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Sample records for wipp final safety

  1. Preliminary safety assessment of the WIPP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balestri, R.J.; Torres, B.W.; Pahwa, S.B.; Brannen, J.P.

    1979-01-01

    This paper summarizes the efforts to perform a safety assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. This preliminary safety assessment is limited to a consequence assessment in terms of the dose to a maximally exposed individual as a result of introducing the radionuclides into the biosphere. The extremely low doses to the organs as a result of the liquid breach scenarios are contrasted with the background radiation

  2. The WIPP transportation system: Dedicated to safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.; McFadden, M.

    1993-01-01

    When developing a transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely-dispersed generator sites, the Department of Energy (DOE) recognized and addressed many challenges. Shipments of waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) were to cover a twenty-five year period and utilize routes covering over twelve thousand miles in twenty-three states. Enhancing public safety by maximizing the payload, thus reducing the number of shipments, was the primary objective. To preclude the requirement for overweight permits, the DOE started with a total shipment weight limit of 80,000 pounds and developed an integrated transportation system consisting of a Type ''B'' package to transport the material, a lightweight tractor and trailer, stringent driver requirements, and a shipment tracking system referred to as ''TRANSCOM''

  3. The legal, regulatory and safety basis for opening WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dials, G.E.

    1997-01-01

    Current laws in the United States of America direct the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to site, design, operate, and decommission a deep geological repository for safe disposal of transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. In 1993, the DOE established the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) to integrate the nation's management of TRUW and to open the WIPP site for safe disposal of TRUW in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The CAO submitted the final Compliance Certification Application (CCA) in 1996, and is on schedule to open WIPP in November 1997, about three years earlier than scheduled before the establishment of the CAO. The performance assessment (PA) embodied in the CCA demonstrates that WIPP meets the EPA's regulatory requirements for radioactive releases for the 10,000 year regulatory period in both the undisturbed and disturbed (human intrusion) scenarios. Detailed planning, compliance-based research and development (R and D), teamwork among project participants and early and open iterative interactions with the regulators, oversight groups and other interested parties in the certification/permitting process are key components of the progress in the safe disposal of long-lived radioactive wastes. (author)

  4. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum L. Mine safety code review for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-06-01

    An initial review of New Mexico and Federal mining standards and regulations has been made to determine their applicability to the WIPP conceptual design. These standards and regulations are reviewed point by point and the enclosed listing includes comments and recommendations for those which will affect the design and/or eventual operations of WIPP. The majority of the standards, both federal and state, are standard safe mining practices. Those standards are listed which are thought should be emphasized for development of the design; also those that would increase the hazard risk by strict compliance. Because the WIPP facility is different in many respects from mines for which the regulations were intended, strict compliance in some respects would provide an increased hazard, while in other instances the regulations are less strict than is desirable. These are noted in the attached review

  5. WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant]/SRL in situ tests: Part 2, Pictorial history of MIIT [Materials Interface Interactions Tests] and final MIIT matrices, assemblies, and sample listings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wicks, G.G.; Weinle, M.E.; Molecke, M.A.

    1987-01-01

    In situ testing of Savannah River Plant [SRP] waste glass is an important component in ensuring technical and public confidence in the safety and effective performance of the wasteforms. Savannah River Laboratory [SRL] is currently involved in joint programs involving field testing of SRP waste in Sweden, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Most recently, this in situ effort has been expanded to include the first field tests to be conducted in the United States, involving burial of a variety of simulated nuclear waste systems. This new effort, called the Materials Interface Interactions Tests or MIIT, is a program jointly conducted by Sandia National Laboratory/Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP] and SRL. Over 1800 samples, supplied by the United States, France, West Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, were buried approximately 650m below the earth's surface in the salt geology at WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The MIIT program is one of the largest cooperative efforts ever undertaken in the waste management field; the data produced from these tests are designed to benefit a wide cross-section of the waste management community. An earlier document provided an overview of the WIPP MIIT program and described its place in the waste glass assessment program at Savannah River. This document represents the second in this series and its objectives include: (1) providing a pictorial history of assembly and installation of wasteforms, metals, and geologic samples in WIPP; (2) providing 'finalized and completed' sample matrices for the entire 7-part MIIT program; (3) documenting final sample assemblies by the use of schematic drawings, including each sample, its orientation, and its environment; and (4) providing a complete listing of all samples and the means for managing analyses and resulting data

  6. WIPP fire hazards and risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    The purpose of this analysis was to conduct a fire hazards risk analysis of the Transuranic (TRU) contact-handled waste receipt, emplacement, and disposal activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The technical bases and safety envelope for these operations are defined in the approved WIPP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Although the safety documentation for the initial phase of the Test Program, the dry bin scale tests, has not yet been approved by the Department of Energy (DOE), reviews of the draft to date, including those by the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety (ACNFS), have concluded that the dry bin scale tests present no significant risks in excess of those estimated in the approved WIPP FSAR. It is the opinion of the authors and reviewers of this analysis, based on sound engineering judgment and knowledge of the WIPP operations, that a Fire Hazards and Risk Analysis specific to the dry bin scale test program is not warranted prior to first waste receipt. This conclusion is further supported by the risk analysis presented in this document which demonstrates the level of risk to WIPP operations posed by fire to be extremely low. 15 refs., 41 figs., 48 tabs

  7. Technical basis for external dosimetry at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradley, E.W.; Wu, C.F.; Goff, T.E.

    1993-01-01

    The WIPP External Dosimetry Program, administered by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Waste Isolation Division, for the US Department of Energy (DOE), provides external dosimetry support services for operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site. These operations include the receipt, experimentation with, storage, and disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes. This document describes the technical basis for the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program. The purposes of this document are to: (1) provide assurance that the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program is in compliance with all regulatory requirements, (2) provide assurance that the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program is derived from a sound technical base, (3) serve as a technical reference for radiation protection personnel, and (4) aid in identifying and planning for future needs. The external radiation exposure fields are those that are documented in the WIPP Final Safety Analysis Report

  8. Environmental Impact Statement: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): Executive summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-10-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the environmental impact statement for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the WIPP was published by the US Department of Energy (DOE) in April 1979. This document was reviewed and commented on by members of the general public, private organizations, and governmental agencies. The Final Environmental Impact Statement was subsequently published in October, 1980. This summary is designed to assist decision-maker and interested individuals in reviewing the material presented in the environmental impact statement for the WIPP project. To make this material widely available, this summary is published in both Spanish and English. Additional, more detailed information concerning the environmental and safety consequences of the WIPP project is available in the Final Environmental Impact Statement. Written comments and public hearing comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement are available for review. 27 refs., 4 figs., 7 tabs

  9. The WIPP journey to waste receipt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnes, G.J.; Whatley, M.E.

    1997-01-01

    In the early 1970s the federal government selected an area in southeastern New Mexico containing large underground salt beds as potentially suitable for radioactive waste disposal. An extensive site characterization program was initiated by the federal government. This site became the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, better known as WIPP. It is now 1997, over two decades after the initial selection of the New Mexico site as a potential radioactive waste repository. Numerous scientific studies, construction activities, and environmental compliance documents have been completed. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has addressed all relevant issues regarding the safety of WIPP and its ability to isolate radioactive waste from the accessible environment. Throughout the last two decades up to the present time, DOE has negotiated through a political, regulatory, and legal maze with regard to WIPP. New regulations have been issued, litigation initiated, and public involvement brought to the forefront of the DOE decision-making process. All of these factors combined to bring WIPP to its present status--at the final stages of working through the licensing requirements for receipt of transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal. Throughout its history, the DOE has stayed true to Congress' mandates regarding WIPP. Steps taken have been necessary to demonstrate to Congress, the State of New Mexico, and the public in general, that the nation's first radioactive waste repository will be safe and environmentally sound. DOE's compliance demonstrations are presently under consideration by the cognizant regulatory agencies and DOE is closer than ever to waste receipt. This paper explores the DOE's journey towards implementing a permanent disposal solution for defense-related TRU waste, including major Congressional mandates and other factors that contributed to program changes regarding the WIPP project

  10. Proposed waste isolation pilot project (WIPP) and impacts in the state of New Mexico: a socio-economic analysis. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummings, R.D.; Burness, H.S.; Norton, R.D.

    1981-04-01

    This document is a final report for research conducted concerning the socio-economic impacts in the State of New Mexico that might attend the construction and operation of the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The proposed site for the WIPP, known as the Los Medanos site, is in Southeastern New Mexico's Eddy County, some 25 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico and some 40 miles from Hobbs, New Mexico, in adjacent Lea County. The purpose as set out in the US Department of Energy's environmental impact statements is for storage of TRU waste from the US defense program and the construction of a research and development area for experiments concerning the isolation of all types of nuclear waste in salt. The intended purpose of the study is to identify, measure (when possible) and assess the range of potential socio-economic impacts in the State that may be attributable to the WIPP. Every effort has been made by the authors to approach this task in an objective manner. In efforts to provide an objective analysis of the WIPP, however, particular attention was required in providing a comprehensive review of potential impacts. This means that however unlikely an impact might seem, the authors have purposely avoided pre-judging the potential magnitude of the impact and have applied their best efforts to measure it. On the other hnd, this study is not intended to provide a definitive calculation regarding the net balance of WIPP-related benefits and costs. To help ensure objectivity, two advisory boards, Technical Advisory Board and Public Advisory Board, were formed at the outset of the project for the purpose of providing periodic reviews of research efforts

  11. National Safety Council Final Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norris, Karen; Shannon, Tom

    2005-01-01

    In December 1995, the National Safety Council (NSC) entered into Cooperative Agreement No.DE-FC02-96EW 12729 with the US Department of Energy (DOE) to work together over the next few years on safety and health initiatives surrounding the management of radioactive materials. As a result, three publications, including print and non-print deliverables, were developed and distributed: (1) Series of Backgrounders, Web Services for WIPP; (2) A Guide to Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel; and (3) A Guide to the US Department of Energy's Low-Level Radioactive Waste. DOE and its predecessor agencies have maintained a record of safe transportation of radioactive materials for more than 50 years. Thousands of shipments involving three million packages of radioactive materials are shipped each year in the United States. Historically, DOE shipments constitute less than one percent of the total radioactive material shipments; however, they comprise a significant portion (approaching 75 percent) of the curies, or amounts of radioactivity shipped annually. DOE operations and field offices are responsible for detailed planning and for ensuring full regulatory compliance for their shipments. Packaging is designed to protect workers and limit the risk to the public during transportation. DOE headquarters and program offices provide policy direction and oversight for packaging and transportation activities for their respective offices. The publications NSC produced under the agreement also included primary points of contact for external audiences, including the press, the public, and stakeholders who would not have access to DOE regulations, manuals, and practices

  12. Technical issues for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, T.O.

    1979-01-01

    Emplacement of wastes in the WIPP will include experiments on various waste types which will provide essential data on waste-rock interaction and repository response. These experiments will include evolution of the synergistic effects of both heat production, radiation, and actual waste forms. While these studies will provide essential data on the validity of waste isolation in bedded salt, they will be preceded by a broad-based experimental program which will resolve many of the current technical issues providing not only an assessment of the safety of performing such experiments but also the technical basis for assurance that the appropriate experiments are performed. Data and predictive modeling techniques, which are currently available, can bound the consequences associated with these technical issues. Predictions of the impact on public safety based on these analyses indicate that safe waste disposal in WIPP salt beds is achievable; however, a major use of WIPP will be to conduct realistic experiments with HLW forms to address some of the unresolved details of these waste/salt interactions

  13. WIPP and the local communities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krenz, D.L.; Sankey, C.A.

    1986-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is located 26 miles southeast of Carlsbad, New Mexico in southeastern New Mexico. Other neighboring communities include Lovington, Hobbs and Loving, New Mexico. In March 1983, the Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV) phase of the project was completed. Full scale facility construction began in July of that year. Overall site construction is scheduled to be complete in December 1986. Construction completion will be followed by pre-operational and safety check-out in 1987, prior to receiving the first nuclear waste which is targeted for receipt on or after October 1988. WIPP has had a significant impact on the local communities. Many local people have been hired by the Department of Energy (DOE), Westinghouse Electric, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contractors, as well as associated sub-contractors. As of December 31, 1985, 64% of the 643 people working at WIPP were hired from an 80-mile or less radius of the WIPP site. The majority of local residents support WIPP. As declining potash and mining industries negatively impacted the economic condition of Southeastern New Mexico, WIPP brought jobs and new business opportunities to the area

  14. WIPP startup: Overcoming unprecedented challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, Arlen E.

    1992-01-01

    Since its authorization by the U.S. Congress in Public Law 96-164, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Program has achieved significant progress. Subsequent to a Record of Decision based on the October 1980 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), the scientific and engineering challenge of constructing a 100-acre mined repository to demonstrate the safe and environmentally sound disposal of defense program generated transuranic waste became reality. Since initial conception, however, a complex program has evolved. Demonstration of compliance with the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal Standards defined in 10 CFR 191, Subpart B (yet to be repromulgated), became prerequisites to a disposal decision. On June 13, 1990, based on a supplement to the 1980 FEIS, the decision was made to redefine the program to include a formal test phase. This decision required an addendum to the Final Safety Analysis Report to assure commitment to safety considerations, an intensive operational readiness review effort, and the need for a No-Migration Determination for the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition to meeting the technical challenges, the need to satisfy a broad spectrum of oversight groups (some directly funded by the Department of Energy) was required. With the decision making process publicly displayed on the Secretary of Energy's Decision Plan, the unprecedented challenges of the WIPP Program were painstakingly met, one by one, in an accountable and visible manner. (author)

  15. WIPP 2004 Site Environmental Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The mission of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to safely and permanently dispose of transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste generated by the production of nuclear weapons and other activities related to the national defense of the United States (U.S.). In 2004, 8,839 cubic meters (m3) of TRU waste were emplaced at WIPP. From the first receipt of waste in March 1999 through the end of 2004, 25,809 m3 of TRU waste had been emplaced at WIPP. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) are dedicated to maintaining high quality management of WIPP environmental resources. DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program; DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, require that the environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and the environment. This Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report (SER) summarizes environmental data from 2004 that characterize environmental management performance and demonstrate compliance with applicable federal and state regulations. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, and Guidance for the Preparation of DOE Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs) for Calendar Year 2004 (DOE, 2005). The order and the guidance require that DOE facilities submit an annual SER to the DOE Headquarters Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) further requires that the SER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

  16. WIPP 2004 Site Environmental Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2005-09-30

    The mission of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to safely and permanently dispose of transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste generated by the production of nuclear weapons and other activities related to the national defense of the United States (U.S.). In 2004, 8,839 cubic meters (m3) of TRU waste were emplaced at WIPP. From the first receipt of waste in March 1999 through the end of 2004, 25,809 m3 of TRU waste had been emplaced at WIPP. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) are dedicated to maintaining high quality management of WIPP environmental resources. DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program; DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, require that the environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and the environment. This Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report (SER) summarizes environmental data from 2004 that characterize environmental management performance and demonstrate compliance with applicable federal and state regulations. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, and Guidance for the Preparation of DOE Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs) for Calendar Year 2004 (DOE, 2005). The order and the guidance require that DOE facilities submit an annual SER to the DOE Headquarters Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) further requires that the SER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

  17. Use of Performance Assessment in Support of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Programmatic Activity Planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BASABILVAZO, GEORGE; JOW, HONG-NIAN; LARSON, KURT W.; MARIETTA, MELVIN G.

    1999-01-01

    demonstrate the importance of ongoing scientific and engineering activities associated with the WIPP project. Finally, it provided objective documentation of the decision-making process for issues with an impact on safety at the WIPP, a critical topic for the general public and the regulatory agencies

  18. Actinide Solubility and Speciation in the WIPP [PowerPoint

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reed, Donald T. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-11-02

    The presentation begins with the role and need for nuclear repositories (overall concept, international updates (Sweden, Finland, France, China), US approach and current status), then moves on to the WIPP TRU repository concept (design, current status--safety incidents of February 5 and 14, 2014, path forward), and finally considers the WIPP safety case: dissolved actinide concentrations (overall approach, oxidation state distribution and redox control, solubility of actinides, colloidal contribution and microbial effects). The following conclusions are set forth: (1) International programs are moving forward, but at a very slow and somewhat sporadic pace. (2) In the United States, the Salt repository concept, from the perspective of the long-term safety case, remains a viable option for nuclear waste management despite the current operational issues/concerns. (3) Current model/PA prediction (WIPP example) are built on redundant conservatisms. These conservatisms are being addressed in the ongoing and future research to fill existing data gaps--redox control of plutonium by Fe(0, II), thorium (analog) solubility studies in simulated brine, contribution of intrinsic and biocolloids to the mobile concentration, and clarification of microbial ecology and effects.

  19. Actinide Solubility and Speciation in the WIPP [PowerPoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, Donald T.

    2015-01-01

    The presentation begins with the role and need for nuclear repositories (overall concept, international updates (Sweden, Finland, France, China), US approach and current status), then moves on to the WIPP TRU repository concept (design, current status--safety incidents of February 5 and 14, 2014, path forward), and finally considers the WIPP safety case: dissolved actinide concentrations (overall approach, oxidation state distribution and redox control, solubility of actinides, colloidal contribution and microbial effects). The following conclusions are set forth: (1) International programs are moving forward, but at a very slow and somewhat sporadic pace. (2) In the United States, the Salt repository concept, from the perspective of the long-term safety case, remains a viable option for nuclear waste management despite the current operational issues/concerns. (3) Current model/PA prediction (WIPP example) are built on redundant conservatisms. These conservatisms are being addressed in the ongoing and future research to fill existing data gaps--redox control of plutonium by Fe(0, II), thorium (analog) solubility studies in simulated brine, contribution of intrinsic and biocolloids to the mobile concentration, and clarification of microbial ecology and effects.

  20. WIPP radiation dosimetry program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, C.F.

    1991-01-01

    Radiation dosimetry is the process by which various measurement results and procedures are applied to quantify the radiation exposure of an individual. Accurate and precise determination of radiation dose is a key factor to the success of a radiation protection program. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a Department of Energy (DOE) facility designed for permanent repository of transuranic wastes in a 2000-foot-thick salt bed 2150 feet underground, has established a dosimetry program developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 5480.11, ''Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers''; ANSI/ASME NQA-1, ''Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities''; DOE Order 5484.1, ''Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Information Reporting Requirements''; and other applicable regulations

  1. WIPP Pecos Management Reports

    Science.gov (United States)

    These reviews and evaluations compiled by Pecos Management Services, Inc. encompass the current and future WIPP activities in the program areas of TRU waste characterization, transportation, and disposal.

  2. Geotechnical Perspectives on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Francke, Chris T.; Hansen, Frank D.; Knowles, M. Kathyn; Patchet, Stanley J.; Rempe, Norbert T.

    1999-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the first nuclear waste repository certified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Success in regulatory compliance resulted from an excellent natural setting for such a repository, a facility with multiple, redundant safety systems, and from a rigorous, transparent scientific and technical evaluation. The WIPP story, which has evolved over the past 25 years, has generated a library of publications and analyses. Details of the multifaceted program are contained in the cited references. Selected geotechnical highlights prove the eminent suitability of the WIPP to serve its congressionally mandated purpose

  3. Convention on nuclear safety. Final act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Diplomatic Conference, which was convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency at its Headquarters from 14 to 17 June 1994, adopted the Convention on Nuclear Safety reproduced in document INFCIRC/449 and the Final Act of the Conference. The text of the Final Act of the Conference, including an annexed document entitled ''Some clarification with respect to procedural and financial arrangements, national reports, and the conduct of review meetings, envisaged in the Convention on Nuclear Safety'', is reproduced in the Attachment hereto for the information of all Member States

  4. WIPP documentation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Plung, D.L.; Montgomery, T.T.; Glasstetter, S.R.

    1986-01-01

    In support of the programs at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the Publications and Procedures Section developed a documentation plan that provides an integrated document hierarchy; further, this plan affords several unique features: 1) the format for procedures minimizes the writing responsibilities of the technical staff and maximizes use of the writing and editing staff; 2) review cycles have been structured to expedite the processing of documents; and 3) the numbers of documents needed to support the program have been appreciably reduced

  5. Potential problems from shipment of high-curie content contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste to WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.; Channell, J.K.

    1983-08-01

    There are about 1000 drums of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) wastes containing more than 100 Ci/drum of Pu-238 that are stored at the Savannah River Plant and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Studies performed at DOE laboratories have shown that large quantities of gases are generated in stored drums containing 100 Ci of 238 Pu. Concentrations of hydrogen gas in the void space of the drums are often found to be high enough to be explosive. None of the analyses in the DOE WIPP Final Environmental Impact Statement, Safety Analysis Report, and Preliminary Transportation Analysis have considered the possibility that the generation of hydrogen gas by radiolysis may create an explosive or flammable hazard that could increase the frequency and severity of accidental releases of radionuclides during transportation or handling. These high 238 Pu concentration containers would also increase the estimated doses received by individuals and populations from transportation, WIPP site operations, and human intrusion scenarios even if the possibility of gas-enhanced releases is ignored. The WIPP Project Office has evaluated this effect on WIPP site operations and is suggesting a maximum limit of 140 239 Pu equivalent curies (P-Ci) per drum so that postulated accidental off-site doses will not be larger than those listed in the FEIS. The TRUPACT container, which is being designed for the transportation of CH-TRU wastes to WIPP, does not appear to meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations requiring double containment for the transportation of plutonium in quantities >20 Ci. A 20 alpha Ci/shipment limit would require about 200,000 shipments for the 4 million curies of alpha emitters slated for WIPP

  6. WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] test phase plan: Performance assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing the disposition of transuranic (TRU) wastes resulting from nuclear weapons production activities of the United States. These wastes are currently stored nationwide at several of the DOE's waste generating/storage sites. The goal is to eliminate interim waste storage and achieve environmentally and institutionally acceptable permanent disposal of these TRU wastes. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico is being considered as a disposal facility for these TRU wastes. This document describes the first of the following two major programs planned for the Test Phase of WIPP: Performance Assessment -- determination of the long-term performance of the WIPP disposal system in accordance with the requirements of the EPA Standard; and Operations Demonstration -- evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the DOE TRU waste management system's ability to emplace design throughput quantities of TRU waste in the WIPP underground facility. 120 refs., 19 figs., 8 tabs

  7. WIPP operations planning: an overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miskimin, P.A.; Cossel, S.C.; Plung, D.L.

    1985-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the first-of-a-kind facility for emplacement of radioactive waste in a geologic repository. The concern for safe and efficient operations - coupled with the domestic and international significance of this project - necessitates that WIPP be a ''model plant.'' To develop WIPP as a model plant, a unique planning methodology was employed to identify, evaluate, incorporate, and implement these elements that together will form the best possible overall operation. The resulting improvements in communication among project participants and the smooth transition being made from construction are equally attributable to the methodology employed and the operating program plan developed. 1 fig

  8. Sandia WIPP calibration traceability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schuhen, M.D. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Dean, T.A. [RE/SPEC, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    This report summarizes the work performed to establish calibration traceability for the instrumentation used by Sandia National Laboratories at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) during testing from 1980-1985. Identifying the calibration traceability is an important part of establishing a pedigree for the data and is part of the qualification of existing data. In general, the requirement states that the calibration of Measuring and Test equipment must have a valid relationship to nationally recognized standards or the basis for the calibration must be documented. Sandia recognized that just establishing calibration traceability would not necessarily mean that all QA requirements were met during the certification of test instrumentation. To address this concern, the assessment was expanded to include various activities.

  9. Sandia WIPP calibration traceability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schuhen, M.D.; Dean, T.A.

    1996-05-01

    This report summarizes the work performed to establish calibration traceability for the instrumentation used by Sandia National Laboratories at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) during testing from 1980-1985. Identifying the calibration traceability is an important part of establishing a pedigree for the data and is part of the qualification of existing data. In general, the requirement states that the calibration of Measuring and Test equipment must have a valid relationship to nationally recognized standards or the basis for the calibration must be documented. Sandia recognized that just establishing calibration traceability would not necessarily mean that all QA requirements were met during the certification of test instrumentation. To address this concern, the assessment was expanded to include various activities

  10. WIPP Status and Plans - 2013 - 13379

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nelson, R.A.; Franco, J. [U.S. Department of Energy, PO Box 3090, Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    An up-to-date look at the many aspects of America's only deep geologic long-lived radioactive waste repository is presented in this paper. WIPP's mission includes coordination of all Department of Energy (DOE) sites to prepare, package and characterize defense transuranic waste for final shipment and emplacement in WIPP. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is completing its 14. year of operations. Five of the ten planned disposal panels have been filled and sealed from ventilation, with about half of the legislated volume capacity consumed. About 11,000 shipments have been made successfully, traveling more than 40 million kilometers across the nation's highways. A fleet of new Type B shipping packages, the TRUPACT-III, has been added to the transportation capability, with an ongoing campaign to de-inventory large waste items from the Savannah River Site, while minimizing size reduction and repackaging. A new shipping and emplacement method for remote handled waste in shielded containers has been approved for disposal, and will significantly improve operational efficiency. Remote handled waste packaged in these shielded containers will be shipped, handled and emplaced as contact handled waste. Also described is a new criticality control over-pack container, which will improve efficiency when shipping high fissile-content waste streams consisting of Special Nuclear Material declared as waste from nuclear weapons sites. The paper describes the importance of the infrastructure at WIPP to ensure disposal site availability for defense transuranic waste sites across the weapons complex. With the facility reaching its original design lifetime, there are many infrastructure maintenance and improvements being planned and performed. (authors)

  11. WIPP Project Records Management Handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Records Management Handbook provides the WIPP Project Records Management personnel with a tool to use to fulfill the requirements of the WIPP Records Program and direct their actions in the important area of records management. The handbook describes the various project areas involved in records management, and how they function. The handbook provides the requirements for Record Coordinators and Master Record Center (MRC) personnel to follow in the normal course of file management, records scheduling, records turnover, records disposition, and records retrieval. More importantly, the handbook provides a single reference which encompasses the procedures set fourth in DOE Order 1324.2A, ''Records Disposition'' ASME NQA-1, ''Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities'' and DOE-AL 5700.6B, ''General Operations Quality Assurance.'' These documents dictate how an efficient system of records management will be achieved on the WIPP Project

  12. Manpower analysis in transportation safety. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bauer, C.S.; Bowden, H.M.; Colford, C.A.; DeFilipps, P.J.; Dennis, J.D.; Ehlert, A.K.; Popkin, H.A.; Schrader, G.F.; Smith, Q.N.

    1977-05-01

    The project described provides a manpower review of national, state and local needs for safety skills, and projects future manning levels for transportation safety personnel in both the public and private sectors. Survey information revealed that there are currently approximately 121,000 persons employed directly in transportation safety occupations within the air carrier, highway and traffic safety, motor carrier, pipeline, rail carrier, and marine carrier transportation industry groups. The projected need for 1980 is over 145,000 of which over 80 percent will be in highway safety. An analysis of transportation tasks is included, and shows ten general categories about which the majority of safety activities are focused. A skills analysis shows a generally high level of educational background and several years of experience are required for most transportation safety jobs. An overall review of safety programs in the transportation industry is included, together with chapters on the individual transportation modes.

  13. 2002 WIPP Environmental Monitoring Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2002-09-30

    DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program, requires each DOE | facility to prepare an environmental management plan (EMP). This document is | prepared for WIPP in accordance with the guidance contained in DOE Order 5400.1; DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment; applicable sections of Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance (DOE/EH-0173T; DOE, 1991); and the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 834, ''Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment'' (draft). Many sections of DOE Order 5400.1 have been replaced by DOE Order 231.1, which is the driver for the annual Site Environmental Report (SER) and the guidance source for preparing many environmental program documents. The WIPP Project is operated by Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) for the DOE. This plan defines the extent and scope of WIPP's effluent and environmental | monitoring programs during the facility's operational life and also discusses WIPP's quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) program as it relates to environmental monitoring. In addition, this plan provides a comprehensive description of environmental activities at WIPP including: A summary of environmental programs, including the status of environmental monitoring activities A description of the WIPP Project and its mission A description of the local environment, including demographics An overview of the methodology used to assess radiological consequences to the public, including brief discussions of potential exposure pathways, routine and accidental releases, and their consequences Responses to the requirements described in the Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance.

  14. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) integrated project management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olona, D.; Sala, D.

    1993-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a research and development project of the Department of Energy (DOE), tasked with the mission of demonstrating the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) radioactive wastes. This unique project was authorized by Congress in 1979 in response to the national need for long-term, safe methods for disposing of radioactive by-products from our national defense programs. The WIPP was originally established in December of 1979, by Public Law 96-164, DOE National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980. Since the inception of the WIPP Project, work has continued to prepare the facility to receive TRU wastes. Studies continue to be conducted to demonstrate the safety of the WIPP facility in accordance with federal and state laws, state agreements, environmental regulations, and DOE Orders. The objectives of implementing an integrated project management system are to assure compliance with all regulatory and federal regulations, identify areas of concern, provide justification for funding, provide a management tool for control of program workscope, and establish a project baseline from which accountability and performance will be assessed. Program management and project controls are essential for the success of the WIPP Project. The WIPP has developed an integrated project management system to establish the process for the control of the program which has an expected total dollar value of $2B over the ten-year period from 1990-2000. The implementation of this project management system was motivated by the regulatory requirements of the project, the highly public environment in which the project takes place, limited funding and resources, and the dynamic nature of the project. Specific areas to be addressed in this paper include strategic planning, project organization, planning and scheduling, fiscal planning, and project monitoring and reporting

  15. Status and Growth of Underground Science at WIPP

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rempe, Norbert T.

    2008-10-01

    The science community is increasingly taking advantage of research opportunities in the government-owned Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 655m underground near Carlsbad, NM. Discoveries so far include viable bacteria, cellulose, and DNA in 250 million-year old salt, preserved in an ultra-low background-radiation setting. Supplementing the overburden's shielding against cosmic radiation, terrestrial background from the host formation is less than five percent that of average crustal rock. In the past, WIPP accommodated development and testing of neutral current detectors for the Sudbury Neutrino Observatory and dark matter research, and it currently hosts two experiments pursuing neutrino-less double-beta decay. That scientists can listen to whispers from the universe in proximity to megacuries of radioactive waste lends, of course, credibility to the argument that WIPP itself is very safe. Almost a century of regional petroleum and potash extraction history and more than three decades of WIPP studies have generated a comprehensive body of knowledge on geology, mining technology, rock mechanics, geochemistry, and other disciplines relevant to underground science. Existing infrastructure is being used and can be expanded to fit experimental needs. WIPP's exemplary safety and regulatory compliance culture, low excavating and operating cost, and the high probability of the repository operating at least another 40 years make its available underground space attractive for future research and development. Recent proposals include low-photon energy counting to study internal dose received decades ago, investigations into ultra-low radiation dose response in cell cultures and laboratory animals (e.g., hormesis vs. linear no-threshold) and detectors for dark matter, solar and supernova neutrinos, and proton decay. Additional proposals compatible with WIPP's primary mission are welcome.

  16. Site evaluation for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, L.R.

    1979-01-01

    Preliminary site selection activities for the WIPP are complete now; these consisted primarily of national and regional studies over the past fifteen years, and resulted in selection of the WIPP study area for geological characterization. The work of geological characterization should be considered to have begun with the drilling of ERDA 9 at the center of the WIPP study area and the initiation of seismic reflection work on the site. That geological characterization, which is primarily oriented to provide specific data concerning the present geology of the site, was virtually complete in December, 1978, when the Geological Characterization Report was submitted to the Department of Energy; much basic information has been gathered indicating no major technical problems with the site as it is now understood. Studies of long-term processes which might affect a repository or have an effect on safety analyses will now be the major geotechnical activity for the WIPP site evaluation team, some of these activities are already underway. These studies will deal with the age of significant features and the rates and processes which produce those features. The information so gained will be useful in increasing the confidence in evaluation of the safety of a repository

  17. WIPP facility representative program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This plan describes the Department of Energy (DOE), Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) facility representative (FR) program at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It provides the following information: (1) FR and support organization authorities and responsibilities; (2) FR program requirements; and (3) FR training and qualification requirements

  18. Strategies for reactor safety. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, K

    1997-12-01

    The NKS/RAK-1 project formed part of a four-year nuclear research program (1994-1997) in the Nordic countries, the NKS Programme. The project aims were to investigate and evaluate the safety work, to increase realism and reliability of the safety analysis, and to give ideas for how safety can be improved in selected areas. An evaluation of the safety work in nuclear installations in Finland and Sweden was made, and a special effort was devoted to plant modernisation and to see how modern safety standards can be met up with. A combination of more resources and higher efficiency is recommended to meet requirements from plant modernisation and plant renovations. Both the utilities and the safety authorities are recommended to actively follow the evolving safety standards for new reactors. Various approaches to estimating LOCA frequencies have been explored. In particular, a probabilistic model for pipe ruptures due to intergranular stress corrosion has been developed. A survey has been done over methodologies for integrated sequence analysis (ISA), and different approaches have been developed and tested on four sequences. Structured frameworks for integration between PSA and behavioural sciences have been developed, which e.g. have improved PSA. The status of maintenance strategies in Finland and Sweden has been studied and a new maintenance data information system has been developed. (au) 41 refs.

  19. Strategies for reactor safety. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, K.

    1997-12-01

    The NKS/RAK-1 project formed part of a four-year nuclear research program (1994-1997) in the Nordic countries, the NKS Programme. The project aims were to investigate and evaluate the safety work, to increase realism and reliability of the safety analysis, and to give ideas for how safety can be improved in selected areas. An evaluation of the safety work in nuclear installations in Finland and Sweden was made, and a special effort was devoted to plant modernisation and to see how modern safety standards can be met up with. A combination of more resources and higher efficiency is recommended to meet requirements from plant modernisation and plant renovations. Both the utilities and the safety authorities are recommended to actively follow the evolving safety standards for new reactors. Various approaches to estimating LOCA frequencies have been explored. In particular, a probabilistic model for pipe ruptures due to intergranular stress corrosion has been developed. A survey has been done over methodologies for integrated sequence analysis (ISA), and different approaches have been developed and tested on four sequences. Structured frameworks for integration between PSA and behavioural sciences have been developed, which e.g. have improved PSA. The status of maintenance strategies in Finland and Sweden has been studied and a new maintenance data information system has been developed. (au)

  20. Chapter 8: Final thought on safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2018-04-01

    The chapter presents the objective of implementing and maintaining a good safety system: to prevent the occurrence of accidents and incidents (the abnormalities must be the exception) and if they occur their consequences should be mitigated. And make other considerations.

  1. Safety culture in design. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Macchi, L.; Pietikaeinen, E.; Liinasuo, M.; Savioja, P.; Reiman, T.; Wahlstroem, M.; Kahlbom, U.; Rollenhagen, C.

    2013-04-01

    In this report we approach design from a safety culture approach As this research area is new and understudied, we take a wide scope on the issue. Different theoretical perspectives that can be taken when improving safety of the design process are considered in this report. We suggest that in the design context the concept of safety culture should be expanded from an organizational level to the level of the network of organizations involved in the design activity. The implication of approaching the design process from a safety culture perspective are discussed and the results of the empirical part of the research are presented. In the interview study in Finland and Sweden we identified challenges and opportunities in the design process from safety culture perspective. Also, a small part of the interview study concentrated on state of the art human factors engineering (HFE) practices in Finland and the results relating to that are presented. This report provide a basis for future development of systematic good design practices and for providing guidelines that can lead to safe and robust technical solutions. (Author)

  2. Safety culture in design. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Macchi, L.; Pietikaeinen, E.; Liinasuo, M.; Savioja, P.; Reiman, T.; Wahlstroem, M. [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo (Finland); Kahlbom, U. [Risk Pilot AB, Stockholm (Sweden); Rollenhagen, C. [Vattenfall, Stockholm, (Sweden)

    2013-04-15

    In this report we approach design from a safety culture approach As this research area is new and understudied, we take a wide scope on the issue. Different theoretical perspectives that can be taken when improving safety of the design process are considered in this report. We suggest that in the design context the concept of safety culture should be expanded from an organizational level to the level of the network of organizations involved in the design activity. The implication of approaching the design process from a safety culture perspective are discussed and the results of the empirical part of the research are presented. In the interview study in Finland and Sweden we identified challenges and opportunities in the design process from safety culture perspective. Also, a small part of the interview study concentrated on state of the art human factors engineering (HFE) practices in Finland and the results relating to that are presented. This report provide a basis for future development of systematic good design practices and for providing guidelines that can lead to safe and robust technical solutions. (Author)

  3. Safety in the final disposal of radioactive waste. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Broden, K.; Carugati, S.; Brodersen, K. [and others

    1997-12-01

    During 1994-1997 a project on the disposal of radioactive waste was carried out as part of the NKS program. The objective of the project was to give authorities and waste producers in the Nordic countries background material for determinations about the management and disposal of radioactive waste. The project NKS/AFA-1 was divided into three sub-projects: AFA-1.1, AFA-1.2 and AFA-1.3. AFA-1.1 dealt with waste characterisation, AFA-1.2 dealt with performance assessment for repositories and AFA-1.3 dealt with Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The studies mainly focused on the management of long-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste from research, hospitals and industry. The AFA-1.1 study included an overview on waste categories in the Nordic countries and methods to determine or estimate the waste content. The results from the AFA-1.2 study include a short overview of different waste management systems existing and planned in the Nordic countries. However, the main emphasis of the study was a general discussion of methodologies developed and employed for performance assessments of waste repositories. Some of the phenomena and interactions relevant for generic types of repository were discussed as well. Among the different approaches for the development of scenarios for safety and performance assessments one particular method, the Rock Engineering System (RES), was chosen to be tested by demonstration. The possible interactions and their safety significance were discussed, employing a simplified and generic Nordic repository system as the reference system. New regulations for the inventory of a repository may demand new assessments of old radioactive waste packages. The existing documentation of a waste package is then the primary information source although additional measurements may be necessary. (EG) 33 refs.

  4. Safety in the final disposal of radioactive waste. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broden, K.; Carugati, S.; Brodersen, K.

    1997-12-01

    During 1994-1997 a project on the disposal of radioactive waste was carried out as part of the NKS program. The objective of the project was to give authorities and waste producers in the Nordic countries background material for determinations about the management and disposal of radioactive waste. The project NKS/AFA-1 was divided into three sub-projects: AFA-1.1, AFA-1.2 and AFA-1.3. AFA-1.1 dealt with waste characterisation, AFA-1.2 dealt with performance assessment for repositories and AFA-1.3 dealt with Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The studies mainly focused on the management of long-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste from research, hospitals and industry. The AFA-1.1 study included an overview on waste categories in the Nordic countries and methods to determine or estimate the waste content. The results from the AFA-1.2 study include a short overview of different waste management systems existing and planned in the Nordic countries. However, the main emphasis of the study was a general discussion of methodologies developed and employed for performance assessments of waste repositories. Some of the phenomena and interactions relevant for generic types of repository were discussed as well. Among the different approaches for the development of scenarios for safety and performance assessments one particular method, the Rock Engineering System (RES), was chosen to be tested by demonstration. The possible interactions and their safety significance were discussed, employing a simplified and generic Nordic repository system as the reference system. New regulations for the inventory of a repository may demand new assessments of old radioactive waste packages. The existing documentation of a waste package is then the primary information source although additional measurements may be necessary. (EG)

  5. Alcator C-MOD final safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiore, C.L.

    1989-06-01

    This document is designed to address the safety issues involved with the Alcator C-Mod project. This report will begin with a brief description of the experimental objectives which will be followed by information concerning the site. The Alcator C-Mod experiment is a pulsed fusion experiment in which a plasma formed from small amounts of hydrogen or deuterium gas is confined in a magnetic field for short periods (∼1 s). No radioactive fuels or fissile materials are used in the device, so that no criticality hazard exists and no credible nuclear accident can occur. During deuterium operation, the production of a small number of neutrons from a short pulse could result in a small amount of short- and intermediate-lived radioactive isotopes being produced inside the experimental cell. This report will demonstrate that this does not pose an additional hazard to the general population. The health and safety hazards resulting from Alcator C-Mod occur to the workers on the experiment, each of which is described in its own chapter with the steps taken to minimize the risk to employees. These hazards include fire, chemicals and cryogenics, air quality, electrical, electromagnetic radiation, ionizing radiation, and mechanical and natural phenomena. None of these hazards is unique to the facility, and methods of protection from them are well defined and are discussed in the chapter which describes each hazard. The quality assurance program, critical to ensuring the safety aspects of the program, will also be described

  6. WIPP: why are we waiting?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barker, K.

    1991-01-01

    Rooms cut into salt almost half a mile below the state of New Mexico could become the United States' first underground repository for defence generated transuranic waste. The Department of Energy (DoE) was hoping to ship the first waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) this August, but the $800 million project has faced bureaucratic delays and a definite date has yet to be set. The state of New Mexico established the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) to perform an independent technical evaluation of the project with respect to potential radiation exposure for people or environmental degradation in the area around the WIPP site. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has two objectives: to perform scientific investigations into the behaviour of salt rock and its interactions with transuranic and mixed waste under a variety of conditions; and to demonstrate that transuranic waste can be safely handled, transported and stored in a geologic repository. The EEG is unhappy about proposed in-repository tests to assess the long term performance of WIPP. (author)

  7. Rankine bottoming cycle safety analysis. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lewandowski, G.A.

    1980-02-01

    Vector Engineering Inc. conducted a safety and hazards analysis of three Rankine Bottoming Cycle Systems in public utility applications: a Thermo Electron system using Fluorinal-85 (a mixture of 85 mole % trifluoroethanol and 15 mole % water) as the working fluid; a Sundstrand system using toluene as the working fluid; and a Mechanical Technology system using steam and Freon-II as the working fluids. The properties of the working fluids considered are flammability, toxicity, and degradation, and the risks to both plant workers and the community at large are analyzed.

  8. Environmental management assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Carlsbad, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    This document contains the results of the Environmental Management Assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This Assessment was conducted by EH-24 from July 19 through July 30, 1993 to advise the Secretary of Energy of the adequacy of management systems established at WIPP to ensure the protection of the environment and compliance with Federal, state, and DOE environmental requirements. The mission of WIPP is to demonstrate the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. During this assessment, activities and records were reviewed and interviews were conducted with personnel from the management and operating contractors. This assessment revealed that WIPP's environmental safety and health programs are satisfactory, and that all levels of the Waste Isolation Division (WID) management and staff consistently exhibit a high level of commitment to achieve environmental excellence

  9. Hawaii State Plan for Occupational Safety and Health. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-09-21

    This document announces the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) decision to modify the Hawaii State Plan's ``final approval'' determination under Section 18(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act) and to transition to ``initial approval'' status. OSHA is reinstating concurrent federal enforcement authority over occupational safety and health issues in the private sector, which have been solely covered by the Hawaii State Plan since 1984.

  10. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions'' (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.'' This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment

  11. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions`` (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.`` This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment.

  12. Performance assessment in support of compliance certification application for the WIPP project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jow, H.N.; Anderson, D.R.; Marietta, M.; Helton, J.; Basabilvazo, G.

    1998-03-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is being developed by the US Department of Energy for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. A Compliance Certification Application (CCA) of the WIPP (1) for such disposal was submitted to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in October, 1996, and is currently under review, with a decision anticipated in late 1997. An important component of the CCA is a performance assessment (PA) for the WIPP carried out by Sandia National Laboratories. The final outcome of the PA is a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) for radionuclide releases from the WIPP to the accessible environment and an assessment of the confidence with which this CCDF can be estimated. This paper describes the computational process used to develop the CCDF. The results of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis are also presented

  13. HVAC fault tree analysis for WIPP integrated risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirby, P.; Iacovino, J.

    1990-01-01

    In order to evaluate the public health risk from operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) due to potential radioactive releases, a probabilistic risk assessment of waste handling operations was conducted. One major aspect of this risk assessment involved fault tree analysis of the plant heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, which comprise the final barrier between waste handling operations and the environment. 1 refs., 1 tab

  14. The WIPP transportation system -- ''Safer than any other''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.R.; Spooner, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an integrated transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely dispersed generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The system consists of a Type B container, a specially designed trailer, a lightweight tractor, the DOE TRANSCOM satellite-based vehicle tracking system, and uniquely qualified and highly trained drivers. The DOE has demonstrated that this system is ready to transport the TRU waste to the WIPP site efficiently and safely. Since the system was put in place in November 1988, it has been repeatedly upgraded and enhanced to incorporate additional safety measures. In June of 1989, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reviewed the transportation system and concluded that ''the system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels'' (emphasis added). The NAS conclusion was made before the DOE implemented the Enhanced Driver Training Course for carrier drivers. The challenge facing the DOE was to examine the transportation system objectively and determine what additional improvements could be made to further enhance safety

  15. Weatherization Innovation Pilot Program (WIPP): Technical Assistance Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hollander, A.

    2014-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Weatherization and Intergovernmental Programs Office (WIPO) launched the Weatherization Innovation Pilot Program (WIPP) to accelerate innovations in whole-house weatherization and advance DOE's goal of increasing the energy efficiency and health and safety of low-income residences without the utilization of additional taxpayer funding. Sixteen WIPP grantees were awarded a total of $30 million in Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) funds in September 2010. These projects focused on: including nontraditional partners in weatherization service delivery; leveraging significant non-federal funding; and improving the effectiveness of low-income weatherization through the use of new materials, technologies, behavior-change models, and processes.

  16. Successes and Experiences of the WIPP Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chu, Margaret S.Y.; Weart, Wendell D.

    2000-01-01

    In May 1998, the US Environmental Agency (EPA) certified the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as being in compliance with all of the applicable regulations governing the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic radioactive waste. The WIPP, a transuranic waste repository, is the first deep geologic repository in the US to have successfully demonstrated regulatory compliance with long-term radioactive waste disposal regulations and be certified to receive wastes. Many lessons were learned throughout the 25-year history of the WIPP--from site selection to the ultimate successful certification. The experiences and lessons learned from the WIPP may be of general interest to other repository programs in the world. The lessons learned include all facets of a repository program: programmatic, managerial, regulatory, technical, and social. This paper addresses critical issues that arose during the 25 years of WIPP history and how they influenced the program

  17. A probabilistic analysis of a catastrophic transuranic waste hoist accident at the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenfield, M.A.; Sargent, T.J.; Stanford Univ., CA

    1993-06-01

    This report builds upon the extensive and careful analyses made by the DOE of the probability of failure of the waste hoist, and more particularly on the probability of failure of a major component, the hydraulic brake system. The extensive fault tree analysis prepared by the DOE was the starting point of the present report. A key element of this work is the use of probability distributions rather than so-called point estimates to describe the probability of failure of an element. One of the authors (MAG) developed the expressions for the probability of failure of the brake system. The second author (TJS) executed the calculations of the final expressions for failure probabilities. The authors hope that this work will be of use to the DOE in its evaluation of the safety of the waste hoist, a key element at the WIPP

  18. Comparative study of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) transportation alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    WIPP transportation studies in the Final Supplement Environmental Impact Statement for WIPP are the baseline for this report. In an attempt to present the most current analysis, this study incorporates the most relevant data available. The following three transportation options are evaluated for the Disposal Phase, which is assumed to be 20 years: Truck shipments, consisting of a tractor and trailer, with three TRUPACT-IIs or one RH-72B; Regular commercial train shipments consisting of up to three railcars carrying up to 18 TRUPACT-IIs or up to six RH-72Bs; Dedicated train shipments consisting of a locomotive, an idle car, railcars carrying 18 TRUPACT-IIs or six RH-72Bs, another idle car, and a caboose or passenger car with an emergency response specialist. No other cargo is carried. This report includes: A consideration of occupational and public risks and exposures, and other environmental impacts; A consideration of emergency response capabilities; and An extimation of comparative costs

  19. Comparative study of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) transportation alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-02-01

    WIPP transportation studies in the Final Supplement Environmental Impact Statement for WIPP are the baseline for this report. In an attempt to present the most current analysis, this study incorporates the most relevant data available. The following three transportation options are evaluated for the Disposal Phase, which is assumed to be 20 years: Truck shipments, consisting of a tractor and trailer, with three TRUPACT-IIs or one RH-72B; Regular commercial train shipments consisting of up to three railcars carrying up to 18 TRUPACT-IIs or up to six RH-72Bs; Dedicated train shipments consisting of a locomotive, an idle car, railcars carrying 18 TRUPACT-IIs or six RH-72Bs, another idle car, and a caboose or passenger car with an emergency response specialist. No other cargo is carried. This report includes: A consideration of occupational and public risks and exposures, and other environmental impacts; A consideration of emergency response capabilities; and An extimation of comparative costs.

  20. Recent developments in the conceptual geologic and hydrologic understanding of the WIPP site, Southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lappin, A.R.

    1987-01-01

    Hydrologic and geochemical characterization of the WIPP site has progressed significantly since the 1980 WIPP Final Environmental Impact Statement. In 1980, the entire Rustler Formation was modeled as a single hydrologic unit, assumed to be isotropic, single-porosity, and completely confined. Variability within the Rustler was evaluated only on the basis of testing at individual wells. In the 1983 WIPP Site and Preliminary Design Validation effort, the Salado Formation, in which the WIPP facility is being constructed, was assumed to be anhydrous, except for fluid inclusions and mineralogically bound water. Recent hydrologic and tracer testing at the WIPP indicates: 1) The local importance of dual-porosity behavior in hydraulic response and transport in parts of the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation; 2) the presence of distinct high- and low-transmissivity regions within the Culebra; and 3) the possible importance of vertical fluid flow within the Rustler. Recent analyses indicate that fluids encountered in the WIPP facility and in experimental brine-migration studies are grain-boundary fluids, chemically distinct from fluid inclusions. Fluid-inclination compositions appear to have been determined shortly after the halite deposition. Because of the times required for diagenetic reactions controlling their compositions, the grain-boundary fluids within the Salado probably have a residence time of several million years

  1. Improving the safety of LWR power plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    This report documents the results of the Study to identify current, potential research issues and efforts for improving the safety of Light Water Reactor (LWR) power plants. This final report describes the work accomplished, the results obtained, the problem areas, and the recommended solutions. Specifically, for each of the issues identified in this report for improving the safety of LWR power plants, a description is provided in detail of the safety significance, the current status (including information sources, status of technical knowledge, problem solution and current activities), and the suggestions for further research and development. Further, the issues are ranked for action into high, medium, and low priority with respect to primarily (a) improved safety (e.g. potential reduction in public risk and occupational exposure), and secondly (b) reduction in safety-related costs

  2. Final environmental impact statement. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-10-01

    This volume contains the appendices for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Alternative geologic environs are considered. Salt, crystalline rock, argillaceous rock, and tuff are discussed. Studies on alternate geologic regions for the siting of WIPP are reviewed. President Carter's message to Congress on the management of radioactive wastes and the findings and recommendations of the interagency review group on nuclear waste management are included. Selection criteria for the WIPP site including geologic, hydrologic, tectonic, physicochemical compatability, and socio-economic factors are presented. A description of the waste types and the waste processing procedures are given. Methods used to calculate radiation doses from radionuclide releases during operation are presented. A complete description of the Los Medanos site, including archaeological and historic aspects is included. Environmental monitoring programs and long-term safety analysis program are described

  3. Final environmental impact statement. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-10-01

    This volume contains the appendices for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Alternative geologic environs are considered. Salt, crystalline rock, argillaceous rock, and tuff are discussed. Studies on alternate geologic regions for the siting of WIPP are reviewed. President Carter's message to Congress on the management of radioactive wastes and the findings and recommendations of the interagency review group on nuclear waste management are included. Selection criteria for the WIPP site including geologic, hydrologic, tectonic, physicochemical compatability, and socio-economic factors are presented. A description of the waste types and the waste processing procedures are given. Methods used to calculate radiation doses from radionuclide releases during operation are presented. A complete description of the Los Medanos site, including archaeological and historic aspects is included. Environmental monitoring programs and long-term safety analysis program are described. (DMC)

  4. WIPP gets thumbs up; Ward Valley time runs out

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1996-01-01

    Legislation passed in late September clears the way for the Department of Energy to begin shipment of national defense transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, NM, as early as November 1997. On September 23, President Clinton signed the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Bill, which contained amendments to the 1992 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The implementation of the law will help the DOE in its cleanup sites nationwide, and will enhance public health and safety by providing for the disposal of the waste in a 2150-ft underground salt formation, far away from population centers. Key components of the legislation include the following: (1) The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will continue as primary regulator of WIPP. (2) The EPA will have one year to review the Compliance Certification Application, which the DOE was to submit by October 31, 1996. Upon EPA certification (expected in October 1997), the DOE will begin shipping transuranic waste in November 1997. (3) A six-month waiting period for waste shipments has been removed (previously, the DOE was required to wait 180 days after the Energy Secretary's decision to begin disposal operations). (4) New Mexico will receive $20 million immediately, and annually for 14 years, with the funds to be used for infrastructure and road improvements in the state

  5. SKB's safety case for a final repository license application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hedin, Allan; Andersson, Johan

    2014-01-01

    The safety assessment SR-Site is a main component in SKB's license application, submitted in March 2011, to construct and operate a final repository for spent nuclear fuel at Forsmark in the municipality of Oesthammar, Sweden. Its role in the application is to demonstrate long-term safety for a repository at Forsmark. The assessment relates to the KBS-3 disposal concept in which copper canisters with a cast iron insert containing spent nuclear fuel are surrounded by bentonite clay and deposited at approximately 500 m depth in saturated, granitic rock. The principal regulatory acceptance criterion, issued by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), requires that the annual risk of harmful effects after closure not exceed 10 -6 for a representative individual in the group exposed to the greatest risk. SSM's regulations also imply that the assessment time for a repository of this type is one million years after closure. The licence applied for is one in a stepwise series of permits, each requiring a safety report. The next step concerns a permit to start excavation of the repository and requires a preliminary safety assessment report (PSAR) covering both operational and post-closure safety. Later steps include permission to commence trial operation, to commence regular operation and to close the final repository. (authors)

  6. WIPP performance assessment: impacts of human intrusion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, D.R.; Hunter, R.L.; Bertram-Howery, S.G.; Lappin, A.R.

