Exchange information/good operational practices...

Formative Assessment: Exploring Tunisian Cooperative Teachers Practices in Physical Education

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Melki Hasan

2017-10-01

Full Text Available Purpose: This article is based on questions related to the formative assessment of preparatory trainee ship in the professional life of Physical Education teachers. In general, in the first training program, the traineeship represents an integral part of training. In this sense, the traineeship offers a vital opportunity for future teacher to gain practical experience in the real environment, given that formative evaluation is a process of collecting evidence from trainees by cooperative teachers to make decisions about their knowledge and skills, to guide their own instructional activities and to control their behavior. Accordingly, this study proposed to explore practices of Tunisians cooperative teachers in relation to the formative assessment. Material: To verify our proposed object, we conducted a research using a questionnaire distributed among 96 cooperative teachers in different educational institutions located in the region of the greater Tunis. During the school year 2015-2016, the questionnaire was the subject of a statistical analysis using frequencies and percentages. Results: The analysis of such data revealed a range of practices about formative estimation among cooperative teachers. In particular, each teacher acknowledged the value of guiding and encouraging student’s self-assessment. So that they could lead their students to assume a share of evaluative activity. Conclusion: Both theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and some recommendations are made for future practice.

Relationships between cooperation and goal orientation among male professional and semi-professional team athletes.

Science.gov (United States)

Lameiras, João; Almeida, Pedro L; Garcia-Mas, Alexandre

2014-12-01

In team sports, athletes' goals may focus on the task (enhancing performance, developing better skills, etc.) or on ego (being better than the others, achieving superiority, etc.). This study investigated the relationships between athletes' goal orientation and their tendency to cooperate with teammates and coaches. 158 professional men (M age = 24.1 yr., SD = 4.6) who played on various sport teams participated in this study. Goal orientation was measured with the Portuguese version of the Task and Ego Orientation in Sport Questionnaire, and cooperation was measured with the Questionário de Cooperação Desportiva. Cooperation was positively correlated with task orientation, and negatively correlated with ego orientation. Overall, the findings support that in sports, directing the players' focus on task may promote prosocial behavior.

Secure Cooperation of Autonomous Mobile Sensors Using an Underwater Acoustic Network

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Gianluca Dini

2012-02-01

Full Text Available Methodologies and algorithms are presented for the secure cooperation of a team of autonomous mobile underwater sensors, connected through an acoustic communication network, within surveillance and patrolling applications. In particular, the work proposes a cooperative algorithm in which the mobile underwater sensors (installed on Autonomous Underwater Vehicles—AUVs respond to simple local rules based on the available information to perform the mission and maintain the communication link with the network (behavioral approach. The algorithm is intrinsically robust: with loss of communication among the vehicles the coverage performance (i.e., the mission goal is degraded but not lost. The ensuing form of graceful degradation provides also a reactive measure against Denial of Service. The cooperative algorithm relies on the fact that the available information from the other sensors, though not necessarily complete, is trustworthy. To ensure trustworthiness, a security suite has been designed, specifically oriented to the underwater scenario, and in particular with the goal of reducing the communication overhead introduced by security in terms of number and size of messages. The paper gives implementation details on the integration between the security suite and the cooperative algorithm and provides statistics on the performance of the system as collected during the UAN project sea trial held in Trondheim, Norway, in May 2011.

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/8: Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Qojas, M.

1999-03-01

This document is an analysis of options for unilateral and cooperative action to improve the security of Jordan's borders. Sections describe the current political, economic, and social interactions along Jordan's borders. Next, the document discusses border security strategy for cooperation among neighboring countries and the adoption of confidence-building measures. A practical cooperative monitoring system would consist of hardware for early warning, command and control, communications, and transportation. Technical solutions can expand opportunities for the detection and identification of intruders. Sensors (such as seismic, break-wire, pressure-sensing, etc.) can warn border security forces of intrusion and contribute to the identification of the intrusion and help formulate the response. This document describes conceptual options for cooperation, offering three scenarios that relate to three hypothetical levels (low, medium, and high) of cooperation. Potential cooperative efforts under a low cooperation scenario could include information exchanges on military equipment and schedules to prevent misunderstandings and the establishment of protocols for handling emergency situations or unusual circumstances. Measures under a medium cooperation scenario could include establishing joint monitoring groups for better communications, with hot lines and scheduled meetings. The high cooperation scenario describes coordinated responses, joint border patrols, and sharing border intrusion information. Finally, the document lists recommendations for organizational, technical, and operational initiatives that could be applicable to the current situation.

