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Sample records for atomrechtlichen verfahrensverordnung atvfv

  1. Safety management in nuclear power plants as seen by a Regulatory Authority; Das Sicherheitsmanagement von Kernkraftwerken aus Sicht der atomrechtlichen Aufsichtsbehoerde

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seidel, E.R. [Bayerisches Staatsministerium fuer Umwelt, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz, Muenchen (Germany); Rauh, H.J. [TUeV Sueddeutschland Bau und Betrieb GmbH, Muenchen (Germany)

    2004-03-01

    Over the past few years, the regulatory authorities supervising the operation of German nuclear power plants on behalf of the government have been faced increasingly by problems of safety management and safety culture. So far, notifiable events have not affected the public or the environment. This is due to the fault-tolerant design of nuclear power plants and their effective supervision by government authorities. Operators and regulatory authorities share the understanding that maximum safety of plants should be ensured as a matter of priority even over economic principles. The most perfect safety management, and the high safety culture it promotes, are indispensable parts of safety philosophy. Instructions about practical measures enable the operators of nuclear power plants to elaborate quality goals for a systematically designed safety management. Continuous observation of indicators based on reference requirements (best-practice levels) puts the regulatory authorities in a position to detect systematically, though only by indirect methods, the beginnings of negative developments in the safety management of a plant. In addition, such regulatory indicators make actions by the regulatory authorities more transparent to the operator and to the public at large, thus contributing greatly to the objective assessment of the safety of nuclear power plants. (orig.) [German] In den letzten Jahren sind bei der staatlichen Aufsicht ueber den Betrieb der deutschen Kernkraftwerke Fragen des Sicherheitsmanagements und der Sicherheitskultur immer mehr in den Vordergrund gerueckt. Meldepflichtige Ereignisse haben wegen der fehlerverzeihenden Auslegung der Kernkraftwerke und ihrer effektiven staatlichen Ueberwachung bisher zu keiner Beeintraechtigung der Bevoelkerung oder der Umwelt gefuehrt. Es ist gemeinsames Verstaendnis der Betreiber und der Aufsichtsbehoerden hoechstmoegliche Sicherheit der Anlagen zu gewaehrleisten, vor jeder wirtschaftlichen Ueberlegung. Ein moeglichst perfektes Sicherheitsmanagement und die dadurch gefoerderte hohe Sicherheitskultur sind unverzichtbare Bestandteile der Sicherheitsphilosophie. Durch praktische Handlungsanweisungen koennen die Betreiber von Kernkraftwerken Qualitaetsziele fuer ein systematisch aufgebautes Sicherheitsmanagement erarbeiten. Durch die laufende Beobachtung von Indikatoren, die sich an Referenzanforderungen (Best-Practice-Werten) orientieren, kann die Aufsichtsbehoerde fruehzeitig - wenn auch nur auf indirektem Wege - negative Entwicklungen beim Sicherheitsmanagement der jeweiligen Anlage systematisch erkennen. Darueber hinaus machen derartige aufsichtliche Indikatoren das Handeln der Aufsichtsbehoerde sowohl fueden Betreiber, aber auch fuer die Oeffentlichkeit transparenter und leisten damit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur objektiven Bewertung der Sicherheit von Kenkraftwerken. (orig.)

  2. Range and limits of application of Sec.12, Atomic Energy Act, as a legal basis of the nuclear plant safety ordinance; Tragweite und Grenzen des paragraph 12 AtG als Rechtsgrundlage der Atomrechtlichen Anlagensicherheits-Verordnung

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schmidt-Preuss, Matthias [Bonn Univ. (Germany). Inst. fuer Oeffentliches Recht