    1989-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico is a research and development facility that may become the USA's first and only mined geologic repository for transuranic waste. Human intrusion into the WIPP repository after closure has been shown by preliminary sensitivity analyses and calculations of consequences to be an important, and perhaps the most important, factor in long-term repository performance

  7. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 11 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    Seismic reflection data from petroleum industry sources showed anomalous reflectors in the Castile Formation over a small area about 3 miles north of the center of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. Additional corroborative seismic reflection data were collected as part of WIPP investigations, and WIPP 11 was drilled to investigate the anomaly. WIPP 11 was drilled near the northwest corner of Section 9, T.22.S., R.31E. it penetrated, in descending order, sand dune deposits and the Gatuna Formation (29'), Santa Rosa Sandstone (132'), Dewey Lake Red Beds (502'), Rustler Formation (288'), Salado Formation (1379'), and most of the Castile Formation (1240'). Beds within the lower part of the Salado, and the upper anhydrite of the Castile, are thinner than normal; these beds are displaced upward structurally by the upper Castile halite which is highly thickened (about 968'). The lowest halite is thin (51') and the basal anhydrite was not completely penetrated. Subsequent seismic and borehole data has shown WIPP 11 to be in a structural complex now identified as the disturbed zone. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level waste, though there are no plans at this time to dispose of high level waste or spent fuel at WIPP

  8. Using of BEPU methodology in a final safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menzel, Francine; Sabundjian, Gaiane; D'auria, Francesco; Madeira, Alzira A.

    2015-01-01

    The Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS) has been established since the discovery of nuclear fission, and the occurrence of accidents in Nuclear Power Plants worldwide has contributed for its improvement. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) must contain complete information concerning safety of the plant and plant site, and must be seen as a compendium of NRS. The FSAR integrates both the licensing requirements and the analytical techniques. The analytical techniques can be applied by using a realistic approach, addressing the uncertainties of the results. This work aims to show an overview of the main analytical techniques that can be applied with a Best Estimated Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) methodology, which is 'the best one can do', as well as the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle. Moreover, the paper intends to demonstrate the background of the licensing process through the main licensing requirements. (author)

  9. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Building 332, Increment III

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Odell, B. N.; Toy, Jr., A. J.

    1977-08-31

    This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) supplements the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), dated January 18, 1974, for Building 332, Increment III of the Plutonium Materials Engineering Facility located at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL). The FSAR, in conjunction with the PSAR, shows that the completed increment provides facilities for safely conducting the operations as described. These documents satisfy the requirements of ERDA Manual Appendix 6101, Annex C, dated April 8, 1971. The format and content of this FSAR complies with the basic requirements of the letter of request from ERDA San to LLL, dated March 10, 1972. Included as appendices in support of th FSAR are the Building 332 Operational Safety Procedure and the LLL Disaster Control Plan.

  10. Using of BEPU methodology in a final safety analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menzel, Francine; Sabundjian, Gaiane, E-mail: fmenzel@ipen.br, E-mail: gdjian@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil); D' auria, Francesco, E-mail: f.dauria@ing.unipi.it [Universita degli Studi di Pisa, Gruppo di Ricerca Nucleare San Piero a Grado (GRNSPG), Pisa (Italy); Madeira, Alzira A., E-mail: alzira@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2015-07-01

    The Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS) has been established since the discovery of nuclear fission, and the occurrence of accidents in Nuclear Power Plants worldwide has contributed for its improvement. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) must contain complete information concerning safety of the plant and plant site, and must be seen as a compendium of NRS. The FSAR integrates both the licensing requirements and the analytical techniques. The analytical techniques can be applied by using a realistic approach, addressing the uncertainties of the results. This work aims to show an overview of the main analytical techniques that can be applied with a Best Estimated Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) methodology, which is 'the best one can do', as well as the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle. Moreover, the paper intends to demonstrate the background of the licensing process through the main licensing requirements. (author)

  11. Ferrocyanide safety project ferrocyanide aging studies. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lilga, M.A.; Hallen, R.T.; Alderson, E.V.

    1996-06-01

    This final report gives the results of the work conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) from FY 1992 to FY 1996 on the Ferrocyanide Aging Studies, part of the Ferrocyanide Safety Project. The Ferrocyanide Safety Project was initiated as a result of concern raised about the safe storage of ferrocyanide waste intermixed with oxidants, such as nitrate and nitrite salts, in Hanford Site single-shell tanks (SSTs). In the laboratory, such mixtures can be made to undergo uncontrolled or explosive reactions by heating dry reagents to over 200 degrees C. In 1987, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), published by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Final Environmental Impact Statement, Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level Transuranic and Tank Waste, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, included an environmental impact analysis of potential explosions involving ferrocyanide-nitrate mixtures. The EIS postulated that an explosion could occur during mechanical retrieval of saltcake or sludge from a ferrocyanide waste tank, and concluded that this worst-case accident could create enough energy to release radioactive material to the atmosphere through ventilation openings, exposing persons offsite to a short-term radiation dose of approximately 200 mrem. Later, in a separate study (1990), the General Accounting Office postulated a worst-case accident of one to two orders of magnitude greater than that postulated in the DOE EIS. The uncertainties regarding the safety envelope of the Hanford Site ferrocyanide waste tanks led to the declaration of the Ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) in October 1990

  12. HERBE final safety report; HERBE Finalni sigurnosni izvestaj

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1991-07-01

    The Final safety report of HERBE system constructed at the RB reactor consists of 13 chapters, as follows. Chapter 0 includes a summary and the contents of the Final safety report, fundamental characteristics of the system and conclusion remarks, with the license agreement of the Safety Committee of the Boris Kidric Institute. Chapter 1 describes and analyzes the site of the HERBE system, including demography, topography, meteorology, hydrology, geology, seismicity, ecology. Chapter 3 covers technical characteristics of the system, Chapter 4 deals with safety analysis, Chapter 5 describes organisation of construction and preliminary operational testing of the system. Chapter 6 deals with organisation and program of test and regular operation, relevant procedures. Chapter 7 defines operational conditions and constraints, Chapter 8 and describe methods and means of radiation protection and radioactive materials management respectively. Chapter 10 contains a review of emergency plans, measures and procedures for nuclear accident protection. Chapters 11 and 12 are concerned with quality assurance program and physical protection of the HERBE system and related nuclear material.

  13. Basic data report for deepening of drillhole WIPP 13 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    WIPP 13 is a borehole drilled in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, in section 17, T22S,R31E, in order to investigate a subsurface seismic disturbed zone. The first 1035 ft of the borehole were drilled in July and August 1978. The deepening of WIPP 13 was performed in 1979 between August and October. This report documents the deepening of WIPP 13 to 3861.8 ft. Only rocks of the Permian, Salado and Castile Formations were penetrated in the deepening. Cores were obtained for some portions of the hole and cuttings were collected from some of the sections which were not cored (see Table 1). A suite of geophysical logs was run to provide information on lithology, structure and geochemistry. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  14. WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII,Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a). This work plan describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility's's Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit. The scope of work for the RFI Work Plan or SAP is being developed by the Permittees. The final content of the RFI Work Plan or SAP will be coordinated with the NMED for submittal on May 24, 2000. Specific project-related planning information will be included in the RFI Work Plan or SAP. The SWMU program at WIPP began in 1994 under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority. NMED subsequently received regulatory authority from EPA. A

  15. WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2000-02-25

    This Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII,Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a). This work plan describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to NMED’s guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit. The scope of work for the RFI Work Plan or SAP is being developed by the Permittees. The final content of the RFI Work Plan or SAP will be coordinated with the NMED for submittal on May 24, 2000. Specific project-related planning information will be included in the RFI Work Plan or SAP. The SWMU program at WIPP began in 1994 under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority. NMED subsequently received regulatory authority from EPA

  16. Evaluation of the suitability of the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.; Channell, J.K.; Chaturvedi, L.; Little, M.S.; Rehfeldt, K.; Spiegler, P.

    1983-05-01

    Determination of the suitability of the site for WIPP is only the first major phase in the evaluation of the radiological impact of the repository on the public health and safety. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) will continue to independently review the design of the facility, the operational procedures, the criteria for packaging and shipment of the waste, the plans, procedures and results of the WIPP experiments, emergency preparedness, adherence to EPA and pertinent NRC regulations, and other important features of the project. EEG has concluded from existing evidence that the Los Medanos site for the WIPP project has been characterized in sufficient detail to warrant confidence in the validation of the site for the permanent emplacement of approximately 6 million cubic feet of defense transuranic waste. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the maximum surface dose rate for the unshielded remote-handled transuranic waste canisters will be 100 rem/hr with a maximum radionuclide concentration of 23 Ci/liter. The Site and Preliminary Design Validation program, through the drilling of two shafts to the selected repository level at 2160 ft below the surface and excavation of about 9000 ft of tunnels, has confirmed the interpretations made about the subsurface geological conditions at the site. For an assessment of the potential radiation effects of the nuclear waste repository on the public health and safety, it is necessary to understand the regional geological and hydrological setting. Much work has been done to understand these conditions and to address several specific issues which have arisen as a result of such studies. However, it is almost inevitable that some questions remain unanswered at a given time in the decision-making process. EEG has identified work which still needs to be done at the Los Medanos site in order to improve confidence in the worst case scenario models of possible breaches of the repository

  17. Leveraging Radioactive Waste Disposal at WIPP for Science

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rempe, N. T.

    2008-12-01

    Salt mines are radiologically much quieter than other underground environments because of ultra-low concentrations of natural radionuclides (U, Th, and K) in the host rock; therefore, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a government-owned, 655m deep geologic repository that disposes of radioactive waste in thick salt near Carlsbad, New Mexico, has for the last 15 years hosted highly radiation-sensitive experiments. Incidentally, Nature started her own low background experiment 250ma ago, preserving viable bacteria, cellulose, and DNA in WIPP salt. The Department of Energy continues to make areas of the WIPP underground available for experiments, freely offering its infrastructure and access to this unique environment. Even before WIPP started disposing of waste in 1999, the Room-Q alcove (25m x 10m x 4m) housed a succession of small experiments. They included development and calibration of neutral-current detectors by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for the Sudbury Neutrino Observatory, a proof-of-concept by Ohio State University of a flavor-sensitive neutrino detector for supernovae, and research by LANL on small solid- state dark matter detectors. Two currently active experiments support the search for neutrino-less double beta decay as a tool to better define the nature and mass of the neutrino. That these delicate experiments are conducted in close vicinity to, but not at all affected by, megacuries of radioactive waste reinforces the safety argument for the repository. Since 2003, the Majorana collaboration is developing and testing various detector designs inside a custom- built clean room in the Room-Q alcove. Already low natural background readings are reduced further by segmenting the germanium detectors, which spatially and temporally discriminates background radiation. The collaboration also demonstrated safe copper electro-forming underground, which minimizes cosmogenic background in detector assemblies. The largest currently used experimental

  18. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Part B, Permit application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)]. Volume 1, Revison 1.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-03-01

    This report contains information related to the permit application for the WIPP facility. Information is presented on solid waste management; personnel safety; emergency plans; site characterization; applicable regulations; decommissioning; and ground water monitoring requirements.

  19. The WIPP Water Quality Sampling Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uhland, D.; Morse, J.G.; Colton, D.

    1986-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a Department of Energy facility, will be used for the underground disposal of wastes. The Water Quality Sampling Program (WQSP) is designed to obtain representative and reproducible water samples to depict accurate water composition data for characterization and monitoring programs in the vicinity of the WIPP. The WQSP is designed to input data into four major programs for the WIPP project: Geochemical Site Characterization, Radiological Baseline, Environmental Baseline, and Performance Assessment. The water-bearing units of interest are the Culebra and Magneta Dolomite Members of the Rustler Formation, units in the Dewey Lake Redbeds, and the Bell Canyon Formation. At least two chemically distinct types of water occur in the Culebra, one being a sodium/potassium chloride water and the other being a calcium/magnesium sulfate water. Water from the Culebra wells to the south of the WIPP site is distinctly fresher and tends to be of the calcium/magnesium sulfate type. Water in the Culebra in the north and around the WIPP site is distinctly fresher and tends to be of the sodium/potassium chloride type and is much higher in total dissolved solids. The program, which is currently 1 year old, will continue throughout the life of the facility as part of the Environmental Monitoring Program

  20. WIPP Recertification - An Environmental Evaluation Group Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, L. E.; Silva, M. K.

    2003-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a repository for defense transuranic (TRU) waste, was built and is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) required initial certification of compliance of the WIPP by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In addition, a recertification decision is required by the LWA every five years, dated from the initial receipt of TRU waste. The first TRU waste shipment arrived at the WIPP on March 26, 1999, and therefore the first recertification application is due from DOE to EPA by March 25, 2004. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) provides technical oversight of the WIPP project on behalf of the State of New Mexico. The EEG considers the first recertification as a precedent setting event. Therefore, the EEG began the identification of recertification issues immediately following the initial certification decision. These issues have evolved since that time, based on discussions with the DOE and EEG's understanding of DOE's ongoing research. Performance assessment is required by the EPA certification and its results are needed to determine whether the facility remains in compliance at the time of the recertification application. The DOE must submit periodic change reports to the EPA which summarize activities and conditions that differ from the compliance application. Also, the EPA may request additional information from the DOE that may pertain to continued compliance. These changes and new information must be considered for recertification performance assessment

  1. Pretest characterization of WIPP experimental waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, J.; Davis, H.

    1991-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is an underground repository designed for the storage and disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities across the country. The Performance Assessment (PA) studies for WIPP address compliance of the repository with applicable regulations, and include full-scale experiments to be performed at the WIPP site. These experiments are the bin-scale and alcove tests to be conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Prior to conducting these experiments, the waste to be used in these tests needs to be characterized to provide data on the initial conditions for these experiments. This characterization is referred to as the Pretest Characterization of WIPP Experimental Waste, and is also expected to provide input to other programmatic efforts related to waste characterization. The purpose of this paper is to describe the pretest waste characterization activities currently in progress for the WIPP bin-scale waste, and to discuss the program plan and specific analytical protocols being developed for this characterization. The relationship between different programs and documents related to waste characterization efforts is also highlighted in this paper

  2. Evaluation of proposed panel closure modifications at WIPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allen, Lawrence E.; Silva, Matthew K.; Channell, James K.; Abel, John F.; Morgan, Dudley R.

    2001-12-31

    A key component in the design of the WIPP repository is the installation of concrete structures as panel seals in the intake and exhaust drifts after a panel has been filled with waste containers. As noted in the EPA final rule, the panel seal closure system is intended to block brine flow between the waste panels at the WIPP. On April 17, 2001, the DOE proposed seven modifications to the EPA concerning the design of the panel closure system. EPA approval of these modifications is necessary since the details of the panel design are specified in EPA’s final rule as a condition for WIPP certification. However, the EPA has not determined whether a rulemaking would be required for these proposed design modifications. On September 4, 2001, the DOE withdrew the request, noting that it would be resubmitted on a future date. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) contracted with two engineers, Dr. John Abel and Dr. Rusty Morgan, to evaluate the proposed modifications. The EEG has accepted the conclusions and recommendations from these two experts: 1) replacement of Salado Mass Concrete with a generic salt-based concrete; 2) replacement of the explosion wall with a construction wall; 3) replacement of freshwater grouting with salt-based grouting; 4) option to allow surface or underground mixing; and 5) option to allow up to one year for completion of closure. The proposed modification to allow local carbonate river rock as aggregate is acceptable pending demonstration that no problems will exist in the resulting concrete. The proposed modification to give the contractor discretion in removal of steel forms is not supported. Instead, several recommendations are made to specifically reduce the number of forms left, thereby reducing potential migration pathways.

  3. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant disposal phase final supplemental environmental impact statement. Volume 3: Comment response document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS-II) is to provide information on environmental impacts regarding the Department of Energy''s (DOE) proposed disposal operations at WIPP. The Proposed Action describes the treatment and disposal of the Basic inventory of TRU waste over a 35-year period. The Action Alternatives proposed the treatment of the Basic Inventory and an Additional Inventory as well as the transportation of the treated waste to WIPP for disposal over a 150- to 190-year period. The three Action Alternatives include the treatment of TRU waste at consolidation sites to meet WIPP planning-basic Waste Acceptance Criteria, the thermal treatment of TRU waste to meet Land Disposal Restrictions, and the treatment of TRU waste by a shred and grout process. SEIS-II evaluates environmental impacts resulting from the various treatment options; the transportation of TRU waste to WIPP using truck, a combination of truck and regular rail service, and a combination of truck and dedicated rail service; and the disposal of this waste in the repository. Evaluated impacts include those to the general environment and to human health. Additional issues associated with the implementation of the alternatives are discussed to provide further understanding of the decisions to be reached and to provide the opportunity for public input on improving DOE''s Environmental Management Program. This volume provides responses to public comments on the Draft SEIS-II. Comments are related to: Alternatives; TRU waste; DOE credibility; Editorial; Endorsement/opposition; Environmental justice; Facility accidents; Generator site operations; Health and safety; Legal and policy issues; NEPA process; WIPP facilities; WIPP waste isolation performance; Purpose and need; WIPP operations; Site characterization; Site selection; Socioeconomics; and Transportation

  4. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum C. Cost worksheets for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-04-01

    The cost worksheets for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are presented. A summary cost estimate, cost estimate for surface facilities, and cost estimate for shafts and underground facilities are included

  5. 76 FR 17808 - Final Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan 2011-2013

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-31

    ... [Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0108] Final Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan 2011- 2013 AGENCY... availability. SUMMARY: This document announces the availability of the Final NHTSA Vehicle Safety and Fuel.... This Priority Plan is an update to the Final Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan 2009...

  6. 10 CFR 52.157 - Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ...; technical information in final safety analysis report. The application must contain a final safety analysis... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report. 52.157 Section 52.157 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES...

  7. 10 CFR 52.79 - Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ...; technical information in final safety analysis report. (a) The application must contain a final safety... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Contents of applications; technical information in final safety analysis report. 52.79 Section 52.79 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES...

  8. A methodology of uncertainty/sensitivity analysis for PA of HLW repository learned from 1996 WIPP performance assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Y. M.; Kim, S. K.; Hwang, Y. S.; Kang, C. H.

    2002-01-01

    The WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) is a mined repository constructed by the US DOE for the permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated by activities related to defence of the US since 1970. Its historical disposal operation began in March 1999 following receipt of a final permit from the State of NM after a positive certification decision for the WIPP was issued by the EPA in 1998, as the first licensed facility in the US for the deep geologic disposal of radioactive wastes. The CCA (Compliance Certification Application) for the WIPP that the DOE submitted to the EPA in 1966 was supported by an extensive Performance Assessment (PA) carried out by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with so-called 1996 PA. Even though such PA methodologies could be greatly different from the way we consider for HLW disposal in Korea largely due to quite different geologic formations in which repository are likely to be located, a review on lots of works done through the WIPP PA studies could be the most important lessons that we can learn from in view of current situation in Korea where an initial phase of conceptual studies on HLW disposal has been just started. The objective of this work is an overview of the methodology used in the recent WIPP PA to support the US DOE WIPP CCA ans a proposal for Korean case

  9. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 12 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    WIPP 12 is a borehole drilled in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, to investigate the stratigraphy, structure and lithology in the WIPP area. WIPP 12 was drilled in section 17, T22S,R31E, between November 9 and December 7, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 2785.8 ft. It encountered from top to bottom, 16.2 ft of sand, 3 ft of Mescalero Caliche and 9.6 ft of the Gatuna Formation, all of Quaternary age; 138.2 ft of the Triassic Santa Rosa Formation, 483 ft of the Dewey Lake Red Beds, 326 ft of the Rustler Formation, 1771.5 ft of the Salado Formation, and 48.3 ft of the Castile Formation, all of Permian age. Cores or cuttings were obtained for the entire hole. A suite of geophysical logs, including neutron gamma and density curves, was run to the full depth of WIPP 12. The borehole demonstrated that the elevation of the top of the Castile is about 160' above the same horizon in ERDA 9. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  10. WIPP site and vicinity geological field trip

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaturvedi, L.

    1980-10-01

    The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) is conducting an assessment of the radiological health risks to people from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). As a part of this work, EEG is making an effort to improve the understanding of those geological issues concerning the WIPP site which may affect the radiological consequences of the proposed repository. One of the important geological issues to be resolved is the timing and the nature of the dissolution processes which may have affected the WIPP site. EEG organized a two-day conference of geological scientists, titled Geotechnical Considerations for Radiological Hazard Assessment of WIPP on January 17-18, 1980. During this conference, it was realized that a field trip to the site would further clarify the different views on the geological processes active at the site. The field trip of June 16-18, 1980 was organized for this purpose. This report provides a summary of the field trip activities along with the participants post field trip comments. Important field stops are briefly described, followed by a more detailed discussion of critical geological issues. The report concludes with EEG's summary and recommendations to the US Department of Energy for further information needed to more adequately resolve concerns for the geologic and hydrologic integrity of the site

  11. LOFT integral test system final safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-03-01

    Safety analyses are presented for the following LOFT Reactor systems: engineering safety features; support buildings and facilities; instrumentation and controls; electrical systems; and auxiliary systems. (JWR)

  12. WIPP's Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Renewal Application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Most, W.A.; Kehrman, R.F.

    2009-01-01

    Hazardous waste permits issued by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) have a maximum term of 10-years from the permit's effective date. The permit condition in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) governing renewal applications, directs the Permittees to submit a permit application 180 days prior to expiration of the Permit. On October 27, 1999, the Secretary of the NMED issued to the United States Department of Energy (DOE), the owner and operator of WIPP, and to Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), the Management and Operating Contractor and the cooperator of WIPP, a HWFP to manage, store, and dispose hazardous waste at WIPP. The DOE and WTS are collectively known as the Permittees. The HWFP is effective for a fixed term not to exceed ten years from the effective date of the Permit. The Permittees may renew the HWFP by submitting a new permit application at least 180 calendar days before the expiration date, of the HWFP. The Permittees are not proposing any substantial changes in the Renewal Application. First, the Permittees are seeking the authority to dispose of Contact-Handled and Remote-Handled TRU mixed waste in Panel 8. Panels 4 through 7 have been approved in the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit as it currently exists. No other change to the facility or to the manner in which hazardous waste is characterized, managed, stored, or disposed is being requested. Second, the Permittees also seek to include the Mine Ventilation Rate Monitoring Plan, as Attachment Q in the HWFP. This Plan has existed as a separate document since May 2000. The NMED has requested that the Plan be submitted as part of the Renewal Application. The Permittees have been operating to the Mine Ventilation Rate Monitoring Plan since the Plan was submitted. Third, some information submitted in the original WIPP RCRA Part B Application has been updated, such as demographic information. The Permittees will submit this information in the

  13. Nuclear waste repository transparency technology test bed demonstrations at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betsill J, David; Elkins, Ned Z.; Wu, Chuan-Fu; Mewhinney, James D.; Aamodt, Paul

    2000-01-01

    Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, has stated that one of the nuclear waste legacy issues is ''The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring the safe use of nuclear power.'' Waste management (i.e., the back end) is a domestic and international issue that must be addressed. A key tool in gaining acceptance of nuclear waste repository technologies is transparency. Transparency provides information to outside parties for independent assessment of safety, security, and legitimate use of materials. Transparency is a combination of technologies and processes that apply to all elements of the development, operation, and closure of a repository system. A test bed for nuclear repository transparency technologies has been proposed to develop a broad-based set of concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle. WIPP is the world's first complete geologic repository system for nuclear materials at the back end of the cycle. While it is understood that WIPP does not currently require this type of transparency, this repository has been proposed as realistic demonstration site to generate and test ideas, methods, and technologies about what transparency may entail at the back end of the nuclear materials cycle, and which could be applicable to other international repository developments. An integrated set of transparency demonstrations was developed and deployed during the summer, and fall of 1999 as a proof-of-concept of the repository transparency technology concept. These demonstrations also provided valuable experience and insight into the implementation of future transparency technology development and application. These demonstrations included: Container Monitoring Rocky Flats to WIPP; Underground Container Monitoring; Real-Time Radiation and Environmental Monitoring; Integrated level of confidence in the system and information provided. As the world's only operating deep geologic

  14. Fast Flux Test Facility final safety analysis report. Amendment 72

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gantt, D. A.

    1992-08-01

    This document provides the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 72 for incorporation into the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) FSAR set. This amendment change incorporates Engineering Change Notices issued subsequent to Amendment 71 and approved for incorporation before June 24, 1992. These include changes in: Chapter 2, Site Characteristics; Chapter 3, Design Criteria Structures, Equipment, and Systems; Chapter 5B, Reactor Coolant System; Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Control Systems; Chapter 8, Electrical Systems - The description of the Class 1E, 125 Vdc systems is updated for the higher capacity of the newly installed, replacement batteries; Chapter 9, Auxiliary Systems - The description of the inert cell NASA systems is corrected to list the correct number of spare sample points; Chapter 11, Reactor Refueling System; Chapter 12, Radiation Protection and Waste Management; Chapter 13, Conduct of Operations; Chapter 16, Quality Assurance; Chapter 17, Technical Specifications; Chapter 19, FFTF Fire Specifications for Fire Detection, Alarm, and Protection Systems; Chapter 20, FFTF Criticality Specifications; and Appendix B, Primary Piping Integrity Evaluation.

  15. The WIPP research and development test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, L.D.

    1985-01-01

    The WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) is a DOE RandD Facility for the purpose of developing the technology needed for the safe disposal of the United States defense-related radioactive waste. The in-situ test program is defined for the thermal-structural interactions, plugging and sealing, and waste package interactions in a salt environment. An integrated series of large-scale underground tests address the issues of both systems and long-term isolation performance of a repository

  16. WIPP site and vicinity geological field trip

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaturvedi, L.

    1980-10-01

    The Environmental Evaluation Group is conducting an assessment of the radiological health risks to people from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. As a part of this work, EEG is making an effort to improve the understanding of those geological issues concerning the WIPP site which may affect the radiological consequences of the proposed repository. One of the important geological issues to be resolved is the timing and the nature of the dissolution processes which may have affected the WIPP site. EEG organized a two-day conference of geological scientists, on January 17-18, 1980. On the basis of the January conference and the June field trip, EEG has formed the following conclusions: (1) it has not been clearly established that the site or the surrounding area has been attacked by deep dissolution to render it unsuitable for the nuclear waste pilot repository; (2) the existence of an isolated breccia pipe at the site unaccompanied by a deep dissolution wedge, is a very remote possibility; (3) more specific information about the origin and the nature of the brine reservoirs is needed. An important question that should be resolved is whether each encounter with artesian brine represents a separate pocket or whether these occurrences are interconnected; (4) Anderson has postulated a major tectonic fault or a fracture system at the Basin margin along the San Simon Swale; (5) the area in the northern part of the WIPP site, identified from geophysical and bore hole data as the disturbed zone, should be further investigated to cleary understand the nature and significance of this structural anomaly; and (6) a major drawback encountered during the discussions of geological issues related to the WIPP site is the absence of published material that brings together all the known information related to a particular issue

  17. Safety performance evaluation of converging chevron pavement markings : final report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-12-01

    The objectives of this study were (1) to perform a detailed safety analysis of converging chevron : pavement markings, quantifying the potential safety benefits and developing an understanding of the : incident types addressed by the treatment, and (...

  18. 78 FR 27419 - Final Safety Culture Policy Statement

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-10

    ... organizational characteristics are present in a culture that promotes safety and environmental responsibility. A characteristic, in this case, is a pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving that emphasizes safety...

  19. The WIPP transportation system: Demonstrated readiness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.R.; Spooner, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an integrated transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely-dispersed generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The system consists of a Type B container, a specially- designed trailer, a lightweight tractor, the DOE ''TRANSCOM'' vehicle tracking system, and uniquely qualified and highly-trained drivers. In June of 1989, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the transportation system and concluded that: ''The system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels'' (emphasis added). The next challenge facing the DOE was demonstrating that this system was ready to transport the TRU waste to the WIPP site efficiently and in the safest manner possible. Not only did the DOE feel that is was necessary to convince itself that the system was safe, but also representatives of the 20 states through which it would travel

  20. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) startup plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-03-01

    To allow the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to transition from a Major System Acquisition to an operating demonstration facility, the Acquisition Executive and the Energy System Acquisition Advisory Board (ESAAB) must concur in the facility's readiness to receive waste. This action, designated in DOE Order 4700.1 as Key Decision Four, concludes with the Chairman of the ESAAB issuing a Record of Decision. Since the meeting leading to the Record of Decision is scheduled for August 1988, plans must be made to ensure all activities contributing to that decision are completed in a clear and well-coordinated process. To support that effort, this Start-Up Plan was prepared to identify and track key events necessary to verify WIPP's readiness to receive waste; this provides a management/scheduling/tracking tool for the DOE WIPP Project Office (WPO) and a tracking mechanism for the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE-AL) and for DOE Headquarters (DOE-HQ); and describe the process to ensure readiness is documented by providing relevant data and reports to the cognizant decision makers. The methods by which these two purposes are achieved are discussed in further detail in the remainder of this plan

  1. The WIPP transportation system: Demonstrated readiness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.R.; Spooner, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an integrated transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely-dispersed generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The system consists of a Type B container, a specially-designed trailer, a lightweight tractor, the DOE ''TRANSCOM'' vehicle tracing system, and uniquely qualified and highly-trained drivers. In June of 1989, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the transportation system and concluded that: ''The system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels.'' The next challenge facing the DOE was demonstrating that this system was ready to transport the TRU waste to the WIPP site in the safest manner possible. Not only did the DOE feel that it was necessary to convince itself that the system was safe, but also representatives of the 23 states through which it traveled

  2. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 32 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-11-01

    WIPP 32 is an exploratory borehole drilled to examine the subsurface at a small topographic high in Nash Draw. The borehole is located in east-central Eddy County, New Mexico, in NE 1/4 SE 1/4 Sec. 33, T.22S., R.29E. and was drilled in August, 1979. The hole was drilled to a depth of 390 feet, and encountered, from top to bottom, the Rustler Formation (166') and the upper Salado Formation (224'). Core was taken from 4 to 353 feet. Geophysical logs were run the full length of the hole to measure formation properties. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  3. Seismic reflection data report: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, Southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hern, J.L.; Powers, D.W.; Barrows, L.J.

    1978-12-01

    Three seismic reflection (Vibroseis) surveys conducted from 1976 through 1978 by Sandia Laboratories to support investigations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are described. Volume I describes the purpose, field parameters, and data processing parameters. Volume II contains uninterpreted processed lines and shotpoint maps. Data interpretations will be the subject of the subsequent reports. The data collected during these three surveys total 77 line miles; 72 line miles of this are on or very near the WIPP site. The first of the surveys (1976 SAN) covered 25 line miles and was conducted similarly to previous petroleum industry surveys in the area. 1976 SAN supplemented existing petroleum industry data. The two subsequent surveys (1977 X and 1978 Y) used shorter geophone spacings (110'), higher signal frequencies (up to 100 Hz), and higher data sampling rates (2 ms.) to better define the shallow zone (less than 4000') of primary interest. 1977 X contained 47 line miles on or near the WIPP site and over several structural features northwest of the site. 1978 Y contains 5 line miles over a one square mile area near the center of the WIPP site. These data show increasing discrimination of shallow reflectors as data collection parameters were modified. Data tables of recording and processing parameters are included. A fourth Vibroseis survey was conducted at the WIPP site in 1978 by Grant Geophysical Company for Bechtel; the data are not in final form and are not included. Petroleum industry data and an inconclusive weight-drop survey, conducted in 1976, are also not included in this report

  4. History of geophysical studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borns, D.J.

    1997-01-01

    A variety of geophysical methods including the spectrum of seismic, electrical, electromagnetic and potential field techniques have used support characterization, monitoring and experimental studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The geophysical studies have provided significant understanding of the nature of site deformation, tectonics and stability. Geophysical methods have delineated possible brine reservoirs beneath the underground facility and have defined the disturbed rock zone that forms around underground excavations. The role of geophysics in the WIPP project has evolved with the project. The early uses were for site characterization to satisfy site selection criteria or factors. As the regulatory framework for WIPP grew since 1980, the geophysics program was focused on support of experimental and field programs such as Salado hydrogeology and underground room systems and excavations. In summary, the major types of issues that geophysical studies addressed for WIPP are: Issue 1: Site Characterization; Issue 2: Castile Brine Reservoirs; Issue 3: Rustler /Dewey Lake Hydrogeology; Issue 4: Salado Hydrogeology; and Issue 5: Excavation Effects. The nature of geophysics program for WIPP has been to support investigation rather than being the principal investigation itself. The geophysics program has been used to define conceptual models (e.g., the Disturbed Rock Zone-DRZ) or to test conceptual models (e.g., high transmissivity zones in the Rustler Formation). An effect of being a support program is that as new project priorities arose the funding for the geophysics program was limited and withdrawn. An outcome is that much of the geophysics survey information resides in contractor reports since final interpretation reports were not funded

  5. Systems analysis, long-term radionuclide transport, and dose assessments, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico, September 1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lappin, A.R.; Hunter, R.L.; Davies, P.B.; Borns, D.J.; Reeves, M.; Pickens, J.; Iuzzolino, H.J.

    1990-12-01

    This study supports the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and has two main objectives. First, it describes current ideas about the characteristics and potential impacts of the disturbed-rock zone (DRZ) known to develop with time around excavations at the WIPP horizon. Second, it presents new calculations of radionuclide migration within and from the WIPP repository for steady-state undisturbed conditions and for two cases that consider human intrusion into the repository. At the WIPP, the presence of a DRZ has been confirmed by geophysical studies, gas-flow tests, and direct observations. The DRZ will allow gas or brine from waste-emplacement panels to bypass panel seals and flow into adjacent portions of the underground workings unless preventive measures are taken. Revised calculations of the undisturbed performance of the repository indicate that no radionuclides will be released into the Culebra Dolomite within the regulatory period of 10,000 years. The human-intrusion calculations included here assume a connection between the WIPP repository, an occurrence of pressurized brine within the underlying Castile Formation, and the overlying Culebra Dolomite. 61 refs., 40 figs., 16 tabs

  6. DOE Defense Program (DP) safety programs. Final report, Task 003

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The overall objective of the work on Task 003 of Subcontract 9-X52-W7423-1 was to provide LANL with support to the DOE Defense Program (DP) Safety Programs. The effort included the identification of appropriate safety requirements, the refinement of a DP-specific Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Format and Content Guide (FCG) and Comprehensive Review Plan (CRP), incorporation of graded approach instructions into the guidance, and the development of a safety analysis methodologies document. All tasks which were assigned under this Task Order were completed. Descriptions of the objectives of each task and effort performed to complete each objective is provided here

  7. Training Course for Compliance Safety and Health Officers. Final Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McKnight, A. James; And Others

    The report describes revision of the Compliance Safety and Health Officers (CSHO) course for the Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The CSHO's job was analyzed in depth, in accord with OSHA standards, policies, and procedures. A listing of over 1,700 violations of OSHA standards was prepared, and specialists…

  8. Basic data report for Drillhole WIPP 28 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-08-01

    WIPP 28 was drilled in Nash Draw (NE 1/4, sec. 18, T.21S., R.31E.) in Eddy County, New Mexico, to determine subsurface stratigraphy and examine dissolution features above undisturbed salt in the Salado Formation. Determination of dissolution rates will refine previous estimates and provide short-term (geologically) rates for WIPP risk assessments. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, Mescalero caliche (12 ft with fill material for pad), Dewey Lake Red Beds (203 ft), Rustler Formation (316 ft), and the upper 270 ft of the Salado Formation. A dissolution residue, 58 ft thick, is at the top of the Salado Formation overlying halite-rich beds. In addition to obtaining nearly continuous core from the surface to total depth (801 ft), geophysical logs were taken to measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole basin data, surface mapping, and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes and to then be converted to a repository. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  9. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 19 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 19 is an exploratory borehole whose objective was to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between April 6 and May 4, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1038.2 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (7', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (7'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (82'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (494'), the Rustler Formation (315'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (143'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of geophysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 19 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  10. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum A. Design calculations for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-04-01

    The design calculations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are presented. The following categories are discussed: general nuclear calculations; radwaste calculations; structural calculations; mechanical calculations; civil calculations; electrical calculations; TRU waste surface facility time and motion analysis; shaft sinking procedures; hoist time and motion studies; mining system analysis; mine ventilation calculations; mine structural analysis; and miscellaneous underground calculations

  11. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 21 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 21 is an exploratory borehole whose objective is to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between May 24 and 26, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1046 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (6', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (6'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (34'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (487'), the Rustler Formation (308'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (178'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of goephysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 21 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  12. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 18 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 18 is an exploratory borehole whose objective is to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between March 14 and 30, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1060 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (5', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (4'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (129'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (475'), the Rustler Formation (315'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (132'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of geophysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 18 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  13. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 25 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    WIPP 25 was drilled on the eastern edge of Nash Draw (SW 1/4, Sec. 15, T22S, R30E) in Eddy County, New Mexico, to determine subsurface stratigraphy and examine dissolution features above undisturbed salt in the Salado Formation. Determination of dissolution rates will refine previous estimates and provide short-term (geologically) rates for WIPP risk assessments. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, Pleistocene sediments (17 ft with fill material for pad), Dewey Lake Red Beds (215 ft, Rustler Formation (333 ft, and 90 ft of the upper Salado Formation. A dissolution residue, 37 ft thick, is at the top of the Salado Formation overlying halite-rich beds. In addition to obtaining nearly continuous core from the surface to total depth (655 ft, geophysical logs were taken to measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole basin data, surface mapping, and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes and to then be converted to a repository. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  14. Basic data report for Drillhole WIPP 22 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 22 is an exploratory borehole whose objective is to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between March 14 and 30, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1448 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (6', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (7'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (68'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (492'), the Rustler Formation (311'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (565'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of geophysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 22 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  15. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 26 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-08-01

    WIPP 26 was drilled in Nash Draw (SE 1/4 NE 1/4, sec. 29, T22S, R30E) in Eddy County, New Mexico, to determine subsurface stratigraphy and examine dissolution features above undisturbed salt in the Salado Formation. Determination of dissolution rates will refine previous estimates and provide short-term (geologically) rates for WIPP risk assessments. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, surficial deposits (10 ft with full materials for pad), Rustler Formation (299 ft), and the upper 194 ft of the Salado Formation. A dissolution residue, 11 ft thick, is at the top of the Salado Formation overlying halite-rich beds. In addition to obtaining nearly continuous core from the surface to total depth (503 ft), geophysical logs were taken to measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole basin data, surface mapping, and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes and to then be converted to a repository. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  16. An assessment of traffic safety culture related to engagement in efforts to improve traffic safety : final report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-12-01

    This final report summarizes the methods, results, conclusions, and recommendations derived from a survey conducted to understand values, beliefs, and attitudes regarding engagement in behaviors that impact the traffic safety of others. Results of th...

  17. WIPP: construction and progress on a successful nuclear waste repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper, W.R.; Sankey, C.A.

    1985-01-01

    The Department of Energy is constructing the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeastern New Mexico. The facility will retrievably store transuranic waste from defense activities of the United States and conduct experiments with Defense high-level waste which will be retrieved at the end of the experiments. This paper describes the progress and the present status of activities at WIPP. 4 refs

  18. WIPP Magnesium Oxide (MgO) - Planned Change Request

    Science.gov (United States)

    On April 10, 2006, the DOE submitted a planned change request pertaining to the amount of MgO emplaced in the WIPP repository. MgO is an engineered barrier that DOE included as part of the original WIPP Certification Decision.

  19. Systems Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program: Final Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Sharon M.; Reveley, Mary S.; Withrow, Colleen A.; Evans, Joni K.; Barr, Lawrence; Leone, Karen

    2013-01-01

    A three-month study (February to April 2010) of the NASA Aviation Safety (AvSafe) program was conducted. This study comprised three components: (1) a statistical analysis of currently available civilian subsonic aircraft data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system to identify any significant or overlooked aviation safety issues; (2) a high-level qualitative identification of future safety risks, with an assessment of the potential impact of the NASA AvSafe research on the National Airspace System (NAS) based on these risks; and (3) a detailed, top-down analysis of the NASA AvSafe program using an established and peer-reviewed systems analysis methodology. The statistical analysis identified the top aviation "tall poles" based on NTSB accident and FAA incident data from 1997 to 2006. A separate examination of medical helicopter accidents in the United States was also conducted. Multiple external sources were used to develop a compilation of ten "tall poles" in future safety issues/risks. The top-down analysis of the AvSafe was conducted by using a modification of the Gibson methodology. Of the 17 challenging safety issues that were identified, 11 were directly addressed by the AvSafe program research portfolio.

  20. 76 FR 53051 - Safety Zone; ISAF Nations Cup Grand Final Fireworks Display, Sheboygan, WI

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-25

    ... display. DATES: This rule is effective from 7:45 until 8:45 p.m. on September 13, 2011. ADDRESSES...-AA00 Safety Zone; ISAF Nations Cup Grand Final Fireworks Display, Sheboygan, WI AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. ACTION: Temporary final rule. SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is establishing a temporary safety zone on...

  1. Achieving WIPP certification for software. A white paper

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, S.D.; Adams, K.; Twitchell, K.E.

    1998-07-01

    The NMT-1 and NMT-3 organizations within the Chemical and Metallurgical Research (CMR) facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is working to achieve Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certification to enable them to transport their TRU waste to WIPP. In particular, the NMT-1 management is requesting support from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to assist them in making the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) software WIPP certifiable. Thus, LIMS must be compliant with the recognized software quality assurance (SQA) requirements stated within the QAPD. Since the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) has achieved WIPP certification, INEEL personnel can provide valuable assistance to LANL by sharing lessons learned and recommendations. Thus, this white paper delineates the particular software quality assurance requirements required for WIPP certification

  2. Application of demographic analysis to pedestrian safety : final report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-01

    In recent years, many departments of transportation in the US have invested additional resources to enhance : pedestrian safety. However, there is still a need to effectively and systematically address the pedestrian experience : in low-income areas....

  3. WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP): THE NATIONS' SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL ISSUES

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lopez, Tammy Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-07-17

    In the southeastern portion of my home state of New Mexico lies the Chihuahauan desert, where a transuranic (TRU), underground disposal site known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) occupies 16 square miles. Full operation status began in March 1999, the year I graduated from Los Alamos High School, in Los Alamos, NM, the birthplace of the atomic bomb and one of the nation’s main TRU waste generator sites. During the time of its development and until recently, I did not have a full grasp on the role Los Alamos was playing in regards to WIPP. WIPP is used to store and dispose of TRU waste that has been generated since the 1940s because of nuclear weapons research and testing operations that have occurred in Los Alamos, NM and at other sites throughout the United States (U.S.). TRU waste consists of items that are contaminated with artificial, man-made radioactive elements that have atomic numbers greater than uranium, or are trans-uranic, on the periodic table of elements and it has longevity characteristics that may be hazardous to human health and the environment. Therefore, WIPP has underground rooms that have been carved out of 2,000 square foot thick salt formations approximately 2,150 feet underground so that the TRU waste can be isolated and disposed of. WIPP has operated safely and successfully until this year, when two unrelated events occurred in February 2014. With these events, the safety precautions and measures that have been operating at WIPP for the last 15 years are being revised and improved to ensure that other such events do not occur again.

  4. 9+ years of disposal experience at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rempe, Norbert T.; Nelson, Roger A.

    2008-01-01

    standards and expectations. Process improvements continuously reduce cycle times and costs. During the past few years, regulators have approved configuration changes that eliminated some unnecessary tests and activities. Many more could be targeted to further reduce vulnerability, while maintaining and even enhancing safety. While WIPP is licensed to dispose of only defense-related TRU waste, past experiments and performance assessments have shown that heat-generating high-activity waste could also be safely isolated in salt (and without prior vitrification). Thus, beyond its current restrictions, WIPP helps pave the way toward permanent isolation of all categories of radioactive waste. (author)

  5. Evaluation of safety assessment methodologies in Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide (1985) and Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report (1987)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walsh, B.; Fisher, C.; Zigler, G.; Clark, R.A.

    1990-01-01

    FSARs. Rockwell International, as operating contractor at the Rocky Flats plant, conducted a safety analysis program during the 1980s. That effort resulted in Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) for several buildings, one of them being the Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report, June 87 (707FSAR) and a Plant Safety Analysis Report. Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide, March 1985 (RFRAG85) documents the methodologies that were used for those FSARs. Resources available for preparation of those Rocky Flats FSARs were very limited. After addressing the more pressing safety issues, some of which are described below, the present contractor (EG ampersand G) intends to conduct a program of upgrading the FSARs. This report presents the results of a review of the methodologies described in RFRAG85 and 707FSAR and contains suggestions that might be incorporated into the methodology for the FSAR upgrade effort

  6. Science to compliance: The WIPP success story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howarth, S.M.; Chu, M.S.; Shephard, L.E.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeast New Mexico has been studied as a transuranic waste repository for the past 23 years. During this time, an extensive site characterization, design, construction, and experimental program was completed to provide in-depth understanding of the dominant processes that are most likely to influence the containment of radionuclides for 10,000 years. The success of the program, however, is defined by the regulator in the context of compliance with performance criteria, rather than by the in-depth technical understanding typical of most scientific programs. The WIPP project was successful in making a transformation from science to compliance by refocusing and redirecting programmatic efforts toward the singular goal of meeting regulatory compliance requirements while accelerating the submittal of the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) by two months from the April 1994 Disposal Decision Plan (DDP) date of December 1996, and by reducing projected characterization costs by more than 40%. This experience is unparalleled within the radioactive waste management community and has contributed to numerous lessons learned from which the entire community can benefit

  7. Fast flux test facility final safety analysis report amendment 79

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dautel, W.A.

    1999-01-01

    This document is provided to replace, remove, or add applicable pages to the chapters on: Heat Transport System; Containment and Structures; Auxiliary Systems; Reactor Refueling System; Conduct of Operations; Safety Analysis; Quality Assurance; FFTF Criticality Specifications; and Appendix H's TRIGA Fuel Storage System

  8. 76 FR 34773 - Final Safety Culture Policy Statement

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-14

    .... For example, industry representatives could begin to identify tacit organizational and personal goals... with NRC-regulated activities. Experience has shown that certain personal and organizational traits are present in a positive safety culture. A trait, in this case, is a pattern of thinking, feeling, and...

  9. WIPP shaft seal system parameters recommended to support compliance calculations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hurtado, L.D.; Knowles, M.K. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Kelley, V.A.; Jones, T.L.; Ogintz, J.B. [INTERA Inc., Austin, TX (United States); Pfeifle, T.W. [RE/SPEC, Inc., Rapid City, SD (United States)

    1997-12-01

    The US Department of Energy plans to dispose of transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is sited in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP disposal facility is located approximately 2,150 feet (650 m) below surface in the bedded halite of the Salado Formation. Prior to initiation of disposal activities, the Department of Energy must demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with all regulatory requirements. Applicable regulations require that contaminant releases from the WIPP remain below specified levels for a period of 10,000 years. To demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with these regulations, the Department of Energy has requested that Sandia National Laboratories develop and implement a comprehensive performance assessment of the WIPP repository for the regulatory period. This document presents the conceptual model of the shaft sealing system to be implemented in performance assessment calculations conducted in support of the Compliance Certification Application for the WIPP. The model was developed for use in repository-scale calculations and includes the seal system geometry and materials to be used in grid development as well as all parameters needed to describe the seal materials. These calculations predict the hydrologic behavior of the system. Hence conceptual model development is limited to those processes that could impact the fluid flow through the seal system.

  10. WIPP shaft seal system parameters recommended to support compliance calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurtado, L.D.; Knowles, M.K.; Kelley, V.A.; Jones, T.L.; Ogintz, J.B.; Pfeifle, T.W.

    1997-12-01

    The US Department of Energy plans to dispose of transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is sited in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP disposal facility is located approximately 2,150 feet (650 m) below surface in the bedded halite of the Salado Formation. Prior to initiation of disposal activities, the Department of Energy must demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with all regulatory requirements. Applicable regulations require that contaminant releases from the WIPP remain below specified levels for a period of 10,000 years. To demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with these regulations, the Department of Energy has requested that Sandia National Laboratories develop and implement a comprehensive performance assessment of the WIPP repository for the regulatory period. This document presents the conceptual model of the shaft sealing system to be implemented in performance assessment calculations conducted in support of the Compliance Certification Application for the WIPP. The model was developed for use in repository-scale calculations and includes the seal system geometry and materials to be used in grid development as well as all parameters needed to describe the seal materials. These calculations predict the hydrologic behavior of the system. Hence conceptual model development is limited to those processes that could impact the fluid flow through the seal system

  11. The influence of salt aerosol on alpha radiation detection by WIPP continuous air monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartlett, W.T.; Walker, B.A.

    1996-01-01

    Alpha continuous air monitors (CAMs) will be used at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to measure airborne transuranic radioactivity that might be present in air exhaust or in work-place areas. WIPP CAMs are important to health and safety because they are used to alert workers to airborne radioactivity, to actuate air-effluent filtration systems, and to detect airborne radioactivity so that the radioactivity can be confined in a limited area. In 1993, the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) reported that CAM operational performance was affected by salt aerosol, and subsequently, the WIPP CAM design and usage were modified. In this report, operational data and current theories on aerosol collection were reviewed to determine CAM quantitative performance limitations. Since 1993, the overall CAM performance appears to have improved, but anomalous alpha spectra are present when sampling-filter salt deposits are at normal to high levels. This report shows that sampling-filter salt deposits directly affect radon-thoron daughter alpha spectra and overall monitor efficiency. Previously it was assumed that aerosol was mechanically collected on the surface of CAM sampling filters, but this review suggests that electrostatic and other particle collection mechanisms are more important than previously thought. The mechanism of sampling-filter particle collection is critical to measurement of acute releases of radioactivity. 41 refs

  12. Technical evaluation of WIPP by the New Mexico environmental evaluation group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.

    1988-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a repository under construction in southeastern New Mexico for the disposal of 14.1 million curies of defense transuranic (TRU) waste. The US Department of Energy (DOE) plans to start storing waste in the underground facility in October 1988 for a 5-yr research and demonstration period. Since the State of New Mexico had a number of concerns in 1978 regarding the impact on health and safety of the proposed WIPP facility for disposal of radioactive waste, the DOE agreed to fund an independent technical review and evaluation of the planned repository, resulting in the creation of the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG). This full-time multidisciplinary group has published 39 major reports to date, testified before the New Mexico Legislature and the US Congress, and has disseminated the results of analyses to DOE, the governor, the legislature, the Congress, the scientific community, and the general public. While the disposal of radioactive defense mill tailings and defense high-level wastes are both subject to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing, Congress specifically chose not to have defense TRU waste disposal licensed by the NRC. This has placed a heavy burden on EEG as the only full-time technical review agency on WIPP, but without regulatory authority

  13. Politics and technology in repository siting: military versus commercial nuclear wastes at WIPP 1972-1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Downey, G.L.

    1985-01-01

    During the 1970s, attempts by the federal government to develop a comprehensive system for disposing of nuclear wastes in geologic repositories were plagued by two related political problems; (1) whether or not military and commercial wastes should be buried together in the same repository, and (2) how to define the host state's role in the repository siting mechanism. This article explains why these two problems were connected by showing how they proved to be of decisive importance in the development of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project in Carlsbad, New Mexico. Although WIPP was initially conceived as a wholly military facility, The Department of Energy triggered a three-year dispute over the project's scope by proposing in 1978 to include commercial wastes in the repository. The key issue in the dispute concerned the political legitimacy of decision-making mechanisms for repository siting, which depend upon the extent to which they both adequately represent the interests of affected groups and meet an indistinct technical/political criterion of acceptable safety. DOE's ill-fated proposal to mix military and commercial disposal at WIPP demonstrated that the two rely on somewhat different conditions for their legitimacy. The agency overlapped the legitimate authorities of the federal and state governments and gave itself the hopeless task of negotiating a new boundary between them. 50 references, 3 figures

  14. Probabilistic safety considerations for the final disposal of radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.P.; Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1992-01-01

    In order to demonstrate the safety-related balanced concept of the plant design with respect to the operational phase, probabilistic safety considerations were made for the planned German repository for radioactive wastes, the Konrad repository. These considerations are described with respect to the handling and transfer system in the above-ground and underground facility. The operational sequences and the features of a repository are similar to those of conventional transportation and loading facilities and mining techniques. Hence, failure sequences and probability data were derived from these conventional areas. Incidents taken into consideration are e. g. collision of vehicles, fires, drop of waste packages due to failures of lifting equipment. The statistical data used were made available by authorities, insurance companies, and expert organizations. These data have been converted into probability data which were used for the determination of the frequencies for all radiologically relevant incidents. (author)

  15. Evaluation of safety-parameter display concepts. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, D.D.; Wise, J.A.; Hanes, L.F.

    1982-02-01

    New control room equipment designed to improve operator performance must be evaluated before adoption and installation. Two experimental concepts for a Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) were evaluated to assess benefits and potential problems associated with the SPDS concept and its integration into control room operations. Participants were licensed utility operators undergoing retraining on a nuclear power plant simulator. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed on crew response to seven simulated accident conditions

  16. Nuclear Power Safety Reporting System. Final evaluation results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finlayson, F.C.; Newton, R.D.

