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Sample records for convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials

  1. The convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-05-01

    This document contains the full text of a convention to facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, and to insure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport. Two annexes are included, which establish categories of nuclear materials and levels of physical protection to be applied in international transport

  2. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is composed of the text of 23 articles, annex 1 showing the levels of physical protection and annex 2 which is the categorization list of nuclear material. The text consists of definitions (article 1), the scope of applications (2), liability of protecting nuclear material during international transport (3 and 4), duty of mutual cooperation (5 and 6), responsibility for criminal punishment (7 to 13), and final provisions (14 to 23). It is to be noted that the nuclear material for military purposes and domestic nuclear facilities are excluded in the connection. After the brief description of the course leading to the establishment of the convention, individual articles and annexes and the respective Japanese version, and the explanation based on the intergovernmental meeting discussion on the draft convention are described. (J.P.N.)

  3. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA-INFCIRC-274). Part I contains the status list as of September 6, 1991; Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound; Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  4. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The document presents the original draft for a Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, full reports of all the discussions held by representatives of Member States at meetings called by the IAEA, texts of written comments provided by Member States and the final agreed text of the Convention, list of original signatory States and status of the list of signatory States at the date of publication

  5. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document refers to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA-INFCIRC-274), including in Part I the status list of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession by States or organizations as of 31 December 1996, in Part II the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound, and in Part III the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  6. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument of consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1990 is presented in an attachment

  7. Preliminary assessment on the differences of nuclear terrorism convention from the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and amendment to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Midiana Ariethia; Muhamad Ilman A A; Mas Pungky Hendrawijaya

    2011-01-01

    The threat of acts of nuclear terrorism in all its forms and manifestations create the urgent need to enhance international cooperation between countries in designing and following practical and effective measures for the prevention of acts of terrorism and to counter and punish its offenders. Several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, such as UNSCR Number 1373 (2001), and UNSCR Number 1540 (2005), and the result of Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 that encourage the member countries of IAEA to ratify nuclear conventions as soon as possible, are the reasons that the Indonesian Government planning on ratifying The International Convention for The Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention). Nuclear Terrorism Convention is one of the 16 (sixteen) international instruments that must be ratified by the member countries of IAEA. Of the 16 (sixteen) international instruments, 3 (three) conventions are related to nuclear; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, dan Nuclear Terrorism Convention. This paper presents the preliminary assessment on the differences of Nuclear Terrorism Convention to The Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Amendment to The Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This assessment is important due to the plan of the Indonesian Government to ratify the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The result of this assessment could be used by BAPETEN in the ratification process of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The method used in this assessment is references assessment. (author)

  8. Announcement concerning the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material of March 3, 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    The State Council of the German Democratic Republic ratified the convention on physical protection of nuclear material which was signed on 21 May 1980 and deposited with the Director General on 5 February 1981. The convention entered into force in accordance with its article 19 on 8 February 1987. The German and English texts of this convention are presented

  9. Text of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-11-01

    The Final Act of the Meeting of Governmental Representatives to Consider the Drafting of a Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed on 26 October 1979. According to paragraph 11 of the Final Act, ''The Meeting recommended that the text of the Convention be transmitted for information to the Twenty-Third General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.''

  10. Criminal offences considered in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neira, C.C.

    1996-01-01

    The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed in Vienna, on April 3, 1980, approved by Law 23.620 on September 28, 1998, and published in the Official Bulletin of the Argentine Republic on November 2, 1988. This Convention considers some aspects of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedural Law and integrates the normative hierarchical structure of the article 31 of the National Constitution. The adequacy of this Convention to the Argentine law is considered through two aspects: The first one examines figures existing in the Argentine Legislation about larceny and robbery of nuclear materials, misappropriation of nuclear materials, obtainment and fraud of nuclear materials, exaction through threat or intimidation, etc., which are considered in different articles of the Argentine Criminal Law. The second one analyses behaviours not foreseen in the Criminal Law and which are not qualified by the current Argentina's Criminal Code, such as exaction of nuclear material through the use of violence, the international perpetration of an act consisting to receive, possess, use, vacate, scatter nuclear material without legal authorization, or in the case that the act causes death, serious injuries to persons and others. The purpose of the future enactment of a new Nuclear Law is to put in order and fill-in gaps referred to different aspects such as civil liability in nuclear damages, characteristics of the nuclear damages, etc [es

  11. Bill project authorizing the approval of the amendment to the convention on physical protection of nuclear material - Nr 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayrault, Jean-Marc; Fabius, Laurent

    2012-01-01

    This document contains the brief text of the bill project and the text of the amendment to the Convention on physical protection of nuclear material which has been adopted in Vienna in August 2005 to amend the Convention adopted in October 1979. This amendment introduces the following measures: extension of the scope of application of the Convention to nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes, definition of the objectives of the Convention, articulation of the Convention with other international instruments, definition of the main principles of physical protection, strengthened international cooperation, legal issues concerning extradition and legal cooperation

  12. Strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities Regime: A Path Forward

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitts-Kiefer, S.; Nalabandian, M.

    2017-01-01

    With entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on May 8, 2016, and the culmination of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (CPP), as the amended convention is now known, can play an increasingly important role in efforts to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture. The CPP significantly enhances the international legal framework for nuclear security by expanding the scope of physical protection requirements and providing a direct linkage to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security guidance through incorporation of the Fundamental Principles.The CPP’s entry into force requires states parties to submit reports to the IAEA under Article 14 informing the IAEA of its laws and regulations giving effect to the convention—states parties were required to do so under the original CPPNM, but the scope of the reports will need to expand to reflect the expanded scope of the convention. Reporting builds confidence in the effectiveness of states’ security. In addition, entry into force of the CPP requires the IAEA, under Article 16, to convene a review conference in five years to assess the implementation and adequacy of the convention “in light of the then prevailing situation.” The review conference will provide an opportunity for states parties to assess the status of nuclear security progress and will provide a forum for dialogue on how to strengthen the global architecture and address remaining gaps in the system. Article 16 also provides for additional review conferences at periods of at least five years if requested by a majority of states parties. Regular review conferences would be an important mechanism for sustaining attention on nuclear security and ensuring continued nuclear security progress. For the CPP to fulfill its potential to play an important role in

  13. Bill project authorizing the approval of the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juppe, Alain; Fillon, Francois

    2011-01-01

    This document deals with the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which has been adopted in July 2005. This amendment notably extended the Convention's scope, objectives, relation with other international instruments and content (regarding cooperation, sanctions, and so on). After the text of this amendment, this document contains the bill project which reports an impact study (estimated economic, financial, environmental, and legal consequences of the amendment implementation), comments the penal and criminal cooperation defined in the Convention. A table indicates the impact of the amendment's articles on the French law

  14. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-12-01

    A Technical Committee on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material met in April-May 1989 to advise on the need to update the recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 and on any changes considered to be necessary. The Technical Committee indicated a number of such changes, reflecting mainly: the international consensus established in respect of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the experience gained since 1977; and a wish to give equal treatment to protection against the theft of nuclear material and protection against the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 1 tab

  15. The physical protection of nuclear material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-09-01

    Technical Committee met 21-25 June 1993 to consider changes to INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The revised document, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, reflects the Technical Committee recommendations for changes to the text as well as other modifications determined necessary to advance the consistency of the Categorization Table in INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 with the categorization table contained in The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to reflect additional improvements presented by the experts. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  16. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Technical Committee met 21-25 June 1993 to consider changes to INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The revised document, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, reflects the Technical Committee recommendations for changes to the text as well as other modifications determined necessary to advance the consistency of the Categorization Table in INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 with the categorization table contained in The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to reflect additional improvements presented by the experts. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  17. Facilitating the entry into force and implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: Observations, challenges and benefits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Peri Lynne; )

    2014-01-01

    While the responsibility for nuclear security at the national level rests entirely with each state, international co-operation can be crucial in helping states to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities and obligations. The central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in strengthening the nuclear security framework and leading the co-ordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security is now widely recognised. Although much has been done to help states in improving nuclear security, by and under the auspices of the IAEA and other intergovernmental organisations, nuclear terrorism has gained a global recognition as one of the most challenging threats to global security in the 21. century Reports by IAEA member states to the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) indicate that nuclear material continues to go missing. Also, too many nuclear facilities are still inadequately protected and sabotage thereof is a threat. Border security remains lax in too many places and the possibility for nuclear smuggling may exist. Attempts by individuals and groups of persons are still made to acquire nuclear material for terrorist and other malicious purposes. The threat of nuclear terrorism remains real. Adopted under the auspices of the IAEA on 8 July 2005, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ('Amendment') and the existing convention, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM or 'Convention') of 1980, are one of a number of treaties comprising the international legal framework on nuclear security. As will be explained later in the article, the Amendment expands and deepens the effect of the CPPNM. However, more than nine years after its adoption and despite the perceived threat and recognised need to strengthen the CPPNM dating back some 15 years ago, the Amendment is still not in force. Although to some CPPNM states parties, the pressing need for the

  18. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  19. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  20. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [fr

  1. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  2. Act of 17 April 1986 to implement Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done in Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The purpose of this Act is to implement in domestic legislation Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed by Belgium on 13th June 1980. Article 7 of the Convention lays down that states Parties must provide for penalties for a number of serious offences with respect to nuclear material. Article 8 specifies the cases in which measures must be taken by States Parties to establish their jurisdiction over such offences. (NEA) [fr

  3. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  4. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  5. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  6. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  7. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  8. Physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Full text: An Advisory Group met to consider the up-dating and extension of the Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, produced in 1972. Twenty-seven experts from 11 countries and EURATOM were present. Growing concern has been expressed in many countries that nuclear material may one day be used for acts of sabotage or terrorism. Serious attention is therefore being given to the need for States to develop national systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transport throughout the nuclear fuel cycle which should minimize risks of sabotage or theft. The revised Recommendations formulated by the Advisory Group include new definitions of the objectives of national systems of physical protection and proposals for minimizing possibilities of unauthorized removal and sabotage to nuclear facilities. The Recommendations also describe administrative or organizational steps to be taken for this purpose and the essential technical requirements of physical protection for various types and locations of nuclear material, e.g., the setting up of protected areas, the use of physical barriers and alarms, the need for security survey, and the need of advance arrangements between the States concerned in case of international transportation, among others. (author)

  9. Legal Aspects of international cooperation in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1981-10-01

    This paper provides a detailed analysis of developments in the number field having led the IAEA to promote international cooperation in ensuring adequate physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. This work resulted in the establishment of recommendations and guidelines in this respect and culminated in the development of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. (NEA) [fr

  10. [Safeguards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-01-01

    Testimony is given on the subject of safeguards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, particularly during transportation. The ERDA nation-wide safe-secure transportation system and the Safe-Secure Trailer are described. The nationwide ERDA voice communication system is also described. Development of hardware and systems is discussed. The use of adversary simulation for evaluating protection systems is mentioned

  11. National practices in physical protection of nuclear materials. Regulatory basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goltsov, V.Y.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The Federal law 'On The Use Of Atomic Energy' containing the section on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities was issued in 1995 in Russian Federation. This document became the first federal level document regulating the general requirements to physical protection (PP). The federal PP rules developed on the base of this law by Minatom of Russia and other federal bodies of the Russian Federation were put in force by the government of Russia in 1997. The requirements of the convention on physical protection of nuclear materials (INFCIRC 274) and the modern IAEA recommendations (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) are taken into account in the PP rules. Besides, while developing the PP rules the other countries' experience in this sphere has been studied and taken into account. The PP rules are action-obligatory for all juridical persons dealing with nuclear activity and also for those who are coordinating and monitoring this activity. Nuclear activity without physical protection ensured in accordance with PP rules requirements is prohibited. The requirements of PP Rules are stronger than the IAEA recommendations. The PP rules are establishing: physical protection objectives; federal executive bodies and organizations functions an implementation of physical protection; categorization of nuclear materials; requirements for nuclear materials physical protection as during use and storage as during transportation; main goals of state supervision and ministry level control for physical protection; notification order about the facts of unauthorized actions regarding nuclear materials and facilities. Besides the above mentioned documents, there were put in force president decrees, federal laws and regulations in the field of: counteraction to nuclear terrorism; interactions in physical protection systems; military and ministerial on-site guard activities; information protection. By the initiative of Minatom of Russia the corrections were put into the

  12. Study on CPPNM Interpretation of the Physical Protection Regulatory Aspects for International Transport of Nuclear Material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Woo-jin; Yang, Seong-hyo; Hyung, Sang-chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    Nuclear energy has been regulated by various international agreements or treaties due to the potential dangers. In case of export or import of nuclear material, it is important to comply with international norms and domestic laws related to nonproliferation and physical protection of nuclear material. Because, if non-compliant, it can be taken nuclear sanctions from the international community, and thus the domestic nuclear activities can be under a negative impact. Recently, international interests in nuclear security have been increased, it has become very sensitive to whether or not to join, and to comply with international treaties during international transportation of nuclear materials. Currently it is not discussed yet how to present and interpret the relevant provisions in CPPNM. However, it is necessary to prepare for the dispute among the parties that we don't know when it happens.

  13. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-09-15

    The revised recommendations now brought to the attention of all Member States in the present booklet reflect in attempt to consolidate and reconcile the contributions made by the group of experts, comments made by some governmental organizations and the views of the Secretariat.

  14. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-09-01

    The revised recommendations now brought to the attention of all Member States in the present booklet reflect in attempt to consolidate and reconcile the contributions made by the group of experts, comments made by some governmental organizations and the views of the Secretariat

  15. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5): Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication, Revision 5 of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225), is intended to provide guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes. The recommendations presented in this publication reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

  16. A Road map for Establishing the Physical Protection Regime of Nuclear Materials and Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoo, Ho-Sik; Kwak, Sung-Woo; Jang, Sung-Soon; Kim, Jae-Kwang; Kim, Jung-Soo; Yoon, Wan-Ki

    2007-01-01

    The importance of physical protection for nuclear materials and facilities that can be an objective for terrorists has never been more stressed. The responsibility for physical protection within a State does not rest entirely with that state because cross-border transactions related to nuclear materials increase as nuclear related industries expand. The international community has prepared measures to strengthen the regime of physical protection such as the IAEA's proposal of the 'Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009' and UN's resolution on 'the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism'. In order to cope with this, Korea has also made efforts to establish the implementation system for physical protection in the field of nuclear industries since the law for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facility and Radiological Emergency Preparedness (LPPREP) was promulgated in 2004. The detailed plans should be prepared to accomplish this. This study has been performed to derive the items for establishing the regime of physical protection. The items derived were classified as short, mid and long-term depending on their characteristics and environmental circumstances. The regime of national physical protection will be established if the studies on these items are carried out successfully and tangible results are obtained

  17. Report made on the behalf of the Commission of foreign affairs, defence and armed forces on the bill project, adopted by the National Assembly, authorizing the approval of the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material - Nr 217

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pintat, Xavier

    2012-01-01

    After a presentation of the content of the international Convention (1979) on the physical protection of nuclear material, this report comments how the evolution of the international context during the 2000's induced a strengthening of the Convention measures through an amendment which expands the infractions to be introduced in the national law, and expands the protection to nuclear installations (however, the application is left to the initiative of member States). It discusses the consequences for France of the approval of the amendment. Two other texts are provided in appendix: the report on nuclear safety in 2012 made by the IAEA Director General, and the resolution nr 1540 of the U N Security Council

  18. Strengthened implementation of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shim, H.-W.; Lee, J.-U.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Since the 9.11 terror, strengthening physical protection has been an accelerated trend internationally. IAEA has been requesting that member states implement a strengthened physical protection of nuclear facilities on the basis of threat assessments. In order to cope with this demand, the Korean government promulgated the 'Law for Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency Preparedness (LPPRE)' as a substantial countermeasure against possible threats. Pursuant to LPPRE, which entered into force on February 16, 2004, nuclear enterprisers are obliged to implement an effective physical protection of nuclear materials, get approval for its physical protection system, and be constantly inspected on. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) approved physical protection regulations of 24 domestic facilities operated by 14 enterprisers. National Nuclear management and Control Agency (NNCA) is entrusted with physical protection related duty and has been conducting physical protection inspection on nuclear materials in use, storage and transport. In addition, NNCA has established the methodology of threat assessment that entails organizing the threat assessment working group to develop a design basis threat (DBT). Korea is putting its best efforts to construct the threat assessment system and strengthen domestic physical protection regime in cooperation with competent authorities. (author)

  19. Class notes from the first international training course on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herrington, P.B. (ed.)

    1979-05-01

    The International Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials was intended for representatives from the developing countries who are responsible for preparing regulations and designing and assessing physical protection systems. The first part of the course consists of lectures on the objectives, organizational characteristics, and licensing and regulations requirements of a state system of physical protection. Since the participants may have little experience in nuclear energy, background information is provided on the topics of nuclear materials, radiation hazards, reactor systems, and reactor operations. Transportation of nuclear materials is addressed and emphasis is placed on regulations. Included in these discussions are presentations by guest speakers from countries outside the United States of America who present their countries' threat to nuclear facilities. Effectiveness evaluation methodology is introduced to the participants by means of instructions which teach them how to use logic trees and the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) program. The following elements of a physical protection system are discussed: barriers, protective force, intrusion detection systems, communications, and entry-control systems. Total systems concepts of physical protection system design are emphasized throughout the course. Costs, manpower/technology trade-offs, and other practical considerations are discussed. Approximately one-third of the course is devoted to practical exercises during which the attendees participatein problem solving. A hypothetical nuclear facility is introduced, and the attendees participate in the conceptual design of a physical protection system for the facility.

  20. Class notes from the first international training course on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herrington, P.B.

    1979-05-01

    The International Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials was intended for representatives from the developing countries who are responsible for preparing regulations and designing and assessing physical protection systems. The first part of the course consists of lectures on the objectives, organizational characteristics, and licensing and regulations requirements of a state system of physical protection. Since the participants may have little experience in nuclear energy, background information is provided on the topics of nuclear materials, radiation hazards, reactor systems, and reactor operations. Transportation of nuclear materials is addressed and emphasis is placed on regulations. Included in these discussions are presentations by guest speakers from countries outside the United States of America who present their countries' threat to nuclear facilities. Effectiveness evaluation methodology is introduced to the participants by means of instructions which teach them how to use logic trees and the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) program. The following elements of a physical protection system are discussed: barriers, protective force, intrusion detection systems, communications, and entry-control systems. Total systems concepts of physical protection system design are emphasized throughout the course. Costs, manpower/technology trade-offs, and other practical considerations are discussed. Approximately one-third of the course is devoted to practical exercises during which the attendees participatein problem solving. A hypothetical nuclear facility is introduced, and the attendees participate in the conceptual design of a physical protection system for the facility

  1. Physical protection concepts of nuclear materials. The French experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arnaud, G.; Artaud, R.

    1995-01-01

    As the nuclear energy was being developed, it appeared necessary to set up protections against its potential hazards, that should be more complete and elaborate than those implemented on the other industrial installations. This had to be done both in the safety field to prevent the environment and the populations from the consequences of severe casualties, and in the security field to avoid the risk of proliferation and limit to an acceptable level the results of voluntarily provoked accidents and sabotages. Taking advantage of the gathered experience, this document gives consideration to the concepts used in France in order to ensure the physical protection of the nuclear materials. The following topics are tackled: context inside which are envisaged the specific measures, coherence with the general dispositions taken to protect industrial installations, importance and limitations of the part played by the regulations, respective responsibilities of the plant operators and the public authorities, compromise between objectives in view and means to implement, adjustment between the physical protection system and the operating requirements. In addition, the ways in which these systems should be implemented are discussed, underlining the necessity to make progressive steps under a permanent will, in order, first, to update and bring under conformity the old installations, and second, to ensure the maintenance of the systems, taking account of the evolutions of needs and techniques. Those points are commented on examples taken among the different types of installations to be found in France, showing the differences in approach coming from the type and the age of the facilities, and giving the present trends for the new plants. (authors). 1 annexe

  2. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. Status list as of 12 September 2000. Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. Declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto. Declarations/reservations made upon signature

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This document contains signatures, ratifications, acceptance, approval, accession or succession of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material as well as declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto and declarations made upon signature

  3. Steps to implement the legal and regulatory infrastructure for physical protection of nuclear material in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramirez Quijada, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The signature of Peru to become part of the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1995 has implied an obligation to formalize the legal and regulatory infrastructure for this purpose. As first step, physical protection measures were formalized on the two nuclear facilities: one critical assembly of zero power (RP0) and another research reactor of 10 Mw thermal power (RP10). Both of the installations use low enriched uranium nuclear fuel (Material and Testing Material - MTR type). On the other side, even thorium was put in perspective to control; currently it is being used for non-nuclear purposes and has not been included inside the physical protection measures. Its physical and chemical form and its small quantity do not warrant for applying the Convention. The physical protection measures implemented in the research reactor are well depicted and it is concluded that the physical protection system meets the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The critical facility (RP0), as having nuclear material categorized III, has implemented a less restrictive system but enough to meet the requirements. In 1999 an evaluation of all physical protection systems was performed for these two nuclear installations. This evaluation took into account the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. The general conclusion was that the performance of physical protection system was suitable to the categories of nuclear material - II and III - and that the installations where nuclear material is used were suitably protected against non-authorized or illegal removal of nuclear material and sabotage. However, some of components of the system were not appropriately working and could make all of the system weak. Another of the identified problems was the lack of a rule on physical protection and also the lack of the Design Basis Threat, although this fact was well known due the social conditions in the country. The second undertaking has been to prepare the rule on

  4. Specialists training on nuclear materials control, accounting and physical protection in the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khromov, V.V.; Pogozhin, N.S.; Kryuchkov, E.F.; Glebov, V.B.; Geraskin, N.I.

    1998-01-01

    Educational program to train specialists on non-proliferation problems and nuclear materials control, accounting and physical protection systems (NMCA and PP) at the Science Master's level was developed and is being realized in Moscow Sate Institute of Engineering and Physics at the support of the USA Ministry of Energy. The program is intended to train students who already got the Bachelor's degree on physical and technical subjects. The United methodological base of the program comprises lecture courses, practice in laboratories and computer programs. The educational program contains the following parts for training the students. 1) Deep scientific and technical knowledge. 2) System approach to designing and analysis of the NMCA and PP systems. 3) Knowledge of scientific and technical principles, means, devices and procedures used in the NMCA and PP systems. 4) Judicial, international and economical aspects of nuclear materials management. 5) Application of computer and information technologies for nuclear materials control and accounting. 6) Extensive practice in laboratories, using the most up-to-date equipment and devices used in the worldwide practice of NM control

  5. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Proteccion Fisica Delos Materiales Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1993-09-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [French] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o de grupos ha sido durante largo tiempo motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica para las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe enteramente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, es cosa que no deja indiferentes a los demas Estados. De aqui que la proteccion fisica se haya convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  6. Evolution of the physical protection and control of nuclear materials in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschoa, A.S.; Renha, G.; Mafra, O.Y.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Brazil started protecting its nuclear materials soon after the end of the World War II, when the Combined Development Trust intended to control the world supply of uranium and thorium. This happened in 1944, but on December 27, 1946, an amendment to the report of Committee II of the United Nations established that the international ownership of the unexplored uranium and thorium would not be mandatory. Brazil nationalized its thorium and uranium reserves in 1951. The Brazil-Germany agreement signed in 1975 enhanced the need for Brazilian nuclear safeguards and security. The physical protection (PP) and control of nuclear materials (CNM) became activities under the supervision of the Brazilian military forces. The System for Protection of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (SIPRON), established on 7 October 1980, took over the responsibilities for PP and other aspects of the Brazilian nuclear program. The central organ of SIPRON was the Brazilian National Security Council (CSN). The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was in charge of coordinating, among others, the PP sector. Earlier that year - on 3 March 1980 - the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was signed simultaneously in New York and Vienna. The Brazilian congress approved the CPPNM on 27 November 1984, and the Brazilian government deposited the ratification letter on 17 October 1985. On 16 April 1991 the Brazilian government issued a decree to enforce the CPPNM in the Brazilian territory. CNEN published the regulatory documents NE - 2.01 on 19 April 1996, and NN - 2.02 on 21 September 1999 for PP, and CNM, respectively. CNEN has the ultimate responsibility to enforce these regulations. The operational aspects of PP and CNM in Brazil are still improving. Potential nuclear terrorism for example needs to be examined. Activities concerning training personnel and implementing PP and CNM will be described in the paper. (author)

  7. Dealing with the regional challenge of physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschoa, A.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The problem of protecting sensitive fissile and fissionable nuclear materials of misuses by governments has been the subject of the convention on physical protection of nuclear material (CPPNM), which entered into force on February 8, 1987. However, in May 2001 the final report of the expert meeting had already recognized 'a clear need to strengthen the international physical protection regime'. The board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided then to convene a group, which would meet in Vienna from 3 to 7 December 2001, to draft on amendment to the CPPNM. The tragic occurrences of September 11, 2001, however, changed the then generally accepted view on the problem of physical protection, because nuclear materials had to be protected from falling into the hands of terrorists rather than of governments thirst of nuclear sensitive materials. Moreover, crude explosive devices could be made by terrorists, or hired scientists, using readily available radioactive materials, like 226 Ra or 137 Cs to inflict damage to civilians. Thus physical protection of those and other radioactive materials became an instant challenge for national and international authorities to prevent the use of such materials in terrorist actions. The prevention of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials is now in the priority list of these authorities. Fortunately; an international conference on 'Measures to Detect, Intercept and Respond to the Illicit Uses of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources' was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in May 2001. An IAEA document - GOV/2001/37-GC(45)/20 - recommended in its plan of activities a series of projects to be implemented between 2002 and 2005, which included developing and providing assistance for the application of: (i) standards for physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in member states; (ii) norms and guidelines for nuclear material accounting and control in member states; (iii

  8. Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards and the role of the IAEA in physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smolej, M.

    1999-01-01

    The physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and materials concerns utilities, manufactures, the general public, and those who are responsible for licensing and regulating such facilities. The requirements and process to ensure an acceptable physical protection and security system have been evolutionary in nature. This paper reviews the first step of such process: the State's safeguards system and the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the relationship between these two safeguards systems. The elements of these systems that are reviewed include the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, physical protection measures, and containment and surveillance measures. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described. The paper addresses the IAEA safeguards system, including material accountancy and containment and surveillance; the State safeguards system, including material control and accountancy, and physical protection; the role of the IAEA in physical protection; a summary of safeguards system interactions.(author)

  9. Criteria and application methodology of physical protection of nuclear materials within the national and regional boundaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.E.; Cesario, R.H.; Giustina, D.H.; Canibano, J.

    1998-01-01

    Full text: The physical protection against robbery, diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installations by individuals or groups, has been for long time the reason of national and international concern. Even though, the obligation to create and implement an effective physical protection system for nuclear materials and installations in the territory of a given State, fall entirely on the State's Government, whether this obligation is fulfilled or not, and if it does, in what measure or up to what extent, it also concerns the rest of the States. Therefore, physical protection has become the reason for a regional co-operation. It is evident the need of co-operation in those cases where the physical protection efficiency within the territory of a given State depends also on the appropriate measures other States are taken, specially when dealing with materials been transported through national borders. The above mentioned constitute an important framework for the regional co-operation for the physical protection of nuclear materials. For that reason, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority established criteria and conditions aimed at mitigate diversions, robberies and sabotage to nuclear installations. As a working philosophy, it was established a simplify physical protection model of application in Argentina who, through the ARCAL No. 23 project, will be extrapolated to the whole Latin-American region, concluding that the application of the appropriated physical protection systems at regional level will lead to the strengthening of it at national level. (author) [es

  10. Peculiarities of physical protection assurance of the nuclear materials at nuclear installation decommissioning stage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinchuk, M.G.

    2001-01-01

    On December 15, 2000 Unit 3 of Chernobyl NPP, which is the last one in Ukraine having RBMK-type reactor, was permanently shutdown before the end of its lifetime. A number of projects related to establishing infrastructure for the plant decommissioning are being implemented in compliance with the Ukraine's commitments. Decommissioning stage includes activities on fuel unloading from the cores of Unit I and Unit 3, fuel cooling in the ponds followed by the fuel transportation to the spent fuel dry storage facility (currently under construction) for its safe long-term storage. Special facilities are being created for liquid and solid radioactive waste treatment. Besides, it is planned to implement a number of projects to convert Shelter Object in environmentally safe structure. Physical protection work being an essential part of the nuclear material management is organized in line with the recommendations of the IAEA, and the Laws of Ukraine 'On Nuclear Energy Utilization and Radiation Safety', 'On Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations and Materials', 'Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Installations', other codes and standards. While organizing physical protection on ChNPP decommissioning stage we have to deal with some specific features, namely: Significant amount of fuel assemblies, which are continuously transferred between various storage and operation facilities; Big amount of odd nuclear material at Shelter Object; 'Theft of new fuel fragments from the central hall of the Shelter Object in 1995 with the intention of their further sale. The thieves were detained and sentenced. The stolen material was withdrawn, that prevented its possible proliferation and illicit trafficking. At present physical protection of ChNPP does not fully satisfy the needs of the decommissioning stage and Ukraine's commitments on non-admission of illicit trafficking. Work is carried out, aimed to improve nuclear material physical protection, whose main

  11. Guidance and considerations for the implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    This publication is intended to provide guidance and considerations for a State's competent authority to better understand and prescribe appropriate requirements, consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which are compatible with accepted international practice. This report, together with a more detailed report, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, which addresses to the licencee or designer of physical protection systems who has specific implementation and compliance responsibilities, should be used in conjunction to each other to provide better and comprehensive guidance on physical protection

  12. Guidance and considerations for the implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-05-01

    This publication is intended to provide guidance and considerations for a State's competent authority to better understand and prescribe appropriate requirements, consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which are compatible with accepted international practice. This report, together with a more detailed report, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, which addresses to the licensee or designer of physical protection systems who has specific implementation and compliance responsibilities, should be used in conjunction to each other to provide better and comprehensive guidance on physical protection

  13. Workshop materials from the 2nd international training course on physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, Module 13

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, F.P.

    1980-04-01

    This course is intended for representatives of countries where nuclear power is being developed and whose responsibilities include the preparation of regulation and the design and evaluation of physical protection systems. This is the second of two volumes; the first volume is SAND-79-1090

  14. Consideration on the evaluation of the two-man rule for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itakura, Shuichiro; Nakagome, Yoshihiro

    2008-01-01

    The establishment of effective anti-insider measures is a key issue with regard to the physical protection system. The two-man rule, which obligates workers to act always in pairs inside the protected area, is one of the important measures for the anti-insider physical protection system. However, the effectiveness of this method has not been examined in a quantitative manner taking into account the circumstances of Japanese society, which may influence the effectiveness of this method. In this paper, although with several hypotheses, the effectiveness of the two-man rule is confirmed based on the percentage of criminals in the Japanese population. (author)

  15. Physical protection of export/import and transportation of nuclear material in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The paper contains short overview about average amount of nuclear materials transported on the territory of the Slovak Republic in a year, and the physical protection of these nuclear materials. There are several types of transportation and export/import of nuclear materials in the SR: fresh fuel import; import of other unirradiated nuclear materials (e.g. depleted uranium, natural uranium); export of unirradiated nuclear materials (e.g. natural uranium); internal transportation of fresh fuel; internal transportation of other unirradiated nuclear materials; internal transportation of spent fuel. The main objective of the nuclear regulatory authority SR is to supervise observation of the national legislation as follows: the act no. 130 / 1998 on peaceful use of nuclear energy; UJD SR's regulation no. 186/1999 which details the physical protection of the nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, and radioactive waste (following requirements of INFCIRC 225 / Rev. 4); UJD SR's regulation no. 284 / 1999 which details conditions of nuclear material and radioactive wastes transportation. (author)

  16. The system of physical protection of nuclear materials in the Republic of Belarus: problems and solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piotukh, V.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: It is a matter of common knowledge, that the responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear material and facilities within a state shall rest entirely with the Government of that state. In Belarus all nuclear materials, including HEU, are located at the Center of Nuclear Technologies of the Belarus National Academy of Sciences 'Sosny'. Through regulatory resolution on measures for physical protection of nuclear materials issued by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus in 1993, the committee for Supervision of Industrial and Nuclear Safety (Promatomnadzor) was appointed as the authority responsible for ensuring physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and was tasked to develop and approve relevant normative documents. In 1994 Promatomnadzor issued the order on ensuring physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transportation that was in line with then relevant IAEA recommendations. Since September 2001 Promatomnadzor has been a department of the Ministry for Emergencies of the Republic of Belarus. The system of physical protection at 'Sosny' includes elements of the 'old' system set up in 1984, and the 'new' one installed in 1996 as a result of a multilateral co-operative effort between Belarus, Sweden, Japan and USA. The main technical components of the system are: detection system including magnetic, microwave and infrared sensors; video-surveillance system; system of access delay including electronic blocking devices; system of authorized access including magnetic cards; system of computerized control over all components and communication system. Discussions between potential donor states are taking place regarding various security upgrades, particularly to the protected area where main security sensitive buildings are located. In 2000 Promatomnadzor requested an international physical protection advisory service (IPPAS) mission from the IAEA. The

  17. Decree-Law No. 375/90 of 10 November 1990 designating the competent national authority for the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    This Decree-Law designates, in accordance with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Protection and Nuclear Safety Bureau (GPSN) of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources as the national competent authority in relation to physical protection matters. Accordingly, the import, manufacture, possession, purchase, sale or transfer of nuclear material, as well as its transport, are subject to prior authorisation by the GPSN [fr

  18. Physical Protection of Nuclear Safeguards Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoskins, Richard

    2004-01-01

    IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan is established to assist Member States in implementing effective measures against nuclear terrorism. Four potential threats were identified: theft of nuclear weapon, nuclear explosive device, radiological dispersal device and an attack on radiation facility. In order to achieve effective protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the IAEA sponsored the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which focuses on the protection of nuclear materials 'in international transport. The IAEA also promoted INFCIRC/255 entitled the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities and published TECDOC/967 for the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against theft and sabotage and during transport. Assistance is available for the Member States through the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ). (author)

  19. Physical protection in the transport of nuclear materials (Legal aspects of the domestic system)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novais, F.J.G.