Cooperative Research Projects in the Microgravity Combustion Science Programs Sponsored by NASA and NEDO

Science.gov (United States)

Ross, Howard (Compiler)

2000-01-01

This document contains the results of a collection of selected cooperative research projects between principal investigators in the microgravity combustion science programs, sponsored by NASA and NEDO. Cooperation involved the use of drop towers in Japan and the United States, and the sharing of subsequent research data and findings. The topical areas include: (1) Interacting droplet arrays, (2) high pressure binary fuel sprays, (3) sooting droplet combustion, (4) flammability limits and dynamics of spherical, premixed gaseous flames and, (5) ignition and transition of flame spread across thin solid fuel samples. All of the investigators view this collaboration as a success. Novel flame behaviors were found and later published in archival journals. In some cases the experiments provided verification of the design and behavior in subsequent experiments performed on the Space Shuttle. In other cases, the experiments provided guidance to experiments that are expected to be performed on the International Space Station.

Decentralized Model Predictive Control for Cooperative Multiple Vehicles Subject to Communication Loss

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Hojjat A. Izadi

2011-01-01

Full Text Available The decentralized model predictive control (DMPC of multiple cooperative vehicles with the possibility of communication loss/delay is investigated. The neighboring vehicles exchange their predicted trajectories at every sample time to maintain the cooperation objectives. In the event of a communication loss (packet dropout, the most recent available information, which is potentially delayed, is used. Then the communication loss problem changes to a cooperative problem when random large communication delays are present. Such large communication delays can lead to poor cooperation performance and unsafe behaviors such as collisions. A new DMPC approach is developed to improve the cooperation performance and achieve safety in the presence of the large communication delays. The proposed DMPC architecture estimates the tail of neighbor's trajectory which is not available due to the large communication delays for improving the performance. The concept of the tube MPC is also employed to provide the safety of the fleet against collisions, in the presence of large intervehicle communication delays. In this approach, a tube shaped trajectory set is assumed around the trajectory of the neighboring vehicles whose trajectory is delayed/lost. The radius of tube is a function of the communication delay and vehicle's maneuverability (in the absence of model uncertainty. The simulation of formation problem of multiple vehicles is employed to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

The role of autoshaping in cooperative two-player games between starlings.

Science.gov (United States)

Reboreda, J C; Kacelnik, A

1993-07-01

We report a study of the behavior of starlings in laboratory situations inspired by the "prisoner's dilemma." Our purpose is to investigate some possible mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperation by reciprocity and to investigate the process of autoshaping at a trial-by-trial level. In Experiment 1, pairs of starlings housed in adjacent cages played a discrete-trial "game" in which food could be obtained only by "cooperation." In this game, pecking at a response key eliminated the opportunity to obtain food but produced food for the partner. If neither bird pecked, neither had the opportunity to obtain food in that trial. Some level of cooperation persisted for several sessions whether the birds had been pretrained for a high or low probability of pecking at the key. The probability of a cooperative response was higher after trials in which the partner responded (and a reward was obtained) than after trials in which neither bird responded (and no reward was obtained), but the probability of a response was even higher after trials in which the same bird had responded, even though no reward was obtained by the actor in these trials. This behavior did not require visual presence of another player, because similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 (a replicate of Experiment 1 in which the members of the pair could not see each other) and in Experiment 3, a game in which each starling played with a computer responding with "tit for tat." Using an omission schedule, in which food was given in all trials in which the bird did not peck, Experiment 4 showed that pecking could be maintained by autoshaping. In this experiment, overall probability of pecking decreased with experience, due to a drop in the tendency to peck in consecutive trials. The probability of pecking in trials following a reinforced trial did not decrease with experience. An implementation of the Rescorla-Wagner model for this situation was capable of reproducing molar, but not molecular, aspects