    2009-03-15

    Ensuring plant safety is a key purpose of nuclear law. Sec.7 II No.3, Atomic Energy Act, is considered the basic norm of nuclear legislation. The main requirement this embodies is ensuring 'the provisions against damage arising from construction and operation of a plant as required in accordance with the state of the art'. These normative requirements constitute the strictest yardstick existing in legislation about technology. Putting it into effect has always been the purpose of the set of nuclear rules and regulations constituting the next lower level of legislation, which so far have developed by evolution and are now to be updated comprehensively in the format of so-called modules as provided for in the concept of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU). So far, there has not been a nuclear plant safety ordinance. The Atomic Energy Act has always provided a basis for adopting such an ordinance, especially so in Sec.12 I 1 No.1, Atomic Energy Act. No federal government has so far wanted to make use of it. This makes it all the more remarkable that the BMU took up the subject of a nuclear plant safety ordinance as early as in 2006, starting a dialog with the federal states. This dialog meanwhile has come to a halt. The subject seems to be dormant right now, but certainly has not been shelved. Ensuring plant safety is a key purpose of nuclear law. Sec.7 II No.3, Atomic Energy Act, is considered the basic norm of nuclear legislation. The main requirement this embodies is ensuring 'the provisions against damage arising from construction and operation of a plant as required in accordance with the state of the art'. These normative requirements constitute the strictest yardstick existing in legislation about technology. Putting it into effect has always been the purpose of the set of nuclear rules and regulations constituting the next lower level of legislation, which so far have developed by evolution and are now to be updated comprehensively in the format of so-called modules as provided for in the concept of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU). So far, there has not been a nuclear plant safety ordinance. The Atomic Energy Act has always provided a basis for adopting such an ordinance, especially so in Sec.12 I 1 No.1, Atomic Energy Act. No federal government has so far wanted to make use of it. This makes it all the more remarkable that the BMU took up the subject of a nuclear plant safety ordinance as early as in 2006, starting a dialog with the federal states. This dialog meanwhile has come to a halt. The subject seems to be dormant right now, but certainly has not been shelved. A nuclear plant safety ordinance based on the current Atomic Energy Act would be something new. Unlike other technical new regulations, it would have as its object only old plants. (orig.)

  3. Accident management measures. Demand for action as seen by the supervising authority; Massnahmen des anlageninternen Notfallschutzes - Handlungsbedarf aus behoerdlicher Sicht

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wolter, W. [Ministerium fuer Finanzen und Energie des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel (Germany)

    1994-07-01

    The various measures taken for accident management in the plant are to be classified into categories of nuclear law, as there are: prevention of hazards, prevention of risks, or non-preventive measures ( management of remaining risk). Screening the various measures for classification shows that most of them belong to the category of preventive action under the Atomic Energy Act. This means that these measures have to be addressed in KTA safety standards. (orig./HP) [Deutsch] Die rechtliche Einordnung jeder einzelnen Massnahmen des anlageninternen Notfallschutzes in eine der atomrechtlichen Kategorien Gefahrenabwehr, Risikovorsorge oder Nichtvorsorge (Restrisikomassnahme) ist erforderlich. Eine ueberschlaegige Betrachtung fuehrt zu dem Ergebnis, dass zahlreiche technische Massnahmen des anlageninternen Notfallschutzes dem atomrechtlichen Vorsorgebegriff zuzuordnen sind (Risikovorsorge). Sofern Massnahmen des anlageninternen Notfallschutzes der atomrechtlichen Vorsorge zuzuordenen sind, sind sie zwingend auch im KTA-Regelwerk zu verankern. (orig./HP)

  4. Nuclear safety assessment of nuclear power plants and nuclear risk in Eastern Europe and other regions. Scientific-technical cooperation with nuclear regulatory authorities and technical support organizations (TSOs); Einschaetzung der nuklearen Sicherheit von Kernkraftwerken sowie nuklearer Risiken in Osteuropa und anderen Regionen. Wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit mit atomrechtlichen Behoerden und deren Sachverstaendigenorganisationen (TSO)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wolff, Holger

    2014-09-15

    The BMUB/BfS project 3611I01512 formed the frame of the GRS for the scientifictechnical cooperation with Technical Support Organisations and Nuclear Regulatory Authorities in the field of nuclear safety of NPPs and for the evaluation of nuclear risks in Eastern Europe and other regions for the period from September 2011 till June 2014. In the present final report main results of the project are described. The project comprised the following technical topics: - Record status of NPP modernisation programs, Monitoring and evaluation of modernisation programs; - Design basis and severe accident analyses for NPP with PWR (WWER-440, WWER-1000); - Cooperation with INSC partner countries on DBA, BDBA and severe accident analyses for WWER plants of generation 3+ and on building NRA and safety evaluation capacities; - Decommissioning of nuclear facilities and disposal of radioactive waste; - Evaluation of new reactor concepts and their safety design; Panels at regulatory level. The work results are preceded by a summary on the activities related to the project management and to the planning of the bilateral work.