    1978-04-01

    A study of the physical protection system is made. Emphasis is given to some considerations in the nuclear material transport area, mainly the details of the domestic system, from a juridic pont of view. (Author) [pt

  20. Diet discussion begins for signing convention on physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    As a part of the amendment of the domestic laws required for signing the 'Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials', the government placed the bill for the partial amendment of the 'Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Materials, Nuclear Fuel Materials and Reactors' to the current session of the Diet, following the formal approval by the Cabinet on March 11. This bill provides for punishment in the case of endangering or threat related to the handling and use of nuclear materials. The Atomic Energy Commission proposed in December, last year the early signing of the Convention and the legislation on the antiterrorism and physical protection measures required for the signing. The amendment consists mainly of two parts: one stipulates the obligation for those who manage the handling of nuclear materials to take the proper measures for their physical protection, and the other stipulates the punishment of the crimes related to nuclear materials. Regarding the other amendment of the relevant domestic laws, the Criminal Law was partially amended in June, last year. The Aviation Act and the Ships Safety Act, both related to the transport of nuclear materials, will not be amended, but only the relevant Ministerial Ordinances will be revised. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials came into force in February, 1987, and consists of 23 articles. (Kako, I.)

  1. Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in CEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garnier-Gratia, M.-H.; Jorda, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), as nuclear operator, is responsible for the control and protection of their nuclear materials. Inside CEA, DCS (Central Security Division) is in charge of the security matters, DCS defines the CEA strategy in this field, especially in physical protection. The paper will present the physical protection strategy of CEA. DCS defines the rules and methods; the operators have to apply in order to fulfill the security objectives of CEA. CEA has to provide the regulatory authority with documents proving that it is in accordance with the requirements of the 25th July 1980 law and 12th May 1981 decree. It has to implement all the necessary means in order to achieve the results requested by the regulatory authority. All these arrangements are described in the 'license and control file'. This file should specify the facility safeguards and physical protection system. Accounting measures are also described. In this file, the petitioner has to justify its capacity for holding nuclear materials and for exercising authorized activities on them. So the organization and the installed means have to be described in this authorization file. For physical protection, containment, surveillance and physical protection measures are presented: Containment measures must prevent the unauthorized or unjustified movements of nuclear material in the framework of the authorized activities; Surveillance measures must guarantee the integrity of the containment, check that no material is exiting by an abnormal channel; Physical protection measures for the materials, the premises and the facilities are intended to protect them against malevolent actions by means of security systems. The Central Security Division has established guidelines to provide guidance to the nuclear materials holders in writing such files. Each holding unit has to establish a 'license and control file' and each CEA site establishes a 'site license and control file

  2. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities; Proteccion Fisica De Los Materiales Y Las Instalaciones Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [Spanish] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o grupos es motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional desde hace mucho tiempo. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica de las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe exclusivamente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, son cosas que no dejan indiferentes a los demas Estados. Por ello, la proteccion fisica se ha convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de la cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  3. Expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials at universities of Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pogozhin, N.S.; Bondarev, P.V.; Geraskin, N.I.; Kryuchkov, E.F.; Tolstoy, A.I.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials in Russia is carry out by the universities on the following directions: 'Physical Protection, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials (MPCA)' master educational program. 'Physical and technical problems of atomic engineering' master educational standard. 'Technical Physics' direction. Qualification - master of physics. Duration of training - two years. 'Physical protection of nuclear objects' specialization. 'Nuclear physics and technology' educational standard of a direction for professionally qualified expert training. 'Safety and nonproliferation of nuclear materials' specialty. Qualification - engineer-physician. Duration of training - five years. The Master educational program is intended for the expert training with fundamental knowledge. The masters are assigned to work at the establishments of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia and at the state committee on nuclear supervision (Gosatomnaozor). Many graduates continue their education as post-graduate students. The program is designed for the experts having education of an engineer or a bachelor. The program concept consists in integration in a uniform educational process: profound scientific and technical knowledge; system approach to designing MPCA systems; knowledge of scientific and technical principles, means, devices; MPCA facilities and tools; legal, political and economic aspects of nuclear material management; modern computer and information technologies for MPCA systems; research work and practice of the students. The educational program for 'physical protection of nuclear objects' specialization is intended for the expert training of a practical orientation. Engineer-physicians are assigned as a rule to work at the nuclear objects and are intended for operation and servicing of the certain physical protection systems (PPS). The program concept consists in training not only fundamental aspects of an engineering

  4. Establishing design basis threats for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chetvergov, S.

    2001-01-01

    In the area of nuclear energy utilization, the Republic of Kazakhstan follows the standards of international legislation and is a participant of the Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Treaty as a country that does not have nuclear weapons. In the framework of this treaty, Kazakhstan provides for the measures to ensure the regime of nonproliferation. The Republic signed the Agreement with the IAEA on the guarantee that was ratified by the Presidential Decree in 1995. Now the Government of the RK is considering the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Kazakhstan legislation in the area of nuclear energy utilization is represented by a set of laws: the main of them is the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 'On the utilization of atomic energy', dated April 14, 1997. According to the Law, the issues of physical protection are regulated by interdepartmental guideline documents. Nuclear science and industry of RK include: Enterprises on uranium mining and processing; Ulba metallurgical plant, manufacturing fuel pellets of uranium dioxide for heat release assemblies of RBMK and WWR reactor types, with the enrichment on U235 1.6-4.4%; Power plant in Aktau for heat and power supply and water desalination, based on fast breeder reactor BN-350; Research reactors of National Nuclear Center: WWR-K - water-water reactor, with 10 MW power, uses highly enriched uranium (up to 36% of U-235); IVG.1M - water-water heterogeneous reactor of vessel type on thermal neutrons, maximum power is 35 MW; IGR - impulse homogeneous graphite reactor on thermal neutrons, with graphite reflector; RA - high temperature gas cooled reactor on thermal neutrons, 0.5 MW power. The establishment of design basis threats for nuclear objects in the Republic of Kazakhstan is an urgent problem because of the developing military-political situation in the region. It is necessary to specify important elements affecting the specific features of the design basis threat: military operations of

  5. Proposal for guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear materials, plants and transports in Denmark

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    The guidelines are based on recommendations in the IAEA's ''Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,'' INFCIRC/225/rev.1. In accordance with practice in other countries, the guidelines give more detailed requirements for the protection of reactor plants than those given in the IAEA's present recommendations, which put more emphasis on the protection of nuclear materials. The measures to be taken for nuclear plants, or nuclear transports, are proposed made to fit the potential risk that the more closely defined actions imply. It is suggested that the more detailed rules for the scope of the protection of plants or materials should be laid down by the National Agency on the basis of recommendations made by the Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations, which in turn are based on the safety documentation of the plant/material owners. It is further proposed that the National Agency, again on a recommendation from the Inspectorate, should lay down more detailed guidelines for the reporting of changes in stocks or transports of nuclear materials. (author)

  6. Guidance and considerations for implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, provides recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material against theft in use, storage and transport, whether national or international and whether peaceful or military, and contains provisions relating to the sabotage of nuclear material or facilities. The recommendations contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 detail the elements that should be included in a State's system of physical protection. It also recognizes the adverse health and safety consequences arising from the theft of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material or facilities. Most industrial and developing countries use these recommendations to some extent in the establishment and operation of their physical protection systems. Although INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 provides recommendations for protecting materials and facilities from theft or sabotage, it does not provide in-depth details for these recommendations. In June 1996, the IAEA convened a consultants meeting to consider this matter. This report is the result of continuing discussions and drafts over a period of nine months. The intent of this guidance is to provide a broader basis for relevant State organizations to prescribe appropriate requirements for the use of nuclear materials which are compatible with accepted international practice

  7. Protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.; Winter, D.

    2007-01-01

    In the framework of the French regulation on nuclear materials possession, the first liability is the one of operators who have to know at any time the quantity, quality and localization of any nuclear material in their possession. This requires an organization of the follow up and of the inventory of these materials together with an efficient protection against theft or sabotage. The French organization foresees a control of the implementation of this regulation at nuclear facilities and during the transport of nuclear materials by the minister of industry with the sustain of the institute of radiation protection and nuclear safety (IRSN). This article presents this organization: 1 - protection against malevolence; 2 - national protection and control of nuclear materials: goals, administrative organization, legal and regulatory content (authorization, control, sanctions), nuclear materials protection inside facilities (physical protection, follow up and inventory, security studies), protection of nuclear material transports (physical protection, follow up), control of nuclear materials (inspection at facilities, control of nuclear material measurements, inspection of nuclear materials during transport); 3 - international commitments of France: non-proliferation treaty, EURATOM regulation, international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, enforcement in France. (J.S.)

  8. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-01-01

    This publication is the lead Implementing Guide in a suite of guidance on implementing the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. It provides guidance and suggestions to assist States and their competent authorities in establishing, strengthening and sustaining their national physical protection regime and implementing the associated systems and measures, including operators’ physical protection systems. The structure of this publication is as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 describes the objectives of physical protection and the overall approach to managing the risks of the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities. Section 3 provides guidance for the State and its competent authorities on the physical protection elements of the nuclear security regime; this guidance is based on the fundamental principles set out in the Recommendations publication. Section 4 provides guidance on the operator’s physical protection system and describes a systematic, integrated approach. Appendix I gives an annotated outline of the typical contents of an operator’s security plan. Appendix II provides similar guidance for the contingency plan. Appendix III provides a description of nuclear material aggregation that can be used to categorize nuclear material and determine the appropriate level of protection against unauthorized removal. Appendix IV presents a table of paragraph cross-references between the Recommendations publication and this Implementing Guide.

  9. Physical protection of facilities and special nuclear materials in france

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeanpierre, G.

    1980-01-01

    Physical protection of nuclear facilities and special nuclear materials is subject in France to a national governmental regulation which provides for the basic principles to be taken into account and the minimal level of protection deemed necessary. But the responsibility of implementation is left to the facility management and the resulting decentralization allows for maximum efficiency. All safeguards measures comply with the commitments taken at the international level by the French government

  10. Legal problems raised in Italy by the ratification of the Convention in Physical Protection - implications in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albano, R.; Crocenzi, G.

    1983-01-01

    This paper examines the legal problems which arose in Italy when the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature in 1980, was ratified by that country in 1982. The purpose and background of the Convention and its relationship with other international regulations, in particular in the field of transport, are analysed in detail. Finally, the paper reviews the main European laws (French, German and British) on physical protection of nuclear material. (NEA) [fr

  11. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). Recommendations (Spanish Edition); Recomendaciones de Seguridad Fisica Nuclear sobre la Proteccion Fisica de los Materiales y las Instalaciones Nucleares (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5). Recomendaciones

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-06-15

    This publication, Revision 5 of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225), is intended to provide guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes. The recommendations presented in this publication reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

  12. Consideration on the current status and issues of sensitive information management concerning the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inamura, Tomoaki; Madarame, Haruki

    2009-01-01

    The confidentiality system concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities was enacted by revision of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law in 2005. We made a comparative analysis with the information security in governmental agencies or financial sectors, in order to consider the way the sensitive information management concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities should be. The considerations in this paper are as follows. (1) In order to secure a suitable level of security, close cooperation should be achieved among related governmental agencies. (2) A cycle that continuously evaluates whether suitable management is performed should be established. (3) Excessive secretiveness should be eliminated. (4) An information-sharing system among the related persons beyond the frame of governmental agencies and electricity companies should be established. (5) Improvement in the social acceptability of the sensitive information management is important. (6) Although it is important to perform evaluation by the consideration of suitable balance with information disclosure, it is also important that it is positively shown to society. (author)

  13. 20th International Training Course (ITC-20) on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials evaluation report.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ramirez, Amanda Ann

    2008-09-01

    The goal of this evaluation report is to provide the information necessary to improve the effectiveness of the ITC provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency Member States. This report examines ITC-20 training content, delivery methods, scheduling, and logistics. Ultimately, this report evaluates whether the course provides the knowledge and skills necessary to meet the participants needs in the protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

  14. Physical protection system of nuclear material in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bueker, H.; Jungclaus, D.; von Eyss, H.J.; von Osten, W.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of physical protection, its statutory and other bases as well as the parties involved in the licensing process are described. The facilities are grouped in categories reflecting their hazard potentials: the possibility of a theft of nuclear fuels in an approach similar to INFCIRC 225 and, in addition, the possibility of a release of radioactive materials. Physical protection follows the concept of detection, alert of police force, delay, prevention of the act by police force. The schematic layout of a Category I facility is presented

  15. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-10-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely-activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. A list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (auth)

  16. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed in this paper. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. Finally, a list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (author)

  17. Security Culture in Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Susyanta-Widyatmaka; Koraag, Venuesiana-Dewi; Taswanda-Taryo

    2005-01-01

    In nuclear related field, there are three different cultures: safety, safeguards and security culture. Safety culture has established mostly in nuclear industries, meanwhile safeguards and security culture are relatively new and still developing. The latter is intended to improve the physical protection of material and nuclear facility. This paper describes concept, properties and factors affecting security culture and interactions among these cultures. The analysis indicates that anybody involving in nuclear material and facility should have strong commitment and awareness of such culture to establish it. It is concluded that the assessment of security culture outlined in this paper is still preliminary for developing and conduction rigorous security culture implemented in a much more complex facility such as nuclear power plant

  18. Fingerprinting of nuclear material to strengthen physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueck, K.; Lindauer, H.; Falta, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Physical protection of nuclear material against diversion and stealing presents a major step to prevent abuse of nuclear material for military or terrorist purposes. If such material had been diverted, however, and discovered by border traffic control, police control or other methods of investigation, identifying the site and time of diversion is of utmost importance to ensure that the point of possible diversion is closed and the possible delivery and end-use point becomes known. The quicker and more comprehensive these investigations are performed, the greater are the chances to find the criminal persons and the point of diversion. The paper, therefore, deals with fingerprinting methods used to obtain enough and comprehensive background information for investigators to find out the source of diversion and the channels through which it might have reached the point of discovery and the possible point of ultimate destination (end-use of the material). On the example of the round-robin test for the identification of illicit nuclear material performed by EURATOM in 1999, and the conclusions obtained by our laboratory it is demonstrated that a high amount of information can be drawn from a single sample and that this information can be used by investigators world-wide to find the point of origin of the material and its possible point of diversion. The set of information is segmented into 3 different levels: information gained in the first 24 hours after arrival of the unknown material, information gained up to one week after uptake and information gained up to one month after. The first information is to inform the investigators about the hazard and the relevance of the material, about preliminary investigation results and support the investigating judge on the justification to further detain the person(s). The second information should contain more detail on the material and the possible point of diversion and assist the investigators to decide on proper

  19. Summary report on transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan : transportation infrastructure, threats identified in open literature, and physical protection regulations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cochran, John Russell; Ouchi, Yuichiro (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan); Furaus, James Phillip; Marincel, Michelle K.

    2008-03-01

    This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials1. The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.

  20. Transport of nuclear material under the 1971 Brussels Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lagorce, M.

    1975-01-01

    The legal regime in force before entry into force of the 1971 Brussels Convention relating to civil liability for the maritime carriage of nuclear material created serious difficulties for maritime carriers, regarding both the financial risks entailed and restrictions on enjoyment of the rights granted by civil liability conventions. The 1971 Convention exonerates from liability any person likely to be held liable for nuclear damage under maritime law, provided another person is liable under the nuclear conventions or an equivalent national law. A problem remaining is that of compensation of nuclear damage to the means of transport for countries not having opted for re-inclusion of such damage in the nuclear law regime; this does not apply however to countries having ratified the Convention to date. A feature of the latter is that it establishes as extensively as possible the priority of nuclear law over maritime law. Furthermore the new regime continues to preserve efficiently the interests of victims of nuclear incidents. It is therefore to be hoped that insurers will no longer hesitate to cover international maritime carriage of nuclear material [fr

  1. The protection against nuclear risks under the international nuclear liability law: the geographical and technical scope of the international conventions on third party liability for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kissich, S.J.

    2001-10-01

    This Ph.D.-research deals with the International Conventions on Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage. In 1960, the Paris Convention was established with the aim of providing a special uniform nuclear third party liability regime for Western Europe. This Convention was supplemented in 1963 by the Brussels Supplementary Convention. Also in 1963, the Vienna Convention, which aimed to establish a world-wide system based on the same principles as the Paris Convention, was adopted. A further Convention was adopted in 1971 to ensure that nuclear third party liability law and not maritime law would apply to carriage of nuclear materials by sea. In 1988, the Paris and Vienna Conventions have been linked by the adoption of a Joint Protocol. In 1997, the process of amending the 1963 Vienna Convention was successfully concluded and a Convention on Supplementary Compensation was adopted. This Ph.D.-research consists of seven chapters: following an introduction, the second chapter gives a general view of the existing international legal sources. The third chapter describes the international civil nuclear liability law concept and its leading principles. The main element of this work is the question of the technical and geographical scope of the international nuclear liability conventions (chapter IV and V). The conventions are only applicable to nuclear incidents, which occur in a nuclear installation or incidental to the carriage or storage of nuclear material. The nuclear damage must arise out of the radioactive properties of nuclear substances which are also defined by legal terms. In addition, the scope of the conventions is limited by the nature of the installations. The geographical scope of application is established by the provisions on geographical coverage. Only the 1963 Vienna Convention does not contain any specific provision dealing with the territorial scope of its application. The geographical scope determines where the nuclear incident or the nuclear damage

  2. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. 3: Emphasis on site-wide issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuzin, V.V.; Pshakin, G.M.; Belov, A.P.

    1997-07-01

    During 1997, collaborative Russian-US nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) tasks at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, Russia are focusing increasingly on site-wide issues, though there is continued work at several major facilities: the Fast Critical Facility, the Technological Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication, and the (new and existing) Central Storage Facility. The collaborative work is being done with US Department of Energy National Laboratories. IPPE's emphasis on site-wide issues has resulted in the formation of a separate division for MPC and A. This new division reports directly to the IPPE Chief Engineer. It is a separate scientific and engineering operating division responsible for coordination and harmonization of MPC and A at IPPE, as well as for audit, assessment and inspection. By virtue of the organizational independence of this new division, IPPE has significantly strengthened the role of MPC and A. Two specific site-wide accomplishments are the consolidation of nuclear material from many buildings to a smaller number, and, as a major part of this strategy, the construction of a nuclear island surrounding the Fast Critical Facility and the new Central Storage Facility. Most of IPPE's weapons-grade nuclear materials will be concentrated within the nuclear island. The paper summarizes the following technical elements: computerized accounting, bar coding, weight measurements, gamma-ray measurements, tamper indicating devices, procedures for physical inventory taking and material balance closure, and video monitoring systems for storage and critical assembly areas

  3. Regulatory problems relating to physical protection of nuclear plants and materials in Italy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nocera, F.

    1981-10-01

    Although the questions raised by physical protection have an international charater, it is important to know of national regulations in that field since exchange of information and study of common problems help to achieve satisfactory results. This paper analyses the Italian situation, by illustrating legislative and administrative actions undertaken as well as the practices adopted in Italy to meet problems of prevention of malevolent acts against nuclear installations and substances, until such time an Act is passed in this respect. Finally, the author is in favour of the 1980 Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material being ratified soon by a large number of countries. (NEA) [fr

  4. Educational and laboratory base for the expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials: the requirements and experience of practical implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bondarev, P.V.; Pogozhin, N.S.; Ryzhukhin, D.V.; Tolstoy, A.I.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials (NMPP) an educational and laboratory base has special importance. In these laboratories the students receive practical skills concerning physical protection systems (PPS). The basic requirements for creating such base are formulated in a certain educational program implemented at an educational institution. Thus it is necessary to take into account the following features of a modern nuclear object PPS: restriction of an object visiting with the purpose of acquaintance with features of a certain object PPS; dynamical change of PPS component nomenclature; increase of use of computer facilities for managing all PPS subsystems; increase of integration degree of separate subsystems in a uniform PPS complex; high cost of PPS components. Taking that into consideration a university, which assumes to begin the expert training on NMPP, is compelled to solve the following tasks: creation of its own laboratory base. The implementation of practical occupations with visiting a nuclear object cannot be executed practically; definition of quantity and structure of educational laboratories. Thus the features of the implemented educational plan should be taken into account in addition; optimization of expenses on laboratory creation. The regular updating of laboratory equipment structure is impossible in a practical manner. Therefore unique correct decision is to supply laboratories with the equipment, which uses the typical technological decisions on performing the basic PPS functions (detection, delay, estimation of a situation, neutralization); development of laboratory work conducting procedures (laboratory practical works); technical support of the created laboratories. The certain experience of solving the listed tasks is accumulated at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University) (MEPhl) while implementing 'Physical Protection, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials' master

  5. Physical protection of special nuclear materials in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossnagel, A.

    1987-01-01

    Measures to protect special nuclear materials in West Germany are based on a relatively likely average threat and not on the less-likely but maximum credible threat. The reason is to avoid the costs of maintaining a very high level of security that is seldom needed. The concept of delayed action, which divides the responsibility for security between private protection forces and local police forces, would be insufficient in the event of the maximum credible threat. In principle, sufficient security is possible only when the facilities and transports are constantly protected by a police force large enough to deal with the maximum credible threat without assistance from outside. They must also be adequately armed to avert all possible attackers, and they must be paid by the licensees. The threat of an insider(s) diverting special nuclear material can be addressed only by strengthening the scope and depth of the checks on applicants and employees and the permanent work controls. It is recognized, however, that such security measures may not be compatible with constitutional civil liberties

  6. Amendment of the regulations on the physical protection of nuclear materials (section 18c) made by Royal Decree no. 1809 of 2 november 1984 pursuant to Act no. 28 of 12 may 1972 on atomic energy activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    These Regulations were made by Royal Decree of 25 August 1989 and entered into force on 20 October 1989. They insert a new Section in the 1984 Decree on physical protection of nuclear materials providing that in accordance with the 1979 Regulations on the transport of dangerous goods by air as amended, nuclear materials shall be transported in compliance with the relevant Technical Instructions of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [fr

  7. Systematic Approach to Training and Professional Development Specialists of Physical Protection, Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klos, Nataliia

    2014-01-01

    Conclusion: 1. Ukraine has created the State system for professional training, retraining and professional development of specialists in physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials. 2. Ukraine has founded profession physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials

  8. Implementation of physical protection of nuclear material in Yugoslavia and Slovenia - recent and planned activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Nikolic, A.; Nikoli, D.; Stegnar, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In more than ten last years region of South-Europe, especially countries originated from previous the Socialistic Federal Republics of Yugoslavia, are involved or surrounded, at least, by various conflicts including wars of different intensities. These unfavorable environment conditions have put additional focus at nuclear material kept in various institutions in the region. Following the IAEA recommendation on straighten the physical protection of nuclear material various actions are done or planned in the Yugoslavia and Slovenia to increase level of physical protection of nuclear material during its different usage and storage. Especial attention is drawn to update the administration rules, education of the involved personnel and redundancy of different physical protection modes of protection to prevent thieves and smuggling of nuclear material in the country or at country borders. The financial and experts help were offered by the IAEA at low level scale to Yugoslavia in 1996/97 to increase the physical protection of the fresh high-enriched uranium fuel stored and controlled regularly by the inspectors of the safeguard department of the IAEA. The further help and financial support is expected from the IAEA and relevant EU organization in aim to tighter the country borders to prevent the illegal traffic of nuclear material through the Europe. (author)

  9. Implementation of physical protection of nuclear material in Yugoslavia and Slovenia - recent and planned activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Nikolic, A.; Nikolic, D.; Stegnar, P.

    2002-09-01

    In more than ten last years region of South-East Europe (especially countries originated from previous the Socialistic Federal Republics of Yugoslavia) was involved (or surrounded, at least) by various conflicts, including wars of different intensities. These unfavourable conditions have put additional focus at nuclear material stored in various institutions in the region. Following the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on straighten the physical protection of nuclear material, various actions were done or are planned in the Yugoslavia and Slovenia in aim to increase level of physical protection of nuclear material during its different usage and storage. Especial attention is drawn to update the administration rules, education of the involved personnel and redundancy of different physical protection modes to prevent stealing and smuggling of nuclear material in both the countries or at country borders. The financial and expert help at low-level scale were offered by the IAEA and US government to Yugoslavia in 1996/97. It was used to increase the physical protection of fresh high-enriched uranium fuel stored and controlled regularly by the inspectors of the Safeguard Department of the IAEA. The further help and financial support is expected from the IAEA, USA and relevant European Union (EU) organisations in aim to tighter the borders of both the countries to prevent the illegal traffic of nuclear materials through the Europe. (author)

  10. Increasing the effectiveness of the physical protection system on a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu N.

    2017-01-01

    The malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating, particularly in the case of a nuclear explosive device, it could be unpredictably disruptive resulting in the dispersal of radioactive material, like it was in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Physical Protection System (PPS) plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, organizations and institutions remain vigilant and that sustained measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or of using radioactive material for malicious acts. PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. In the operator's perspective, this paper study factors influencing the performance of a PPS in a nuclear facility suggesting ways to increase the system effectiveness. The human factor, the physical and the psychological work environment has a large impact on how personnel perform their work and comply with nuclear security requirements. Apathy and corporatism are two human behaviors that collaborate negatively and make decrease the effectiveness of any PPS. Job satisfaction reduces the probability that personnel will become less reliable and/or obstructive in extreme cases an insider threat. Managers must recognize individual and group needs and the relationship among personnel so that they may motivate personnel by creating a supportive working environment that reduces workplace stress. An effective PPS can result in a significant increase in the effectiveness of the security of radioactive material and associated facilities. (author)

  11. Increasing the effectiveness of the physical protection system on a nuclear facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu N., E-mail: acavaz@ipen.br, E-mail: tnconti@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), São Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    The malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating, particularly in the case of a nuclear explosive device, it could be unpredictably disruptive resulting in the dispersal of radioactive material, like it was in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Physical Protection System (PPS) plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, organizations and institutions remain vigilant and that sustained measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or of using radioactive material for malicious acts. PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. In the operator's perspective, this paper study factors influencing the performance of a PPS in a nuclear facility suggesting ways to increase the system effectiveness. The human factor, the physical and the psychological work environment has a large impact on how personnel perform their work and comply with nuclear security requirements. Apathy and corporatism are two human behaviors that collaborate negatively and make decrease the effectiveness of any PPS. Job satisfaction reduces the probability that personnel will become less reliable and/or obstructive in extreme cases an insider threat. Managers must recognize individual and group needs and the relationship among personnel so that they may motivate personnel by creating a supportive working environment that reduces workplace stress. An effective PPS can result in a significant increase in the effectiveness of the security of radioactive material and associated facilities. (author)

  12. Effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwarz, G.

    2016-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) has been established after the Chernobyl accident with the primary objective of achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide, through the enhancement of national measures and international cooperation. The CNS is an incentive convention. It defines the basic safety standard which shall be met by the Contracting Parties. The verification of compliance is based on a self-assessment by the Countries and a Peer Review by the other Contracting Parties. As of July 2015, there are 78 Contracting Parties. Among the Contracting Parties of the Convention are all countries operating nuclear power plants except the Islamic Republic of Iran and Taiwan, all countries constructing nuclear power plants, all countries having nuclear power plants in long term shutdown and all countries having signed contracts for the construction of nuclear power plants. The National Reports under the CNS therefore cover almost all nuclear power plants of the world. The peer review of reports, questions and answers that are exchanged in connection with the Review Meetings provided a unique overview of nuclear safety provisions and issues in countries planning or operating nuclear power plants. This is especially important for neighbouring countries to those operating nuclear power plants.

  13. Physical protection system to detect and control the illicit trafficking and transfer of nuclear materials in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Young Ho [Catholic Univ. of Daegu, Gyeongbuk (Korea, Republic of); Moon, Joo Hyun [Dongguk Univ., Gyeongbuk (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-11-15

    Physical protection has played an essential role in ensuring the implementation of global nuclear nonproliferation framework for the past decades. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon the United States, physical protection has also played the same role in combating nuclear terrorism. Nowadays, physical protection is more highlighted than before with global nuclear security regimes more strengthened. Ever since the commencement of the first nuclear power plant in 1978, Korea has devotedly implemented international physical protection standards as an exemplary country in respect of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Korean government has recently reinforced national physical protection policy including the revision of laws and regulations. In this paper, the national policy is extensively reviewed and additional measures are proposed to enhance the national physical protection system. (orig.)

  14. Nuclear materials management handbook. Safeguards, physical protection of nuclear material. 1995 ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Now, very safe and stable supply of electric power has become to be obtained by nuclear energy, and Japan has steadily promoted nuclear power as the basic energy that contributes to overcome the unstable structure of energy supply in Japan highly depending on foreign countries, as shown in the long term plan of the research, development and utilization of nuclear power. Great progress was observed in nuclear fuel recycling in Japan such as the attainment of initial criticality of the prototype FBR 'Monju' and the start of construction of the commercial fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho. Recently the recognition of the importance of nuclear substance management has heightened, and the measures for maintaining and strengthening the reliability of nuclear nonproliferation system are investigated. It is important that Japan strictly observes the nuclear nonproliferation system based on the NPT which was extended infinitely. In this handbook, the outline of the measures for nuclear nonproliferation and safeguard and the protection of nuclear substances, the treaties and agreements and the national laws related to these are described. (K.I.)

  15. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matveenko, I.P.; Pshakin, G.M.; Mozhaev, V.K.

    1995-01-01

    The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) is a leading research center under the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation. IPPE encompasses many installations and many specialists who perform fundamental and applied investigations in nuclear power and technology for the national nuclear program. IPPE has a key role in the national nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC ampersand A) system both as a nuclear facility and also as a training center for MPC ampersand A. As a participant in the US-Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory Cooperative Program in MPC ampersand A, IPPE is conducting several tasks in collaboration with US Department of Energy national laboratories. The main goal of these tasks is the rapid improvement of MPC ampersand A at one of the most sensitive operating IPPE installations, the BFS critical facility, which has large numbers of fuel items containing highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. After the completion of several test, evaluation, and demonstration tasks, it is hoped that the tested and adopted methods and procedures can be applied not only to the entire population of BFS fuel items, but also to other facilities at IPPE and other Russian nuclear institutes and operating facilities. The collaborative tasks cover seven areas: computerized nuclear material accounting, entry control and portals, item control and inventory, design evaluation and analysis, gamma and neutron assay, an integrated demonstration, and physical protection elements and test bed

  16. A study on international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Kwang Seok; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Byung Wook; Cho, Il Hoon; Lee, Jae Sung; Choi, Young Rok; Ko, Han Seok; Ham, Chul Hoon; Lee, Byung Woon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze the current status of international nuclear organizations and conventions in systems perspective and suggest national strategies for utilizing them for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. This study analyzes the current status of international nuclear organizations such as IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency) and international nuclear conventions related to nuclear accidents, nuclear liability, physical protection or nuclear safety. Based on the analysis, this study suggests national strategies, in general and specific terms, to utilize international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. Separately from this report this study publishes `IAEA Handbook`, which contains all about IAEA such as statute, membership, organizational structure, main activities, finance and budget, etc.. 9 tabs., 2 figs., 35 refs. (Author).