The story of technical cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Yang Taek

1989-09-01

This book gives descriptions of technical cooperation, which is about why does technology transfer?, process of technology transfer with model, decisive cause and cooperation of technology transfer, cost and effect of technology transfer, historical experience of technology transfer, cases of technology transfer by field such as rubber tire, medicine and computer industry and automobile industry, technology transfer process and present condition of technical cooperation, and strategy for rising of technical cooperation : selection of technology for object of cooperation and development of human resources.

Chaos and crises in a model for cooperative hunting: a symbolic dynamics approach.

Science.gov (United States)

Duarte, Jorge; Januário, Cristina; Martins, Nuno; Sardanyés, Josep

2009-12-01

In this work we investigate the population dynamics of cooperative hunting extending the McCann and Yodzis model for a three-species food chain system with a predator, a prey, and a resource species. The new model considers that a given fraction sigma of predators cooperates in prey's hunting, while the rest of the population 1-sigma hunts without cooperation. We use the theory of symbolic dynamics to study the topological entropy and the parameter space ordering of the kneading sequences associated with one-dimensional maps that reproduce significant aspects of the dynamics of the species under several degrees of cooperative hunting. Our model also allows us to investigate the so-called deterministic extinction via chaotic crisis and transient chaos in the framework of cooperative hunting. The symbolic sequences allow us to identify a critical boundary in the parameter spaces (K,C(0)) and (K,sigma) which separates two scenarios: (i) all-species coexistence and (ii) predator's extinction via chaotic crisis. We show that the crisis value of the carrying capacity K(c) decreases at increasing sigma, indicating that predator's populations with high degree of cooperative hunting are more sensitive to the chaotic crises. We also show that the control method of Dhamala and Lai [Phys. Rev. E 59, 1646 (1999)] can sustain the chaotic behavior after the crisis for systems with cooperative hunting. We finally analyze and quantify the inner structure of the target regions obtained with this control method for wider parameter values beyond the crisis, showing a power law dependence of the extinction transients on such critical parameters.

Testosterone is associated with cooperation during intergroup competition by enhancing parochial altruism

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Luise eReimers

2015-06-01

Full Text Available The steroid hormone testosterone is widely associated with negative behavioral effects, such as aggression or dominance. However, recent studies applying economic exchange tasks revealed conflicting results. While some point to a prosocial effect of testosterone by increasing altruistic behavior, others report that testosterone promotes antisocial tendencies. Taking into account additional factors such as parochial altruism (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility might help to explain this contradiction. First evidence for a link between testosterone and parochial altruism comes from recently reported data of male soccer fans playing the ultimatum game. In this study high levels of endogenous testosterone predicted increased altruistic punishment during outgroup interactions and at the same time heightened ingroup generosity. Here, we report findings of another experimental task, the prisoner’s dilemma, applied in the same context to examine the role of testosterone on parochial tendencies in terms of cooperation. In this task, fifty male soccer fans were asked to decide whether or not they wanted to cooperate with partners marked as either fans of the subject’s own favorite team (ingroup or fans of other teams (outgroups. Our results show that high testosterone levels were associated with increased ingroup cooperation during intergroup competition. In addition, subjects displaying a high degree of parochialism during intergroup competition had significantly higher levels of testosterone than subjects who did not differentiate much between the different groups. In sum, the present data demonstrate that the behavioral effects of testosterone are not limited to aggressive and selfish tendencies but may imply prosocial aspects depending on the context. By this means, our results support the previously reported findings on testosterone-dependent intergroup bias and indicate that this social hormone might be an important factor driving

Testosterone is associated with cooperation during intergroup competition by enhancing parochial altruism.