  5. Stakeholder Involvement in Germany. Appendix IX.1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stakeholder involvement which is not incorporated in the relevant legal process (Atomrechtliche Verfahrensverordnung, Nuclear Licensing Procedure Ordinance) typically manifests itself in the form of public protest. The number of participants in such protests generally varies between dozens and tens of thousands. The majority of protests are against or motivated by transport of used or spent nuclear fuel. More recently, there have also been protests against the transport of decommissioning waste. In light of these tendencies, voluntary arrangements for taking account of public opinion have been established, although these are not required by law. This additional participation partly takes place for licensing second and subsequent phases of the decommissioning process

  6. The hearing. Expectations and communication. Two selected examples are given

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The results of the hearings concerning Wyhl and Biblis C show that the basic tendencies can also be found in the analysis of the formal licensing procedure within the ATVfV - Atomrechtliche Verfahrensordnung (an order of the Atomic Energy Law concerning the licensing procedure). The corresponding explanations are formulated in an understandable manner; thus disputes about function and procedure of the hearing are theoretically not to be expected. In practice, however, it is obvious that disputes about the usefulness and purpose of the procedure itself continue to remain the topic of violent controversies during the hearing. (DG)

  7. Atomic Energy Act and ordinances. 8. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The new issue of the text contains the Atomic Energy Act (AtG) in its new wording of the announcement of 31 Oct 76, the new wording of the ordinances put in effect in 1977: Atomic procedure ordinance (AtVfV), radiation protection ordinance (SSU), and atomic financial security ordinance (AtDeckV); furthermore the x-ray ordinance (RoeV) of 1978 in its wording which has been changed by the radiation protection ordinance. Also printed are the cost ordinance (AtKostV) of 1971, the food irradiation ordinance (LebensmBestrV) in the wording of 1975 and the medicine ordinance (ArzneimV) in the wording of 1971. An addition was made by adding to the liability laws the Paris agreement (PUE) on the liability towards third persons in the field of nuclear energy in the wording of the announcement of 5 Feb 76. (orig./HP)

  8. Notifiable events in facilities for fission of nuclear fuels in the Federal Republic of Germany. Nuclear power plants and research reactors with a maximum continuous thermal output of more than 50 kW. Second quarterly report 1998; Meldepflichtige Ereignisse in Anlagen zur Spaltung von Kernbrennstoffen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kernkraftwerke und Forschungsreaktoren, deren Hoechstleistung 50 kW thermische Dauerleistung ueberschreitet. Vierteljahresbericht 2. Quartal 1998

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-12-31

    The report contains the documentation of notifiable events in the defined reactors recorded over the second quarter of 1998. The documentation is prepared according to the national notification and reporting system prescribed by the relevant law in Germany, and is filed to the national atomic energy supervisory authorities in Germany for documentation in the national record. (orig./CB) [Deutsch] Der vorliegende Bericht enthaelt die Uebersicht ueber die meldepflichtigen Ereignisse in Anlagen zur Spaltung von Kernbrennstoffen (Kernkraftwerke und Forschungsreaktoren, deren Hoechstleistuung 50 kW thermische Dauerleistung ueberschreitet) der Bundesrepublik Deutschland fuer das zweite Vierteljahr 1998. Meldepflichtige Ereignisse in Kernkraftwerken der Bundesrepublik Deutschland werden seit 1975 nach bundeseinheitlichen Meldekriterien in der jeweils gueltigen Fassung an die atomrechtlichen Aufsichtsbehoerden gemeldet und in einer zentral gefuehrten Liste erfasst. (orig.)

  9. Nuclear reactors: Notifiable events in 2002; Meldepflichtige Ereignisse 2002

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anon.