    1986-02-01

    This document presents the results of a study conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission of an unobtrusive, voluntary, anonymous third-party managed, nonpunitive human factors data gathering system (the Nuclear power Safety Reporting System - NPSRS) for the nuclear electric power production industry. The data to be gathered by the NPSRS are intended for use in identifying and quantifying the factors that contribute to the occurrence of significant safety incidents involving humans in nuclear power plants. The NPSRS has been designed to encourage participation in the System through guarantees of reporter anonymity provided by a third-party organization that would be responsible for NPSRS management. As additional motivation to reporters for contributing data to the NPSRS, conditional waivers of NRC disciplinary action would be provided to individuals. These conditional waivers of immunity would apply to potential violations of NRC regulations that might be disclosed through reports submitted to the System about inadvertent, noncriminal incidents in nuclear plants. This document summarizes the overall results of the study of the NPSRS concept. In it, a functional description of the NPSRS is presented together with a review and assessment of potential problem areas that might be met if the System were implemented. Conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study are also presented. A companion volume (NUREG/CR-4133, Nuclear Power Safety Reporting System: Implementation and Operational Specifications'') presented in detail the elements, requirements, forms, and procedures for implementing and operating the System. 13 refs

  17. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 13 (Waste isolation pilot plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    The borehole WIPP-13 was drilled in the SW 1/4 section 17, T22S, R31E of eastern Eddy County during July and August, 1978, to investigate the nature of a resistivity anomaly. The stratigraphic section was normal, consisting of 13 feet of Quaternary deposits (including artificial fill for drill pad), 53 feet of the Triassic Santa Rosa Sandstone, 451 feet of Dewey Lake Red Beds, 269 feet of the Rustler Formation and 179 feet of the upper member of the Salado Formation. Consecutive cores were taken from 570 to 595, 656 to 729, and 827 to 878 feet. Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals throughout the rest of the hole. Geophysical logs were run to aid in interpretation of the stratigraphy. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic (TRU) defense wastes. Eventual conversion of the facility to a repository for TRU defense wastes is anticipated. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  18. Basic data report for Drillhole WIPP 14 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-08-01

    Borehole WIPP 14 is an exploratory well drilled in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, in section 9, T22S,R31E. The borehole was drilled to a depth of 1000.0 ft measured from ground level. It penetrated, from top to bottom, 15.4 ft of Quaternary sands, 125.6 ft of the Triassic Santa Rosa Sandstone, and in the Permian strata, 497.7 ft of the Dewey Lake Red Beds, 312.9 ft of the Rustler Formation and 48.4 ft of the Upper Salado Formation. Seven hundred feet of the well were cored, at consecutive and nonconsecutive 10-ft intervals to a depth of 925.5 ft. Cuttings were collected where core was not taken. Density, gamma ray neutron and caliper logs were run the full depth of the hole. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  19. Prioritization of tasks in the draft LWR safety technology program plan. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lim, E.Y.; Miller, W.J.; Parkinson, W.J.; Ritzman, R.L.; vonHerrmann, J.L.; Wood, P.J.

    1980-05-01

    The purpose of this report is to describe both the approach taken and the results produced in the SAI effort to prioritize the tasks in the Sandia draft LWR Safety Technology Program Plan. This work used the description of important safety issues developed in the Reactor Safety Study (2) to quantify the effect of safety improvements resulting from a research and development program on the risk from nuclear power plants. Costs of implementation of these safety improvements were also estimated to allow a presentation of the final results in a value (i.e., risk reduction) vs. impact (i.e., implementation costs) matrix

  20. Evaluation of safety parameter display concepts. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, D.D.; Wise, J.A.; Hanes, L.F.

    1982-02-01

    New control room equipment designed to improve operator performance must be evaluated before adoption and installation. Two experimental concept for a Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) were evaluated to assess benefits and potential problems associated with the SPDS concept and its integration into control room operations. Participants were licensed utility operators undergoing retraining on a nuclear power plant simulator. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed on crew response to seven simulated accident conditions. Data on operator decisions and actions have been organized into timelines. Analysis of the timelines and observations collected during testing provide important insights about the potential impact of the SPDS concept on control room operations

  1. Ferrocyanide Safety Program cyanide speciation studies. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, S.A.; Pool, K.H.; Bryan, S.L.

    1995-07-01

    This report summarizes Pacific Northwest Laboratory's fiscal year (FY) 1995 progress toward developing and implementing methods to identify and quantify cyanide species in ferrocyanide tank waste. This work was conducted for Westinghouse Hanfbrd Company's (WHC's) Ferrocyanide Safety Program. Currently, there are 18 high-level waste storage tanks at the US Department of Energy's Hanford Site that are on a Ferrocyanide Tank Watchlist because they contain an estimated 1000 g-moles or more of precipitated ferrocyanide. In the presence of oxidizing material such as sodium nitrate or nitrite, ferrocyanide can be made to react exothermally by heating it to high temperatures or by applying an electrical spark of sufficient energy (Cady 1993). However, fuel, oxidizers, and temperature are all important parameters. If fuel, oxidizers, or high temperatures (initiators) are not present in sufficient amounts, then a runaway or propagating reaction cannot occur. To bound the safety concern, methods are needed to definitively measure and quantitate ferrocyanide concentration present within the actual waste. The target analyte concentration for cyanide in waste is approximately 0.1 to 15 wt % (as cyanide) in the original undiluted sample. After dissolution of the original sample and appropriate dilutions, the concentration range of interest in the analytical solutions can vary between 0.001 to 0.1 wt % (as cyanide). In FY 1992, 1993, and 1994, two solution (wet) methods were developed based on Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) spectroscopy and ion chromatography (IC); these methods were chosen for further development activities. The results of these activities are described

  2. Sensitivity analysis of the reactor safety study. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parkinson, W.J.; Rasmussen, N.C.; Hinkle, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    The Reactor Safety Study (RSS) or Wash 1400 developed a methodology estimating the public risk from light water nuclear reactors. In order to give further insights into this study, a sensitivity analysis has been performed to determine the significant contributors to risk for both the PWR and BWR. The sensitivity to variation of the point values of the failure probabilities reported in the RSS was determined for the safety systems identified therein, as well as for many of the generic classes from which individual failures contributed to system failures. Increasing as well as decreasing point values were considered. An analysis of the sensitivity to increasing uncertainty in system failure probabilities was also performed. The sensitivity parameters chosen were release category probabilities, core melt probability, and the risk parameters of early fatalities, latent cancers and total property damage. The latter three are adequate for describing all public risks identified in the RSS. The results indicate reductions of public risk by less than a factor of two for factor reductions in system or generic failure probabilities as high as one hundred. There also appears to be more benefit in monitoring the most sensitive systems to verify adherence to RSS failure rates than to backfitting present reactors. The sensitivity analysis results do indicate, however, possible benefits in reducing human error rates

  3. Seismic safety margins research program. Phase I final report - Overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.D.; Dong, R.G.; Bernreuter, D.L.; Bohn, M.P.; Chuang, T.Y.; Cummings, G.E.; Johnson, J.J.; Mensing, R.W.; Wells, J.E.

    1981-04-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) is a multiyear, multiphase program whose overall objective is to develop improved methods for seismic safety assessments of nuclear power plants, using a probabilistic computational procedure. The program is being carried out at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and is sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. Phase I of the SSMRP was successfully completed in January 1981: A probabilistic computational procedure for the seismic risk assessment of nuclear power plants has been developed and demonstrated. The methodology is implemented by three computer programs: HAZARD, which assesses the seismic hazard at a given site, SMACS, which computes in-structure and subsystem seismic responses, and SEISIM, which calculates system failure probabilities and radioactive release probabilities, given (1) the response results of SMACS, (2) a set of event trees, (3) a family of fault trees, (4) a set of structural and component fragility descriptions, and (5) a curve describing the local seismic hazard. The practicality of this methodology was demonstrated by computing preliminary release probabilities for Unit 1 of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant north of Chicago, Illinois. Studies have begun aimed at quantifying the sources of uncertainty in these computations. Numerous side studies were undertaken to examine modeling alternatives, sources of error, and available analysis techniques. Extensive sets of data were amassed and evaluated as part of projects to establish seismic input parameters and to produce the fragility curves. (author)

  4. Champion for radioactive waste disposal host of the WIPP: Carlsbad, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rempe, N.T.

    1995-01-01

    The city of Carlsbad, New Mexico, volunteered to host the United States' first final repository for radioactive waste. Carlsbad citizens and their leaders understood that after decades of accumulating waste, the time had come to close the nuclear cycle. They therefore agreed to support the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), provided the project would not endanger its neighbors or the environment. The southeastern New Mexico area offers several advantages for deep geologic waste disposal: The regional geology is well understood. Massive salt beds are an excellent repository medium. Decades of potash mining experience inspired confidence in that concept. In underground nuclear test in the salt had caused no harm. And the city was seeking opportunities to diversify its economic base. Through the growth of the project, beginning in 1971, Carlsbad has demonstrated unwavering commitment, patience, and persistence. Without these attitudes, the WIPP would certainly not be where it is today and most likely would not exist at all. Civic leaders made the critical difference as the project weathered repeated challenges. With the support of their constituents, they foiled anti-nuclear obstructionism and advanced the project at every turn, frequently on their own time and at their own expense. The WIPP is now scheduled to start disposal in 1998, after a ten-year delay from its originally intended opening date. If it still has a realistic chance to start operations before the end of the century, the credit must in no small measure go to the city and the citizens of Carlsbad, New Mexico

  5. Position paper on flammability concerns associated with TRU waste destined for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), in southeastern New Mexico,is an underground repository, designed for the safe geologic disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated from defense-related activities of the US Department of Energy (DOE). The WIPP storage rooms are mined in a bedded salt (halite) formation, and are located 2150 feet below the surface. After the disposal of waste in the storage rooms, closure of the repository is expected to occur by creep (plastic flow) of the salt formation, with the waste being permanently isolated from the surrounding environment. This paper has evaluated the issue of flammability concerns associated with TRU waste to be shipped to WIPP, including a review of possible scenarios that can potentially contribute to the flammability. The paper discusses existing regulations that address potential flammability concerns, presents an analysis of previous flammability-related incidents at DOE sites with respect to the current regulations, and finally, examines the degree of assurance these regulations provide in safeguarding against flammability concerns during transportation and waste handling. 50 refs., 7 figs., 7 tabs

  6. Radionuclide transport in sandstones with WIPP brine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weed, H.C.; Bazan, F.; Fontanilla, J.; Garrison, J.; Rego, J.; Winslow, A.M.

    1981-02-01

    Retardation factors (R) have been measured for the transport of 3 H, /sup 95m/Tc, and 85 Sr in WIPP brine using St. Peter, Berea, Kayenta, and San Felipe sandstone cores. If tritium is assumed to have R=1, /sup 95m/Tc has R=1.0 to 1.3 and therefore is essentially not retarded. Strontium-85 has R = 1.0 to 1.3 on St. Peter, Berea, and Kayenta, but R=3 on San Felipe. This is attributed to sorption on the matrix material of San Felipe, which has 45 volume % matrix compared with 1 to 10 volume % for the others. Retardation factors (R/sub s/) for 85 Sr calculated from static sorption measurements are unity for all the sandstones. Therefore, the static and transport results for 85 Sr disagree in the case of San Felipe, but agree for St. Peter, Berea, and Kayenta

  7. Second reference calculation for the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Branstetter, L.J.

    1985-03-01

    Results of the second reference calculation for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project using the dynamic relaxation finite element code SANCHO are presented. This reference calculation is intended to predict the response of a typical panel of excavated rooms designed for storage of nonheat-producing nuclear waste. Results are presented that include relevant deformations, relative clay seam displacements, and stress and strain profiles. This calculation is a particular solution obtained by a computer code, which has proven analytic capabilities when compared with other structural finite element codes. It is hoped that the results presented here will be useful in providing scoping values for defining experiments and for developing instrumentation. It is also hoped that the calculation will be useful as part of an exercise in developing a methodology for performing important design calculations by more than one analyst using more than one computer code, and for defining internal Quality Assurance (QA) procedures for such calculations. 27 refs., 15 figs

  8. WIPP/SRL in-situ tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mamsey, W.G.

    1990-01-01

    The Materials Interface Interactions Test (MIIT) is the only in-situ program involving the burial of simulated high-level waste forms operating in the United States. Fifteen glass and waste form compositions and their proposed package materials, supplied by 7 countries, are interred in salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. A joint effort between Sandia National Laboratories and Savannah River Laboratory, MIIT is the largest international cooperative in-situ venture yet undertaken. The objective of the current study is to document the waste form compositions used in the MIIT program and then to examine compositional correlations based on structural considerations, bonding energies, and surface layer formation. These correlations show important similarities between the many different waste glass compositions studied world wide and suggest that these glasses would be expected to perform well and in a similar manner

  9. Second benchmark problem for WIPP structural computations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krieg, R.D.; Morgan, H.S.; Hunter, T.O.

    1980-12-01

    This report describes the second benchmark problem for comparison of the structural codes used in the WIPP project. The first benchmark problem consisted of heated and unheated drifts at a depth of 790 m, whereas this problem considers a shallower level (650 m) more typical of the repository horizon. But more important, the first problem considered a homogeneous salt configuration, whereas this problem considers a configuration with 27 distinct geologic layers, including 10 clay layers - 4 of which are to be modeled as possible slip planes. The inclusion of layering introduces complications in structural and thermal calculations that were not present in the first benchmark problem. These additional complications will be handled differently by the various codes used to compute drift closure rates. This second benchmark problem will assess these codes by evaluating the treatment of these complications

  10. Certifying the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Lessons Learned from the WIPP Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, D.R.; Chu, Margaret S.Y.; Froehlich, Gary K.; Howard, Bryan A.; Howarth, Susan M.; Larson, Kurt W.; Pickering, Susan Y.; Swift, Peter N.

    1999-01-01

    In May 1998, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as being in compliance with applicable long-term regulations governing the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level, and transuranic radioactive wastes. The WIPP is the first deep geologic repository in the US to have successfully demonstrated regulatory compliance with long-term radioactive waste disposal requirements. The first disposal of TRU waste at WIPP occurred on March 26, 1999. Many of the lessons learned during the WIPP Project's transition from site characterization and experimental research to the preparation of a successful application may be of general interest to other repository programs. During a four-year period (1992 to 1996), the WIPP team [including the DOE Carlsbad Area Office (CAO), the science advisor to CAO, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the management and operating contractor of the WIPP site, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WID)] met its aggressive schedule for submitting the application without compromising the integrity of the scientific basis for the long-term safety of the repository. Strong leadership of the CAO-SNL-WID team was essential. Within SNL, a mature and robust performance assessment (PA) allowed prioritization of remaining scientific activities with respect to their impact on regulatory compliance. Early and frequent dialog with EPA staff expedited the review process after the application was submitted. Questions that faced SNL are familiar to geoscientists working in site evaluation projects. What data should be gathered during site characterization? How can we know when data are sufficient? How can we know when our understanding of the disposal system is sufficient to support our conceptual models? What constitutes adequate ''validation'' of conceptual models for processes that act over geologic time? How should we use peer review and expert judgment? Other

  11. Final disposal in deep boreholes using multiple geological barriers. Digging deeper for safety. Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bracke, Guido; Hurst, Stephanie; Merkel, Broder; Mueller, Birgit; Schilling, Frank

    2016-03-15

    The proceedings of the workshop on final disposal in deep boreholes using multiple geological barriers - digging deeper for safety include contributions on the following topics: international status and safety requirements; geological and physical barriers; deep drilling - shaft building; technical barriers and emplacement technology for high P/T conditions; recovery (waste retrieval); geochemistry and monitoring.

  12. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindholm, I.; Berg, Oe.; Nonboel, E.

    1997-12-01

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project has involved research on quantification of the effects of selected severe accident phenomena for Nordic nuclear power plants, development and testing of a computerised accident management support system and data collection and description of various mobile reactors and of different reactor types existing in the UK. The investigations of severe accident phenomena focused mainly on in-vessel melt progression, covering a numerical assessment of coolability of a degraded BWR core, the possibility and consequences of a BWR reactor to become critical during reflooding and the core melt behavior in the reactor vessel lower plenum. Simulant experiments were carried out to investigate lower head hole ablation induced by debris discharge. In addition to the in-vessel phenomena, a limited study on containment response to high pressure melt ejection in a BWR and a comparative study on fission product source term behaviour in a Swedish PWR were performed. An existing computerised accident management support system (CAMS) was further developed in the area of tracking and predictive simulation, signal validation, state identification and user interface. The first version of a probabilistic safety analysis module was developed and implemented in the system. CAMS was tested in practice with Barsebaeck data in a safety exercise with the Swedish nuclear authority. The descriptions of the key features of British reactor types, AGR, Magnox, FBR and PWR were published as data reports. Separate reports were issued also on accidents in nuclear ships and on description of key features of satellite reactors. The collected data were implemented in a common Nordic database. (au)

  13. Safety against releases in severe accidents. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lindholm, I.; Berg, Oe.; Nonboel, E. [eds.

    1997-12-01

    The work scope of the RAK-2 project has involved research on quantification of the effects of selected severe accident phenomena for Nordic nuclear power plants, development and testing of a computerised accident management support system and data collection and description of various mobile reactors and of different reactor types existing in the UK. The investigations of severe accident phenomena focused mainly on in-vessel melt progression, covering a numerical assessment of coolability of a degraded BWR core, the possibility and consequences of a BWR reactor to become critical during reflooding and the core melt behavior in the reactor vessel lower plenum. Simulant experiments were carried out to investigate lower head hole ablation induced by debris discharge. In addition to the in-vessel phenomena, a limited study on containment response to high pressure melt ejection in a BWR and a comparative study on fission product source term behaviour in a Swedish PWR were performed. An existing computerised accident management support system (CAMS) was further developed in the area of tracking and predictive simulation, signal validation, state identification and user interface. The first version of a probabilistic safety analysis module was developed and implemented in the system. CAMS was tested in practice with Barsebaeck data in a safety exercise with the Swedish nuclear authority. The descriptions of the key features of British reactor types, AGR, Magnox, FBR and PWR were published as data reports. Separate reports were issued also on accidents in nuclear ships and on description of key features of satellite reactors. The collected data were implemented in a common Nordic database. (au) 39 refs.

  14. WIPP R and D in situ test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, L.D.

    1987-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a Department of Energy (DOE) RandD Facility for the purpose of developing the technology needed for the safe disposal of the United States' defense-related radioactive waste. The in situ test program focus is to provide the models and data to demonstrate the facility performance for isolation of waste at WIPP. The program is defined for the WIPP sealing system, thermal-structural interactions and waste package performance. A number of integrated large-scale underground tests have been operational since 1983 and are ongoing. The tests address the issues of both systems design and long-term isolation performance of the WIPP repository

  15. Environmental monitoring and cooperative resource management at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This poster session by the Environmental Monitoring Section of the US DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is to demonstrate that the DOE is committed to sound environmental management. This WIPP poster session demonstrates radiological as well as nonradiological environmental monitoring activities conducted routinely at the WIPP. And how data collected prior to the WIPP being operational is used to establish a preoperational baseline for environmental studies in which the samples collected during the operational phase will be compared. Cooperative Resource Management is a relatively new concept for governments agencies. It allows two or more agencies the ability to jointly share in funding a program or project and yet both agencies can benefit from the outcome. These programs are usually a biological type study. The WIPP cooperative agreement between the US BLM, DOE and its contractors is to continue the ongoing documentation of the diversity of the Chihuahuan desert

  16. Conclusions regarding geotechnical acceptability of the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1983-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was authorized by Congress in 1980 as an unlicensed research and development (R and D) facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes arising from the defense activities and programs of the United States. WIPP is now being constructed in southeast New Mexico, using salt beds about 655 m below the surface of the ground. Construction of the full WIPP facility will not commence until a preliminary underground excavation phase, called Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV), is satisfactorily concluded in the summer of 1983. This SPDV program permits confirmation of subsurface geology, in drifts at planned facility depth that extend for 1555 m in a north-south direction, and in the two vertical shafts that provide access to these drifts. The subsurface studies are nearing completion, and it is therefore appropriate to draw conclusions regarding the geotechnical acceptability of the WIPP site. Four geotechnical elements are discussed: dissolution, deformation, hydrologic regime, and natural resources

  17. Process Inherent Ultimate Safety (PIUS) reactor evaluation study: Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-02-01

    This report presents the results of an independent study by United Engineers and Constructors (UNITED) of the SECURE-P Process Inherent Ultimate Safety (PIUS) Reactor Concept which is presently under development by the Swedish light water reactor vendor ASEA-ATOM of Vasteras, Sweden. This study was performed to investigate whether there is any realistic basis for believing that the PIUS reactor could be a viable competitor in the US energy market in the future. Assessments were limited to the technical, economic and licensing aspects of PIUS. Socio-political issues, while certainly important in answering this question, are so broad and elusive that it was considered that addressing them with the limited perspective of one small group from one company would be of questionable value and likely be misleading. Socio-political issues aside, the key issue is economics. For this reason, the specific objectives of this study were to determine if the estimated PIUS plant cost will be competitive in the US market and to identify and evaluate the technical and licensing risks that might make PIUS uneconomical or otherwise unacceptable

  18. Final safety analysis report for the atmospheric protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-06-01

    An Atmospheric Protection System (APS) has been constructed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to minimize the release of radioactive particulate material to the atmosphere from nonroutine occurrences. Existing off-gas cleanup systems remove radioactive particulates to well below allowable limits for controlled areas before release to the plant stack. Previously all ventilation air from process cells was discharged to the stack without treatment. The APS provides continuous filtration of all ventilation air from process cells and backup filtration of all process off gases before they are released to the atmosphere. A safety analysis of the potential hazards associated with the APS has been completed. The review indicates that the system is capable of withstanding design basis natural phenomena including a flood, tornado, and earthquake without releasing unacceptable amounts of radioactive particulate from the filters to the environment. An in-cell explosion, fire, mechanical damage, and other postulated accident situations were investigated. From these, the design basis accident postulated for the facility is complete release of the maximum amount of radioactive particulate collected on the 104 ventilation air HEPA filters to the atmosphere via the 250-foot high stack. Even though the release of all the radioactive particulate contained on the filters is hardly credible, it would not present an unacceptable hazard to personnel on or offsite

  19. Fire safety of LPG in marine transportation. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martinsen, W.E.; Johnson, D.W.; Welker, J.R.

    1980-06-01

    This report contains an analytical examination of cargo spill and fire hazard potential associated with the marine handling of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as cargo. Principal emphasis was on cargo transfer operations for ships unloading at receiving terminals, and barges loading or unloading at a terminal. Major safety systems, including emergency shutdown systems, hazard detection systems, and fire extinguishment and control systems were included in the analysis. Spill probabilities were obtained from fault tree analyses utilizing composite LPG tank ship and barge designs. Failure rates for hardware in the analyses were generally taken from historical data on similar generic classes of hardware, there being very little historical data on the specific items involved. Potential consequences of cargo spills of various sizes are discussed and compared to actual LPG vapor cloud incidents. The usefulness of hazard mitigation systems (particularly dry chemical fire extinguishers and water spray systems) in controlling the hazards posed by LPG spills and spill fires is also discussed. The analysis estimates the probability of fatality for a terminal operator is about 10/sup -6/ to 10/sup -5/ per cargo transfer operation. The probability of fatality for the general public is substantially less.

  20. SAFETY OF PASSIVE HOUSES SUBJECTED TO EARTHQUAKE, FINAL REPORT

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vojko Kilar

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available he topic researched within the applied project. "Safety of passive houses subjected to earthquake" stemmed from two otherwise quite unrelated fields, i.e. seismic resistance and energy efficiency that in European countries do not frequently appear together. Just in Slovenia these two fields join each other, so identifying the problem and establishment of research right in Slovenia represents uniqueness and specificity. The majority of Slovenia is situated in area of moderate seismic risk. In order to ensure adequate mechanical resistance and stability of structures constructed in such area, the consideration of seismic effects is required by law. In Slovenia the number of passive houses and energy efficient buildings increases rapidly. However, for the time being the structural solutions that have been developed and broadly applied mainly in the areas with low seismicity (where the structural control to vertical static loads is sufficient are used. In earthquake-prone areas also adequate resistance to dynamic seismic effects have to be assured.

  1. Final Safety Assessment of Coal Tar as Used in Cosmetics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-07-01

    Coal Tar is a semisolid by-product obtained in the destructive distillation of bituminous coal, which functions in cosmetic products as a cosmetic biocide and denaturant-antidandruff agent is also listed as a function, but this is considered an over-the-counter (OTC) drug use. In 2002, Coal Tar was reported to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to be used in four formulations, all of which appear to be OTC drug products. Coal Tar is monographed by the FDA as Category I (safe and effective) OTC drug ingredient for use in the treatment of dandruff, seborrhoea, and psoriasis. Coal Tar is absorbed through the skin of animals and humans and is systemically distributed. Although the Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) Expert Panel believes that Coal Tar use as an antidandruff ingredient in OTC drug preparations is adequately addressed by the FDA regulations, the Panel also believes that the appropriate concentration of use of Coal Tar in cosmetic formulations should be that level that does not have a biological effect in the user. Additional data needed to make a safety assessment include product types in which Coal Tar is used (other than as an OTC drug ingredient), use concentrations, and the maximum concentration that does not induce a biological effect in users.

  2. Safety criteria for spent-fuel transport. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldmann, K.; Gekler, W.C.

    1986-10-01

    The focus of this study is on the question, ''Do current regulations provide reasonable assurance of safety for a transport scenario of spent fuel, as presently anticipated by the Department of Energy, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.'' This question has been addressed by developing a methodology for identifying the expected frequency of Accidents Which Exceed Regulatory Conditions in Severity (AWERCS) for spent fuel transport casks and then assessing the health effects resulting from that frequency. By applying the methodology to an illustrative case of road transports, it was found that the accidental release of radioactive material from impact AWERCS would make negligible contributions to health effects associated with spent fuel transports by road. It is also concluded that the current regulatory drop test requirements in 10 CFR 71.51 which form the basis for cask design and were used to establish AWERCS screening criteria for this study are adequate, and that no basis was found to conclude that cask performance under expected road accident conditions represents an undue risk to the public

  3. Test Plan: WIPP bin-scale CH TRU waste tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.

    1990-08-01

    This WIPP Bin-Scale CH TRU Waste Test program described herein will provide relevant composition and kinetic rate data on gas generation and consumption resulting from TRU waste degradation, as impacted by synergistic interactions due to multiple degradation modes, waste form preparation, long-term repository environmental effects, engineered barrier materials, and, possibly, engineered modifications to be developed. Similar data on waste-brine leachate compositions and potentially hazardous volatile organic compounds released by the wastes will also be provided. The quantitative data output from these tests and associated technical expertise are required by the WIPP Performance Assessment (PA) program studies, and for the scientific benefit of the overall WIPP project. This Test Plan describes the necessary scientific and technical aspects, justifications, and rational for successfully initiating and conducting the WIPP Bin-Scale CH TRU Waste Test program. This Test Plan is the controlling scientific design definition and overall requirements document for this WIPP in situ test, as defined by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), scientific advisor to the US Department of Energy, WIPP Project Office (DOE/WPO). 55 refs., 16 figs., 19 tabs

  4. 75 FR 61619 - Safety Zone; IJSBA World Finals, Lower Colorado River, Lake Havasu, AZ

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-06

    ... Sports Boating Association (IJSBA) World Finals. This temporary safety zone is necessary to provide for... International Jet Sports Boating Association (IJSBA) is sponsoring the IJSBA World Finals. The event will... 13211. Technical Standards The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) (15 U.S.C. 272...

  5. Review of the WIPP draft application to show compliance with EPA transuranic waste disposal standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.; Chaturvedi, L.; Clemo, T.M.

    1996-03-01

    The purpose of the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) is to conduct an independent technical evaluation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project to ensure the protection of the public health and safety and the environment. The WIPP Project, located in southeastern New Mexico, is being constructed as a repository for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) radioactive wastes generated by the national defense programs. The EEG was established in 1978 with funds provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to the State of New Mexico. Public Law 100-456, the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Section 1433, assigned EEG to the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and continued the original contract DE-AC04-79AL10752 through DOE contract DE-AC04-89AL58309. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, continues the authorization. EEG performs independent technical analyses of the suitability of the proposed site; the design of the repository, its planned operation, and its long-term integrity; suitability and safety of the transportation systems; suitability of the Waste Acceptance Criteria and the generator sites' compliance with them; and related subjects. These analyses include assessments of reports issued by the DOE and its contractors, other federal agencies and organizations, as they relate to the potential health, safety and environmental impacts from WIPP. Another important function of EEG is the independent environmental monitoring of background radioactivity in air, water, and soil, both on-site and off-site

  6. Review of the WIPP draft application to show compliance with EPA transuranic waste disposal standards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Neill, R.H.; Chaturvedi, L.; Clemo, T.M. [and others

    1996-03-01

    The purpose of the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) is to conduct an independent technical evaluation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project to ensure the protection of the public health and safety and the environment. The WIPP Project, located in southeastern New Mexico, is being constructed as a repository for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) radioactive wastes generated by the national defense programs. The EEG was established in 1978 with funds provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to the State of New Mexico. Public Law 100-456, the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Section 1433, assigned EEG to the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and continued the original contract DE-AC04-79AL10752 through DOE contract DE-AC04-89AL58309. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, continues the authorization. EEG performs independent technical analyses of the suitability of the proposed site; the design of the repository, its planned operation, and its long-term integrity; suitability and safety of the transportation systems; suitability of the Waste Acceptance Criteria and the generator sites` compliance with them; and related subjects. These analyses include assessments of reports issued by the DOE and its contractors, other federal agencies and organizations, as they relate to the potential health, safety and environmental impacts from WIPP. Another important function of EEG is the independent environmental monitoring of background radioactivity in air, water, and soil, both on-site and off-site.

  7. Upgrade Uranium Recovery Project No. 34110: final safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-09-01

    The accident analysis of the upgrade uranium recovery system indicated three potential hazards: (1) criticality, (2) toxic fumes from nitric acid solutions, and (3) release of toxic uranyl nitrate solutions. Any of these are capable of causing the death of one or more employees; therefore, they form the basis for the residual risks identified below. The analysis found no hazardous energies or substances capable of causing irreversible injury to, or the death of, any members of the public. The following residual risks will be controlled administratively by procedural constraints: An operator or maintenance error will cause 235 U to be transferred into an unsafe container and cause a criticality. An operator or maintenance error will cause containers of 235 U bearing material to be improperly spaced and cause a criticality. Extensive corrosion will cause a hole to form in a calciner tube, the corrosion will go undetected, and a criticality will result, and a loss of system and/or building solution containment will occur concurrent with a drain being open resulting in a criticality and/or release of toxic material. Additional residual risks that have a small probability are that an earthquake or tornado will affect the building, alter the system geometry, and initiate a criticality; that the compressed-gas (nitrogen) cylinder valve will be sheared off, become airborne, and alter the system geometry; and that loss of system and/or building solution containment may occur concurrently with fire sprinkler system actuation causing a criticality and/or release of toxic material. The following residual risks will be addressed in the Safety Study of the existing X-705 Building: that a spill of raffinate highly contaminated with 99 Tc will occur due to operator error or incorrect lab analysis and that a gaseous or liquid effluent release of small amounts of transuranic elements will occur

  8. Safety Culture Enhancement Project. Final Report. A Field Study on Approaches to Enhancement of Safety Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowe, Andrew; Hayward, Brent

    2006-08-01

    This report documents a study with the objective of enhancing safety culture in the Swedish nuclear power industry. A primary objective of this study was to ensure that the latest thinking on human factors principles was being recognised and applied by nuclear power operators as a means of ensuring optimal safety performance. The initial phase of the project was conducted as a pilot study, involving the senior management group at one Swedish nuclear power-producing site. The pilot study enabled the project methodology to be validated after which it was repeated at other Swedish nuclear power industry sites, providing a broad-ranging analysis of opportunities across the industry to enhance safety culture. The introduction to this report contains an overview of safety culture, explains the background to the project and sets out the project rationale and objectives. The methodology used for understanding and analysing the important safety culture issues at each nuclear power site is then described. This section begins with a summary of the processes used in the information gathering and data analysis stage. The six components of the Management Workshops conducted at each site are then described. These workshops used a series of presentations, interactive events and group exercises to: (a) provide feedback to site managers on the safety culture and safety leadership issues identified at their site, and (b) stimulate further safety thinking and provide 'take-away' information and leadership strategies that could be applied to promote safety culture improvements. Section 3, project Findings, contains the main observations and output from the project. These include: - a brief overview of aspects of the local industry operating context that impinge on safety culture; - a summary of strengths or positive attributes observed within the safety culture of the Swedish nuclear industry; - a set of identified opportunities for further improvement; - the aggregated results of the

  9. Safety Culture Enhancement Project. Final Report. A Field Study on Approaches to Enhancement of Safety Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lowe, Andrew; Hayward, Brent (Dedale Asia Pacific, Albert Park VIC 3206 (Australia))

    2006-08-15

    This report documents a study with the objective of enhancing safety culture in the Swedish nuclear power industry. A primary objective of this study was to ensure that the latest thinking on human factors principles was being recognised and applied by nuclear power operators as a means of ensuring optimal safety performance. The initial phase of the project was conducted as a pilot study, involving the senior management group at one Swedish nuclear power-producing site. The pilot study enabled the project methodology to be validated after which it was repeated at other Swedish nuclear power industry sites, providing a broad-ranging analysis of opportunities across the industry to enhance safety culture. The introduction to this report contains an overview of safety culture, explains the background to the project and sets out the project rationale and objectives. The methodology used for understanding and analysing the important safety culture issues at each nuclear power site is then described. This section begins with a summary of the processes used in the information gathering and data analysis stage. The six components of the Management Workshops conducted at each site are then described. These workshops used a series of presentations, interactive events and group exercises to: (a) provide feedback to site managers on the safety culture and safety leadership issues identified at their site, and (b) stimulate further safety thinking and provide 'take-away' information and leadership strategies that could be applied to promote safety culture improvements. Section 3, project Findings, contains the main observations and output from the project. These include: - a brief overview of aspects of the local industry operating context that impinge on safety culture; - a summary of strengths or positive attributes observed within the safety culture of the Swedish nuclear industry; - a set of identified opportunities for further improvement; - the aggregated

  10. Task Group on Safety Margins Action Plan (SMAP). Safety Margins Action Plan - Final Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hrehor, Miroslav; Gavrilas, Mirela; Belac, Josef; Sairanen, Risto; Bruna, Giovanni; Reocreux, Michel; Touboul, Francoise; Krzykacz-Hausmann, B.; Park, Jong Seuk; Prosek, Andrej; Hortal, Javier; Sandervaag, Odbjoern; Zimmerman, Martin

    2007-01-01

    The international nuclear community has expressed concern that some changes in existing plants could challenge safety margins while fulfilling all the regulatory requirements. In 1998, NEA published a report by the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities on Future Nuclear Regulatory Challenges. The report recognized 'Safety margins during more exacting operating modes' as a technical issue with potential regulatory impact. Examples of plant changes that can cause such exacting operating modes include power up-rates, life extension or increased fuel burnup. In addition, the community recognized that the cumulative effects of simultaneous changes in a plant could be larger than the accumulation of the individual effects of each change. In response to these concerns, CSNI constituted the safety margins action plan (SMAP) task group with the following objectives: 'To agree on a framework for integrated assessments of the changes to the overall safety of the plant as a result of simultaneous changes in plant operation / condition; To develop a CSNI document which can be used by member countries to assess the effect of plant change on the overall safety of the plant; To share information and experience.' The two approaches to safety analysis, deterministic and probabilistic, use different methods and have been developed mostly independently of each other. This makes it difficult to assure consistency between them. As the trend to use information on risk (where the term risk means results of the PSA/PRA analysis) to support regulatory decisions is growing in many countries, it is necessary to develop a method of evaluating safety margin sufficiency that is applicable to both approaches and, whenever possible, integrated in a consistent way. Chapter 2 elaborates on the traditional view of safety margins and the means by which they are currently treated in deterministic analyses. This chapter also discusses the technical basis for safety limits as they are used today

  11. WIPP/SRL Program - characterization of samples for burial in WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holtzscheiter, R.C.; Wicks, G.G.

    1984-01-01

    The laboratory studies described in this report characterize the performance and homogeneity of waste glass from a 2-ft-dia glass slice taken from a full-scale 2 ft by 10 ft canister filled with glass at TNX. The leaching performance of glass samples extracted from the slice was determined as a function of radial position and will be used in support of existing programs. The waste glass produced at TNX and used for the burial tests in WIPP was very homogeneous. The extent of glass leaching in brine (using standard MCC-1 leach tests and based on boron extraction) was 15X less than that of leaching in deionized water

  12. Final report of the safety assessment of Urea.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-01-01

    alone or with other agents in treatment of diseased skin. Overall, there are few reports of sensitization among the many clinical studies that report use of Urea in treatment of diseased skin. The Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) Expert Panel determined the data provided in this report to be sufficient to assess the safety of Urea. The Panel did note that Urea can cause uncoiling of DNA, a property used in many DNA studies, but concluded that this in vitro activity is not linked to any in vivo genotoxic activity. Although noting that formulators should be aware that Urea can increase the percutaneous absorption of other chemicals, the CIR Expert Panel concluded that Urea is safe as used in cosmetic products.

  13. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) fact sheet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended (42 USC 6901, et seq.), and the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (Section 74-4-1 et seq., NMSA 1978), Permit is issued to the owner and operator of the US DOE, WIPP site (hereafter called the Permittee(s)) to operate a hazardous waste storage facility consisting of a container storage unit (Waste Handling Building) and two Subpart X miscellaneous below-ground storage units (Bin Scale Test Rooms 1 and 3), all are located at the above location. The Permittee must comply with all terms and conditions of this Permit. This Permit consists of the conditions contained herein, including the attachments. Applicable regulations cited are the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, as amended 1992 (HWMR-7), the regulations that are in effect on the date of permit issuance. This Permit shall become effective upon issuance by the Secretary of the New Mexico Environment Department and shall be in effect for a period of ten (10) years from issuance. This Permit is also based on the assumption that all information contained in the Permit application and the administrative record is accurate and that the activity will be conducted as specified in the application and the administrative record. The Permit application consists of Revision 3, as well as associated attachments and clarifying information submitted on January 25, 1993, and May 17, 1993

  14. An HVAC [heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning] fault-tree analysis for WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] integrated risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirby, P.N.; Iacovino, J.M.

    1990-01-01

    In order to evaluate the public health risk of potential radioactive releases from operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a probabilistic risk assessment of waste-handling operations was conducted. One major aspect of this risk assessment involved fault-tree analysis of the plant heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems, which constitute the final barrier between waste-handling operations and the environment. The WIPP site is designed to receive and store two types of waste: contact-handled transuranic (CH TRU) wastes to be shipped in 208-ell drums and remote-handled (RH) TRU wastes to be shipped in shielded casks. The identification of accident sequences for CH waste operations revealed no identified accidents that could release significant radioactive particulates to the environment without a failure in the HVAC systems. When the HVAC fault-tree results were combined with other critical system fault trees and the analysis of waste-handling accident sequences, the approximation of the overall WIPP plant risk due to airborne releases was determined to be 2.6 x 10 -7 fatalities per year for the population within a 50-mile radius of the WIPP site. This risk was demonstrated to be well below the risk of fatality from other voluntary and involuntary activities for the population within the vicinity of the WIPP

  15. Final safety and hazards analysis for the Battelle LOCA simulation tests in the NRU reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Axford, D.J.; Martin, I.C.; McAuley, S.J.

    1981-04-01

    This is the final safety and hazards report for the proposed Battelle LOCA simulation tests in NRU. A brief description of equipment test design and operating procedure precedes a safety analysis and hazards review of the project. The hazards review addresses potential equipment failures as well as potential for a metal/water reaction and evaluates the consequences. The operation of the tests as proposed does not present an unacceptable risk to the NRU Reactor, CRNL personnel or members of the public. (author)

  16. The WIPP institutional program for states' involvement in WIPP transportation planning, and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonard, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Supplemental Stipulated Agreement of 1982 between the state of New Mexico and the Department of Energy (DOE) committed the DOE to emergency response training in New Mexico. In 1988, the state of New Mexico and the DOE entered into a two-year agreement providing $203,017 for financial assistance and $67,000 for equipment to enhance the state's emergency response capability. In 1990, this agreement was extended for an additional two years providing $226,088 for financial assistance and $39,000 for emergency response equipment. Also, in 1988 an agreement between the Western Governors' Association and the United States Department of Transportation provided $1.0 million to seven western states (Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) to identify and implement programs to help ensure the safe transportation of transuranic waste from western points of origin to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). As part of this process, the Western Governors' Association and the seven states prepared the Report to Congress, Transport of Transuranic Wastes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: State Concerns and Proposed Solutions. In July 1990, a five-year cooperative agreement between the Western Governors' Association and the DOE was signed providing $1.515 million in funding to seven states along the Hanford/WIPP route. This continued the work started under the Department of Transportation's cooperative agreement

  17. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 15 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-11-01

    WIPP 15 is a borehole drilled in Marformation.h, 1978, in section 18, T.23S., R. 35E. of south-central Lea County. The purpose of WIPP 15 was to examine fill in San Simon Sink in order to extract climatic information and to attempt to date the collapse of the sink. The borehole was cored to total depth (810.5 feet) and encountered, from top to bottom, Quaternary calcareous clay, marl and sand, the claystones and siltstones of the Triassic Santa Rosa Formation. Neutron and gamma ray geophysical logs were run to measure density and radioactivity. The sink was about 547 feet of Quaternary fill indicating subsidence and deposition. Diatomaceous beds exposed on the sink margin yielded samples dated by 14 C at 20,570 +- 540 years BP and greater than 32,000 years BP; these beds are believed stratigraphically equivalent to ditomaceous beds at 153 to 266 feet depth in the core. Aquatic fauna and flora from the upper 98 feet of core indicate a pluvial period (probably Tohokan) followed by an arid or very arid time before the present climate was established. Aquifer pump tests performed in the Quaternary sands and clays show transmissivities to be as high as 600 feet squared per day. As the water quality was good, the borehole was released to the lessee as a potential water well

  18. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 15 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1981-11-01

    WIPP 15 is a borehole drilled in Marformation.h, 1978, in section 18, T.23S., R. 35E. of south-central Lea County. The purpose of WIPP 15 was to examine fill in San Simon Sink in order to extract climatic information and to attempt to date the collapse of the sink. The borehole was cored to total depth (810.5 feet) and encountered, from top to bottom, Quaternary calcareous clay, marl and sand, the claystones and siltstones of the Triassic Santa Rosa Formation. Neutron and gamma ray geophysical logs were run to measure density and radioactivity. The sink was about 547 feet of Quaternary fill indicating subsidence and deposition. Diatomaceous beds exposed on the sink margin yielded samples dated by /sup 14/C at 20,570 +- 540 years BP and greater than 32,000 years BP; these beds are believed stratigraphically equivalent to ditomaceous beds at 153 to 266 feet depth in the core. Aquatic fauna and flora from the upper 98 feet of core indicate a pluvial period (probably Tohokan) followed by an arid or very arid time before the present climate was established. Aquifer pump tests performed in the Quaternary sands and clays show transmissivities to be as high as 600 feet squared per day. As the water quality was good, the borehole was released to the lessee as a potential water well.

  19. A feasibility study for Arizona's roadway safety management process using the Highway Safety Manual and SafetyAnalyst : final report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-07-01

    To enable implementation of the American Association of State Highway Transportation (AASHTO) Highway Safety Manual using : SaftetyAnalyst (an AASHTOWare software product), the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) studied the data assessment :...

  20. Concentration of uranium in the drinking and surface water around the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khaing, H.; Lemons, B.G.; Thakur, P.

    2016-01-01

    Activity concentration of uranium isotopes ( 238 U, 234 U and 235 U) were analyzed in drinking and surface water samples collected in the vicinity of the WIPP site using alpha spectroscopy. The purpose of this study was to investigate the changes in uranium concentrations (if any) in the vicinity of the WIPP site and whether the February 14, 2014 radiation release event at the WIPP had any detectable impact on the water bodies around the WIPP. (author)

  1. Resource conservation and recovery act draft hazardous waste facility permit: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-08-01

    Volume IV contains the following attachments for Module IV: VOC monitoring plan for bin-room tests (Appendix D12); bin emission control and VOC monitoring system drawings; bin scale test room ventilation drawings; WIPP supplementary roof support system, underground storage area, room 1, panel 1, DOE/WIPP 91-057; and WIPP supplementary roof support system, room 1, panel 1, geotechnical field data analysis bi-annual report, DOE/WIPP 92-024

  2. WIPP - Pre-Licensing and Operations: Developer and Regulator Perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peake, Tom; Patterson, R.

    2014-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a disposal system for defense-related transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste. Developed by the Department of Energy (DOE), WIPP is located in Southeastern New Mexico: radioactive waste is disposed of 2,150 feet underground in an ancient layer of salt with a total capacity of 6.2 million cubic feet of waste. Congress authorized the development and construction of WIPP in 1980 for the express purpose of providing a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States. This paper makes a historical review of the site development, site operations (waste disposal operations started in 1999), communications between US EPA and DOE, the chronology of pre-licensing and pre-operations, the operational phase and the regulatory challenges, and the lessons learned after 12 years of operations

  3. Project Guarantee 1985. Final repository for high-level radioactive wastes: The system of safety barriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    Final disposal of radioactive waste involves preventing the waste from returning from the repository location into the biosphere by means of successively arranged containment measures known as safety barriers. In the present volume NGB 85-04 of the series of reports for Project 'Guarantee' 1985, the safety barrier system for the type C repository for high-level waste is described. The barrier parameters which are relevant for safety analysis are quantified and associated error limits and data scatter are given. The aim of the report is to give a summary documentation of the safety analysis input data and their scientific background. For secure containment of radioactive waste safety barriers are used which effectively limit the release of radioactive material from the repository (release barriers) and effectively retard the entry of the original radioactive material into the biosphere (time barriers). Safety barriers take the form of both technically constructed containment measures and the siting of the repository in suitable geological formations. The technical safety barrier system in the case of high-level waste comprises: the waste solidification matrix (borosilicate glass), massive steel canisters, encasement of the waste canisters, encasement of the waste canisters in highly compacted bentonite, sealing of vacant storage space and access routes on repository closure. The natural geological safety barriers - the host rock and overlying formations provide sufficiently long deep groundwater flow times from the repository location to the earth's surface and for additional lengthening of radionuclide migration times by means of various chemical and physical retardation mechanisms. The stability of the geological formations is so great that hydrogeological system is protected for a sufficient length of time from deterioration caused, in particular, by erosion. Observations in the final section of the report indicate that input data for the type C repository safety

  4. Chronic beryllium disease prevention program; worker safety and health program. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2006-02-09

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is today publishing a final rule to implement the statutory mandate of section 3173 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2003 to establish worker safety and health regulations to govern contractor activities at DOE sites. This program codifies and enhances the worker protection program in operation when the NDAA was enacted.

  5. Radiation protection and safety for final disposal of radioactive wastes stored in Abadia de Goias, Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This standard aims to satisfy the radiation protection and safety conditions required by Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) for final disposal of radioactive wastes stored in Abadia de Goias. These wastes are products of the accident happened in 1987 caused by the Cs-137 source violation. (M.V.M.)

  6. ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR) and relevant documents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    This volume contains the fourth major milestone report and documents associated with its acceptance, review and approval. This ITER Final Design Report, Cost Review and Safety Analysis was presented to the ITER Council at its 13th meeting in February 1998 and was approved at its extraordinary meeting on 25 June 1998. The contents include an outline of the ITER objectives, the ITER parameters and design overview as well as operating scenarios and plasma performance. Furthermore, design features, safety and environmental characteristics and schedule and cost estimates are given

  7. Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the N Basin Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1998-08-01

    The purposes of this report are to serve as the auditable safety analysis (ASA) for the N Basin Segment, during surveillance and maintenance preceding decontamination and decommissioning; to determine and document the final hazard classification (FHC) for the N Basin Segment. The result of the ASA evaluation are: based on hazard analyses and the evaluation of accidents, no activity could credibly result in an unacceptable exposure to an individual; controls are identified that serve to protect worker health and safety. The results of the FHC evaluation are: potential exposure is much below 10 rem (0.46 rem), and the FHC for the N Basin Segment is Radiological

  8. Evaluation of the proposed WIPP site in southeast New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    Five years of earth science characterization of the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site provide a high level of assurance that the area is satisfactory for development of a geologic repository. Ecological investigations and socioeconomic studies have indicated only relatively benign impacts will occur from construction, operation and long-term aspects of the repository

  9. WIPP: Lessons learned for state/DOE consultation and cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.

    1986-01-01

    WIPP is intended to be a repository for permanent disposal of 6,200,000 cu ft of transuranic waste generated from the nation's defense programs. The waste is not fixed, up to 1% can be respirable and it is stored in conventional 17-C Type A Carbon steel drums with a design life of 20 years. (Storage began in 1970). The waste form is not fused in an insoluble glass matrix and there is no commitment by DOE for getters. The question arises of the need and desirability to perform experiments with high level wastes at WIPP. The original purpose in the Oct 1980 WIPP FIES stated ''...the experiments are not so much concerned with the WIPP itself, as they are with planning future high level waste repositories. They are to answer technical questions about the disposal of high level waste in bedded salt and to provide a valid demonstration of the concepts involved.'' The purpose of this paper is to provide information for RH TRU disposal and to generate scientific knowledge that may be helpful to others and not to demonstrate high level waste disposal

  10. Evaluation of the proposed WIPP site in southeast New Mexico

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weart, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    Five years of earth science characterization of the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site provide a high level of assurance that the area is satisfactory for development of a geologic repository. Ecological investigations and socioeconomic studies have indicated only relatively benign impacts will occur from construction, operation and long-term aspects of the repository.

  11. Characterization of mixed CH-TRU waste for the WIPP Experimental Test Program conducted at ANL-W

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dwight, C.C.; McClellan, G.C.; Guay, K.P. [Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Courtney, J.C. [Louisiana State Univ., Baton Rouge, LA (United States); Duff, M.J. [Consolidated Technical Services, Inc., Walkersville, MD (United States)

    1992-02-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is participating in the Department of Energy`s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experimental Test Program by characterizing and repackaging mixed contact-handled transuranic waste. Characterization activities include gas sampling the waste containers, visually examining the waste contents, categorizing the contents according to their gas generation potentials, and weighing the contents. The waste is repackaged from 0.21m{sup 3} (55 gallon) drums into instrumented steel test bins which can hold up to six drum-equivalents in volume. Eventually the loaded test bins will be shipped to WIPP where they will be evaluated during a five-year test program. Three test bins of inorganic solids (primarily glass) were prepared between March and September 1991 and are ready for shipment to WIPP. The characterization activities confirmed process knowledge of the waste and verified the nondestructive examinations; the gas sample analyses showed the target constituents to be within allowable regulatory limits. A new waste characterization chamber is being developed at ANL-W which will improve worker safety, decrease the potential for contamination spread, and increase the waste characterization throughput. The new facility is expected to begin operations by Fall 1992. A comprehensive summary of the project is contained herein.

  12. Characterization of mixed CH-TRU waste for the WIPP Experimental Test Program conducted at ANL-W

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dwight, C.C.; McClellan, G.C.; Guay, K.P. (Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)); Courtney, J.C. (Louisiana State Univ., Baton Rouge, LA (United States)); Duff, M.J. (Consolidated Technical Services, Inc., Walkersville, MD (United States))

    1992-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is participating in the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experimental Test Program by characterizing and repackaging mixed contact-handled transuranic waste. Characterization activities include gas sampling the waste containers, visually examining the waste contents, categorizing the contents according to their gas generation potentials, and weighing the contents. The waste is repackaged from 0.21m{sup 3} (55 gallon) drums into instrumented steel test bins which can hold up to six drum-equivalents in volume. Eventually the loaded test bins will be shipped to WIPP where they will be evaluated during a five-year test program. Three test bins of inorganic solids (primarily glass) were prepared between March and September 1991 and are ready for shipment to WIPP. The characterization activities confirmed process knowledge of the waste and verified the nondestructive examinations; the gas sample analyses showed the target constituents to be within allowable regulatory limits. A new waste characterization chamber is being developed at ANL-W which will improve worker safety, decrease the potential for contamination spread, and increase the waste characterization throughput. The new facility is expected to begin operations by Fall 1992. A comprehensive summary of the project is contained herein.

  13. Characterization of mixed CH-TRU waste for the WIPP Experimental Test Program conducted at ANL-W

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwight, C.C.; McClellan, G.C.; Guay, K.P.; Courtney, J.C.; Duff, M.J.

    1992-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is participating in the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experimental Test Program by characterizing and repackaging mixed contact-handled transuranic waste. Characterization activities include gas sampling the waste containers, visually examining the waste contents, categorizing the contents according to their gas generation potentials, and weighing the contents. The waste is repackaged from 0.21m 3 (55 gallon) drums into instrumented steel test bins which can hold up to six drum-equivalents in volume. Eventually the loaded test bins will be shipped to WIPP where they will be evaluated during a five-year test program. Three test bins of inorganic solids (primarily glass) were prepared between March and September 1991 and are ready for shipment to WIPP. The characterization activities confirmed process knowledge of the waste and verified the nondestructive examinations; the gas sample analyses showed the target constituents to be within allowable regulatory limits. A new waste characterization chamber is being developed at ANL-W which will improve worker safety, decrease the potential for contamination spread, and increase the waste characterization throughput. The new facility is expected to begin operations by Fall 1992. A comprehensive summary of the project is contained herein

  14. In-Situ Testing and Performance Assessment of a Redesigned WIPP Panel Closure - 13192

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Klein, Thomas [URS-Professional Solutions, 4021 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States); Patterson, Russell [Department of Energy-Carlsbad Field Office, 4021 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States); Camphouse, Chris; Herrick, Courtney; Kirchner, Thomas; Malama, Bwalya; Zeitler, Todd [Sandia National Laboratories-Carlsbad, 4100 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States); Kicker, Dwayne [SM Stoller Corporation-Carlsbad, 4100 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM (United States)

    2013-07-01

    There are two primary regulatory requirements for Panel Closures at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the nation's only deep geologic repository for defense related Transuranic (TRU) and Mixed TRU waste. The Federal requirement is through 40 CFR 191 and 194, promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The state requirement is regulated through the authority of the Secretary of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) under the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA), New Mexico Statutes Annotated (NMSA) 1978, chap. 74-4-1 through 74-4-14, in accordance with the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR), 20.4.1 New Mexico Annotated Code (NMAC). The state regulations are implemented for the operational period of waste emplacement plus 30 years whereas the federal requirements are implemented from the operational period through 10,000 years. The 10,000 year federal requirement is related to the adequate representation of the panel closures in determining long-term performance of the repository. In Condition 1 of the Final Certification Rulemaking for 40 CFR Part 194, the EPA required a specific design for the panel closure system. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has requested, through the Planned Change Request (PCR) process, that the EPA modify Condition 1 via its rulemaking process. The DOE has also requested, through the Permit Modification Request (PMR) process, that the NMED modify the approved panel closure system specified in Permit Attachment G1. The WIPP facility is carved out of a bedded salt formation 655 meters below the surface of southeast New Mexico. Condition 1 of the Final Certification Rulemaking specifies that the waste panels be closed using Option D which is a combination of a Salado mass concrete (SMC) monolith and an isolation/explosion block wall. The Option D design was also accepted as the panel closure of choice by the NMED. After twelve years of waste handling

  15. Denying a patient's final will: public safety vs. medical confidentiality and patient autonomy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gaertner, Jan; Vent, Julia; Greinwald, Ralf; Rothschild, Markus A; Ostgathe, Christoph; Kessel, Rene; Voltz, Raymond

    2011-12-01

    Especially when caring for patients approaching the end of life, physicians and nursing staff feel committed to fulfilling as many patient desires as possible. However, sometimes a patient's "final will" may threaten public safety. This can lead to severe conflicts, outweighing the physician's obligation and dedication to care for the patient and to respect his autonomy. Yet, public safety can be threatened if confidentiality is not broken. This article provides a concise summary of the medicolegal and ethical fundamentals concerning this difficult situation. If the patient's and others' health and safety are at risk, physicians may (and in some countries must) break medical confidentiality and disclose confidential patient information to the police and other authorities. Physicians should be able to professionally deal with such a conflict in all patients, not only in patients with advanced illness. Copyright © 2011 U.S. Cancer Pain Relief Committee. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  16. Final hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the 105-C Reactor Interim Safe Storage Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.; Larson, A.R.; Dexheimer, D.