Science.gov (United States)

Reimers, Luise; Diekhof, Esther K

2015-01-01

The steroid hormone testosterone is widely associated with negative behavioral effects, such as aggression or dominance. However, recent studies applying economic exchange tasks revealed conflicting results. While some point to a prosocial effect of testosterone by increasing altruistic behavior, others report that testosterone promotes antisocial tendencies. Taking into account additional factors such as parochial altruism (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility) might help to explain this contradiction. First evidence for a link between testosterone and parochial altruism comes from recently reported data of male soccer fans playing the ultimatum game. In this study high levels of endogenous testosterone predicted increased altruistic punishment during outgroup interactions and at the same time heightened ingroup generosity. Here, we report findings of another experimental task, the prisoner's dilemma, applied in the same context to examine the role of testosterone on parochial tendencies in terms of cooperation. In this task, 50 male soccer fans were asked to decide whether or not they wanted to cooperate with partners marked as either fans of the subject's own favorite team (ingroup) or fans of other teams (outgroups). Our results show that high testosterone levels were associated with increased ingroup cooperation during intergroup competition. In addition, subjects displaying a high degree of parochialism during intergroup competition had significantly higher levels of testosterone than subjects who did not differentiate much between the different groups. In sum, the present data demonstrate that the behavioral effects of testosterone are not limited to aggressive and selfish tendencies but may imply prosocial aspects depending on the context. By this means, our results support the previously reported findings on testosterone-dependent intergroup bias and indicate that this social hormone might be an important factor driving parochial altruism.

Social distance influences the outcome evaluation of cooperation and conflict: Evidence from event-related potentials.

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Yezi; Lu, Jiamei; Wang, Yiwen; Feng, Zhouqi; Yuan, Bo

2017-04-24

Previous research shows that social distance plays an important role in promoting cooperation and that subtle cues that reduce social distance increase the tendency to cooperate. However, it is unclear how social distance influences our outcome evaluation of cooperative and conflict feedback. The present study investigated the influence of social distance on cooperative and conflict behavior and the evaluation process of the cooperative and conflict outcomes, using the event-related potentials (ERPs) technique. We recorded ERPs from 14 normal adults playing a social game task against a friend and a stranger. The results showed that the FRN (Feedback Related Negativity) and P300 were affected by the opponent's choice to cooperate or aggress; however, only the P300 was affected by social distance. Specifically, when the opponent chose to cooperate, the feedback elicited a smaller FRN and a larger P300 amplitude; and compared with playing against friends, the P300 had a larger amplitude when participants gaming with strangers. Our results indicate that at the early stage of the evaluation of cooperation and conflict outcomes, individuals may initially and quickly encode the valence of outcomes, judging whether an outcome is consistent with their expectations. However, at the late stage, which involves a top-down cognitive appraisal process, some social factors, such as social distance, may moderate processing of attention resource allocation of feedback about outcomes, and of higher-level motivation/affective appraisal. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation.

Science.gov (United States)

Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Iwasa, Yoh

2007-02-07

Reputation formation is a key to understanding indirect reciprocity. In particular, the way to assign reputation to each individual, namely a norm that describes who is good and who is bad, greatly affects the possibility of sustained cooperation in the population. Previously, we have exhaustively studied reputation dynamics that are able to maintain a high level of cooperation at the ESS. However, this analysis examined the stability of monomorphic population and did not investigate polymorphic population where several strategies coexist. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of multiple behavioral strategies by replicator dynamics. We exhaustively study all 16 possible norms under which the reputation of a player in the next round is determined by the action of the self and the reputation of the opponent. For each norm, we explore evolutionary dynamics of three strategies: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. We find that only three norms, simple-standing, Kandori, and shunning, can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. The other 13 norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors. Also, we study the model in which private reputation errors exist to a small extent. In this case, we find the stable coexistence of unconditional and conditional cooperators under the three norms.