    2003-06-01

    Notifiable events in nuclear power plants in the Federal Republic of Germany are reported to the regulatory authorities under the Atomic Energy Act in accordance with standardized national reporting criteria, and are recorded centrally. The binding legal provisions covering these reports can be found in the Nuclear Safety Commissioner and Reporting Ordinance (AtSMV). On an international level, events are classified in the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) comprising eight levels. The four quarterly reports covering 2002 include 167 notifiable events for nuclear power plants in operation and in the decommissioning stage. Of these events, 157 are in reporting category N (normal), while ten are in reporting category E (urgent). No events have been reported in category S (immediate). 154 events are INES level 0, 13 events are INES level 1. 13 category-N events were reported for research reactors. All of them are INES level 0. There were no releases of radioactive material above the licensed levels for ex-vent air and liquid effluents. (orig.) [German] Meldepflichtige Ereignisse in Kernkraftwerken in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland werden gemaess bundeseinheitlichen Meldekriterien an die atomrechtlichen Aufsichtsbehoerden gemeldet und zentral erfasst. Rechtsverbindlich sind sie in der Atomrechtlichen Sicherheitsbeauftragten- und Meldeverordnung AtSMV niedergelegt. International werden Ereignisse der insgesamt acht Stufen umfassenden ''International Nuclear Event Scale'' zugeordnet. Nach den vorliegenden Quartalsberichten fuer das Jahr 2002 wurden 167 meldepflichtige Ereignisse fuer Kernkraftwerke (in Betrieb und in Stillegung) mitgeteilt. Von diesen sind 157 der Meldekategorie N (Normalmeldung) und 10 der Meldekategorie E (Eilmeldung) zugeordnet. Es sind keine Ereignisse der Kategorie S (Sofortmeldung) zu verzeichnen. Der INES-Sufe 0 sind 154, der Stufe 1 13 Ereignisse zugeordnet. Fuer Forschungsreaktoren wurden 13 Ereignisse der Kategorie N

  10. Licensing issues in the context of terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants; Genehmigungsrechtliche Fragen terroristischer Angriffe auf Kernkraftwerke

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danwitz, T. von

    2002-07-01

    The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001 has prompted enhanced nuclear risk awareness among the German population. But in the current public debate about the safety of nuclear power plants in Germany in times of new dimensions of danger, aspects such as the role of the constitutional law, the German Atomic Energy Act, and the regulatory system governing nuclear power plant licensing in the context of protection and safety have not been addressed. The author therefore discusses the German nuclear power plant licensing law and administrative regime, elaborating on the significance attributed in those bodies of law to risks like terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants. (orig./CB) [German] Das allgemeine Risiko von terroristischen Anschlaegen auf Kernkraftwerke ist durch die Ereignisse vom 11. September 2001 wieder verstaerkt in das Bewusstsein der Oeffentlichkeit getreten. Die verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen und die atomgesetzliche Einordnung der Risiken von terroristischen Angriffen auf kerntechnische Anlagen bleiben jedoch in der aktuellen Diskussion weithin ungeklaert. Der Beitrag unternimmt es daher, die verfassungs- und verwaltungsrechtliche Bedeutung der Risiken terroristischer Angriffe auf Kernkraftwerke in atomrechtlichen Genehmigungsverfahren zu untersuchen. (orig./CB)

  11. Appeal to the Constitutional Court concerning participation of the TUeV (Technical Control Board) in a hearing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The procedural provisions of the ordinance concerning the procedure for licensing nuclear installations (AtVfV) do not give the party raising a plea (Einwendung) the legal status to commence action referring to constitutional law. (Non-official headnote of a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court, BVG, 29.7.1988 - 1 BvR 1047/88). The constitutional complaint was raised against the rejection by an administrative court, of an urgent motion aiming at preventing further participation of the TUEV Bavaria as an expert, and of individual civil servants of the licensing authority, in the then current hearing concerning the licensing of the Wackersdorf reprocessing plant (2nd partial construction licence). Admissibility of the constitutional complaint by the party in question (a foreign public law entity) was considered possible without final examination, but the matter was dismissed due to lack of reasonable prospects of success, as Art. 19 para. 4, sentence 1 of the Basic Law in this case does not offer legal protection. (orig./RST)

  12. Study of basic safety-related aspects of decommissioning nuclear installations. Pt. 1. Legal aspects and set of technical rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The set of nuclear rules is checked for its applicability to the decommissioning, safe containment and dismantling of nuclear installations. In the foreground of the individual parts of the set of rules is the question about the relevance of licensing procedures according to No. 7 para. 3 of the Atomic Energy Law. The set of rules checked, basically consists of: 1. the Atomic Energy Law (AtG), the ordinances adopted on its basis (AtVfV, StrSchV, AtDeckV, AtKostV, EndlagerVIV, AtSMV) and on neighbouring laws (StrVG, BImschG, UVPG, AbfG); 2. the announcements of the BMU, BMI and BMFT: 3. the recommendations of the RSK, SSK, the rules of the KTA, the DIN standards, and 4. several international guidelines and recommendations (European Union EU, IAEA, NEA of the OECD). A generic assessment is performed, in the course of which, starting from the content or treated facts, reference to defined licensing facts and the wording, it is determined whether a specific regulation or rule is relevant or irrelevant in the licensing procedure according to No. 7 para. 3 Atomic Energy Law. In addition, a plant-related evaluation based on implemented licensing procedures is done. The expertises and licensing notifications referred to for this purpose, which represent a wide cross-section of German nuclear installations, were evaluated to find out which of the regulations and rules were explicitely applied. (orig./HP)