  17. A study on international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Kwang Seok; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Byung Wook; Cho, Il Hoon; Lee, Jae Sung; Choi, Young Rok; Ko, Han Seok; Ham, Chul Hoon; Lee, Byung Woon

    1995-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze the current status of international nuclear organizations and conventions in systems perspective and suggest national strategies for utilizing them for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. This study analyzes the current status of international nuclear organizations such as IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency) and international nuclear conventions related to nuclear accidents, nuclear liability, physical protection or nuclear safety. Based on the analysis, this study suggests national strategies, in general and specific terms, to utilize international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. Separately from this report this study publishes 'IAEA Handbook', which contains all about IAEA such as statute, membership, organizational structure, main activities, finance and budget, etc.. 9 tabs., 2 figs., 35 refs. (Author)

  18. Order of 26 March 1982 on the protection and control of nuclear materials during transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    This Order was made in implementation of Act No. 80-572 of 25th July 1980 on protection and control of nuclear materials and in particular, of Decree No. 81-512 of 12th May 1981, which was itself made in pursuance of the Act. In accordance with the Decree, this Order determines the rules applicable to the protection and control of nuclear materials in course of carriage, especially in connection with the supervision of the conditions in which such transport is carried out and the authorities warned in case of an incident, accident or any occurrence whatsoever which is likely to delay or jeopardize execution of the planned transport operation or protection of the nuclear material concerned. (NEA) [fr

  19. Workshop on materials science and the physics of non-conventional energy sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furlan, G.; Nobili, D.; Sayigh, A.M.; Seraphin, B.O.

    1989-01-01

    The non-conventional energy activities started in 1974, on the island of Procida, Italy. About 50 leading physicists and engineers got together for two weeks in September to discuss the states of the art and consult with each other about various devices and ways of energy conversion. The esteemed Nobel Prize Laureate, Professor Abdus Salam, accepted to have the first meeting on non-conventional energy at the ICTP, Trieste, in September 1977. In 1987, the meeting was once again back in Trieste, Italy. Also, during the even years since 1978 until 1986, meetings were held in Trieste in the French language. The results of the last 10 years at ICTP are very clear to all fellow scientist and engineers. Some 150 applicants are chosen every year. The workshop is being graded gradually to emphasize the high technology and up-to-date achievements in the field. A good proportion of the physicists who were with us from the beginning are now top experts in the field and in charge of existing programmes in their own countries. The present programme emphasized the following topics: Material Science; Solar Energy Conversion with concentration on Photovoltaic Conversion; and Energy Storage. Refs, figs and tabs

  20. Experience of developing and introduction of the integrated systems for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials under conditions of continuously operating production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filatov, O.N.; Rogachev, V.E.

    2003-01-01

    The improvements of the integrated systems for accounting, control and physical protection (ACPP) of nuclear materials under conditions practically continuous production cycle are described. As a result of development and introduction of the improved means and technologies the developed systems realized successfully the requirements of reliable ACPP of nuclear materials [ru

  1. Physical protection of special nuclear material in the commercial fuel cycle. Volume I. Executive summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-04-01

    This is the summary of the work and recommendations resulting from Sandia's participation in the Special Safeguards Study, which covered three areas: protection of SNM at fixed facilities, protection of SNM while in transit, and relocation and recovery of lost SNM. The results are published in full in five other volumes. 6 tables, 4 fig

  2. 10 CFR 73.25 - Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... strategic special nuclear material in transit. 73.25 Section 73.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION... Transit § 73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit. (a) To meet the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20 an in-transit physical...

  3. Physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myers, D.A.

    1989-01-01

    Physical protection is defined and its function in relation to other functions of a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials is described. The need for a uniform minimum international standard for physical protection as well as the need for international cooperation in physical protection is emphasized. The IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 (Annex 1) is reviewed. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Annex 2) is discussed. Photographs show examples of typical physical protection technology (Annex 3)

  4. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. II. extension to additional facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuzin, V.V.; Pshakin, G.M.; Belov, A.P.

    1996-01-01

    During 1995, collaborative Russian-US nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC ampersand A) tasks at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, Russia focused on improving the protection of nuclear materials at the BFS Fast Critical Facility. BFS has thousands of fuel disks containing highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium that are used to simulate the core configurations of experimental reactors in two critical assemblies. Completed tasks culminated in demonstrations of newly implemented equipment and methods that enhanced the MPC ampersand A at BFS through computerized accounting, nondestructive inventory verification measurements, personnel identification and assess control, physical inventory taking, physical protection, and video surveillance. The collaborative work is now being extended. The additional tasks encompass communications and tamper-indicating devices; new storage alternatives; and systemization of the MPC ampersand A elements that are being implemented

  5. Chapter No.5. Nuclear materials and physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) is based on requirements resulting from the Safeguards Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the IAEA. UJD performs this activity according to the 'Atomic Act' and relevant decree. The purpose of the SSAC is also to prevent unauthorised use of nuclear materials, to detect loses of nuclear materials and provide information that could lead to the recovery of missing material. The main part of nuclear materials under jurisdiction of the Slovak Republic is located at NPP Jaslovske Bohunice, NPP Mochovce and at interim storage in Jaslovske Bohunice. Even though that there are located more then 99% of nuclear materials in these nuclear facilities, there are not any significant problems with their accountancy and control due to very simply identification of accountancy units - fuel assemblies, and due to stability of legal subjects responsible for operation and for keeping of information continuity, which is necessary for fulfilling requirements of the Agreement. The nuclear material located outside nuclear facilities is a special category. There are 81 such subjects of different types and orientations on the territory of the Slovak Republic. These subjects use mainly depleted uranium as a shielding and small quantity of natural uranium, low enrichment uranium and thorium for experimental purposes and education. Frequent changes of these subjects, their transformations into the other subjects, extinction and very high fluctuation of employees causes loss of information about nuclear materials and creates problems with fulfilling requirements resulting from the Agreement. In 2001, the UJD carried out 51 inspections of nuclear materials, of which 31 inspections were performed at nuclear installations in co-operation with the IAEA inspectors. No discrepancies concerning the management of nuclear materials were found out during inspections and safeguards goals in year 2001 were

  6. Support to the physical protection and accountancy for nuclear materials in Kazakstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hashimoto, Yu.; Yoshida, M.; Akutsu, M.; Takeda, H.

    1998-01-01

    The support programs for Republic of Kazakstan have been carried out for the purpose of establishing the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). These support are based on the cooperation agreement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, that reached mutual agreement between both government of Japan and the Republic of Kazakstan in March, 1994, 1994. Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have conducted the support for Kazakstan. Since there are many facilities to be supported such as fast reactors, fuel fabrication facilities and research facilities, items to be supported are coordinated and shared among the supporting countries. Japan has been carrying out the supporting tasks mainly for the fast breeder reactor facility, BN-350 and Atomic Energy Agency of Kazakstan (KAEA). PESCO Co., Ltd. is entrusted this supporting work from Technical Secretariat on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Former Soviet Union, and has conducted the support in the area of flow monitoring system, nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection, obtaining technical cooperation from Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation (PNC)

  7. Role of physical protection and safeguards technology used to Nuclear Material Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djoko-Irianto, Ign.

    2005-01-01

    The presence of nuclear materials at any nuclear facility must be in secure and must be known as safeguards purpose such as its position, from or type and amount. The clarification of the amount be reported to the national regulatory body and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the International regulatory body. The national regulatory body and IAEA will then verify that report. The verification must be done to know there is no difference of the amount, and to give the assurance to the International community that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use to a prescribed military purpose would be detected. To carry out verification, several verification techniques such as non-destructive analysis, surveillance, unattended and remote monitoring and environmental sampling are explained to convey the impression how those techniques are implemented. According to the security requirement, the physical protection system including all components of physical protection system have to be effectively designed

  8. Physical protection of small amounts of nuclear material or contaminated parts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zipper, R.

    2002-01-01

    In July 2001 an incident was recognized where a worker occupied with decontamination of structures in a shut down reprocessing plant for spent fuel illegally removed a small amount of radioactive material from the facility site. The investigations exhibited that he brought this material to the apartment of his partner in life and she incorporated significantly α-activity in the form of plutonium. Immediately after the incident was discovered the supervisory authorities and the operating company of the facility took action to minimize the harms to third parties arising from the radioactive material released and to prevent a similar event to occur. As the overall inventory of radioactive material in the shut down facility at the time the theft occurred was below the limit where measures of physical protection are required by the German regulatory work discussions were raised on consequences to be drawn from this incident to close this obvious gap. The German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety (BMU) as the superior competent authority therefore ordered GRS to draft a set of fundamental requirements for future rules to make a repetition of the initiating incident unlikely. Further discussions of the authorities involved on supplementary rules and guidelines aiming to better protect small amounts of radioactive material from being illegally removed out of nuclear facilities and laboratories are based on these fundamentals defined by GRS but not yet finished. (orig.)

  9. Cooperative efforts to improve nuclear materials accounting, control and physical protection at the National Science Center, Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zelensky, V.F.; Mikhailov, V.A.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ukrainian Government are engaged in a program of cooperation to enhance the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by developing a strong national system of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A). This paper describes the capabilities and work of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) and cooperative efforts to improve MPC and A at this facility. It describes how these cooperative efforts grew out of Ukraine''s decision to become a non-nuclear weapon state and the shortcomings in MPC and A that developed at KIPT after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It also envisions expanded future cooperation in other areas of nuclear materials management

  10. Physical protection of nuclear materials: Experience in regulation, implementation and operations. Proceedings of a conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The conference was held at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna from 10 to 14 November 1997. It was attended by 162 registered participants from 42 countries and eight international organizations. The 58 papers presented dealt with the experience of regulators, designers and facility operators, including response forces, in meeting the demands and requirements in this changing area of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Individual abstracts were prepared for each of the papers. Topics covered include contemporary and emerging issues, experience in regulation, implementation at facilities, program assessment and cooperation, hardware and software, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and transportation

  11. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    Ursu, Ioan

    2015-01-01

    Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials presents basic information regarding the structure, properties, processing methods, and response to irradiation of the key materials that fission and fusion nuclear reactors have to rely upon. Organized into 12 chapters, this book begins with selectively several fundamentals of nuclear physics. Subsequent chapters focus on the nuclear materials science; nuclear fuel; structural materials; moderator materials employed to """"slow down"""" fission neutrons; and neutron highly absorbent materials that serve in reactor's power control. Other chapters exp

  12. Objective of the regulatory system for the physical protection of facilities and nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Polo, Rolando

    1996-01-01

    During the work that is developed in our country in order to have a regulatory system, recommendation on the issue have been considered. Such recommendation are gathered in the informative regulation 225 rev, 3 of the IAEA and the requirements are collected in the Informative Regulation 274 rev 1 of the IAEA, as well as the good national and international practices

  13. Application of crime countermeasures for the protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, C.H.

    1975-01-01

    Federal regulations prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and published in the Federal Register require licensees to take appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public from unauthorized use of special nuclear material (SNM), which includes plutonium, uranium-233, and highly enriched uranium. Crime countermeasures for compliance with these regulations are an important part of the guidance that is provided by the NRC's Office of Standards Development. The use of crime countermeasures and protective devices is intended to prevent the unauthorized diversion of material and to aid in the detection of diversion should it be attempted. Plant and equipment designs should incorporate both electronic and physical security measures for protection of SNM. This applies to facilities and equipment for reprocessing, fabrication, and transportation of SNM. The protection systems include physical barriers, access controls, intrusion detection devices, surveillance devices, central alarm stations, communications, and response capability. Acceptable security measures and devices applicable to protected areas, material access areas, vital areas, vital equipment, and transportation vehicles have been presented in Regulatory Guides. (U.S.)

  14. The implementation of nuclear security program and the improvement of physical protection in Indonesia: progress and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khairul

    2009-01-01

    facilities. The nuclear material and its installation is potential target in the facilities so that they needed physical protection measures in prevention and protection of nuclear material and radioactive source against theft and sabotage. The implementation of physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources in Indonesia complied with the international instruments such as the Convention of the Physical Protection on Nuclear Material and Facilities, amended on July 2005, and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, (corrected), the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, June 1999. The application of nuclear energy for power program generation involve in the management of nuclear materials and other radioactive substance. According to international regulation and convention, an effective physical protection system is needed to protect nuclear materials and its facilities against theft and sabotage for both non-proliferation and radiation safety purpose. Further to implementation of the IAEA nuclear security program in the region, Indonesia received two nuclear security services, IPPAS and INSServ mission. Based on the expert mission recommendation, therefore Indonesia improved their physical protection system on nuclear material and facilities against theft and sabotage. One thing that should be considered by the Government of Indonesia is human resource development programmes. So far, some effort has developed to enhance the knowledge of the employee who deals with nuclear material and radioactive substances. It still needed to increase the awareness in particular to personal and other related agencies as well. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration discussed security assistance with Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency, BATAN. These upgrades not only reduced the threat of theft at the three research reactors, but also provided local physical protection expertise to use during the concept, design, and operation of

  15. Program for upgrading nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting at all facilities within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yuferev, V.; Zhikharev, S.; Yakimov, Y.

    1998-01-01

    As part of the Department of Energy-Russian program for strengthening nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A), plans have now been formulated to install an integrated MPC and A system at all facilities containing large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16) complex. In addition to storage facilities, the complex houses a number of critical facilities used to conduct nuclear physics research and facilities for developing procedures for disassembly of nuclear weapons

  16. Physical protection of nuclear operational units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-07-01

    The general principles of and basic requirements for the physical protection of operational units in the nuclear field are established. They concern the operational units whose activities are related with production, utilization, processing, reprocessing, handling, transport or storage of materials of interest for the Brazilian Nuclear Program. (I.C.R.) [pt

  17. Experience gained with certification of instruments for the system for nuclear material physical protection, accounting, and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gus'kov, O.M.; Egorov, V.V.; Morozov, O.S.; Novikov, V.M.

    1999-01-01

    Results of the tests have confirmed the expedience of certification of the equipment, especially imported items. For the use of imported equipment at Russian facilities, it is justified to accommodate the accompanying documents thereto for the Russian standards. Equipment items shipped to Russia should be prepared for the certification tests and/or operation. When taking decision on the certification of imported equipment, it is expedient to preliminarily estimate the instrument's parameters and its operation in Russia. To solve the question whether the imported equipment is usable for Russia and what engineering support and maintenance is needed for its operation, it would be justified to create the Center for engineering support of instruments to be used for nuclear material protection, control and accounting on the basis of one of institutes dealing with the development of instruments for these application [ru

  18. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. These concepts identify ways in which material accounting systems can be used to enable effective monitoring of authorized movement of nuclear material through physical protection boundaries. Concepts are also discussed for monitoring user access to nuclear material and for tagging user identification to material accounting transactions through physical protection functions. These result in benefits in detecting diversion and in positively tracing material movement. Finally, coordination of safeguards information from both subsystems in such an integrated system through a safeguards coordination center is addressed with emphasis on appropriate response in case of discrepancies

  19. Standard format and content of a licensee physical protection plan for strategic special nuclear material in transit - April 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events is required to be prepared, based on personnel and other physical protection resources described in the Physical Protection Plan for strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit. Specific requirements for the contingency plan are provided in Appendix C. Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, to 10 CFR Part 73. Regulatory Guide 5.56, Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Transportation, provides guidance for the preparation of transportation contingency plans. Licensee is reminded that all three submissions - the Physical Protection Plan, the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, and the Safeguards Contingency Plan - together describe the system for physical protection of each particular shipment. They should be developed and maintained to be completely consistent with each other for each shipment

  20. Physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toepfer, K.

    1989-01-01

    This contribution investigates the possible danger and the legal basis of physical protection and explains the current, integrated system provided for, as well as the underlying possible scenarios of an assault: (1) by a violent crowd of aggressors outside the installation, (2) by a small group of aggressors outside the installation, (3) by a person allowed to enter (internal assault). The physical protection system supplements the internal safety measures to enhance protection against hypothetical and possible acts of terrorism or other criminal assault. The system covers external and internal controlled areas, access monitoring, physical protection control room and service, security checks of the personnel, and activities to disclose sabotage. Some reflections on the problem field between security controls and the constitutional state conclude this contribution. (orig./HSCH) [de

  1. Guidance and considerations for the implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; Orientaciones y sugerencias para la aplicacion del documento INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, proteccion fisica de los materiales y las instalaciones nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-05-01

    This publication is intended to provide guidance and considerations for a State's competent authority to better understand and prescribe appropriate requirements, consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which are compatible with accepted international practice. This report, together with a more detailed report, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, which addresses to the licensee or designer of physical protection systems who has specific implementation and compliance responsibilities, should be used in conjunction to each other to provide better and comprehensive guidance on physical protection.

  2. Strengthening global physical protection practices; gaining better information on national practices for protection of weapons-usable material. Keynote address/session 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, G.; Rinne, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty requirement that non-nuclear-weapon parties provide 'safeguards' information to the IAEA on their nuclear materials and their state systems for accounting and control, there is no related requirement to provide information on state systems of physical protection. A review of 1997 IAEA and Stanford physical protection conference proceedings showed both the absence of information on important practices from many states and the great variation in practices from state to state. Besides the lack of internationally required standards for domestic protection, reasons for the variations described in Stanford-Sandia National Laboratories research include: differences in states' perceptions of the threats to their materials; differences in their abilities to pay the cost of stronger physical protection; differences in their laws and regulatory practices in general; and differences in their cultural attitudes - for example, attitudes toward whether to arm personnel guarding weapon-usable material or to require clearances for personnel with access to such material. The information presented to the 1997 IAEA and Stanford conferences was supplied voluntarily. The two global documents which provide norms for physical protection do not require submission of such information. These are the 1980 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 1999 IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. This means that, without bilateral cooperation, no state can find out how other states are protecting their nuclear material. Yet, as IAEA Director General El Baradei has said, '[I]t is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent [physical protection] responsibility is fulfilled. ...The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations - where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter and defeat hostile actions against nuclear

  3. Main results of ten years co-operation with Nis in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salewski, P.; Gutschmidt, W.

    2001-01-01

    The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Russian Federation (RF) and the New Independent States (NIS) have been working closely together since 1992 in the field of physical protection. The success of this co-operative work is based on mutually beneficial agreements between corresponding FRG and RF ministries. The main working points of these agreements were a) a mutual exchange of information and experience, and b) assistance in developing licensing and regulatory procedures and guidelines, and c) physical upgrades to Russian nuclear facilities. The first two points have been established by holding seminars, workshops and by on-site instruction. Upgrades of RF nuclear installations, financed by the FRG were performed at: the Bochvar Institute in Moscow, the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow and the Mayak reactor plant in Chelyabinsk. This paper will outline the progress made to date and the GRS procedure for achieving successful co-operation with its RF and NIS counterparts. The major results of ten years cooperation will be shown. The following document describes the experiences gained during the evaluation of security reports by GRS as an external expert organisation in contract with the Supervisory Authorities. (authors)

  4. Trial operation of material protection, control, and accountability systems at two active nuclear material handling sites within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skripka, G.; Vatulin, V.; Yuferev, V.

    1997-01-01

    This paper discusses Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC)-VNIIEF activities in the area of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) procedures enhancement. The goal of such activities is the development of an automated systems for MPC and A at two of the active VNIIEF research sites: a research (reactor) site and a nuclear material production facility. The activities for MPC and A system enhancement at both sites are performed in the framework of a VNIIEF-Los Alamos National Laboratory contract with participation from Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and PANTEX Plant in accordance with Russian programs supported by MinAtom. The American specialists took part in searching for possible improvement of technical solutions, ordering equipment, and delivering and testing the equipment that was provided by the Americans

  5. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  6. The adhesion characteristics of protective coating materials for the containment structure in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang-Kook; Shin, Jae-Chul

    2003-01-01

    Protective coating materials used in the containment structures should be durable for the designed 30 to 40 year lifetime of a nuclear power plant. At the present, these materials have not yet been developed. Therefore it is very important to keep the durability of the protective coating materials through persistent maintenance, and in order to achieve this, understanding the adhesion characteristics of the coating materials is of utmost importance. Therefore, this study attempts to find any methods for durability maintenance of these protective coating materials. To accomplish these aims, this study applied an experimental deterioration environment condition relevant to Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), categorized as of Design Basis Accident (DBA), onto steel liner plate specimens covered with protective coating materials. Adhesion tests were performed on these deteriorated coating materials to characterize the physical properties and through these tests, the quantitative adhesion characteristics according to the history of deterioration environment were found

  7. Status of physical protection systems of nuclear facilities; survey report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, In Koo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Ahn, Jin Soo; Lee, Hyun Chul; Kim, Jung Soo

    2002-02-01

    This report presents a survey on the physical protection equipment for a nuclear power plant. This survey was conducted by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute as a part of the project, 'Development of Technologies for National Control of and Accountancy for Nuclear Material,' funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Korea. A physical protection system of a nuclear plant includes outer and inner fences, intrusion detection sensors, alarm generation system, illumination equipment, central monitoring and control station, entry control and management system, etc. The outermost fence indicates the boundary of the plant area and prevents a simple or unintentional intrusion. The inner fence area of each plant unit associated with intrusion detection sensors, illuminators, monitoring cameras, serves the key role for physical protection function for the nuclear plant

  8. Evaluation of effectiveness of physical protection systems at nuclear facilities in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stefulova, A.

    2001-01-01

    This paper contains a short presentation of the state supervision in approach to the evaluation of physical protection systems at the nuclear facilities as one kind of measure used to prevent combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials in the Slovak Republic. (author)

  9. The declaration regime: An efficient tool to improve control and protection of nuclear materials in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillette-Cousin, L.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The French Government set up a national safeguards system under the authority of the Ministry for Industry to control nuclear materials within national boundaries and to ensure physical protection for nuclear materials, even for the small quantities held by users in industrial, medical and research areas. The main nuclear materials detained by small owners are depleted uranium and thorium. These materials are present in manufactured equipment (radiation shielding in industrial gammagraphy and radiotherapy, collimation devices and other accessories) which are used or unused, which may be damaged or left as scraps. The French protection and control system of nuclear materials is an original system based on detailed and comprehensive regulations, taking into account in a specific way the small users of nuclear materials. The decree no. 81-512 of 12 May 1981 establishes three different regimes: licensing, declaration and exemption, according to the nature and quantity of nuclear materials involved. Typically, the declaration regime applies to quantities of depleted uranium or thorium, greater than 1 kg and lower than 500 kg. The Order of 14 March 1984 sets the requirements related to the control and physical protection of nuclear materials in the frame of the declaration regime. A declaration must be established every year by the operator and sent to the IPSN, acting as technical support body of the national authority. This declaration provides the stock of all nuclear materials held by the operator and stock variations occurred during the previous year, including the identification of senders and receivers. Before fulfilling its annual declaration, the operator must carry out a physical inventory of all nuclear material, both used and unused. The declaration also describes the main features concerning facility layout related to surveillance and physical protection of materials. With respect to physical protection requirements, nuclear materials should be

  10. Standard format and content for a licensee physical security plan for the protection of special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance - January 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    This guide describes the information required in the physical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport special nuclear material (SNM) of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of SNM of low strategic significance and recommends a standard format for presenting the information in an orderly arrangement. This standards format will thus serve as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection plan of the license application. This document can also be used as guidance by licensees possessing or transporting less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance in understanding the intent and implementing the requirements of paragraphs 73.67(a), 73.67(f), and 73.67(g) of 10 CRF Part 73

  11. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ursu, I.

    1985-01-01

    The subject is covered in chapters, entitled; elements of nuclear reactor physics; structure and properties of materials (including radiation effects); fuel materials (uranium, plutonium, thorium); structural materials (including - aluminium, zirconium, stainless steels, ferritic steels, magnesium alloys, neutron irradiation induced changes in the mechanical properties of structural materials); moderator materials (including - nuclear graphite, natural (light) water, heavy water, beryllium, metal hydrides); materials for reactor reactivity control; coolant materials; shielding materials; nuclear fuel elements; nuclear material recovery from irradiated fuel and recycling; quality control of nuclear materials; materials for fusion reactors (thermonuclear fusion reaction, physical processes in fusion reactors, fuel materials, materials for blanket and cooling system, structural materials, materials for magnetic devices, specific problems of material irradiation). (U.K.)

  12. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Singapore concerning co-operation on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The Agreement which entered into force on the date of its signature, states that both countries are Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and members of the IAEA. It covers arrangements regarding the transshipment of Australian origin uranium ore concentrates to Singapore. It provides that Australia will notify Singapore in advance of shipments of uranium ore concentrates, specifying the mode of transport and expected time of arrival, while Singapore will confirm their arrival and notify their return. The concentrates will be physically protected in Singapore at least to the level set out in the Annex to the Agreement. (NEA) [fr

  13. Vital area identification software VIP for the physical protection of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, Woo Sik; Park, Chang Kue; Yang, Joon Eon

    2004-01-01

    There are two major factors to be considered for the physical protection of nuclear power plants. They are a design basis threat (DBT) and the vital area identification (VAI). The DBT has been considered as 'the maximum credible threat.' The vital area is defined as 'an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear materials, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to unacceptable radiological consequences.' For the VAI of nuclear power plants, a software VIP (Vital area Identification Package based on PSA method) is being developed. The VIP is based on the current probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques. The PSA method, including internal as well as external events, is known as the most complete and consistent method for identifying various accident sequences that might result in a core melt and radioactive material release to the environment. Thus, the VIP employs a fault tree analysis method in the PSA and utilizes the PSA results

  14. International convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jankowitsch-Prevor, O.

    2005-01-01

    The Preamble, composed of 13 paragraphs and drafted in the usual style of a General Assembly resolution, is aimed at placing the convention in a number of relevant contexts. First, the convention is linked to the issue of the maintenance of international peace and security through a reference to the purposes of the United Nations under Article 1 of the Charter. Next, it is presented as being a further step in the decisions, measures and instruments developed by the United Nations over the past ten years with the common objective of eliminating international terrorism in all its forms. Lastly, the convention is placed in its specific nuclear context through a number of references. In its third paragraph, the Preamble contains a reference to the principle recognizing 'the right of all states to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy'. This paragraph is identical to the first paragraph of the Preamble of the CPPNM, and the same principle is stated again in the first paragraph of the Preamble of the Amendment to the CPPNM, and constitutes a kind of general statement in favour of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, without explicit reservations concerning non-proliferation, the safety and security of nuclear facilities or the management of radioactive waste. A draft amendment presented by the United States delegation in the final phase of work that suggested adding the phrase 'while recognizing that the goals of peaceful utilisation should not be used as a cover for proliferation' to the sentence cited above, was apparently not retained. Next, the Preamble mentions the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and in the tenth paragraph the threat that 'acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace and security'. Paragraph 11 of the

  15. Nuclear physics for protection of the environment. NPPE-95. Abstracts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-12-31

    Nuclear-physics methods used for environmental monitoring are discussed. Great attention is paid to the neutron activation and X-ray fluorescence methods of analysis of environmental objects contaminated with heavy metals and radioisotopes. Equipment applied was also considered.

  16. Nuclear physics for protection of the environment. NPPE-95. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Nuclear-physics methods used for environmental monitoring are discussed. Great attention is paid to the neutron activation and X-ray fluorescence methods of analysis of environmental objects contaminated with heavy metals and radioisotopes. Equipment applied was also considered

  17. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    These Guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter called the Convention), are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material that may be useful to include in the National Reports required under Article 5 of the Convention and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention.

  18. Physical protection of radioactive material in transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Safety in the transport of radioactive material is ensured by enclosing the material, when necessary, in packaging which prevents its dispersal and which absorbs to any adequate extent any radiation emitted by the material. Transport workers, the general public and the environment are thus protected against the harmful effects of the radioactive material. The packaging also serves the purpose of protecting its contents against the effects of rough handling and mishaps under normal transport conditions, and against the severe stresses and high temperatures that could be encountered in accidents accompanied by fires. If the radioactive material is also fissile, special design features are incorporated to prevent any possibility of criticality under normal transport conditions and in accidents. The safe transport requirements are designed to afford protection against unintentional opening of packages in normal handling and transport conditions and against damage in severe accident conditions; whereas the physical protection requirements are designed to prevent intentional opening of packages and deliberate damage. This clearly illustrates the difference in philosophical approach underlying the requirements for safe transport and for physical protection during transport. This difference in approach is, perhaps, most easily seen in the differing requirements for marking of consignments. While safety considerations dictate that packages be clearly labelled, physical protection considerations urge restraint in the use of special labels. Careful consideration must be given to such differences in approach in any attempt to harmonize the safety and physical protection aspects of transport. (author)

  19. The project of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum to develop an interactive educational material on Radiological Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Real, A.; Cruz, T. de la; Girona, L.; Montesinos, L.; Sanchez, P.

    2012-01-01

    The Training Department of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum has undertaken a new project to develop an interactive educational material on Radiological Protection. The objective was to develop an attractive, comprehensive and interactive material, to facilitate students and teachers of Elementary, Middle and High schools, to become familiar with ionising radiations. The novelly of the project, is that based on the European framework of key competencies for file long learning, which are defined as a set of knowledge, skills and altitudes that all individuals need for personal fulfilment and employment. The material presented in this paper, is based in an integrated structure of tasks, activities and exercises, which will facilitate the acquisition of as may key competencies as possible. Besides, the material also includes reference texts, links to pertinent web sites and videos. Students, through the development of a specific task (and related activities and exercises), will learn the differences between ionizing and non ionising radiation, the origin, characteristics and types of types of ionising radiation, how to detect and measure them, the potential detrimental health effects, the principles of radiation protection and the beneficial applications can have for man. The material is freely available in www.rinconeducativo.org. (Author) 4 refs.

  20. Computerized materials protection, control, and accountability at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Efimenko, V.; Goryunov, V.; Ilyantsev, A.

    1998-01-01

    As part of a multifaceted approach to protecting its nuclear materials, The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) at Obninsk, Russia, has been computerizing its materials protection, control, and accountability capabilities. This is being accomplished in collaboration with the CoreMAS team at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Such international cooperation in applying advanced science and technology to managing and controlling nuclear materials will help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation by preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized individuals, organizations, or states. One important characteristic of IPPE is that it encompasses several facilities that manage nuclear materials, and three of these facilities already operate their own independent (or independently developed) computerized accounting systems. This paper focuses on the importance of compatibility between the computerized accountability systems at the facilities, the ability of the individual systems to communicate with a single site-wide system, and the necessity of coordination between facilities in designing and developing computerized systems. The authors believe that the lessons learned at IPPE in coordinating these efforts have wide-ranging significance for other sites with multiple facilities

  1. The trend on legislation of physical protection law and the effective measures for its implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J. W.

    2002-01-01

    As a part of strengthening the international regime of physical protection, the 'Legal and Technical Experts Meeting' to prepare a draft amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material(INFCIRC/274/Rev.1) has been held under the auspices of IAEA Secretariat, based on the results of about two-year discussion related to its amendment among the Member States. In addition, terrorism of last September in the United States has made the amendment work of the Convention speed up to quickly cope with the real threat of nuclear facility, and the Diplomatic Conference for its amendment would be held at the end of this year. In order to meet these international strengthening trends and to prepare the measures against radiological emergency with the re-establishment of domestic protection system, Korean government has currently pursued to establish a comprehensive 'law for Physical Protection and Measures against Radiological Emergency' This paper suggests the consideration on domestic status of the legal system, the trend of its legislation and the effective measures for its implementation, to efficiently maintain domestic system of physical protection

  2. Use of the project management methodology to establish physical protection system at nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gramotkin, F.; Kuzmyak, I.; Kravtsov, V.

    2015-01-01

    The paper considers the possibility of using the project management methodology developed by the Project Management Institute (USA) in nuclear security in terms of modernization or development of physical protection system at nuclear facility. It was demonstrated that this methodology allows competent and flexible management of the projects on physical protection, ensuring effective control of their timely implementation in compliance with the planned budget and quality

  3. Ensuring preservation of nuclear materials at RT plant storage facilities by upgrading physical protection, containment (TID) and TV surveillance measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Savin, A.A.

    1999-01-01

    The upgrading of nuclear material (NM) physical protection system of storage facilities for plutonium dioxide has been carried out in the frame of contract between Sandia National Laboratories and PA Mayak. The implementation of this project is of great importance for ensuring the preservation of NM in storage. The project envisages a complex approach to the solution of the task: the use of engineered fences, detection means, observation devices, access and control thereof for the personnel; the organization of security force in such way that to give a possibility to take adequate and purposeful actions towards possible adversaries. The design includes upgrading the system for physical protection through the introduction of modern, efficient engineering devices for security, integrated system for access control and security, the system for TV surveillance [ru

  4. Yugoslavia: Act of 21 November 1984 on radiation protection and the safe use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This Act which entered into force on 1 December 1984 repeals the 1976 Act on Protection against Ionizing Radiation and regulates most of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and radiation protection in Yugoslavia. The Act lays down the licensing procedure for nuclear installations and covers safety-related questions in connection with standards, technical criteria etc. It also takes into account several areas regulated at international level, namely safeguards and physical protection of nuclear material. (NEA) [fr

  5. Main features of the convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage - an over view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanenkov, V.