Conducting Cancer Control and Survivorship Research via Cooperative Groups: A Report from the American Society of Preventive Oncology

OpenAIRE

Palesh, Oxana; Demark-Wahnefried, Wendy; Mustian, Karen; Minasian, Lori; Rowland, Julia; Sprod, Lisa; Janelsins, Michelle; Peppone, Luke; Sloan, Jeff; Engquist, Karen Basen; Jones, Lee; Buist, Diana; Paskett, Electra

2011-01-01

As the number of cancer survivors expands, the need for cancer control and survivorship research becomes increasingly important. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) Cooperative Groups may offer a viable platform to perform such research. Observational, preventive, and behavioral research can often be performed within the cooperative group setting, especially if resources needed for evaluation are fairly simple, if protocols are easily implemented within the typical clinical setting, and if in...

What is a cooperative?

Science.gov (United States)

Kimberly Zeuli

2006-01-01

Groups of individuals throughout time have worked together in pursuit of common goals. The earliest forms of hunting and agriculture required a great deal of cooperation among humans. Although the word "cooperative" can be applied to many different types of group activities, in this publication it refers to a formal business model. Cooperative businesses are...

A network of helping: Generalized reciprocity and cooperative behavior in response to peer and staff affirmations and corrections among therapeutic community residents.

Science.gov (United States)

Doogan, Nathan J; Warren, Keith

2017-01-01

Clinical theory in therapeutic communities (TCs) for substance abuse treatment emphasizes the importance of peer interactions in bringing about change. This implies that residents will respond in a more prosocial manner to peer versus staff intervention and that residents will interact in such a way as to maintain cooperation. The data consist of electronic records of peer and staff affirmations and corrections at four corrections-based therapeutic community units. We treat the data as a directed social network of affirmations. We sampled 100 resident days from each unit (n = 400) and used a generalized linear mixed effects network time series model to analyze the predictors of sending and receiving affirmations and corrections. The model allowed us to control for characteristics of individuals as well as network-related dependencies. Residents show generalized reciprocity following peer affirmations, but not following staff affirmations. Residents did not respond to peer corrections by increasing affirmations, but responded to staff corrections by decreasing affirmations. Residents directly reciprocated peer affirmations. Residents were more likely to affirm a peer whom they had recently corrected. Residents were homophilous with respect to race, age and program entry time. This analysis demonstrates that TC residents react more prosocially to behavioral intervention by peers than by staff. Further, the community exhibits generalized and direct reciprocity, mechanisms known to foster cooperation in groups. Multiple forms of homophily influence resident interactions. These findings validate TC clinical theory while suggesting paths to improved outcomes.

When does "economic man" dominate social behavior?

Science.gov (United States)

Camerer, Colin F; Fehr, Ernst

2006-01-06

The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when "Economic Man" dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate. Here we show that strategic incentives are the key to answering this question. A minority of self-regarding individuals can trigger a "noncooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for the majority of other-regarding individuals to mimic the minority's behavior. Likewise, a minority of other-regarding individuals can generate a "cooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for a majority of self-regarding people to behave cooperatively. Similarly, in strategic games, aggregate outcomes can be either far from or close to Nash equilibrium if players with high degrees of strategic thinking mimic or erase the effects of others who do very little strategic thinking. Recently developed theories of other-regarding preferences and bounded rationality explain these findings and provide better predictions of actual aggregate behavior than does traditional economic theory.

Multiscale habitat use and selection in cooperatively breeding Micronesian kingfishers

Science.gov (United States)

Kesler, D.C.; Haig, S.M.

2007-01-01

Information about the interaction between behavior and landscape resources is key to directing conservation management for endangered species. We studied multi-scale occurrence, habitat use, and selection in a cooperatively breeding population of Micronesian kingfishers (Todiramphus cinnamominus) on the island of Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. At the landscape level, point-transect surveys resulted in kingfisher detection frequencies that were higher than those reported in 1994, although they remained 15-40% lower than 1983 indices. Integration of spatially explicit vegetation information with survey results indicated that kingfisher detections were positively associated with the amount of wet forest and grass-urban vegetative cover, and they were negatively associated with agricultural forest, secondary vegetation, and upland forest cover types. We used radiotelemetry and remote sensing to evaluate habitat use by individual kingfishers at the home-range scale. A comparison of habitats in Micronesian kingfisher home ranges with those in randomly placed polygons illustrated that birds used more forested areas than were randomly available in the immediate surrounding area. Further, members of cooperatively breeding groups included more forest in their home ranges than birds in pair-breeding territories, and forested portions of study areas appeared to be saturated with territories. Together, these results suggested that forest habitats were limited for Micronesian kingfishers. Thus, protecting and managing forests is important for the restoration of Micronesian kingfishers to the island of Guam (United States Territory), where they are currently extirpated, as well as to maintaining kingfisher populations on the islands of Pohnpei and Palau. Results further indicated that limited forest resources may restrict dispersal opportunities and, therefore, play a role in delayed dispersal and cooperative behaviors in Micronesian kingfishers.