  13. Participation of the public in licensing procedures under the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal Emission Control Act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Section 7 of the Atomic Energy Act (AtG), section 4 of the Federal Emission Control Act (BImSchG), the Nuclear Installations Licensing Ordinance (AtVfV), and the Ninth Ordinance on the Implementation of the BImSchG (Principles of the licensing procedure) require participation of the public in the procedure before administrative provisions or decisions are issued. The book presents the legally prescribed steps at which participation of the public is mandatory, for the simple case (only one license on the agenda), and for the multi-stage licensing procedure: preliminary negotiations / filling of applications for a license and filing of documents / public announcement of projects / access to files / objections / preclusion of delayed objections / public hearing and other expert discussions / termination of procedure, decision-making by the authorities / decisions on subdivision of procedure into defined stages / modification of the procedure. The analysis of the functions of participation of the public examines the following goals: information / representation of interests / reconciliation of interests / legitimation / control / protection of rights / support. Finally, the book explains the principles of the Constitution demanding participation of the public: human dignity / democracy / rule of law / anticipated effects of the right to have recourse to the courts / civil rights. (orig./HP)

  14. Direct ultimate disposal of spent fuel. Simulation of shaft transport. Proof of state-of-the-art of a conceptual design of a shaft hoisting equipment for a max. payload of 85 t (TA 2); Direkte Endlagerung ausgedienter Brennelemente DEAB. Simulation des Schachttransportes. Uebertragbarkeit des Standes der Technik auf eine Schachtfoerderanlage bis 85 t Nutzlast (TA 2)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Filbert, W. [comp.; Kipka, P. [Siemag Transplan GmbH, Netphen (Germany); Simmich, K. [Siemag Transplan GmbH, Netphen (Germany); Weber, H. [Siemag Transplan GmbH, Netphen (Germany)

    1994-03-01

    The reported conceptual design is the first of its kind worldwide for design payloads of this dimension, intended for the POLLUX containers. In order to prove the feasibility and thus the licensibility of the hoisting engineering concept, the first project task was to establish the design of the shaft hoisting equipment. The design of the essential components and sub-systems is based on the requirements of the existing safety guides and engineering codes determining the design quantities to be selected. According to a specific catalogue of criteria developed for this purpose, nine existing German hoisting facilities were selected as reference systems. The criteria are: establishment of a database allowing verification, site variance, payloads and rope loads, rope diameters, design type, number of ropes, performance conditions. The report explains the structural members, components and processes that could be tested and verified by existing reference facilities, and those which remained to be designed and verified in the completely new approach. (orig./HP) [Deutsch] Schachtfoerderanlagen fuer solche Nutzlasten (POLLUX-Behaelter) wurden weltweit noch nicht gebaut. Um die Einsatzreife dieser Foerdertechnik und damit auch die Genehmigungsfaehigkeit in einem atomrechtlichen Verfahren nachzuweisen, wurde zunaechst eine Schachtfoerderanlage fuer diese Aufgabenstellung konzipiert. Fuer die wesentlichen Komponenten und Anlagenteile wurden Anforderungen gemaess dem konventionellen Regelwerk definiert und Auslegungsgroessen bestimmt. Aufgrund eines Kriterienkataloges wurden 9 deutsche Foerderanlagen als Referenzanlagen ausgewaehlt. Diese Kriterien waren: Ueberpruefbarkeit der Datenbasis, Standortvarianz, Nutz- und Seillasten, Seildurchmesser, Bauart, Anzahl der Seile und Einsatzbedingungen. Es wird erlaeutert, welche Anlagenteile, Komponenten und Ablaeufe untersucht wurden und mit Referenzanlagen belegt werden koennen bzw. welche Anlagenteile, Komponenten und Ablaeufe im