    1996-12-01

    This document summarizes the inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials present in the 105-C Reactor Facility and the operations associated with the Interim Safe Storage Project which includes decontamination and demolition and interim safe storage of the remaining facility. This document also establishes a final hazard classification and verifies that appropriate and adequate safety functions and controls are in place to reduce or mitigate the risk associated with those operations

  17. Basic data report for Drillhole AEC 7 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    AEC 7 is a borehole drilled in western Lea County, New Mexico, in section 31, T.21S.,R.32E. AEC 7 was drilled to 3918 feet in 1974 by Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Sandia deepened the hole to 4732 ft in 1979. The borehole provided stratigraphic and lithologic information in the initial and final drilling. The borehole was used extensively for tests of borehole plugs and plugging operations. AEC 7 penetrated, in descending order, Holocene sands and Mescalero caliche (8 ft), Santa Rosa Sandstone (109 ft), Dewey Lake Red Beds (542 ft), Rustler Formation (325 ft), Salado Formation (2014 ft), Castile Formation (1521 ft), and the upper Bell Canyon Formation (197 ft). Cores were obtained from much of the borehole. An extensive suite of geophysical logs provides information on stratigraphy, lithology, and structure. Beds were in normal stratigraphic sequence and without structural deformation except in the lower Castile. Anhydrite II and Halite II appear to be repeated in the borehole. This section was penetrated during deepening by Sandia; the structural complication is consistent with deformation found nearby in ERDA 6. The potential site on which AEC 7 is located was abandoned in 1976 after ERDA 6 was drilled. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  18. Project Guarantee 1985. Final repository for low- and intermediate level radioactive wastes: Safety report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    Storage of radioactive waste must delay the return of radionuclides to the biosphere for a long period of time and must maintain the release rates at a sufficiently low level for all time. This is achieved with the aid of a series of safety barriers which consist, on the one hand, of technical barriers in the repository and, on the other hand , of natural geological barriers as they occur at the repository location. In order to assess the efficiency of the barriers, the working methods of the technical barriers and the host rock must be understood. This understanding is transferred into quantitative models in order to calculate the safety of the repository. The individual barriers and the methods used to modelling their functions were described in volume NGB 85-07 of the Project Guarantee 1985 report series and the data necessary for modelling were given. The models and data are used in the safety analysis, the results of which are contained in the present report. Safety considerations show that models are available in Switzerland which allow, in principle, an assessment of the long-term behaviour of a repository for low- and intermediate-level waste. The evaluation of earlier studies and experimental work, suitable laboratory measurements and results from field research enable compilation of a representative data-set so that the requirements for quantitative statements on safety of final disposal are met from this side also. The safety calculations show that the radiation doses calculated for a base case scenario with realistic/conservative parameter values are negligibly low. Also, radiation doses which are clearly under the protection standard of 10 mrem per year result for conservative values and the cumulation of several conservative assumptions. Even assuming exposure of the repository by erosion, a radiotoxicity of the soil formed results which is under natural values

  19. Grouts and concretes for the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wakeley, L.D.

    1990-01-01

    The Structures Laboratory of the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station has conducted research on cement-based composites for the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) since 1977, in cooperation with Sandia National Laboratories. Field testing requirements guided initial development of grouts. Concurrent and later laboratory studies explored the chemical stability and probable durability of these mixtures. Beginning in 1985, a series of small-scale seal performance tests at the WIPP prompted development of an expansive salt-saturated concrete. Important lessons learned from this ongoing work include: (1) carefully tailored mixtures can tolerate phase changes involving Ca, Al, and SO 4 , without loss of structural integrity; (2) handling and placement properties are probably more crucial to the mixtures than is exact phase composition; and (3) for the environment of a geologic repository, demonstrated chemical durability will be the best indicator of long-term performance

  20. Constitutive representation of damage development and healing in WIPP salt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chan, K.S.; Bodner, S.R.; Fossum, A.F.; Munson, D.E.

    1994-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in characterizing and modeling the constitutive behavior of rock salt with particular reference to long-term creep and creep failure. The interest is motivated by the projected use of excavated rooms in salt rock formations as repositories for nuclear waste. It is presumed that closure of those rooms by creep ultimately would encapsulate the waste material, resulting in its effective isolation. A continuum mechanics approach for treating damage healing is formulated as part of a constitutive model for describing coupled creep, fracture, and healing in rock salt. Formulation of the healing term is, described and the constitutive model is evaluated against experimental data of rock salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. The results indicate that healing anistropy in WIPP salt can be modeled with an appropriate power-conjugate equivalent stress, kinetic equation, and evolution equation for damage healing

  1. Assessment of allowable transuranic activity levels for WIPP wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    This study provides a technical evaluation for the establishment of an upper limit on the transuranic content of waste packages to be received. To accomplish this, the predicted radiological performance of WIPP is compared to the radiological performance requirements applicable to WIPP. These performance requirements include radiation protection standards for both routine facility operations and credible operational accidents. These requirements are discussed in Chapter 2.0. From the margin between predicted performance and the performance requirements, the maximum allowable transuranic content of waste packages can then be inferred. Within the resulting compliance envelope, a waste acceptance criterion can be established that delineates the allowable level of transuranic radioactivity content for contact handled (CH) and remote handled (RH) waste packages. 13 refs., 8 tabs

  2. New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group - experience in reviewing WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group is to conduct an independent evaluation of the potential radiation exposure to people from WIPP--a radioactive waste facility intended to permanently dispose transuranic radioactive waste generated from the nation's nuclear weapons program. The concept of a State review of a proposed radioactive waste facility has been endorsed by both Federal and State legislative and executive agencies, and the experiences and interactions of the past four years to solve problems of this first-of-a-kind radioactive waste facility has led to many innovations in conflict resolution. The multidisciplinary Group's position is neither pro nor anti-WIPP and results are published and given broad dissemination to insure technical and public scrutiny of its work

  3. Los Alamos National Laboratory Develops ''Quick to WIPP'' Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, R.; Allen, G.; Kosiewicz, S.; Martin, B.; LANL; Nunz, J.; Biedscheid, J.; Sellmer, T.; Willis, J.; Orban, J.; Liekhus, K.; Djordjevic, S.

    2003-01-01

    The Cerro Grande forest fire in May of 2000 and the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 precipitated concerns of the vulnerability of legacy contact-handled (CH), high-wattage transuranic (TRU) waste stored at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). An analysis of the 9,100 cubic meters of stored CH-TRU waste revealed that 400 cubic meters or 4.5% of the inventory represented 61% of the risk. The analysis further showed that this 400 cubic meters was contained in only 2,000 drums. These facts and the question ''How can the disposition of this waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) be accelerated?'' formed the genesis of LANL's Quick to WIPP initiative

  4. Probabilistic Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants; Phases 2-4 / Final Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bengtsson, Lisa; Knochenhauer, Michael; Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Rossi, Jukka

    2011-05-01

    identified, such as the problem of consistency in judgement, comparability of safety goals used in different industries, the relationship between criteria on different levels, and relations between criteria for level 2 and 3 PSA. In parallel, additional context information has been provided. This was achieved by extending the international overview by contributing to and benefiting from a survey on PSA safety criteria which was initiated in 2006 within the OECD/NEA Working Group Risk. Finally, a separate report has been issued providing general guidance concerning the formulation, application and interpretation of probabilistic criteria. The results from the project can be used as a platform for discussions at the utilities on how to define and use quantitative safety goals. The results can also be used by safety authorities as a reference for risk-informed regulation. The outcome can have an impact on the requirements on PSA, e.g., regarding quality, scope, level of detail, and documentation. Finally, the results can be expected to support on-going activities concerning risk-informed applications

  5. Sandia Review of High Bridge Associates Report: Comparison of Plutonium Disposition Alternatives: WIPP Diluted Plutonium Storage and MOX Fuel Irradiation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shoemaker, Paul E. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hardin, Ernest [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Park, HeeHo Daniel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Brady, Patrick Vane [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rechard, Robert P. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-08-01

    The subject report from High Bridge Associates (HBA) was issued on March 2, 2016, in reaction to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program decision to pursue down-blending of surplus Pu and geologic disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Sandia National Laboratories was requested by the DOE to review the technical arguments presented in the HBA report. Specifically, this review is organized around three technical topics: criticality safety, radiological release limits, and thermal impacts. Questions raised by the report pertaining to legal and regulatory requirements, safeguards and security, international agreements, and costing of alternatives, are beyond the scope of this review.

  6. Test plan: Potash Core Test. WIPP experimental program borehole plugging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, C.L.

    1979-09-01

    The Potash Core Test will utilize a WIPP emplaced plug to obtain samples of an in-situ cured plug of known mix constituents for bench scale testing. An earlier effort involved recovery at the salt horizon of Plug 217, a 17 year old plug in a potash exploration hole for bond testing, but the lack of particulars in the emplacement precluded significant determination of plug performance

  7. Permeability of WIPP Salt During Damage Evolution and Healing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BODNER, SOL R.; CHAN, KWAI S.; MUNSON, DARRELL E.

    1999-01-01

    The presence of damage in the form of microcracks can increase the permeability of salt. In this paper, an analytical formulation of the permeability of damaged rock salt is presented for both initially intact and porous conditions. The analysis shows that permeability is related to the connected (i.e., gas accessible) volumetric strain and porosity according to two different power-laws, which may be summed to give the overall behavior of a porous salt with damage. This relationship was incorporated into a constitutive model, known as the Multimechanism Deformation Coupled Fracture (MDCF) model, which has been formulated to describe the inelastic flow behavior of rock salt due to coupled creep, damage, and healing. The extended model was used to calculate the permeability of rock salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site under conditions where damage evolved with stress over a time period. Permeability changes resulting from both damage development under deviatoric stresses and damage healing under hydrostatic pressures were considered. The calculated results were compared against experimental data from the literature, which indicated that permeability in damaged intact WIPP salt depends on the magnitude of the gas accessible volumetric strain and not on the total volumetric strain. Consequently, the permeability of WIPP salt is significantly affected by the kinetics of crack closure, but shows little dependence on the kinetics of crack removal by sintering

  8. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site gravity survey and interpretation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrows, L.J.; Fett, J.D.

    1983-04-01

    A portion of the WIPP site has been extensively surveyed with high-precision gravity. The main survey (in T22S, R31E) covered a rectangular area 2 by 4-1/3 mi encompassing all of WIPP site Zone II and part of the disturbed zone to the north of the site. Stations were at 293-ft intervals along 13 north-south lines 880 ft apart. The data are considered accurate to within a few hundredths of a milligal. Long-wavelength gravity anomalies correlate well with seismic time structures on horizons below the Castile Formation. Both the gravity anomalies and the seismic time structures are interpreted as resulting from related density and velocity variations within the Ochoan Series. Shorter wavelength negative gravity anomalies are interpreted as resulting from bulk density alteration in the vicinity of karst conduits. The WIPP gravity survey was unable to resolve low-amplitude, long-wavelength anomalies that should result from the geologic structures within the disturbed zone. It did indicate the degree and character of karst development within the surveyed area

  9. WIPP: a perspective from ten years of operating success - 16189

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregory, Phillip C.

    2009-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located 35 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA is the first and, to the author's knowledge, only facility in the world for the permanent disposal of defense related transuranic (TRU) waste. Soon after plutonium was first synthesized in 1940 by a team of scientists at the University of California Berkeley Laboratory, the need to find a permanent repository for plutonium contaminated waste was recognized due to the more than 24,000 year half-life of Plutonium-239 ( 239 Pu). In 1957 the National Academy of Sciences published a report recommending deep geological burial in bedded salt as a possible solution. However, more than 50 years passed before the solution was achieved when in 1999 WIPP received the first shipment of TRU waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory. Ten years later, more than 7,600 shipments of TRU waste have been disposed of in rooms mined in an ancient salt bed more than 2,000 feet underground. This paper provides a brief history of WIPP with an overview of the technical, regulatory, and political hurdles that had to be overcome before the idea of a permanent disposal facility became reality. The paper focuses primarily on the safe, uneventful transportation program that has moved 100,000- plus containers of TRU waste from various U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) generator and/or storage sites across the Unites States to southeastern New Mexico. (author)

  10. A coupled mechanical/hydrologic model for WIPP shaft seals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehgartner, B.

    1991-06-01

    Effective sealing of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) shafts will be required to isolate defense-generated transuranic wastes from the accessible environment. Shafts penetrate water-bearing hard rock formations before entering a massive creeping-salt formation (Salado) where the WIPP is located. Short and long-term seals are planned for the shafts. Short-term seals, a composite of concrete and bentonite, will primarily be located in the hard rock formations separating the water-bearing zones from the Salado Formation. These seals will limit water flow to the underlying long-term seals in the Salado. The long-term seals will consist of lengthly segments of initially unsaturated crushed salt. Creep closure of the shaft will consolidate unsaturated crushed salt, thereby reducing its permeability. However, water passing through the upper short-term seals and brine inherent to the salt host rock itself will eventually saturate the crushed salt and consolidation could be inhibited. Before saturating, portions of the crushed salt in the shafts are expected to consolidate to a permeability equivalent to the salt host rock, thereby effectively isolating the waste from the overlying water-bearing formations. A phenomenological model is developed for the coupled mechanical/hydrologic behavior of sealed WIPP shafts. The model couples creep closure of the shaft, crushed salt consolidation, and the associated reduction in permeability with Darcy's law for saturated fluid flow to predict the overall permeability of the shaft seal system with time. 17 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab

  11. Nuclear emergency preparedness. Final report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Project BOK-1

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lauritzen, B.

    2002-01-01

    Final report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research project BOK-1. The BOK-1 project, “Nuclear Emergency Preparedness”, was carried out in 1998-2001 with participants from the Nordic and Baltic Sea regions. The project consists of six sub-projects:Laboratory measurements and quality assurance (BOK-1.......1); Mobile measurements and measurement strategies (BOK-1.2); Field measurements and data assimilation (BOK-1.3); Countermeasures in agriculture and forestry (BOK-1.4); Emergency monitoring in theNordic and Baltic Sea countries (BOK-1.5); and Nuclear exercises (BOK-1.6). For each sub-project, the project...

  12. Technical basis for the ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-12-01

    The ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR) is the 4th major milestone, representing the progress made in the ITER Engineering Design Activities. With the approval of the Detailed Design Report (DDR), the design work was concentrated on the requirements of operation, with only relatively minor changes to design concepts of major components. The FDR is the culmination of almost 6 years collaborative design and supporting technical work by the ITER Joint Central Team and Home Teams under the terms of the ITER EDA Agreement. Refs, figs, tabs

  13. Technical basis for the ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The ITER final design report, cost review and safety analysis (FDR) is the 4th major milestone, representing the progress made in the ITER Engineering Design Activities. With the approval of the Detailed Design Report (DDR), the design work was concentrated on the requirements of operation, with only relatively minor changes to design concepts of major components. The FDR is the culmination of almost 6 years collaborative design and supporting technical work by the ITER Joint Central Team and Home Teams under the terms of the ITER EDA Agreement

  14. Auditable safety analysis and final hazard classification for Buildings 1310-N and 1314-N

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1997-05-01

    This document is a graded auditable safety analysis (ASA) of the deactivation activities planned for the 100-N facility segment comprised of the Building 1310-N pump silo (part of the Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility) and 1314-N Building (Liquid Waste Disposal Building).The ASA describes the hazards within the facility and evaluates the adequacy of the measures taken to reduce, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. This document also serves as the Final Hazard Classification (FHC) for the 1310-N pump silo and 1314-N Building segment. The FHC is radiological based on the Preliminary Hazard Classification and the total inventory of radioactive and hazardous materials in the segment

  15. Waste compatibility safety issues and final results for tank 241-T-110 push mode samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuzum, J.L.

    1997-01-01

    This document is the final laboratory report for Tank 241-T-110. Push mode core segments were removed from risers 2 and 6 between January 29, 1997, and February 7, 1997. Segments were received and extruded at 222-S Laboratory. Analyses were performed in accordance with Tank 241-T-110 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP) and Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO). None of the subsamples submitted for total alpha activity (AT) or differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analyses exceeded the notification limits stated in DQO

  16. Full-Length High-Temperature Severe Fuel Damage Test No. 5: Final safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lanning, D.D.; Lombardo, N.J.; Panisko, F.E.

    1993-09-01

    This report presents the final safety analysis for the preparation, conduct, and post-test discharge operation for the Full-Length High Temperature Experiment-5 (FLHT-5) to be conducted in the L-24 position of the National Research Universal (NRU) Reactor at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories (CRNL), Ontario, Canada. The test is sponsored by an international group organized by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The test is designed and conducted by staff from Pacific Northwest Laboratory with CRNL staff support. The test will study the consequences of loss-of-coolant and the progression of severe fuel damage

  17. Investigational new drug safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products and safety reporting requirements for bioavailability and bioequivalence studies in humans. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending its regulations governing safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products subject to an investigational new drug application (IND). The final rule codifies the agency's expectations for timely review, evaluation, and submission of relevant and useful safety information and implements internationally harmonized definitions and reporting standards. The revisions will improve the utility of IND safety reports, reduce the number of reports that do not contribute in a meaningful way to the developing safety profile of the drug, expedite FDA's review of critical safety information, better protect human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, subject bioavailability and bioequivalence studies to safety reporting requirements, promote a consistent approach to safety reporting internationally, and enable the agency to better protect and promote public health.

  18. Flammability Assessment Methodology Program Phase I: Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    C. A. Loehr; S. M. Djordjevic; K. J. Liekhus; M. J. Connolly

    1997-09-01

    The Flammability Assessment Methodology Program (FAMP) was established to investigate the flammability of gas mixtures found in transuranic (TRU) waste containers. The FAMP results provide a basis for increasing the permissible concentrations of flammable volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in TRU waste containers. The FAMP results will be used to modify the ''Safety Analysis Report for the TRUPACT-II Shipping Package'' (TRUPACT-II SARP) upon acceptance of the methodology by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Implementation of the methodology would substantially increase the number of drums that can be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) without repackaging or treatment. Central to the program was experimental testing and modeling to predict the gas mixture lower explosive limit (MLEL) of gases observed in TRU waste containers. The experimental data supported selection of an MLEL model that was used in constructing screening limits for flammable VOC and flammable gas concentrations. The MLEL values predicted by the model for individual drums will be utilized to assess flammability for drums that do not meet the screening criteria. Finally, the predicted MLEL values will be used to derive acceptable gas generation rates, decay heat limits, and aspiration time requirements for drums that do not pass the screening limits. The results of the program demonstrate that an increased number of waste containers can be shipped to WIPP within the flammability safety envelope established in the TRUPACT-II SARP.

  19. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum M. Computer system and data processing requirements for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, R.

    1977-06-01

    Data-processing requirements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) dictate a computing system that can provide a wide spectrum of data-processing needs on a 24-hour-day basis over an indeterminate time. A computer system is defined as a computer or computers complete with all peripheral equipment and extensive software and communications capabilities, including an operating system, compilers, assemblers, loaders, etc., all applicable to real-world problems. The computing system must be extremely reliable and easily expandable in both hardware and software to provide for future capabilities with a minimum impact on the existing applications software and operating system. The computer manufacturer or WIPP operating contractor must provide continuous on-site computer maintenance (maintain an adequate inventory of spare components and parts to guarantee a minimum mean-time-to-repair of any portion of the computer system). The computer operating system or monitor must process a wide mix of application programs and languages, yet be readily changeable to obtain maximum computer usage. The WIPP computing system must handle three general types of data processing requirements: batch, interactive, and real-time. These are discussed. Data bases, data collection systems, scientific and business systems, building and facilities, remote terminals and locations, and cables are also discussed

  20. Methodology and applicability of a safety and demonstration concept for a HAW final repository on clays. Safety concept and verification strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruebel, Andre; Meleshyn, Artur

    2014-08-01

    The report describes the site independent frame for a safety concept and verification strategy for a final repository for heat generating wastes in clay rock. In the safety concept planning specifications and technical measures are summarized that are supposed to allow a safe inclusion of radionuclides in the host rock. The verification strategy defines the systematic procedures for the development of fundamentals and scenarios as basis for the demonstration of the safety case and to allow the prognosis of appropriateness. The report includes the boundary conditions, the safety concept for the post-closure phase and the verification strategy for the post-closure phase.

  1. 78 FR 16208 - Safety Zone; V. I. Carnival Finale; St. Thomas Harbor; St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-14

    ... 1625-AA00 Safety Zone; V. I. Carnival Finale; St. Thomas Harbor; St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands AGENCY... establish a safety zone on the waters of St. Thomas Harbor in St. Thomas, U. S. Virgin Islands during the V... between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. The telephone number is 202-366...

  2. 78 FR 16211 - Safety Zone, Corp. Event Finale UHC, St. Thomas Harbor; St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-14

    ... 1625-AA00 Safety Zone, Corp. Event Finale UHC, St. Thomas Harbor; St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands... establish a temporary safety zone on the waters of St. Thomas Harbor in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands... through Friday, except federal holidays. The telephone number is 202-366-9329. See the ``Public...

  3. SKB 91. Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Importance of the bedrock for safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The safety of a deep repository for spent nuclear fuel has been assessed in this report. The spent fuel is assumed to be encapsulated in a copper canister and deposited at a depth of 600 m in the bedrock. The primary purpose has been to shed light on the importance of the geological features of the site for the safety of a final repository. The assessment shows that the encapsulated fuel will, in all likelihood, be kept isolated from the groundwater for millions of years. This is considerably longer than the more than 100 000 years that are required in order for the toxicity of the waste to have declined to a level equivalent to that of rich uranium ores. However, in order to be able to study the role of the rock as a barrier to the dispersal of radioactive materials, calculations have been carried out under the assumption that waste canisters leak. The results show that the safety of a carefully designed repository is only affected to a small extent by the ability of the rock to retain the escaping radionuclides. The primary role of the rock is to provide stable mechanical and chemical conditions in the repository over a long period of time so that the function of the engineered barriers is not jeopardized. (187 refs.) (au)

  4. Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Warner, C.L. (comp.)

    1979-07-01

    The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described.

  5. Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warner, C.L.

    1979-07-01

    The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described

  6. Origin of the brines near WIPP from the drill holes ERDA-6 and WIPP-12 based on stable isotope concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spiegler, P.; Updegraff, D.

    1983-03-01

    Pathways which might alter the isotopic compositions of deuterium and oxygen-18 meteoric water, seawaters, and in hydration waters in gypsum to the isotopic compositions of brines encountered at ERDA-6 and WIPP-12 are discussed. Present geologic conditions do not favor the alteration of the isotopic compositions of waters that exist near the WIPP site to those of the brines by these pathways. It is concluded that the brines encountered at ERDA-6 and WIPP-12 are probably derived from ancient ocean waters that have been isotopically enriched in oxygen-18 by exchange interaction with rock. The dehydration of gypsum as a process of origin of these brines cannot be ruled out

  7. Probabilistic safety goals for nuclear power plants; Phases 2-4. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bengtsson, L.; Knochenhauer, M. (Scandpower AB (Sweden)); Holmberg, J.-E.; Rossi, J. (VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (Finland))

    2011-05-15

    safety authorities as a reference for risk-informed regulation. The outcome can have an impact on the requirements on PSA, e.g., regarding quality, scope, level of detail, and documentation. Finally, the results can be expected to support on-going activities concerning risk-informed applications. The project provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art description and has contributed to clarifying the history of safety goals both nationally and internationally, the concepts involved in defining and applying probabilistic safety criteria, and the international status and trends in general. It has identified critical issues and the main problem areas. Finally, the project provides useful recommendations and guidance on the definition and application of criteria. Furthermore, the project makes it possible to define criteria stringently, improving the possibilities of argumentation on safety. Generally, this supports efficient use of criteria, yielding more useful PSA results. In this connection, the introduction of ALARP type criteria is judged to provide a very useful way of balancing stringency with the necessary flexibility. There is a possibility of making more active use of lower level criteria. This makes the connection to defence in depth more evident, and opens the perspective of increased control of defence in depth by use of probabilistic methods, including the use as design tools. There is an opportunity for comparison of risk of different NPPs, as well as of comparison of NPP risk with other risks in society. This is judged to provide an opportunity for improved communication on risks with non-PSA experts and with the public in general. However, a necessary condition for meaningful comparisons is to agree on the scope of PSA and methods applied. Obviously, there will also be challenges in the future definition and application of probabilistic safety criteria. These include very general aspects, such as the interpretation of the probability, quality aspects of PSA

  8. Probabilistic safety goals for nuclear power plants; Phases 2-4. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bengtsson, L.; Knochenhauer, M.; Holmberg, J.-E.; Rossi, J.

    2011-05-01

    safety authorities as a reference for risk-informed regulation. The outcome can have an impact on the requirements on PSA, e.g., regarding quality, scope, level of detail, and documentation. Finally, the results can be expected to support on-going activities concerning risk-informed applications. The project provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art description and has contributed to clarifying the history of safety goals both nationally and internationally, the concepts involved in defining and applying probabilistic safety criteria, and the international status and trends in general. It has identified critical issues and the main problem areas. Finally, the project provides useful recommendations and guidance on the definition and application of criteria. Furthermore, the project makes it possible to define criteria stringently, improving the possibilities of argumentation on safety. Generally, this supports efficient use of criteria, yielding more useful PSA results. In this connection, the introduction of ALARP type criteria is judged to provide a very useful way of balancing stringency with the necessary flexibility. There is a possibility of making more active use of lower level criteria. This makes the connection to defence in depth more evident, and opens the perspective of increased control of defence in depth by use of probabilistic methods, including the use as design tools. There is an opportunity for comparison of risk of different NPPs, as well as of comparison of NPP risk with other risks in society. This is judged to provide an opportunity for improved communication on risks with non-PSA experts and with the public in general. However, a necessary condition for meaningful comparisons is to agree on the scope of PSA and methods applied. Obviously, there will also be challenges in the future definition and application of probabilistic safety criteria. These include very general aspects, such as the interpretation of the probability, quality aspects of PSA

  9. Patient safety competence for final-year health professional students: Perceptions of effectiveness of an interprofessional education course.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hwang, Jee-In; Yoon, Tai-Young; Jin, Hyeon-Jeong; Park, Yikyun; Park, Ju-Young; Lee, Beom-Joon

    2016-11-01

    As final-year medical and nursing students will soon play key roles in frontline patient care, their preparedness for safe, reliable care provision is of special importance. We assessed patient safety competencies of final-year health profession students, and the effect of a 1-day patient safety education programme on these competencies. A cross-sectional survey was conducted with 233 students in three colleges of medicine, nursing, and traditional medicine in Seoul. A before-and-after study followed to evaluate the effectiveness of the curriculum. Patient safety competency was measured using the Health-Professional Education for Patients Safety Survey (H-PEPSS) and an objective patient safety knowledge test. The mean scores were 3.4 and 1.7 out of 5.0, respectively. The communication domain was rated the highest and the teamwork domain was rated the lowest. H-PEPSS scores significantly differed between the students from three colleges. The 1-day patient safety education curriculum significantly improved H-PEPSS and knowledge test scores. These results indicated that strengthening patient safety competencies, especially teamwork, of students is required in undergraduate healthcare curricula. A 1-day interprofessional patient safety education programme may be a promising strategy. The findings suggest that interprofessional patient safety education needs to be implemented as a core undergraduate course to improve students' safety competence.

  10. Key Past and Present Hydrologic Issues at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lappin, Allen R.; McKenna, Sean A.; Davies, Peter B.

    2000-01-01

    In May 1998, the U.S; Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to be in compliance with applicable portions of regulations governing the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes. The step was accomplished after 24 years of effort by Sandia National Laboratories, extending from initial site selection, through extensive site characterization and under-ground experimentalization to evaluation and demonstration of regulatory compliance. The strong focus on regulatory compliance extended over approximately five years, culminating in DOE's submittal of a Compliance Certification Application (CCA) in October, 1996. Specific lessons learned from the WIPP'S transition from site characterization/experimental research to a successful regulatory compliance application may be of general interest to participants in other repository problems. In summary, the three examples considered in this paper indicate that: It is critical that site-characterization and performance-assessment (PA) activities in a repository project advance through multiple iterative interactions. This is because there are parallel paths of evolution-within a projecy On one hand, there is a natural development in the conceptual understanding of the site and repository geology, hydrology, and geochemistry over time, as well as a normal increase in the roles of regulatory/safety issues relative to technical issues. On the other hand there is ongoing evolution in numerical-modeling, experimental, and PA techniques, as well as in understanding of the insights gained from these activities. However, even if conceptual models do not change, the modeling and documentation techniques and detailed logic supporting these models will change; as additional relevant information is collected within or outside the project. Some issues related to general site-characterization or site-suitability will remain of interest, even after initial

  11. Probability of failure of the waste hoist brake system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenfield, M.A.; Sargent, T.J.; Stanford Univ., CA

    1998-01-01

    In its most recent report on the annual probability of failure of the waste hoist brake system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the annual failure rate is calculated to be 1.3E(-7)(1/yr), rounded off from 1.32E(-7). A calculation by the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) produces a result that is about 4% higher, namely 1.37E(-7)(1/yr). The difference is due to a minor error in the US Department of Energy (DOE) calculations in the Westinghouse 1996 report. WIPP's hoist safety relies on a braking system consisting of a number of components including two crucial valves. The failure rate of the system needs to be recalculated periodically to accommodate new information on component failure, changes in maintenance and inspection schedules, occasional incidents such as a hoist traveling out-of-control, either up or down, and changes in the design of the brake system. This report examines DOE's last two reports on the redesigned waste hoist system. In its calculations, the DOE has accepted one EEG recommendation and is using more current information about the component failures rates, the Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data (NPRD). However, the DOE calculations fail to include the data uncertainties which are described in detail in the NPRD reports. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommended that a system evaluation include mean estimates of component failure rates and take into account the potential uncertainties that exist so that an estimate can be made on the confidence level to be ascribed to the quantitative results. EEG has made this suggestion previously and the DOE has indicated why it does not accept the NRC recommendation. Hence, this EEG report illustrates the importance of including data uncertainty using a simple statistical example

  12. Technical developments in the WIPP program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1980-01-01

    More than five years of site specific studies have led to the conclusion that radioactive wastes can be safely isolated in the bedded salt of the Delaware Basin in southeast New Mexico. Aspects of particular concern for site integrity, such as regional or local dissolution processes and salt deformation have been thoroughly evaluated and are not believed to present hazards to the repository. Hydrology of the site area has been shown to possess many desirable features with respect to transport of radioisotopes to the bioshpere in the event of a repository breach. Natural resources, potash and hydrocarbons, are present in the area of the site but can be exploited with appropriate precautions. Safety analyses have considered the consequences of their possible attraction to future man. Repository behavior and interactions between waste and the host rock have been studied in the laboratory, in field tests and by calculational methods. In particular, such issues as brine migration and canister corrosion may be shown to have little detrimental impact if modest and practical engineering measures are adopted. Calculations indicate salt deformation and room closure rates may be great enough that a salt repository must be carefully designed in order to assure ready retrieval of emplaced waste over long periods of time. Safety assessment calculations have been performed to determine the consequences of assumed repository failure scenarios. Even the most dire credible (but improbable) natural failure scenarios prove to be benign in their consequences to man. Direct penetration by unknowing, future man could result in significant exposures to the specific individuals involved but would not cause significant population effects

  13. Resource conservation and recovery act draft hazardous waste facility permit: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Attachments: Volume 4 of 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-08-01

    Volume IV contains the following attachments for Module IV: VOC monitoring plan for bin-room tests (Appendix D12); bin emission control and VOC monitoring system drawings; bin scale test room ventilation drawings; WIPP supplementary roof support system, underground storage area, room 1, panel 1, DOE/WIPP 91-057; and WIPP supplementary roof support system, room 1, panel 1, geotechnical field data analysis bi-annual report, DOE/WIPP 92-024.

  14. Resource conservation and recovery act draft hazardous waste facility permit: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-08-01

    Volume I contains the following attachments for Module II: waste analysis plan; quality assurance program plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experiment Waste Characterization Program(QAPP); WIPP Characterization Sampling and Analysis Guidance Manual (Plan)(SAP); and no migration Determination Requirement Summary (NMD)

  15. Organisational factors. Their definition and influence on nuclear safety. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baumont, G.; Wahlstroem, B.; Sola, R.; Williams, J.; Frischknecht, A.; Wilpert, B.; Rollenhagen, C.

    2000-12-01

    The importance of organisational factors in the operational safety and efficiency of nuclear power plants (NPP) has been recognised by many organisations around the world. Despite this recognition, however, there are as yet very few methods by which organisational factors can be systematically assessed and improved. The majority of research efforts applied so far have tended to be modest and scattered. The ORFA project was created as a remedy to these problems. The objective of the project is to create a better understanding of how organisation and management factors influence nuclear safety. A key scientific objective of the project is to identify components of a theoretical framework, which would help in understanding the relationships between organisational factors and nuclear safety. Three work packages were planned. First, a review of literature listed out the identified factors and methods for assessing them. Then, a draft version of the present report was prepared to clarify the environment context and the main issues of the topics. This draft was discussed at the ORFA seminar in Madrid 21-22 October 1999. During the seminar views and comments were collected on preliminary results of the project. Finally, this information has been integrated in the present and other reports and will be used to give further guidance to the European Commission in the development of forthcoming research programmes in the field. The project has addressed nuclear safety taking a broad perspective, which reflected and took into account the views of senior NPP management and regulators. The questions discussed during the project have been: how can organisational factors be included in safety assessments, how can good and bad operational practices be identified, which methods can be used for detecting weak signals of deteriorating performance, how should incidents be analysed with respect to organisational factors to give the largest learning benefit, how can data on organisational

  16. Site safety progress review of spent fuel central interim storage facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Serva, L.; Giuliani

    1995-01-01

    Following the request of the Czech Power Board (CEZ) and within the scope of the Technical Cooperation Project CZR/9/003, a progress review of the site safety of the Spent Fuel Central Interim Storage Facility (SFCISF) was performed. The review involved the first two stages of the works comprising the regional survey and identification of candidate sites for the underground and surface storage options. Five sites have been identified as a result of the previous works. The following two stages will involved the identification of the preferred candidate sites for the two options and the final site qualification. The present review had the purpose of assessing the work already performed and making recommendations for the next two stages of works

  17. Radiological and environmental consequences. Final report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research project BOK-2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palsson, S.E.

    2002-11-01

    Final report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research project BOK-2, Radiological and Environmental Consequences. The project was carried out 1998-2001 with participants from all the Nordic countries. Representatives from the Baltic States were also invited to some of the meetings and seminars. The project consisted of work on terrestrial and marine radioecology and had a broad scope in order to enable participation of research groups with various fields of interest. This report focuses on the project itself and gives a general summary of the studies undertaken. A separate technical report summarises the work done by each research group and gives references to papers published in scientific journals. The topics in BOK-2 included improving assessment of old and recent fallout, use of radionuclides as tracers in Nordic marine areas, improving assessment of internal doses and use of mass spectrometry in radioecology. (au)

  18. Nuclear emergency preparedness. Final report of the Nordic nuclear safety research project BOK-1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lauritzen, Bent [Risoe National Lab., Roskilde (Denmark)

    2002-02-01

    Final report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research project BOK-1. The BOK-1 project, 'Nuclear Emergency Preparedness', was carried out in 1998-2001 with participants from the Nordic and Baltic Sea regions. The project consists of six sub-projects: Laboratory measurements and quality assurance (BOK-1.1); Mobile measurements and measurement strategies (BOK-1.2); Field measurement and data assimilation (BOK-1.3); Countermeasures in agriculture and forestry (BOK-1.4); Emergency monitoring in the Nordic and Baltic Sea countries (BOK-1.5); and Nuclear exercises (BOK-1.6). For each sub-project, the project outline, objectives and organization are described and main results presented. (au)

  19. Nuclear emergency preparedness. Final report of the Nordic nuclear safety research project BOK-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lauritzen, Bent

    2002-02-01

    Final report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research project BOK-1. The BOK-1 project, 'Nuclear Emergency Preparedness', was carried out in 1998-2001 with participants from the Nordic and Baltic Sea regions. The project consists of six sub-projects: Laboratory measurements and quality assurance (BOK-1.1); Mobile measurements and measurement strategies (BOK-1.2); Field measurement and data assimilation (BOK-1.3); Countermeasures in agriculture and forestry (BOK-1.4); Emergency monitoring in the Nordic and Baltic Sea countries (BOK-1.5); and Nuclear exercises (BOK-1.6). For each sub-project, the project outline, objectives and organization are described and main results presented. (au)

  20. Final hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the N basin segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.; Smith, R.I.; Larson, A.R.; Duncan, G.M.

    1996-12-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide the following: To serve as the auditable safety analysis (ASA) for the N Basin Segment, including both the quiescent state and planned intrusive activities. The ASA is developed through the realistic evaluation of potential hazards that envelope the threat to personnel. The ASA also includes the specification of the programmatic, baseline, and activity- specific controls that are necessary for the protection of workers. To determine and document the final hazard classification (FHC) for the N Basin Segment. The FHC is developed through the use of bounding accident analyses that envelope the potential exposures to personnel. The FHC also includes the specification of the special controls that are necessary to remain within the envelope of those accident analyses

  1. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  2. A regional water balance for the WIPP site and surrounding area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    A water balance or budget is developed as an accounting of the components of a closed hydrologic system. In the WIPP study area, water-budget techniques have previously been used to compute leakage from Lake Avalon and from potash refinery spoil ponds. A general expression for a closed hydrologic system is presented. In a developed area like the WIPP region, the water budget must include many usage factors, such as municipal or industrial pumpage. In the WIPP water-budget study area, inflows are precipitation, surface- and ground-water inflow, and the artificial addition of surface and ground water. Outflows are surface runoff, evaporation and transpiration, and ground-water outflow. Changes in storage in the WIPP region have also been documented. The WIPP water balance described here is based on a combination of long-term averages and figures for 1980. 12 refs., 5 figs., 1 tab

  3. Environmental monitoring at the WIPP site CY 1976

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brewer, L.W.; Metcalf, J.H.

    1977-08-01

    Measurements made in the WIPP study area indicate background exposure levels of 8-9 μR/hr. These measured data are in good agreement with calculated exposure rates (7.5-9.6 μrad/hr). Airborne gross beta concentrations, which were low (0.02 pCi/m 3 ), confirmed the presence of global fallout from the Chinese nuclear tests conducted in the atmosphere during the fall. The air-quality measurements, except for a few unexplained excursions, were less than State and/or Federal air-quality standards

  4. WIPP air-intake shaft disturbed-rock zone study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dale, T.; Hurtado, L.D.

    1996-01-01

    The disturbed-rock zone surrounding the air-intake shaft at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site was investigated to determine the extent and the permeability of the disturbed-rock zone as a function of radial distance from the 6.1 m diameter shaft, at different elevations within the Salado. Gas- and brine-permeability tests were performed in the bedded halite of the Salado formation at two levels within the air-intake shaft. The gas- and brine-permeability test results demonstrated that the radial distance to an undisturbed formation permeability of 1 x 10 -21 m 2 was less than 3.0 m

  5. Designing a database for performance assessment: Lessons learned from WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martell, M.A.; Schenker, A.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Certification Application (CCA) Performance Assessment (PA) used a relational database that was originally designed only to supply the input parameters required for implementation of the PA codes. Reviewers used the database as a point of entry to audit quality assurance measures for control, traceability, and retrievability of input information used for analysis, and output/work products. During these audits it became apparent that modifications to the architecture and scope of the database would benefit the EPA regulator and other stakeholders when reviewing the recertification application. This paper contains a discussion of the WPP PA CCA database and lessons learned for designing a database

  6. Developing a smartphone based warning system application to enhance the safety at work zones : final report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-05-01

    Collisions in the work zone have always been a contributing factor to compromising safety on urban roadways. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the State Transportation Authorities have implemented many safety countermeasu...

  7. Final safety analysis report (FSAR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weidert, J.R.

    1997-01-01

    This safety analysis report provides a summary description of the WRAP Facility, focusing on significant safety-related characteristics of the location and facility design. This report demonstrates that adherence to the safety basis wi11 ensure necessary operational safety considerations have been addressed sufficiently and justifies the adequacy of the safety basis in protecting the health and safety of the public, workers, and the environment

  8. Strategies for reactor safety: Preventing loss of coolant accidents. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lydell, B.O.Y.

    1997-12-01

    This final report on the NKS/RAK-1.2 summarizes the main features of the PIFRAP PC-program and its intended implementation. Regardless of the preferred technical approach to LOCA frequency estimation, the analysis approach must include recognition of the following technical issues: a) Degradation and failure mechanisms potentially affecting piping systems within the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and the potential consequences; b) In-service inspection practices and how they influence piping reliability; and c) The service experience with piping systems. The report consists of six sections and one appendix. A Nordic perspective on LOCA and nuclear safety is given. It includes summaries of results from research in material sciences and current regulatory philosophies regarding piping reliability. A summary of the LOCA concept is applied in Nordic PSA studies. It includes a discussion on deterministic and probabilistic views on LOCA. The R and D on piping reliability by SKI and the PIFRAP model is summarized. Next, Section 6 presents conclusion and recommendations. Finally, Appendix A contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms, together with a glossary of technical terms. (EG)

  9. Chemistry of brines in salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico: a preliminary investigation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, C.L.; Krumhansl, J.L.

    1986-03-01

    We present here analyses of macro- and microscopic (intracrystalline) brines observed within the WIPP facility and in the surrounding halite, with interpretations regarding the origin and history of these fluids and their potential effect(s) on long-term waste storage. During excavation, several large fluid inclusions were recovered from an area of highly recrystallized halite in a thick salt bed at the repository horizon (2150 ft below ground level). In addition, 52 samples of brine ''weeps'' were collected from walls of recently excavated drifts at the same stratigraphic horizon from which the fluid inclusion samples are assumed to have been taken. Analyses of these fluids show that they differ substantially in composition from the inclusion fluids and cannot be explained by mixing of the fluid inclusion populations. Finally, holes in the facility floor that filled with brine were sampled but with no stratographic control; therefore it is not possible to interpret the compositions of these brines with any accuracy, except insofar as they resemble the weep compositions but with greater variation in both K/Mg and Na/Cl ratios. However, the Ca and SO 4 values for the floor holes are relatively close to the gypsum saturation curve, suggesting that brines filling floor holes have been modified by the presence of gypsum or anhydrite, possibly even originating in one or more of the laterally continuous anhydrite units referred to in the WIPP literature as marker beds. In conclusion, the wide compositional variety of fluids found in the WIPP workings suggest that (1) an interconnected hydrologic system which could effectively transport radonuclides away from the repository does not exist; (2) brine migration studies and experiments must consider the mobility of intergranular fluids as well as those in inclusions; and (3) near- and far-field radionuclide migration testing programs need to consider a wide range of brine compositions rather than a few reference brines

  10. WIPP Benchmark calculations with the large strain SPECTROM codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Callahan, G.D.; DeVries, K.L.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides calculational results from the updated Lagrangian structural finite-element programs SPECTROM-32 and SPECTROM-333 for the purpose of qualifying these codes to perform analyses of structural situations in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Results are presented for the Second WIPP Benchmark (Benchmark II) Problems and for a simplified heated room problem used in a parallel design calculation study. The Benchmark II problems consist of an isothermal room problem and a heated room problem. The stratigraphy involves 27 distinct geologic layers including ten clay seams of which four are modeled as frictionless sliding interfaces. The analyses of the Benchmark II problems consider a 10-year simulation period. The evaluation of nine structural codes used in the Benchmark II problems shows that inclusion of finite-strain effects is not as significant as observed for the simplified heated room problem, and a variety of finite-strain and small-strain formulations produced similar results. The simplified heated room problem provides stratigraphic complexity equivalent to the Benchmark II problems but neglects sliding along the clay seams. The simplified heated problem does, however, provide a calculational check case where the small strain-formulation produced room closures about 20 percent greater than those obtained using finite-strain formulations. A discussion is given of each of the solved problems, and the computational results are compared with available published results. In general, the results of the two SPECTROM large strain codes compare favorably with results from other codes used to solve the problems

  11. WIPP Salado hydrology program data report No. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saulnier, G.J. Jr.; Domski, P.S.; Palmer, J.B.; Roberts, R.M.; Stensrud, W.A.; Jensen, A.L.

    1991-05-01

    WIPP Salado Hydrology Program Data Report number-sign 1 presents hydrologic data collected during permeability tests of the Salado Formation performed from August 1988 through December 1989. Analysis and interpretation of the test data are presented in a separate report. The report presents the results of the drilling and testing of six boreholes drilled from the WIPP underground facility 655 m below ground surface in the Salado Formation. Permeability tests were conducted using multipacker test tools with inflatable packers to isolate borehole intervals to allow formation pore-pressure buildup and subsequent pulse-withdrawal tests. Test data include pressures and temperatures in brine-filled, packer-isolated test intervals and borehole-closure and axial test-tool-movement measurements. Permeability tests were performed after installing multipacker test tools in test boreholes, inflating the packers, and allowing pressures to build up in the isolated intervals. Pulse-withdrawal tests were performed after buildup pressures approached the apparent formation pore pressure. Pulse injections were sometimes performed to increase the fluid pressures in isolated intervals. Compliance tests were conducted in lengths of steel and stainless-steel casing to evaluate the mechanical performance of the multipacker test tools. The stainless-steel compliance-test chamber was installed with externally mounted thermocouples in a downward-angled borehole in Experimental Room 4. Compliance tests included leak tests and simulated pulse-injection and pulse-withdrawal sequences. 9 refs., 143 figs., 2 tabs

  12. PASS: a component of Desk Top PA for the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, M.B.; Wilmot, R.D.; Galson, D.A.; Swift, P.N.; Fewell, M.E.

    1998-01-01

    There is a growing recognition internationally of the need to demonstrate comprehensiveness in order to build confidence in performance assessments (PAs) for radioactive waste disposal projects. This has resulted in a number of methodologies being developed to formalize the process of defining and documenting the decision basis that underlies a PA. Such methodologies include process influence diagrams and the rock engineering system (RES) matrix. However, these methodologies focus mainly on the conceptualization of the disposal system and do not provide a ready framework to document the decisions behind the model development and parameterization of the PA system. The Performance Assessment Support System (PASS) is a flexible electronic tool designed to increase the transparency and traceability of decision making in the entire PA process. An application of PASS has been developed for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) where it forms an important component of Desk Top PA, a PC-based PA computational environment under development at Sandia National Laboratories to document, plan, and support management decisions and to assess performance for the WIPP recertification process. This desk-top PA environment is also aimed at providing scientifically-based decision support for assessing the performance of nuclear and hazardous waste management and environmental clean-up systems

  13. Effects of clay-seam behavior on WIPP repository design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stone, C.M.; Krieg, R.D.; Branstetter, L.J.

    1981-07-01

    The geology at the southeastern New Mexico WIPP site consists of bedded layers of rock salt, anhydrite, polyhalite, mixtures of those materials, and thin clay seams. In spite of their very small (0.005 m to 0.05 m) thickness, clay seams are important to structural characterization of the WIPP stratigraphy since slip might possibly take place across them. Results of a study to determine the effects of clay seam frictional slip on the closure of a well-defined drift configuration are described. A Mohr-Coulomb dry friction model was used to model the active clay seams. The main thrust of the study was to determine the effects of friction coefficient variability on drift closure. Results show that the drift closure varies by a factor of 3.0 over the range of friction coefficients studied. The maximum slip observed along any clay seam was 0.12 m. For values of μ > .7, virtually no slip occurs along any clay seam

  14. WIPP Compliance Certification Application calculations parameters. Part 1: Parameter development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howarth, S.M.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeast New Mexico has been studied as a transuranic waste repository for the past 23 years. During this time, an extensive site characterization, design, construction, and experimental program was completed, which provided in-depth understanding of the dominant processes that are most likely to influence the containment of radionuclides for 10,000 years. Nearly 1,500 parameters were developed using information gathered from this program; the parameters were input to numerical models for WIPP Compliance Certification Application (CCA) Performance Assessment (PA) calculations. The CCA probabilistic codes frequently require input values that define a statistical distribution for each parameter. Developing parameter distributions begins with the assignment of an appropriate distribution type, which is dependent on the type, magnitude, and volume of data or information available. The development of the parameter distribution values may require interpretation or statistical analysis of raw data, combining raw data with literature values, scaling of lab or field data to fit code grid mesh sizes, or other transformation. Parameter development and documentation of the development process were very complicated, especially for those parameters based on empirical data; they required the integration of information from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) code sponsors, parameter task leaders (PTLs), performance assessment analysts (PAAs), and experimental principal investigators (PIs). This paper, Part 1 of two parts, contains a discussion of the parameter development process, roles and responsibilities, and lessons learned. Part 2 will discuss parameter documentation, traceability and retrievability, and lessons learned from related audits and reviews

  15. Prospects for regional groundwater contamination due to karst landforms in Mescalero caliche at the WIPP site near Carlsbad, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, R.H.

    1987-01-01

    Plutonium from nuclear weapons production will be permanently buried in Permian salt beds at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in the Nash Draw watershed. Overlying the salt beds are cavernous Rustler dolomite aquifers, the most likely flow paths for contaminated water from WIPP to the biosphere. Overlying the Rustler are sandstones, siltstones, Mescalero caliche, and windblown sand. The WIPP site contains thousands of closed topographic depressions. If some are karst features, the ability of WIPP to isolate nuclear waste cannot be demonstrated. A water balance and geochemical analysis of the Nash Draw watershed and nearby brine springs were undertaken to determine: (1) which Rustler aquifers discharge where, and in what quantities; (2) the rates of evapotranspiration and natural groundwater recharge; (3) the most likely discharge point for contaminated water from WIPP. Laguna Grande, a natural salt lake in Nash Draw, is the outlet for the Rustler dolomite aquifers and for plutonium contaminations from WIPP. The recharge time for the Rustler may be only 6 to 8 years. WIPP is unsuitable for nuclear waste isolation because: (1) Rustler groundwater flow paths and travel times are inherently unpredictable; (2) caliche and sandstones allow rainwater recharge of the Rustler; (3) pressurized brine underneath WIPP can carry dissolved waste up the WIPP shafts to the Rustler; (4) geologic barriers between the brine and WIPP are unreliable; and (5) WIPP is vulnerable to human intrusion

  16. Building the safety case for a hypothetical underground repository in crystalline rock. Final report. Vol. 2. Safety file

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biurrun, E.; Engelmann, H.J.; Jobmann, M.; Lommerzheim, A.; Popp, W.; Frentz, R.R. v.; Wahl, A.

    1996-10-01

    The study was intended as a desk simulation of the process of preparing a licensing application for a deep repository for spent fuel and high level waste in crystalline rock. After clarifying of organizational aspects of table of contents specifying all aspects in a safety life for license application were considered. The volume II is subdivided in two parts. Part A describes the general information, waste description, site characteristics, disposal facility design, reporitory construction and operation, quality assurance, operational safety, repository closure, organization and financial aspects, and long-term safety assessment. Part B deals with the impact of retrievability. (DG)

  17. Safety requirements of the BMU to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste: An evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    On August 12, 2008, The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) published a draft of July 29, 2008 of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). There is no waste management concept underlying the safety requirements. As a consequence, the draft should be withdrawn by the Federal Ministry for the Environment and replaced by a version revised from scratch and offering assured quality. (orig./GL)

  18. Review comments on Environmental Analysis Cost Reduction Proposals (WIPP-DOE-136), July 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Channell, J.K.

    1982-11-01

    The cost reduction proposals have the laudable goal of significantly reducing the total capital And operating cost connected with WIPP. Furthermore, since the proposed changes would reduce the size and operating rate of the project, they would be expected to have decreased environmental And socioeconomic impacts. However, some of these cost reduction proposals do decrease factors of safety in various components of the project or trade off one type of environmental detriment for another. The report does not contain sufficient detail to justify all of the conclusions reached; more discussion and quantitative information (including costs) is necessary in some cases. Also, there are places where the report is unclear or contradictory. Without a more detailed evaluation, EEG is unable to conclude that each of these cost reduction proposals either has a net environmental/health and safety benefit or a cost savings that justifies a net detriment. A revised Environmental Analysis (EA) should either include additional information or specifically reference backup documents where these conclusions have been justified. In addition, the EA needs to be revised to include the effect of the recently announced (11/18/82) decision by DOE to relocate the underground waste storage areas of the repository to the south

  19. Safety evaluation report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report: Contact-handled transuranic waste disposal operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-02-01

    DOE 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, requires that the US Department of Energy conduct an independent, defensible, review in order to approve a Safety Analysis Report (SAR). That review and the SAR approval basis is documented in this formal Safety Evaluation Report (SER). This SER documents the DOE's review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant SAR and provides the Carlsbad Area Office Manager, the WIPP SAR approval authority, with the basis for approving the safety document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP SAR is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with planned waste disposal operations

  20. Mechanical Modeling of a WIPP Drum Under Pressure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Jeffrey A. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-11-25

    Mechanical modeling was undertaken to support the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) technical assessment team (TAT) investigating the February 14th 2014 event where there was a radiological release at the WIPP. The initial goal of the modeling was to examine if a mechanical model could inform the team about the event. The intention was to have a model that could test scenarios with respect to the rate of pressurization. It was expected that the deformation and failure (inability of the drum to contain any pressure) would vary according to the pressurization rate. As the work progressed there was also interest in using the mechanical analysis of the drum to investigate what would happen if a drum pressurized when it was located under a standard waste package. Specifically, would the deformation be detectable from camera views within the room. A finite element model of a WIPP 55-gallon drum was developed that used all hex elements. Analyses were conducted using the explicit transient dynamics module of Sierra/SM to explore potential pressurization scenarios of the drum. Theses analysis show similar deformation patterns to documented pressurization tests of drums in the literature. The calculated failure pressures from previous tests documented in the literature vary from as little as 16 psi to 320 psi. In addition, previous testing documented in the literature shows drums bulging but not failing at pressures ranging from 69 to 138 psi. The analyses performed for this study found the drums failing at pressures ranging from 35 psi to 75 psi. When the drums are pressurized quickly (in 0.01 seconds) there is significant deformation to the lid. At lower pressurization rates the deformation of the lid is considerably less, yet the lids will still open from the pressure. The analyses demonstrate the influence of pressurization rate on deformation and opening pressure of the drums. Analyses conducted with a substantial mass on top of the closed drum demonstrate that the

  1. The Brine Sampling and Evaluation Program (PSEP) at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deal, D.E.; Roggenthen, W.M.