Datasets on organizational citizenship behavior in the selected hospitals with different ownership.

Science.gov (United States)

Jahani, Mohammad Ali; Mahmoudjanloo, Shahrbanoo; Rostami, Fatemeh Hoseini; Nikbakht, Hosein Ali; Mahmoudi, Ghahraman

2018-08-01

Studying the role of employees as the base of an organization on achieving organizational goals has increased in recent years [1]. To have better organizational citizens, organizations should encourage their staff [2]. As the most powerful form of organizational behavior, organizational citizenship is more influential than organizational cooperation [3]. Studies have shown that cooperative behavior, such as the citizenship behavior results in easier organizational communication, promoting organizational planning, improving inter-personal cooperation and developing better organizational climate, directly influence staff satisfaction, work life quality, service-provision, job commitment and financial output [4]. As the most fundamental organizational behavior, the organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) causes so-called organizational effectiveness. This study Focused on the comparing organizational citizenship behavior components including conscientiousness, courtesy, altruism, sportsmanship and civic virtue among hospitals based on ownership. Research population included all therapeutic and non-therapeutic employees working in the five selected hospital located in Golestan province, Iran in 2016. This study is approved by Ethical committee of Islamic Azad Sari Branch. Based on Cochran׳s sampling formula, 312 employees working in different hospital sections and units (nurses and administrative personnel) were proportionally selected as the research sample. They completed the Persian version of Podsakoff׳s standard scale measuring organizational citizenship behavior. The data were analyzed using SPSS 22 and applying inferential statistics approaches such as t-test, Tukey, and ANOVA in the confidence interval of 95%.

Scandinavian Cooperative Advantage

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Strand, Robert; Freeman, R. Edward

2015-01-01

. We conclude by endorsing the expression “Scandinavian cooperative advantage” in an effort to draw attention to the Scandinavian context and encourage the field of strategic management to shift its focus from achieving a competitive advantage toward achieving a cooperative advantage....

Milk marketing under cooperative and non-cooperative marketing channels: Evidence from west Bengal

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sarker Debnarayan

2010-01-01

Full Text Available The present study is an attempt to empirically investigate the price spread, marketing costs, marketing margins, marketing efficiency, and profit efficiency among market middlemen under cooperative and non-cooperative marketing channels in the domestic trade market of liquid milk in West Bengal. One of the important findings of this study is that, although the inter-market (and intramarket price variation for liquid milk under the cooperative marketing agency in not far from uniformity, and all marketing agencies under cooperative channels receive much lower abnormal profit per unit of milk as compared with non-cooperative channels, the former fails to provide much economic benefit, either to the producer or to the consumer, because of the burden of much higher fixed cost per unit of liquid milk.

Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Krasnow, Max M; Delton, Andrew W; Cosmides, Leda; Tooby, John

