List of external hazards to be considered in ASAMPSA-E

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Decker, Kurt; Brinkman, Hans

2016-01-01

The current report includes an exhaustive list of external hazards posing potential threats to nuclear installations. The list comprises of both, natural and man-made external hazards. Also, a cross correlation matrix of the hazards is presented. The list is the starting point for the hazard analysis process in Level 1 PSA as outlined by IAEA (2010; SSG-3) and the definition of design basis as required by WENRA (2014; Reference Levels for Existing Reactors). The list is regarded comprehensive by including all types of hazards that were previously cited in documents by IAEA and WENRA-RHWG. 73 natural hazards (N1 to N73) and 24 man-made external hazards (M1 to M24) are included. Natural hazards are grouped into seismo-tectonic hazards, flooding and hydrological hazards, extreme values of meteorological phenomena, rare meteorological phenomena, biological hazards / infestation, geological hazards, and forest fire. The list of external man-made hazards includes industry accidents, military accidents, transportation accidents, pipeline accidents and other man-made external events. The dataset further contains information on hazard correlations. 577 correlations between individual hazards are identified and shown in a cross-correlation chart. Correlations discriminate between: (1) Causally connected hazards (cause-effect relation) where one hazard (e.g., liquefaction) may be caused by another hazard (e.g., earthquake); or where one hazard (e.g., high wind) is a prerequisite for a correlated hazard (e.g., storm surge). (authors)

Study on large release frequency of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen Yan; Song Wei; Li Chaojun; Fu Zhiwei; Wang Zhe; Zuo Jiaxu; Tong Jiejuan

2014-01-01

There are several definitions of large release frequency of nuclear power plant. This paper reviews the meanings of large release and requirement of large release frequency provided by IAEA, NRC and WENRA, analyses the relationship between the meanings of large release, compares the calculations of several large release frequencies, It is different frequency that the definition of LRF is not same. Last we discuss the difference between large release frequency and large early release frequency and explore the suitable definitions of LRF for nuclear power plants in China. (authors)

The ASTRID Project: Status and Future Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Le Coz, Pierre; Sauvage, Jean-François; Hamy, Jean-Marie; Jourdain, Vincent; Biaudis, Jean-Pierre; Oota, Hiroyuki; Chauveau, Thomas; Audouin, Philippe; Robertson, Daniel; Gefflot, René

2013-01-01

The ASTRID objectives: → Industrial technology demonstrator; → Integrating French and international SFRs feedback; → A GEN IV system: Safety: - Level at least equivalent to GEN III systems (WENRA requirements); - With significant improvements on Na reactors specificities issues; - Integrating FUKUSHIMA accident feedback. Operability: - Load factor of 80% or more after first “learning” years; - Significant improvements concerning In Service Inspection & Repair (ISIR). Ultimate wastes transmutation: - Continue experimentation on minor actinides transmutation, up to large scales if decided, according to June 28, 2006 French Act on Wastes Management; - A mastered investment cost. → Irradiation services and testing long term options

French R&D Program on SFR and the ASTRID Prototype

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Béhar, Christophe

2013-01-01

• ASTRID will be designed using lessons learnt from the Fukushima-Daichi accident; • The design benefits of merits of pool-type Sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors: → Favorable intrinsic features to cool-down the reactor: Large thermal inertia; Diversified heat sinks; Natural circulation; Ability to guarantee a minimum sodium level. • Safety objectives of ASTRID are derived from the WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association) document “Safety objectives for new nuclear power plants”. → It summarizes the highest safety standards, even for Fukushima-like initiators. Former Beyond Design Basis Accidents are included in the design. • Safety requirements are checked with the Generation IV International Forum Safety Design Criteria

Trans-border emergency management. What can be improved?; Grenzueberschreitender Notfallschutz. Was koennen wir verbessern?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Piller, Georges [Eidgenoessisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat ENSI, Brugg (Switzerland); Rother, Wolfram [Bundesministerium fuer Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (BMUB), Bonn (Germany). Referat RS II 5 - Radiooekologie, Ueberwachung der Umweltradioaktivitaet, Notfallschutz

2017-10-01

As a consequence of the severe accident in Fukushima Daiichi many working groups were installed in local, regional, national and also international levels, most under the motto ''think the unthinkable''. The resulting hundreds of reports are used by different actors for their interests. Certainly this has triggered further improvements of emergency preparedness. But the question raises whether these activities were agreed with the relevant partners of the emergency management and the neighboring countries. In practice this would be of essential importance and is therefore in the focus of HERCA (head s of the radiological protection competent authorities) and WENRA (Western European nuclear regulators association).

Nuclear safety and energy supply security: conflict or goal?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kutas, S.