    1989-01-01

    The Permian salt beds of the WIPP facility are virtually dry. The amount of water present in the rocks exposed in the excavations that is free to migrate under pressure gradients was estimated by heating salt samples to 95 degrees C and measuring weight loss. Clear balite contains about 0.22 weight percent water and the more argillaceous units average about 0.75 percent. Measurements made since 1984 as part of the Brine Sampling and Evaluation Program (BSEP) indicate that small amounts of this brine can migrate into the excavations and does accumulate in the underground environment. Brine seepage into drillholes monitored since thy were drilled show that brine seepage decreases with time and that many have dried up entirely. Weeping of brine from the walls of the repository excavations also decreases after two or more years. Chemical analyses of brines shows that they are sodium-chloride saturated and magnesium-rich

  2. QA lessons learned for parameter control from the WIPP Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richards, R.R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper provides a summary of lessons learned from experiences on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP) Project in implementation of quality assurance controls surrounding inputs for performance assessment analysis. Since the performance assessment (PA) process is inherent in compliance determination for any waste repository, these lessons-learned are intended to be useful to investigators, analysts, and Quality Assurance (QA) practitioners working on high level waste disposal projects. On the WIPP Project, PA analyses for regulatory-compliance determination utilized several inter-related computer programs (codes) that mathematically modeled phenomena such as radionuclide release, retardation, and transport. The input information for those codes are the parameters that are the subject of this paper. Parameters were maintained in a computer database, which was then queried electronically by the PA codes whenever input was needed as the analyses were run

  3. WIPP Waste Characterization: Implementing Regulatory Requirements in the Real World

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper Wayman, J.D.; Goldstein, J.D.

    1999-01-01

    It is imperative to ensure compliance of the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In particular, compliance with the waste characterization requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and its implementing regulation found at 40 CFR Parts 262,264 and 265 for hazardous and mixed wastes, as well as those of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, as amended, and their implementing regulations found at 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 for non-mixed radioactive wastes, are often difficult to ensure at the operational level. For example, where a regulation may limit a waste to a certain concentration, this concentration may be difficult to measure. For example, does the definition of transuranic waste (TRU) as 100 nCi/grain of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes per gram of waste mean that the radioassay of a waste must show a reading of 100 plus the sampling and measurement error for the waste to be a TRU waste? Although the use of acceptable knowledge to characterize waste is authorized by statute, regulation and DOE Orders, its implementation is similarly beset with difficulty. When is a document or documents sufficient to constitute acceptable knowledge? What standard can be used to determine if knowledge is acceptable for waste characterization purposes? The inherent conflict between waste characterization regulatory requirements and their implementation in the real world, and the resolution of this conflict, will be discussed

  4. WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2001-02-25

    This 2001 Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII, Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a), and incorporates comments from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) received on December 6, 2000 (NMED, 2000a). This February 2001 FWP describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. The permittees are evaluating data from previous investigations of the SWMUs and AOCs against the newest guidance proposed by the NMED. Based on these data, the permittees expect that no further sampling will be required and that a request for No Further Action (NFA) at the SWMUs and AOCs will be submitted to the NMED. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current NMED guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to the NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit.

  5. Mineralogy in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility stratigraphic horizon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, C.L.

    1985-09-01

    Forty-six samples were selected for this study from two cores, one extending 50 ft up through the roof of the WIPP facility and the other penetrating 50 ft below the facility floor. These samples, selected from approximately every other foot of core length, represent the major lithologies present in the immediate vicinity of the WIPP facility horizon: ''clean'' halite, polyhalitic halite, argillaceous halite, and mixed polyhalitic-argillaceous halite. Samples were analyzed for non-NaCl mineralogy by determining weight percents of water- and EDTA-insoluble residues, which were then identified by x-ray diffraction. In general, WIPP halite contains at most 5 wt % non-NaCl residue. The major mineral constituents are quartz, magnesite, anhydrite, gypsum, polyhalite, and clays. Results of this study confirm that, in previous descriptions of WIPP core, trace mineral quantities have been visually overestimated by approximately an order of magnitude. 9 refs., 5 figs., 5 tabs

  6. Geotechnical evaluation of the proposed WIPP site in southeast New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1978-10-01

    The Department of Energy is proposing to demonstrate the acceptability of geologic disposal of radioactive waste by locating a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the salt beds 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP will serve as a permanent repository for defense generated transuranic contaminated waste and will also be used as a facility in which experiments and demonstrations with all radioactive waste types can be conducted. The present area being proposed for the WIPP is the second such location in the Delaware Basin for which new site data have been developed; the first site proved geologically unacceptable. Ecologic and socioeconomic aspects have been investigated and extensive geophysical, geological and hydrologic studies have been conducted to allow an evaluation of site acceptability. Geotechnical aspects of site characterization are examined. These studies are now sufficiently complete that the site can be recommended for further development of the WIPP

  7. Effects of microbial processes on gas generation under expected WIPP repository conditions: Annual report through 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Francis, A.J.; Gillow, J.B.

    1993-09-01

    Microbial processes involved in gas generation from degradation of the organic constituents of transuranic waste under conditions expected at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository are being investigated at Brookhaven National Laboratory. These laboratory studies are part of the Sandia National Laboratories -- WIPP Gas Generation Program. Gas generation due to microbial degradation of representative cellulosic waste was investigated in short-term ( 6 months) experiments by incubating representative paper (filter paper, paper towels, and tissue) in WIPP brine under initially aerobic (air) and anaerobic (nitrogen) conditions. Samples from the WIPP surficial environment and underground workings harbor gas-producing halophilic microorganisms, the activities of which were studied in short-term experiments. The microorganisms metabolized a variety of organic compounds including cellulose under aerobic, anaerobic, and denitrifying conditions. In long-term experiments, the effects of added nutrients (trace amounts of ammonium nitrate, phosphate, and yeast extract), no nutrients, and nutrients plus excess nitrate on gas production from cellulose degradation

  8. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum G. Accident analysis for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shefelbine, H.C.; Metcalf, J.H.

    1977-06-01

    The types of accidents or risks pertinent to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are presented. Design features addressing these risks are discussed. Also discussed are design features that protect the public

  9. Annex D-200 Area Interim Storage Area Final Safety Analysis Report [FSAR] [Section 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CARRELL, R.D.

    2002-01-01

    The 200 Area Interim Storage Area (200 Area ISA) at the Hanford Site provides for the interim storage of non-defense reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) housed in aboveground dry cask storage systems. The 200 Area ISA is a relatively simple facility consisting of a boundary fence with gates, perimeter lighting, and concrete and gravel pads on which to place the dry storage casks. The fence supports safeguards and security and establishes a radiation protection buffer zone. The 200 Area ISA is nominally 200,000 ft 2 and is located west of the Canister Storage Building (CSB). Interim storage at the 200 Area ISA is intended for a period of up to 40 years until the materials are shipped off-site to a disposal facility. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) does not address removal from storage or shipment from the 200 Area ISA. Three different SNF types contained in three different dry cask storage systems are to be stored at the 200 Area ISA, as follows: (1) Fast Flux Test Facility Fuel--Fifty-three interim storage casks (ISC), each holding a core component container (CCC), will be used to store the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) SNF currently in the 400 Area. (2) Neutron Radiography Facility (NRF) TRIGA'--One Rad-Vault' container will store two DOT-6M3 containers and six NRF TRIGA casks currently stored in the 400 Area. (3) Commercial Light Water Reactor Fuel--Six International Standards Organization (ISO) containers, each holding a NAC-I cask4 with an inner commercial light water reactor (LWR) canister, will be used for commercial LWR SNF from the 300 Area. An aboveground dry cask storage location is necessary for the spent fuel because the current storage facilities are being shut down and deactivated. The spent fuel is being transferred to interim storage because there is no permanent repository storage currently available

  10. Annex D-200 Area Interim Storage Area Final Safety Analysis Report [FSAR] [Section 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CARRELL, R D

    2002-07-16

    The 200 Area Interim Storage Area (200 Area ISA) at the Hanford Site provides for the interim storage of non-defense reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) housed in aboveground dry cask storage systems. The 200 Area ISA is a relatively simple facility consisting of a boundary fence with gates, perimeter lighting, and concrete and gravel pads on which to place the dry storage casks. The fence supports safeguards and security and establishes a radiation protection buffer zone. The 200 Area ISA is nominally 200,000 ft{sup 2} and is located west of the Canister Storage Building (CSB). Interim storage at the 200 Area ISA is intended for a period of up to 40 years until the materials are shipped off-site to a disposal facility. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) does not address removal from storage or shipment from the 200 Area ISA. Three different SNF types contained in three different dry cask storage systems are to be stored at the 200 Area ISA, as follows: (1) Fast Flux Test Facility Fuel--Fifty-three interim storage casks (ISC), each holding a core component container (CCC), will be used to store the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) SNF currently in the 400 Area. (2) Neutron Radiography Facility (NRF) TRIGA'--One Rad-Vault' container will store two DOT-6M3 containers and six NRF TRIGA casks currently stored in the 400 Area. (3) Commercial Light Water Reactor Fuel--Six International Standards Organization (ISO) containers, each holding a NAC-I cask4 with an inner commercial light water reactor (LWR) canister, will be used for commercial LWR SNF from the 300 Area. An aboveground dry cask storage location is necessary for the spent fuel because the current storage facilities are being shut down and deactivated. The spent fuel is being transferred to interim storage because there is no permanent repository storage currently available.

  11. Project Guarantee 1985. Final repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes: The system of safety barriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    The safety barrier system for the type B repository for low- and intermediate-level waste is described. The barrier parameters which are relevant for safety analysis are quantified and associated error limits and data scatter are given. The aim of the report is to give a summary documentation of the safety analysis input data and their scientific background. For secure containment of radioactive waste safety barriers are used which effectively limit the release of radioactive material from the repository (release barriers) and effectively retard the entry of the original radioactive material into the biosphere (time barriers). In the case of low- and intermediate-level waste the technical safety barrier system comprises: waste solidification matrix (cement, bitumen and resin), immobilisation of the waste packages in containers using liquid cement, concrete repository containers, backfilling of remaining vacant storage space with special concrete, concrete lining of the repository caverns, sealing of access tunnels on final closure of the repository. Natural geological safety barriers - host rock and overlying formations - have the following important functions. Because of its stability, the host rock in the repository zone protects the technical safety barrier system from destruction caused by climatic effects and erosion for a sufficient length of time. It also provides for low water flow and favourable chemistry (reducing conditions)

  12. Nevada State plan; final approval determination. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), U.S. Department of Labor. Final State plan approval--Nevada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2000-04-18

    This document amends OSHA's regulations to reflect the Assistant Secretary's decision granting final approval to the Nevada State plan. As a result of this affirmative determination under section 18(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Federal OSHA's standards and enforcement authority no longer apply to occupational safety and health issues covered by the Nevada plan, and authority for Federal concurrent jurisdiction is relinquished. Federal enforcement jurisdiction is retained over any private sector maritime employment, private sector employers on Indian land, and any contractors or subcontractors on any Federal establishment where the land is exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction remains in effect with respect to Federal government employers and employees. Federal OSHA will also retain authority for coverage of the United States Postal Service (USPS), including USPS employees, contract employees, and contractor-operated facilities engaged in USPS mail operations.

  13. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B permit application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This volume contains Appendix D2, engineering design basis reports. Contents include: Design considerations for the waste hoist of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP); A site-specific study of wind and tornado probabilities at the WIPP Site in southeast New Mexico; Seismic evaluation report of underground facilities; and calculations for analysis of wind loads and tornado loads for WHB, seismic calculations, calculations for VOC-10 monitoring system, and for shaft at station A

  14. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

  15. Safety studies project on waste management. Final report. Chapters 2 and 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The report presents, in summary form, a mode of procedure for accident analysis in nuclear waste management facilities. New instruments for safety analysis have been developed and tested. The report describes exemplary safety analyses with the new instrumentation. The safety analyses were carried out in surface systems, i.e. reprocessing and waste treatment systems, and in underground nuclear waste storage road and rail transport of radioactive materials have been investigated. (EF) [de

  16. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

  17. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by DOE itself. The three major recommendations are: under any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

  18. Some safety considerations in laser-controlled thermonuclear reactors. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Botts, T.E.; Breton, D.; Chan, C.K.; Levy, S.I.; Sehnert, M.; Ullman, A.Z.

    1978-07-01

    A major objective of this study was to identify potential safety questions for laser controlled thermonuclear reactors. From the safety viewpoint, it does not appear that the actual laser controlled thermonuclear reactor conceptual designs present hazards very different than those of magnetically confined fusion reactors. Some aspects seem beneficial, such as small lithium inventories, and the absence of cryogenic devices, while other aspects are new, for example the explosion of pressure vessels and laser hazards themselves. Major aspects considered in this report include: (a) general safety considerations, (b) tritium inventories, (c) system behavior during loss of flow accidents, and (d) safety considerations of laser related penetrations

  19. DOE high-level waste tank safety program Final report, Task 002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The overall objective of the work on Task 002 was to provide LANL with support to the DOE High-Level Waste Tank Safety program. The objective of the work was to develop safety documentation in support of the unsafe tank mitigation activities at Hanford. The work includes the development of safety assessment and an environmental assessment. All tasks which were assigned under this Task Order were completed. Descriptions of the objectives of each task and effort performed to complete each objective are provided. The two tasks were: Task 2.1--safety assessment for instrumentation insertion; and Task 2.2--environmental assessment

  20. Intergrated plant safety assessment. Systematic evaluation program. Palisades plant, Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published its Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report (IPSAR) (NUREG-0820), under the scope of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), for Consumers Power Company's Palisades Plant located in Covert, Van Buren County, Michigan. The SEP was initiated by the NRC to review the design of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. This report documents the review completed under the SEP for the Palisades Plant. The review has provided for (1) as assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when the Palisades Plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when all supplements to the Final IPSAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for converting the license from a provisional to a full-term license have been issued. The report also addresses the comments and recommendations made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in connection with its review of the Draft Report, issued in April 1982

  1. Actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): FY94 results

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Novak, C.F. [ed.

    1995-08-01

    This document contains six reports on actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These reports, completed in FY94, are relevant to the estimation of the potential dissolved actinide concentrations in WIPP brines under repository breach scenarios. Estimates of potential dissolved actinide concentrations are necessary for WIPP performance assessment calculations. The specific topics covered within this document are: the complexation of oxalate with Th(IV) and U(VI); the stability of Pu(VI) in one WIPP-specific brine environment both with and without carbonate present; the solubility of Nd(III) in a WIPP Salado brine surrogate as a function of hydrogen ion concentration; the steady-state dissolved plutonium concentrations in a synthetic WIPP Culebra brine surrogate; the development of a model for Nd(III) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate solutions; and the development of a model for Np(V) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium Perchlorate, sodium carbonate, and sodium chloride media.

  2. Actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): FY94 results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novak, C.F.

    1995-08-01

    This document contains six reports on actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These reports, completed in FY94, are relevant to the estimation of the potential dissolved actinide concentrations in WIPP brines under repository breach scenarios. Estimates of potential dissolved actinide concentrations are necessary for WIPP performance assessment calculations. The specific topics covered within this document are: the complexation of oxalate with Th(IV) and U(VI); the stability of Pu(VI) in one WIPP-specific brine environment both with and without carbonate present; the solubility of Nd(III) in a WIPP Salado brine surrogate as a function of hydrogen ion concentration; the steady-state dissolved plutonium concentrations in a synthetic WIPP Culebra brine surrogate; the development of a model for Nd(III) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate solutions; and the development of a model for Np(V) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium Perchlorate, sodium carbonate, and sodium chloride media

  3. Status Report on the Microbial Characterization of Halite and Groundwater Samples from the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swanson, Juliet S.; Reed, Donald T.; Ams, David A.; Norden, Diana; Simmons, Karen A.

    2012-01-01

    This report summarizes the progress made in the ongoing task of characterizing the microbial community structures within the WIPP repository and in surrounding groundwaters. Through cultivation and DNA-based identification, the potential activity of these organisms is being inferred, thus leading to a better understanding of their impact on WIPP performance. Members of the three biological domains - Bacteria, Archaea, and Eukarya (in this case, Fungi) - that are associated with WIPP halite have been identified. Thus far, their activity has been limited to aerobic respiration; anaerobic incubations are underway. WIPP halite constitutes the near-field microbial environment. We expect that microbial activity in this setting will proceed from aerobic respiration, through nitrate reduction to focus on sulfate reduction. This is also the current WIPP performance assessment (PA) position. Sulfate reduction can occur at extremely high ionic strengths, and sulfate is available in WIPP brines and in the anhydrite interbeds. The role of methanogenesis in the WIPP remains unclear, due to both energetic constraints imposed by a high-salt environment and substrate selectivity, and it is no longer considered in PA. Archaea identified in WIPP halite thus far fall exclusively within the family Halobacteriaceae. These include Halobacterium noricense, cultivated from both low- and high-salt media, and a Halorubrum-like species. The former has also been detected in other salt mines worldwide; the latter likely constitutes a new species. Little is known of its function, but it was prevalent in experiments investigating the biodegradation of organic complexing agents in WIPP brines. Bacterial signatures associated with WIPP halite include members of the phylum Proteobacteria - Halomonas, Pelomonas, Limnobacter, and Chromohalobacter - but only the latter has been isolated. Also detected and cultivated were Salinicoccus and Nesterenkonia spp. Fungi were also isolated from halite. Although

  4. Status Report on the Microbial Characterization of Halite and Groundwater Samples from the WIPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swanson, Juliet S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reed, Donald T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ams, David A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Norden, Diana [Ohio State University; Simmons, Karen A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-10

    This report summarizes the progress made in the ongoing task of characterizing the microbial community structures within the WIPP repository and in surrounding groundwaters. Through cultivation and DNA-based identification, the potential activity of these organisms is being inferred, thus leading to a better understanding of their impact on WIPP performance. Members of the three biological domains - Bacteria, Archaea, and Eukarya (in this case, Fungi) - that are associated with WIPP halite have been identified. Thus far, their activity has been limited to aerobic respiration; anaerobic incubations are underway. WIPP halite constitutes the near-field microbial environment. We expect that microbial activity in this setting will proceed from aerobic respiration, through nitrate reduction to focus on sulfate reduction. This is also the current WIPP performance assessment (PA) position. Sulfate reduction can occur at extremely high ionic strengths, and sulfate is available in WIPP brines and in the anhydrite interbeds. The role of methanogenesis in the WIPP remains unclear, due to both energetic constraints imposed by a high-salt environment and substrate selectivity, and it is no longer considered in PA. Archaea identified in WIPP halite thus far fall exclusively within the family Halobacteriaceae. These include Halobacterium noricense, cultivated from both low- and high-salt media, and a Halorubrum-like species. The former has also been detected in other salt mines worldwide; the latter likely constitutes a new species. Little is known of its function, but it was prevalent in experiments investigating the biodegradation of organic complexing agents in WIPP brines. Bacterial signatures associated with WIPP halite include members of the phylum Proteobacteria - Halomonas, Pelomonas, Limnobacter, and Chromohalobacter - but only the latter has been isolated. Also detected and cultivated were Salinicoccus and Nesterenkonia spp. Fungi were also isolated from halite. Although

  5. EU DEMO blanket concepts safety assessment. Final report of Working Group 6a of the Blanket Concept Selection Exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kleefeldt, K.; Porfiri, T.

    1996-06-01

    The European Union has been engaged since 1989 in a programme to develop tritium breeding blankets for application in a fusion power reactor. There are four blanket concepts under development. Two of them use lithium ceramics, the other two concepts employ an eutectic lead-lithium alloy (Pb-17Li) as breeder material. The two most promising concepts were to select in 1995 for further development. In order to prepare the selection, a Blanket Concept Selection Exercise (BCSE) has been inititated by the participating associations under the auspices of the European Commission. This BCSE has been performed in 14 working groups which, in a comparative evaluation of the four blanket concepts, addressed specific fields. The working group safety addressed the safety implications. This report describes the methodology adopted, the safety issues identified, their comparative evaluation for the four concepts, and the results and conclusions of the working group to be entered into the overall evaluation. There, the results from all 14 working groups have been combined to yield a final ranking as a basis for the selection. In summary, the safety assessment showed that the four European blanket concepts can be considered as equivalent in terms of the safety rating adopted, each concept, however, rendering safety concerns of different quality in different areas which are substantiated in this report. (orig.) [de

  6. Development and validation of three-dimensional CFD techniques for reactor safety applications. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buchholz, Sebastian; Palazzo, Simone; Papukchiev, Angel; Scheurer Martina

    2016-12-01

    The overall goal of the project RS 1506 ''Development and Validation of Three Dimensional CFD Methods for Reactor Safety Applications'' is the validation of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) software for the simulation of three -dimensional thermo-hydraulic heat and fluid flow phenomena in nuclear reactors. For this purpose a wide spectrum of validation and test cases was selected covering fluid flow and heat transfer phenomena in the downcomer and in the core of pressurized water reactors. In addition, the coupling of the system code ATHLET with the CFD code ANSYS CFX was further developed and validated. The first choice were UPTF experiments where turbulent single- and two-phase flows were investigated in a 1:1 scaled model of a German KONVOI reactor. The scope of the CFD calculations covers thermal mixing and stratification including condensation in single- and two-phase flows. In the complex core region, the flow in a fuel assembly with spacer grid was simulated as defined in the OECD/NEA Benchmark MATIS-H. Good agreement are achieved when the geometrical and physical boundary conditions were reproduced as realistic as possible. This includes, in particular, the consideration of heat transfer to walls. The influence of wall modelling on CFD results was investigated on the TALL-3D T01 experiment. In this case, the dynamic three dimensional fluid flow and heat transfer phenomena were simulated in a Generation IV liquid metal cooled reactor. Concurrently to the validation work, the coupling of the system code ATHLET with the ANSYS CFX software was optimized and expanded for two-phase flows. Different coupling approaches were investigated, in order to overcome the large difference between CPU-time requirements of system and CFD codes. Finally, the coupled simulation system was validated by applying it to the simulation of the PSI double T-junction experiment, the LBE-flow in the MYRRA Spallation experiment and a demonstration test case simulating a pump trip

  7. Lessons learned in demonstration projects regarding operational safety during final disposal of vitrified waste and spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filbert, Wolfgang; Herold, Philipp

    2015-01-01

    The paper summarizes the lessons learned in demonstration projects regarding operational safety during the final disposal of vitrified waste and spent fuel. The three demonstration projects for the direct disposal of vitrified waste and spent fuel are described. The first two demonstration projects concern the shaft transport of heavy payloads of up to 85 t and the emplacement operations in the mine. The third demonstration project concerns the borehole emplacement operation. Finally, open issues for the next steps up to licensing of the emplacement and disposal systems are summarized.

  8. Development of safety-relevant components for the transport and handling of final storage casks for waste from decommissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruening, D.; Geiser, H.; Kloeckner, F.; Rittscher, D.; Schlesinger, H.J.

    1992-10-01

    The aim of the study was the development, construction and testing of a transportation system that is able to transport cylindrical waste containers as well as containers from the deliverer to the 'KONRAD' final repository. A transport palette has been developed that can carry two cylindrical waste containers with type B requirement or classification II. An Open-All-Container for the transport of palettes and 'KONRAD' containers has been developed. A storage of cylindrical waste containers and containers in the final repository is possible with the newly developed transportation system. Safety specifications of the transportation system have been passed successfully. (orig.). 30 refs., 8 tabs., 74 figs [de

  9. Shaft seals for final high-level radioactive waste repositories. ELSA. Pt. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kudla, W.; Schreiter, F.; Gruner, M.

    2013-01-01

    The state of the art in science and technology fir shaft seals with long-term stability is summarized regarding their applicability for high-level waste repository in Germany. The concepts and drafts for the shaft sealing systems ERAM, Asse, Konrad, the WIPP side, the RESEAL concept, the NAGRA concept and the project LASA are reviewed. The methodology of applying partial factors in a safety analysis is summarized and the applicability of this method for geotechnical sealing structures is confirmed. To establish geomechanical boundary conditions of the host rocks and clay stone the stress-strain behavior of the rock mass adjoining the shaft has to be identified including time-dependent thermo-mechanical processes. The general and special requirements for the design of shaft sealing systems, especially in salt rock and clay formations are described, derived from the safety requirements (BMU 2010). Finally general information needs were identified.

  10. Safety analysis of fusion reactors pertaining to nuclear incidents and accidents. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raeder, J.; Weller, A.; Wolf, R.; Jin, X.; Boccaccini, L.V.; Stieglitz, R.; Carloni, D.; Pistner, C.; Herb, J.

    2013-11-01

    The BfS gave the projekt partners IPP, KIT, Oeko-Institut e. V., and GRS the order to carry out a literature study on the topic of safety of fusion power plants regarding nuclear incidents and accidents. In the framework of this study the actual status of science and technology of the safety concept of fusion power plants should be determined and the applicability of the nuclear safety regulations hitherto developed for nuclear power plants checked. For future commercial fusion power plants today only conceptional designs exist. The most advanced conceptual study for a future fusion power plant is the European Power Plant Conceptual Study (PPCS) from the year 2005, which is based on the tokamak principle. In this study also fundamental aspects of the safety concept of nuclear fusion are treated. Hereby several different conceptual approaches are discussed, which differ among others also in the lay-out approaches relevant for the safety of a facility like for instance the choice of the breeding concept or the materials for the blanket/divertor structure and the coolants. The safety concept of nuclear fusion is oriented on safety concepts for facilities with radioactive inventory. It is based on the concept of tiered safety levels. In order to check whether for the nuclear fusion a safety concept comparable with the nuclear fission at all is necessary, in a first step it was considered, which consequences are possible at a postulated release o large parts of the radioactive inventory of a fusion power plant. Such a worst-case scenario was compared with a corresponding, postulated release of large parts of the radioactive inventory of a nuclear power plant. As scale hereby served the radiological criterion, at the transgression of which in the environment of the facility an evacuation would be necessary. In a next step the transferability of the safety concept of the tiered safety levels of nuclear technology to the fusion was checked. Beside events transferable from

  11. Pretest parametric calculations for the heated pillar experiment in the WIPP In-Situ Experimental Area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Branstetter, L.J.

    1983-03-01

    Results are presented for a pretest parametric study of several configurations and heat loads for the heated pillar experiment (Room H) in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) In Situ Experimental Area. The purpose of this study is to serve as a basis for selection of a final experiment geometry and heat load. The experiment consists of a pillar of undisturbed rock salt surrounded by an excavated annular room. The pillar surface is covered by a blanket heat source which is externally insulated. A total of five thermal and ten structural calculations are described in a four to five year experimental time frame. Results are presented which include relevant temperature-time histories, deformations, rock salt stress component and effective stress profiles, and maximum stresses in anhydrite layers which are in close proximity to the room. Also included are predicted contours of a conservative post-processed measure of potential salt failure. Observed displacement histories are seen to be highly dependent on pillar and room height, but insensitive to other geometrical variations. The use of a tensile cutoff across slidelines is seen to produce more accurate predictions of anhydrite maximum stress, but to have little effect on rock salt stresses. The potential for salt failure is seen to be small in each case for the time frame of interest, and is only seen at longer times in the center of the room floor

  12. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) conceptual design report. Part I: executive summary. Part II: facilities and system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-06-01

    The pilot plant is developed for ERDA low-level contact-handled transuranic waste, ERDA remote-handled intermediate-level transuranic waste, and for high-level waste experiments. All wastes placed in the WIPP arrive at the site processed and packaged; no waste processing is done at the WIPP. All wastes placed into the WIPP are retrievable. The proposed site for WIPP lies 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. This document includes the executive summary and a detailed description of the facilities and systems

  13. Management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camper, L.W.; Schlueter, J.; Woods, S.

    1997-05-01

    A Task Force, comprising eight US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and two Agreement State program staff members, developed the guidance contained in this report. This report describes a systematic approach for effectively managing radiation safety programs at medical facilities. This is accomplished by defining and emphasizing the roles of an institution's executive management, radiation safety committee, and radiation safety officer. Various aspects of program management are discussed and guidance is offered on selecting the radiation safety officer, determining adequate resources for the program, using such contractual services as consultants and service companies, conducting audits, and establishing the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals; NRC's reporting and notification requirements are discussed, and a general description is given of how NRC's licensing, inspection and enforcement programs work

  14. U27 : real-time commercial vehicle safety & security monitoring final report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-01

    Accurate real-time vehicle tracking has a wide range of applications including fleet management, drug/speed/law enforcement, transportation planning, traffic safety, air quality, electronic tolling, and national security. While many alternative track...

  15. Proving autonomous vehicle and advanced driver assistance systems safety : final research report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-15

    The main objective of this project was to provide technology for answering : crucial safety and correctness questions about verification of autonomous : vehicle and advanced driver assistance systems based on logic. : In synergistic activities, we ha...

  16. Management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Camper, L.W.; Schlueter, J.; Woods, S. [and others

    1997-05-01

    A Task Force, comprising eight US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and two Agreement State program staff members, developed the guidance contained in this report. This report describes a systematic approach for effectively managing radiation safety programs at medical facilities. This is accomplished by defining and emphasizing the roles of an institution`s executive management, radiation safety committee, and radiation safety officer. Various aspects of program management are discussed and guidance is offered on selecting the radiation safety officer, determining adequate resources for the program, using such contractual services as consultants and service companies, conducting audits, and establishing the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals; NRC`s reporting and notification requirements are discussed, and a general description is given of how NRC`s licensing, inspection and enforcement programs work.

  17. Consideration of social scientific issues in a safety case. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sailer, Michael; Kallenbach-Herbert, Beate; Brohmann, Bettina; Spieth-Achtnich, Angelika

    2010-01-01

    The research outcome presented here - a model for identifying and describing safety-relevant social scientific issues - provides a scientific basis for addressing these issues in a safety case. In order for them to be implemented in a repository process, it would be necessary to elaborate in greater detail the initial conceptual foundations that have been laid in this research project in line with the project's terms of reference. The requisite elaboration relates to binding rules for designing the repository process, particularly with regard to the stages in which the safety case is to be developed during planning, approval, construction and operation through to repository closure. Such detailed elaboration also needs to involve specifying the extent to which each social scientific issue and sub-issue is to be addressed in the different stages. Consideration would need to be given not only to the relevance of the issue for a given stage but also to the various options and methods for providing proof of safety. It would be possible to draw on experiences with handling safety management in nuclear power plants - a sphere in which over the last ten years efforts have been ongoing to develop methods for presentation by the operator and review by the authorities. Furthermore, it is likely that the social scientific issues relevant to a safety case cannot be defined once and for all in a single process, but that the need for continual revision and adaptation will arise due to both the increasing knowledge acquired during the course of the repository process and the experiences and expectations of stakeholders (similarly to experiences in the sphere of scientific-technological requirements). Appropriate conditions need to be defined for such a process. This process could be supported by implementing the option mentioned above whereby a regulatory definition of safety management for geological disposal is formulated which encompasses all safety-relevant social scientific

  18. Safety case for license application for a final repository: The French example

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boissier, Fabrice; Voinis, Sylvie

    2014-01-01

    The reversible repository in a deep geological formation is the French reference solution for the long-term management of high-level and intermediate-level long-lived radioactive waste (HLW and ILW). Twenty years of R and D work and conceptual and basic studies since the first French Act of 1991 led, in particular, to a feasibility demonstration in 2005. According to the French Act on Radioactive Waste of 28 of June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository in order to apply for license in 2015. In response to this demand, Andra developed the industrial project known as 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. Two years before applying for authorisation, Andra's project is now focusing on three main targets: developing Cigeo's industrial design, preparing the authorisation process through increased exchanges with stakeholders and the preparation of a safety case to support authorisation application. The latter draws on the previous safety cases of 2005 and 2009, which give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety, both for the operational and post-closure periods. In this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - to identify the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) and guides applicable to the facility; - to ensure that the industrial design complies in particular with the safety requirements as presented in the safety case and its supporting safety assessment; - to identify crucial inputs (R and D, tests,...) needed to support the authorisation application, in particular, to bring convincing arguments to assess the technical feasibility of the design and when appropriate its ability to meet the safety requirements; - to ensure that all the requirements from previous regulatory and peer reviews (national and international?) are taken into account. (authors)

  19. Final disposal of spent fuel in the Finnish bedrock. Scope and requirements for site-specific safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-12-01

    The report is a summary of the research conducted in the period 1993 to 1996 into safety of spent fuel final disposal. The principal goal of the research in this period, as set in 1993, was to develop a strategy for site-specific safety analysis. At the same time efforts were to be continued to gather data and validate the technical approach for the analysis. The work aimed at having the data needed for the analysis available at the end of year 1998. A safety assessment update, TILA-96, prepared by VTT Energy, is published as a separate report. The assessment is based on the TVO-92 safety analysis, but takes into account the knowledge acquired after 1992 on safety aspects of the disposal system and the data gathered from the site investigations made by TVO and from the beginning of 1996, by Posiva. Since the site investigations are still ongoing and much of the data gathered still pending interpretation, only limited amount of new site-specific information has been available for the present assessment. (172 refs.)

  20. Final Safety Analysis Document for Building 693 Chemical Waste Storage Building at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salazar, R.J.; Lane, S.

    1992-02-01

    This Safety Analysis Document (SAD) for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 693, Chemical Waste Storage Building (desipated as Building 693 Container Storage Unit in the Laboratory's RCRA Part B permit application), provides the necessary information and analyses to conclude that Building 693 can be operated at low risk without unduly endangering the safety of the building operating personnel or adversely affecting the public or the environment. This Building 693 SAD consists of eight sections and supporting appendices. Section 1 presents a summary of the facility designs and operations and Section 2 summarizes the safety analysis method and results. Section 3 describes the site, the facility desip, operations and management structure. Sections 4 and 5 present the safety analysis and operational safety requirements (OSRs). Section 6 reviews Hazardous Waste Management's (HWM) Quality Assurance (QA) program. Section 7 lists the references and background material used in the preparation of this report Section 8 lists acronyms, abbreviations and symbols. Appendices contain supporting analyses, definitions, and descriptions that are referenced in the body of this report

  1. Performance in the WIPP nondestructive assay performance demonstration program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marcinkiewicz, C.J. [Consolidated Technical Services, Inc., Frederick, MD (United States); Connolly, M.J.; Becker, G.K. [Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    1997-11-01

    Measurement facilities performing nondestructive assay (NDA) of wastes intended for disposal at the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are required to demonstrate their ability to meet specific Quality Assurance Objectives (QAOs). This demonstration is performed, in part, by participation in the NDA Performance Demonstration Program (PDP). The PDP is funded and managed by the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) of DOE and is conducted by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. It tests the characteristics of precision, system bias and/or total uncertainty through the measurement of variable, blind combinations of simulated waste drums and certified radioactive standards. Each facility must successfully participate in the PDP using each different type of measurement system planned for use in waste characterization. The first cycle of the PDP using each different type of measurement system planned for use in waste characterization. The first cycle of the PDP was completed in July 1996 and the second is scheduled for completion by December 1996. Seven sites reported data in cycle 1 for 11 different measurement systems. This paper describes the design and operation of the PDP and provides the performance data from cycle 1. It also describes the preliminary results from cycle 2 and updates the status and future plans for the NDA PDP. 4 refs., 9 figs., 11 tabs.

  2. WIPP waste package testing on simulated DHLW: emplacement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.

    1984-01-01

    Several series of simulated (nonradioactive) defense high-level waste (DHLW) package tests have been emplaced in the WIPP, a research and development facility authorized to demonstrate the safe disposal of defense-related wastes. The primary purpose of these 3-to-7 year duration tests is to evaluate the in situ materials performance of waste package barriers (canisters, overpacks, backfills, and nonradioactive DHLW glass waste form) for possible future application to a licensed waste repository in salt. This paper describes all test materials, instrumentation, and emplacement and testing techniques, and discusses progress of the various tests. These tests are intended to provide information on materials behavior (i.e., corrosion, metallurgical and geochemical alterations, waste form durability, surface interactions, etc.), as well as comparison between several waste package designs, fabrications details, and actual costs. These experiments involve 18 full-size simulated DHLW packages (approximately 3.0 m x 0.6 m diameter) emplaced in vertical boreholes in the salt drift floor. Six of the test packages contain internal electrical heaters (470 W/canister), and were emplace under approximately reference DHLW repository conditions. Twelve other simulated DHLW packages were emplaced under accelerated-aging or overtest conditions, including the artificial introduction of brine, and a thermal loading approximately three to four times higher than reference. Eight of these 12 test packages contain 1500 W/canister electrical heaters; the other four are filled with DHLW glass. 9 refs., 1 fig

  3. Geomechanical applications for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matalucci, R.V.; Hunter, T.O.

    1981-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a research and development facility in bedded salt addressing the technical issues associated with the demonstration of disposal of radioactive waste from the defense programs of the USA. The geomechanical program includes laboratory experimentation, constitutive model and computer code development, and in-situ experimentation. Various material models, including creep for salt, and techniques for predicting room response under thermal and mechanical loads have been developed and are being applied to experiment and facility designs. A Benchmark II study has been conducted to compare the capabilities of nine structural codes to predict response of underground configuration under ambient temperature and with a thermal load of 7.5 W/m 2 . Parametric studies are being conducted to evaluate optimum room configurations. A series of in situ experiments is the next step towards validating models and predictive techniques. These experiments will be conducted in a facility in southeastern New Mexico mined at a depth of 659 m

  4. Safety research experiment facilities, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho. Final environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liverman, J.L.

    1977-09-01

    This environmental statement was prepared for the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) Project. The purpose of the proposed project is to modify some existing facilities and provide a new test facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for conducting fast breeder reactor (FBR) safety experiments. The SAREF Project proposal has been developed after an extensive study which identified the FBR safety research needs requiring in-reactor experiments and which evaluated the capability of various existing and new facilities to meet these needs. The proposed facilities provide for the in-reactor testing of large bundles of prototypical FBR fuel elements under a wide variety of conditions, ranging from those abnormal operating conditions which might be expected to occur during the life of an FBR power plant to the extremely low probability, hypothetical accidents used in the evaluation of some design options and in the assessment of the long-term potential risk associated with wide-acale deployment of the FBR

  5. Final Report of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Agile Benchmarking Team

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wetherholt, Martha

    2016-01-01

    To ensure that the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) community remains in a position to perform reliable Software Assurance (SA) on NASAs critical software (SW) systems with the software industry rapidly transitioning from waterfall to Agile processes, Terry Wilcutt, Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) established the Agile Benchmarking Team (ABT). The Team's tasks were: 1. Research background literature on current Agile processes, 2. Perform benchmark activities with other organizations that are involved in software Agile processes to determine best practices, 3. Collect information on Agile-developed systems to enable improvements to the current NASA standards and processes to enhance their ability to perform reliable software assurance on NASA Agile-developed systems, 4. Suggest additional guidance and recommendations for updates to those standards and processes, as needed. The ABT's findings and recommendations for software management, engineering and software assurance are addressed herein.

  6. Commercial-grade motors in safety-related applications: Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holzman, P.M.

    1988-04-01

    The objective of this project was to discuss the process necessary to utilize commercial grade equipment in safety related applications and to provide utilities with guidance for accepting commercial grade motors for safety-related applications. The generic commercial-grade concepts presented in this report can be successfully applied to motors. Commercial grade item utilization has the greatest applicability to motors in ''mild'' environments, because these motors are essentially similar to commercial grade motors in materials, construction methods, and capabilities. The acceptance process is less applicable to motors that are subject to ''harsh'' environments during postulated accidents, because of the unique design features and testing required to qualify these motors

  7. Feasibility studies of safety assessment methods for programmable automation systems. Final report of the AVV project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haapanen, P.; Maskuniitty, M.; Pulkkinen, U.; Heikkinen, J.; Korhonen, J.; Tuulari, E.

    1995-10-01

    Feasibility studies of two different groups of methodologies for safety assessment of programmable automation systems has been executed at the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). The studies concerned the dynamic testing methods and the fault tree (FT) and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) methods. In order to get real experience in the application of these methods, an experimental testing of two realistic pilot systems were executed and a FT/FMEA analysis of a programmable safety function accomplished. The purpose of the studies was not to assess the object systems, but to get experience in the application of methods and assess their potentials and development needs. (46 refs., 21 figs.)

  8. Fluor Daniel Hanford Inc. integrated safety management system phase 1 verification final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PARSONS, J.E.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this review is to verify the adequacy of documentation as submitted to the Approval Authority by Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH). This review is not only a review of the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) System Description documentation, but is also a review of the procedures, policies, and manuals of practice used to implement safety management in an environment of organizational restructuring. The FDH ISMS should support the Hanford Strategic Plan (DOE-RL 1996) to safely clean up and manage the site's legacy waste; deploy science and technology while incorporating the ISMS theme to ''Do work safely''; and protect human health and the environment

  9. Final summary report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Program 1998-2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennerstedt, T.

    2002-11-01

    The results of the 1998 - 2001 NKS program are presented in the form of executive summaries, highlighting the conclusions, recommendations and other findings and results of the six projects carried out during that period. The titles of the six projects are: Risk assessment and strategies for safety (NKS/SOS-1); Reactor safety (NKS/SOS-2); Radioactive waste (NKS/SOS-3); Nuclear Emergency preparedness (NKS/BOK-1); Radiological and environmental consequences (NKS/BOK-2); Nuclear threats from Nordic surroundings (NKS/SBA-1) (ln)

  10. Review guidelines on software languages for use in nuclear power plant safety systems. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hecht, H.; Hecht, M.; Graff, S.; Green, W.; Lin, D.; Koch, S.; Tai, A.; Wendelboe, D.

    1996-06-01

    Guidelines for the programming and auditing of software written in high level languages for safety systems are presented. The guidelines are derived from a framework of issues significant to software safety which was gathered from relevant standards and research literature. Language-specific adaptations of these guidelines are provided for the following high level languages: Ada, C/C++, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Ladder Logic, International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard 1131-3 Sequential Function Charts, Pascal, and PL/M. Appendices to the report include a tabular summary of the guidelines and additional information on selected languages.s

  11. Final report-passive safety optimization in liquid sodium-cooled reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cahalana, J. E.; Hahn, D.

    2007-01-01

    This report summarizes the results of a three-year collaboration between Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) to identify and quantify the performance of innovative design features in metallic-fueled, sodium-cooled fast reactor designs. The objective of the work was to establish the reliability and safety margin enhancements provided by design innovations offering significant potential for construction, maintenance, and operating cost reductions. The project goal was accomplished with a combination of advanced model development (Task 1), analysis of innovative design and safety features (Tasks 2 and 3), and planning of key safety experiments (Task 4). Task 1--Computational Methods for Analysis of Passive Safety Design Features: An advanced three-dimensional subassembly thermal-hydraulic model was developed jointly and implemented in ANL and KAERI computer codes. The objective of the model development effort was to provide a high-accuracy capability to predict fuel, cladding, coolant, and structural temperatures in reactor fuel subassemblies, and thereby reduce the uncertainties associated with lower fidelity models previously used for safety and design analysis. The project included model formulation, implementation, and verification by application to available reactor tests performed at EBR-II. Task 2--Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Innovative Design Features: Integrated safety assessments of innovative liquid metal reactor designs were performed to quantify the performance of inherent safety features. The objective of the analysis effort was to identify the potential safety margin enhancements possible in a sodium-cooled, metal-fueled reactor design by use of passive safety mechanisms to mitigate low-probability accident consequences. The project included baseline analyses using state-of-the-art computational models and advanced analyses using the new model developed in Task 1. Task 3--Safety

  12. The Wipp Disposal Decision Plan: the Successful Road Map for Transparent and Credible Decision-Making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eriksson, Leif G.

    2001-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) deep geological repository for long-lived, transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) opened on the 26th of March 1999. Beginning on the 4th of April 1994, the United States Department of Energy (DOE), implemented the WIPP Disposal Decision Plan (DDP), which embodied the five-year vision and intents of the then DOE Manager of the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO), presently the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). The successful design and implementation of the DDP ensured good science, enhanced regulator and stake holder (affected and interested parties) interactions and acceptance of programmatic decisions, which resulted in the certification of the WIPP TRUW repository by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the 18th of May 1998, almost three years earlier than projected in November 1993. The present paper contains three sections: A concise background information on the CBFO's TRUW disposal program, incl. the legal framework, current status, and author-envisioned challenges and solutions; A description of the main components and attributes of the WIPP DDP. A summary of the lessons learned during and after the 1994 through 1998 implementation of the WIPP DDP

  13. History of geophysical studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borns, D.J.

    1997-01-01

    A variety of geophysical methods including the spectrum of seismic, electrical, electromagnetic and potential field techniques have supported characterization, monitoring and experimental studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The geophysical studies have provided significant understanding of the nature of site deformation, tectonics and stability. Geophysical methods have delineated possible brine reservoirs beneath the underground facility and have defined the disturbed rock zone that forms around underground excavations. The role of geophysics in the WIPP project has evolved with the project. The early uses were for site characterization to satisfy site selection criteria or factors. As the regulatory framework for WIPP grew since 1980, the geophysics program supported experimental and field programs such as Salado hydrogeology and underground room systems and excavations. In summary, the major types of issues that geophysical studies addressed for WIPP are: Site Characterization; Castile Brine Reservoirs; Rustler/Dewey Lake Hydrogeology; Salado Hydrogeology; and Excavation Effects. The nature of geophysics programs for WIPP has been to support investigation rather than being the principal investigation itself. The geophysics program has been used to define conceptual models (e.g., the Disturbed Rock Zone-DRZ) or to test conceptual models (e.g., high transmissivity zones in the Rustler Formation). The geophysics program primarily supported larger characterization and experimental programs. Funding was not available for the complete documentation and interpretation. Therefore, a great deal of the geophysics survey information resides in contractor reports

  14. Preliminary identification of interfaces for certification and transfer of TRU waste to WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitty, W.J.; Ostenak, C.A.; Pillay, K.K.S.

    1982-02-01

    This study complements the national program to certify that newly generated and stored, unclassified defense transuranic (TRU) wastes meet the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria. The objectives of this study were to identify (1) the existing organizational structure at each of the major waste-generating and shipping sites and (2) the necessary interfaces between the waste shippers and WIPP. The interface investigations considered existing waste management organizations at the shipping sites and the proposed WIPP organization. An effort was made to identify the potential waste-certifying authorities and the lines of communication within these organizations. The long-range goal of this effort is to develop practicable interfaces between waste shippers and WIPP to enable the continued generation, interim storage, and eventual shipment of certified TRU wastes to WIPP. Some specific needs identified in this study include: organizational responsibility for certification procedures and quality assurance (QA) program; simple QA procedures; and specification and standardization of reporting forms and procedures, waste containers, and container labeling, color coding, and code location

  15. The Wipp Disposal Decision Plan: the Successful Road Map for Transparent and Credible Decision-Making

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eriksson, Leif G. [GRAM, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) deep geological repository for long-lived, transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) opened on the 26th of March 1999. Beginning on the 4th of April 1994, the United States Department of Energy (DOE), implemented the WIPP Disposal Decision Plan (DDP), which embodied the five-year vision and intents of the then DOE Manager of the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO), presently the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). The successful design and implementation of the DDP ensured good science, enhanced regulator and stake holder (affected and interested parties) interactions and acceptance of programmatic decisions, which resulted in the certification of the WIPP TRUW repository by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the 18th of May 1998, almost three years earlier than projected in November 1993. The present paper contains three sections: A concise background information on the CBFO's TRUW disposal program, incl. the legal framework, current status, and author-envisioned challenges and solutions; A description of the main components and attributes of the WIPP DDP. A summary of the lessons learned during and after the 1994 through 1998 implementation of the WIPP DDP.

  16. Implications of the presence of petroleum resources on the integrity of the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, M.K.

    1994-06-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a facility of the US Department of Energy (DOE), designed and constructed for the permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) defense waste. The WIPP is surrounded by reserves of potash, crude oil, and natural gas. These are attractive targets for exploratory drilling which could disrupt the integrity of the transuranic waste repository. The performance assessment calculations published to date have identified future drilling for oil and gas reserves as an event that may disrupt the repository and may release radionuclides in excess of the standards. Therefore, the probability of inadvertent human intrusion into the repository by drilling and its impact on the integrity of the repository must be carefully assessed. This report evaluates: (1) the studies funded by the DOE to examine the crude oil potential in the immediate vicinity of the WIPP; (2) the use of an elicitation exercise to predict future drilling rates for use in the calculation of the repository performance; and (3) the observed limitations of institutional controls. This report identifies the following issues that remain to be resolved: (1) the limited performance of blowout preventers after drilling into high pressure zones immediately adjacent to the WIPP Site Boundary; (2) reported problems with waterflooding operations in southeastern New Mexico; (3) reported water level rises in several wells completed in the Rustler Formation, south of the WIPP Site, possibly due to oil and gas wells or leaking injection wells; and (4) reports of inadequate well abandonment practices on BLM leases and the continued absence of enforceable regulations

  17. Project Guarantee 1985. Final repository for high-level radioactive wastes: Safety report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    Disposal of radioactive was involves preventing releases to the biosphere for a long period of time and subsequently limiting the magnitude of releases by means of a series of safety barriers: the waste solidification matrix (borosilicate glass), massive steel canisters in highly compacted bentonite, sealing of void spacer and access routes on repository closure. The geological barriers are formed by the crystalline bed-rock and the overlying sedimentary layers. In order to perform a safety assessment the behaviour of these technical barriers and of the host rock must be understood and this understanding must be translated into quantitative models which allow calculation of repository performance. For the particular case of a Swiss repository, the main criterion is the individual dose limit of 10 mrem/year, which is given in the safety guidelines of the Swiss authorities. The procedure for the safety analysis involves examination of all scenarios which could give rise to radionuclide release from the repository. Qualitative considerations of both the magnitude of their consequences and their likelihood are used in order to identify a restricted number of scenarios for quantitative analysis

  18. Safety analysis of final disposal of nuclear waste - significance, development and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Kjell; Norrby, Soeren; Simic, Eva; Wene, Clas-Otto

    2007-05-01

    The report starts with a review of the role and development of safety assessments from the middle of the 70's up until today. Then follows a section on how the assessment is performed today. The demands from the licensing authorities is then described. The report ends with a chapter on conclusions and reflections

  19. Impact of cruise control on traffic safety, energy consumption and environmental pollution : final report

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hoedemaeker, D.M.; Brouwer, R.F.T.; Malone, K.; Klunder, G.; et al

    2006-01-01

    In this subproject, the impact of Cruise Control (CC) was analysed with respect to traffic safety, energy consumption, and environmental pollution. In order to work on this topic from a European perspective, a team of European experts in the fields of driver assistance systems, human factors,

  20. Project CHERISH (Children in Home Environments: Regulation To Improve Safety and Health). Final Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grubb, Paul Dallas

    In 1990, Project CHERISH (Children in Home Environments: Regulation to Increase Safety and Health) enabled the Texas Department of Human Services to implement and evaluate several innovative strategies to strengthen regulation of family day care homes. This report contains descriptions of those strategies, an evaluation of their efficacy, and…

  1. Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)/Department of Energy (DOE) cooperative agreement final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slavich, Antoinette; Daust, James E.

    1999-01-01

    This S and T product is a culmination of the activities, including research of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) in developing and implementing inspection procedures and the out-of-service criteria for states and tribes to use when inspecting HRCQ and Transuranic shipments of radioactive materials. The report also contains the results of a pilot study to test the procedures

  2. Final safety analysis report for the Ground Test Accelerator (GTA), Phase 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-10-01

    This document is the second volume of a 3 volume safety analysis report on the Ground Test Accelerator (GTA). The GTA program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the major element of the national Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) program, which is supported by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO). A principal goal of the national NPB program is to assess the feasibility of using hydrogen and deuterium neutral particle beams outside the Earth`s atmosphere. The main effort of the NPB program at Los Alamos concentrates on developing the GTA. The GTA is classified as a low-hazard facility, except for the cryogenic-cooling system, which is classified as a moderate-hazard facility. This volume consists of failure modes and effects analysis; accident analysis; operational safety requirements; quality assurance program; ES&H management program; environmental, safety, and health systems critical to safety; summary of waste-management program; environmental monitoring program; facility expansion, decontamination, and decommissioning; summary of emergency response plan; summary plan for employee training; summary plan for operating procedures; glossary; and appendices A and B.

  3. RETU The Finnish research programme on reactor safety 1995-1998. Final Symposium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vanttola, T.