2015-01-01

Humans everywhere cooperate in groups to achieve benefits not attainable by individuals. Individual effort is often not automatically tied to a proportionate share of group benefits. This decoupling allows for free-riding, a strategy that (absent countermeasures) outcompetes cooperation. Empirically and formally, punishment potentially solves the evolutionary puzzle of group cooperation. Nevertheless, standard analyses appear to show that punishment alone is insufficient, because second-order free riders (those who cooperate but do not punish) can be shown to outcompete punishers. Consequently, many have concluded that other processes, such as cultural or genetic group selection, are required. Here, we present a series of agent-based simulations that show that group cooperation sustained by punishment easily evolves by individual selection when you introduce into standard models more biologically plausible assumptions about the social ecology and psychology of ancestral humans. We relax three unrealistic assumptions of past models. First, past models assume all punishers must punish every act of free riding in their group. We instead allow punishment to be probabilistic, meaning punishers can evolve to only punish some free riders some of the time. This drastically lowers the cost of punishment as group size increases. Second, most models unrealistically do not allow punishment to recruit labor; punishment merely reduces the punished agent's fitness. We instead realistically allow punished free riders to cooperate in the future to avoid punishment. Third, past models usually restrict agents to interact in a single group their entire lives. We instead introduce realistic social ecologies in which agents participate in multiple, partially overlapping groups. Because of this, punitive tendencies are more expressed and therefore more exposed to natural selection. These three moves toward greater model realism reveal that punishment and cooperation easily evolve by

Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Max M Krasnow

Full Text Available Humans everywhere cooperate in groups to achieve benefits not attainable by individuals. Individual effort is often not automatically tied to a proportionate share of group benefits. This decoupling allows for free-riding, a strategy that (absent countermeasures outcompetes cooperation. Empirically and formally, punishment potentially solves the evolutionary puzzle of group cooperation. Nevertheless, standard analyses appear to show that punishment alone is insufficient, because second-order free riders (those who cooperate but do not punish can be shown to outcompete punishers. Consequently, many have concluded that other processes, such as cultural or genetic group selection, are required. Here, we present a series of agent-based simulations that show that group cooperation sustained by punishment easily evolves by individual selection when you introduce into standard models more biologically plausible assumptions about the social ecology and psychology of ancestral humans. We relax three unrealistic assumptions of past models. First, past models assume all punishers must punish every act of free riding in their group. We instead allow punishment to be probabilistic, meaning punishers can evolve to only punish some free riders some of the time. This drastically lowers the cost of punishment as group size increases. Second, most models unrealistically do not allow punishment to recruit labor; punishment merely reduces the punished agent's fitness. We instead realistically allow punished free riders to cooperate in the future to avoid punishment. Third, past models usually restrict agents to interact in a single group their entire lives. We instead introduce realistic social ecologies in which agents participate in multiple, partially overlapping groups. Because of this, punitive tendencies are more expressed and therefore more exposed to natural selection. These three moves toward greater model realism reveal that punishment and cooperation

OPEC behavior

Science.gov (United States)

Yang, Bo

This thesis aims to contribute to a further understanding of the real dynamics of OPEC production behavior and its impacts on the world oil market. A literature review in this area shows that the existing studies on OPEC still have some major deficiencies in theoretical interpretation and empirical estimation technique. After a brief background review in chapter 1, chapter 2 tests Griffin's market-sharing cartel model on the post-Griffin time horizon with a simultaneous system of equations, and an innovative hypothesis of OPEC's behavior (Saudi Arabia in particular) is then proposed based on the estimation results. Chapter 3 first provides a conceptual analysis of OPEC behavior under the framework of non-cooperative collusion with imperfect information. An empirical model is then constructed and estimated. The results of the empirical studies in this thesis strongly support the hypothesis that OPEC has operated as a market-sharing cartel since the early 1980s. In addition, the results also provide some support of the theory of non-cooperative collusion under imperfect information. OPEC members collude under normal circumstances and behave competitively at times in response to imperfect market signals of cartel compliance and some internal attributes. Periodic joint competition conduct plays an important role in sustaining the collusion in the long run. Saudi Arabia acts as the leader of the cartel, accommodating intermediate unfavorable market development and punishing others with a tit-for-tat strategy in extreme circumstances.

Mindfulness training increases cooperative decision making in economic exchanges: Evidence from fMRI.