    2000-01-01

    The Chernobyl accident prompted widespread awareness of the need for improved protection of the public from the consequences of nuclear accidents. It was generally recognised that urgent efforts should be undertaken to strengthen the international nuclear liability regime based on two civil law conventions, namely the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. The work initiated by the Agency - it was assigned to the Standing Committee established in 1990 - followed a two-track approach: to improve the existing civil liability regime, including revision of the Vienna Convention for which the IAEA is depositary; and, to develop a comprehensive international liability regime. The issue of compensation additional to that available under the two basic conventions received full attention in the negotiations. In the latter context, this work resulted in the adoption by a diplomatic conference convened by the IAEA in September 1997 of a new instrument, i.e. the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (the CSC). The CSC is a product of many years of multilateral negotiations and represents a balance of various legal, economic and political considerations. While not all concerns may have been fully met, it represents a significant improvement in the protection of the public from the consequences of nuclear accidents. (author)

  6. Order of 31 July 1987 on protection and control of nuclear materials carried by air

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Order is part of a series of texts on protection and control of nuclear materials which include: the Act of 25 July 1980 and the Decree of 12 May 1981 made in its implementation and, as regards the specific aspect of protection and control of materials during transport, the Order of 26 March 1982 amended in 1986. The 1987 Order lays down the conditions which must be complied with by approved carriers (the French or the foreign holders of a licence under the above-mentioned Act of 1980) in case of transport of such materials by air [fr

  7. Modernization of physical protection educational laboratories in the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI

    Science.gov (United States)

    Geraskin, N. I.; Krasnoborodko, A. A.

    2017-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear materials includes, in addition to accounting and control, the Physical Protection (PP) of one. The paper considers the experience by MEPhI in application the practical educational in the area of PP technical systems. The following aspects are discussed in the paper: specific features graduate program in nuclear security area; overview of the practical course curricula in the special laboratory.

  8. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter called the Convention), are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material that it may be useful to include in the National Reports required under Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention [es

  9. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter called the Convention), are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material that it may be useful to include in the National Reports required under Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention

  10. Paris Convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy and Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    This new bilingual (English and French) edition of the 1960 Paris Convention and 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention incorporates the provisions of the Protocols which amended each of them on two occasions, in 1964 and 1982. The Expose des motifs to the Paris Convention, as revised in 1982 is also included in this pubication. (NEA) [fr

  11. Report made on the behalf of the Commission of foreign affairs, defence and armed forces on the bill project authorizing the ratification of the international convention for the repression of acts of nuclear terrorism - Nr 215

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pintat, Xavier

    2012-01-01

    In a first part, this report recalls that the terrorist threat has already been addressed by texts which have been negotiated within the United Nations. It describes how the content of the convention has been elaborated while taking into account existing conventions related to nuclear issues. It outlines that this text is the fruit of the efforts made by a special committee created by the U N, and by the Lyons-Rome group within the G8. The second part comments how this convention is based on other conventions already ratified by France, notably the conventions of 1980 and 1997 on the physical protection of nuclear material. It outlines the important progress contained by this convention regarding incriminations of acts of nuclear terrorism and their crackdown

  12. Sweden's third national report under the the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The national reports to the review meetings according to Article 5 of the Convention call for a self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to compliance with the obligations of the Convention. For Sweden this self-assessment has demonstrated full compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as shown in detail in part B of this national report. There is an open and constructive dialogue between the regulatory bodies and the licensees. The owner companies are well established with good corporate financial records. They demonstrate a commitment to maintain a high level of safety in their nuclear power plants. Not withstanding the increased competition, the licensees continue to co-operate in solving important safety issues. The regulators in Sweden are assessed as well qualified for their tasks and their resources have been maintained. The international co-operation networks of both regulators and utilities are well developed. From the safety and environmental impact point of view, the Swedish nuclear power plants are competitive internationally. However, Sweden would like to point out the following issues, where further development should be given special attention in relation to the obligations under the Convention: The compatibility of the Act on Nuclear Activities with the Environmental Code needs to be followed up in order to assure that the licensing process is fully consistent. The future supply of radiation protection specialists needs to be further investigated and measures may need to be taken, as has been done to ensure the supply or nuclear safety specialists. The ongoing concentration of vendors and service companies needs to be assessed, from the safety and availability point of view, and the licensees may need to implement their own joint solutions if the market can not supply the necessary services at acceptable conditions. The operating organisations need to assess their consolidation after several organisational changes following

  13. Convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted on 17 June 1994 by Diplomatic Conference convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency at its Headquarters from 14 to 17 June 1994. The Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the Depository (the Agency's Director General) of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of seventeen States, having each at leas one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core. The text of the Convention as adopted is reproduced in the Annex hereto for the information of all Member States

  14. Application of nuclear-physics methods in space materials science

    Science.gov (United States)

    Novikov, L. S.; Voronina, E. N.; Galanina, L. I.; Chirskaya, N. P.

    2017-07-01

    The brief history of the development of investigations at the Skobeltsyn Institute of Nuclear Physics, Moscow State University (SINP MSU) in the field of space materials science is outlined. A generalized scheme of a numerical simulation of the radiation impact on spacecraft materials and elements of spacecraft equipment is examined. The results obtained by solving some of the most important problems that modern space materials science should address in studying nuclear processes, the interaction of charged particles with matter, particle detection, the protection from ionizing radiation, and the impact of particles on nanostructures and nanomaterials are presented.

  15. Design and evaluation of physical protection systems of nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    An, Jin Soo; Lee, Hyun Chul; Hwang, In Koo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Yung Myung

    2001-06-01

    Nuclear material and safety equipment of nuclear facilities are required to be protected against any kind of theft or sabotage. Physical protection is one of the measures to prevent such illegally potential threats for public security. It should cover all the cases of use, storage, and transportation of nuclear material. A physical protection system of a facility consists of exterior intrusion sensors, interior intrusion sensors, an alarm assessment and communication system, entry control systems, access delay equipment, etc. The design of an effective physical protection system requires a comprehensive approach in which the designers define the objective of the system, establish an initial design, and evaluate the proposed design. The evaluation results are used to determine whether or not the initial design should be modified and improved. Some modelling techniques are commonly used to analyse and evaluate the performance of a physical protection system. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute(KAERI) has developed a prototype of software as a part of a full computer model for effectiveness evaluation for physical protection systems. The input data elements for the prototype, contain the type of adversary, tactics, protection equipment, and the attributes of each protection component. This report contains the functional and structural requirements defined in the development of the evaluation computer model.

  16. Convention on Nuclear Safety. Second national report on the implementation by france of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-09-01

    The first national report on the implementation by france of the obligation under the Convention is structured along its Articles. the french Nuclear safety Authority ensured the co ordination of the report, with contributions from other regulators and nuclear operators. this report was distributed at the middle of April 2003 to the other Contracting party (on 3 november to 14, 2003 at the IAEA headquarters. (author)

  17. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-11-01

    The full text of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency adopted by the General Conference at its special session from 24-26 September 1986 is presented. It is stipulated that the States Parties shall cooperate between themselves and with the Agency to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, the property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases

  18. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    Part I: Status lists as of 31 December 1996. A. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention). B. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). PART II: Texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto Part III: Texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  19. Decree of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission concerning the security protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    In compliance with the Czechoslovak State Surveillance over Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations Act No. 28/1984, the Decree specifies requirements for assuring security protection of nuclear installations (and their parts) and of nuclear materials with the aim to prevent their abuse for jeopardizing the environment and the health and lives of people. (P.A.)

  20. Transweb and trafficking in illicit nuclear materials: beyond the borders of physical security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, J.D.; Dilger, F.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Transweb is a developing threat assessment analytical protocol that uses real time GIS based assessments (a.k.a., GTA for GIS Threat Assessment) to better understand potential trafficking in illicit nuclear materials that may come from energy related sites and/or weapons production facilities. This is not a physical security protocol nor is this program a border check format like the DOE's Second Line of Defense which is designed to detect special nuclear fuels. Transweb is a tool that allows the user to look at surreptitious transportation pathways that may be used to move illicit nuclear materials after they have already breached traditional physical security barriers and allows for movement prediction and potential mitigation/intervention if they are not traveling on the highways or railways, traversing the waterways, or entering ports equipped with detecting equipment like that deployed in Second Line of Defense program. Transweb is for the real world, a world where physical security may be breached and the smugglers that capture these materials do not follow the most traveled highways, railways, or waterways in a given society. Transweb focuses on the less obvious transportation routes that may be the most likely ways that illicit nuclear materials will be transported. Thus this program offers an additional layer of security analysis not currently in use as physical protection or as border mitigation. (author)

  1. Quantitative evaluation of physical protection system in nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun Yahua; Li Bin; Li Shiju

    2009-01-01

    Based on the prompt detection analysis, this paper introduced one analysis model of intrusion path in nuclear power plant by means of morphology analysis and developed the evaluation software for path model analysis of physical protection system. Quantitative analysis on three elements (detection, delay, and response) of physical protection system was presented with an imaginary intrusion event example in Mac Arthur nuclear center. The results indicated that the path prompt detection analysis worked effectively to find the weak point of the physical protection system in NPP, and meantime we can also get the high cost-effectiveness improved measures. It is an effective approach to evaluate the overall performance of the system. (authors)

  2. Standard format and content for a licensee physical security plan for the protection of special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance (Revision 1, Feb. 1983)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    This regulatory guide describes the information required in the physical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of SNM of low strategic significance and recommends a standard format for presenting the information in an orderly arrangement. This standard format will thus serve as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical security plan of the license application. This document can also be used as guidance by licensees possessing or transporting less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance in understanding the intent and implementing the requirements of paragraphs 73.67(a), 73.67(f), and 73.67(g) of 10 CFR Part 73

  3. The main findings of the third Russian international conference on nuclear material protection, control and accounting, Obninsk, RF, 16-20 May, 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kondratov, S.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The first and the second Russian international conferences on MPC+A held in 1997 and 2000 correspondingly, under the Russian-American program of the MPC+A cooperation proved to be a useful tool for Russian, American specialists and experts from a number for sharing their opinions and exchanging achievements in this sensitive area. The recommendation to hold the next third MPC+A conference in Russia was formulated in the final document of the second conference in 2000. The results of the Russian-American cooperation are especially valuable since they demonstrate how much can be done due to the joint efforts of even previously adversarial countries. This paper gives a summary of the main findings of the third Russian conference on the MPC+A with a specific emphasis on physical protection of the Russian nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Besides the physical protection, materials accounting, education and training of personnel, security culture and some other associated topics of the conference are also addressed. (author)

  4. Upgrade of the Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System at the VNIIEF Industrial Zone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, J.C.; Maltsev, V.; Singh, S.P.

    1999-01-01

    The Industrial Zone at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center/All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC/VNEEF) consists of ten guarded areas with twenty two material balance areas (A and As). The type of facilities in the Industrial Zone include storage sites, machine shops, research facilities, and training facilities. Modernization of the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) System at the Industrial Zone started in 1997. This paper provides a description of, the methodology/strategy used in the upgrade of the MFC and A system

  5. Proceedings of the Fifth Seminar on Technology of Nuclear Materials Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Indro Yuwono; Nababan, Binsar; Suharyanta

    2004-11-01

    Proceedings of the Fifth Seminar on Technology of Nuclear Material Safety all aspect of research activity concerning the role of physical protection, nuclear safeguards technology and international convection in supporting the establishment of Nuclear Power Plant in Indonesia. There are 16 articles which have separated index. (PPIN)

  6. Nuclear safety: an international approach: the convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosen, M.

    1994-01-01

    This paper is a general presentation of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety which has already be signed by 50 countries and which is the first legal instrument that directly addresses the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide. The paper gives a review of its development and some key provisions for a better understanding of how this agreement will operate in practice. The Convention consists of an introductory preamble and four chapters consisting of 35 articles dealing with: the principal objectives, definitions and scope of application; the various obligations (general provisions, legislation, responsibility and regulation, general safety considerations taking into account: the financial and human resources, the human factors, the quality assurance, the assessment and verification of safety, the radiation protection and the emergency preparedness; the safety of installations: sitting, design and construction, operation); the periodic meetings of the contracting parties to review national reports on the measures taken to implement each of the obligations, and the final clauses and other judicial provisions common to international agreements. (J.S.). 1 append

  7. Physical protection: threat response and performance goals as applied at the nuclear material inspection and storage (NMIS) building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanford, T.H.

    1982-01-01

    Only one aspect of nuclear security has been discussed here, a disciplined approach to physical protection systems (PPS) design. The best security against a multitude of threats to the nuclear industry is a dynamic and multifaceted safeguards program. It is one that combines PPS design with employee screening, reliability or behavioral observation programs, procedural control, assessment techniques, response capabilities, and security hardware. To be effective, such a program must be supported by management and applied uniformly to all personnel, including the safeguards and security staff

  8. Proceedings of the 6. Argentine congress on radiation protection and nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The 6th Argentine Congress on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety was organized by the Radioprotection Argentine Society, in Buenos Aires, between the 22 and 24 of september of 1998. In this event, were presented almost 66 papers in the following sessions, about these subjects: 1.- Safety in nuclear installations. 2.- Control of nuclear material and physical protection of nuclear installations. 3.- Programs of quality assurance. 4.- Training, technical information and public information. 5.- Physical dosimetry. 6.- Physical dosimetry and occupational radiation protection. 7.- Exposure of the natural radiation. 8.- Environmental radiological safety. 9.- Biological effects of the ionizing radiations and biological dosimetry. 10.- Radiological protection of the medical practice and the radiological emergencies. 11.- Radioactive wastes management. 12.- Transport of radioactive materials

  9. Summary of physical protection and material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koppel, P.J.

    1977-01-01

    The tremendous growth in safeguards and security requirements for activities involving strategic quantities of high enriched uranium and plutonium has resulted in a wealth of proposed regulations, counter proposals, interim plans, license conditions, and final regulations. This paper reviews the actions taken and indicates their impact on facilities handling special nuclear material

  10. Ireland and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kirwan, Seán

    2010-12-01

    Ratification by Ireland of the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage will not be able to take place until after enactment of additional domestic legislation. The reasons for this are examined in the context of Ireland's legal system. Since 1987 Ireland has had extensive legal protection for underwater cultural heritage, but the jurisdictional aspects of the Convention are key to understanding why additional legislation is necessary. Issues relating to salvage law are also considered. The 2001 Convention is placed in the context of development of Irish policy on underwater cultural heritage.

  11. France - Convention on nuclear safety. Fourth national report established in view of the 2008 examination meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    This report is the fourth one established in compliance with the article 5 of the international Convention on nuclear safety, and presents measures implemented by France to meet each of the Convention requirements. It addresses electro-nuclear reactors as well as research reactors. After an overview of the main evolutions since the third French report, and a general presentation of the French national nuclear policy, the report addresses the different articles of the Convention. These articles deal with general arrangements (application arrangements, presentation of reports, existing nuclear installations with their safety assessments and main safety improvements brought to the different nuclear reactors), law and regulation (legal and regulatory framework, regulation bodies, responsibility of an authorization holder), general safety considerations (priority for safety, human and financial resources, human factors, quality insurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection, organisation in case of emergency), and installation safety (site selection, design and construction, exploitation, activities planned to improve safety). Appendices propose a list and locations of French nuclear reactors, a list of the main legal and regulatory texts, presentations of nuclear reactor operators (EDF, CEA, ILL), and an overview of practices of control of the environment

  12. Physical protection enhancements in Japan and the role of JNES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishida, Seishi

    2010-01-01

    The possibility of terrorist attacks on nuclear material and nuclear facilities has posed a continuing threat since the events of September 11, 2001. The Japanese government has strengthened its physical protection regime, including legislative amendments, due to the necessity of upgrading the degree of protection of nuclear facilities to be equivalent to international levels, in order to cope effectively with the threat of theft of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear facilities. In relation to these enhancements of the physical protection regime in Japan, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) gives technical support to the regulatory agency, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), in the area of physical protection examination and inspection, through the development of technical guides for inspectors and operators, acquisition, analysis, and evaluation of related information, and international cooperation. This support is aimed at ensuring the consistent implementation of physical protection measures in Japan. In the future also, the JNES will provide further support to the NISA aimed at a well-developed physical protection framework in Japan, giving consideration to international physical protection enhancements such as publication of IAEA nuclear security series documents, inter alia Recommendations for physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities being also Revision 5 of INFCIRC 225. (author)

  13. Proceedings of the 9. Workshop on Nuclear Physics - Communications of basic nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The abstracts of researches on basic nuclear physics of 9. Workshop on Nuclear Physics in Brazil are presented. Mathematical models and experimental methods for nuclear phenomenon description, such as nuclear excitation and disintegration of several nuclei were discussed. (M.C.K.) [pt

  14. The strengthening of international regime of protection of the nuclear materials and other radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shiganbayev, E.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The widening of export streams satisfies the interest of any state, but at the same time the interests of individual countries and the whole international community requires the limitation of export of goods and technologies which are potentially dangerous. The decision of this problem, finding of the optimal balance between the devotion of the principles of free trade and the necessity of limiting the danger export is one of the main tasks of the national system of security of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a country with a policy of nonproliferation. This important element of the policy of the country, directed to maintenance and strengthening of the international security, becomes the priority trend in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. The international community decides this problem under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Destruction, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction. At present there are four international regimes in control with the aim of nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD): The group of the nuclear supplies which deals with the questions of delivery of special nuclear materials and technologies, and also nuclear materials and double function technologies; Australian group works in the sphere of control for materials and technologies of chemical and biological weapons; The regime of the control of rocket technologies functioning with the aim to prevent the proliferation of rockets as means of delivery of weapon of mass destruction; Wassenaar agreement, regime of export control for usual armament, goods and double function technologies. Kazakhstan does not have nuclear weapons and participants in the Agreement

  15. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-05-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I of the document contains the texts of reservations/declarations made by some of the countries upon or following signature. Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument, expressing consent to be bound

  16. Sweden's fourth national report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The national reports to the review meetings according to Article 5 of the Convention call for a self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to compliance with the obligations of the Convention. For Sweden this self-assessment has demonstrated compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as shown in part B of this national report. The Swedish existing nuclear power programme is currently under strong development since a few years. Large amounts are being invested in the 10 remaining operating reactors to prepare for long term operation. The licensees as well as the regulatory bodies have also been challenged over the last years by events, especially the Forsmark event in July 2006, demonstrating the importance of having strong safety management in place and maintaining of a vital safety culture. Of particular importance is not only to develop good formal management systems, but also to monitor and follow up how the systems function in the daily work at the plants. The need for this attention is reinforced by the major programmes going on during a limited time period to upgrade and uprate the plants. These programmes will require a full effort of the operating organisations as well as of the regulatory bodies. An additional challenge is, during the same time period, to manage the transfer of knowledge to a new generation of engineers and specialists. A large number of key staff is due to retire within the next 10 years. The generally positive impression reported to earlier review meetings under the Convention still stands. Therefore, Sweden would like to point out the following as strong features in its national nuclear practice: The Swedish legal framework is well developed and the responsibility for safety is very well defined. The nuclear law also provides for public insight into the activities of the licensees. The regulatory bodies have maintained and increased their resources and are further developing their regulatory practices. There is an

  17. The impact of the future Nuclear Safety Convention on the Spanish licensing system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ripol Carulla, S.

    1995-01-01

    The adoption of the 1994 Nuclear Safety Convention should not affect Spanish law. Nevertheless, the coming into force of the Nuclear Safety Convention in Spain will represent an opportunity for Spanish nuclear authorities to clarify one of the aspects of the Spanish nuclear legislation that has become oldfashioned. It would be important to adopt a general rule on nuclear safety which, at the highest level, would clearly establish the prerequisites which have to be fulfilled in order to get a licence as well as the competences of the supervision authorities, including the (criminal and) administrative penalties that can be imposed. (orig./HP)

  18. Enhancement the physical protection system of the WWR-SM reactor at Institute of Nuclear Physics of Academy of Science of the Republic of Uzbekistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karabaev, Kh.Kh.; Rakhimbaev, A.T.; Rakhmanov, A.B.; Salikhbaev, U.S.; Yuldashev, B.S.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: Joining of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Non-Proliferation Treaty required the revision of nuclear fuel protection system and radioactive sources from illegal access in all stages of work with nuclear materials. One of the primary technical actions of ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear materials is physical protection. The project was worked out on upgrading and enhancement of the physical protection of the reactor building. In cooperation with Sandia National Laboratory and support of the Department of Energy (DOE) USA The first stage of the physical protection upgrading provided for fresh fuel protection: - the new fresh fuel storage room was built and equipped with the modern control and detection system, - the reactor building was equipped with detection devices and access control, - the central alarm station (CAS) has been built and equipped with computer control and observing system, - code access system has been implemented. The first stage of upgrading of physical protection system was accomplished for 4 months, and put into operation in 1996. The second stage of physical protection system modernization included the construction of the second barrier of the physical protection, equipping it with observation and control devices and also extension of the CAS. The perimeter around the reactor building was cleaned from trees, bushed and in a short time a two-fence barrier was erected. The access control point provided the secured intensified control of the access to the reactor territory. The physical protection system was supplied with equipment for safeguard and TV observation of perimeter, access control to the territory of the reactor: - the CAS was extended and computer observation control system was upgraded, - the badge station has been constructed, equipped and set up, - all doors, windows, reactor hall gate have been replaced by strengthened metal ones, - uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and diesel-generator have been installed, - the

  19. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status lists as of 10 September 1992, part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections there to, and part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  20. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status list as of 31 December 1996, Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto, and Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  1. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-02-28

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status list as of 31 December 1996, Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto, and Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature.

  2. Liability for nuclear damage: an international perspective. Reflections on the revision of the Vienna Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopuski, J.

    1993-01-01

    This book deals with deals of the complex issues of liability and compensation for nuclear damage which have been considered in the course of the work of the IAEA concerning the revision of the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability. It presents, in an orderly way, personal reflections of its author based on his experience gathered in years 1989-1992 when participating in this work. Necessarily it contains in some of its parts references to documents of the IAEA Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability; these documents because of their length could not be reproduced. Consequently these parts may not be fully intelligible for those who have not participated in or closely followed the Committee's work. The IAEA work on liability for nuclear damage was initiated in the wake of the impact made on the world's public opinion by the Chernobyl incident and its transboundary effects; issues of international state liability and full compensation have been raised. But humanitarian ideas have quickly been confronted with cold calculations of the cost of financial protection for victims and an open unwillingness of some nuclear states has been manifested. After three years of discussions no wide consensus could be reached on some basic issues, such as: relationship between international state and civil liability regimes, structure of international legislation, concept of nuclear damage, limits of compensation, role of public funds or jurisdiction. The author presents his approach to these controversial issue, trying to provide at the same time a theoretical outline for the future international legislation on nuclear liability. (author)

  3. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status lists as of August 31, 1991. Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections there to. Part III contains reservations/declarations made upon signature

  4. Second review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rafferty, Barbara

    2002-01-01

    identified that require special attention, particularly, with regard to safety management, safety culture, plant ageing, upgrading and effectiveness of regulatory practices, as well as maintaining competence and knowledge in the industry, regulatory bodies and research institutions. The review process highlighted factors and circumstances, external to nuclear safety as such, which nevertheless may impact on nuclear safety. Contracting Parties were invited to provide further information in their next national reports on maintaining competence and motivation of staff needed for safe regulation and operation of nuclear installation. Since the 1999 Review Meeting, several Contracting Parties have restructured their regulatory bodies and adopted new legislation or improved existing legislation to more closely meet the requirements of the Convention. Examples of areas of new legislation are: establishing independent regulatory bodies; emergency preparedness; decommissioning; and radiation protection provisions consistent with the International Commission on Radiological Protection's 1990 Recommendations (ICRP 60) and the International Basic Safety Standards published by the IAEA (BSS). Full implementation of the ICRP 60 recommendations and BSS is not complete in some countries. Contracting Parties reported on their individual national regulatory strategies. Some Contracting Parties use probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) as an additional tool in optimizing their regulatory or inspection activities, and some use performance indicators, whether they be quantitative or qualitative, to monitor the safety of their nuclear installations. In discussions, comparison was made of the advantages and disadvantages of regulations that are detailed and prescriptive in nature as compared to less prescriptive, goal-oriented approaches and the complementary use of risk assessments. Contracting Parties agreed to review their experience and report at the next Review Meeting. All Contracting

  5. Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic has been announcemented that from September 20, 1994 up to acquirement of its validity was opened in Vienna for signature Convention on nuclear safety. Instead of Slovak Republic the convention September 20, 1994 was signed. National Council of the Slovak Republic with the convention expressed the consent by its resolution No. 75 from January 25, 1995 and the president of the Slovak Republic February 23, 1995 its ratified. Ratification document at the depository of this convention was deposited, the director general of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, March 7, 1995. The validity of the Convention October 24, 1996, on the article section 1, was acquired. The text of the Convention on nuclear safety continued [sk

  6. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  7. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1989 for the conventions is presented in two attachments

  8. Implementation of the G8GP program on physical protection - experiences and results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2006-01-01

    At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G8 Leaders launched the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction committing to support projects to issues of non-proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism and nuclear safety in Russia. Since then progress has been made in implementing projects. The German Federal Foreign Office contracted GRS to implement a program for improving the physical protection of nuclear or highly radioactive materials of relevance at facilities in the Russian Federation. This paper reports about this G8GP Program on physical protection, its implementation, gained experiences, current achievements and results. (author)

  9. SNAP: a tool for nuclear physical protection system modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Grant, F.H. III.

    1979-10-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned, in part, with the physical protection of nuclear materials. The function of a physical protection system is to define the facility against adversary activities which could lead to theft of nuclear material or sabotage resulting in a radiological release. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system analysis. This paper describes a detailed application of SNAP to a hypothetical nuclear facility

  10. Entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Opening the umbrella

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McRae, Ben

    2015-01-01

    There are 431 commercial nuclear power plants around the world. On 14 April 2015, 193 of these power plants were covered by a nuclear liability instrument (118 power plants by the Paris Convention and 75 by the Vienna Convention). With the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC)4 on 15 April 2015, the number of power plants covered by a nuclear liability instrument increased to 340. Thus, the entry into force of the CSC marked a major milestone towards the establishment of a global nuclear liability regime. This article discusses several events that have promoted progress towards a global nuclear liability regime and then addresses several questions that may arise as countries consider actions necessary to achieve such a regime. (author)

  11. Proceedings of the 9. Workshop on Nuclear Physics - Communications of applied nuclear physics and instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The communications of applied nuclear physics and intrumentation of 9. Workshop on Nuclear Physics in Brazil are presented. Several intruments for radiation measurements, such as detectors, dosemeters and spectrometers were developed. Techniques of environmental monitoring and instrument monitoring for nuclear medicine are evaluated. (M.C.K.) [pt

  12. Nuclear Physics computer networking: Report of the Nuclear Physics Panel on Computer Networking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bemis, C.; Erskine, J.; Franey, M.; Greiner, D.; Hoehn, M.; Kaletka, M.; LeVine, M.; Roberson, R.; Welch, L.

    1990-05-01

    This paper discusses: the state of computer networking within nuclear physics program; network requirements for nuclear physics; management structure; and issues of special interest to the nuclear physics program office

  13. Proceedings of the Third National Conference on Nuclear Physics and Techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nguyen Thanh Binh; Nguyen Nhi Dien; Tran Kim Hung; Vuong Huu Tan

    2000-01-01

    The proceedings contains 130 papers of scientists from institutes, universities, enterprises nation-wide in Vietnam. Its subjects include: nuclear physics, theoretical physics, science and technology of nuclear reactor, application of nuclear techniques in industry, agriculture, biology, medicine, geo-hydrology, environmental protection, nuclear equipment, radiation technology, material technology, waste management, ect

  14. Sweden's second national report under the Convention on nuclear safety. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The National Reports to the Review Meetings according to Article 5 of the Convention call for a self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to compliance with the obligations of the Convention. For Sweden this self-assessment has demonstrated full compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as shown in detail in part B of this National Report. Sweden wishes to emphasise the incentive character of the Convention. In the opinion of Sweden, the Convention implies a commitment to continuous learning from experience and a proactive approach to safety improvement. Therefore, Sweden has found it important that a National Report highlights strong features in national nuclear practices as well as areas where special attention to the further development are needed. Since the first report to the Convention was issued, three major events have been experienced in the Swedish nuclear programme: Phase out of nuclear power started by the closing of one unit of a twin unit plant on 30 November 1999. The full effects of deregulation of the electricity market have been experienced. Together with increasing taxes on nuclear power, this has strongly affected the production economy of the nuclear industry resulting in efforts to reduce production costs and leaving less room for investments. The new general safety regulations came into force 1 July 1999, resulting in a more structured approach to inspection and safety assessment. These changes have created new challenges for the safety work of the licensees as well as for the regulatory bodies during the last three years. However, the generally positive impression reported to the first review meeting under the Convention still stands. Therefore, Sweden would like to point out the following as strong features in its national nuclear practice: The responsibility for safety is very well defined in the Swedish legal framework. In order not to dilute the responsibility of the licence holders, the Swedish regulations are

  15. International Law governing the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jankowitsch-Prevor, O.

    2002-01-01

    1. The International Governmental Institutions. History and mandates: IAEA, OECD/NEA, EURATOM. 2. International Treaties and Conventions: The Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Commitment and Verification (the NPT, Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, The Additional protocol, Regional Non-proliferation Treaties); the Physical protection of Nuclear Material (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material); Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna Convention on the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention, Paris Convention on Civil Liability, Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, Convention on Supplementary compensation for Nuclear Damage); In case of Nuclear Accident: Notification and Assistance (Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency); International Law Governing Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management). 3. Relationship between International and National Law

  16. 40. annual convention 1990 of the Austrian physical society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    Titles and abstracts of the 1990 Convention of the Austrian Physical Society, 17-21 September 1990 at Salzburg, Austria, are given. The topical sections are: 1. Atomic, Molecular- and Plasma Physics; 2. Solid State Physics; 3. Polymer Physics; 4. Nuclear- and Particle Physics; 5. Medical Physics and Biophysics. There are alltogether 193 contributions, 61 thereof of INIS interest

  17. Regulation on control of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, Kaname

    1976-01-01

    Some comment is made on the present laws and the future course of consolidating the regulation of nuclear fuel materials. The first part gives the definitions of the nuclear fuel materials in the laws. The second part deals with the classification and regulation in material handling. Refinement undertaking, fabrication undertaking, reprocessing undertaking, the permission of the government to use the materials, the permission of the government to use the materials under international control, the restriction of transfer and receipt, the reporting, and the safeguard measures are commented. The third part deals with the strengthening of regulation. The nuclear fuel safety deliberation special committee will be established at some opportunity of revising the ordinance. The nuclear material safeguard special committee has been established in the Atomic Energy Commission. The last part deals with the future course of legal consolidation. The safety control will be strengthened. The early investigation of waste handling is necessary, because low level solid wastes are accumulating at each establishment. The law for transporting nuclear materials must be consolidated as early as possible to correspond to foreign transportation laws. Physical protection is awaiting the conclusions of the nuclear fuel safeguard special committee. The control and information systems for the safeguard measures must be consolidated in the laws. (Iwakiri, K.)

  18. 1987 Annual convention of the Austrian Physical Society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-09-01

    This is the pre-convention program of the annual convention to be held in September 1987. The divisions 1) general, 2) nuclear - and particle physics, 3) high-polymer physics have 124 contributions with abstracts, 75 of them of INIS interest. Another 22 contributions from the divisions, 4) atomic -, nuclear - and plasma physics, 5) solid state physics and 6) vocational training, are announced ty titles only. (G.Q.)