    1998-01-01

    The Reactor Safety (RETU, 1995-1998) research programme concentrated on search of safe limits for nuclear fuel and the reactor core, accident management methods and risk management of nuclear power plants. The total volume of the programme was 100 person years and funding FIM 58 million. This symposium report summarises the research fields, the objectives and the main results obtained. In the field of operational margins of a nuclear reactor, the behaviour of high burnup nuclear fuel was studied both in normal operation and during power transients. The static and dynamic reactor analysis codes were developed and validated to cope with new fuel designs and complicated three-dimensional reactivity transients. Advanced flow models and numerical solution methods for the dynamics codes were developed and tested. Research on accident management developed and validated calculation methods needed to plan preventive measures and to train the personnel to severe accident mitigation. Efforts were made to reduce uncertainties in phenomena important in severe accidents and to study actions planned for accident management. The programme included experimental work, but also participation in large international tests. The Finnish thermal-hydraulic test facility PACTEL was used extensively for the evaluation of the VVER-440 plant accident behaviour, for the validation of the accident analysis computer codes and for the testing of passive safety system concepts for future plant designs. In risk management probabilistic methods were developed for safety related decision making and for complex event sequences. Effects of maintenance on safety were studied and effective methods for assessment of human reliability and safety critical organisations were searched. To enhance human competencies in control of complex environments, practical tools for training and continuous learning were worked out, and methods to evaluate appropriateness of control room design were developed. (orig)

  4. DOE responses to the State of New Mexico's comments on ''summary of the results of the evaluation of the WIPP site and preliminary design validation program'' (WIPP-DOE-161)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    During the 60-day period provided for comments on the ''Summary of the Results of the Evaluation of the WIPP Site and Preliminary Design Validation Program'' (WIPP-DOE-161), written submittals and hearing testimony from about 133 individuals, 7 citizens groups and 6 state agencies were received by the Department of Energy (DOE). Approximately 25% of the public comment submittals were positive statements supporting the WIPP, with the remaining 75% reflecting concern with one or more aspects of the project. A portion of the state's comment package (submitted by the Governor of New Mexico) contained concerns relevant to WIPP which were unrelated to site suitability. Supportive comments formed the majority of the submittals from the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) which ''...is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the suitability of the site for carrying out the mission of WIPP by analyzing all the reports and other information which form the background to the DOE evaluation of the site''

  5. Integrated plant safety assessment. Systematic evaluation program, Big Rock Point Plant (Docket No. 50-155). Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-05-01

    The Systematic Evaluation Program was initiated in February 1977 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review the designs of older operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety. The review provides (1) an assessment of how these plants compare with current licensing safety requirements relating to selected issues, (2) a basis for deciding how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when the supplement to the Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report has been issued. This report documents the review of the Big Rock Point Plant, which is one of ten plants reviewed under Phase II of this program. This report indicates how 137 topics selected for review under Phase I of the program were addressed. It also addresses a majority of the pending licensing actions for Big Rock Point, which include TMI Action Plan requirements and implementation criteria for resolved generic issues. Equipment and procedural changes have been identified as a result of the review

  6. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    A brief account of activities carried out by the Nuclear power plants Jaslovske Bohunice in 1997 is presented. These activities are reported under the headings: (1) Nuclear safety; (2) Industrial and health safety; (3) Radiation safety; and Fire protection

  7. Analysis of Waste Isolation Pilot Plan (WIPP) Underground and MGO Samples by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Young, J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Ajo, H. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Brown, L. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Coleman, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Crump, S. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Diprete, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Diprete, D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Ekechukwu, A. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Gregory, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Jones, M. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Missimer, D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); O' Rourke, P. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); White, T. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States)

    2014-12-31

    Analysis of the recent WIPP samples are summarized in this report; WIPP Cam Filters 4, 6, 9 (3, 7, 11 were analyzed with FAS-118 in a separate campaign); WIPP Drum Lip R16 C4; WIPP Standard Waste Box R15 C5; WIPP MgO R16 C2; WIPP MgO R16 C4; WIPP MgO R16 C6; LANL swipes of parent drum; LANL parent drum debris; LANL parent drum; IAEA Swipe; Unused “undeployed” Swheat; Unused “undeployed” MgO; and Masselin cloth “smears”. Analysis showed that the MgO samples were very pure with low carbonate and water content. Other samples showed the expected dominant presence of Mg, Na and Pb. Parent drum debris sample was mildly acidic. Interpretation of results is not provided in this document, but rather to present and preserve the analytical work that was performed. The WIPP Technical Analysis Team is responsible for result interpretation which will be written separately.

  8. Fluor Daniel Hanford Inc. integrated safety management system phase 1 verification final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PARSONS, J.E.

    1999-10-28

    The purpose of this review is to verify the adequacy of documentation as submitted to the Approval Authority by Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH). This review is not only a review of the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) System Description documentation, but is also a review of the procedures, policies, and manuals of practice used to implement safety management in an environment of organizational restructuring. The FDH ISMS should support the Hanford Strategic Plan (DOE-RL 1996) to safely clean up and manage the site's legacy waste; deploy science and technology while incorporating the ISMS theme to ''Do work safely''; and protect human health and the environment.

  9. Minimizing risks of maritime oil transport by holistic safety strategies (MIMIC) Final report

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Haapasaari, Päivi Elisabet; Dahlbo, Kim; Aps, Robert

    the costeffectiveness of different types of risk control options in reducing the risks of oil accidents. The cost-effectiveness of the ENSI (Enhanced Navigation Support Information) service, compulsory pilotage, and improved crashworthiness of ships was evaluated. According to the results, the ENSI service is the most......, and the consequent oil outflow  - evaluated optional measures to control oil accident risks and produced a related decision support model  - developed tools for estimating the length of oiled shoreline after an accident  - developed tools for examining the recovery efficiency and optimal disposition of Finnish...... oil combating vessels and for forecasting the clean-up costs of oil spills  - improved operational tools for guiding oil combating activities  - identified and assessed security threats and pondered their connection to safety - analysed the prevailing regulatory system related to maritime safety...

  10. Follow-up of foreign safety studies of final storage of nuclear fuel waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gelin, R.

    1985-04-01

    The development of mathematical models and calculation programs for estimating radionuclide migration from radioactive waste storage is continuing. Detailed site studies are in progress in the United States. The Swiss investigation which has been recently published, recommends waste storage in granite at the depth of 1200 m. The safety analysis is similar to the one of the Swedish KBS-3 study. 68 references. (G.B.)

  11. Safety and risk questions following the nuclear incidents and accidents in Japan. Summary final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mildenberger, Oliver

    2015-03-01

    After the nuclear accidents in Japan, GRS has carried out in-depth investigations of the events. On the one hand, the accident sequences in the affected units have been analysed from various viewpoints. On the other hand, the transferability of the findings to German plants has been examined to possibly make recommendations for safety improvements. The accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi have been traced with as much detail as possible based on all available information. Additional insights have been drawn from thermohydraulic analyses with the GRS code system ATHLET-CD/COCOSYS focusing on the events in units 2 and 3, e.g. with regard to core damage and the state of the containments in the first days of the accident sequence. In-depth investigations have also been carried out on topics such as natural external hazards, electrical power supply or organizational measures. In addition, methodological studies on further topics related with the accidents have been performed. Through a detailed analysis of the relevant data from the events in Japan, the basis for an in-depth examination of the transferability to German plants was created. It was found that an implementation of most of the insights gained from the investigations had already been initiated as part of the GRS information notice 2012/02. Further findings have been communicated to the federal government and introduced into other relevant bodies, e.g. the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (KTA) or the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK).

  12. ORSERG resource book. Operational reactor safety engineering and review group. Final report, March 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-03-01

    EPRI has prepared this resource book to help utilities with their Self-Assessment Programs at nuclear power plants. Self-assessments are reviews performed by nuclear power plant utilities to monitor plant performance status and adequacy, identify trends in operational activities important to safety, and assess the impact of these trends on plant safety. Activities performed as self-assessments include reviews and evaluations of plant performance and abnormal events, technical evaluations of plant activities to identify potential problem areas, and reviews of other sources of plant design and operating experience for applicability to safety. This resource book is based on information obtained from utilities and includes examples of activities and methods that have proven effective. The resource book includes a summary of NRC requirements, guidelines for self-assessment program planning, descriptions and examples of investigative techniques, and key references that can be consulted for additional information. It can serve as a training guide for plant staff members who are assigned to self-assessment activities. (author)

  13. Final Hazard Classification and Auditable Safety Analysis for the 105-F Building Interim Safe Storage Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.; Bond, S.L.

    1998-07-01

    The auditable safety analysis (ASA) documents the authorization basis for the partial decommissioning and facility modifications to place the 105-F Building into interim safe storage (ISS). Placement into the ISS is consistent with the preferred alternative identified in the Record of Decision (58 FR). Modifications will reduce the potential for release and worker exposure to hazardous and radioactive materials, as well as lower surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) costs. This analysis includes the following: A description of the activities to be performed in the course of the 105-F Building ISS Project. An assessment of the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 105-F Building. Identification of the hazards associated with the activities of the 105-F Building ISS Project. Identification of internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to produce significant local or offsite consequences during the 105-F Building ISS Project. Bounding evaluation of the consequences of the potentially significant accident scenarios. Hazard classification based on the bounding consequence evaluation. Associated safety function and controls, including commitments. Radiological and other employee safety and health considerations

  14. Salt impact studies at WIPP effects of surface storage of salt on microbial activity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, A.L.

    1988-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) currently under construction in southeastern New Mexico is a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of transuranic waste in a deep geological formation (bedded salt). The Ecological Monitoring Program at WIPP is designed to detect and measure changes in the local ecosystem which may be the result of WIPP construction activities. The primary factor which may affect the system prior to waste emplacement is windblown salt from discrete stockpiles. Both vegetation and soil microbial processes should reflect changes in soil chemistry due to salt importation. Control and experimental (potentially affected) plots have been established at the site, and several parameters are measured quarterly in each plot as part of the soil microbial sampling subprogram. This subprogram was designed to monitor a portion of the biological community which can be affected by changes in the chemical properties at the soil surface

  15. Modification of the ventilation system at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, S.C.

    1987-01-01

    The WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) Project near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a research and development project sponsored by the US Department of Energy, designed to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive waste. A mine (repository) is being developed 2,150 feet below the surface in a thick salt bed, which will serve as the disposal medium. The underground ventilation system for the WIPP project was originally designed based on a fixed project scope. The design criteria and ventilation requirements were developed for the performance of various activities as then envisioned towards the achievement of this goal. However, in light of new information and actual site-specific experience at WIPP leading to a clearer definition of the scope-related programs and activities, it was realized that the existing ventilation system may need to be modified

  16. An evaluation of the proposed tests with radioactive waste at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaturvedi, L.; Silva, M.

    1992-01-01

    This paper discusses the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) a planned repository for permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) radiative waste that has resulted from the defense activities of the U.S. Government over the past 50 years. Only the waste that is currently stored in an easily retrievable mode at ten U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories around the country will be shipped to WIPP. The waste consists of various kinds of trash including paper, rubber, rags and metal that is contaminated with radionuclides with very long half-lives. The decision to dispose of the waste permanently will be made based on projections of the behavior of the waste and the repository of 10,000 years or more. DOE has proposed shipping a limited amount of waste to WIPP for a five year Test Phase to demonstrating compliance with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Standard for long-term isolation

  17. Rationale for the H-19 and H-11 tracer tests at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beauheim, R.L.; Meigs, L.C.; Davies, P.B.

    1996-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a repository for transuranic wastes constructed in bedded Permian-age halite in the Delaware Basin, a sedimentary basin in southeastern New Mexico, USA. A drilling scenario has been identified during performance assessment (PA) that could lead to the release of radionuclides to the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation, the most transmissive water-saturated unit above the repository horizon. Were this to occur, the radionuclides would need to be largely contained within the Culebra (or neighboring strata) within the WIPP-site boundary through the period lasting for 10,000 years after repository closure for WIPP to remain in compliance with applicable regulations on allowable releases. Thus, processes affecting transport of radionuclides within the Culebra are of importance to PA

  18. Cookoff Modeling of a WIPP waste drum (68660)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hobbs, Michael L. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-11-24

    A waste drum located 2150 feet underground may have been the root cause of a radiation leak on February 14, 2014. Information provided to the WIPP Technical Assessment Team (TAT) was used to describe the approximate content of the drum, which included an organic cat litter (Swheat Scoop®, or Swheat) composed of 100% wheat products. The drum also contained various nitrate salts, oxalic acid, and a nitric acid solution that was neutralized with triethanolamine (TEA). CTH-TIGER was used with the approximate drum contents to specify the products for an exothermic reaction for the drum. If an inorganic adsorbent such as zeolite had been used in lieu of the kitty litter, the overall reaction would have been endothermic. Dilution with a zeolite adsorbent might be a useful method to remediate drums containing organic kitty litter. SIERRA THERMAL was used to calculate the pressurization and ignition of the drum. A baseline simulation of drum 68660 was performed by assuming a background heat source of 0.5-10 W of unknown origin. The 0.5 W source could be representative of heat generated by radioactive decay. The drum ignited after about 70 days. Gas generation at ignition was predicted to be 300-500 psig with a sealed drum (no vent). At ignition, the wall temperature increases modestly by about 1°C, demonstrating that heating would not be apparent prior to ignition. The ignition location was predicted to be about 0.43 meters above the bottom center portion of the drum. At ignition only 3-5 kg (out of 71.6 kg total) has been converted into gas, indicating that most of the material remained available for post-ignition reaction.

  19. Safety requirements to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste an evaluation of the BMU draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, B.

    2008-01-01

    The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on August 12, 2008 published a July 29, 2008 draft of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). The main changes made by the BMU are the introduction of a phased procedure in building repositories. A phased plans approval procedure under the Atomic Energy Act has been foreseen by the Ministry for this purpose. In addition, the draft provides for the introduction of a risk-based goal of protection. To ensure retrievability of the waste, the casks are to have a demonstrated service life of 500 years. The BMU draft safety requirements are unable to bring the safety criteria of 1983 up to the current state of the art. Here are the key points of criticism: - A risk-based goal of protection is introduced. The yardstick to be applied is to be defined in a guideline yet to be elaborated. As a consequence, the draft lacks substance. - As in licensing of nuclear facilities, the licensing procedure provides for a phased plans approval procedure for exploration. This analogy does not exist, as exploration is not the first phase of the plant to be built but a measure which is a precondition for obtaining a permit for construction and operation. - The information contained in the draft indicates that, contrary to international recommendations, it tightens the goal of protection by more than one order of magnitude. - The requirements to be met by the casks because of retrievability impose constraints on solutions optimized for safety in emplacement technology. - The risk-based approach is not mature and is

  20. Assessment of near-surface dissolution at and near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bachman, G.O.

    1985-07-01

    The area at and near the WIPP site was examined for evidence of karst development on the geomorphic surface encompassing the site. Certain surficial depressions of initial concern were identified as blowouts in sand dune fields (shallow features unrelated to karstification). An ancient stream system active more than 500,000 yr ago contained more water than any system since. During that time (Gatuna, Middle Pleistocene), many karst features such as Clayton Basin and Nash Draw began to form in the region. Halite was probably dissolved from parts of the Rustler Formation at that time. Dissolution of halite and gypsum from intervals encountered in Borehole WIPP-33 west of the WIPP site occurred during later Pleistocene time (i.e., <450,000 yr ago). However, there is no evidence of active near-surface dissolution within a belt to the east of WIPP-33 in the vicinity of the WIPP shaft. 26 refs., 11 figs., 1 tab

  1. 76 FR 61261 - Safety Zone; IJSBA World Finals; Lower Colorado River, Lake Havasu, AZ

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-04

    ... navigable waters of Lake Havasu on the lower Colorado River in support of the International Jet Sports... The International Jet Sports Boating Association is sponsoring the IJSBA World Finals. The event will... National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) (15 U.S.C. 272 note) directs agencies to use...

  2. Final summary report of the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Program 1994 - 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennerstedt, T.; Lemmens, A.

    1999-11-01

    This is a summary report of the NKS research program carried out 1994 - 1997. It is basically a compilation of the executive summaries of the final reports on the nine scientific projects carried out during that period. It highlights the conclusions, recommendations and other results of the projects. (au)

  3. Hanford to WIPP - What a Trip: The Road from Hanford is now Open

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRENCH, M.S.

    2001-01-01

    The road leading from Hanford's Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP) in New Mexico developed a few bumps and detours over the past year, but it has now been successfully traversed. There were challenges obtaining Carlsbad Area Office and New Mexico Department of Ecology certification of the Hanford characterization program. After months of work, when initial certification appeared imminent, the issuance of the WIPP Hazardous Waste Permit changed the Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) required for characterizing waste for acceptance at WIPP. After a ceremony dedicating the ''Washington'' room at WIPP, the inaugural shipment from WRAP to WIPP was scheduled for June 2000. This first shipment was planned based on shipping a number of containers that had been characterized before the issuance of the WIPP Mixed Waste Permit. However, the New Mexico Department of Ecology initially declined to accept the characterization data generated before the permit was issued, necessitating revision to the planned shipment. Because of the difficulties inherent in scheduling the TRUPACT-II transport and coordination with all of the states through which the shipment would pass, it was decided to proceed with the first shipment in early July with only the drums that had been characterized after Hanford compliance with the new WIPP WAP requirements had been certified. Following the initial shipment, previously certified containers were recertified using a process approved through negotiation with the New Mexico Environment Department, and additional full shipments have been successfully completed. This paper will present an overview of the challenges overcome and lessons learned in obtaining certification, coordination with the involved states, and eventual successful1 implementation of a routine shipping program

  4. SSI and SKI's Review of SKB's Updated Final Safety Report for SFR 1. Review Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-10-01

    The Repository for Radioactive Operational Waste (SFR 1) is now the object of a new review by the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). One of the stipulations for operating SFR 1 was that a new assessment of the long-term performance and environmental consequences of the repository should be conducted once every 10 years by the licensee, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB). During the time that SFR 1 has been in operation, experience has been gained of operating the facility and new knowledge of long-term performance of SFR 1 has been obtained. New regulations for nuclear facilities have been promulgated since SFR 1 was taken into operation (1988). A review committee comprising employees from SKI and SSI has conducted the review of SSR 2001. This review report has resulted in the committee's evaluation of the safety of SFR 1 and is the basis of the regulatory authorities' decision concerning any amendments to the stipulations for the operation of SFR 1. However, the review has found deficiencies in the follow up of the development of design basis norms since the facility was constructed as well as deficiencies in learning from operating experience. However, the overall evaluation is that the facility is being operated in an acceptable manner from the standpoint of safety. With respect to the long-term performance of the repository, it is a deficiency that SSR 2001 does not describe how compliance with the stipulated radiation protection requirements on optimisation and use of the best available technology (BAT) is achieved during operation. In the opinion of the review committee, issues relating to occupational radiation protection are being handled satisfactorily and the operational releases of radioactive substances are very small. Safety and Radiation Protection after Closure SKB's long-term repository performance assessment contains essential updates and improvements compared with the

  5. Safety-evaluation report related to the final design of the Standard Nuclear Steam Supply Reference System - CESSAR System 80. Docket No. STN 50-470

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-03-01

    Supplement No. 1 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by Combustion Engineering, Inc. for a Final Design Approval for the Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report (STN 50-470) has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The purpose of this supplement is to update the Safety Evaluation by providing: (1) the evaluation of additional information submitted by the applicant since the Safety Evaluation Report was issued, (2) the evaluation of the matters the staff had under review when the Safety Evaluation Report was issued, and (3) the response to comments made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

  6. Code development incorporating environmental, safety, and economic aspects of fusion reactors (FY 92--94). Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ho, S.K.; Fowler, T.K.; Holdren, J.P.

    1994-01-01

    This is the Final Report for a three-year (FY 92--94) study of the Environmental, Safety, and Economic (ESE) aspects of fusion energy systems, emphasizing development of computerized approaches suitable for incorporation as modules in fusion system design codes. First, as is reported in Section 2, the authors now have operating a simplified but complete environment and safety evaluation code, BESAFE. The first tests of BESAFE as a module of the SUPERCODE, a design optimization systems code at LLNL, are reported in Section 3. Secondly, as reported in Section 4, the authors have maintained a strong effort in developing fast calculational schemes for activation inventory evaluation. In addition to these major accomplishments, considerable progress has been made on research on specific topics as follows. A tritium modeling code TRIDYN was developed in collaboration with the TSTA group at LANL and the Fusion Nuclear Technology group at UCLA. A simplified algorithm has been derived to calculate the transient temperature profiles in the blanket during accidents. The scheme solves iteratively a system of non-linear ordinary differential equations describing about 10 regions of the blanket by preserving energy balance. The authors have studied the physics and engineering aspects of divertor modeling for safety applications. Several modifications in the automation and characterization of environmental and safety indices have been made. They have applied this work to the environmental and safety comparisons of stainless steel with alternative structural materials for fusion reactors. A methodology in decision analysis utilizing influence and decision diagrams has been developed to model fusion reactor design problems. Most of the work during this funding period has been reported in 26 publications including theses, journal publications, conference papers, and technical reports, as listed in Section 11

  7. WIPP Regulatory Compliance Strategy and Management Plan for demonstrating compliance to long-term disposal standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-05-01

    The primary purpose of this document is to provide a strategy by which the WIPP will demonstrate its ability to perform as a deep geologic repository. The document communicates the DOE's understanding of the regulations related to long-term repository performance; and provides the most efficient strategy that intergrates WIPP Project elements, ensures the sufficiency of information, and provides flexibility for changes in the TRU waste generation system to facilitate the disposal of defense-generated TRU wastes. In addition, this document forms a focal point between the DOE and its various external regulators as well as other stakeholders for the purpose of arriving at compliance decisions that consider all relevant input

  8. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum F. HVAC systems energy analysis for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-04-01

    This report presents the results of a technical and economic analysis of alternative methods of meeting the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning requirements of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facilities proposed to be constructed in southeastern New Mexico. This report analyzes a total of ten WIPP structures to determine the most energy and economic efficient means of providing heating, ventilating, and air conditioning services. Additional analyses were performed to determine the merits of centralized versus dispersed refrigeration and heating facilities, and of performing supplemental domestic hot water heating with solar panels

  9. The waste isolation pilot plant transuranic waste repository: A case study in radioactive waste disposal safety and risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eriksson, Leif G. [GRAM, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1999-12-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) deep geological defense-generated transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) repository in the United States was certified on the 13 of May 1998 and opened on the 26 of March 1999. Two sets of safety/performance assessment calculations supporting the certification of the WIPP TRUW repository show that the maximum annual individual committed effective dose will be 32 times lower than the regulatory limit and that the cumulative amount of radionuclide releases will be at least 10 times, more likely at least 20 times, lower than the regulatory limits. Yet, perceptions remain among the public that the WIPP TRUW repository imposes an unacceptable risk.

  10. The waste isolation pilot plant transuranic waste repository: A case study in radioactive waste disposal safety and risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eriksson, Leif G.

    1999-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) deep geological defense-generated transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) repository in the United States was certified on the 13 of May 1998 and opened on the 26 of March 1999. Two sets of safety/performance assessment calculations supporting the certification of the WIPP TRUW repository show that the maximum annual individual committed effective dose will be 32 times lower than the regulatory limit and that the cumulative amount of radionuclide releases will be at least 10 times, more likely at least 20 times, lower than the regulatory limits. Yet, perceptions remain among the public that the WIPP TRUW repository imposes an unacceptable risk

  11. Review and assessments of potential environmental, health and safety impacts of MHD technology. Final draft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to develop an environmental, health and safety (EH and S) assessment and begin a site - specific assessment of these and socio - economic impacts for the magnetohydrodynamics program of the United States Department of Energy. This assessment includes detailed scientific and technical information on the specific EH and S issues mentioned in the MHD Environmental Development Plan. A review of current literature on impact-related subjects is also included. This document addresses the coal-fired, open-cycle MHD technology and reviews and assesses potential EH and S impacts resulting from operation of commercially-installed technology.

  12. Critical review of the reactor-safety study radiological health effects model. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper, D.W.; Evans, J.S.; Jacob, N.; Kase, K.R.; Maletskos, C.J.; Robertson, J.B.; Smith, D.G.

    1983-03-01

    This review of the radiological health effects models originally presented in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) and currently used by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was undertaken to assist the NRC in determining whether or not to revise the models and to aid in the revision, if undertaken. The models as presented in the RSS and as implemented in the CRAC (Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences) Code are described and critiqued. The major elements analyzed are those concerning dosimetry, early effects, and late effects. The published comments on the models are summarized, as are the important findings since the publication of the RSS

  13. Some safety studies for conceptual fusion--fission hybrid reactors. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kastenberg, W.E.; Okrent, D.

    1978-07-01

    The objective of this study was to make a preliminary examination of some potential safety questions for conceptual fusion-fission hybrid reactors. The study and subsequent analysis was largely based upon reference to one design, a conceptual mirror fusion-fission reactor, operating on the deuterium-tritium plasma fusion fuel cycle and the uranium-plutonium fission fuel cycle. The blanket is a fast-spectrum, uranium carbide, helium cooled, subcritical reactor, optimized for the production of fissile fuel. An attempt was made to generalize the results wherever possible

  14. Safety research needs for carbide and nitride fueled LMFBR's. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kastenberg, W.E.

    1975-01-01

    The results of a study initiated at UCLA during the academic year 1974--1975 to evaluate and review the potential safety related research needs for carbide and nitride fueled LMFBR's are presented. The tasks included the following: (1) Review Core and primary system designs for any significant differences from oxide fueled reactors, (2) Review carbide (and nitride) fuel element irradiation behavior, (3) Review reactor behavior in postulated accidents, (4) Examine analytical methods of accident analysis to identify major gaps in models and data, and (5) Examine post accident heat removal. (TSS)

  15. Critical review of the reactor-safety study radiological health effects model. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cooper, D.W.; Evans, J.S.; Jacob, N.; Kase, K.R.; Maletskos, C.J.; Robertson, J.B.; Smith, D.G.

    1983-03-01

    This review of the radiological health effects models originally presented in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) and currently used by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was undertaken to assist the NRC in determining whether or not to revise the models and to aid in the revision, if undertaken. The models as presented in the RSS and as implemented in the CRAC (Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences) Code are described and critiqued. The major elements analyzed are those concerning dosimetry, early effects, and late effects. The published comments on the models are summarized, as are the important findings since the publication of the RSS.

  16. Final disposal of high-level radioactive waste. State of knowledge and development for safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Seichi; Muraoka, Susumu; Murano, Toru

    1995-01-01

    In Europe and USA, the formation disposal of high level radioactive waste entered the stage of doing the activities aiming at its execution. Also in Japan, the storage of high level waste began in the spring of 1995. Regarding the utilization of nuclear power, the establishment of the technology for disposing radioactive waste is the subject of fist priority, and the stage that requires its social recognition has set in. There are the features of formation disposal in that the disposal is in the state of confining extremely large amount of radioactivity, and that the assessment of long term safety exceeding tens of thousands years is demanded. The amount of occurrence and the main nuclides of high level radioactive waste, the disposal as seen in the Coady report and in the IAEA standard, the selection of dispersion or confinement and the selection of passive system or long term human participation, the reason why formation disposal is selected, the features of formation disposal and the way of advancing the research, the general techniques of safety assessment, artificial barriers and natural barriers for formation disposal, and the subjects of formation disposal are described. (K.I.) 57 refs

  17. PROSA PRObabilistic Safety Assessment: Dutch summary of the ECN/RIVM/RGD final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prij, J.; Laheij, G.M.H.; Oostrom, M.; Van Rheenen, W.; Uffink, G.J.M.; Uijt de Haag, P.; Wildenborg, A.F.B.

    1994-05-01

    In the PROSA project the safety of radioactive waste in salt caverns is investigated systematically. PROSA is carried out within the framework of the phase 1A program of the Committee Land Storage (OPLA, abbreviated in Dutch) and is a follow-up of the safety study VEOS. PROSA is focused on improving some aspects of VEOS, in particular the systematic selection of scenarios and determining and calculating the uncertainties. For the scenario selection a system has been developed that takes into account the multi-barrier system and all the possible FEPs (features, events and processes). As a result of the method 22 scenarios were identified. For seven scenarios the radiological consequences have been analyzed by means of a computer model that differs from the model, applied in the VEOS study. The parameters, necessary for the analyses are determined by means of the sources VEOS, PAGIS and PACOMA. The stochastic parameters for the groundwater compartment are calculated with MiniBIOS analyses. Probabilistic calculations were made for the subrosion scenarios, and deterministic calculations are made for the water intrusion scenarios. Of the human intrusion scenarios it appeared that the calculated risk is much lower than has been calculated in VEOS. From the calculated results of the sensitivity and uncertainty analysis it appeared that there is a very large distribution of risks. 10 figs., 10 tabs

  18. Final report of the 'Nordic thermal-hydraulic and safety network (NOTNET)' - Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuunanen, J.; Tuomainen, M.

    2005-04-01

    A Nordic network for thermal-hydraulics and nuclear safety research was started. The idea of the network is to combine the resources of different research teams in order to carry out more ambitious and extensive research programs than would be possible for the individual teams. From the very beginning, the end users of the research results have been integrated to the network. Aim of the network is to benefit the partners involved in nuclear energy in the Nordic Countries (power companies, reactor vendors, safety regulators, research units). First task within the project was to describe the resources (personnel, know-how, simulation tools, test facilities) of the various teams. Next step was to discuss with the end users about their research needs. Based on these steps, few most important research topics with defined goals were selected, and coarse road maps were prepared for reaching the targets. These road maps will be used as a starting point for planning the actual research projects in the future. The organisation and work plan for the network were established. National coordinators were appointed, as well as contact persons in each participating organisation, whether research unit or end user. This organisation scheme is valid for the short-term operation of NOTNET when only Nordic organisations take part in the work. Later on, it is possible to enlarge the network e.g. within EC framework programme. The network can now start preparing project proposals and searching funding for the first common research projects. (au)

  19. Final disposal room structural response calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stone, C.M.

    1997-08-01

    Finite element calculations have been performed to determine the structural response of waste-filled disposal rooms at the WIPP for a period of 10,000 years after emplacement of the waste. The calculations were performed to generate the porosity surface data for the final set of compliance calculations. The most recent reference data for the stratigraphy, waste characterization, gas generation potential, and nonlinear material response have been brought together for this final set of calculations

  20. Evaluation of methods and tools to develop safety concepts and to demonstrate safety for an HLW repository in salt. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bollingerfehr, W.; Buhmann, D.; Doerr, S.; and others

    2017-03-15

    safety demonstration are the integrity proofs for the geological and geotechnical barriers and analysis of backfill compaction. In addition, any possible radionuclide release from the repository to the environment has also to be assessed. The safety and demonstration concept developed in the course of the ISIBEL project was further evolved and applied in the course of the R and D project ''Vorlaeufige Sicherheitsanalyse Gorleben - VSG'' (preliminary safety analysis Gorleben) as an example for an HLW repository in a domal salt structure. The repository concepts also consider the requirement for retrievability of stored waste during the operational phase of the repository. The results of the R and D project VSG provide evidence that a safe HLW repository within a salt dome of a suitable geologic structure is feasible. The long-term safety can be ensured using state-of-the-art science and technology. In 2010, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) issued new safety requirements for the disposal of heat-generating radioactive waste. These requirements have been included in the analysis. After completion of the VSG project in 2013 complementary work has been performed within the framework of the ISIBEL programme. In this context e.g. potential contributions of natural and antropogenic analogs to confidence building were addressed as well as the feasibility and limits of deriving a repository conc ept strictly from requirements. The report in hands provides a comprehensive summary of the results of R and D work regarding HLW disposal in domal salt formations that has been performed after launching the ISIBEL programme in 2005. This study shows the depth of the geological and technical knowledge on final disposal of HLW in a salt dome with a suitable geologic structure that had been gained up to now and demonstrates that the tools required for safety evaluations are available and allow reliable safety

  1. Evaluation of methods and tools to develop safety concepts and to demonstrate safety for an HLW repository in salt. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bollingerfehr, W.; Buhmann, D.; Doerr, S.

    2017-03-01

    safety demonstration are the integrity proofs for the geological and geotechnical barriers and analysis of backfill compaction. In addition, any possible radionuclide release from the repository to the environment has also to be assessed. The safety and demonstration concept developed in the course of the ISIBEL project was further evolved and applied in the course of the R and D project ''Vorlaeufige Sicherheitsanalyse Gorleben - VSG'' (preliminary safety analysis Gorleben) as an example for an HLW repository in a domal salt structure. The repository concepts also consider the requirement for retrievability of stored waste during the operational phase of the repository. The results of the R and D project VSG provide evidence that a safe HLW repository within a salt dome of a suitable geologic structure is feasible. The long-term safety can be ensured using state-of-the-art science and technology. In 2010, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) issued new safety requirements for the disposal of heat-generating radioactive waste. These requirements have been included in the analysis. After completion of the VSG project in 2013 complementary work has been performed within the framework of the ISIBEL programme. In this context e.g. potential contributions of natural and antropogenic analogs to confidence building were addressed as well as the feasibility and limits of deriving a repository conc ept strictly from requirements. The report in hands provides a comprehensive summary of the results of R and D work regarding HLW disposal in domal salt formations that has been performed after launching the ISIBEL programme in 2005. This study shows the depth of the geological and technical knowledge on final disposal of HLW in a salt dome with a suitable geologic structure that had been gained up to now and demonstrates that the tools required for safety evaluations are available and allow reliable safety assessments of HLW

  2. Final safety analysis report for the Ground Test Accelerator (GTA), Phase 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-10-01

    This document is the first volume of a 3 volume safety analysis report on the Ground Test Accelerator (GTA). The GTA program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is the major element of the national Neutral Particle Beam (NPB) program, which is supported by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO). A principal goal of the national NPB program is to assess the feasibility of using hydrogen and deuterium neutral particle beams outside the Earth`s atmosphere. The main effort of the NPB program at Los Alamos concentrates on developing the GTA. The GTA is classified as a low-hazard facility, except for the cryogenic-cooling system, which is classified as a moderate-hazard facility. This volume consists of an introduction, summary/conclusion, site description and assessment, description of facility, and description of operation.

  3. Environmental Safety and Health Analytical Laboratory, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas. Final Environmental Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) of the construction and operation of an Environmental Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) Analytical Laboratory and subsequent demolition of the existing Analytical Chemistry Laboratory building at Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. In accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality requirements contained in 40 CFR 1500--1508.9, the Environmental Assessment examined the environmental impacts of the Proposed Action and discussed potential alternatives. Based on the analysis of impacts in the EA, conducting the proposed action, construction of an analytical laboratory and demolition of the existing facility, would not significantly effect the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality regulations in 40 CFR 1508.18 and 1508.27

  4. Experience with the use of programmable logic controllers in nuclear safety applications. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, E.M.; Stofko, M.J.

    1995-03-01

    This report describes the implementation and experience with Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) for nuclear safety applications. Two applications are described. The first is an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) mitigation system provided as a Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (DAFAS). It was implemented at Arizona Public Service's Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station and has been in commercial operation since early 1992. The second system described is an Emergency Diesel Generator Bus Load Sequencer installed at Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. This system was installed as part of an upgrade to the emergency power system in 1988. The experience gained in the design, development, implementation and qualification of these systems will be beneficial to utilities that are considering the utilization of PLCs for their plant applications

  5. Ferrocyanide tank safety program: Cesium uptake capacity of simulated ferrocyanide tank waste. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burgeson, I.E.; Bryan, S.A.

    1995-07-01

    The objective of this project is to determine the capacity for 137 Cs uptake by mixed metal ferrocyanides present in Hanford Site waste tanks, and to assess the potential for aggregation of these 137 Cs-exchanged materials to form ''hot-spots'' in the tanks. This research, performed at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for Westinghouse Hanford Company, stems from concerns regarding possible localized radiolytic heating within the tanks. After ferrocyanide was added to 18 high-level waste tanks in the 1950s, some of the ferrocyanide tanks received considerable quantities of saltcake waste that was rich in 137 Cs. If radioactive cesium was exchanged and concentrated by the nickel ferrocyanide present in the tanks, the associated heating could cause tank temperatures to rise above the safety limits specified for the ferrocyanide-containing tanks, especially if the supernate in the tanks is pumped out and the waste becomes drier

  6. RATU Nuclear power plant structural safety research programme 1990-1994. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rintamaa, R.; Sarkimo, M.

    1995-12-01

    The major part of nuclear energy research in Finland has been organized as five-year nationally coordinated research programmes. The research programme on the Nuclear Power Plant Structural Safety was carried out during the period from 1990 to 1994. The total volume was about 76 person-years and the expenditure about 49 million FIM. Studies on the structural materials in nuclear power plants created the experimental data and background information necessary for the structural integrity assessments of mechanical components. The research was carried out by developing experimental fracture mechanics methods including statistical analysis methods of material property data, and by studying material ageing and, in particular, mechanisms of material deterioration due to neutron irradiation, corrosion and water chemistry. Besides material studies, new testing methods and sensors for the measurement of loading and water chemistry parameters have been developed

  7. Final report on the safety assessment of Cocos nucifera (coconut) oil and related ingredients.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burnett, Christina L; Bergfeld, Wilma F; Belsito, Donald V; Klaassen, Curtis D; Marks, James G; Shank, Ronald C; Slaga, Thomas J; Snyder, Paul W; Andersen, F Alan

    2011-05-01

    Cocos nucifera (coconut) oil, oil from the dried coconut fruit, is composed of 90% saturated triglycerides. It may function as a fragrance ingredient, hair conditioning agent, or skin-conditioning agent and is reported in 626 cosmetics at concentrations from 0.0001% to 70%. The related ingredients covered in this assessment are fatty acids, and their hydrogenated forms, corresponding fatty alcohols, simple esters, and inorganic and sulfated salts of coconut oil. The salts and esters are expected to have similar toxicological profiles as the oil, its hydrogenated forms, and its constituent fatty acids. Coconut oil and related ingredients are safe as cosmetic ingredients in the practices of use and concentration described in this safety assessment.

  8. Seismic safety review mission Almaty WWR 10 MW research reactor Almaty, Kazakhstan. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Slemmons, D.B.; David, M.; Masopust, R.

    1995-06-01

    On the request of the government of Kazakhstan and within the scope of the TC project KAZ/0/004, a seismic safety review mission was conducted in Almaty, 8-19 May 1995 for the WWR 10 Mw research reactor. This review followed the fact finding mission which visited Almaty in November 1993 together with an INSARR mission. At that time some information regarding the seismotectonic setting of the site as well as the seismic capacity of the facility was obtained. This document presents the results of further work carried out on both the issues. It discusses technical session findings on geology, seismology, structures and equipments. In the end conclusions and recommendations of the mission are given. 4 refs, figs, tabs, 18 photos

  9. Final report of the amended safety assessment of Dioscorea Villosa (Wild Yam) root extract.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2004-01-01

    ; irritation in the iris and cornea was mild and transient. Undiluted extract was not irritating during the induction phase of a guinea pig sensitization study, nor did challenge with a 25% dilution elicit any sensitization. The specified extract at concentrations up to 500 mg/kg/day did not have any estrogenic activity in the juvenile rat uterotrophic assay. Genotoxicity assays in bacterial and mammalian systems were negative, except that Ames test strain TA 1537 was positive at one dose level using the plate incorporation method, but not using a preincubation method. Although the concentration at which the actual plant extract is used in cosmetic products is low, one of the primary safety concerns with this plant extract is the possible metabolic/endocrine activity, e.g., estrogen-like or progesterone-like activity as a result of the presence of small amounts of plant phytosterols such as diosgenin. Extracts prepared as described in this safety assessment, with an upper limit of 3.5% diosgenin, did not have any estrogenic activity, demonstrating that it is possible to produce material that does not present this specific safety concern. Although extracts from pesticide-free plants were not considered genotoxic and it was the view of the Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) Expert Panel that there do not appear to be any components that could be carcinogenic, pesticide residues could raise this issue. It was urged that manufacturers limit pesticide residues to the limit previously used for lanolin of not more than 40 ppm (with not more than 10 ppm for any one residue). Based on these data, it was concluded that Dioscorea Villosa (Wild Yam) Root Extract is safe as used in cosmetic formulations. This conclusion regarding safety, however, is valid only for extracts prepared in a manner that produces a similar chemical profile as that described in this report, particularly as regards diosgenin. Extracts not prepared in a manner that produces a similar chemical profile would be

  10. Reliability analysis and computation of computer-based safety instrumentation and control used in German nuclear power plant. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ding, Yongjian; Krause, Ulrich; Gu, Chunlei

    2014-01-01

    extended according to cope with special needs of the digital safety I and C system. The new modelling method based on fault tree analysis (FTA) combined with MCBFR model is provided and validated by a real example system from an industrial partner. The reliability data are taken from a platform specific data base of the industrial partner and an international generic data base. The results demonstrate the applicability of the new approach although the modelling quality is strongly dependent on the observed failure cases from the plant operation. Therefore more failure data of safety I and C should be collected in the future. This report is the final project report.

  11. Amended final report of the safety assessment of Drometrizole as used in cosmetics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-01-01

    Drometrizole is used in cosmetics as an ultraviolet (UV) light absorber and stabilizer. In an earlier safety assessment, the available data were found insufficient to support the safety of this ingredient, but new data have been provided and assessed. In voluntary industry reports to the Food and Drug Administration, this ingredient is reported to be used in noncoloring hair care products, and in an industry use concentration survey, uses in nail care products at 0.07% were reported. Drometrizole has absorbance maxima at 243, 298, and 340 nm. Drometrizole is used widely as a UV absorber and stabilizer in plastics, polyesters, celluloses, acrylates, dyes, rubber, synthetic and natural fibers, waxes, detergent solutions, and orthodontic adhesives. It is similarly used in agricultural products and insecticides. Drometrizole is approved as an indirect food additive for use as an antioxidant and/or stabilizer in polymers. Short-term studies using rats reported liver weight increases, increases in the activities of enzymes aminopyrine N-demethylase, and UDP glucuronosyl transferase, but no significant effects were noted in the activities of acid hydrolases or in hepatocyte organelles. Although Drometrizole is insoluble in water and soluble in a wide range of organic solvents, a distribution and elimination study using rats indicated that some Drometrizole was absorbed, then metabolized and excreted in the urine. Drometrizole and products containing Drometrizole were nontoxic in acute oral, inhalation, and dermal studies using animals. No increase in mortality or local and/or systemic toxicity were observed in a 13-week oral toxicity study using dogs; the no observed effect level (NOEL) was 31.75 mg/kg day(- 1) for males and 34.6 mg/kg day(-1) for females. In a 2-year feeding study using rats, a NOEL of 47 to 58 mg/kg day(- 1) was reported. Developmental studies of Drometrizole in rats and mice found no teratogenic effects and a NOEL of 1000 mg/kg day(- 1) was reported

  12. Final report on the safety assessment of Calendula officinalis extract and Calendula officinalis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2001-01-01

    Calendula Officinalis Extract is an extract of the flowers of Calendula officinalis, the common marigold, whereas Calendula Officinalis is described as plant material derived from the flowers of C. officinalis. Techniques for preparing Calendula Officinalis Extract include gentle disintegration in soybean oil. Propylene glycol and butylene glycol extractions were also reported. Components of these ingredients are variously reported to include sugars, carotenoids, phenolic acids, sterols, saponins, flavonoids, resins, sterins, quinones, mucilages, vitamins, polyprenylquinones, and essential oils. Calendula Officinalis Extract is reported to be used in almost 200 cosmetic formulations, over a wide range of product categories. There are no reported uses of Calendula Officinalis. Acute toxicity studies in rats and mice indicate that the extract is relatively nontoxic. Animal tests showed at most minimal skin irritation, and no sensitization or phototoxicity. Minimal ocular irritation was seen with one formulation and no irritation with others. Six saponins isolated from C. officinalis flowers were not mutagenic in an Ames test, and a tea derived from C. officinalis was not genotoxic in Drosophila melanogaster. No carcinogenicity or reproductive and developmental toxicity data were available. Clinical testing of cosmetic formulations containing the extract elicited little irritation or sensitization. Absent any basis for concluding that data on one member of a botanical ingredient group can be extrapolated to another in a group, or to the same ingredient extracted differently, these data were not considered sufficient to assess the safety of these ingredients. Additional data needs include current concentration of use data; function in cosmetics; ultraviolet (UV) absorption data; if absorption occurs in the UVA or UVB range, photosensitization data are needed; gross pathology and histopathology in skin and other major organ systems associated with repeated dermal

  13. HANFORD SITE RIVER PROTECTION PROJECT (RPP) TRANSURANIC (TRU) TANK WASTE IDENTIFICATION and PLANNING FOR REVRIEVAL TREATMENT and EVENTUAL DISPOSAL AT WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRISTOFZSKI, J.G.; TEDESCHI, R.; JOHNSON, M.E.; JENNINGS, M

    2006-01-01

    The CH2M HILL Manford Group, Inc. (CHG) conducts business to achieve the goals of the Office of River Protection (ORP) at Hanford. As an employee owned company, CHG employees have a strong motivation to develop innovative solutions to enhance project and company performance while ensuring protection of human health and the environment. CHG is responsible to manage and perform work required to safely store, enhance readiness for waste feed delivery, and prepare for treated waste receipts for the approximately 53 million gallons of legacy mixed radioactive waste currently at the Hanford Site tank farms. Safety and environmental awareness is integrated into all activities and work is accomplished in a manner that achieves high levels of quality while protecting the environment and the safety and health of workers and the public. This paper focuses on the innovative strategy to identify, retrieve, treat, and dispose of Hanford Transuranic (TRU) tank waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

  14. An innovative fuel design concept for improved light water reactor performance and safety. Final technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tulenko, J.S.; Connell, R.G.

    1995-07-01

    Light water reactor (LWR) fuel performance is limited by thermal and mechanical constraints associated with the design, fabrication, and operation of fuel in a nuclear reactor. The purpose of this research was to explore a technique for extending fuel performance by thermally bonding LWR fuel with a non-alkaline liquid metal alloy. Current LWR fuel rod designs consist of enriched uranium oxide (UO 2 ) fuel pellets enclosed in a zirconium alloy cylindrical clad. The space between the pellets and the clad is filled by an inert gas. Due to the thermal conductivity of the gas, the gas space thermally insulates the fuel pellets from the reactor coolant outside the fuel rod, elevating the fuel temperatures. Filling the gap between the fuel and clad with a high conductivity liquid metal thermally bonds the fuel to the cladding, and eliminates the large temperature change across the gap, while preserving the expansion and pellet loading capabilities. The resultant lower fuel temperature directly impacts fuel performance limit margins and also core transient performance. The application of liquid bonding techniques to LWR fuel was explored for the purposes of increasing LWR fuel performance and safety. A modified version of the ESCORE fuel performance code (ESBOND) has been developed under the program to analyze the in-reactor performance of the liquid metal bonded fuel. An assessment of the technical feasibility of this concept for LWR fuel is presented, including the results of research into materials compatibility testing and the predicted lifetime performance of Liquid Metal Bonded LWR fuel

  15. Safety analysis report for packages: packaging of fissile and other radioactive materials. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chalfant, G.G.

    1984-01-01

    The 9965, 9966, 9967, and 9968 packages are designed for surface shipment of fissile and other radioactive materials where a high degree of containment (either single or double) is required. Provisions are made to add shielding material to the packaging as required. The package was physically tested to demonstrate that it meets the criteria specified in USDOE Order No. 5480.1, chapter III, dated 5/1/81, which invokes Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71 (10 CFR 71), Packing and Transportation of Radioactive Material, and Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100-179, Transportation. By restricting the maximum normal operating pressure of the packages to less than 7 kg/cm 2 (gauge) (99 to 54 psig), the packages will comply with Type B(U) regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Safety Series No. 6, 1973 Revised Edition, and may be used for export and import shipments. These packages have been assessed for transport of up to 14.5 kilograms of uranium, excluding uranium-233, or 4.4 kilograms of plutonium metal, oxides, or scrap having a maximum radioactive decay energy of 30 watts. Specific maximum package contents are given. This quantity and the configuration of uranium or plutonium metal cannot be made critical by any combination of hydrogeneous reflection and moderation regardless of the condition of the package. For a uranium-233 shipment, a separate criticality evaluation for the specific package is required

  16. Automotive Airbag Safety Enhancement Final Report CRADA No. TSB-1165-95

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cutting, Jack [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Durrell, Robert [Quantic Industries, Inc., San Carlos, CA (United States)

    2017-11-09

    The Vehicle Safety systems (VSS) Division of Quantic Industries, Inc. (QII) manufactured automotive airbag components. When both the driver and the passenger side airbags inflated in a tightly sealed passenger compartment, the compression of the surrounding air could and, in some instances, would cause damage to the eardrums of the occupants. The Aerospace and Division (ADD) of QII had partially developed the technology to fracture the canopy of a jet aircraft at the time of pilot ejection. The technical problem was how to adapt the canopy fracturing technology to the rear window of a motor vehicle in a safe and cost effective manner. The existing approach was to replace the embedded rear window defroster with a series-parallel network of exploding bridge wires (EBWs). This would still provide the defrost function at low voltage/ current, but would cause fracturing of the window when a high current/voltage pulse was applied without pyrotechnics or explosives. The elements of this system were the embedded EBW network and a trunk-mounted fireset. The fireset would store the required energy to fire the network upon the receipt of a trigger signal from the existing air bag crash sensor.

  17. Safety evaluation report related to Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group Plant Reassessment Program: [Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-11-01

    After the accident of Three Mile Island, Unit 2, nuclear power plant owners made a number of improvements to their nuclear facilities. Despite these improvements, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is concerned that the number and complexity of events at Babcock and Wilcox (B and W) nuclear plants have not decreased as expected. This concern was reinforced by the June 9, 1985 total-loss-of-feedwater event at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and the December 26, 1985 overcooling transient at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. By letter dated January 24, 1986, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) informed the Chairman of the B and W Owners Group (BWOG) that a number of recent events at B and W-designed reactors have led the NRC staff to conclude that the basic requirements for B and W reactors need to be reexamined. In its February 13, 1986 response to the EDO's letter, the BWOG committed to lead an effort to define concerns relative to reducing the frequency of reactor trips and the complexity of post-trip response in B and W plants. The BWOG submitted a description of the B and W program entitled ''Safety and Performance Improvement Program'' (BAW-1919) on May 15, 1986. Five revisions to BAW-1919 have also been submitted. The NRC staff has reviewed BAW-1919 and its revisions and presents its evaluation in this report. 2 figs., 34 tabs

  18. Responsibility, safety and certainty. A new consensus on nuclear waste disposal. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2016-05-25

    With the consent of all parties represented in the Bundestag, the Federal Republic of Germany resolved to properly end the use of nuclear energy for power generation. The legal framework for the energy transition is provided by the consensus reached on nuclear energy in 2001 and the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Act (Atomgesetz, hereinafter: Atomic Energy Act) passed in 2002 and amended in 2011, together with the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, hereinafter: Renewable Energy Act), the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) and extensive provisions on accelerating the construction of power lines in Germany. Nuclear energy plants will have gradually phased out their power generation operations by the end of the year 2022. The decision to phase out nuclear power plants has entailed major changes in radioactive waste management - dismantling, packaging spent fuel in containers, and interim storage and final disposal. For one thing, the amount of radioactive waste requiring final storage is now easier to calculate and to limit, in contrast with periods of indefinite operation. Limiting the operating lives of nuclear plants also shortens the period in which assets can be generated for the decreased amounts of high-level, intermediate-level and low-level waste. Along with the phase-out, the rapidly expanding renewable energy market and continued integration into the European Single Market has changed market conditions for nuclear power plant operators. Not only have new market participants joined the competition for power generation - due to a surplus and, ultimately, to price erosion in the international fuel markets, stock market prices for power have dropped dramatically. This has affected nuclear power plant operators in particular, because of their large share in conventional power generation.

  19. Compilation of historical radiological data collected in the vicinity of the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradshaw, P.L.; Louderbough, E.T.

    1987-01-01

    The Radiological Baseline Program (RBP) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has been implemented to characterize the radiological conditions at the site prior to receipt of radioactive wastes. Because southeastern New Mexico was the site of an underground nuclear test in 1961, various sampling programs have intermittently monitored background and elevated radiation levels in the vicinity of the WIPP. In addition, radiological characterization of the site region was performed during the 1970's in support of the WIPP Environmental Impact Statement. The historical data are drawn primarily from monitoring activities of the US Public Health Service (PHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), US Geological Survey (USGS) and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNLA). Information on air and water quality, meat, milk, biota and vegetation is included in the report. This survey is intended to provide a source of reference for historical data on radiological conditions in the vicinity of the WIPP site prior to the establishment of a systematic Radiological Baseline Program. 31 refs., 1 fig

  20. EVALUATION OF RISKS AND WASTE CHARACTERIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TRANSURANIC WASTE EMPLACED IN WIPP DURING 1999

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Channell, J.K.; Walker, B.A.

    2000-01-01

    Specifically this report: 1. Compares requirements of the WAP that are pertinent from a technical viewpoint with the WIPP pre-Permit waste characterization program, 2. Presents the results of a risk analysis of the currently emplaced wastes. Expected and bounding risks from routine operations and possible accidents are evaluated; and 3. Provides conclusions and recommendations

  1. Assessment of Contaminated Brine Fate and Transport in MB139 at WIPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuhlman, Kristopher L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Applied Systems Analysis and Research Dept.; Malama, Bwalya [Sandia National Lab., Carlsbad, NM (United States). Performance Assessment Dept.

    2014-07-01

    Following the radionuclide release event of February 14, 2014 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), actinide contamination has been found on the walls and floor in Panel 7 as a result of a release in Room 7 of Panel 7. It has been proposed to decontaminate Panel 7 at the WIPP by washing contaminated surfaces in the underground with fresh water. A cost-effective cleanup of this contamination would allow for a timely return to waste disposal operations at WIPP. It is expected that the fresh water used to decontaminate Panel 7 will flow as contaminated brine down into the porosity of the materials under the floor – the run-of-mine (ROM) salt above Marker Bed 139 (MB139) and MB139 itself – where its fate will be controlled by the hydraulic and transport properties of MB139. Due to the structural dip of MB139, it is unlikely that this brine would migrate northward towards the Waste-Handling Shaft sump. A few strategically placed shallow small-diameter observation boreholes straddling MB139 would allow for monitoring the flow and fate of this brine after decontamination. Additionally, given that flow through the compacted ROM salt floor and in MB139 would occur under unsaturated (or two-phase) conditions, there is a need to measure the unsaturated flow properties of crushed WIPP salt and salt from the disturbed rock zone (DRZ).

  2. Construction quality assurance program plan for the WIPP project, Carlsbad, NM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-05-01

    The purpose of this plan is to describe the Quality Assurance (QA) Program to be established and implemented by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project Office (WPO) and by the Major Project Participants: the Architect-Engineer (Bechtel), the Construction Manager (US Army Corps of Engineers), the Scientific Advisor (Sandia National Laboratory), and the Management and Operating Contractor (Westinghouse Electric Corporation). This plan addresses the construction, including site evaluation, design, and turnover phases of WIPP. Other work in progress during the same period is controlled by DOE documents applicable to that work effort. The prime responsibility for ensuring the quality of construction rests with the DOE WIPP Project Office and is implemented through the combined efforts of the Construction Manager, the Construction Contractors, the Management and Operating Contractor, and the Architect-Engineer. Inspection and burden of proof of acceptability rests with the Construction Contractor as defined by the technical provisions of the contract and as otherwise specified by the DOE WIPP Project Office on an individual work-package basis. To the maximum extent possible, acceptance of work will be based upon first-hand witnessing by the Construction Manager and other representatives of the DOE organization

  3. Summary of research and development activities in support of waste acceptance criteria for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, T.O.