Science.gov (United States)

Kirk, Ulrich; Gu, Xiaosi; Sharp, Carla; Hula, Andreas; Fonagy, Peter; Montague, P Read

2016-09-01

Emotions have been shown to exert influences on decision making during economic exchanges. Here we investigate the underlying neural mechanisms of a training regimen which is hypothesized to promote emotional awareness, specifically mindfulness training (MT). We test the hypothesis that MT increases cooperative economic decision making using fMRI in a randomized longitudinal design involving 8weeks of either MT or active control training (CT). We find that MT results in an increased willingness to cooperate indexed by higher acceptance rates to unfair monetary offers in the Ultimatum Game. While controlling for acceptance rates of monetary offers between intervention groups, subjects in the MT and CT groups show differential brain activation patterns. Specifically, a subset of more cooperative MT subjects displays increased activation in the septal region, an area linked to social attachment, which may drive the increased willingness to express cooperative behavior in the MT cohort. Furthermore, MT resulted in attenuated activity in anterior insula compared with the CT group in response to unfair monetary offers post-training, which may suggest that MT enables greater ability to effectively regulate the anterior insula and thereby promotes social cooperation. Finally, functional connectivity analyses show a coupling between the septal region and posterior insula in the MT group, suggesting an integration of interoceptive inputs. Together, these results highlight that MT may be employed in contexts where emotional regulation is required to promote social cooperation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Flocking with minimal cooperativity: the panic model.

Science.gov (United States)

Pilkiewicz, Kevin R; Eaves, Joel D

2014-01-01

We present a two-dimensional lattice model of self-propelled spins that can change direction only upon collision with another spin. We show that even with ballistic motion and minimal cooperativity, these spins display robust flocking behavior at nearly all densities, forming long bands of stripes. The structural transition in this system is not a thermodynamic phase transition, but it can still be characterized by an order parameter, and we demonstrate that if this parameter is studied as a dynamical variable rather than a steady-state observable, we can extract a detailed picture of how the flocking mechanism varies with density.

77 FR 43120 - Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement-Dosage-Based Probation as an Effective Intervention

Science.gov (United States)

2012-07-23

... and organizational capacity to meet the goals of the project? Program Management/Administration: (25... offenders in their communities for positive reinforcement of desired new behaviors. (7) Measure Relevant... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE National Institute of Corrections Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement...

Excited cooper pairs

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lopez-Arrietea, M. G.; Solis, M. A.; De Llano, M. [Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico, D.F (Mexico)

2001-02-01

Excited cooper pairs formed in a many-fermion system are those with nonzero total center-of mass momentum (CMM). They are normally neglected in the standard Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) theory of superconductivity for being too few compared with zero CMM pairs. However, a Bose-Einstein condensation picture requires both zero and nonzero CMM pairs. Assuming a BCS model interaction between fermions we determine the populations for all CMM values of Cooper pairs by actually calculating the number of nonzero-CMM pairs relative to that of zero-CMM ones in both 2D and 3D. Although this ratio decreases rapidly with CMM, the number of Cooper pairs for any specific CMM less than the maximum (or breakup of the pair) momentum turns out to be typically larger than about 95% of those with zero-CMM at zero temperature T. Even at T {approx}100 K this fraction en 2D is still as large as about 70% for typical quasi-2D cuprate superconductor parameters. [Spanish] Los pares de cooper excitados formados en un sistema de muchos electrones, son aquellos con momentos de centro de masa (CMM) diferente de cero. Normalmente estos no son tomados en cuenta en la teoria estandar de la superconductividad de Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) al suponer que su numero es muy pequeno comparados con los pares de centro de masa igual a cero. Sin embargo, un esquema de condensacion Bose-Einstein requiere de ambos pares, con CMM cero y diferente de cero. Asumiendo una interaccion modelo BCS entre los fermiones, determinamos la poblacion de pares cooper con cada uno de todos los posibles valores del CMM calculando el numero de pares con momentos de centro de masa diferente de cero relativo a los pares de CMM igual a cero, en 2D y 3D. Aunque esta razon decrece rapidamente con el CMM, el numero de pares de cooper para cualquier CMM especifico menor que el momento maximo (o rompimiento de par) es tipicamente mas grande que el 95% de aquellos con CMM cero. Aun a T {approx}100 K esta fraccion en 2D es

Player Experiences and Behaviors in a Multiplayer Game: designing game rules to change interdependent behavior