  19. Liability for nuclear damage: an international perspective. Reflections on the revision of the Vienna Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lopuski, J

    1994-12-31

    This book deals with deals of the complex issues of liability and compensation for nuclear damage which have been considered in the course of the work of the IAEA concerning the revision of the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability. It presents, in an orderly way, personal reflections of its author based on his experience gathered in years 1989-1992 when participating in this work. Necessarily it contains in some of its parts references to documents of the IAEA Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability; these documents because of their length could not be reproduced. Consequently these parts may not be fully intelligible for those who have not participated in or closely followed the Committee`s work. The IAEA work on liability for nuclear damage was initiated in the wake of the impact made on the world`s public opinion by the Chernobyl incident and its transboundary effects; issues of international state liability and full compensation have been raised. But humanitarian ideas have quickly been confronted with cold calculations of the cost of financial protection for victims and an open unwillingness of some nuclear states has been manifested. After three years of discussions no wide consensus could be reached on some basic issues, such as: relationship between international state and civil liability regimes, structure of international legislation, concept of nuclear damage, limits of compensation, role of public funds or jurisdiction. The author presents his approach to these controversial issue, trying to provide at the same time a theoretical outline for the future international legislation on nuclear liability. (author).

  20. Liability for nuclear damage: an international perspective. Reflections on the revision of the Vienna Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lopuski, J.

    1993-12-31

    This book deals with deals of the complex issues of liability and compensation for nuclear damage which have been considered in the course of the work of the IAEA concerning the revision of the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability. It presents, in an orderly way, personal reflections of its author based on his experience gathered in years 1989-1992 when participating in this work. Necessarily it contains in some of its parts references to documents of the IAEA Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability; these documents because of their length could not be reproduced. Consequently these parts may not be fully intelligible for those who have not participated in or closely followed the Committee`s work. The IAEA work on liability for nuclear damage was initiated in the wake of the impact made on the world`s public opinion by the Chernobyl incident and its transboundary effects; issues of international state liability and full compensation have been raised. But humanitarian ideas have quickly been confronted with cold calculations of the cost of financial protection for victims and an open unwillingness of some nuclear states has been manifested. After three years of discussions no wide consensus could be reached on some basic issues, such as: relationship between international state and civil liability regimes, structure of international legislation, concept of nuclear damage, limits of compensation, role of public funds or jurisdiction. The author presents his approach to these controversial issue, trying to provide at the same time a theoretical outline for the future international legislation on nuclear liability. (author).

  1. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1990 is presented in two attachments

  2. Order of 20 September 1993 amending the Order of 26 March 1982 on protection and control of nuclear materials during transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This Order amends and supplements the system for the transport of nuclear materials laid down by the 1982 Order. Two new provisions have been inserted. The first specifies that in the event of an accident or an incident occurring during the transport of nuclear materials which implies a radiological risk, the Central Service for Proteciton against Ionizing Radiation (SCPRI) must be notified immediately. The other provision specifies that the transport vehicle must be equipped with a means of communication so as to inform the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN) about the main stages of the operation. (NEA)

  3. Act No. 80-572 on protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This Act lays down that the import, export, possession, transfer, use and transport of nuclear materials defined by the Act are subject to licensing and control under conditions to be determined by Decree. The purpose of this control is to avoid loss, theft or diversion of such materials. Any person who obtains fraudulently nuclear material referred to in the Act or who carries out activities involving such material without the required licence shall be subject to severe penalties. Finally, it is provided that the Government shall report to Parliament each year on operation of the provisions of this Act. (NEA) [fr

  4. Securing a better future for all: Nuclear techniques for global development and environmental protection. NA factsheet on nuclear physics: Facilitating the peaceful and practical uses of nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    When properly applied, nuclear science - the study of atomic nuclei and other subatomic particles - can contribute in many ways to the health, development and security of communities around the world. In this context, the IAEA plays an important role in helping interested Member States develop the capabilities and infrastructure necessary to manage their own programmes devoted to nuclear and radiological applications. The IAEA's nuclear science programme helps Member States to establish sound frameworks for the efficient, safe and secure use of new nuclear technologies, including accelerator facilities, research reactors and future nuclear fusion facilities. By applying nuclear technologies in a wide variety of areas such as energy production, health care, food and agriculture, industry and the environment, Member States can benefit immensely from the ensuing socioeconomic developments, as well as providing better living conditions for their citizens.

  5. The project of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum to develop an interactive educational material on Radiological Protection; El Proyecto de Foro de la Industria Nuclear espanola para elaborar un material didactico interactivo sobre Proteccion Radiologica

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Real, A.; Cruz, T. de la; Girona, L.; Montesinos, L.; Sanchez, P.

    2012-07-01

    The Training Department of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum has undertaken a new project to develop an interactive educational material on Radiological Protection. The objective was to develop an attractive, comprehensive and interactive material, to facilitate students and teachers of Elementary, Middle and High schools, to become familiar with ionising radiations. The novelly of the project, is that based on the European framework of key competencies for file long learning, which are defined as a set of knowledge, skills and altitudes that all individuals need for personal fulfilment and employment. The material presented in this paper, is based in an integrated structure of tasks, activities and exercises, which will facilitate the acquisition of as may key competencies as possible. Besides, the material also includes reference texts, links to pertinent web sites and videos. Students, through the development of a specific task (and related activities and exercises), will learn the differences between ionizing and non ionising radiation, the origin, characteristics and types of types of ionising radiation, how to detect and measure them, the potential detrimental health effects, the principles of radiation protection and the beneficial applications can have for man. The material is freely available in www.rinconeducativo.org. (Author) 4 refs.

  6. Physical protection of nuclear materials in transit. Quarterly progress report, April--June 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.

    1978-12-01

    A computer model, SOURCE, has been developed to study the impact of convoy configuration and tactics upon personnel survival and emergency signal generation during an initial armed attack. During this quarter, several improvements were made to the SOURCE code. These improvements include (1) the capability to model an ambush in which the adversaries set up a roadblock, (2) upgraded data on aiming accuracies and human vulnerabilities, and (3) two output formats for examining the locations of the surviving guards. To support the conflict analysis task, several complementary conflict modeling efforts are undergoing parallel development. These methodologies include the SABRES computerized conflict simulation models, the AMBUSH conflict board game, and an alternative methodology being developed by Vector Research, Inc. (VRI). The SABRES I combat model can be used to study the relative value of alternative defender tactics and the relative value of different weapon systems. AMBUSH is a tactical board game which provides a hypothetical conflict between a truck convoy and an adversary group attempting a hijacking. ORINCON Corporation developed network models to be used in determining the cost implications of alternative transportation regulations. SRI International provided weapon characterization data from representative types and calibers of sporting rifles, assault rifles, machine guns, submachine guns, shotguns, and handguns. The alternative methodology for conflict modeling being developed by VRI is the engagement model, CONVOY. SAI is under contract to model the communication system for transporters of SNM

  7. The role of nuclear law in nuclear safety after Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cardozo, Diva E. Puig

    2013-01-01

    The paper contains the following topics: nuclear law, origin and evolution, role of the legal instruments on nuclear safety, nuclear safety the impact of major nuclear accidents: Chernobyl and Fukushima. The response of the nuclear law post Fukushima. Safety and security. International framework for nuclear safety: nuclear convention joint convention on safety on spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. The Fukushima World Conference on Nuclear Safety. Convention on Prompt Notification and Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety. IAEA recommendations for the safety transport of radioactive material. International framework for nuclear security. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against Nuclear Terrorism. Resolution No. 1540 of the Security Council of United Nations (2004). Measures to strengthen international safety. Code of conduct on the safety research reactor

  8. Proceedings of the 3. Workshop on Nuclear Physics in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This publication is the final report of the III Workshop on Nuclear Physics in Brazil. Many works were presented on the fields related to Nuclear Physics. It was organized some work groups which discussed the following topics: Perspectivas of Nuclear Physics in Brazil, Personnel Formation and Related Instrumentation. (A.C.A.S.) [pt

  9. The design study of a new nuclear protection material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huang Yiping; Liang Lu; Xu Jiao; Zhang Weijiang

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► A new epoxy adhesive filled with boron carbide was firstly studied. ► The thermal neutron radiation shielding effect of the adhesive was excellent. ► The sheared strength of the adhesive filled with 30% B 4 C powder B was particularly better. ► The SEM analysis of sheared fracture surface was well consistent with the former test. - Abstract: A new epoxy adhesive filled with boron carbide (B 4 C) was investigated, which has two main functions of adhesiving and radiation shielding. The thermal neutron radiation shielding effect of the adhesive was detected by multiple-track spectrum analyzer, and it was excellent when the thickness of the adhesiving film was beyond 300 μm. In addition, the sheared strength performance of the adhesive with five kinds of Hardeners was treated under the thermal cycling condition. The result displayed that combined use of Hardener A and Hardener B was better than others. Meantime, the sheared strength of the adhesive filled with different type of B4C powder was measured, and it was particularly better when the content of B 4 C powder B filled with 30%. Moreover, the sheared fracture surface was further analyzed by virtue of Metallographic Microscope and Scan Electric Microscope, and the exhibited result was well consistent with the former tensile sheared test.

  10. Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-03-14

    72 | Air & Space Power Journal Increasing Uncertainty The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence Jennifer Bradley To put...relationships and should serve as the cornerstone of US nuclear deterrence policy. Although Russia and China are not identified as adversaries of...exactly what has happened over the past year. The US decision to meet the needs of deterrence by relying less on nuclear weapons and instead devel- oping

  11. Guidance for the application of an assessment methodology for innovative nuclear energy systems. INPRO manual - Physical protection. Vol. 6 of the final report of phase 1 of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-11-01

    The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was initiated in the year 2000, based on a resolution of the IAEA General Conference (GC(44)/RES/21). The main objectives of INPRO are (1) to help to ensure that nuclear energy is available to contribute in fulfilling energy needs in the 21st century in a sustainable manner, (2) to bring together both technology holders and technology users to consider jointly the international and national actions required to achieve desired innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles; and (3) to create a forum to involve all relevant stakeholders that will have an impact on, draw from, and complement the activities of existing institutions, as well as ongoing initiatives at the national and international level. This document follows the guidelines of the INPRO report M ethodology for the assessment of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, Report of Phase 1B (first part) of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) , IAEA-TECDOC-1434 (2004), together with its previous report G uidance for the evaluation for innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, Report of Phase 1A of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), IAEATECDOC-1362 (2003). This INPRO manual is comprised of an overview volume and eight additional volumes covering the areas of economics (Volume 2), infrastructure (Volume 3), waste management (Volume 4), proliferation resistance (Volume 5), physical protection (Volume 6), environment (Volume 7), safety of reactors (Volume 8), and safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities (Volume 9). The INPRO Manual for the area of physical protection (Volume 6) provides guidance to the assessor of an INS (innovative nuclear energy system) under a physical protection regime in a country that is planning to install a nuclear power program (or maintaining or enlarging an existing one), and describes the application of the

  12. The physics of radiation protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doerschel, B.; Schuricht, V.; Steuer, J.

    1996-01-01

    The book is aimed at both practising specialists and scientists wishing to learn about the fundamental science of radiation protection. The first part of the book, 'Physical Fundamentals of Radiation Protection', presents a concise description of radiation sources and radiation fields, interaction of radiation with matter, radiation effects and radiation damage, basic concept of radiation protection, radiation exposure of man, radiation protection measuring techniques and physical fundamentals for limiting radiation exposure. The second part, 'Calculational Exercises for Radiation Protection' is intended to supplement the first part by carrying out relevant calculations, amending and adding special aspects and to give guidance in solving practical problems. The book is written for scientists as well as for students and staff working in nuclear facilities, hospitals and institutions responsible for radiation and environmental protection. (UK)

  13. Physical protection nuclear facilities against sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: INFCIRC 225 Rev. 4 has introduced the Design Basis Threat, DBT, as a key element of the states physical protection system. The DBT is a definition which determines the level of physical protection of nuclear material during use, storage, transport and of nuclear facilities. It the basis for physical protection concepts and for the design of measures the operator or licensee has to provide. By this means it is also a definition of the responsibility for the physical protection which the operator accepts with the license. The new chapter designated to the physical protection against sabotage which has resulted also in the amendment of the title in INFCIRC 225 demonstrates the grown international concern about the potential consequences of sabotage. More than the physical protection against unauthorized removal the physical protection against sabotage has interfaces with the nuclear safety field. The basis of protection against sabotage therefore is much more based on the facility design-the safety design of the facility. Using the DBT the competent authority is in the position to determine the level of protection against sabotage and the remaining risk which has to be accepted. This risk of course depends on the real threat which is not known in advance. The acceptance of the remaining risk depends on both the assessment of the threat, its credibility and the potential consequences. There has been no serious act of sabotage in the past nor an attempt of. Despite of this the Harnun attack of the Japanese underground and some other recent terrorist activities could have given reasons to reconsider what threat might be credible. The German physical protection system has been developed since the increasing terrorist activities in the 1970s. From the beginning the protection against sabotage played an important role in the German system of physical protection. The requirements for the physical protection against unauthorized removal and against sabotage were

  14. Materials science and physics of non-conventional energy sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furlan, G.; Nobili, D.; Sayigh, A.A.M.; Seraphin, B.O.

    1991-01-01

    Recently, many countries in the world have restructured their energy policy to include renewables, for example, in UK the Government expect that by the year 2010 it will be possible to meet 20% of the electricity supply by renewables. Photovoltaic is one of the easiest forms of changing sunlight into direct electricity. Research initiatives have reduced the cost of it from $1,000 per peak watt in 1960 to less than $5 per peak watt nowadays. It is anticipated that by the year 2000 this cost will be $2 per peak watt. ICTP has, since 1977, taken an active role in disseminating knowledge and promoting renewable energy through its massive programme, Physics of Renewable Energy. The aim is to help the developing countries in grasping the technology as well as the transfer of this technology through courses, seminars and workshops. These workshops are repeated every two years and the theme of them has gradually been changed to emphasize the high-powered physics associated with renewable energy and in particular material technology. The workshops are run for three weeks and include lectures, seminars, discussion, visits to industry and small task presentation. Although the Proceedings of these workshops emphasize mainly the photovoltaic conversion, technology and manufacturing facilities, a few other lectures on the state-of-the-art, development and potential of other forms of renewable energy are included. Refs, figs and tabs

  15. Convention on Nuclear Safety. Second national report on the implementation by france of the obligations of the Convention; Convention sur la surete nucleaire. Deuxieme rapport national sur la mise en oeuvre par la France des obligations de la Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-09-15

    The first national report on the implementation by france of the obligation under the Convention is structured along its Articles. the french Nuclear safety Authority ensured the co ordination of the report, with contributions from other regulators and nuclear operators. this report was distributed at the middle of April 2003 to the other Contracting party (on 3 november to 14, 2003 at the IAEA headquarters. (author)

  16. National report of Brazil on nuclear safety convention - introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This document was prepared for fulfilling the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Chapter 1 presents some historical aspects of the Brazilian nuclear policy, targets to be attained for increasing the nuclear energy contribution for the national production of electric energy

  17. A bridge between two conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage: The Joint Protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busekist, Otto von

    2006-01-01

    The adoption of the Joint Protocol and its signature on 21 September 1988, at the closure of the diplomatic conference jointly convened in Vienna by the IAEA and the NEA, was hailed as landmark in efforts towards the establishment of a comprehensive civil nuclear liability regime. The importance of liability and compensation for transfrontier damage caused by a nuclear incident is indeed one of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident. The present article attempts to describe the history of the Joint Protocol during the many years it took to develop this link between the two conventions, to provide comment on its objectives and content, and to discuss some important questions related to its application

  18. A bridge between two Conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage: the Joint protocol Relating to the application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busekist, O. von.

    1989-01-01

    The adoption of the Joint-Protocol and its signature on 21 September 1988, at the closure of the diplomatic conference jointly convened in Vienna by the IAEA and NEA, was hailed as a landmark in efforts towards the establishment of a comprehensive civil nuclear liability regime. The importance of liability and compensation for transfrontier damage caused by a nuclear incident is indeed one of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident. This article describes the history of the Joint Protocol during the many years it took to develop this link between the two Conventions, provides a comment on its objectives and content, and discusses some important questions related to its application. (NEA) [fr

  19. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    The document presents the status of signatures and notifications of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency which entered into force on 26 February 1987, i.e. thirty days after the date (26 January 1987) on which the third State expressed its consent to be bound by the Convention. The list of signature, notification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or Organizations is given

  20. Contribution of the radiation hygiene laboratories network in physical protection of radiation materials in Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Milu, C.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The Ministry of Health and Family from Romania has its own radiation protection network, including 23 radiation hygiene laboratories (RHLs), within the Institutes of Public Health-Bucharest, Iassy, Cluj-Napoca and Timisoara and the Directions of Public Health from Arges county, Bihor, Brasov, Mures, Maramures, Cluj, Sibiu, Harghita, Suceava, lassy, Bacau, Neamt, Galati, Constanta, Prahova, Dolj, Caras-Severin, Timis and Bucharest City. The RHLs network has 170 persons (physicians, physicists, engineers, chemists, biologists and technicians) and it is technically co-ordinated by the RHL in the Institute of Public Health-Bucharest. Within the local or national activities for physical protection of radioactive materials, the RHLs network closely co-operates with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) and with the nuclear regulatory authority, named the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). In the particular case of theft, sabotage or illicit traffic of radioactive materials, usually the MAI has the main role in the co-ordination of intervention actions of the three authorities. The RHLs network contributes by the expertise of its staff and by using its intervention facilities. The specific tasks for the RHLs network are: identification of the type and size of the radioactive material (by direct dosimetry and/or by gamma spectroscopy); dose reconstructions for the involved persons, the intervention personnel and the population; health management for overexposed persons and the medical response, including biological dosimetry and epidemiological studies. Recent special situations in this field, were: theft of some fuel (defect) tablets of natural uranium, from a production factory; the illicit traffic of radioactive materials, in transition to Western European Countries; an unauthorized decommissioning of a furnace, determining the uncontrolled dispersion of about 30 cobalt-60 sealed sources and the radiation exposure of nearly 20

  1. States agree on stronger physical protection regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Delegates from 89 countries agreed on 8 July to fundamental changes that will substantially strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the agreement in saying 'This new and stronger treaty is an important step towards greater nuclear security by combating, preventing, and ultimately punishing those who would engage in nuclear theft, sabotage or even terrorism. It demonstrates that there is indeed a global commitment to remedy weaknesses in our nuclear security regime.' The amended CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It will also provide for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences. The original CPPNM applied only to nuclear material in international transport. Conference President Dr. Alec Baer said 'All 89 delegations demonstrated real unity of purpose. They put aside some very genuine national concerns in favour of the global interest and the result is a much improved convention that is better suited to addressing the nuclear security challenges we currently face.' The new rules will come into effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of the 112 States Parties of the Convention, expected to take several years. 'But concrete actions are already taking place around the world. For more than 3 years, the IAEA has been implementing a systematic Nuclear Security plan, including physical protection activities designed to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts,' said Anita Nillson, Director of the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security. The Agency's Nuclear Security Fund, set up after the events of 9/11, has delivered $19.5 million in practical assistance to 121 countries

  2. Capabilities of the Institute of Nuclear Physics (Kazakhstan) for technical expertise of seized nuclear and other radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lukashenko, S.; Chakrov, P.; Gorlachyov, I.; Knyazev, B.; Yakushev, E.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Institute of Nuclear Physics of the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (INP NNC RK) widely uses the nuclear-physical and others analytical methods which were used during the last years to carry out technical expertise of the nuclear and radioactive materials as well. The spectrometric methods for determination radionuclide composition. INP NNC RK has modern spectrometric equipment for solving all types of analytical and radio analytical problems including: gamma spectrometers - planar, coaxial and well type, alpha spectrometers ('Canberra'), liquid scintillation counter 'TriCarb 3100', beta spectrometers. An original procedures with own software are developed for each spectrometric device. Mass-spectrometric methods. The thermion mass - spectrometry (TI-MS) with prism ionic optics are used for environment objects and nuclear materials analysis. Now the operations on determination of plutonium and uranium isotope composition of the environmental objects of former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site by usage of this method are under way. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM). At the INP, SEM techniques have been used traditionally in studies of irradiated metal materials (original surface, fracture surfaces, cross sections), but rather recently they were successfully applied for characterization of 'hot particles' from nuclear testing site, polymer materials, and also uranium fuel pellets. (The microscope used in AMRAY-1200B equipped with ANS X-ray analyzer). Determination methods of macro - and microelements composition. For determination of macro - and microelement composition the set of various methods are used, including: neutron - activation analysis, atomic - emission spectrometry with high - frequency inductively- coupled plasma, roentgen fluorescent analysis, traditional chemical methods: titrimetry, voltamperometry etc. For determination the most difficult elements - carbon and oxygen the nuclear reactions method is developed at the

  3. Strengthening global practices for protecting nuclear material (NUMAT). Book of Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhaeusler, F.; Heissl, C.

    2002-08-01

    The International Conference on Physical Protection 'Strengthening Global Practices for Protecting Nuclear Material' was organized by the Institute of Physics and Biophysics, Salzburg University in cooperation with/supported by the European Commission, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, European Forum of the Stanford University's Institute for International Studies and Austria Institute for European Security. Its purpose was fostering exchange of information on the policy and technical aspects require to ensure the security of nuclear material around the world. There is a general concern that the international community needs to establish effective measures to counter theft, sabotage, and other illicit uses of nuclear fissile and other radioactive materials. The main subjects addressed by this conference were: a) global and local threat development and 'design basis'; b) standards for physical protection (PP), its adequacy and future needs; c) national practices in PP of nuclear materials (how to strengthen national security culture?); d) current R and D in security and detection technologies (identification of focus points for future R and D); e) programmes to aid in training, design, and implementation of physical protection systems (how to improve efficiency and assure sustainability of assistance programmes?). (nevyjel)

  4. Nuclear Materials Management. Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1966-02-15

    An increasing number of countries are using nuclear materials which, because of their high value and the potential hazards involved, require special methods of handling. To discuss these and to provide a forum at which different systems for achieving the necessary economy and safety could be compared, the International Atomic Energy Agency held a Symposium at Vienna on Nuclear Materials Management from 30 August to 3 September, 1965. It was attended by 115 participants from 19 Member States and two international organizations. Nuclear materials are already being used on an industrial scale and their high cost demands close and continuous control to ensure that they are delivered precisely on time and that they are used to the fullest possible extent before they are withdrawn from service. Routine industrial methods of material control and verification are widely used to ensure safe and economical operation and handling in nuclear power stations, in fuel-element fabrication and reprocessing plants, and in storage facilities. In addition special refinements are needed to take account of the value and the degree of purity required of nuclear materials. Quality as well as quantity has to be checked thoroughly and the utmost economy in processing is necessary. The radioactivity of the material poses special problems of handling and storage and creates a potential hazard to health. A further problem is that of criticality. These dangers and the means of averting them are well understood, as is evidenced by the outstandingly good safety record of the atomic energy industry. But besides accommodating all these special problems, day-to-day procedures must be simple enough to fit in with industrial conditions. Many of the 58 papers presented at the Symposium emphasized that records, checks, measurements and handling precautions, if suitably devised, provide the control vital to efficient operation, serve as checks against loss or waste of valuable materials and help meet the

  5. Design basis threat analysis and implementation of the physical protection system at Nuclear Facility of BATAN Yogyakarta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip

    2005-01-01

    An analysis to determine the design basis threat (DBT) and its follow-up through the implementation of physical protection system at the nuclear facility of BATAN Yogyakarta has been done. Methodology used for the analysis is based on the IAEA guidance for the development and maintenance of a DBT. Based on the analysis results, it can be concluded that the threat motivation is influenced by political situation (related to the government policy), criminal, sabotage and theft. The characteristics of threats are: not so well organized, terror, theft of materials information, involving insider (collusion), and intimidation to workers. Potential threat could from guests/students who take a practical job or laboratory exercise. Therefore, it is necessary to be anticipated the possibility and its impact of turmoil/demonstrators such as destruction of: lighting, road, fence, sabotage on the electric and communication lines, surrounding the Yogyakarta nuclear facility

  6. Physical protection of nuclear power plants-technical and legal aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Castro Martins, O.J. de.

    1978-04-01

    The nuclear power plants are defined according to the definitions included in the Brazilian legislation and international conventions and their physical protection is analysed. Besides, the differences and the relations among nuclear security, safeguards and physical protection are established. (A.L.) [pt

  7. The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duncan, William

    1993-01-01

    Reviews chapters of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption which establish requirements for intercountry adoption, provide for a system of adoption authorities in contracting states, establish procedures to be adopted by the authorities, and provide for recognition of adoptions made under the convention. Notes that the convention guarantees…

  8. Protecting nuclear material and facilities: Is a new approach needed?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhausler, F.; Bunn, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The main reason why national physical protection (PP) systems for nuclear and other radioactive material need to be strengthened further is that, after the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, the threat of dangerous, suicidal radiological and nuclear terrorism can no longer be excluded as a possibility. Existing PP systems were not designed to deal with the threat of suicidal terrorists having the numbers, skills, training, and resources available to the commandos attacking on 11 September. Moreover, there are no mandatory international standards for domestic PP systems for nuclear or radioactive material, and this has produced great variation in protection provided from country to country. IAEA recommended standards, while useful, were not designed with the new terrorist threat in mind. Moreover, they are often not followed in practice. The result is inadequate protection against the new form of terrorism in most countries. The Director General of the IAEA expressed a similar view after 11 September, but achieving a consensus to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to require specific standards of protection for different amounts and kinds of nuclear material used or stored domestically (not in international transport) has been impossible in the year since 11 September. In the case of radiological materials, a new effort to provide required international standards for protection against the new form of terrorism has not begun. In the summer of 2001, leaders of the G-8 countries agreed to a Global Partnership to prevent the new terrorists from acquiring nuclear and radiological as well as other materials related to weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps in part because of the failure to date to achieve agreement on an effective amendment to the CPPNM, the first principle of this partnership is to strengthen 'multilateral treaties and other instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit

  9. Proceedings of the symposium on frontier nuclear physics (FRONP99)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chiba, Satoshi

    2000-01-01

    The symposium on Frontier Nuclear Physics (FRONP99), organized by the Research Group for Hadron Science, Advanced Science Research Center, under close cooperation with the Research Center for Nuclear Physics, Osaka University and High Energy Accelerator Research Organization, was held at Tokai Research Establishment of JAERI on August 2 to 4, 1999. The symposium was devoted for discussions and presentations of research results in wide variety of fields such as hyper nuclear physics, lepton nuclear physics, quark nuclear physics, unstable nuclear physics, superheavy elements and heavy-ion physics. Three talks on the joint project between JAERI (Neutron Science Research Center) and KEK (JHF) were presented in a public session. Thirty three talks on these topics presented at the symposium aroused lively discussions among approximately 70 participants. This report contains 26 papers submitted from the lecturers. (author)

  10. Protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials against malevolent actions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cornu, P.; Aurelle, J.; Jalouneix, J.

    2001-01-01

    The french approach for considering malevolent actions affecting the design and operation of nuclear facilities is aimed at determining the extent to which the facilities are protected. When carrying out these studies, operating organizations have to demonstrate that their are complying with the objectives set by the Competent Authority for reducing the risk of internal or external malevolent actions. The approach to be followed consist to determine the sensitivity of each zone and to estimate the vulnerability of the most critical zones to each type of aggression. The sensitivity can be defined by the level of the radiological consequences resulting from a malevolent action. The estimation of the vulnerability is made of the extent to which it is difficult to carry out a malevolent action. if need be, counter-measures are taken to protect zones for which the consequences would be unacceptable compared to the force of the aggression. Counter-measures are intended both to minimise sensitivity and make it more difficult to carry out the aggression envisaged. Acceptable consequences are taken as being those leading to levels of radioactive releases less than, or equal to, those taken into account in the facility safety case. This implies that the vulnerability of the most sensitive zones should be reduced to a minimum so that an acceptable level of protection can be provided for these areas. Emphasis will be paid on the defence in depth approach organized around prevention, management and mitigation measures. (authors)

  11. Proceedings of the 6. Argentine congress on radiation protection and nuclear safety; Actas del 6. congreso argentino de proteccion radiologica y seguridad nuclear

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    The 6th Argentine Congress on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety was organized by the Radioprotection Argentine Society, in Buenos Aires, between the 22 and 24 of september of 1998. In this event, were presented almost 66 papers in the following sessions, about these subjects: 1.- Safety in nuclear installations. 2.- Control of nuclear material and physical protection of nuclear installations. 3.- Programs of quality assurance. 4.- Training, technical information and public information. 5.- Physical dosimetry. 6.- Physical dosimetry and occupational radiation protection. 7.- Exposure of the natural radiation. 8.- Environmental radiological safety. 9.- Biological effects of the ionizing radiations and biological dosimetry. 10.- Radiological protection of the medical practice and the radiological emergencies. 11.- Radioactive wastes management. 12.- Transport of radioactive materials

  12. Convention on nuclear safety. Rules of procedure and financial rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document is the first revision of the Rules of Procedures and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/573), convened in accordance with the Chapter 3 of the Convention

  13. Convention on Nuclear Safety. Rules of procedure and financial rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The document is the second revision of the Rules of Procedures and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/573), convened in accordance with the Chapter 3 of the Convention

  14. The impact of nuclear and conventional disarmament on the African continent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Azikiwe, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    In this paper, the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the Office of the United nations at Geneva discusses the positive impact of nuclear and conventional disarmament for development in the African States

  15. Development of a system for academic training of the personnel engaged in nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Onykiy, B.N.; Kryuchkov, E.F.

    2005-01-01

    The main attention in the present paper is focused on discussing the educational problems in the area of nuclear materials physical protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) in Russia. Currently, only the Master of Science Graduate Program has been completely developed for students training. This is taking place at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University, MEPhI), where the sixth generation of Masters has graduated in May 2004. The MPC and A Engineer Degree Program, currently under development at MEPhI, is considered in the paper. This paper discusses specific features of the Engineer Degree training required by the Russian educational legislation and the Russian quality control system as applied to the training process. The paper summarises the main joint actions undertaken during the past three years by MEPhI in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and US National Laboratories for developing the MPC and A Engineer Degree Program in Russia. (author)

  16. Insights of the periodic reviews regarding the physical protection of nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2001-01-01

    Among other prerequisites for licensing a nuclear activity, the German Atomic Energy Act stipulates that the necessary physical protection against malevolent acts has to be approved before granting a license. This is required for nuclear power plants in paragraph 7 of the Atomic Energy Act. The licenses for nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards were granted about 20 years ago and more. All NPPs are under the supervision of the Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that all conditions of the license are met during the whole plant operation period. The 'Periodic Safety Review', PSR, is designated to provide the Supervisory Authority with additional information on the safety status. One part of the PSR is the 'Deterministic Security Analysis', DSA. The subject of the DSA is the actual physical protection of a NPP. The following document outlines the experiences gained during the evaluation of DSA reports by GRS as an external expert organisation under contract of the Supervisory Authorities. (author)

  17. The Halland model - An innovative model for the physical protection of a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boode, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Halland - Halland is situated on the west coast of Sweden. The entire west coast borders on the sea - the Kattegatt and Skagerack. The local population is about 280,000, and is considerably larger during the summer. The county comprises six municipalities - Falkenberg, Halmstad, Hylte, Kungsbacka, Laholm and Varberg). Halmstad is the seat of the county administration. Ringhals - Ringhals is Sweden's largest nuclear facility with four reactors. The facility is located near to the sea, several kilometres north of Varberg. Physical Protection - The Police Authority of Halland County is responsible for physical protection at Ringhals. Officers have been appointed to ensure that there is adequate preparedness and competence within the Police Authority. The Police Authority works in close co-operation with the County Administrative Board and the municipalities involved as well as with the management of Ringhals. An extensive set of plans exists for work at Ringhals Nuclear Power Plant. The plans relate to physical protection, emergency standby and incident response in connection with technical problems. The plans for physical protection are formulated so that they coincide with Ringhals' status with respect to threats. Emergency alerts and measures exist in order to cope with the following events: Demonstrations - Peaceful demonstrations concern offsite activities that do not have a significant impact on Ringhals' activities and which mainly aim at influencing external opinion. Threatening demonstrations that concern offsite activities that have a significant impact on Ringhals' activities or which involve masked or armed participants as well as any form of demonstration where the participants enter the Ringhals site. Assault - Threats that arise if an armed individual or a group of people enter the Ringhals site and/or congregate on the site. Bomb Threats - The bomb threat must be directed to Ringhals or to Ringhals' activities. Dangerous Objects - Unknown

  18. Convention on nuclear safety. Rules of procedure and financial rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document presents the Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/449) convened in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Convention. It includes four parts: General provisions, Preparatory process for review meetings, Review meetings, and Amendment and interpretation of rules

  19. Development of conventional fatigue database for structure materials of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Bing

    2002-01-01

    Management system of the conventional fatigue database for structure materials of nuclear power plant (NPP) is developed. The database included the parameters of design curves, i.e., the stress-life, survival probability-stress-life, strain-life, survival probability-strain-life, stress-strain and survival probability-stress-strain curves, and corresponding information of materials and testing conditions. Two ways, by materials name or by the inter-bounds of material mechanical properties, are constructed to search the database. From the searched information it can be conveniently performed of the conventional fatigue design analysis and reliability assessment of structures

  20. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The first Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-09-01

    This report is issued according to Article 5 of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. It has been produced by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. Before submission to the Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication, the report has been commented by the Federal Office of Energy (BFE/OFEN), the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission (KSA/CSA), and the Swiss nuclear power plants of Beznau, Leibstadt and Muehleberg. The Goesgen nuclear power plant has chosen not to comment on the report. The introduction to the report provides general information about Switzerland, a brief political history of nuclear power and an overview of the nuclear facilities in Switzerland. In the subsequent sections, numbered after the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, key aspects are commented on in such a way as to give a clear indication on how the various duties imposed by the Convention are fulfilled in Switzerland.