    1979-11-01

    The development of waste acceptance criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is summarized. Specifications for acceptable waste forms are included. Nine program areas are discussed. They are: TRU characterization, HLW interactions, thermal/structural interactions, nuclide migration, permeability, brine migration, borehole plugging, operation/design support, and instrumentation development. Recommendations are included

  4. The development of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project's public affairs program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walter, L.H.

    1988-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) offers a perspective on the value of designing flexibility into a public affairs program to enable it to grow with and complement a project's evolution from construction through to operations. This paper discusses how the WIPP public affairs program progressed through several stages to its present scope. During the WIPP construction phase, the public affairs program laid a foundation for Project acceptance in the community. A speaker's bureau, a visitors program, and various community outreach and support programs emphasized the educational and socioeconomic benefits of having this controversial project in Carlsbad. Then, in this past year as the project entered a preoperational status, the public affairs program emphasis shifted to broaden the positive image that had been created locally. In this stage, the program promoted the project's positive elements with the various state agencies, government officials, and federal organizations involved in our country's radioactive waste management and transportation program. Currently, an even broader, more aggressive public affairs program is planned. During this stage public affairs will be engaged in a comprehensive institutional and outreach program, explaining and supporting WIPP's mission in each of the communities and agencies affected by the operation of the country's first geologic repository

  5. Safety-technical characteristics of biomass, coal and straw. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wilen, C.; Rautalin, A.

    1995-12-31

    Safety-technical factors related to spontaneous ignition and dust explosions of biomasses were investigated. Parametres of dust explosions and effect of inertisation on the maximum pressure (pmax) and the maximum rate of pressure rise (Kstmax) were studied at elevated initial pressure (1-9 bar). The level of inertisation required to prevent dust explosions totally was determined at different initial pressures. The sensitivity of fuels to spontaneous ignition and the effect of pressure on the sensitivity to and temperature of spontaneous ignition were studied on a pressurised dynamic self-ignition equipment. The effect of inertisation on the self-ignition temperature and alternatives of preventing spontaneous ignition by effective inertisation in the pressure ranges of 1 and 25 bar were investigated. As an example of application, results obtained with the laboratory test equipment were extrapolated to bin sizes used in practice. As a factor contributing to spontaneous ignition, the flowability of different fuels in bins and lock-hoppers (stagnant fuel layers are especially sensitive to spontaneous ignition) in continuous flow and in flow stopped for a storage time of 1 hour was also studied. Walker`s rotating ring shear equipment and Jenike`s linear shear equipment based on shearing the fuel were used in the flowability measurements. The effect of fuel temperature (22 deg C, 40 deg C) on flowability was determined for forest residue chips. Dynamic friction coefficients between fuels and handling equipment were determined for stainless steel and rusty metal surface. As an example of application, results obtained with laboratory test equipment were extrapolated to a bin size of 21 m{sup 3} by calculating the size of the minimum discharge opening required by mass flow of different coals and forest residue chips and the minimum angle of repose of the conical part for a bin of stainless steel

  6. Seismic Safety Margins Research Program. Phase I final report - Subsystem response (Project V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shieh, L.C.; Chuang, T.Y.; O'Connell, W.J.

    1981-10-01

    This document reports on (1) the computation of the responses of subsystems, given the input subsystem support motion for components and systems whose failure can lead to an accident sequence (radioactive release), and (2) the results of a sensitivity study undertaken to determine the contributions of the several links in the seismic methodology chain (SMC) - seismic input (SI), soil-structure interaction (SSI), structure response (STR), and subsystem response (SUB) - to the uncertainty in subsystem response. For the singly supported subsystems (e.g., pumps, turbines, electrical control panels, etc.), we used the spectral acceleration response of the structure at the point where the subsystem components were mounted. For the multiple supported subsystems, we developed 13 piping models of five safety-related systems, and then used the pseudostatic-mode method with multisupport input motion to compute the response parameters in terms of the parameters used in the fragility descriptions (i.e., peak resultant accelerations for valves and peak resultant moments for piping). Damping and frequency were varied to represent the sources of modeling and random uncertainty. Two codes were developed: a modified version of SAPIV which assembles the piping supports into groups depending on the support's location relative to the attached structure, and SAPPAC a stand-alone modular program from which the time-history analysis module is extracted. On the basis of our sensitivity study, we determined that the variability in the combined soil-structure interaction, structural response, and subsystem response areas contribute more to uncertainty in subsystem response than does the variability in the seismic input area, assuming an earthquake within the limited peak ground acceleration range, i.e., 0.15 to 0.30g. The seismic input variations were in terms of different earthquake time histories. (author)

  7. Safety-technical characteristics of biomass, coal and straw. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wilen, C; Rautalin, A

    1996-12-31

    Safety-technical factors related to spontaneous ignition and dust explosions of biomasses were investigated. Parametres of dust explosions and effect of inertisation on the maximum pressure (pmax) and the maximum rate of pressure rise (Kstmax) were studied at elevated initial pressure (1-9 bar). The level of inertisation required to prevent dust explosions totally was determined at different initial pressures. The sensitivity of fuels to spontaneous ignition and the effect of pressure on the sensitivity to and temperature of spontaneous ignition were studied on a pressurised dynamic self-ignition equipment. The effect of inertisation on the self-ignition temperature and alternatives of preventing spontaneous ignition by effective inertisation in the pressure ranges of 1 and 25 bar were investigated. As an example of application, results obtained with the laboratory test equipment were extrapolated to bin sizes used in practice. As a factor contributing to spontaneous ignition, the flowability of different fuels in bins and lock-hoppers (stagnant fuel layers are especially sensitive to spontaneous ignition) in continuous flow and in flow stopped for a storage time of 1 hour was also studied. Walker`s rotating ring shear equipment and Jenike`s linear shear equipment based on shearing the fuel were used in the flowability measurements. The effect of fuel temperature (22 deg C, 40 deg C) on flowability was determined for forest residue chips. Dynamic friction coefficients between fuels and handling equipment were determined for stainless steel and rusty metal surface. As an example of application, results obtained with laboratory test equipment were extrapolated to a bin size of 21 m{sup 3} by calculating the size of the minimum discharge opening required by mass flow of different coals and forest residue chips and the minimum angle of repose of the conical part for a bin of stainless steel

  8. ORNL Evaluation of Electrabel Safety Cases for Doel 3 / Tihange 2: Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bass, Bennett Richard [ORNL; Dickson, Terry L [ORNL; Gorti, Sarma B [ORNL; Klasky, Hilda B [ORNL; Nanstad, Randy K [ORNL; Sokolov, Mikhail A [ORNL; Williams, Paul T [ORNL; Server, W. L. [ATI Consulting, Pinehurst, NC

    2015-11-01

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) performed a detailed technical review of the 2015 Electrabel (EBL) Safety Cases prepared for the Belgium reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) at Doel 3 and Tihange 2 (D3/T2). The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) in Belgium commissioned ORNL to provide a thorough assessment of the existing safety margins against cracking of the RPVs due to the presence of almost laminar flaws found in each RPV. Initial efforts focused on surveying relevant literature that provided necessary background knowledge on the issues related to the quasilaminar flaws observed in D3/T2 reactors. Next, ORNL proceeded to develop an independent quantitative assessment of the entire flaw population in the two Belgian reactors according to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure, New York (1992 and 2004). That screening assessment of all EBL-characterized flaws in D3/T2 used ORNL tools, methodologies, and the ASME Code Case N-848, Alternative Characterization Rules for QuasiLaminar Flaws . Results and conclusions from the ORNL flaw acceptance assessments of D3/T2 were compared with those from the 2015 EBL Safety Cases. Specific findings of the ORNL evaluation of that part of the EBL structural integrity assessment focusing on stability of the flaw population subjected to primary design transients include the following: ORNL s analysis results were similar to those of EBL in that very few characterized flaws were found not compliant with the ASME (1992) acceptance criterion. ORNL s application of the more recent ASME Section XI (2004) produced only four noncompliant flaws, all due to LOCAs. The finding of a greater number of non-compliant flaws in the EBL screening assessment is due principally to a significantly more restrictive (conservative) criterion for flaw size acceptance used by EBL. ORNL s screening assessment results

  9. Safety Evaluation Report related to the final design approval of the GESSAR II BWR/6 Nuclear Island design, Docket No. 50-447

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-04-01

    The Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by General Electric Company for the Final Design Approval for the General Electric Standard Safety Analysis Report (GESSAR II FSAR) has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report summarizes the results of the staff's safety review of the GESSAR II BWR/6 Nuclear Island Design. Subject to favorable resolution of items discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report, the staff concludes that the facilities referencing GESSAR II, subject to approval of the balance-of-plant design, can conform with the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  10. Organic tanks safety program waste aging studies. Final report, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C.

    1998-09-01

    Uranium and plutonium production at the Hanford Site produced large quantities of radioactive byproducts and contaminated process chemicals that are stored in underground tanks awaiting treatment and disposal. Having been made strongly alkaline and then subjected to successive water evaporation campaigns to increase storage capacity, the wastes now exist in the physical forms of saltcakes, metal oxide sludges, and aqueous brine solutions. Tanks that contain organic process chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salt wastes might be at risk for fuel-nitrate combustion accidents. This project started in fiscal year 1993 to provide information on the chemical fate of stored organic wastes. While historical records had identified the organic compounds originally purchased and potentially present in wastes, aging experiments were needed to identify the probable degradation products and evaluate the current hazard. The determination of the rates and pathways of degradation have facilitated prediction of how the hazard changes with time and altered storage conditions. Also, the work with aged simulated waste contributed to the development of analytical methods for characterizing actual wastes. Finally, the results for simulants provide a baseline for comparing and interpreting tank characterization data

  11. Organic tanks safety program waste aging studies. Final report, Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C. [and others

    1998-09-01

    Uranium and plutonium production at the Hanford Site produced large quantities of radioactive byproducts and contaminated process chemicals that are stored in underground tanks awaiting treatment and disposal. Having been made strongly alkaline and then subjected to successive water evaporation campaigns to increase storage capacity, the wastes now exist in the physical forms of saltcakes, metal oxide sludges, and aqueous brine solutions. Tanks that contain organic process chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salt wastes might be at risk for fuel-nitrate combustion accidents. This project started in fiscal year 1993 to provide information on the chemical fate of stored organic wastes. While historical records had identified the organic compounds originally purchased and potentially present in wastes, aging experiments were needed to identify the probable degradation products and evaluate the current hazard. The determination of the rates and pathways of degradation have facilitated prediction of how the hazard changes with time and altered storage conditions. Also, the work with aged simulated waste contributed to the development of analytical methods for characterizing actual wastes. Finally, the results for simulants provide a baseline for comparing and interpreting tank characterization data.

  12. Safety analysis of the transportation of radioactive waste to the Konrad final repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sentuc, F.N.; Bruecher, W.

    2010-01-01

    A transport risk assessment study has been conducted for transport of radioactive waste with negligible heat-generation to the German final repository Konrad. This study is a revision of the former Konrad Transport Study performed by GRS in 1991 implementing updated waste data among other improved methods and assumptions for the purpose of a more realistic approach to risk assessment. The first part of the transport risk assessment study concerns the radiological consequences from normal (accident-free) transportation of radioactive material, i.e. the radiation exposure of transport personnel and the public. Based on the assessed detailed information on transport arrangements and on the average number and radiological characteristics of waste packages the maximum annual effective doses for the representative persons were estimated. The risk associated with transport incidents and accidents has been quantified for the area within a radius of 25 km around the repository site. The probabilistic method adopted in this study considers parameters as the frequency and severity of railway or road accidents, characteristics of radioactive waste and transport packagings and the frequency of atmospheric dispersion conditions. From a large set of parameter combinations the spectrum of potential radiological consequences and of the associated probability of occurrence was assessed. (orig.)

  13. Probabilistic modelling of gas generation in nuclear waste repositories under consideration of new studies performed at the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, M.; Wilhelm, S.; Poppei, J.

    2012-01-01

    consequences for calculations in long-term safety analyses are discussed. Recent experimental studies from WIPP have provided new quantitative results concerning the rates of microbial degradation under aerobic and anaerobic conditions. In addition to the methodology and selected results, this contribution provides a comparison to the experimental results from WIPP and an evaluation of the results under consideration of the previously used degradation rates. (authors)

  14. SAFETY

    CERN Multimedia

    Niels Dupont

    2013-01-01

    CERN Safety rules and Radiation Protection at CMS The CERN Safety rules are defined by the Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection Unit (HSE Unit), CERN’s institutional authority and central Safety organ attached to the Director General. In particular the Radiation Protection group (DGS-RP1) ensures that personnel on the CERN sites and the public are protected from potentially harmful effects of ionising radiation linked to CERN activities. The RP Group fulfils its mandate in collaboration with the CERN departments owning or operating sources of ionising radiation and having the responsibility for Radiation Safety of these sources. The specific responsibilities concerning "Radiation Safety" and "Radiation Protection" are delegated as follows: Radiation Safety is the responsibility of every CERN Department owning radiation sources or using radiation sources put at its disposition. These Departments are in charge of implementing the requi...

  15. Seismic safety margins research program. Phase I final report - Major structure response (Project IV)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benda, B.J.; Johnson, J.J.; Lo, T.Y.

    1981-08-01

    The primary task of the Major Structure Response Project within the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) was to develop detailed finite element models of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant's containment building and auxiliary-fuel-turbine (AFT) complex. The resulting models served as input to the seismic methodology analysis chain. The containment shell was modeled as a series of beam elements with the shear and bending characteristics of a circular cylindrical shell. Masses and rotary inertias were lumped at nodal points; thirteen modes were included in the analysis. The internal structure was modeled with three-dimensional finite elements, with masses again lumped at selected nodes; sixty modes were included in the analysis. The model of the AFT complex employed thin plate and shell elements to represent the concrete shear walls and floor diaphragms, and beam and truss elements to model the braced frames. Because of the size and complexity of the model, and the potentially large number of degrees of freedom, masses were lumped at a limited number of node points. These points were selected so as to minimize the effect of the discrete mass distribution on structural response. One hundred and thirteen modes were extracted. A second objective of Project IV was to investigate the effects of uncertainty and variability on structural response. To this end, four side studies were conducted. Three of them, briefly summarized in this volume, addressed themselves respectively to an investigation of sources of random variability in the dynamic response of nuclear power plant structures; formulation of a methodology for modeling and evaluating the effects of structural uncertainty on predicted modal characteristics of major nuclear power plant structures and substructures; and a preliminary evaluation of nonlinear responses in shear-wall structures. A fourth side study, reported in detail in this volume, quantified variations in dynamic characteristics and seismic

  16. Amended final report of the safety assessment of dibutyl adipate as used in cosmetics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Andersen, Alan

    2006-01-01

    irritation, no comedogenicity, and no genotoxicity. Combined with the data demonstrating little acute toxicity, no skin or ocular irritation, and no reproductive or developmental toxicity, these data form an adequate basis for reaching a conclusion that Dibutyl Adipate is safe as a cosmetic ingredient in the practices of use and concentrations as reflected in this safety assessment.

  17. Final report on the safety assessment of Triethylene Glycol and PEG-4.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2006-01-01

    and PEG-4 also would not be irritants or sensitizers, and the absence of any reported reactions in the case literature and the professional experience of the Expert Panel further supported the absence of any significant sensitization potential. The need for additional data to demonstrate the safety of PEGs Cocamine was related to the Cocamine moiety and is not relevant here. The Panel reminded formulators of cosmetic products that, as with other PEG compounds, Triethylene Glycol and PEG-4 should not be used on damaged skin because of cases of systemic toxicity and contact dermatitis in burn patients have been attributed to a PEG-based topical ointment. Based on its consideration of the available information, the CIR Expert Panel concluded that Triethylene Glycol and PEG-4 are safe as cosmetic ingredients in the present practices and concentrations of use as described in this safety assessment.

  18. Auditable Safety Analysis and Final Hazard Classification for the 105-N Reactor Zone and 109-N Steam Generator Zone Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kloster, G.L.

    1998-07-01

    This document is a graded auditable safety analysis (ASA) and final hazard classification (FHC) for the Reactor/Steam Generator Zone Segment. The Reactor/Steam Generator Zone Segment, part of the N Reactor Complex, that is also known as the Reactor Building and Steam Generator Cells. The installation of the modifications described within to support surveillance and maintenance activities are to be completed by July 1, 1999. The surveillance and maintenance activities addressed within are assumed to continue for the next 15- 20 years, until the initiation of facility D ampersand D (i.e., Interim Safe Storage). The graded ASA in this document is in accordance with EDPI-4.30-01, Rev. 1, Safety Analysis Documentation, (BHI-DE-1) and is consistent with guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Energy. This ASA describes the hazards within the facility and evaluates the adequacy of the measures taken to reduce, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. This document also serves as the FHC for the Reactor/Steam Generator Zone Segment. This FHC is developed through the use of bounding accident analyses that envelope the potential exposures to personnel

  19. Final report of the safety assessment of methacrylate ester monomers used in nail enhancement products.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-01-01

    Methacrylate ester monomers are used in as artificial nail builders in nail enhancement products. They undergo rapid polymerization to form a hard material on the nail that is then shaped. While Ethyl Methacrylate is the primary monomer used in nail enhancement products, other methacrylate esters are also used. This safety assessment addresses 22 other methacrylate esters reported by industry to be present in small percentages as artificial nail builders in cosmetic products. They function to speed up polymerization and/or form cross-links. Only Tetrahydrofurfuryl Methacrylate was reported to the FDA to be in current use. The polymerization rates of these methacrylate esters are within the same range as Ethyl Methacrylate. While data are not available on all of these methacrylate esters, the available data demonstrated little acute oral, dermal, or i.p. toxicity. In a 28-day inhalation study on rats, Butyl Methacrylate caused upper airway irritation; the NOAEL was 1801 mg/m3. In a 28-day oral toxicity study on rats, t-Butyl Methacrylate had a NOAEL of 20 mg/kg/day. Beagle dogs dosed with 0.2 to 2.0 g/kg/day of C12 to C18 methacrylate monomers for 13 weeks exhibited effects only in the highest dose group: weight loss, emesis, diarrhea, mucoid feces, or salivation were observed. Butyl Methacrylate (0.1 M) and Isobutyl Methacrylate (0.1 M) are mildly irritating to the rabbit eye. HEMA is corrosive when instilled in the rabbit eye, while PEG-4 Dimethacrylate and Trimethylolpropane Trimethacrylate are minimally irritating to the eye. Dermal irritation caused by methacrylates is documented in guinea pigs and rabbits. In guinea pigs, HEMA, Isopropylidenediphenyl Bisglycidyl Methacrylate, Lauryl Methacrylate, and Trimethylolpropane Trimethacrylate are strong sensitizers; Butyl Methacrylate, Cyclohexyl Methacrylate, Hexyl Methacrylate, and Urethane Methacrylate are moderate sensitizers; Hydroxypropyl Methacrylate is a weak sensitizer; and PEG-4 Dimethacrylate and

  20. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Part B Permit Application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)]. Volume 5, Chapter D, Appendix D1 (conclusion), Revision 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cook, Neville G.W.; Heuze, Francois E.; Miller, Hamish D.S.; Thoms, Robert L.

    1993-03-01

    The reference design for the underground facilities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant was developed using the best criteria available at initiation of the detailed design effort. These design criteria are contained in the US Department of Energy document titled Design Criteria, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Revised Mission Concept-IIA (RMC-IIA), Rev. 4, dated February 1984. The validation process described in the Design Validation Final Report has resulted in validation of the reference design of the underground openings based on these criteria. Future changes may necessitate modification of the Design Criteria document and/or the reference design. Validation of the reference design as presented in this report permits the consideration of future design or design criteria modifications necessitated by these changes or by experience gained at the WIPP. Any future modifications to the design criteria and/or the reference design will be governed by a DOE Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) covering underground design changes. This procedure will explain the process to be followed in describing, evaluating and approving the change.

  1. Shaft seals for final high-level radioactive waste repositories. ELSA. Pt. 1; Schachtverschluesse fuer Endlager fuer hochradioaktive Abfaelle. ELSA. T. 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kudla, W.; Schreiter, F.; Gruner, M. [Technische Univ. Bergakademie Freiberg (Germany). Inst. fuer Bergbau und Spezialtiefbau; Jobmann, M.; Bollingerfehr, W.; Mueller-Hoeppe, N.; Herold, P. [DBE Technology GmbH, Peine (Germany)

    2013-04-30

    The state of the art in science and technology fir shaft seals with long-term stability is summarized regarding their applicability for high-level waste repository in Germany. The concepts and drafts for the shaft sealing systems ERAM, Asse, Konrad, the WIPP side, the RESEAL concept, the NAGRA concept and the project LASA are reviewed. The methodology of applying partial factors in a safety analysis is summarized and the applicability of this method for geotechnical sealing structures is confirmed. To establish geomechanical boundary conditions of the host rocks and clay stone the stress-strain behavior of the rock mass adjoining the shaft has to be identified including time-dependent thermo-mechanical processes. The general and special requirements for the design of shaft sealing systems, especially in salt rock and clay formations are described, derived from the safety requirements (BMU 2010). Finally general information needs were identified.

  2. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This annual report of the Senior Inspector for the Nuclear Safety, analyses the nuclear safety at EDF for the year 1999 and proposes twelve subjects of consideration to progress. Five technical documents are also provided and discussed concerning the nuclear power plants maintenance and safety (thermal fatigue, vibration fatigue, assisted control and instrumentation of the N4 bearing, 1300 MW reactors containment and time of life of power plants). (A.L.B.)

  3. Amended final report on the safety assessment of polyacrylamide and acrylamide residues in cosmetics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-01-01

    to human health and safety. Based on the genotoxicity and carcinogenicity data, the Panel does not believe that acrylamide is a genotoxic carcinogen in the usual manner and that several of the risk assessment approaches have overestimated the human cancer risk. The Panel did conclude, however, that it was appropriate to limit acrylamide levels to 5 ppm in cosmetic formulations.

  4. Final report on the safety assessment of potassium silicate, sodium metasilicate, and sodium silicate.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elmore, Amy R

    2005-01-01

    Metasilicate, and Sodium Silicate ranged from negligible to severe, depending on the species tested and the molar ratio and concentration tested. Sodium Metasilicate was negative in the local lymph node assay (LLNA), but a delayed-type hypersensitivity response was observed in mice. Potassium Silicate was nonirritating in two acute eye irritation studies in rabbits. Sodium Metasilicate (42.4% H2O) was corrosive to the rabbit eye. Sodium Silicate was a severe eye irritant in some eye irritation studies, but was irritating or nonirritating in others. A skin freshener containing Sodium Silicate was nonirritating. Sodium Metasilicate was nonmutagenic in bacterial cells. Rats given Sodium Silicate (600 and 1200 ppm of added silica) in the drinking water in reproductive studies produced a reduced number of offspring: to 67% of controls at 600 ppm and to 80% of controls at 1200 ppm. Three adult rats injected intratesticularly and subcutaneously with 0.8 mM/kg of Sodium Silicate showed no morphological changes in the testes and no effect on the residual spermatozoa in the ductus deferens. Sodium Metasilicate (37% in a detergent) mixed with water was a severe skin irritant when tested on intact and abraded human skin, but 6%, 7%, and 13% Sodium Silicate were negligible skin irritants to intact and abraded human skin. Sodium Silicate (10% of a 40% aqueous solution) was negative in a repeat-insult predictive patch test in humans. The same aqueous solution of Sodium Silicate was considered a mild irritant under normal use conditions in a study of cumulative irritant properties. The Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) Expert Panel recognized the irritation potential of these ingredients, especially in leave-on products. However, because these ingredients have limited dermal absorption and Sodium Metasilicate is a GRAS direct food substance, the Panel deemed the ingredients safe for use in cosmetic products in the practices of use and concentration described in this safety assessment, when

  5. Final characterization and safety screen report of double shell tank 241-AP-105 for evaporator campaign 97-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, G.L.

    1997-01-01

    Evaporator candidate feed from tank 241-AP-105 (hereafter referred to as AP-105) was characterized for physical, inorganic, organic and radiochemical parameters by the 222-S Laboratory as directed by the Tank Sample and Analysis Plan (TSAP), References 1 through 4, and Engineering Change Notice, number 635332, Reference 5. This data package satisfies the requirement for a format IV, final report as described in Reference 1. This data package is also a follow-up to the 45-Day safety screen results for tank AP-105, Reference 8, which was issued on November 5, 1996, and is attached as Section II to this report. Preliminary data in the form of summary analytical tables were provided to the project in advance of this final report to enable early estimation of evaporator operational parameters, using the Predict modeling program. Analyses were performed at the 222-S Laboratory as defined and specified in the TSAP and the Laboratory's Quality Assurance P1an, References 6 and 7. Any deviations from the instructions documented in the TSAP are discussed in this narrative and are supported with additional documentation

  6. Shipment and Disposal of Solidified Organic Waste (Waste Type IV) to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Amico, E. L; Edmiston, D. R.; O'Leary, G. A.; Rivera, M. A.; Steward, D. M.

    2006-01-01

    In April of 2005, the last shipment of transuranic (TRU) waste from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site to the WIPP was completed. With the completion of this shipment, all transuranic waste generated and stored at Rocky Flats was successfully removed from the site and shipped to and disposed of at the WIPP. Some of the last waste to be shipped and disposed of at the WIPP was waste consisting of solidified organic liquids that is identified as Waste Type IV in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC) document. Waste Type IV waste typically has a composition, and associated characteristics, that make it significantly more difficult to ship and dispose of than other Waste Types, especially with respect to gas generation. This paper provides an overview of the experience gained at Rocky Flats for management, transportation and disposal of Type IV waste at WIPP, particularly with respect to gas generation testing. (authors)

  7. A report on developing a checklist to assess company plans focused on improving safety awareness, safe behaviour and safety culture: final report

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Steijger, N.; Starren, H.; Keus, M.; Gort, J.; Vervoort, M.

    2003-01-01

    This report describes the process of developing a checklist to asses company plans focused on improving safety awareness, safe behaviour and safety culture. These plans are part of a programme initiated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment aiming at improving the safety performance of

  8. Assessment of the potential for karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lorenz, John Clay

    2006-01-01

    This report is an independent assessment of the potential for karst dissolution in evaporitic strata of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. Review of the available data suggests that the Rustler strata thicken and thin across the area in depositional patterns related to lateral variations in sedimentary accommodation space and normal facies changes. Most of the evidence that has been offered for the presence of karst in the subsurface has been used out of context, and the different pieces are not mutually supporting. Outside of Nash Draw, definitive evidence for the development of karst in the Rustler Formation near the WIPP site is limited to the horizon of the Magenta Member in drillhole WIPP-33. Most of the other evidence cited by the proponents of karst is more easily interpreted as primary sedimentary structures and the localized dissolution of evaporitic strata adjacent to the Magenta and Culebra water-bearing units. Some of the cited evidence is invalid, an inherited baggage from studies made prior to the widespread knowledge of modern evaporite depositional environments and prior to the existence of definitive exposures of the Rustler Formation in the WIPP shafts. Some of the evidence is spurious, has been taken out of context, or is misquoted. Lateral lithologic variations from halite to mudstone within the Rustler Formation under the WIPP site have been taken as evidence for the dissolution of halite such as that seen in Nash Draw, but are more rationally explained as sedimentary facies changes. Extrapolation of the known karst features in Nash Draw eastward to the WIPP site, where conditions are and have been significantly different for half a million years, is unwarranted. The volumes of insoluble material that would remain after dissolution of halite would be significantly less than the observed bed thicknesses, thus dissolution is an unlikely explanation for the lateral variations from halite to mudstone and siltstone

  9. Assessment of the potential for karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP site.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lorenz, John Clay

    2006-01-01

    This report is an independent assessment of the potential for karst dissolution in evaporitic strata of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. Review of the available data suggests that the Rustler strata thicken and thin across the area in depositional patterns related to lateral variations in sedimentary accommodation space and normal facies changes. Most of the evidence that has been offered for the presence of karst in the subsurface has been used out of context, and the different pieces are not mutually supporting. Outside of Nash Draw, definitive evidence for the development of karst in the Rustler Formation near the WIPP site is limited to the horizon of the Magenta Member in drillhole WIPP-33. Most of the other evidence cited by the proponents of karst is more easily interpreted as primary sedimentary structures and the localized dissolution of evaporitic strata adjacent to the Magenta and Culebra water-bearing units. Some of the cited evidence is invalid, an inherited baggage from studies made prior to the widespread knowledge of modern evaporite depositional environments and prior to the existence of definitive exposures of the Rustler Formation in the WIPP shafts. Some of the evidence is spurious, has been taken out of context, or is misquoted. Lateral lithologic variations from halite to mudstone within the Rustler Formation under the WIPP site have been taken as evidence for the dissolution of halite such as that seen in Nash Draw, but are more rationally explained as sedimentary facies changes. Extrapolation of the known karst features in Nash Draw eastward to the WIPP site, where conditions are and have been significantly different for half a million years, is unwarranted. The volumes of insoluble material that would remain after dissolution of halite would be significantly less than the observed bed thicknesses, thus dissolution is an unlikely explanation for the lateral variations from halite to mudstone and siltstone

  10. Information need about the safety of the final disposal of nuclear waste. Information receiver's views in Eurajoki, Kuhmo and Aeaenekoski municipalities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautakangas, H.

    1997-03-01

    The study analyses the public's information need about the safety issues related to the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel generated by the Finnish nuclear power stations. Locals in three municipalities that are studied as possible sites for final disposal were interviewed for the study. Earlier studies made in Finland had indicated that the public's knowledge about safety issues related to the final disposal was almost opposite to the findings of the natural sciences. Also, the public had expressed a wish to receive more information from the safety authority, the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK). This study therefore had two basic objectives: To find out what kind of safety information the locals need and what the safety authority's role could be in providing information. The main results show interest and need especially for information concerning the disposal phases taking place on the ground level, such as nuclear waste transportation and encapsulation. Also, the interviews show a clear need and desire for an impartial actor such as STUK in the information and communication process. (author) (107 refs.)

  11. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Part B permit application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)]. Volume 4, Revision 1.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1991-12-31

    The US Department of Energy is currently constructing the Waste Isolation Pilot near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The full-scale pilot plant will demonstrate the feasibility of the safe disposal of defense-related nuclear waste in a bedded salt formation at a depth of 2160 feet below the surface. WIPP will provide for the permanent storage of 25,000 cu ft of remote-handled (RH) transuranic waste and 6,000,000 cu ft of contact-handled (CH) transuranic waste. This paper covers the major mechanical/structural design considerations for the waste hoist and its hoist tower structure. The design of the hoist system and safety features incorporates state-of-the-art technology developed in the hoist and mining industry to ensure safe operation for transporting nuclear waste underground. Also included are design specifications for VOC-10 monitoring system.

  12. The integrated in situ testing program for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matalucci, R.V.

    1987-03-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is developing the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project in southeastern New Mexico as a research and development (R and D) facility for examining the response of bedded (layered) salt to the emplacement of radioactive wastes generated from defense programs. The WIPP Experimental Program consists of a technology development program, including laboratory testing and theoretical analysis activities, and an in situ testing program that is being done 659 m underground at the project site. This experimental program addresses three major technical areas that concern (1) thermal/structural interactions, (2) plugging and sealing, and (3) waste package performance. To ensure that the technical issues involved in these areas are investigated with appropriate emphasis and timing, an in situ testing plan was developed to integrate the many activities and tasks associated with the technical issues of waste disposal. 5 refs., 4 figs

  13. Comparison between disign criteria and observed structural performance of underground openings at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cook, R.F.; Francke, C.

    1989-01-01

    This paper discusses the observed structural performance of the underground excavations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in relation to design criteria. The criteria were established at an early stage of the project to define the functional and structural requirements that were to be addressed in the design of the facility. For the underground structural response, the criteria defined the requirements for the shaft and shaft liner design, mine design, waste emplacement, retrievability and instrumentation. The observed structural performance of the underground is determined by the field data that have been collected since excavations were started at the WIPP site. The observations include field measurements of rock and water conditions, as well as maintenance records. The data provide input to design confirmation, performance assessment and form the basis for the design of new underground structures. For this paper, the field data have been compared with the design criteria applicable to ground control to demonstrate that the requirements of the design are met

  14. Analysis report for WIPP colloid model constraints and performance assessment parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mariner, Paul E.; Sassani, David Carl

    2014-03-01

    An analysis of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) colloid model constraints and parameter values was performed. The focus of this work was primarily on intrinsic colloids, mineral fragment colloids, and humic substance colloids, with a lesser focus on microbial colloids. Comments by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning intrinsic Th(IV) colloids and Mg-Cl-OH mineral fragment colloids were addressed in detail, assumptions and data used to constrain colloid model calculations were evaluated, and inconsistencies between data and model parameter values were identified. This work resulted in a list of specific conclusions regarding model integrity, model conservatism, and opportunities for improvement related to each of the four colloid types included in the WIPP performance assessment.

  15. Plutonium interaction with a bacterial strain isolated from the waste isolation pilot plant (WIPP) environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strietelmeier, B.A.; Kraus, S.M.; Leonard, P.A.; Triay, I.R.

    1996-01-01

    This work was conducted as part of a series of experiments to determine the association and interaction of various actinides with bacteria isolated from the WIPP site. The majority of bacteria that exist at the site are expected to be halophiles, or extreme halophiles, due to the high concentration of salt minerals at the location. Experiments were conducted to determine the toxicity of plutonium-n-239, neptunium-237 and americium-243 to several species of these halophiles and the results were reported elsewhere. As an extension of these experiments, we report an investigation of the type of association that occurs between 239 Pu and the isolate WIPP-1A, isolated by staff at Brookhaven National Laboratory, when grown in a high-salt, defined medium. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) techniques, we demonstrate a surface association of the 239 Pu with the bacterial cells

  16. Performance Demonstration Program Plan for the WIPP Experimental-Waste Characterization Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-02-01

    The Performance Demonstration Program is designed to ensure that compliance with the Quality Assurance Objective, identified in the Quality Assurance Program Plan for the WIPP Experimental-Waste Characterization Program (QAPP), is achieved. This Program Plan is intended for use by the WPO to assess the laboratory support provided for the characterization of WIPP TRU waste by the storage/generator sites. Phase 0 of the Performance Demonstration Program encompasses the analysis of headspace gas samples for inorganic and organic components. The WPO will ensure the implementation of this plan by designating an independent organization to coordinate and provide technical oversight for the program (Program Coordinator). Initial program support, regarding the technical oversight and coordination functions, shall be provided by the USEPA-ORP. This plan identifies the criteria that will be used for the evaluation of laboratory performance, the responsibilities of the Program Coordinator, and the responsibilities of the participating laboratories. 5 tabs

  17. Comparative analysis of nine structural codes used in the second WIPP benchmark problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, H.S.; Krieg, R.D.; Matalucci, R.V.

    1981-11-01

    In the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Benchmark II study, various computer codes were compared on the basis of their capabilities for calculating the response of hypothetical drift configurations for nuclear waste experiments and storage demonstration. The codes used by participants in the study were ANSALT, DAPROK, JAC, REM, SANCHO, SPECTROM, STEALTH, and two different implementations of MARC. Errors were found in the preliminary results, and several calculations were revised. Revised solutions were in reasonable agreement except for the REM solution. The Benchmark II study allowed significant advances in understanding the relative behavior of computer codes available for WIPP calculations. The study also pointed out the possible need for performing critical design calculations with more than one code. Lastly, it indicated the magnitude of the code-to-code spread in results which is to be expected even when a model has been explicitly defined

  18. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 27 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    WIPP 27 was drilled in Eddy County, New Mexico (NM 1/4 sec. 21, T21S, R30E) to investigate evaporite dissolution features and to determine the stratigraphy of surface and near-surface formations. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, 79 feet of Quaternary deposits, 73 feet of the Rustler Formation, and 171 feet of the upper portion of the Salado Formation. Consecutive cores were obtained for the entire depth of WIPP 27. Geophysical logs measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole data, surface mapping and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids

  19. The influence of salt aerosol on alpha radiation detection by WIPP continuous air monitors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bartlett, W.T.; Walker, B.A. [Environmental Evaluation Group, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-08-01

    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) alpha continuous air monitor (CAM) performance was evaluated to determine if CAMs could detect accidental releases of transuranic radioactivity from the underground repository. Anomalous alpha spectra and poor background subtraction were observed and attributed to salt deposits on the CAM sampling filters. Microscopic examination of salt laden sampling filters revealed that aerosol particles were forming dendritic structures on the surface of the sampling filters. Alpha CAM detection efficiency decreased exponentially as salt deposits increased on the sampling filters, suggesting that sampling-filter salt was performing like a fibrous filter rather than a membrane filter. Aerosol particles appeared to penetrate the sampling-filter salt deposits and alpha particle energy was reduced. These findings indicate that alpha CAMs may not be able to detect acute releases of radioactivity, and consequently CAMs are not used as part of the WIPP dynamic confinement system. 12 refs., 12 figs., 1 tab.

  20. Contamination control aspects of attaching waste drums to the WIPP Waste Characterization Chamber

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rubick, L.M.; Burke, L.L.

    1998-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory West (ANL-W) is verifying the characterization and repackaging of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) mixed waste in support of the Waste Isolation Pilot Program (WIPP) project located in Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP Waste Characterization Chamber (WCC) was designed to allow opening of transuranic waste drums for this process. The WCC became operational in March of 1994 and has characterized approximately 240 drums of transuranic waste. The waste drums are internally contaminated with high levels of transuranic radionuclides. Attaching and detaching drums to the glove box posed serious contamination control problems. Prior to characterizing waste, several drum attachment techniques and materials were evaluated. An inexpensive HEPA filter molded into the bagging material helps with venting during detachment. The current techniques and procedures used to attach and detach transuranic waste drums to the WCC are described

  1. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection; Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating controls and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  2. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection: Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating control and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  3. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection; Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating controls and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  4. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection; Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating controls and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  5. Summary of 1988 WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] Facility horizon gas flow measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stormont, J.C.

    1990-11-01

    Numerous gas flow measurements have been made at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Facility horizon during 1988. All tests have been pressure decay or constant pressure tests from single boreholes drilled from the underground excavations. The test fluid has been nitrogen. The data have been interpreted as permeabilities and porosities by means of a transient numerical solution method. A closed-form steady-state approximation provides a reasonable order-of-magnitude permeability estimate. The effective resolution of the measurement system is less than 10 -20 m 2 . Results indicate that beyond 1 to 5 m from an excavation, the gas flow is very small and the corresponding permeability is below the system resolution. Within the first meter of an excavation, the interpreted permeabilities can be 5 orders of magnitude greater than the undisturbed or far-field permeability. The interpreted permeabilities in the region between the undisturbed region and the first meter from an excavation are in the range of 10 -16 to 10 -20 m 2 . Measurable gas flow occurs to a greater depth into the roof above WIPP excavations of different sizes and ages than into the ribs and floor. The gas flows into the formation surrounding the smallest excavation tested are consistently lower than those at similar locations surrounding larger excavations of comparable age. Gas flow measured in the interbed layers near the WIPP excavations is highly variable. Generally, immediately above and below excavations, relatively large gas flow is measured in the interbed layers. These results are consistent with previous measurements and indicate a limited disturbed zone surrounding WIPP excavations. 31 refs., 99 figs., 5 tabs

  6. Joint state of Colorado-US Department of Energy WIPP Shipment Exercise Program: TRANSAX '90

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    In July 1990, the United States Secretary of Energy requested the DOE conduct a transportation emergency exercise before the end of CY 1990. The tasking was subsequently directed to the Director of DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM) to plan and conduct an exercise, based on a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) shipment scenario. The state of Colorado was asked to participate. Colorado, in turn, invited the DOE to integrate the exercise into its own series of WIPP-related tabletop and field exercises for which the state had already begun planning. The result was a joint USDOE/Colorado full-scale (orientation) exercise called Transportation Accident Exercise 1990 (TRANSAX '90). The state of Colorado's exercise program was a follow-on to previously conducted classroom training. The program would serve to identify and resolve outstanding issues concerning inspections of the WIPP shipment transporter as it entered and passed through the state on the designated Interstate 25 transportation corridor; criteria for movement under various adverse weather and road conditions; and emergency response to accidents occurring in an urban or rural environment. The USDOE designed its participation in the exercise program to test selected aspects of the DOE Emergency Management System relating to response to and management of DOE off-site transportation emergencies involving assistance to state and local emergency response personnel. While a number of issues remain under study for ultimate resolution, others have been resolved and will become the basis for emergency operations plans, SOPs, mutual aid agreements, and checklist upgrades. Concurrently, the concentrated efforts at local, state, and federal levels in dealing with WIPP- related activities during this exercise program development have given renewed impetus to all parties as the beginning of actual shipments draws nearer. Three tabletop scenarios are discussed in this report

  7. Final safety evaluation report related to the certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor design. Supplement 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-05-01

    This report supplements the final safety evaluation report (FSER) for the US Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) standard design. The FSER was issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff as NUREG-1503 in July 1994 to document the NRC staff's review of the US ABWR design. The US ABWR design was submitted by GE Nuclear Energy (GE) in accordance with the procedures of Subpart B to Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This supplement documents the NRC staff's review of the changes to the US ABWR design documentation since the issuance of the FSER. GE made these changes primarily as a result of first-of-a-kind-engineering (FOAKE) and as a result of the design certification rulemaking for the ABWR design. On the basis of its evaluations, the NRC staff concludes that the confirmatory issues in NUREG-1503 are resolved, that the changes to the ABWR design documentation are acceptable, and that GE's application for design certification meets the requirements of Subpart B to 10 CFR Part 52 that are applicable and technically relevant to the US ABWR design

  8. Final safety evaluation report related to the certification of the System 80+ design: Docket Number 52-002. Supplement 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-05-01

    This report supplements the final safety evaluation report (FSER) for the System 80+ standard design. The FSER was issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff as NUREG-1462 in August 1994 to document the NRC staff's review of the System 80+ design. The System 80+ design was submitted by Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE), in accordance with the procedures of Subpart B to Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This supplement documents the NRC staff's review of the changes to the System 80+ design documentation since the issuance of the FSER. ABB-CE made these changes as a result of its review of the System 80+ design details. The NRC staff concludes that the changes to the System 80+ design documentation are acceptable, and that ABB-CE's application for design certification meets the requirements of Subpart B to 10 CFR Part 52 that are applicable and technically relevant to the System 80+ design

  9. Efficacy and safety of fasudil in patients with subarachnoid hemorrhage. Final results of a randomized trial of fasudil versus nimodipine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhao Jizong; Zhou Dingbiao; Guo Jing

    2011-01-01

    Fasudil is believed to be at least equally effective as nimodipine for the prevention of cerebral vasospasm and subsequent ischemic injury in patients undergoing surgery for subarachnoid hemorrhage (SAH). We report the final results of a randomized, open trial to compare the efficacy and safety of fasudil with nimodipine. A total of 63 patients undergoing surgery for SAH received fasudil and 66 received nimodipine between 1998 and 2004. Symptomatic vasospasm, low density areas on computed tomography (CT), clinical outcomes, and adverse events were all recorded, and the results were compared between the fasudil and nimodipine groups. Absence of symptomatic vasospasm, occurrence of low density areas associated with vasospasm on CT, and occurrence of adverse events were similar between the two groups. The clinical outcomes were more favorable in the fasudil group than in the nimodipine group (p=0.040). The proportion of patients with good clinical outcome was 74.5% (41/55) in the fasudil group and 61.7% (37/60) in the nimodipine group. There were no serious adverse events reported in the fasudil group. The present results suggest that fasudil is equally or more effective than nimodipine for the prevention of cerebral vasospasm and subsequent ischemic injury in patients undergoing surgery for SAH. (author)

  10. Final safety evaluation report related to the certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor design. Supplement 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-05-01

    This report supplements the final safety evaluation report (FSER) for the US Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) standard design. The FSER was issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff as NUREG-1503 in July 1994 to document the NRC staff`s review of the US ABWR design. The US ABWR design was submitted by GE Nuclear Energy (GE) in accordance with the procedures of Subpart B to Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This supplement documents the NRC staff`s review of the changes to the US ABWR design documentation since the issuance of the FSER. GE made these changes primarily as a result of first-of-a-kind-engineering (FOAKE) and as a result of the design certification rulemaking for the ABWR design. On the basis of its evaluations, the NRC staff concludes that the confirmatory issues in NUREG-1503 are resolved, that the changes to the ABWR design documentation are acceptable, and that GE`s application for design certification meets the requirements of Subpart B to 10 CFR Part 52 that are applicable and technically relevant to the US ABWR design.

  11. TWRS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) integrated control decision team (ICDT) meetings January 22 - 31,1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saladin, V.L.

    1997-01-01

    U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL) letter 97-MSD-163 dated January 15, 1997, directed the Project Hanford Management Contractor (Contractor), Fluor Daniel Hanford, inc., to form a joint RL-Contractor Integrated Control Decision Team (ICDT) to evaluate the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident scenarios that were identified to be above the risk evaluation guidelines (radiological and/or toxicological) defined by the April 8, 1996, letter from J. Kinzer, RL-TWRS (96-MSO-069) to Dr. A. L. Trego, Westinghouse Hanford Company. The ICDT evaluated six postulated accidents from the draft FSAR which had analyzed consequences above the DOE directed risk evaluation guidelines after controls were applied. The accidents were: (1) Organic Solvent Fires; (2) Organic Salt-Nitrate Fire; (3) Spray Leak; (4) Flammable Gas; (5) Steam Intrusion; and (6) Seismic Event. Five of the postulated accidents exceed radiological risk guidelines. Although the postulated steam intrusion accident does not exceed the radiological risk guidelines, it was considered in the ICDT evaluation because its calculated consequences exceed toxicological risk evaluation guidelines. Figure 1 delineates the mitigated and unmitigated risk evaluations performed for the FSAR

  12. Final hazard classification and auditable safety analysis for the 308 Building Complex during post-deactivation surveillance and maintenance mode

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dexheimer, D.

    1996-11-01

    This document summarizes the inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials present within the 308 Building Complex, and presents the hazard evaluation methodology used to prepare the hazard classification for the Complex. The complex includes the 308 Building (process area and office facilities) and the 308 Building Annex, which includes the former Neutron Radiography Facility containing a shutdown (and partially decommissioned) reactor. This document applies to the post-deactivation surveillance and maintenance mode only, and provides an authorization basis limited to surveillance and maintenance activities. This document does not authorize decommissioning and decontamination activities, movement of fissile materials, modification to facility confinement structures, nor the introduction or storage of additional radionuclides in the 308 Building Complex. This document established a final hazard classification and identifies appropriate and adequate safety functions and controls to reduce or mitigate the risk associated with the surveillance and maintenance mode. The most consequential hazard event scenario is a postulated unmitigated release from an earthquake event involving the entire complex. That release is equivalent to 30% of the Nuclear Category 3 threshold adjusted as allowed by DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE 1992). The dominant isotopes are 239 Pu, 240 Pu, and 241 Am in the gloveboxes

  13. Hydraulic fracturing tests in anhydrite interbeds in the WIPP, Marker Beds 139 and 140

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Howard, C L [RE/SPEC Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Wawersik, W. R.; Carlson, L. V.; Henfling, J. A.; Borns, D. J.; Beauheim, R. L.; Roberts, R. M.

    1997-05-01

    Hydraulic fracturing tests were integrated with hydrologic tests to estimate the conditions under which gas pressure in the disposal rooms in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Carlsbad, NM (WIPP) will initiate and advance fracturing in nearby anhydrite interbeds. The measurements were made in two marker beds in the Salado formation, MB139 and MB140, to explore the consequences of existing excavations for the extrapolation of results to undisturbed ground. The interpretation of these measurements is based on the pressure-time records in two injection boreholes and several nearby hydrologic observation holes. Data interpretations were aided by post-test borehole video surveys of fracture traces that were made visible by ultraviolet illumination of fluorescent dye in the hydraulic fracturing fluid. The conclusions of this report relate to the upper- and lower-bound gas pressures in the WIPP, the paths of hydraulically and gas-driven fractures in MB139 and MB140, the stress states in MB139 and MB140, and the probable in situ stress states in these interbeds in undisturbed ground far away from the WIPP.

  14. Analysis of the potential formation of a Breccia chimney beneath the WIPP repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spiegler, P.

    1982-05-01

    This report evaluates the potential formation of a Breccia pipe beginning at the Bell Canyon aquifer beneath the WIPP repository and the resulting release of radioactivity to the surface. Rock mechanics considerations indicate that the formation of a Breccia pipe by collapse of a cavern is not reasonable. Even if rock mechanics is ignored, the overlying strata act as a barrier and would prevent the release of radioactivity to the biosphere. Gradual formation of a Breccia pipe is so slow that the plutonium-239 in the waste (one of the most important long-lived components) would decay during formation. If Bell Lake and San Simon Sinks are the surface manifestation of a regional deep dissolution wedge, such a wedge is too far removed to represent pipe forming activity near the WIPP site. The formation of a Breccia pipe under the WIPP repository is highly unlikely. If it did occur, the concentration of plutonium-239 in brine reaching the surface would be less than the maximum permissible concentration in water specified in the Code of Federal Regulation Title 10, part 20

  15. Road Safety Data, Collection, Transfer and Analysis DaCoTa. Deliverable 0.1: Final project report.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Thomas, P. Hill, J. Morris, A.P. Welsh, R. Talbot, R. Muhlrad, N. Vallet, G. Yannis, G. Papadimitriou, E. Evgenikos, P. Dupont, E. Martensen, H. Hermitte, T. Bos, N. & Aarts, L.

    2015-01-01

    The European Road Safety Observatory was established European Commission and first announced in the 2001 Transport White Paper1. It was further developed in the 2003 Road Safety Action Plan 2 where the Commission announced it was to establish a new European Road Safety Observatory (ERSO) to

  16. The Revised WIPP Passive Institutional Controls Program - A Conceptual Plan - 13145

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patterson, Russ; Klein, Thomas; Van Luik, Abraham

    2013-01-01

    The Department of Energy/Carlsbad Field Office (DOE/CBFO) is responsible for managing all activities related to the disposal of TRU and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository, 650 m below the land surface, at WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The main function of the Passive Institutional Controls (PIC's) program is to inform future generations of the long-lived radioactive wastes buried beneath their feet in the desert. For the first 100 years after cessation of disposal operations, the rooms are closed and the shafts leading underground sealed, WIPP is mandated by law to institute Active Institutional Controls (AIC's) with fences, gates, and armed guards on patrol. At this same time a plan must be in place of how to warn/inform the future, after the AIC's are gone, of the consequences of intrusion into the geologic repository disposal area. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts and testing schedules. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Today the NEA is coordinating a study called the 'Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory (RK and M) Across Generations' to provide the international nuclear waste repository community with a guide on how a nuclear record archive programs should be approached and developed. CBFO is cooperating and participating in this project and will take what knowledge is gained and apply that to the WIPP program. At the same time CBFO is well aware that the EPA and others are expecting DOE to move forward with planning for the future WIPP PIC's program; so a plan will be in place in time for WIPP's closure slated for the early 2030's. The DOE/CBFO WIPP PIC's program in place today meets the regulatory criteria, but complete feasibility of implementation is questionable, and may not be in conformance

  17. Application of the new requirements of safety of the IAEA for the previous management to the final disposal of radioactive waste in the region: a personal vision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sed, Luis Andres Jova

    2013-01-01

    The work includes the requirements for the responsibilities associated with the management prior to the final disposal of radioactive waste and as they are referred to in the Region. Also discusses the requirements for the main stages of the management prior to the final disposal of radioactive waste. A very important section of the new requirements is that establish requirements for safe operation of facilities management prior to the final disposal of radioactive wastes and the implementation of activities under conditions of safety and development. The work is emphatic on the importance of safety justification since the beginning of the development of a facility as a basis for the decision-making and approval process. Emphasis is also on the gradual approach which should provide for the collection, analysis and interpretation of the relevant technical data, plans for the design and operation, and the formulation of the justification of the security. This paper gives a personal view of the situation in the Region

  18. Increased component safety through improved methods for residual stress analysis. Subprojects. Consideration of real component geometries (phase 1). Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nau, Andreas; Scholtes, B.

    2014-01-01

    Residual stresses can be result in both detrimental as well as beneficial consequences on the component's strength and lifetime. A most detailed knowledge of the residual stress state is a pre-requisite for the assessment of the component's performance. The mechanical methods for residual stress measurements are classified in non-destructive, destructive and semi-destructive methods. The two commonly used (semi-destructive) mechanical methods are the hole drilling and the ring core method. In the context of reactor safety research of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), two fundamental and interacting weak points of the hole drilling as well as of the ring core method are investigated. On the one hand, there are effects concerning geometrical boundary conditions of the components and on the other hand, there are influences of plasticity due to notch effects. Both aspects affect the released strain field, when the material is removed and finally, the calculated residual stresses. The first issue mentioned above is under the responsibility of Institute of Materials Engineering - Metallic Materials (Kassel University) and the last one will be investigated by University of Stuttgart-Otto-Graf-Institut - materials testing institute. Within the framework of this project it could be demonstrated that updated calibration coefficients lead to more reliable residual stress calculation in contrast to existing ones. These findings are valid for points of measurements on components without geometrical boundary effects like edges or shoulders. Reasons are high developed Finite-Element software packages and the opportunity of modelling the point of measurement (hole geometry, layout of the strain gauges) and its vicinity more in detail. Special challenges are multi-axial residual stress depth distributions and the geometry of components composing edges and claddings. Unlike existing analyses considering uni-axial and homogeneous stress states, bi

  19. Annex D 200 Area Interim Storage Area Final Safety Analysis Report Volume 5 (FSAR) (Section 1 and 2)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CARRELL, R.D.