  1. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The first Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-09-01

    This report is issued according to Article 5 of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. It has been produced by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. Before submission to the Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication, the report has been commented by the Federal Office of Energy (BFE/OFEN), the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission (KSA/CSA), and the Swiss nuclear power plants of Beznau, Leibstadt and Muehleberg. The Goesgen nuclear power plant has chosen not to comment on the report. The introduction to the report provides general information about Switzerland, a brief political history of nuclear power and an overview of the nuclear facilities in Switzerland. In the subsequent sections, numbered after the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, key aspects are commented on in such a way as to give a clear indication on how the various duties imposed by the Convention are fulfilled in Switzerland

  2. Achievements, current status and prospects for Russian-American cooperation in nuclear material physical protection, control and accounting - 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nikiforov, N.V.

    1999-01-01

    The process of upgrading the material physical protection, control and accounting systems is an ongoing and long-term process that consists of modernization measuring equipment and methodologies, improving, data exchange and processing technologies, and improving administrative procedures. The positive results that was already achieved form a foundation upon which this collaboration may extend into other new and important areas, such as - the second and third lines of defence, which are directed toward countering illegal trafficking not only in nuclear materials, but in other hazardous substances that constitute a threat to the nuclear sites and national security of the countries [ru

  3. Analysis of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and Suggestions for Improvement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, K. S.; Viet, Phuong Nguyen

    2013-01-01

    The innovative approach of the Convention, which is based on incentive after than legal binding, had been considered successful in strengthening the nuclear safety worldwide. However, the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (Japan) in March 2011 has exposed a number of weaknesses of the Convention. Given that context, this paper will analyse the characteristics of the CNS in order to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the Convention, and finally to suggest some possible improvements. The analysis in this paper shows that the incentive approach of the CNS has succeeded in facilitating the active roles of its Contracting Parties in making the National Reports and participating in the peer review of these reports. However, the incoherent quality of the National Reports, the different level of participation in the peer review process by different Contracting Parties, and the lack of transparency of the peer review have undermined the effectiveness of the Convention in strengthening the international safety regime as well as preventing serious regulatory errors that had happened in Japan before the Fukushima accident. Therefore, the peer review process should be reformed into a more transparent and independent direction, while an advisory group of regulators within the CNS might also be useful in improving the effectiveness of the Convention as already proven by the good practice in the European Union. Only with such effective change, the CNS can maintain its pivotal role in the international safety regime

  4. Plasma processing techniques for deposition of carbonic thin protective coatings on structural nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrei, V.; Oncioiu, G.; Coaca, E.; Rusu, O.; Lungu, C.

    2009-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: The production of nano-structured surface films with controlled properties is crucial for the development of materials necessary for the Advanced Systems for Nuclear Energy. Since the surface of materials is the zone through which materials interact with the environment, the surface science and surface engineering techniques plays an essential role in the understanding and control of the processes involved. Complex surface structures were developed on stainless steels used as structural nuclear materials: austenitic stainless steels based on Fe, austenitic steels with high content of Cr, ferrites resistant to corrosion, by various Plasma Processing methods which include: - Plasma Electrolytic (PE) treatments: the steel substrates were modified by nitriding and nitro-carburizing plasma diffusion treatments; - carbonic films deposition in Thermionic Vacuum Arc Plasma. The results of the characterization of surface structures obtained in various experimental conditions for improvement of the properties (corrosion resistance, hardness, wear properties) are reported: the processes and structures were characterized by correlation of the results of the complementary techniques: XPS, 'depth profiling', SEM, XRD, EIS. An overall description of the processes involved in the surface properties improvement, and some consideration about the new materials development for energy technologies are presented

  5. Physical protection of radioactive materials in a University Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boeck, H.

    1998-01-01

    Although nuclear research centers attached to universities usually do not keep large inventories of radioactive or special nuclear material, the mentioned material has still to be under strict surveillance and safeguards if applicable. One problem in such research centers is the large and frequent fluctuation of persons - mainly students, scientists or visiting guest scientists - using such materials for basic or applied research. In the present paper an overview of protective actions in such a research institute will be given and experience of more than 36 years will be presented. (author)

  6. The new Brazilian legislation on nuclear protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, Denise

    1981-10-01

    This paper considers the new system on nuclear protection in Brazil which was established to integrate all government agencies and private bodies involved in nuclear activities. The role of each organisation is analysed in relation to the Brazilian political and administrative structure, in particular that of the Nuclear Energy Commission. (NEA) [fr

  7. Proceedings of the Tenth Radiation Physics and Protection Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The publication has been set up as proceedings of the Radiation Physics and Protection Conference.. The conference consists Natural Radiation Sources; Radiation Detection and Measurements; Applied Radiation Physics; Radiation Medical Physics and Biophysics; Radiation Dosimetry; Operational Radiation Protection; Radiation Shielding; Transport of Radioactive Materials; Nuclear and Radiation Physics; Medical Physics and Public Protection Against Radiological Attack. This conference consists of 402 p., figs., tabs., refs.

  8. Progress in the activities on prevention and combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear material in Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurselis, S.; Stadalnikas, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The paper gives a general overview of the progress which has been made in the activities on prevention and combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear material in Lithuania. It describes the measures which were taken to strengthen nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. The current status of the national legislation and the functions of institutions involved in control of nuclear material and combating of illicit trafficking are discussed. Lithuania, similar to many countries, did not avoid a new type of a crime - smuggling of nuclear materials - which was observed in the 1990's. The most serious case in Lithuania happened in 1993 when fresh fuel assembly was stolen from Ignalina NPP. This assembly contains approximately 124 kg of UO 2 (enrichment 2%). 100 kg of the pellets from this assembly was found later in several pieces at different places. This case served as a strong stimulus to strengthen prevention measures of Illicit trafficking. The legal basis was created and governmental institutions were obliged with special duties related with nuclear material. The laws and regulations set the order for the shipment and handling of nuclear material. The penalties for violation of these laws and regulations specified in Penal Code and Administrative Code were made stricter. The State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is a very important element in prevention of the illicit trafficking. The Regulations of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material at Nuclear Facilities and LOFs was issued by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) on 10 December 1997 following the provisions of the Law on Nuclear Energy. Lithuania extended its international obligations by ratifying the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (entered into force on 5 July 2000). The fully computerized nuclear material accountancy system was created at Ignalina NPP. The system gives the possibility to find the

  9. A Study on Establishment of Unacceptable Radiological Consequence (URC) for Physical Protection against Sabotage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Myungtak; Koh, Moonsung; Lee, Youngwook; Jo, Kwang Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The international community has recommended that a graded approach should be applied to the establishment of the domestic regime for physical protection in accordance with fundamental principle H of the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and INFCIRC/225/rev.5. In Korea, Currently, the graded approach to unauthorized removal of nuclear material is divided into three categories (Category Ι, Category ΙΙ, Category ΙΙΙ) based on the IAEA INFCIRC/225/rev.5. Moreover, depending on the categorization of nuclear material, physical protection measures against unauthorized removal are also clearly categorized. But in the case of physical protection against sabotage, the graded approach to the physical protection measures is not applied since Unacceptable Radiological Consequence (URC) for identifying sabotage target and level is not determined. URC can be established based on either dose limit or design limit. The report by Sandia National Lab. in USA specifies that core damage is used for URC. Calculation of an exact dose is based on various assumptions and processes and subsequently increases uncertainty. Therefore, using design limit for decreasing uncertainty is more effective than using dose limit. In order to apply the graded approach to physical protection against sabotage, we have taken into Fundamental principle H : Physical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material of nuclear facilities consideration legal and institutional standards on domestic and international radiological consequences and intended to provide a reference for the URC establishment by the State. The study on various standards led to the conclusion that each value has advantages and

  10. Proceedings of the X. international school on nuclear physics, neutron physics and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrejtscheff, W.; Elenkov, D.

    1992-01-01

    The history of the International School on Nuclear Physics, Neutron physics and nuclear Energy ('Varna School') goes back to the year 1973. Since that time it has been carried out in the fall of every other year in the Conference Center of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences at the Black Sea coast near Varna. This volume contains the full texts of the lectures delivered by distinguished scientists from different countries on the Tenth Varna School, 1991. 14 of them are included in INIS separately

  11. Applications of the INFCIRC225/rev5 to the national physical protection regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jae Gwang

    2011-01-01

    The IAEA's first effort for playing a key role in physical protection of nuclear material and facilities resulted in the publication of 'Recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material' in 1972. These recommendations were revised by a group of experts in co-operation with the IAEA Secretariat and the revised version was published in 1975 in INFCIRC/225. The document was subsequently revised in 1977(rev.1), 1989(rev.2), in 1993(rev.3) and 1998(rev4). The Physical Protection regime in ROK has been established on the basis of INFCIRC225 rev4 since 2004 IAEA recently published The INFCIRC 225 rev5 through the 2 years expert consultations. The publication recommended 12 nuclear security fundamentals and requirements of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facility to the member states. This paper suggests the several applications to the national physical protection system from the 12 fundamentals and the requirements

  12. The system of nuclear material control of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yeligbayeva, G.Zh.

    2001-01-01

    regulating exports and determines the mechanism for the realization of export control policy. KAEC is the main government organization for nuclear export control. KAEC's provision determines the functions, orders, and procedures to coordinate nuclear material export and import. KEAC's database on nuclear material exports and imports aids in the tracking of the transfer of nuclear materials into, out of, and through Kazakhstan. The consolidated analysis of the nuclear material accountancy and nuclear material transfer increases the level of the nuclear control system. The system of physical protection, which prevents the unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials from facilities, is another component of the state control system. The main goal of this system is the organizational activity to block the ability to steal nuclear material or to sabotage a facility through nuclear material dispersal. Now, physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities is implemented by different government organizations. They activate their physical protection programs according to their individual departmental regulations. From 1994-1998 with the financial and technical support of donor-countries, the Committee had been able to support the systems modernization of nuclear facilities. In 2000, Kazakhstan state boards had agreed upon an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between Kazakhstan and IAEA, for the application of safeguards. When the Additional Protocol procedures will be finished and signed, then mining facilities will also be under safeguards. The National Control List, similar to the European Control List, was also validated in 2000. Now, new rules considering the recommendation of the Nuclear Supplier Group for the export and import of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, dual-use equipment, materials, and technologies is now being agreed upon by the Kazakhstan state board. Thus we have the basics for a nuclear control system in Kazakhstan and now we carrying out the

  13. U.S. Department of Energy physical protection upgrades at the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center, Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haase, M.; Hine, C.; Robertson, C.

    1996-01-01

    Approximately five years ago, the Safe, Secure Dismantlement program was started between the US and countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The purpose of the program is to accelerate progress toward reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. This would be accomplished by strengthening the material protection, control, and accounting systems within the FSU countries. Under the US Department of Energy''s program of providing cooperative assistance to the FSU countries in the areas of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC and A), the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (LNRC) near Riga, Latvia, was identified as a candidate site for a cooperative MPC and A project. The LNRC is the site of a 5-megawatt IRT-C pool-type research reactor. This paper describes: the process involved, from initial contracting to project completion, for the physical protection upgrades now in place at the LNRC; the intervening activities; and a brief overview of the technical aspects of the upgrades

  14. Nuclear physics on the lattice?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koonin, S.E.

    1985-01-01

    The goal of the paper is to try to adapt lattice gauge theory to build in some biases in order for being applicable to nuclear physics. In so doing the calculations are made more precise, and the author can address questions like the size of the nucleon, the nucleon-nucleon potential, the modifications of the nucleon in the nuclear medium, etc. (Auth.)

  15. Regulation on the transport of nuclear fuel materials by vehicles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The regulations applying to the transport of nuclear fuel materials by vehicles, mentioned in the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The transport is for outside of the factories and the site of enterprises by such modes of transport as rail, trucks, etc. Covered are the following: definitions of terms, places of fuel materials handling, loading methods, limitations on mix loading with other cargo, radiation dose rates concerning the containers and the vehicles, transport indexes, signs and indications, limitations on train linkage during transport by rail, security guards, transport of empty containers, etc. together with ordinary rail cargo and so on. (Mori, K.)

  16. National report of the Slovak Republic. Compiled in terms of the convention on nuclear safety. May 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balaj, J.; Konecny, L.; Rovny, J.; Metke, E.; Zemanova, D.; Turner, M.; Pospisil, M.; Jurina, V.; Rivny, I.; Soltes, L.; Petrik, T.; Petrovic, J.; Fazekasova, H.; Kobzova, D.; Trcka, T.; Maudry, J.; Betak, A.; Capkovic, J.

    2007-05-01

    A brief national safety report of the Slovak Republic compiled in terms of the joint convention on nuclear safety in 2007 is presented. This safety report consists of following chapters: (1) Introduction; (2) Nuclear installations in the Slovak Republic in terms of the Convention; (C) Scope of application; (3) Legislation and regulation; (4) General safety aspects; (5) Safety of nuclear installations in Slovakia; (6) Annexes

  17. The role of nuclear law in nuclear safety after Fukushima; El rol del derecho nuclear en seguridad nuclear luego de Fukushima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cardozo, Diva E. Puig, E-mail: d.puig@adinet.com.uy [International Nuclear Law Association (INLA), Montevideo (Uruguay)

    2013-07-01

    The paper contains the following topics: nuclear law, origin and evolution, role of the legal instruments on nuclear safety, nuclear safety the impact of major nuclear accidents: Chernobyl and Fukushima. The response of the nuclear law post Fukushima. Safety and security. International framework for nuclear safety: nuclear convention joint convention on safety on spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. The Fukushima World Conference on Nuclear Safety. Convention on Prompt Notification and Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety. IAEA recommendations for the safety transport of radioactive material. International framework for nuclear security. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against Nuclear Terrorism. Resolution No. 1540 of the Security Council of United Nations (2004). Measures to strengthen international safety. Code of conduct on the safety research reactor.

  18. Considerations about the impact of the Convention on Nuclear Safety on the regulatory action of the CNEN in Brazilian nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camargo, Claudio; Pontedeiro, Auro

    1995-01-01

    Preliminary discussion is conducted about the impact of the terms of the Convention on Nuclear safety, adopted by Diplomatic Conference in September 1994 in the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the regulatory action of Brazilian Nuclear Regulatory Body - CNEN. Following the Convention articles structure, the paper emphasizes technical aspects of the nuclear safety standards adopted in the licensing process of Brazilian Nuclear Power Plants. The recent experience in the issuance of Angra-1 NPP Permanent Operation Authorization is used to demonstrate that current safety standards in Brazil are in compliance with the international compromises and in agreement with what is expected by the so called Safety Culture. (author). 9 refs

  19. Information report on nuclear safety and radiation protection of the SOMANU site - Issue 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Published in compliance with the French code of the environment, this report first presents different aspects of the SOMANU plant which is dedicated to the maintenance of materials and equipment from nuclear installations: location and environment, history, description of activities, regulatory framework. It describes the various measures regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection: general principles of nuclear safety, organization, presentation of the Areva's nuclear safety Charter, inspections and controls, measures regarding radiation protection. The next part addresses nuclear events which occurred on this site and had to be declared. The report gives an overview of activities and measures regarding the management of releases and the control of the environment. The next part addresses waste management: general considerations on radioactive waste management in France, description and classification of radioactive wastes present in the INB, management of conventional wastes. The management of other impacts is also reported. The last chapter reviews the actions undertaken in the field of transparency and information. Recommendations of the CHSCT are reported

  20. Information report on nuclear safety and radiation protection of the SOMANU site - Issue 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-06-01

    Published in compliance with the French code of the environment, this report first presents different aspects of the SOMANU plant which is dedicated to the maintenance of materials and equipment from nuclear installations: location and environment, history, description of activities, regulatory framework. It describes the various measures regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection: general principles of nuclear safety, organization, presentation of the Areva's nuclear safety Charter, inspections and controls, measures regarding radiation protection. The next part addresses nuclear events which occurred on this site and had to be declared. The report gives an overview of activities and measures regarding the management of releases and the control of the environment. The next part addresses waste management: generalities on radioactive waste management in France, description and classification of radioactive wastes present in the INB, management of conventional wastes. The management of other impacts is also reported. The last chapter reviews the actions undertaken in the field of transparency and information. Recommendations of the CHSCT are reported

  1. Report on the behalf of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces on the bill proposition adopted by the National Assembly, related on the strengthening of the protection of civil installations containing nuclear materials. Nr 446

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pintat, Xavier

    2015-01-01

    In its first part, this report presents the nuclear sector as a sensitive sector under strict surveillance: a sector of critical importance (safety policy with its actors and its multi-level planning, a safety arrangement for the nuclear energy sector), a regulation specific to the nuclear sector, and specialised protection forces. It also addresses the issues of intrusions and over-flights (overview of intrusions, unsuitable penal repression, and new dimension of air safety due to the development of civil uses of drones). The next part comments the content of the bill proposition, and addresses the lack of a suitable penal regime for the protection of nuclear materials and of areas regarding defence. The scope of application of the bill proposition is discussed, as well as the applicable and additional penalties. A list of hearings is provided as well as non adopted amendments and a table proposing a comparison between different versions of the text

  2. Revision of the Paris and Brussels Conventions of Nuclear Liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reyners, P.

    2002-01-01

    The Contracting Parties to the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and to the 1963 Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, have concluded this Spring four years of negotiation on the revision of these instruments. This exercise was itself started as a logical consequence of the adoption in 1997 of a revised Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and of a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The Contracting Parties have concluded that the existing regime established by these Conventions remains viable and sound but that it also warrants improvements to ensure that greater financial security will be available to compensate a potentially larger number of victims in respect of a broader range of nuclear damage. A number of more technical amendments have also been agreed, in particular to ensure compatibility with other existing Conventions in this field. When the revised Paris and Brussels Conventions come into force, the total amount of funds available for compensation, provided by the liable nuclear operator and by the States concerned, will be 1.5 billion euros. (author)

  3. Development of the system for academic training of personnel engaged in nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kryuchkov, E.F.

    2004-01-01

    educational problems in area of nuclear materials physical protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) in Russia. General scheme of Russian educational system is considered with main emphasis on the directions under implementation now, namely academic training system, re-training system and specialists qualification upgrade system in MPC and A area. Russian academic training system consists of the educational programs at various levels: Bachelor of Sciences, Master of Sciences, Specialist (also referred to as an Engineer Degree), and professional re-training of the personnel already working in the nuclear field. Currently, only the Master of Sciences Graduate Program is completely developed for the students training. This is taking place at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University, MEPhI), where the fourth generation of Masters has graduated from in May 2003. The graduates are now working at nuclear-related governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and nuclear facilities. Development of the system to produce academically trained Russian MPC and A personnel is therefore well underway. MEPhI's MPC and A Engineering Degree Program which currently under development is considered in the paper. Analysis of MPC and A needs at Russian nuclear facilities has demonstrated the Engineering Degree Program is the best way to satisfy these needs and the resulting demands for MPC and A specialists at Russian nuclear enterprises. This paper discusses specific features of the Engineering Degree training required by Russian education legislation and the Russian system of quality control as applied to the training process. The paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken during the past three years by MEPhI in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and US national laboratories to develop the MPC and A Engineering Degree Program in Russia. These actions include opening a new Engineering Degree specialty, Safeguards and Nonproliferation

  4. Physical protection as the most important part of the national system of combating illicit trafficking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivanov, P.; Kokhan, V.D.

    2001-01-01

    based on the Convention on Physical Protection, IAEA Guidelines and Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Installations as well as 'Basic Safety Standards for Ionising Radiation', practical application of which facilitates the development of a national system for combating illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and sources of radiation. These documents will assist in creating basic national legislation. An integrated approach should be provided for the improvement of the System of Physical Protection. These are main provisions of the Concept of Integration of the System of Physical Protection with the System of Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Materials. Goals: earlier detection of theft; improve accuracy of accounts, strengthen objectives and integrity of control; ensure personnel's safety; reduce dependence on human factor; speed-up detection and retrieval of stolen or lost material. The system is based on: national norms and regulations for accountancy, control and physical protection of nuclear materials and installations; existing control and management structure for nuclear materials and nuclear installations; senior officials and companies responsible for organization and quality assurance regarding work on accountancy, control and physical protection; new principles of accountancy and control; methods for supervision of working procedures, response to any abnormal event; model of life circle of nuclear materials; zone classification of nuclear materials etc. Establishment of single integrated system for accountancy, control and physical protection will undoubtedly lead to handling illicit trafficking of nuclear materials more efficiently and to eliminating unauthorized distribution of nuclear materials

  5. Using virtual reality in the training of security staff and evaluation of physical protection barriers in nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Augusto, Silas C.; Mol, Antonio C.A.; Mol, Pedro C.; Sales, Douglas S.

    2009-01-01

    The physical security of facilities containing radioactive objects, an already important matter, now has a new aggravating factor: the existence of groups intending to obtain radioactive materials for the purpose of intentionally induce radioactive contamination incidents, as for example the explosion of dirty bombs in populated regions, damaging both people and environment. In this context, the physical security of such facilities must be reinforced so to reduce the possibilities of such incidents. This paper presents a adapted game engine used as a virtual reality system, enabling the modeling and simulation of scenarios of nuclear facilities containing radioactive objects. In these scenarios, the physical protection barriers, as fences and walls, are simulated along with vigilance screens. Using a computer network, several users can participate simultaneously in the simulation, being represented by avatars. Users can play the roles of both invaders and security staff. The invaders have as objective to surpass the facility's physical protection barriers to steal radioactive objects and flee. The security staff have as objective to prevent and stop the theft of radioactive objects from the facility. The system can be used to analysis simulated scenarios and train vigilance/security staff. A test scenario was already developed and used, and the preliminary tests had satisfactory results, as they enabled the evaluation of the physical protection barriers of the virtual facility, and the training of those who participated in the simulations in the functions of a security staff. (author)

  6. Using virtual reality in the training of security staff and evaluation of physical protection barriers in nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Augusto, Silas C.; Mol, Antonio C.A.; Mol, Pedro C.; Sales, Douglas S. [Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), RJ (Brazil)], e-mail: silas@ien.gov.br, e-mail: mol@ien.gov.br, e-mail: pedro98@gmail.com, e-mail: dsales@ien.gov.br

    2009-07-01

    The physical security of facilities containing radioactive objects, an already important matter, now has a new aggravating factor: the existence of groups intending to obtain radioactive materials for the purpose of intentionally induce radioactive contamination incidents, as for example the explosion of dirty bombs in populated regions, damaging both people and environment. In this context, the physical security of such facilities must be reinforced so to reduce the possibilities of such incidents. This paper presents a adapted game engine used as a virtual reality system, enabling the modeling and simulation of scenarios of nuclear facilities containing radioactive objects. In these scenarios, the physical protection barriers, as fences and walls, are simulated along with vigilance screens. Using a computer network, several users can participate simultaneously in the simulation, being represented by avatars. Users can play the roles of both invaders and security staff. The invaders have as objective to surpass the facility's physical protection barriers to steal radioactive objects and flee. The security staff have as objective to prevent and stop the theft of radioactive objects from the facility. The system can be used to analysis simulated scenarios and train vigilance/security staff. A test scenario was already developed and used, and the preliminary tests had satisfactory results, as they enabled the evaluation of the physical protection barriers of the virtual facility, and the training of those who participated in the simulations in the functions of a security staff. (author)

  7. Raising awareness about protection and control of nuclear materials held by 'small-scale holders'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladsous, D.; Coulie, E.; Giorgio, M.

    2013-01-01

    In France, the activities carried out by the 'small-scale holders' of nuclear materials are organized by a specific regulatory system which defines in a detailed way their obligations and the means of control of the government. The first part of the article presents the legal framework relating to the use of nuclear materials by small-scale holders in civilian fields. The importance of the declaration of the nuclear material inventory is clearly emphasized and must be prepared and transmitted to the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) every year. The second part describes how this declaration is used to provide basic information for the competent Ministry and the inspectors to check the correct application of the regulatory requirements relating to physical protection and to the control of nuclear materials. Finally, the last part presents the on-site inspections carried out by sworn and accredited inspectors under the authority of the competent Authority, which provide an overall picture and allow an evaluation of the risks of theft, loss or diversion of these materials. (authors)

  8. Use of NMAC for the Evaluation of Physical Protection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoo, Ho Sik; Koh, Moon Sung; Seo, Hyoung Min; Kim, Jae San [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    At the facility level, an NMAC system can help to deter and detect the unauthorized removal of nuclear material by maintaining an accurate inventory, including information related to its location. An effective NMAC system can detect insider activities and assess any irregularity involving nuclear material. Therefore, an NMAC can be a useful tool for evaluating a physical protection system at nuclear facility. In this study, elements of an NMAC system at the facility level were identified based on a draft document prepared by the IAEA. An evaluation sheet on the NMAC system was also developed by analyzing these elements. The NMAC system has been used as an important measure in safeguards. The system is useful in detecting and preventing insiders from acquiring nuclear material. Many countries are considering adopting the NMAC system for their own nuclear security. The IAEA has also recognized the importance of the NMAC system for strengthening the nuclear security regime. The Agency is preparing to publish a document on the use of the NMAC for nuclear security as implementation guide. The NMAC system consists of several elements such as management, nuclear material control, nuclear material movement and PIT. Those elements can be used as attributes for evaluating the NMAC system at a nuclear facility. In this study, all the elements comprising the NMAC system were extracted and major elements that were seen as significant for evaluating the system were selected. In addition, questionnaires on each selected element were developed. These questionnaires reflected the underlying purpose of the NMAC system for nuclear security.

  9. The regime for nuclear materials and the competence of the Communities to conclude international agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puissochet, J.-P.

    1978-01-01

    This is a commentary of a Decision handed down on 14 November 1978 by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The Court was invited to decide whether it was necessary for the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to take part in the negociations on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Installations and Transport. In its Decision, the Court considered that the negotiations covered certain aspects within the sole competence of Euratom (in particular concerning supply). Euratom should therefore participate in the Convention on this basis. The author analyses the relevant provisions of the Euratom Treaty and expresses reservations on certain conclusions reached by the Court. (NEA) [fr

  10. Applications of nuclear physics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hayes, A. C.

    2017-02-01

    Today the applications of nuclear physics span a very broad range of topics and fields. This review discusses a number of aspects of these applications, including selected topics and concepts in nuclear reactor physics, nuclear fusion, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-geophysics, and nuclear medicine. The review begins with a historic summary of the early years in applied nuclear physics, with an emphasis on the huge developments that took place around the time of World War II, and that underlie the physics involved in designs of nuclear explosions, controlled nuclear energy, and nuclear fusion. The review then moves to focus on modern applications of these concepts, including the basic concepts and diagnostics developed for the forensics of nuclear explosions, the nuclear diagnostics at the National Ignition Facility, nuclear reactor safeguards, and the detection of nuclear material production and trafficking. The review also summarizes recent developments in nuclear geophysics and nuclear medicine. The nuclear geophysics areas discussed include geo-chronology, nuclear logging for industry, the Oklo reactor, and geo-neutrinos. The section on nuclear medicine summarizes the critical advances in nuclear imaging, including PET and SPECT imaging, targeted radionuclide therapy, and the nuclear physics of medical isotope production. Each subfield discussed requires a review article unto itself, which is not the intention of the current review; rather, the current review is intended for readers who wish to get a broad understanding of applied nuclear physics.

  11. Applications of nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayes-Sterbenz, Anna Catherine

    2017-01-01

    Today the applications of nuclear physics span a very broad range of topics and fields. This review discusses a number of aspects of these applications, including selected topics and concepts in nuclear reactor physics, nuclear fusion, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-geophysics, and nuclear medicine. The review begins with a historic summary of the early years in applied nuclear physics, with an emphasis on the huge developments that took place around the time of World War II, and that underlie the physics involved in designs of nuclear explosions, controlled nuclear energy, and nuclear fusion. The review then moves to focus on modern applications of these concepts, including the basic concepts and diagnostics developed for the forensics of nuclear explosions, the nuclear diagnostics at the National Ignition Facility, nuclear reactor safeguards, and the detection of nuclear material production and trafficking. The review also summarizes recent developments in nuclear geophysics and nuclear medicine. The nuclear geophysics areas discussed include geo-chronology, nuclear logging for industry, the Oklo reactor, and geo-neutrinos. The section on nuclear medicine summarizes the critical advances in nuclear imaging, including PET and SPECT imaging, targeted radionuclide therapy, and the nuclear physics of medical isotope production. Lastly, each subfield discussed requires a review article unto itself, which is not the intention of the current review; rather, the current review is intended for readers who wish to get a broad understanding of applied nuclear physics.

  12. The convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage (CSC). A cornerstone of a global nuclear liability regime?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pelzer, Norbert

    2015-01-01

    International discussions on compensation of nuclear damage seem to be governed by the magic word ''global nuclear liability regime''. It is said that only such regime promises to guarantee full and timely compensation at conditions acceptable and favourable for both the victims and the operator liable and at the same time promotes nuclear industry. Surely, nuclear incidents may have worldwide implications, and a globally unified legal framework appears to be desirable or is even necessitated. But until today we have not yet achieved a global regime. There are international nuclear liability conventions some of which may be qualified to form such regime. But which of them is best qualified and which one could be accepted by all States? Mainly the USA opt for, and strongly support, the 1997 ''Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage'' (CSC) to be the only international instrument which is apt to form a global regime. This paper will deal with the question whether this assertion is convincing. It will also be asked whether we need a global regime.

  13. The convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage (CSC). A cornerstone of a global nuclear liability regime?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pelzer, Norbert

    2015-06-15

    International discussions on compensation of nuclear damage seem to be governed by the magic word ''global nuclear liability regime''. It is said that only such regime promises to guarantee full and timely compensation at conditions acceptable and favourable for both the victims and the operator liable and at the same time promotes nuclear industry. Surely, nuclear incidents may have worldwide implications, and a globally unified legal framework appears to be desirable or is even necessitated. But until today we have not yet achieved a global regime. There are international nuclear liability conventions some of which may be qualified to form such regime. But which of them is best qualified and which one could be accepted by all States? Mainly the USA opt for, and strongly support, the 1997 ''Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage'' (CSC) to be the only international instrument which is apt to form a global regime. This paper will deal with the question whether this assertion is convincing. It will also be asked whether we need a global regime.

  14. The convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage and asian states: the advantages and disadvantages of Korea's adherence to the convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, K.G.

    2000-01-01

    This paper intends to make some assessments of the advantages and disadvantages which would result from Korea's ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), opened for signature on 29 September 1997 in Vienna, Austria. I have presented elsewhere a view on the creation of an Asian regional regime in the event of a transboundary nuclear accident, but here I will focus on the applicability of a global regime especially to Asian States. (author)

  15. The physical protection of radiation sources and radioactive materials in Tanzania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sungita, Y.Y.; Massalu, I.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In recognition of the legal deficiency and the awareness of radiation safety, the parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania enacted the protection from radiation act no. 5 of 1983, which established the national radiation commission (NRC) as a regulatory authority. The main objective of the act was to provide for a legal framework and guidance of the control of the use of radiation sources and radioactive materials with the view to achieve an assurance for acceptance level of radiation protection and safety standard. Due to trade liberalization that is currently experienced in the country, the increase in the number of radiation practices is observed yearly. medical diagnostic x-ray facilities constitute 72 % of all radiation installations in the country. Radioactive materials used in research, teaching and industrial application constitute 24 % and those used in therapy and nuclear medicine is 4 %. About seven radioactive materials incidents occurred in Tanzania during 1996-2000. Among these cases, some were illegal possession and across-boarder trafficking of radioactive materials. Theft and losses radioactive equipments or sources were also experienced. This presentation discusses the experienced incidents of illegal possession, theft and loss of radioactive materials and the lesson learnt from those events in connection with our operational laws. The needs for improvement of the whole system of notification, authorization, registration and licensing to cope up with increase in radiation practices and cross-border illegal trafficking of radioactive materials. The importance of involving immigration officers, police and custom officer with proper training in radiation safety aspect is emphasized. The recommendation are given in an attempt to rescue the situation. (author)

  16. The Relevance of Nuclear Physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weisskopf, V.F.

    1969-01-01

    I am asked what nuclear physics is about, that is, nuclear physics as distinct from particle physics and other parts of physics. I see three trends in this science. One is the discovery of new phenomena, phenomena of nature which we have not seen or observed, of which we did not know anything before. The second trend, I would say, is towards the solution of fundamental problems, the answers to certain basic questions in physics; I shall give some details later on. The third is the construction of new concepts in physics necessary to deal with the problems not only in nuclear physics but also in the rest of physics. The order of these three items is unimportant. This meeting should be concerned not only with the factual questions of science, but also with the, let me say, philosophic and practical questions of nuclear physics. Why do we do nuclear physics, what is the sense of it, what is the meaning of it and, most importantly, how can we defend the support of nuclear physics, how can we convince the governments to spend money on such a thing, which to a certain extent is our pleasure? And so we will have to be quite clear among ourselves that this is a very important matter

  17. The IAEA Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moser, B.

    1989-01-01

    This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of both IAEA Conventions. Special attention is paid to the rules of the Convention on Early Notification which identify the events subject to notification and the content and addresses of the information to be provided with regard to a nuclear accident, as well as to the provisions of the Convention on Assistance concerning the request and grant of international assistance with regard to a nuclear accident and the duties attributed in this field to the IAEA. The author also considers the liability questions raised by that Convention. (NEA) [fr

  18. Regulations on nuclear materials control of the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The present 'Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control of the People's Republic of China' were promulgated by the State Council on June 15, 1987, which are enacted to ensure safe and lawful use of nuclear materials, to prevent theft, sabotage, lose, unlawful diversion and unlawful use, to protect the security of the State and the Public and to facilitate the development of nuclear undertakings. The nuclear materials controlled are: 1. Uranium-235 (materials and products); 2. Uranium-233 (material and products); 3. Plutonium-239 (materials and products); 4. tritium (materials and products); 5. lithium-6 (materials and products); 6. Other nuclear materials requiring control. The present regulations are not applicable to the control of uranium ore and its primary products. The control measures for nuclear products transferred to the armed forces shall be laid down by the national defence department

  19. "International Criminalisation and Child Welfare Protection": The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child

    Science.gov (United States)

    Buck, Trevor

    2008-01-01

    The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography has two overall aims: (i) to strengthen international criminalisation and (ii) to provide welfare protection for child victims. This article reviews the context of the Protocol including the work of the Special…

  20. Circular from January 26, 2004, taken for the enforcement of the by-law from January 26, 2004, relative to the national defense secrecy protection in the domain of nuclear materials protection and control; Circulaire du 26 janvier 2004 prise pour l'application de l'arrete du 26 janvier 2004 relatif a la protection du secret de la defense nationale dans le domaine de la protection et du controle des matieres nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-01-15

    The by-law of January 26, 2004 gives a regulatory foundation to the classification of sensible informations relative to the security and physical protection of nuclear materials. This circular recalls, in this framework, the conditions of implementation of the regulation relative to the protection of national defense secrecies in the domain of the protection of nuclear facilities and materials. (J.S.)

  1. Report on SUJB results achieved in the surveillance of nuclear facilities and radiation protection for 2005. Pt. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This part of the report consists of the following chapters: (1) State Office for Nuclear Safety; (2) Nuclear safety; (3) Spent fuel, rad-waste management, decommissioning; (4) Transport of nuclear materials, physical protection; (5) Radiation protection; (6) Emergency preparedness; (7) Radiation Monitoring Network in the Czech Republic; (8) Non -proliferation, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; (9) International cooperation; (10) Science and research; (11) Free access to information; (12) Activities of institutes controlled by the State Office for Nuclear Safety. It is concluded that the operation of all Czech nuclear facilities, including the Dukovany and Temelin nuclear power plants, was safe and reliable in 2005. (P.A.)

  2. Second Meeting for Evaluation of the Nuclear Safety Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This report presents the results of the Second Meeting for Evaluation of the Nuclear Safety Convention. the CSN. as the only competent Government organism on nuclear safety, represented Spain in the preparation of the national report and at the Review Meeting, acquiring a set of obligations for the next three years, until the holding of third meeting. (Author)

  3. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the former Soviet Republics through computerized materials protection, control and accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roumiantsev, A.N.; Ostroumov, Y.A.; Whiteson, R.; Seitz, S.L.; Landry, R.P.; Martinez, B.J.; Boor, M.G.; Anderson, L.K.; Gary, S.P.

    1997-01-01

    The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem of global concern. International efforts at nonproliferation focus on preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized states, organizations, or individuals. Nonproliferation can best be accomplished through international cooperation in the application of advanced science and technology to the management and control of nuclear materials. Computerized systems for nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) are a vital component of integrated nuclear safeguards programs. This paper describes the progress of scientists in the United States and former Soviet Republics in creating customized, computerized MPC and A systems. The authors discuss implementation of the Core Material Accountability System (CoreMAS), which was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by the US Department of Energy and incorporates, in condensed and integrated form, the most valuable experience gained by US nuclear enterprises in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials. The CoreMAS approach and corresponding software package have been made available to sites internationally. CoreMAS provides methods to evaluate their existing systems and to examine advantages and disadvantages of customizing CoreMAS or improving their own existing systems. The sites can also address crucial issues of software assurance, data security, and system performance; compare operational experiences at sites with functioning computerized systems; and reasonably evaluate future efforts. The goal of the CoreMAS project is to introduce facilities at sites all over the world to modern international MPC and A practices and to help them implement effective, modern, computerized MPC and A systems to account for their nuclear materials, and thus reduce the likelihood of theft or diversion. Sites are assisted with MPC and A concepts and the implementation of an effective computerized MPC and A system

  4. Proceedings of the 13. Workshop on Nuclear Physics in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    Theoretical and experimental studies on nuclear structure, nuclear matter, scattering, nuclear reactions, radioactive decay, nuclear properties and nuclear models are presented. Studies on radiation protection, radiation detectors, spectroscopy and elementary particles area also presented. (M.C.K.)

  5. Ministerial Decree of 20 March 1979 excluding certain categories of nuclear substances from the scope of the Paris and Brussels Conventions on Nuclear Third Party Liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The purpose of this Decree is to exclude certain categories of nuclear substances from the scope of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. Its publication enables implementation at the internal level of the corresponding Decision taken by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency's Steering Committee on 27 October 1977. (NEA) [fr

  6. Evaluating the attractiveness of nuclear material for proliferation-resistance and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jor-Shan; Ikegame, Kou; Kuno, Yusuke

    2011-01-01

    The attractiveness of nuclear material, defined as a function of the isotopic composition of the nuclear material in formulas expressing the material's intrinsic properties, is of considerably debate in recent developments of proliferation-resistance measures of a nuclear energy system. A reason for such debate arises from the fact that the concept of nuclear material attractiveness can be confusing because the desirability of a material for nuclear explosive use depends on many tangible and intangible factors including the intent and capability of the adversary. In addition, a material that is unattractive to an advanced nation (in the case of proliferation) may be very attractive to a terrorist (in the case of physical protection and nuclear security). Hence, the concept of 'Nuclear Material Attractiveness' for different nuclear materials must be considered in the context of safeguards and security. The development of a ranking scheme on the attractiveness of nuclear materials could be a useful concept to start-off the strategies for safeguards and security on a new footing (i.e., why and how nuclear material is attractive, and what are the quantifiable basis). Japan may benefit from such concept regarding the attractiveness of nuclear materials when recovering nuclear materials from the damaged cores in Fukushima because safety, security, and safeguards (3S) would be a prominent consideration for the recovery operation, and it would be the first time such operation is performed in a non-nuclear weapons state. (author)

  7. Questions raised on transport of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lubinska, A.

    1984-01-01

    Public opinion is demanding safer rules for the shipment of radioactive materials since the recent collision and sinking of a French freighter carrying uranium hexafluoride. At issue is the secrecy of the cargo, the delay in releasing information to the public and salvage crews, and the use of unmarked trucks. The nuclear industry points out that no recent incidents have led to the loss of human life, but there is concern among European Community members that a number of countries have yet to ratify international conventions and agreements on hazardous materials transport, that none of these agreements are mandatory, and that none address the transfrontier movement of waste materials

  8. The nuclear liability conventions revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reyners, P.

    2004-01-01

    The signature on 12 February 2004 of the Protocols amending respectively the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention was the second step of the process of modernisation of the international nuclear liability regime after the adoption in September 1997 of a Protocol revising the 1963 Vienna Convention and of a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The common objective of the new instruments is to provide more funds to compensate a larger number of potential victims in respect of a broader range of damage. Another goal of the revision exercise was to maintain the compatibility between the Paris and Vienna based systems, a commitment enshrined in the 1988 Joint Protocol, as well as to ascertain that Paris/Brussels countries could also become a Party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. However, while generally consistent vis a vis the Joint Protocol, the provisions of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, as revised, differ on some significant aspects. Another remaining issue is whether the improved international nuclear liability regime will succeed in attracting in the future a larger number of countries, particularly outside Europe, and will so become truly universal. Therefore, the need for international co-operation to address these issues, to facilitate the adoption of new implementing legislation and to ensure that this special regime keeps abreast of economic and technological developments, is in no way diminished after the revision of the Conventions.(author)

  9. The usage of phase change materials in fire fighter protective clothing: its effect on thermal protection

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhao, Mengmeng

    2017-12-01

    The thermal protective performance of the fire fighter protective clothing is of vital importance for fire fighters. In the study fabrics treated by phase change materials (PCMs) were applied in the multi-layered fabrics of the fire fighter protective clothing ensemble. The PCM fabrics were placed at the different layers of the clothing and their thermal protective performance were measured by a TPP tester. Results show that with the application of the PCM fabrics the thermal protection of the multi-layered fabrics was greatly increased. The time to reach a second degree burn was largely reduced. The location of the PCM fabrics at the different layers did not affect much on the thermal protective performance. The higher amount of the PCM adds on, the higher thermal protection was brought. The fabrics with PCMs of a higher melting temperature could contribute to higher thermal protection.

  10. Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dougherty, D.; Fainberg, A.; Sanborn, J.; Allentuck, J.; Sun, C.

    1996-11-01

    On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed open-quotes... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.close quotes The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as open-quotes the Cutoff Conventionclose quotes) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. open-quotes Productionclose quotes would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards

  11. International physical protection standards: support for development and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soo Hoo, M.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Since 1972, the IAEA has been a recognized organization in promoting the development of international standards on the physical protection of nuclear materials. This responsibility has continued through the present in the 1999 publication of the fourth revision of INFCIRC/225, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and in being the repository for the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material which was originally published in 1980 as INFCIRC/274. The IAEA has also published other reference documents in support these two standards. With changing world events and greater concern for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, IAEA member states have increased IAEA physical protection responsibilities. Currently, the IAEA is serving as the secretariat for drafting revisions to the physical protection convention. The proposed revisions will strengthen international physical protection standards through the incorporation of physical protection fundamentals that should apply to all nuclear materials in international or domestic use, storage and transport. Furthermore, the physical protection fundamentals would also extend to include nuclear facilities. Presently, the physical protection convention applies only to nuclear materials that are in international transport. To complement efforts to develop and promote international physical protection standards, the IAEA is actively involved in assisting member states with the implementation of the standards. This is accomplished through the delivery of training courses, workshops and hosting other international forums for the exchange of information. Through review services such as the international physical protection advisory service (IPPAS), the IAEA provides advice to member states on the application of international standards at national and facility-specific levels. These services can be followed up with technical support to implement the

  12. The proceedings of the 14th national symposium on atomic physics and nuclear physics and the 7th annual meeting on modern physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    It is the proceedings of the 14th national symposium on atomic physics and nuclear physics and the 7th annual meeting on modern physics. 27 theses are collected in these proceedings. Many of them are related with nuclear physics

  13. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chinese Nuclear Society, Beijing; U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute

    2000-01-01

    The Contracting parties recognize the importance of the measures provided in the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third party liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as well as in national legislation on compensation for nuclear damage consistent with the principles of these conventions. The Contracting parties desire to establish a worldwide liability regime to supplement and enhance these measures with a view to increasing the amount of compensation for nuclear damage and encourage regional and global co-operation to promote a higher level of nuclear safety in accordance with the principle of international partnership and solidarity

  14. Annual convention 1986 of the Austrian Physical Society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    There are 152 contributions, 58 thereof of INIS interest. The subject matters are indicated by the grouping of contributions into topical sessions on 1) nuclear and particle physics 2) physics of high polymers 3) atomic and plasma physics. There is additionally a session for teachers contimation training and one page informations on the Austrian Physical Society. (G.Q.)

  15. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-05-01

    On 11 March 2011 a massive earthquake of magnitude 9 followed by a devastating tsunami hit the east coast of Japan's main island Honshu. Those natural events triggered a series of malfunctioning and equipment failures that led to the severe nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi. The consequences of the accident have been dramatic for the Japanese population and the staff involved, and had a major impact on the public opinion as well. In Switzerland in particular the government and the parliament have decided to suspend the licensing process for the new builds and committed to a nuclear phase-out. In the global nuclear community the reaction to the accident has led to the adoption of the IAEA Action Plan by all member states. Within this framework, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) advocates an effective strengthening of the global nuclear safety regime, including mandatory international review missions and enhanced transparency in reporting. The European Union (EU) initiated a so-called stress test for its member countries with nuclear power plants in which also Switzerland participates. The EU stress tests is a focused reassessment of the European nuclear facilities on their protection against extreme external events (namely earthquakes, flooding and extreme weather conditions), against the loss of safety functions (namely in the case of prolonged station blackouts and loss of ultimate heat sink) and severe accident management in general. The reassessment aims at identifying safety margins beyond design and cliff edge effects. Beside the various international efforts which Switzerland actively supported, there has been a series of national actions taken by ENSI with the goal of understanding the event sequence in Fukushima and its causes so as to draw consequences for nuclear safety in Switzerland. In fact lessons have been identified, analyses performed and concrete measures adopted. In general terms the safety of the Swiss nuclear power

  16. Standard format and content for the physical protection section of a license application (for facilities other than nuclear power plants)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-06-01

    The document presented has been prepared as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection section of license applications. It is applicable to fuel reprocessing plants, fuel manufacturing plants, SNM tranportation, or other special nuclear material operations involving the possession and use of uranium 235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium 233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula: grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). The document is not intended to be used for nuclear power plants. The information specified is the minimum needed for a license application. Additional information may be required for completion of the staff review of a particular application

  17. Insights of the periodic reviews regarding the physical protection of nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hagemann, A. [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Cologne (Germany)

    2001-07-01

    Among other prerequisites for licensing a nuclear activity, the German Atomic Energy Act stipulates that the necessary physical protection against malevolent acts has to be approved before granting a license. This is required for nuclear power plants in paragraph 7 of the Atomic Energy Act. The licenses for nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards were granted about 20 years ago and more. All NPPs are under the supervision of the Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that all conditions of the license are met during the whole plant operation period. The 'Periodic Safety Review', PSR, is designated to provide the Supervisory Authority with additional information on the safety status. One part of the PSR is the 'Deterministic Security Analysis', DSA. The subject of the DSA is the actual physical protection of a NPP. The following document outlines the experiences gained during the evaluation of DSA reports by GRS as an external expert organisation under contract of the Supervisory Authorities. (author)

  18. 37. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1996-01-01

    The following subjects were covered in this meeting: waste management; nuclear materials management -- safety and health; international safeguards; measurement control and statistics for nuclear materials management; material control and accountability; packaging and transportation; nonproliferation and arms control; and physical protection. Separate papers were prepared for 74 items of this meeting

  19. Expanding Kenya's protected areas under the Convention on Biological Diversity to maximize coverage of plant diversity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scherer, Laura; Curran, Michael; Alvarez, Miguel

    2017-04-01

    Biodiversity is highly valuable and critically threatened by anthropogenic degradation of the natural environment. In response, governments have pledged enhanced protected-area coverage, which requires scarce biological data to identify conservation priorities. To assist this effort, we mapped conservation priorities in Kenya based on maximizing alpha (species richness) and beta diversity (species turnover) of plant communities while minimizing economic costs. We used plant-cover percentages from vegetation surveys of over 2000 plots to build separate models for each type of diversity. Opportunity and management costs were based on literature data and interviews with conservation organizations. Species richness was predicted to be highest in a belt from Lake Turkana through Mount Kenya and in a belt parallel to the coast, and species turnover was predicted to be highest in western Kenya and along the coast. Our results suggest the expanding reserve network should focus on the coast and northeastern provinces of Kenya, where new biological surveys would also fill biological data gaps. Meeting the Convention on Biological Diversity target of 17% terrestrial coverage by 2020 would increase representation of Kenya's plant communities by 75%. However, this would require about 50 times more funds than Kenya has received thus far from the Global Environment Facility. © 2016 Society for Conservation Biology.

  20. 10 CFR 73.73 - Requirement for advance notice and protection of export shipments of special nuclear material of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... shipments of special nuclear material of low strategic significance. 73.73 Section 73.73 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Records and Reports § 73.73... Incident Response, using any appropriate method listed in § 73.4; (2) Assure that the notification will be...

  1. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS - Switzerland’s seventh national report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-07-01

    In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are considered safe by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and as long as they fulfil all legal and regulatory requirements in this respect. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPPs). Assessments of long-term operation have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau and Muehleberg) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for taking a NPP out of service have not yet been reached and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. In late 2013, BKW Energy Ltd announced that Muehleberg NPP will be decommissioned at the end of 2019. The plant will shut down on December 20 th , 2019.The single 373 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. It will be the first Swiss nuclear power plant to be decommissioned. The preparatory work for decommissioning is well under way. In April 2015, a follow-up mission was conducted by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in Switzerland. The Swiss government should give ENSI the ability to issue legally binding technical safety requirements and license conditions concerning nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation safety. A follow-up mission by the Operational Safety Review Team on the Muehleberg NPP was completed in June 2014. Switzerland participated in the European Stress Test and its follow-up activities. During 2014, the necessary measures to achieve continuous improvement in the supervisory culture were defined. The

  2. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety CNS - Switzerland’s seventh national report to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2016-07-15

    In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are considered safe by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and as long as they fulfil all legal and regulatory requirements in this respect. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPPs). Assessments of long-term operation have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau and Muehleberg) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for taking a NPP out of service have not yet been reached and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. In late 2013, BKW Energy Ltd announced that Muehleberg NPP will be decommissioned at the end of 2019. The plant will shut down on December 20{sup th}, 2019.The single 373 MWe boiling water reactor began operating in 1972. It will be the first Swiss nuclear power plant to be decommissioned. The preparatory work for decommissioning is well under way. In April 2015, a follow-up mission was conducted by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in Switzerland. The Swiss government should give ENSI the ability to issue legally binding technical safety requirements and license conditions concerning nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation safety. A follow-up mission by the Operational Safety Review Team on the Muehleberg NPP was completed in June 2014. Switzerland participated in the European Stress Test and its follow-up activities. During 2014, the necessary measures to achieve continuous improvement in the supervisory culture were defined

  3. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention, are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material which it may be useful to include in the national reports required by Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention

  4. Guidelines regarding national reports under the convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention, are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material which it may be useful to include in the national reports required by Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention

  5. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-15

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention, are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material which it may be useful to include in the national reports required by Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention.

  6. IPPAS guidelines. Reference document for the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The IAEA International Physical protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides advice to Member States to assist them in strengthening the effectiveness of their national physical protection system whilst recognizing the ultimate responsibility for physical protection is that of the Member State. The IPPAS is available to all countries with nuclear materials and facilities. The basic concepts, purposes and functions of physical protection are provided in INFCIR/225, 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities' as amended from time to time and 'the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIR/247/Rev.1). The guidance given in INFCIR/225 recognizes that implementation of these requirements vary from country to country depending on their existing constitutional, legal and administrative systems; the assessment of the threat for the potential theft of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities; the technical skills and professional and financial resources available to the competent authority; and social customs and cultural traditions. IPPAS missions are performance oriented in that they accept different approaches to the implementation of national physical protection system

  7. IAEA Director General welcomes landmark convention to combat nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the adoption of an International convention against nuclear terrorism. 'This is a landmark achievement which will bolster global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism,' Dr. ElBaradei said. 'It will be a key part of international efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons'. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the convention, The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, on 13 April 2005. The Convention strengthens the global legal framework to counter terrorist threats. Based on a proposal by the Russian Federation in 1998, the Convention focuses on criminal offences related to nuclear terrorism and covers a broad range of possible targets, including nuclear reactors as well as nuclear material and radioactive substances. Under its provisions, alleged offenders - for example any individual or group that unlawfully and intentionally possesses or uses radioactive material with the intent to cause harm - must be either extradited or prosecuted. States are also encouraged to cooperate with each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings. The Convention further requires that any seized nuclear or radiological material be held in accordance with IAEA safeguards, and handled in keeping with the IAEA's health, safety and physical protection standards. Dr. ElBaradei also recalled that the Agency is in the process of amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in order to broaden its scope, and in so doing, strengthen the current legal framework for securing nuclear material against illicit uses. A conference will be held from 4 to 8 July in Vienna to consider and adopt the amendments. The Convention opens for signature in September this year. Dr ElBaradei urged all States to 'sign and ratify the Convention without delay so nuclear terrorism will have no chance'. (IAEA)

  8. Systematic evaluation of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ionescu, D.S.

    2002-01-01

    protection of the NPP. Analyzing the SAVI results, the physical protection specialists from Cernavoda NPP were able to find out the most important vulnerable elements and weakest part of the NPP-PPS, and based on that analyses to build a very strong improvement program avoiding to waste resources in non-important directions. Day by day evaluation of the behavior of physical protection components diagnosing the general health of the PPS is done at Cernavoda NPP through an indoor-developed program (under Excel). The program lists the components of PPS and the relationship between them through specific equation giving as an output a set of numbers. Comparing the successive sets of numbers, the maintenance team is able to focus the effort to the most important parts of the PPS, so that the maintenance activity effectiveness is maximized. (author)

  9. Conference on Techniques of Nuclear and Conventional Analysis and Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text : With their wide scope, particularly in the areas of environment, geology, mining, industry and life sciences; analysis techniques are of great importance in research as fundamental and applied. The Conference on Techniques for Nuclear and Conventional Analysis and Applications (TANCA) are Registered in the national strategy of opening of the University and national research centers on their local, national and international levels. This conference aims to: Promoting nuclear and conventional analytical techniques; Contribute to the creation of synergy between the different players involved in these techniques include, Universities, Research Organizations, Regulatory Authorities, Economic Operators, NGOs and others; Inform and educate potential users of the performance of these techniques; Strengthen exchanges and links between researchers, industry and policy makers; Implement a program of inter-laboratory comparison between Moroccan one hand, and their foreign counterparts on the other; Contribute to the research training of doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars. Given the relevance and importance of the issues related to environment and impact on cultural heritage, this fourth edition of TANCA is devoted to the application of analytical techniques for conventional and nuclear Questions ied to environment and its impact on cultural heritage.

  10. Panorama of the nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aragones, J.M.

    1981-01-01

    A summary of the topics covered by the nuclear physics, as disciplinary basis of the nuclear engineering, is presented, including from the fundamentals of modern physics used in nuclear physics, to the methods and more important applications, with the nucleus structure as central topic of the nuclear physics. In addition to a survey of the essential historical development in the different areas, this survey summarizes the basic concepts, postulates, laws and processes, which are the starting points, as in every scientific discipline for the understanding, interpretation and prediction of the variety of nuclear phenomena observed by methods increasingly improved and more complex, although such experimental methods are not discussed. (author) [es

  11. Proceedings of the 7. Workshop on Nuclear Physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The courses, seminaries and contributions of the 7.Work Meeting on Nuclear Physics are presented. In the courses and seminaries parts, a method to solve nuclear systems, the present stage of development of heavy ions reactions at high energies, the project and experiences for accelerators, in addition to, some important topics on tokamaks are presented. In the part of contributions, the theoretical and experimental results of reactions with light and heavy ions involving high energies, the studies of nuclear phenomena and techniques for improving instruments of radiation detection are presented. (M.C.K.) [pt

  12. National report of the Slovak Republic compiled according to the terms of the convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adamovsky, V.; Betak, A.; Balaj, J.; Bystricka, S.; Grebeciova, J.; Husarcek, J.; Metke, E.; Pospisil, M.; Smrtnik, I.; Turner, M.; Uhrik, P.; Zemanova, D.; Bulla, R.; Filip, A.; Jurina, V.; Sedlak, M.; Tomek, J.; Zimermann, M.

    2013-06-01

    A brief safety report of the Slovak Republic in 2013 is presented. A account of activities carried out by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) is presented. These activities are reported under the headings: (1) Introduction; (2) Nuclear installations in Slovak Republic in terms of the convention; (3) Legislation and regulation; (4) General safety aspects; (5) Safety of nuclear installations in the Slovak Republic; ((6) Annexes; (6.1) List of nuclear installations and technical and economic indicators; (6.2) Selected generally binding legal regulations and safety guidelines in relation to nuclear and radiation safety; (6.3) List of selected national and international documents applicable to safety of nuclear installations; (6.4) Limits for radioactive discharges; (6.5) IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety; (6.6) Team of authors.

  13. Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The main purpose of this Act is to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which opened for signature at Vienne and New York on 3 March 1980. The Act extends throughout the United Kingdom. (NEA) [fr

  14. Protocols to Amend the Paris, Vienna and Brussels Supplementary Conventions and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Status of their Implementation into National Legislation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwartz, J.

    2006-01-01

    Over the last decade, a number of very significant developments have taken place in modernising the existing international nuclear liability regimes. The first major advancement was the adoption, in September 1997, of the Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (VC Protocol) and of a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). This was followed, in February 2004, by the adoption of Protocols to amend both the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (PC Protocol) and the 1963 Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention (BSC Protocol). The principle goal of all these new instruments is to provide a greater amount of compensation to a larger number of victims in respect of a broader scope of nuclear damage suffered as a result of a nuclear accident. The second, but still very important objective is the maintenance of compatibility between the revised Paris and Vienna Conventions to ensure the smooth functioning of the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (VC) and the Paris Convention (PC). In addition, the PC States wish to ensure that their newly revised Convention will not prevent a Contracting Party from joining the more global regime established by the CSC. However, it remains to be seen to what extent these new instruments will attract a sufficient number of adherents to make them truly effective. While the VC Protocol is already in force, it has not drawn wide support from the 1963 VC States or from countries with important nuclear generating capacity which have not yet joined that latter any Convention. In addition, notwithstanding its adoption almost 10 years ago, the CSC has not yet entered into force and it remains questionable whether it will ever attract the necessary number of adherents for that purpose, especially in light of its strict requirements in this regard. As for the PC and BSC Protocols to

  15. The physical protection systems at the Czech nuclear installations and the Y2K issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malach, J.; Seifert, Z.; Sedlacek, J.; Bartak, L.; Polanka, J.

    1999-01-01

    The paper describes the joint effort of the State Office for Nuclear Safety, EZ, a.s., Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany and EBIS Ltd., as a subcontractor, to solve the problem of the Y2K particularly in connection with real time operation of the integrated physical protection system at Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany. (author)

  16. Sixth national report of Brazil for the nuclear safety convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Brazil has presented periodically its National Report prepared by a group composed of representatives of the various Brazilian organizations with responsibilities related to nuclear safety. Due to the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, an Extraordinary National Report was presented in 2012. This Sixth National Report is an update of the Fifth National Report in relation to the Convention on Nuclear Safety articles and also an update of the Extraordinary Report with respect to the action taken related to lesson learned from the Fukushima accident. It includes relevant information for the period of 2010/2012. This document represents the national report prepared as a fulfillment of the brazilian obligations related to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In chapter 2 some details are given about the existing nuclear installations. Chapter 3 provides details about the legislation and regulations, including the regulatory framework and the regulatory body. Chapter 4 covers general safety considerations as described in articles 10 to 16 of the Convention. Chapter 5 addresses to the safety of the installations during siting, design, construction and operation. Chapter 6 describes planned activities to further enhance nuclear safety. Chapter 7 presents the final remarks related to the degree of compliance with the Convention obligations

  17. Sixth national report of Brazil for the nuclear safety convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-07-01

    Brazil has presented periodically its National Report prepared by a group composed of representatives of the various Brazilian organizations with responsibilities related to nuclear safety. Due to the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, an Extraordinary National Report was presented in 2012. This Sixth National Report is an update of the Fifth National Report in relation to the Convention on Nuclear Safety articles and also an update of the Extraordinary Report with respect to the action taken related to lesson learned from the Fukushima accident. It includes relevant information for the period of 2010/2012. This document represents the national report prepared as a fulfillment of the brazilian obligations related to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In chapter 2 some details are given about the existing nuclear installations. Chapter 3 provides details about the legislation and regulations, including the regulatory framework and the regulatory body. Chapter 4 covers general safety considerations as described in articles 10 to 16 of the Convention. Chapter 5 addresses to the safety of the installations during siting, design, construction and operation. Chapter 6 describes planned activities to further enhance nuclear safety. Chapter 7 presents the final remarks related to the degree of compliance with the Convention obligations.

  18. Impact of Y2K problem on physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, R.; Swadia, N.S.; Zanwar, P.S.; Mishra, G.P.; Salunke, A.S.; Nigam, R.K.

    1999-01-01

    Year 2000 related system failures/problems in Physical Protection System pose no threat to general safety and functioning of any nuclear facility. But there can be potential security threats having radiation safety and non-proliferation concern and hence should be given due importance. Reviewing and testing Physical Protection System for Y2K compliance are easier than other systems as it does not directly affect operation of the plant. The existing emergency response capability at the nuclear facilities should be utilizes effectively to mitigate any Y2K induced events on Physical Protection System with dedicated manpower and channeled efforts

  19. Results of 6th Review Meeting and Perspective of the 7th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sukho; Kim, Manwoong; You, Jeongwon; Lee, Youngeal

    2017-01-01

    This paper highlighted the objective and role of the Convention on Nuclear Safety organized by the IAEA. The Convention provides Member States to demonstrate and share how to maintain and improve the level of nuclear safety. The results of the 6 th review meeting were implemented for safety improvements and to prepare for 7 th national report. Seven and a half months before the 7 th Review Meeting, the National Report has submitted on steps and measures taken to implement Convention obligations. The Contracting Parties reviewed each other’s reports, and exchanged written questions, written answers and comments. The discussions in the Country Group sessions were generally good with a lively and frank exchange of information. The Country Groups noted the significant measures taken by Contracting Parties to improve nuclear safety and identified a number of good practices to be shared with all Contracting Parties.

  20. Standard guide for application of radiation monitors to the control and physical security of special nuclear material

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1999-01-01

    1.1 This guide briefly describes the state-of-the-art of radiation monitors for detecting special nuclear material (SNM) (see 3.1.11) in order to establish the context in which to write performance standards for the monitors. This guide extracts information from technical documentation to provide information for selecting, calibrating, testing, and operating such radiation monitors when they are used for the control and protection of SNM. This guide offers an unobtrusive means of searching pedestrians, packages, and motor vehicles for concealed SNM as one part of a nuclear material control or security plan for nuclear materials. The radiation monitors can provide an efficient, sensitive, and reliable means of detecting the theft of small quantities of SNM while maintaining a low likelihood of nuisance alarms. 1.2 Dependable operation of SNM radiation monitors rests on selecting appropriate monitors for the task, operating them in a hospitable environment, and conducting an effective program to test, calibrat...

  1. The physics of nuclear reactors

    CERN Document Server

    Marguet, Serge

    2017-01-01

    This comprehensive volume offers readers a progressive and highly detailed introduction to the complex behavior of neutrons in general, and in the context of nuclear power generation. A compendium and handbook for nuclear engineers, a source of teaching material for academic lecturers as well as a graduate text for advanced students and other non-experts wishing to enter this field, it is based on the author’s teaching and research experience and his recognized expertise in nuclear safety. After recapping a number of points in nuclear physics, placing the theoretical notions in their historical context, the book successively reveals the latest quantitative theories concerning: •   The slowing-down of neutrons in matter •   The charged particles and electromagnetic rays •   The calculation scheme, especially the simplification hypothesis •   The concept of criticality based on chain reactions •   The theory of homogeneous and heterogeneous reactors •   The problem of self-shielding �...