    2003-01-01

    The 200 Area Interim Storage Area (200 Area ISA) at the Hanford Site provides for the interim storage of non-defense reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) housed in aboveground dry cask storage systems. The 200 Area ISA is a relatively simple facility consisting of a boundary fence with gates, perimeter lighting, and concrete and gravel pads on which to place the dry storage casks. The fence supports safeguards and security and establishes a radiation protection buffer zone. The 200 Area ISA is nominally 200,000 ft 2 and is located west of the Canister Storage Building (CSB). Interim storage at the 200 Area ISA is intended for a period of up to 40 years until the materials are shipped offsite to a disposal facility. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) does not address removal from storage or shipment from the 200 Area ISA. Three different SNF types contained in three different dry cask storage systems are to be stored at the 200 Area ISA, as follows: (1) Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Fuel--Fifty-three interim storage casks (ISC), each holding a core component container (CCC), will be used to store the FFTF SNF currently in the 400 Area. (2) Neutron Radiography Facility (NRF)TRIGA--One Rad-Vault container stores two DOT-6M 3 containers and six NRF TRIGA casks. (3) Commercial Light Water Reactor Fuel--Six International Standards Organization (ISO) containers, each holding a NAC-1 cask with an inner commercial light water reactor (LWR) canister, are used for storing commercial LWR SNF from the 300 Area. An aboveground dry cask storage location is necessary for the spent fuel because the current storage facilities are being shut down and deactivated. The spent fuel is being transferred to interim storage because there is no permanent repository storage currently available

  20. Source term estimation and the isotopic ratio of radioactive material released from the WIPP repository in New Mexico, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thakur, P.

    2016-01-01

    After almost 15 years of operations, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) had one of its waste drums breach underground as a result of a runaway chemical reaction in the waste it contained. This incident occurred on February 14, 2014. Moderate levels of radioactivity were released into the underground air. A small portion of the contaminated underground air also escaped to the surface through the ventilation system and was detected approximately 1 km away from the facility. According to the source term estimation, the actual amount of radioactivity released from the WIPP site was less than 1.5 mCi. The highest activity detected on the surface was 115.2 μBq/m 3 for 241 Am and 10.2 μBq/m 3 for 239+240 Pu at a sampling station located 91 m away from the underground air exhaust point and 81.4 μBq/m 3 of 241 Am and 5.8 μBq/m 3 of 239+240 Pu at a monitoring station located approximately 1 km northwest of the WIPP facility. The dominant radionuclides released were americium and plutonium, in a ratio that matches the content of the breached drum. Air monitoring across the WIPP site intensified following the first reports of radiation detection underground to determine the extent of impact to WIPP personnel, the public, and the environment. In this paper, the early stage monitoring data collected by an independent monitoring program conducted by the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring & Research Center (CEMRC) and an oversight monitoring program conducted by the WIPP's management and operating contractor, the Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) LLC were utilized to estimate the actual amount of radioactivity released from the WIPP underground. The Am and Pu isotope ratios were measured and used to support the hypothesis that the release came from one drum identified as having breached that represents a specific waste stream with this radionuclide ratio in its inventory. This failed drum underwent a heat and gas producing reaction that overpowered its vent and

  1. Additional guidance for including nuclear safety equivalency in the Canister Storage Building and Cold Vacuum Drying Facility final safety analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garvin, L.J.

    1997-05-20

    This document provides guidance for the production of safety analysis reports that must meet both DOE Order 5480.23 and STD 3009, and be in compliance with the DOE regulatory policy that imposes certain NRC requirements.

  2. Additional guidance for including nuclear safety equivalency in the Canister Storage Building and Cold Vacuum Drying Facility final safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garvin, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    This document provides guidance for the production of safety analysis reports that must meet both DOE Order 5480.23 and STD 3009, and be in compliance with the DOE regulatory policy that imposes certain NRC requirements

  3. Application and further development of models for the final repository safety analyses on the clearance of radioactive materials for disposal. Final report; Anwendung und Weiterentwicklung von Modellen fuer Endlagersicherheitsanalysen auf die Freigabe radioaktiver Stoffe zur Deponierung. Abschlussbericht

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Artmann, Andreas; Larue, Juergen; Seher, Holger; Weiss, Dietmar

    2014-08-15

    The project of application and further development of models for the final repository safety analyses on the clearance of radioactive materials for disposal is aimed to study the long-term safety using repository-specific simulation programs with respect to radiation exposure for different scenarios. It was supposed to investigate whether the 10 micro Sv criterion can be guaranteed under consideration of human intrusion scenarios. The report covers the following issues: selection and identification of models and codes and the definition of boundary conditions; applicability of conventional repository models for long-term safety analyses; modeling results for the pollutant release and transport and calculation of radiation exposure; determination of the radiation exposure.

  4. Safety Evaluation Report related to the final design approval of the GESSAR II BWR/6 Nuclear Island Design (Docket No. 50-447). Supplement No. 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Supplement 3 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the application filed by General Electric Company for the final design approval for the GE BWR/6 nuclear island design has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report supplements the GESSAR II SER (NUREG-0979), issued in April 1983, summarizing the results of the staff's safety review of the GESSAR II BWR/6 nuclear island design. Subject to favorable resolution of the items discussed in this supplement, the staff concludes that the GESSAR II design satisfactorily addresses the severe-accident concerns described in draft NUREG-1070

  5. 75 FR 51818 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Final Effect of Designation of a Class of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-23

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health...: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS... a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this...

  6. 76 FR 62409 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Final Effect of Designation of a Class of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-07

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health...: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS..., from January 1, 1961 through June 30, 1970, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work...

  7. 75 FR 74733 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Final Effect of Designation of a Class of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-12-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health...: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS... aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment, or in combination with work...

  8. 75 FR 51816 - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Final Effect of Designation of a Class of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-23

    ... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health...: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS... number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or...

  9. Summary of site-characterization studies conducted from 1983 through 1987 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lappin, A.R.

    1988-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is being excavated at a depth of approximately 655 m in bedded halites. Site-characterization activities at the WIPP site began in 1976. Characterization activities since 1983 have had the objective of updating the conceptual model for the geologic and hydrologic behavior of the WIPP site and vicinity. This paper discusses aspects of the general conceptual model significant to both site characterization and performance assessment. The geological and hydrologic behavior of the WIPP site and vicinity is transient, and has been transient since at least deposition of the Permian Salado Formation containing the underground workings of the WIPP facility. The Salado Formation deforms regionally in response to gravity, but is very low in permeability, except within approximately two meters of the WIPP facility. The Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation dominates the hydrology at the WIPP site. Hydrologic measurements, geologic studies, major-element and minor-element distributions in Culebra fluids, and the results of isotopic studies (stable-isotope, radiocarbon, uranium-disequilibrium, and 87 Sr/ 86 Sr) are consistent with the interpretations that, although the Culebra dominates flow within the Rustler at the WIPP site and Rustler karst is not present, there has been limited vertical fluid movement within the Rustler and between the Rustler and the overlying Dewey Lake Red Beds

  10. SAFETY

    CERN Multimedia

    M. Plagge, C. Schaefer and N. Dupont

    2013-01-01

    Fire Safety – Essential for a particle detector The CMS detector is a marvel of high technology, one of the most precise particle measurement devices we have built until now. Of course it has to be protected from external and internal incidents like the ones that can occur from fires. Due to the fire load, the permanent availability of oxygen and the presence of various ignition sources mostly based on electricity this has to be addressed. Starting from the beam pipe towards the magnet coil, the detector is protected by flooding it with pure gaseous nitrogen during operation. The outer shell of CMS, namely the yoke and the muon chambers are then covered by an emergency inertion system also based on nitrogen. To ensure maximum fire safety, all materials used comply with the CERN regulations IS 23 and IS 41 with only a few exceptions. Every piece of the 30-tonne polyethylene shielding is high-density material, borated, boxed within steel and coated with intumescent (a paint that creates a thick co...

  11. SAFETY

    CERN Multimedia

    C. Schaefer and N. Dupont

    2013-01-01

      “Safety is the highest priority”: this statement from CERN is endorsed by the CMS management. An interpretation of this statement may bring you to the conclusion that you should stop working in order to avoid risks. If the safety is the priority, work is not! This would be a misunderstanding and misinterpretation. One should understand that “working safely” or “operating safely” is the priority at CERN. CERN personnel are exposed to different hazards on many levels on a daily basis. However, risk analyses and assessments are done in order to limit the number and the gravity of accidents. For example, this process takes place each time you cross the road. The hazard is the moving vehicle, the stake is you and the risk might be the risk of collision between both. The same principle has to be applied during our daily work. In particular, keeping in mind the general principles of prevention defined in the late 1980s. These principles wer...

  12. Expert (Peer) Reviews at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): Making Complex Information and Decision Making Transparent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eriksson, Leif G.

    2001-01-01

    On the 18th of May 1998, based on the information provided by the United Sates Department of Energy (DOE) in support of the 1996 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Certification Application, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency certified the proposed deep geological repository for disposal of long-lived, defense-generated, transuranic radioactive waste at the WIPP site in New Mexico, United States of America, was compliant with all applicable radioactive waste disposal regulations. Seven domestic and one joint international peer reviews commissioned by the DOE were instrumental in making complex scientific and engineering information, as well as the related WIPP decision-making process, both credible and transparent to the majority of affected and interested parties and, ultimately, to the regulator

  13. Construction of the thermal/structural interactions in situ tests at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Munson, D.E.; Matalucci, R.V. [Sandia National Lab., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hoag, D.L.; Blankenship D.A. [RE/SPEC Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)] [and others

    1997-02-01

    The Department of Energy has constructed the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to develop the technology for the disposal of radioactive waste from defense programs. Sandia National Laboratories has the responsibility for experimental activities at the WIPP and has emplaced several large-scale Thermal/Structural Interactions (TSI) in situ tests to validate techniques used to predict repository performance. The construction of the tests relied heavily on earlier excavations at the WIPP site to provide a basis for selecting excavation, surveying, and instrumentation methods, and achievable construction tolerances. The tests were constructed within close tolerances to provide consistent room dimensions and accurate placement of gages. This accuracy has contributed to the high quality of data generated which in turn has facilitated the comparison of test results to numerical predictions. The purpose of this report is to detail the construction activities of the TSI tests.

  14. Construction of the thermal/structural interactions in situ tests at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munson, D.E.; Matalucci, R.V.; Hoag, D.L.; Blankenship D.A.

    1997-02-01

    The Department of Energy has constructed the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to develop the technology for the disposal of radioactive waste from defense programs. Sandia National Laboratories has the responsibility for experimental activities at the WIPP and has emplaced several large-scale Thermal/Structural Interactions (TSI) in situ tests to validate techniques used to predict repository performance. The construction of the tests relied heavily on earlier excavations at the WIPP site to provide a basis for selecting excavation, surveying, and instrumentation methods, and achievable construction tolerances. The tests were constructed within close tolerances to provide consistent room dimensions and accurate placement of gages. This accuracy has contributed to the high quality of data generated which in turn has facilitated the comparison of test results to numerical predictions. The purpose of this report is to detail the construction activities of the TSI tests

  15. The WIPP PC based data collection program for real time data capture from the Eberline Alpha Air Monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofer, D.A.; Clayton, S.G.

    1991-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) needed the capability to evaluate the performance of the Eberline Alpha Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs). An additional goal was to characterize and document the Radon background activity at various locations above and below ground at the WIPP. A PC based data collection system was developed to continuously collect information used to evaluate the CAMs' performance and document the operability of the Alpha monitoring program at the WIPP. To accomplish the stated objectives, Westinghouse Radiation Monitoring Systems Engineering modified an existing Eberline CAM supervision and control program to include real time data collection. The paper will address the specific hardware requirements for program usage, the functional structure of the program, and the actions required for an operator to generate graphical output. The utilization of the information generated and the future plans for the expansion and networking of the data collection system also be presented

  16. Expert (Peer) Reviews at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): Making Complex Information and Decision Making Transparent

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eriksson, Leif G. [GRAM, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    On the 18th of May 1998, based on the information provided by the United Sates Department of Energy (DOE) in support of the 1996 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Certification Application, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency certified the proposed deep geological repository for disposal of long-lived, defense-generated, transuranic radioactive waste at the WIPP site in New Mexico, United States of America, was compliant with all applicable radioactive waste disposal regulations. Seven domestic and one joint international peer reviews commissioned by the DOE were instrumental in making complex scientific and engineering information, as well as the related WIPP decision-making process, both credible and transparent to the majority of affected and interested parties and, ultimately, to the regulator.

  17. Department of Energy Operation Quality Assurance Program for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project (Carlsbad, New Mexico)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    The purpose of this plan is to describe the Quality Assurance (QA)reverse arrow Program to be established and implemented by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project Office (WPO) and by the Project Participants: the Scientific Advisor (Sandia National Laboratory) and the Management and Operating Contractor (Westinghouse Electric Corporation). This plan addresses the Pre-Operational and Operational phases of the WIPP Project not addressed under the construction phase. This plan also requires the QA Programs for DOE and Project Participants to be structured so as to comply with this plan and ANSI-ASME NQA-1. The prime responsibility for Operational Quality Assurance rests with the DOE WIPP Project Office and is implemented through the combined efforts of the Scientific Advisor and the Management and Operating Contractor. Overviews of selected operational and testing activities will be are conducted in accordance with prescribed requirements and that adequate documentation of these activities is maintained. 4 figs

  18. Analytical technology in support of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villareal, R.

    1994-01-01

    The need for long-term disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) wastes became apparent as the DOE recognized the environmental consequences of maintaining waste storage facilities designed for short or interim storage periods, not long-term storage. In 1979, Congress authorized the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a research and development facility and full-scale pilot plant, to demonstrate the safe management, storage, and disposal of TRU wastes. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations governing disposal of TRU wastes in 40 CFR 191 require that TRU waste disposal systems be designed to limit migration of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years based on performance assessment results. The actinide source-term waste test program (STTP) is an experiment designed to quantitatively measure the time-dependent concentrations of plutonium, uranium, neptunium, thorium, and americium in TRU wastes immersed in brines that simulate the chemistry that may occur in WIPP disposal rooms, partially or completely contacted with brines. The total concentration of each actinide in brine is the sum of its dissolved and colloidally suspended components, as determined by variables including pcH, oxidation-reduction potential (Eh), chelating and complexing agents, sorption capacity, and colloidal suspension capabilities. To determine the effect of influencing variables on the concentration of actinides in WIPP brines, several TRU waste types will be characterized and loaded into specially designed noncorrosive test containers filled with brine containing additives to enhance the action of each influencing variable. The test container brine and headspace gases will be analyzed

  19. Large-scale dynamic compaction demonstration using WIPP salt: Fielding and preliminary results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahrens, E.H.; Hansen, F.D.

    1995-10-01

    Reconsolidation of crushed rock salt is a phenomenon of great interest to programs studying isolation of hazardous materials in natural salt geologic settings. Of particular interest is the potential for disaggregated salt to be restored to nearly an impermeable state. For example, reconsolidated crushed salt is proposed as a major shaft seal component for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project. The concept for a permanent shaft seal component of the WIPP repository is to densely compact crushed salt in the four shafts; an effective seal will then be developed as the surrounding salt creeps into the shafts, further consolidating the crushed salt. Fundamental information on placement density and permeability is required to ensure attainment of the design function. The work reported here is the first large-scale compaction demonstration to provide information on initial salt properties applicable to design, construction, and performance expectations. The shaft seals must function for 10,000 years. Over this period a crushed salt mass will become less permeable as it is compressed by creep closure of salt surrounding the shaft. These facts preclude the possibility of conducting a full-scale, real-time field test. Because permanent seals taking advantage of salt reconsolidation have never been constructed, performance measurements have not been made on an appropriately large scale. An understanding of potential construction methods, achievable initial density and permeability, and performance of reconsolidated salt over time is required for seal design and performance assessment. This report discusses fielding and operations of a nearly full-scale dynamic compaction of mine-run WIPP salt, and presents preliminary density and in situ (in place) gas permeability results

  20. Regional water balance for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site and surrounding area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, R.L.

    1985-12-01

    The WIPP water-balance study area defined here comprises approx.2000 mi 2 in Eddy and Lea Counties, southeastern New Mexico. Inflows to the study area are precipitation (roughly 1.47 x 10 6 ac-ft/y), surface water (roughly 1.1 x 10 5 ac-ft/y), water imported by municipalities and industries (roughly 3 x 10 4 ac-ft/y), and ground water (volume not estimated). Outflows from the area are evapotranspiration (roughly 1.5 x 10 6 ac-ft/y), surface water (roughly 1.2 x 10 5 ac-ft/y), and possibly some ground water. The volume of surface and ground water in storage in Nash Draw has increased since the beginning of potash refining. Regional ground-water flow in aquifers above the Salado Formation is from the northeast to the southwest, although this pattern is interrupted by Clayton Basin, Nash Draw, and San Simon Swale. The Pecos River is the only important perennial stream. Most of the area has no integrated surface-water drainage. The available data suggest that approx.1600 mi 2 of the study area are hydrologically separate from Nash Draw and the WIPP site. Ground water north of Highway 180 apparently discharges into Clayton Basin and evaporates. Water in San Simon Swale apparently percolates downward and flows to the southeast. Data are inadequate to create a water budget for the Nash Draw-WIPP site hydrologic system alone, although an attempt to do so can provide guidance for further study

  1. Brine transport studies in the bedded salt of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McTigue, D.F.; Nowak, E.J.

    1987-01-01

    Brine flow has been measured to unheated boreholes for periods of a few days and to heated holes for two years in the WIPP facility. It is suggested that Darcy flow may dominate the observed influx of brine. Exact solutions to a linearized model for one-dimensional, radial flow are evaluated for conditions approximating the field experiments. Flow rates of the correct order of magnitude are calculated for permeabilities in the range 10 -21 to 10 -20 m 2 (1 to 10 nanodarcy) for both the unheated and heated cases. 20 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab

  2. NMT-7 plan for producing certifiable TRU debris waste for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montoya, A.J.

    1997-12-01

    Analysis of waste characterization data for debris items generated during a recent six month period indicates that the certifiability of TRUPACT II payload containers packaged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA-55) can be increased from approximately 52% of solid waste payload containers to 78% by applying the simple strategies of screening out high decay heat items and sorting remaining items to maintain nuclear material loading at levels below WIPP waste acceptance limits. Implementation of these strategies will have negative impacts on waste minimization and waste management operations that must also be considered

  3. Basic data report for drillhole H-12 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercer, J.W.; Snyder, R.P.

    1990-01-01

    Drillhole H-12 was drilled where hydraulic data were needed to better establish flow characteristics existing south-southeast of the WIPP site. The fluid-bearing zones of interest are the Magenta and Culebra dolomite units of the Rustler Formation. Dissolution of halite in the Rustler Formation has occurred in the uppermost member, but has not yet begun in the lower halite-bearing members. Cuttings and cores were taken at selected intervals and geophysical logs were run over the entire depth of the hole. 3 refs., 2 figs., 3 tabs

  4. Evaluation of the WIPP Project`s compliance with the EPA radiation protection standards for disposal of transuranic waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Neill, R.H.; Chaturvedi, L.; Rucker, D.F.; Silva, M.K.; Walker, B.A.; Channell, J.K.; Clemo, T.M. [Environmental Evaluation Group, Albuquerque, NM (United States)]|[Environmental Evaluation Group, Carlsbad, NM (United States)

    1998-03-01

    The US Environmental Protection Agency`s (EPA) proposed rule to certify that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) meets compliance with the long-term radiation protection standards for geologic repositories (40CFR191 Subparts B and C), is one of the most significant milestones to date for the WIPP project in particular, and for the nuclear waste issue in general. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) has provided an independent technical oversight for the WIPP project since 1978, and is responsible for many improvements in the location, design, and testing of various aspects of the project, including participation in the development of the EPA standards since the early 1980s. The EEG reviewed the development of documentation for assessing the WIPP`s compliance by the Sandia National Laboratories following the 1985 promulgation by EPA, and provided many written and verbal comments on various aspects of this effort, culminating in the overall review of the 1992 performance assessment. For the US Department of Energy`s (DOE) compliance certification application (CCA), the EEG provided detailed comments on the draft CCA in March, 1996, and additional comments through unpublished letters in 1997 (included as Appendices 8.1 and 8.2 in this report). Since the October 30, 1997, publication of the EPA`s proposed rule to certify WIPP, the EEG gave presentations on important issues to the EPA on December 10, 1997, and sent a December 31, 1997 letter with attachments to clarify those issues (Appendix 8.3). The EEG has raised a number of questions that may have an impact on compliance. In spite of the best efforts by the EEG, the EPA reaction to reviews and suggestions has been slow and apparently driven by legal considerations. This report discusses in detail the questions that have been raised about containment requirements. Also discussed are assurance requirements, groundwater protection, individual protection, and an evaluation of EPA`s responses to EEG`s comments.

  5. Road Safety Data, Collection, Transfer and Analysis DaCoTa. Deliverable 1.6: Final Report of WP1 – road safety policy.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Muhlrad, N. Papadimitriou, E. & Yannis, G.

    2015-01-01

    The ‘Policy’ Work Package of DaCoTA was designed to fill in the gap in knowledge on road safety policy making processes, their institutional framework and the data, methods and technical tools needed to base policy formulation and adoption on scientifically-established evidence. More specifically,

  6. 45-Day safety screen results and final report for Tank 241-SX-113, Auger samples 94-AUG-028 and 95-AUG-029

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, L.M.

    1995-01-01

    This document serves as the 45-day report deliverable for tank 241-SX-113 auger samples collected on May 9 and 10, 1995. The samples were extruded, and analyzed by the 222-S Laboratory. Laboratory procedures completed include: differential scanning calorimetry; thermogravimetric analysis; and total alpha analysis. This report incudes the primary safety screening results obtained from the analyses. As the final report, the following are also included: chains of custody; the extrusion logbook; sample preparation data; and total alpha analysis raw data

  7. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, P.M.S.

    1987-01-01

    Aspects of fission reactors are considered - control, heat removal and containment. Brief descriptions of the reactor accidents at the SL-1 reactor (1961), Windscale (1957), Browns Ferry (1975), Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) are given. The idea of inherently safe reactor designs is discussed. Safety assessment is considered under the headings of preliminary hazard analysis, failure mode analysis, event trees, fault trees, common mode failure and probabalistic risk assessments. These latter can result in a series of risk distributions linked to specific groups of fault sequences and specific consequences. A frequency-consequence diagram is shown. Fatal accident incidence rates in different countries including the United Kingdom for various industries are quoted. The incidence of fatal cancers from occupational exposure to chemicals is tabulated. Human factors and the acceptability of risk are considered. (U.K.)

  8. Generic requirements specification for qualifying a commercially available PLC for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ostenso, A.; May, R.

    1996-12-01

    This is a specification for qualifying a commercially available PLC for application to safety systems in nuclear power plants. The specifications are suitable for evaluating a particular PLC product line as a platform for safety-related applications, establishing a suitable qualification test program, and confirming that the manufacturer has a quality assurance program that is adequate for safety-related applications or is sufficiently complete that, with a reasonable set of compensatory actions, it can be brought into conformance. The specification includes requirements for: (1) quality assurance measures applied to the qualification activities, (2) documentation to support the qualification, and (3) documentation to provide the information needed for applying the qualified PLC platform to a specific application. The specifications are designed to encompass a broad range of safety applications; however, qualifying a particular platform for a different range of applications can be accomplished by appropriate adjustments to the requirements

  9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Part B Permit Application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)]. Volume 4, Chapter D, Appendix D1 (beginning), Revision 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lappin, A. R.

    1993-03-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is designed for receipt, handling, storage, and permanent isolation of defense-generated transuranic wastes, is being excavated at a depth of approximately 655 m in bedded halites of the Permian Salado Formation of southeastern New Mexico. Site-characterization activities at the present WIPP site began in 1976. Full construction of the facility began in 1983, after completion of ``Site and Preliminary Design Validation`` (SPDV) activities and reporting. Site-characterization activities since 1983 have had the objectives of updating or refining the overall conceptual model of the geologic, hydrologic, and structural behavior of the WIPP site and providing data adequate for use in WIPP performance assessment. This report has four main objectives: 1. Summarize the results of WIPP site-characterization studies carried out since the spring of 1983 as a result of specific agreements between the US Department of Energy and the State of New Mexico. 2. Summarize the results and status of site-characterization and facility-characterization studies carried out since 1983, but not specifically included in mandated agreements. 3. Compile the results of WIPP site-characterization studies into an internally consistent conceptual model for the geologic, hydrologic, geochemical, and structural behavior of the WIPP site. This model includes some consideration of the effects of the WIPP facility and shafts on the local characteristics of the Salado and Rustler Formations. 4. Discuss the present limitations and/or uncertainties in the conceptual geologic model of the WIPP site and facility. The objectives of this report are limited in scope, and do not include determination of whether or not the WIPP Project will comply with repository-performance criteria developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (40CFR191).

  10. Preliminary performance assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, December 1992. Volume 3, Model parameters: Sandia WIPP Project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-29

    This volume documents model parameters chosen as of July 1992 that were used by the Performance Assessment Department of Sandia National Laboratories in its 1992 preliminary performance assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Ranges and distributions for about 300 modeling parameters in the current secondary data base are presented in tables for the geologic and engineered barriers, global materials (e.g., fluid properties), and agents that act upon the WIPP disposal system such as climate variability and human-intrusion boreholes. The 49 parameters sampled in the 1992 Preliminary Performance Assessment are given special emphasis with tables and graphics that provide insight and sources of data for each parameter.

  11. Groundwater flow in the Rustler Formation, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeast New Mexico (SENM). Interim report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzalez, D.D.

    1983-03-01

    In hypothetical breach scenarios for the WIPP, the Culebra Dolomite in the Rustler Formation has historically been considered the aquifer most likely to play a significant role in transporting radioisotopes to the biosphere. Recently, it was determined that breach scenarios involving connection of aquifers above and below the Salado Formation where waste emplacement is planned would not result in an upward flow of water into the Rustler aquifers. Considerable hydrologic investigation has focused on the Culebra, since some scenarios might result in contamination of this aquifer. In such events the Culebra would provide more rapid transport of radioisotopes from the WIPP than any of the other aquifers in the WIPP area. Hydrologic tests conducted in three-well arrays at four different locations near the WIPP are described. Tracer tests at the H-6 wells northwest of the WIPP indicated an effective porosity of 0.007 in the principal direction of flow and a dispersivity of 33 ft. At the H-2 wells, 1-1/4 mi W-SW of the center of the WIPP site, the effective porosity in the principal flow direction is 0.18 and the dispersivity is 17 ft. Anisotropy of transmissivity was determined from pumping tests at the H-4, H-5, and H-6 wells. The principal direction of transmissivity is roughly NW-SE at all three locations. The ratio of the major-to-minor transmissivity components varies only from 2.1 to 2.7, even though the transmissivity itself varies three orders of magnitude among the three locations. This information, coupled with transmissivity and head potential data, indicates that flow patterns near the WIPP site are toward the southeast. Present estimates for flow rates are 1 to 10 ft/y. Values of transmissivity for the Culebra vary six orders of magnitude over the extent of the study area, decreasing monotonically from 10 3 ft 2 /d in Nash Draw to 10 - 3 ft 2 /d on the east side of the WIPP site

  12. SCOPE safety-controls optimization by performance evaluation: A systematic approach for safety-related decisions at the Hanford Tank Remediation System. Phase 1, final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bergeron, K.D.; Williams, D.C.; Slezak, S.E.; Young, M.L. [and others

    1996-12-01

    The Department of Energy`s Hanford Tank Waste Remediation system poses a significant challenge for hazard management because of the uncertainty that surrounds many of the variables that must be considered in decisions on safety and control strategies. As a result, site managers must often operate under excessively conservative and expensive assumptions. This report describes a systematic approach to quantifying the uncertainties surrounding the critical parameters in control decisions (e.g., condition of the tanks, kinds of wastes, types of possible accidents) through the use of expert elicitation methods. The results of the elicitations would then be used to build a decision support system and accident analysis model that would allow managers to see how different control strategies would affect the cost and safety of a facility configuration.

  13. SCOPE safety-controls optimization by performance evaluation: A systematic approach for safety-related decisions at the Hanford Tank Remediation System. Phase 1, final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergeron, K.D.; Williams, D.C.; Slezak, S.E.; Young, M.L.

    1996-12-01

    The Department of Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Remediation system poses a significant challenge for hazard management because of the uncertainty that surrounds many of the variables that must be considered in decisions on safety and control strategies. As a result, site managers must often operate under excessively conservative and expensive assumptions. This report describes a systematic approach to quantifying the uncertainties surrounding the critical parameters in control decisions (e.g., condition of the tanks, kinds of wastes, types of possible accidents) through the use of expert elicitation methods. The results of the elicitations would then be used to build a decision support system and accident analysis model that would allow managers to see how different control strategies would affect the cost and safety of a facility configuration

  14. Final disposal of spent fuel in the Finnish bedrock. Scope and requirements for site-specific safety analysis; Kaeytetyn polttoaineen loppusijoitus Suomen kallioperaeaen. Paikkakohtaisen turvallisuusanalyysin edellytykset ja mahdollisuudet

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-12-01

    The report is a summary of the research conducted in the period 1993 to 1996 into safety of spent fuel final disposal. The principal goal of the research in this period, as set in 1993, was to develop a strategy for site-specific safety analysis. At the same time efforts were to be continued to gather data and validate the technical approach for the analysis. The work aimed at having the data needed for the analysis available at the end of year 1998. A safety assessment update, TILA-96, prepared by VTT Energy, is published as a separate report. The assessment is based on the TVO-92 safety analysis, but takes into account the knowledge acquired after 1992 on safety aspects of the disposal system and the data gathered from the site investigations made by TVO and from the beginning of 1996, by Posiva. Since the site investigations are still ongoing and much of the data gathered still pending interpretation, only limited amount of new site-specific information has been available for the present assessment. (172 refs.).

  15. WIPP supplementary roof support system, Room 1, Panel 1: Geotechnical field data analysis bi-annual report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In June 1991, Waste Isolation Division (WID) initiated the design effort to develop a supplementary roof support system to extend the life of Room 1, Panel 1, to allow successful completion of the bin-scale test program. A number of potential options for ground control were considered leading to the finalization of the currently installed roof support system. This highly instrumented system is ''state of the art'' for mine ground control and will provide extensive geotechnical data. The system is an innovative blend of several standard techniques and incorporates five of the suggestions made by the Geotechnical Panel in its report of June 1991, on the effective life of Rooms in Panel 1. The design was subjected to an exhaustive scrutiny by two formal Design Review Panels and was approved based on reviewed design documents, on-site observations at the WIPP underground facility, and detailed discussions with members of the design team. The original requirement was to have only a section of the room completed in October in preparation for first waste receipt. This goal was met and the relatively complex installation in the entire room was completed in December 1991. The Support System, with all its instrumentation, is now fully operational and generating geotechnical data. Examination of extensometer, closure and load cell data indicate that Room support is performing within the design parameters. All the anchors were initially loaded to approximately 445 kN (1000 lbs). The results of load cell monitoring indicates a steady increase of load on the rock bolts. The anchors installed near the room centerline have shown the greatest increase with the outermost anchors showing little or no load

  16. Study on the safety and on international developments of small modular reactors (SMR). Final report; Studie zur Sicherheit und zu internationalen Entwicklungen von Small Modular Reactors (SMR). Abschlussbericht

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buchholz, Sebastian; Kruessenberg, Anne; Schaffrath, Andreas; Zipper, Reinhard

    2015-05-15

    This report documents the work and results of the project RS1521 Study of Safety and International Development of Small Modular Reactors (SMR). The aims of this study can be summarized as - setting-up of a sound overview on SMR, - identification of essential issues of reactor safety research and future R and D projects, - identification of needs for adaption of system codes of GRS used in reactor safety research. The sound overview consists of the descriptions of in total 69 SMR (Small and Medium Sized Rector) concepts (32 light water reactors (LWR), 22 liquid metal cooled reactors (LMR), 2 heavy water reactors, 9 gas cooled reactors (GCR) and 4 molten salt reactors (MSR)). It provides information about the core, the cooling circuits and the safety systems. The quality of the given specifications depends on their availability and public accessibility. Using the safety requirements for nuclear power plants and the fundamental safety functions, the safety relevant issues of the described SMR concepts were identified. The systems and measures used in the safety requirements were summarized in table form. Finally it was evaluated whether these systems and measures can be already simulated with the nuclear simulation chain of GRS and where further code development and validation is necessary. The results of this study can be summarized as follows: Many of the current SMR concepts are based on integral design. Here the main components like steam generators, intermediate heat exchangers or - in case of forced convection core cooling - main cooling pumps are located within the reactor pressure vessel. Most of the SMR fulfil highest safety standards and their safety concepts are mainly based on passive safety systems. The safety of theses reactors is achieved indefinitely without energy supply or additional measures of the operators. Since SMR's aim is not only to produce electricity but also couple them with chemical or physical process plants, the safety aspects of

  17. The WIPP research and development program: providing the technical basis for defense waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, Th.O.

    1983-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, is being developed by the US Department of Energy as a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes from the defense programs of the United States. Underground workings are at a depth of 660 in a bedded-salt formation. Site investigations began in the early 1970s and are culminating with the completion of the Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV) program in 1983 in which two shafts and several thousand feet of underground drifts are being constructed. The underground facility will be used for in situ tests and demonstrations that address technical issues associated with the disposal of transuranic and defense high-level wastes (DHLW) in bedded salt. These tests are based on several years of laboratory tests, field tests in mines, and analytical modeling studies. They primarily address repository development in bedded salt, including thermal-structural interactions plugging and sealing, and facility operations; and waste package interactions, including the effects of the waste on local rock salt and the evaluation of waste package materials. In situ testing began in the WIPP with the initiation of the SPDV program in 1981. In 1983, a major series of tests will begin to investigate the response of the rock salt without the use of any radioactivity

  18. WIPP Sampling and Analysis Plan for Solid Waste Management Units and Areas of Concern

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) has been prepared to fulfill requirements of Module VII, Section VII.M.2 and Table VII.1, requirement 4 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED [New Mexico Environment Department], 1999a). This SAP describes the approach for investigation of the Solid Waste Management Units (SWMU) and Areas of Concern (AOC) specified in the Permit. This SAP addresses the current Permit requirements for a RCRA Facility Investigation(RFI) investigation of SWMUs and AOCs. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the RFI specified in Module VII of the Permit, current NMED guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI work plan and report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the facility's Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can beentered either before or after a RFI work plan. According to NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare a RFI work plan or SAP for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998).

  19. A sensitivity analysis of the WIPP disposal room model: Phase 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Labreche, D.A.; Beikmann, M.A. [RE/SPEC, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Osnes, J.D. [RE/SPEC, Inc., Rapid City, SD (United States); Butcher, B.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1995-07-01

    The WIPP Disposal Room Model (DRM) is a numerical model with three major components constitutive models of TRU waste, crushed salt backfill, and intact halite -- and several secondary components, including air gap elements, slidelines, and assumptions on symmetry and geometry. A sensitivity analysis of the Disposal Room Model was initiated on two of the three major components (waste and backfill models) and on several secondary components as a group. The immediate goal of this component sensitivity analysis (Phase I) was to sort (rank) model parameters in terms of their relative importance to model response so that a Monte Carlo analysis on a reduced set of DRM parameters could be performed under Phase II. The goal of the Phase II analysis will be to develop a probabilistic definition of a disposal room porosity surface (porosity, gas volume, time) that could be used in WIPP Performance Assessment analyses. This report documents a literature survey which quantifies the relative importance of the secondary room components to room closure, a differential analysis of the creep consolidation model and definition of a follow-up Monte Carlo analysis of the model, and an analysis and refitting of the waste component data on which a volumetric plasticity model of TRU drum waste is based. A summary, evaluation of progress, and recommendations for future work conclude the report.

  20. Petrographic study of evaporite deformation near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borns, D.J.

    1983-06-01

    The Delaware Basin of southeastern New Mexico contains about 1000 m of layered evaporites. Areas in the northern Delaware Basin, bordering the Capitan reef, have anomalous seismic reflection characteristics, such as loss in reflector continuity. Core from holes within this zone exhibits complex mesoscopic folds and extension structures. On a larger scale, anticlines and synclines are indicated by structure contours based on boreholes. The deformation is probably gravity-driven. Such a process is initiated by basin tilting during either a Mesozoic or Cenozoic period of uplift. Small-scale structures suggest that deformation was episodic with an early, syndepositional stage of isoclinal folding. Later, open-to-tight asymmetric folding is more penetrative and exhibits a sense of asymmetry opposite to that of the earlier isoclinal folding. The younger folds are associated with development of zonal crenulation cleavage and microboundinage of more competent carbonate layers. At the same time, halite beds developed dimensional fabrics and convolute folds in anhydrite stringers. Late-stage, near-vertical fractures formed in competent anhydrite layers. Microscopic textures exhibit rotated anhydrite porphyroblasts, stress shadow growth, and microboundinage. Except during late-stage deformation, anhydrite and halite recrystallized synkinematically. Drastic strength reduction in anhydrites through dynamic recrystallization occurs experimentally near 200 0 C. However, evaporites of the WIPP site never experienced temperatures > 40 0 C. Microscopic fabrics and P, T history of the evaporites suggest that pressure solution was the active mechanism during deformation of evaporites at the WIPP site

  1. Test plan: Gas-threshold-pressure testing of the Salado Formation in the WIPP underground facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saulnier, G.J. Jr.

    1992-03-01

    Performance assessment for the disposal of radioactive waste from the United States defense program in the WIPP underground facility must assess the role of post-closure was generation by waste degradation and the subsequent pressurization of the facility. be assimilated by the host formation will Whether or not the generated gas can be assimilated by the host formation will determine the ability of the gas to reach or exceed lithostatic pressure within the repository. The purpose of this test plan is (1) to present a test design to obtain realistic estimates of gas-threshold pressure for the Salado Formation WIPP underground facility including parts of the formation disturbed by the underground of the Salado, and (2) to provide a excavations and in the far-field or undisturbed part framework for changes and amendments to test objectives, practices, and procedures. Because in situ determinations of gas-threshold pressure in low-permeability media are not standard practice, the methods recommended in this testplan are adapted from permeability-testing and hydrofracture procedures. Therefore, as the gas-threshold-pressure testing program progresses, personnel assigned to the program and outside observers and reviewers will be asked for comments regarding the testing procedures. New and/or improved test procedures will be documented as amendments to this test plan, and subject to similar review procedures

  2. Geochemistry of Salado Formation brines recovered from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abitz, R.; Myers, J.; Drez, P.; Deal, D.

    1990-01-01

    Intergranular brines recovered from the repository horizon of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) have major- and trace-element compositions that reflect seawater evaporation and diagenetic processes. Brines obtained from repository drill holes are heterogenous with respect to composition, but their compositional fields are distinct from those obtained from fluid inclusions in WIPP halite. The heterogeneity of brine compositions within the drill-hole population indicates a lack of mixing and fluid homogenization within the salt at the repository level. Compositional differences between intergranular (drill hole) and intragranular (fluid inclusions) brines is attributed to isolation of the latter from diagenetic fluids that were produced from dehydration reactions involving gypsum and clay minerals. Modeling of brine-rock equilibria indicates that equilibration with evaporite minerals controls the concentrations of major elements in the brine. Drill-hole brines are in equilibrium with the observed repository minerals halite, anhydrite, magnesite, polyhalite and quartz. The equilibrium model supports the derivation of drill-hole brines from near-field fluid, rather than large-scale vertical migration of fluids from the overlying Rustler or underlying Castile Formations. 13 refs., 6 figs., 6 tabs

  3. Geochemistry of Salado formation brines recovered from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abitz, R.; Myers, J.; Drez, P.; Deal, D.

    1990-01-01

    Intergranular brines recovered from the repository horizon of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) have major- and trace-element compositions that reflect seawater evaporation and diagenetic processes. Brines obtained from repository drill holes are heterogeneous with respect to composition but their compositional fields are distinct from those obtained from fluid inclusions in WIPP halite. The heterogeneity of brine compositions within the drill-hole population indicates a lack of mixing and fluid homogenization within the salt at the repository level. Compositional differences between intergranular (drill hole) and intragranular (fluid inclusions) brines is attributed to isolation of the latter from diagenetic fluids that were produced from dehydration reactions involving gypsum and clay minerals. Modeling of brine-rock equilibria indicates that equilibration with evaporite minerals controls the concentrations of major elements in the brine. Drill-hole brines are in equilibrium with the observed repository minerals halite, anhydrite, magnesite, polyhalite and quartz. The equilibrium model supports the derivation of drill-hole brines from near-field fluid, rather than large-scale vertical migration of fluids from the overlying Rustler or underlying Castile Formations. 13 refs., 6 figs., 6 tabs

  4. Conclusions from working group 2 - the analyses of the WIPP-2 experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, C.P.

    1995-01-01

    The INTRAVAL WIPP-2 test case is based on data from site investigations carried out at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, USA. The site has been chosen as a potential location for a radioactive waste repository. Extensive investigations have been carried out, focused mainly on groundwater flow and transport in the Culebra Dolomite, the main pathway for transport of radionuclides off the site by groundwater in the case of an accidental borehole intrusion into the repository. Five teams studied the test case. Two teams addressed issues involved in the treatment of heterogeneity. Stochastic models and a Monte Carlo approach were used. One team quantified the increased uncertainty resulting from fewer data and explored the issues involved in validation of stochastic models. A second team developed a new method for conditioning stochastic models on head data. Two other teams examined issues relating to the choice of conceptual models. Two-dimensional vertical cross-section models were used to explore the importance of vertical flow. The fifth team advocate the use of a variety of models to highlight the most important processes and parameters. Conclusions from each team experiment are analysed. (J.S.). 4 refs., 11 figs

  5. Basic data report for drillhole AEC 8 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    AEC 8 was originally drilled in 1974 to a depth of 3028 ft by Oak Ridge National Laboratory as part of the initial investigations of a site for radioactive waste disposal. In 1976, Sandia National Laboratories deepened the borehole from the top of the Castile Formation into the Bell Canyon Formation to test the hydraulic properties of the Bell Canyon. The borehole encountered in descending order Holocene sands (20 ft), Mescalero caliche (6 ft), Santa Rosa Sandstone (143 ft), Dewey Lake Redbeds (491 ft), Rustler Formation (322 ft), Salado Formation (1990 ft), Castile Formation (1335 ft), and the upper Bell Canyon Formation (603 ft). The borehole stratigraphy is in normal order and there is no significant deformation. An extensive suite of geophysical logs provides information on the lithology and stratigraphy. The potentiometric surfaces of Bell Canyon fluid-bearing zones are 550 ft (for the zone at 4821 ft to 4827 ft) and 565 ft below land surface (for the zone at 4844 to 4860 ft). The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  6. WIPP Sampling and Analysis Plan for Solid Waste Management Units and Areas of Concern

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2000-05-23

    This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) has been prepared to fulfill requirements of Module VII, Section VII.M.2 and Table VII.1, requirement 4 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED [New Mexico Environment Department], 1999a). This SAP describes the approach for investigation of the Solid Waste Management Units (SWMU) and Areas of Concern (AOC) specified in the Permit. This SAP addresses the current Permit requirements for a RCRA Facility Investigation(RFI) investigation of SWMUs and AOCs. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the RFI specified in Module VII of the Permit, current NMED guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI work plan and report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the facility's Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can beentered either before or after a RFI work plan. According to NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare a RFI work plan or SAP for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998).

  7. Evaporite dissolution relevant to the WIPP site, northern Delaware Basin, southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lambert, S.J.

    1982-01-01

    Evaluation of the threat of natural dissolution of host evaporites to the integrity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico has taken into consideration (1) the volume of missing rock salt, (2) the occurrence (or not) of characteristic dissolution brines, (3) geomorphic features, some of which are unrelated to dissolution, and (4) the time intervals over which dissolution may have been active. Even under the assumption that all missing halite was originally present and has been removed by dissolution, there is no evidence of active preferential removal of the lower Salado Formation halite by any geologically reasonable process. The geologic record contains evidence of dissolution in the Triassic and Jurassic; to constrain all removal of basinal halite to the late Cenozoic yields an unrealistically high rate of removal. Application to the lower Salado of a stratabound mechanism known to be active in Nash Draw, a near-surface feature within the Basin, allows a minimum survival time of 2,500,000 years to be predicted for the subsurface facility for storage of radioactive waste at WIPP. This calculation is based on an analysis of all known dissolution features in the Delaware Basin, and takes into account the wetter (pluvial) climate during the past 600,000 years. 2 figures, 1 table

  8. The WIPP decision plan: Charting the course for openness in the decision making process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagers, J.

    1992-01-01

    In June of 1989, the Secretary of Energy requested that a plan be developed that would clearly outline the prerequisites to opening the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It was to provide the basis for a decision making process that was not only visible to the public, but one which included public participation. It must also be dynamic enough to effectively deal with the changing legislative, regulatory, and technical environments. Based on a recognized need for openness, the Secretary's Draft Decision Plan was developed. The plan charted the course for ultimately making the decision to declare WIPP ready to receive waste for the start of test phase operations. It outlined to critics and supporters alike the rigorous and thorough process by which the internal decisions were made. The plan identified all internal prerequisites to the decision; charted the review cycles, and targeted the completion dates. It also outlined the processes outside the control of the Department, institutional issues, such as legislative land withdrawal, issuance of permits, and designation of transportation routes

  9. Potential release scenario and radiological consequence evaluation of mineral resources at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Little, M.S.

    1982-05-01

    This report has reviewed certain of the natural resources which may be found at the site of the nuclear waste repository being considered for southeastern New Mexico, and discussed the scenarios which have been used to estimate the radiological consequences from the mining of these resources several hundred years after the radioactive waste has been emplaced. It has been concluded that the radiological consequences of the mining of potash or hydrocarbons (mostly natural gas) are probably bounded by the consequences of hydrologic breach scenarios already considered by the US Department of Energy, and by reports of EEG. These studies conclude that the resultant doses would not constitute a significant threat to public health. This report also evaluates the radiological consequences of solution mining of halite at the WIPP site. Although such mining in the Delaware Basin and particularly at the WIPP site, is not likely at the present time, significant economic, social or climatic changes a few hundred years after emplacement may make these resources more attractive. The DOE did not consider such mining at the site credible

  10. Final report on the safety assessment of sodium cetearyl sulfate and related alkyl sulfates as used in cosmetics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fiume, Monice; Bergfeld, Wilma F; Belsito, Donald V; Klaassen, Curtis D; Marks, James G; Shank, Ronald C; Slaga, Thomas J; Snyder, Paul W; Alan Andersen, F

    2010-05-01

    Sodium cetearyl sulfate is the sodium salt of a mixture of cetyl and stearyl sulfate. The other ingredients in this safety assessment are also alkyl salts, including ammonium coco-sulfate, ammonium myristyl sulfate, magnesium coco-sulfate, sodium cetyl sulfate, sodium coco/hydrogenated tallow sulfate, sodium coco-sulfate, sodium decyl sulfate, sodium ethylhexyl sulfate, sodium myristyl sulfate, sodium oleyl sulfate, sodium stearyl sulfate, sodium tallow sulfate, sodium tridecyl sulfate, and zinc coco-sulfate. These ingredients are surfactants used at concentrations from 0.1% to 29%, primarily in soaps and shampoos. Many of these ingredients are not in current use. The Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR) Expert Panel previously completed a safety assessment of sodium and ammonium lauryl sulfate. The data available for sodium lauryl sulfate and ammonium lauryl sulfate provide sufficient basis for concluding that sodium cetearyl sulfate and related alkyl sulfates are safe in the practices of use and concentration described in the safety assessment.

  11. Survey on the use of configuration risk and safety management tools at nuclear power plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fleming, K.N.; Read, J.W.; Dagan, W.J.; Bidwell, D.A.

    1998-09-01

    In order to provide input to Electricite de France's (EDF) evaluation of the use of configuration safety and risk management tools in the French plants and to collect information to guide the EPRI efforts to provide useful tools for the EPRI member utilities and international partners, a joint effort to survey US and selected non-US nuclear power stations was conducted. This survey examined the use of various approaches, techniques, and software tools that are being used to evaluate the safety and risk aspects of plant configuration changes and configuration changes during plant outages as well as during power operation. The use of these tools has increased in recent years as a result of efforts to optimize plant maintenance programs, improve plant safety, and increase plant reliability and availability. This report provides the results of the survey of 37 organizations covering 54 nuclear plant sites and 97 reactor units

  12. Review guidelines for software languages for use in nuclear power plant safety systems: Final report. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hecht, M.; Decker, D.; Graff, S.; Green, W.; Lin, D.; Dinsmore, G.; Koch, S. [SoHaR, Inc., Beverly Hills, CA (United States)

    1997-10-01

    Guidelines for the programming and auditing of software written in high level languages for safety systems are presented. The guidelines are derived from a framework of issues significant to software safety which was gathered from relevant standards and research literature. Language-specific adaptations of these guidelines are provided for the following high level languages: Ada83 and Ada95; C and C++; International Electrochemical Commission (IEC) Standard 1131-3 Ladder Logic, Sequential Function Charts, Structured Text, and Function Block Diagrams; Pascal; and PL/M. Appendices to the report include a tabular summary of the guidelines and additional information on selected languages.

  13. Pantex Plant final safety analysis report, Zone 4 magazines. Staging or interim storage for nuclear weapons and components: Issue D

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-04-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) contains a detailed description and evaluation of the significant environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) issues associated with the operations of the Pantex Plant modified-Richmond and steel arch construction (SAC) magazines in Zone 4. It provides (1) an overall description of the magazines, the Pantex Plant, and its surroundings; (2) a systematic evaluations of the hazards that could occur as a result of the operations performed in these magazines; (3) descriptions and analyses of the adequacy of the measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards; and (4) analyses of potential accidents and their associated risks.

  14. Review guidelines for software languages for use in nuclear power plant safety systems: Final report. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hecht, M.; Decker, D.; Graff, S.; Green, W.; Lin, D.; Dinsmore, G.; Koch, S.

    1997-10-01

    Guidelines for the programming and auditing of software written in high level languages for safety systems are presented. The guidelines are derived from a framework of issues significant to software safety which was gathered from relevant standards and research literature. Language-specific adaptations of these guidelines are provided for the following high level languages: Ada83 and Ada95; C and C++; International Electrochemical Commission (IEC) Standard 1131-3 Ladder Logic, Sequential Function Charts, Structured Text, and Function Block Diagrams; Pascal; and PL/M. Appendices to the report include a tabular summary of the guidelines and additional information on selected languages

  15. SUNflower +6 : a comparative study of the development of road safety in the SUNflower +6 countries : final report.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Wegman, F.C.M. Eksler, V. Hayes, S. Lynam, D. Morsink, P. & Oppe, S. (eds.)

    2006-01-01

    This project has developed the SUNflower approach, originally used to assess Sweden, Great Britain and the Netherlands, for comparing safety programmes and records between countries. The approach has been applied to nine countries, adding three Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary

  16. Safety analysis report: packages 238Pu oxide shipping cask (packaging of fissile and other radioactive materials). Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, J.E.; Gates, A.A.

    1975-06-01

    Plutonium-238 (as PuO 2 powder) is shipped in triple-container stainless steel shipping casks in compliance with ERDA Manual Chapter 0529 (ERDAM 0529), Safety Standards for the Packaging of Fissile and Other Radioactive Materials. (U.S.)

  17. A Fire Safety Certification System for Board and Care Operators and Staff. SBIR Phase II: Final Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walker, Bonnie L.

    This report describes Phase II of a project which developed a system for delivering fire safety training to board and care providers who serve adults with developmental disabilities. Phase II focused on developing and pilot testing a "train the trainers" workshop for instructors and field testing the provider's workshop. Evaluation of…

  18. A Fire Safety Certification System for Board and Care Operators and Staff. SBIR Phase I: Final Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walker, Bonnie L.

    This report describes the development and pilot testing of a fire safety certification system for board and care operators and staff who serve clients with developmental disabilities. During Phase 1, training materials were developed, including a trainer's manual, a participant's coursebook a videotape, an audiotape, and a pre-/post test which was…

  19. Numerical simulation of ground-water flow in the Culebra dolomite at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site: Second interim report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaVenue, A.M.; Haug, A.; Kelley, V.A.

    1988-03-01

    This hydrogeologic modeling study has been performed as part of the regional hydrologic characterization of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site in southeastern New Mexico. The study resulted in an estimation of the transmissivity distrubution, hydraulic potentials, flow field, and fluid densities in the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Permian Rustler Formation at the WIPP site. The three-dimensional finite-difference code SWIFT-II was employed for the numerical modeling, using variable-fluid-density and a single-porosity formulation. The modeled area includes and extends beyond the WIPP controlled zone (Zone 3). The work performed consisted of modeling the hydrogeology of the Culebra using two approaches: (1) steady-state modeling to develop the best estimate of the undisturbed head distribution, i.e., of the situation before sinking if the WIPP shafts, which began in 1981; and (2) superimposed transient modeling of local hydrologic responses to excavation of the three WIPP shafts at the center of the WIPP site, as well as to various well tests. Boundary conditions (prescribed constant fluid pressures and densities) were estimated using hydraulic-head and fluid-density data obtained from about 40 wells at and near the WIPP site. The transient modeling used the calculated steady-state freshwater heads as initial conditions. 107 refs., 112 figs., 22 tabs

  20. Numerical simulation of ground-water flow in the Culebra dolomite at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site: Second interim report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    LaVenue, A.M.; Haug, A.; Kelley, V.A.

    1988-03-01

    This hydrogeologic modeling study has been performed as part of the regional hydrologic characterization of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site in southeastern New Mexico. The study resulted in an estimation of the transmissivity distrubution, hydraulic potentials, flow field, and fluid densities in the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Permian Rustler Formation at the WIPP site. The three-dimensional finite-difference code SWIFT-II was employed for the numerical modeling, using variable-fluid-density and a single-porosity formulation. The modeled area includes and extends beyond the WIPP controlled zone (Zone 3). The work performed consisted of modeling the hydrogeology of the Culebra using two approaches: (1) steady-state modeling to develop the best estimate of the undisturbed head distribution, i.e., of the situation before sinking if the WIPP shafts, which began in 1981; and (2) superimposed transient modeling of local hydrologic responses to excavation of the three WIPP shafts at the center of the WIPP site, as well as to various well tests. Boundary conditions (prescribed constant fluid pressures and densities) were estimated using hydraulic-head and fluid-density data obtained from about 40 wells at and near the WIPP site. The transient modeling used the calculated steady-state freshwater heads as initial conditions. 107 refs., 112 figs., 22 tabs.