  2. Application of a Physical Protection to HANARO

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryu, Jeong-Soo; Park, Cheol; Cho, Yeong-Garp; Lee, Jung-Hee; Jung, Hoan-Sung

    2006-01-01

    After the fearful terror attack on September 11, 2001, in USA, international nuclear society has strengthened its physical protection system against nuclear reactors to prevent the theft of nuclear materials and its ill-intended application, and the destruction of nuclear installations and the obstruction of an operation in such facilities. In the nuclear agreements between Korea and USA or other countries, the observance of the IAEA recommendations on a physical protection for a nuclear installation and nuclear materials is clearly requested. Since IAEA recommendation on physical protection was revised more strictly, KAERI made a plan to follow the strengthened IAEA recommendation and to improve the physical protection for the HANARO and fuel fabrication building. In response to the plan for the improvement of the physical protection system, the reactor hall, control room, and fuel fabrication building was established as the boundary of a physical protection concept. Accordingly, the existing doors were recommended to be replaced with new security doors against a terror attack. Therefore, security doors reflecting the design characteristics of the HANARO have been developed to replace the existing doors, and the design, fabrication, driving and leak tight tests were carried out before an installation. For securing a safety and easy operation of the security doors, HANARO access control system (HANACS) has been developed to perform a real time communication and identification of persons for an access control

  3. Central eastern Europe approach to the security over nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smagala, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: This paper presents an overview of the national approaches to physical protection of nuclear materials in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), with an emphasis on Poland. Soviet influence in the past led to inadequate safety culture in nuclear activities and insufficient security of nuclear materials and facilities in the region. In the centralized economies all aspects of nuclear activities, including ownership of the nuclear facilities, were the responsibility of the state with no clear separation between regulating and promoting functions. During the last decade a significant progress has been made in the region to clean up the legacy of the past and to improve practices in physical protection of nuclear materials. The countries of Central Eastern Europe have had many similar deficiencies in nuclear field and problems to overcome, but cannot be viewed as a uniform block. There are local variations within the region in a size of nuclear activities, formulated respective regulations and adopted measures to secure nuclear materials and facilities. Nevertheless, all twelve nations, with nuclear reactors and without nuclear facilities, have joined the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and most of them declare that they have followed the IAEA recommendations INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 to elaborate and implement their physical protection systems of nuclear materials and facilities. The largest request for an international advisory mission (IPPAS) to review states' physical protection systems and to address needs for improvement was received from the countries of Central Eastern Europe. Poland belongs to the beneficiaries where the IPPAS mission and later follow-up consultations resulted in physical protection upgrade of the research reactor under the IAEA/US/UK technical assistance project. A powerful incentive to the progress made in a number of CEE countries was the goal of accession to the European Union. The physical protection of nuclear

  4. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  5. Act of 18 July 1966 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, establishing certain measures regarding implementation of the Paris Convention and its additional protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1966-01-01

    This Act on nuclear third party liability lays down that certain Articles (definitions, liability, scope and amounts of liability, insurance) of the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) are immediately applicable in Belgium. It stipulates that a nuclear operator is recognised as such by the King when he furnishes proof that he has taken out insurance or other financial security to cover his liability under this Act, without prejudice to implementation of legal and regulatory provisions on protection of the population against the hazards of ionizing radiations. Finally, the operator of a nuclear installation must take out and maintain, for each installation, insurance approved by the appropriate authorities; if the State itself operates a nuclear installation, it has no obligation to take out insurance or other financial security. (NEA) [fr

  6. Proceedings of the Eleventh Radiation Physics and Protection Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The proceeding contains of 404 pages, the available maertial of 35 contributions: and covering of conference topics: Plenary, Invited, Keynote Talks. Nuclear Power Plant Accident. Cosmogenic Radionuclides. Waste Storage and Disposal Solutions. Radiation Medical Physics. Radiation Detection and Measurements. Radioactive in Building Materials. Radiation Protection Regulations and public Protection. Environmental Radioactivity.

  7. Implementing Physical Protection Education for an Enhanced Nuclear Security Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jeong Ho; Kim, Hyun Chul; Shin, Ick Hyun; Lee, Hyung Kyung; Choe, Kwan Kyoo [KINAC, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    In this paper, we are going to outline our efforts and experiences at implementing physical protection education. KINAC (as the only designated educational institute) places great effort in delivering an effective and a high-quality education program for physical protection. We have also provided a way for nuclear operators to share the lessons they have gained through their own experiences. We made physical protection education an important communication channel, not only among nuclear operators but also between operators and a regulatory body. There is growing attention given to education and training on the subject of physical protection in order to enhance the nuclear security culture. The IAEA recommends that all personnel in organizations directly involved with the nuclear industry receive regularly education in physical protection according to the recently revised INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which are mainly responsible for the national nuclear security regime, have already recognized the importance of education and training in physical protection. The NSSC enacted its decree on physical protection education and training in 2010. KINAC was designated as the first educational institute in 2011 and implemented physical protection education as mandatory from 2012.

  8. Implementing Physical Protection Education for an Enhanced Nuclear Security Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jeong Ho; Kim, Hyun Chul; Shin, Ick Hyun; Lee, Hyung Kyung; Choe, Kwan Kyoo

    2013-01-01

    In this paper, we are going to outline our efforts and experiences at implementing physical protection education. KINAC (as the only designated educational institute) places great effort in delivering an effective and a high-quality education program for physical protection. We have also provided a way for nuclear operators to share the lessons they have gained through their own experiences. We made physical protection education an important communication channel, not only among nuclear operators but also between operators and a regulatory body. There is growing attention given to education and training on the subject of physical protection in order to enhance the nuclear security culture. The IAEA recommends that all personnel in organizations directly involved with the nuclear industry receive regularly education in physical protection according to the recently revised INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which are mainly responsible for the national nuclear security regime, have already recognized the importance of education and training in physical protection. The NSSC enacted its decree on physical protection education and training in 2010. KINAC was designated as the first educational institute in 2011 and implemented physical protection education as mandatory from 2012

  9. Abstracts of the fourth international conference on modern problems of nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-09-01

    The Fourth International Conference on modern problems of nuclear physics was held on 25-29 September, 2001 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The specialists discussed various aspects of modern problems of both fundamental and applied nuclear physics. More than 300 talks were presented in the meeting on the following subjects: particle physics, relativistic nuclear physics and physics of atomic nuclei; applied nuclear physics; radiation solid state physics, condensed matter physics; activation analysis, radiochemistry, isotopes. (M.K.)

  10. The Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant Sustainability Program of Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System Upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vakhonin, Alexander; Yuldashev, Rashid; Dabbs, Richard D.; Carroll, Michael F.; Garrett, Albert G.; Patrick, Scott W.; Ku, Eshter M.

    2009-01-01

    UEIP has been working on a comprehensive sustainability program that includes establishing a site sustainability working group, information gathering, planning, organizing, developing schedule and estimated costs, trhough joint UEIP-US DOE/NNSA National Laboratory sustainability contracts. Considerable efforts have been necessary in the sustainability planning, monitoring, and control of the scope of work using tools such as Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Project and SAP R/3. While information interchanges within the sustainability program provides adequate US assurances that US funds are well spent through its quarterly reporting methodology, proper information security and protection measures are taken throughout the process. Decommissioning of outdated equipment has also become part of determining sustainability requirements and processes. The site's sustainability program has facilitated the development of a transition plan toward eventual full Russian funding of sustaining nuclear security upgrades.

  11. Fifth national report of Brazil for the nuclear safety convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Fifth National Report is a new update to include relevant information for the period of 2007/2009. This document represents the national report prepared as a fulfillment of the Brazilian obligations related to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In chapter 2 some details are given about the existing nuclear installations. Chapter 3 provides details about the legislation and regulations, including the regulatory framework and the regulatory body. Chapter 4 covers general safety considerations as described in articles 10 to 16 of the Convention. Chapter 5 addresses to the safety of the installations during siting, design, construction and operation. Chapter 6 describes planned activities to further enhance nuclear safety. Chapter 7 presents the final remarks related to the degree of compliance with the Convention obligations

  12. Abstracts of the sixth international conference on modern problems of nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yuldashev, B.; Fazylov, M.; Ibragimova, E.; Salikhbaev, U.

    2006-09-01

    The Sixth International Conference on modern problems of nuclear physics was held on 19-22 September, 2006 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The specialists discussed various aspects of modern problems of both fundamental and applied nuclear physics. About 275 talks were presented in the meetingof on the following subjects: particle physics, relativistic nuclear physics and physics of atomic nuclei; radiation physics of condenced matter; nuclear applications in industry, medicine, biology and agriculture; nuclear and radiation safety, non prolifaration issues. (K.M.)

  13. Abstracts of the sixth international conference on modern problems of nuclear physics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yuldashev, B; Fazylov, M; Ibragimova, E; Salikhbaev, U [eds.

    2006-09-15

    The Sixth International Conference on modern problems of nuclear physics was held on 19-22 September, 2006 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The specialists discussed various aspects of modern problems of both fundamental and applied nuclear physics. About 275 talks were presented in the meetingof on the following subjects: particle physics, relativistic nuclear physics and physics of atomic nuclei; radiation physics of condenced matter; nuclear applications in industry, medicine, biology and agriculture; nuclear and radiation safety, non prolifaration issues. (K.M.)

  14. Current status and improvement of the nuclear physics experiment course for speciality of nuclear physics and nuclear technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qu Guopu; Guo Lanying

    1999-01-01

    The author reviews the current status of the nuclear physics experiment course for speciality of nuclear physics and nuclear technology in higher education and expresses author's views on the future improvement of the nuclear physics experiment course

  15. Nuclear. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Treaty series 1990 no.21

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The States present at this convention are aware that comprehensive measures have been are being taken to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences of any such accident should it occur. The States are convinced of the need to provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized. In the event of an accident the State involved will notify, through the International Energy Agency the other States which may be physically affected, as to the nature of the accident, the time of occurrence and its exact location

  16. Nuclear. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Treaty series 1990 no.21

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1992-12-31

    The States present at this convention are aware that comprehensive measures have been are being taken to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences of any such accident should it occur. The States are convinced of the need to provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized. In the event of an accident the State involved will notify, through the International Energy Agency the other States which may be physically affected, as to the nature of the accident, the time of occurrence and its exact location.

  17. Nuclear reactors: physics and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yadigaroglu, G

    2005-07-01

    In the form of a tutorial addressed to non-specialists, the article provides an introduction to nuclear reactor technology and more specifically to Light Water Reactors (LWR); it also shows where materials and chemistry problems are encountered in reactor technology. The basics of reactor physics are reviewed, as well as the various strategies in reactor design and the corresponding choices of materials (fuel, coolant, structural materials, etc.). A brief description of the various types of commercial power reactors follows. The design of LWRs is discussed in greater detail; the properties of light water as coolant and moderator are put in perspective. The physicochemical and metallurgical properties of the materials impose thermal limits that determine the performance and the maximum power a reactor can deliver. (author)

  18. Strengthening global norms for protecting nuclear materials - feedback on little countries radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chelidze, L.; Kakushadze, S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Georgia is the part of New Great Silk Road, connecting Europe and Asia. Along this rout will be laid oil and gas pipelines, transport and telecommunication lines. Unfortunately, besides economical communication, the rout can be used for illegal transit of nuclear materials. There is special concern regarding uncontrolled territories of conflict zones. Taking into consideration recent terrible terrorist acts we feel great responsibility for ensuring safety of this rout, which is a precondition of economical development and political stability of the whole Caucasian region A potentially hazardous radiological situation developed in Georgia with orphan radiation sources in the late 1990s and 2001: discovery of high-activity strong Radiation sources of (Strontium-90 from thermo-generators) in Tsalenjikha district. Eight such generators were brought to Georgia in 1984, and four of them have been found in Svanety mountainous region in addition to the two found in the Tsalenjikha, but remaining two are not yet found. During the last years several incidents of illicit trafficking were reported. The radiation problems greatly relate to the withdrawal of the Russian military bases. The radiological accident took place in Lilo, Georgia, when sealed radiation sources had been abandoned by a previous owner at a site. Taking into account the geopolitical location of Georgia it is quite important to strengthen the physical protection infrastructure in country with has serious territorial problems. The first step was to provide an appropriate legal framework for the safety management in the country and clearly identify regulatory body. The ministry implements state control in the nuclear and radiation safety field for protection of environment and natural resources of Georgia (hereinafter referred to as the Ministry). The Ministry is obliged to supervise the physical protection systems. The Ministry shall co-ordinate the state system of physical protection of the use

  19. Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Sanborn, J.

    1994-12-01

    Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on (1) a database of about 650 facilities a total of eight states, i.e., the five nuclear-weapons states and three ''threshold'' states; (2) typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derived from IAEA experience, where applicable; and (3) alternative estimates of inspection effort in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated. Considerable uncertainty must be attached to the effort estimates. About 50--60% of the effort for each option is attributable to 16 large-scale reprocessing plants assumed to be in operation in the eight states; it is likely that some of these will be shut down by the time the convention enters into force. Another important question involving about one third of the overall effort is whether Euratom inspections in France and the U.K. could obviate the need for full-scale IAEA inspections at these facilities. Finally, the database does not yet contain many small-scale and military-related facilities. The results are therefore not presented as predictions but as the consequences of alternative assumptions. Despite the preliminary nature of the estimates, it is clear that a broad application of NPT-like safeguards to the eight states would require dramatic increases in the IAEA's safeguards budget. It is also clear that the major component of the increased inspection effort would occur at large reprocessing plants (and associated plutonium facilities). Therefore, significantly bounding the increased effort requires a limitation on the inspection effort in these facility types

  20. On the physical interpretation of the nuclear molecular orbital energy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Charry, Jorge; Pedraza-González, Laura; Reyes, Andrés

    2017-06-07

    Recently, several groups have extended and implemented molecular orbital (MO) schemes to simultaneously obtain wave functions for electrons and selected nuclei. Many of these schemes employ an extended Hartree-Fock approach as a first step to find approximate electron-nuclear wave functions and energies. Numerous studies conducted with these extended MO methodologies have explored various effects of quantum nuclei on physical and chemical properties. However, to the best of our knowledge no physical interpretation has been assigned to the nuclear molecular orbital energy (NMOE) resulting after solving extended Hartree-Fock equations. This study confirms that the NMOE is directly related to the molecular electrostatic potential at the position of the nucleus.

  1. 45. Annual Convention of the Austrian Physical Society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This volume contains lectures of the 45 th symposium of the Austrian Physical Society which had been held in Leoben, Austria in 1995. The following topics are included: Atomic physics, molecular physics, plasma physics, solid state physics, nuclear and particle physics, biophysics, environmental physics, quantum electronics and quantum optics. (Suda)

  2. Abstracts of the third international conference on modern problems of nuclear physics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-08-01

    The Third Uzbekistan Conference on modern problems of nuclear physics was held on 23-27 August, 1999 in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. The specialists discussed various aspects of modern problems of both fundamental and applied nuclear physics. More than 300 talks were presented in the meeting on the following subjects: particle physics, relativistic nuclear physics and physics of atomic nuclei; activation analysis, radiochemistry, isotopes, applied nuclear physics; radiation solid state physics. (A.A.D.)

  3. Abstracts of the fifth international conference on modern problems of nuclear physics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-08-01

    The Fifth Uzbekistan Conference on modern problems of nuclear physics was held on 12-15 August, 2003 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The specialists discussed various aspects of modern problems of both fundamental and applied nuclear physics. More than 300 talks were presented in the meeting on the following subjects: particle physics, relativistic nuclear physics and physics of atomic nuclei; activation analysis, radiochemistry, isotopes, applied nuclear physics; radiation solid state physics.

  4. Abstracts of the fifth international conference on modern problems of nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-08-01

    The Fifth Uzbekistan Conference on modern problems of nuclear physics was held on 12-15 August, 2003 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The specialists discussed various aspects of modern problems of both fundamental and applied nuclear physics. More than 300 talks were presented in the meeting on the following subjects: particle physics, relativistic nuclear physics and physics of atomic nuclei; activation analysis, radiochemistry, isotopes, applied nuclear physics; radiation solid state physics

  5. Protocol to amend the Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. Final act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna between 8-12 September 1997 which adopted the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage

  6. Protocol to amend the Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. Final act

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-07-23

    The document reproduces the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna between 8-12 September 1997 which adopted the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage

  7. The century of nuclear materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mansur, Lou; Was, Gary S.; Zinkle, Steve; Petti, David; Ukai, Shigeharu

    2018-03-01

    In the spring of 1959 the well-read metallurgist would have noticed the first issue of an infant Journal, one dedicated to a unique and fast growing field of materials issues associated with nuclear energy systems. The periodical, Journal of Nuclear Materials (JNM), is now the leading publication in the field from which it takes its name, thriving beyond the rosiest expectations of its founders. The discipline is well into the second half-century. During that time much has been achieved in nuclear materials; the Journal provides the authoritative record of virtually all those accomplishments. These pages introduce the 500th volume, a significant measure in the world of publishing. The Editors reflect on the progress in the field and the role of this journal.

  8. Optional Protocol concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes to the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage which was adopted on 21 May 1963 by the International Conference held in Vienna from 29 April to 19 May 1963. It came into force on 13 May 1999

  9. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety - 6th national report of Switzerland to the Convention in accordance with its article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    After a short description of Switzerland as a state in the middle of Europe and of its political organization, the report explains the development of the nuclear power from the first experimental reactor in 1957. Presently five nuclear power plants (NPP) are operating in Switzerland, producing about 40% of the electricity consumption of the country, the rest being produced essentially by hydroelectric plants. As the first regulatory authority, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission was set up in 1960, which evolved to the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) which came into force at the end of 1996. Since there, Switzerland has prepared and submitted the country reports for the regular Review Meetings of Contracting Countries. This 6th report by ENSI provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. It gives consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 5th meeting and at the extraordinary meeting dedicated to the consequences of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi. Shortly after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the Swiss government has decided to phase out nuclear energy; existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are safe. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss NPPs. Such assessments have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau NPP and Muehleberg NPP) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for the taking out of service of an NPP are not and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. After the Fukushima accident, additional safety reviews were performed. All Swiss

  10. Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety - 6th national report of Switzerland to the Convention in accordance with its article 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-08-01

    After a short description of Switzerland as a state in the middle of Europe and of its political organization, the report explains the development of the nuclear power from the first experimental reactor in 1957. Presently five nuclear power plants (NPP) are operating in Switzerland, producing about 40% of the electricity consumption of the country, the rest being produced essentially by hydroelectric plants. As the first regulatory authority, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission was set up in 1960, which evolved to the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) which came into force at the end of 1996. Since there, Switzerland has prepared and submitted the country reports for the regular Review Meetings of Contracting Countries. This 6th report by ENSI provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. It gives consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 5th meeting and at the extraordinary meeting dedicated to the consequences of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi. Shortly after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the Swiss government has decided to phase out nuclear energy; existing plants will continue to operate as long as they are safe. In Switzerland, on-going activities regarding safety assessment of the different stages in the lifetime of nuclear installations consist of periodic assessments and assessments of long-term operation for existing Swiss NPPs. Such assessments have been performed for two Swiss NPPs (Beznau NPP and Muehleberg NPP) which have been in commercial operation for over 40 years. A detailed examination demonstrated that the conditions for the taking out of service of an NPP are not and will not be reached by these two plants within the next 10 years. Nevertheless, it is mandatory to continue with the scheduled ageing management, maintenance and backfitting activities. After the Fukushima accident, additional safety reviews were performed. All Swiss

  11. Accuracy increasing in the nuclear-physical analysis of mineral raw materials of heterogeneous composition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pak, Yu.; Vdovkin, A.; Pak, D.

    2002-01-01

    In the practice of the instrumental nuclear-physical analysis, because of the simple realization and very deep research, the gamma-albedo method is widely used. When realizing the gamma-albedo method the problem of macro-heterogeneity account arises. The intensity of the gamma-radiation scattered by the analyzed medium is in general case a function of material and granulometric composition. Macro-heterogeneity effect on the intensity value of scattered gamma-radiation can be considered from the two points of view. On one hand, the intensity of scattered by the heterogeneous medium gamma-radiation a function of the particle sizes and differential function of their distribution. Variations of the particle sizes non-correlated with the defined component content lead to the dispersion of the intensity value. On the other hand, the heterogeneous medium is represented by the system of randomly distributed particles of the defined component and filler and this leads to the static fluctuation of the defined component content in the studied medium. The total methodological error at the expense of macro- heterogeneity are presented as a result of the simultaneous action of the above-mentioned factors. Thus, the problem of estimation of the total error at the expense of macro heterogeneity reduces to the defining of the gamma-albedo method sensitivity to the defined component content and to the particle sizes, taking into account the analytical expression presence, which describes the scattered gamma-radiation dependence upon the material and granulometric composition of the analyzed heterogeneous object. Mathematical modeling of the total error minimization process of the gamma-albedo analysis at the expense of heterogeneity has been carried out on the basis of approximation of heterogeneous media by the set of flat and parallel layers of variable height and single gamma-radiation interaction approach. The results obtained show that for the methodical error minimization in

  12. Nuclear liability: Joint protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, 1988

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-10-01

    The Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention was adopted by the Conference on the Relationship between the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention, which met in Vienna, at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 21 September 1988. The Joint Protocol establishes a link between the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963. The Joint Protocol will extend to the States adhering to it the coverage of the two Conventions. It will also resolve potential conflicts of law, which could result from the simultaneous application of the two Conventions to the same nuclear accident. The Conference on the Relationship between the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention was jointly organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. This publication contains the text of the Final Act of the Conference in the six authentic languages, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, also in the six authentic languages and an explanatory note, prepared by the IAEA and NEA Secretariats, providing background information on the content of the Joint Protocol

  13. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-07-22

    The document reproduces the text of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage which was adopted on 12 September 1997 by a Diplomatic Conference held between 8-12 September 1997 in Vienna

  14. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage which was adopted on 12 September 1997 by a Diplomatic Conference held between 8-12 September 1997 in Vienna

  15. 10 CFR 76.111 - Physical security, material control and accounting, and protection of certain information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... significance (Category III), and for protection of Restricted Data, National Security Information, Safeguards... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Physical security, material control and accounting, and protection of certain information. 76.111 Section 76.111 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED...

  16. Department of Energy Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program at the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex, Aktau, Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Case, R.; Berry, R.B.; Eras, A.

    1998-01-01

    As part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC and A) Program, the US Department of Energy and Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex (MAEC), Aktau, Republic of Kazakstan have cooperated to enhance existing MAEC MPC and A features at the BN-350 liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor. This paper describes the methodology of the enhancement activities and provides representative examples of the MPC and A augmentation implemented at the MAEC

  17. Proceedings of the topical conference on nuclear physics, high energy physics and astrophysics (NPHEAP-2010)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vo Van Thuan; Tran Duc Thiep; Le Hong Khiem

    2011-01-01

    There were roughly 80 scientists gathering for the NPHEAP-2010 and there 61 oral talks and posters have been presented. The audience has been introduced to the status of long term nuclear power program of Vietnam up to 2030. One of the highlights for near future activity of Vietnamese nuclear sector should be the manpower training and education for this huge master plan. Most of invited and contributed papers have devoted to both basic nuclear physics at world radioactive beams and applied nuclear instrumentation. In addition to some traditional astronomical papers, there were more contributions on advanced cosmic ray physics and related nuclear astrophysics. A few of papers on high energy and particle physics jointly showed a high interest in flavor physics at LHC, KEK and J-PARC. (NHA)

  18. The Status of Development on a Web-Based Nuclear Material Accounting System at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byungdoo; Kim, Inchul; Lee, Seungho; Kim, Hyunjo

    2014-01-01

    The Integrated Safeguards (IS) has been applied to 10 nuclear facilities and 1 location outside facility (LOF) at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since July 2008. One of the major changes in the implementation of safeguards under the IS is to apply the concept of a Random Interim Inspection (RII) instead of an interim inspection. The RII plan is notified within a few hours under the IS. It is thus difficult for facility operators to prepare the inspection documents within a short time if they do not periodically manage and process the nuclear material accounting data at each facility. To resolve these issues, KAERI developed a Web-based accounting system with the function of a near real-time accounting (NRTA) system to effectively and efficiently manage the nuclear material accounting data produced at the nuclear facilities and cope with a short notice inspection under the IS, called KASIS (KAeri Safeguards Information treatment System). The facility operators must input the accounting data on the inventory changes, which are the transfers of nuclear materials among the nuclear facilities and the chemical/physical composition changes, into the KASIS. KAERI also established an RFID system for controlling and managing the transfer of nuclear material and/or radioactive materials between the nuclear facilities for the purpose of nuclear safety management, and developed the nuclear material accounting system with the functions of inventory management of nuclear material at the facility level

  19. The Status of Development on a Web-Based Nuclear Material Accounting System at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byungdoo; Kim, Inchul; Lee, Seungho; Kim, Hyunjo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The Integrated Safeguards (IS) has been applied to 10 nuclear facilities and 1 location outside facility (LOF) at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since July 2008. One of the major changes in the implementation of safeguards under the IS is to apply the concept of a Random Interim Inspection (RII) instead of an interim inspection. The RII plan is notified within a few hours under the IS. It is thus difficult for facility operators to prepare the inspection documents within a short time if they do not periodically manage and process the nuclear material accounting data at each facility. To resolve these issues, KAERI developed a Web-based accounting system with the function of a near real-time accounting (NRTA) system to effectively and efficiently manage the nuclear material accounting data produced at the nuclear facilities and cope with a short notice inspection under the IS, called KASIS (KAeri Safeguards Information treatment System). The facility operators must input the accounting data on the inventory changes, which are the transfers of nuclear materials among the nuclear facilities and the chemical/physical composition changes, into the KASIS. KAERI also established an RFID system for controlling and managing the transfer of nuclear material and/or radioactive materials between the nuclear facilities for the purpose of nuclear safety management, and developed the nuclear material accounting system with the functions of inventory management of nuclear material at the facility level.

  20. Protocol between the Nuclear Protection and Safety Bureau representing the Nuclear Authorities of Portugal and the Nuclear Energy Commission of Spain on Co-operation in Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This Protocol was signed further to the Agreement between Portugal and Spain on 14 January 1971 on co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It provides for exchange of information on the general aspects of nuclear safety and radiation protection; study of the basic characteristics of siting, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations, and experience acquired in these areas; the problematics of planning against nuclear incidents and their environmental impact; legislation, regulations and technical standards concerning nuclear installations. The Protocol entered into force for a period of five years on the day of its signature. (NEA) [fr

  1. Protection of unaccompanied minor refugees’ rights in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child

    OpenAIRE

    Berg, Christina Myrvang

    2017-01-01

    In 2015, the total number of refugees in the world reached 21.3 million. Over half of these were children. And the majority of these minors were unaccompanied, traveling alone without their family, trying to find a safer place to continue their lives. The Norwegian government is obligated to protect the rights of unaccompanied minors, (15 to 18 years old), in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The aim of this research have been to investigate how the hum...

  2. Systems Thinking Safety Analysis: Nuclear Security Assessment of Physical Protection System in Nuclear Power Plants

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tae Ho Woo

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available The dynamical assessment has been performed in the aspect of the nuclear power plants (NPPs security. The physical protection system (PPS is constructed by the cyber security evaluation tool (CSET for the nuclear security assessment. The systems thinking algorithm is used for the quantifications by the Vensim software package. There is a period of 60 years which is the life time of NPPs' operation. The maximum possibility happens as 3.59 in the 30th year. The minimum value is done as 1.26 in the 55th year. The difference is about 2.85 times. The results of the case with time delay have shown that the maximum possibility of terror or sabotage incident happens as 447.42 in the 58th year and the minimum value happens as 89.77 in the 51st year. The difference is about 4.98 times. Hence, if the sabotage happens, the worst case is that the intruder can attack the target of the nuclear material in about one and a half hours. The general NPPs are modeled in the study and controlled by the systematic procedures.

  3. Human reliability-based MC and A methods for evaluating the effectiveness of protecting nuclear material - 59379

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duran, Felicia A.; Wyss, Gregory D.

    2012-01-01

    Material control and accountability (MC and A) operations that track and account for critical assets at nuclear facilities provide a key protection approach for defeating insider adversaries. MC and A activities, from monitoring to inventory measurements, provide critical information about target materials and define security elements that are useful against insider threats. However, these activities have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the path analysis methods that are used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site's protection system. The path analysis methodology focuses on a systematic, quantitative evaluation of the physical protection component of the system for potential external threats, and often calculates the probability that the physical protection system (PPS) is effective (PE) in defeating an adversary who uses that attack pathway. In previous work, Dawson and Hester observed that many MC and A activities can be considered a type of sensor system with alarm and assessment capabilities that provide recurring opportunities for 'detecting' the status of critical items. This work has extended that characterization of MC and A activities as probabilistic sensors that are interwoven within each protection layer of the PPS. In addition, MC and A activities have similar characteristics to operator tasks performed in a nuclear power plant (NPP) in that the reliability of these activities depends significantly on human performance. Many of the procedures involve human performance in checking for anomalous conditions. Further characterization of MC and A activities as operational procedures that check the status of critical assets provides a basis for applying human reliability analysis (HRA) models and methods to determine probabilities of detection for MC and A protection elements. This paper will discuss the application of HRA methods used in nuclear power plant probabilistic risk assessments to define detection

  4. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-15

    Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). In accordance with Article 5 of CNS, Switzerland has submitted 4 country reports for Review Meetings of Contracting Parties. This 5{sup th} report by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. The report attempts to give appropriate consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 4{sup th} Review Meeting. It starts with general political information on Switzerland, a brief history of nuclear power and an overview of Swiss nuclear facilities. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the status of nuclear safety in Switzerland (as of July 2010) which indicates how Switzerland complies with the key obligations of the Convention. ENSI updated a substantial proportion of its guidelines which are harmonised with the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) based on IAEA Safety Standards. On 1{sup st} January 2009, ENSI became formally independent of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. It is now a stand-alone organisation controlled by its own management board. Switzerland recently started a process to select a site for the disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Energy Act and its ordinance came into force

  5. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-07-01

    Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). In accordance with Article 5 of CNS, Switzerland has submitted 4 country reports for Review Meetings of Contracting Parties. This 5 th report by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. The report attempts to give appropriate consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 4 th Review Meeting. It starts with general political information on Switzerland, a brief history of nuclear power and an overview of Swiss nuclear facilities. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the status of nuclear safety in Switzerland (as of July 2010) which indicates how Switzerland complies with the key obligations of the Convention. ENSI updated a substantial proportion of its guidelines which are harmonised with the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) based on IAEA Safety Standards. On 1 st January 2009, ENSI became formally independent of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. It is now a stand-alone organisation controlled by its own management board. Switzerland recently started a process to select a site for the disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Energy Act and its ordinance came into force in 2005

  6. Special national report of the Slovak Republic compiled under the convention on nuclear safety. April 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-04-01

    A Special safety report of the Slovak Republic in 2012 is presented. An account of activities carried out by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) is presented. These activities are reported under the headings: (0) Introduction; (0.1) Purpose of the report; (0.2) Brief description of the site characteristics and units; (1) Executive summary; (2) External events; (2.1) Seismic; (2.2) Flooding; (2.3) Extreme weather conditions; (3) Design issues; (3.1) Loss of electrical power; (3.2) Loss of the decay heat removal capability/ultimate heat sink; (3.3) Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink, combined with station black out (see stress tests specifications); (4) Severe accident management; (4.1) Organization and arrangements of the licensee to manage accidents; (4.2) Accident management measures in place at the various stages of a scenario of loss of the core cooling function; (4.3) Maintaining the containment integrity after occurrence of significant fuel damage (up to core meltdown) in the reactor core; (4.4) Accident management measures to restrict the radioactive releases; (5) National organizations (regulator, technical support organizations, operator, government); (5.1) Legislative and regulatory framework; (6) Emergency preparedness and response and post--accident management (off-site); (6.1) Implementation of legislation in the field of emergency preparedness; (7) International cooperation; (7.1) Conventions and communications; (7.2) Cooperation with the international organizations; (7.3) Providing feedback including occurrences at nuclear installations of other nuclear power plants abroad.

  7. Insurance considerations arising from the revision of the Paris and Brussels conventions on nuclear liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warren, G. C.

    2000-01-01

    The work being undertaken by the 14 countries, party to the 1960 Paris Convention in preparing a revised instrument will or so it is to be hoped provide a more comprehensive scope of liability and a larger compensatory fund for the protection of potential victims. Both these developments have serious implications for insurers or other providers of financial security. Equally they are of concern to society itself as it will be necessary to balance the needs of the individual for example, in obtaining redress for injury or damage to personal property with the need to provide for the ''common good''. The author's paper will attempt to explore these avenues, to point to perceived difficulties and, perhaps, to acceptable solutions. (author)

  8. Draft bill relating to the IAEA convention of September 26, 1986,