2006-01-01

Energy generation and safety problems at the nuclear power plant have been analysed. Nuclear power plants are operated on the commercial basis in many countries today. Safety and security in energy generation and distribution is a complex problem. Energy supply reliability, security energy price and other issues should be co-ordinated and solved at the same time. Decentralisation and deregulation means new challenges for regulatory bodies and assurance of security. International co-operation in this field is very important. Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) consolidates efforts of regulatory bodies of European countries in order to harmonize approaches of nuclear safety. Nuclear Safety, and security of energy supply is the task and goal at the same time. (author)

Modernization of tritium in air monitoring system for CANDU type NPP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Purghel, L.; Iancu, R.; Popescu, M.

2009-01-01

Nuclear energy provides at present one third of Europe's electricity with nearly no greenhouse-gas emissions. Sustained efforts are now being conducted to harmonize regulations all over Europe through WENRA and to converge on technical nuclear safety practices within the TSO network ETSON (European Technical Safety Organizations Network). In order to achieve this goals of safety function, IFIN-HH together with CITON developed a new solution to improve the Tritium Monitoring System (TMS) of Cernavoda NPP and the new generation of CANDU type reactors, using Tritium in air Intelligent Monitors (TIM) developed and patented by IFIN-HH. The paper presents a comparative analysis between the technical characteristics of traditional solutions implemented in CANDU type NPP, particularly in Cernavoda NPP Unit 2 and the newly proposed solution. (authors)

Nuclear safety in France in 2001; La surete nucleaire en France en 2001

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-07-01

This press dossier summarizes the highlights of nuclear safety in France in 2001: the point-of-view of A.C. Lacoste, director of the French authority of nuclear safety (ASN), the new organisation of the control of nuclear safety and radiation protection, the ASN's policy of transparency, the evolutions of nuclear fuels and the consistency of the fuel cycle, the necessary evolutions of the nuclear crisis management, the harmonizing work of safety approaches carried out by the WENRA association. The following documents are attached in appendixes: the decrees relative to the reformation of the nuclear control in France, the missions of the ASN, the control of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France, the organization of ASN in March 2000, the incidents notified in 2001, the inspections performed in 2001, and the list of the main French nuclear sites. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety in France in 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This press dossier summarizes the highlights of nuclear safety in France in 2001: the point-of-view of A.C. Lacoste, director of the French authority of nuclear safety (ASN), the new organisation of the control of nuclear safety and radiation protection, the ASN's policy of transparency, the evolutions of nuclear fuels and the consistency of the fuel cycle, the necessary evolutions of the nuclear crisis management, the harmonizing work of safety approaches carried out by the WENRA association. The following documents are attached in appendixes: the decrees relative to the reformation of the nuclear control in France, the missions of the ASN, the control of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France, the organization of ASN in March 2000, the incidents notified in 2001, the inspections performed in 2001, and the list of the main French nuclear sites. (J.S.)

Learning from Fukushima: Institutional Isomorphism as Constraining and Contributing Nuclear Safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ylönen, M.

2016-01-01

This paper is an analysis of the international institutional isomorphic pressures and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. The recent upgrading of nuclear safety requirements at the international and national level, as well as harmonisation attempts of nuclear reactor safety by the Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), show serious efforts to improve nuclear safety and implement lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. After Fukushima new requirements for the new nuclear power plants were set, such as preparedness for natural hazards, multiple failure and core melt situations. In addition, improvement of safety culture was emphasised, as well as strengthening of independence of the regulatory body from external pressures, and increasing of independence between different levels of defence in depth safety. However, learning from accidents is often affected by institutional factors, which may both contribute and hamper safety and learning.

International relations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2009-01-01

The French nuclear safety authority (A.S.N.) has participated at different meeting in European Union as nuclear decommissioning assistance programme(N.D.A.P.), Regulatory assistance management group (R.A.M.G.) and Instrument for nuclear safety cooperation (I.N.S.C.). The members of Western European nuclear regulator association (W.E.N.R.A.) met and discussed about the future of W.E.N.R.A. and its representativeness and its cooperation with European nuclear safety regulator group (E.N.S.R.E.G.) and head of European radiation control authorities (H.E.R.C.A.). About International relations it is to noticed a meeting at the invitation of IAEA to discuss about the possibility to resort to the Ines scale for medical events. An audit mission under the IAEA aegis stood at Fessenheim, O.S.A.R.T. for operational safety review team. Two years and a half passed by between the audit mission Integrated regulatory review service (I.R.S.S.) welcome by A.S.N. in november 2006 and the audit mission follow up in 2009, 12 experts from 11 different countries and coordinated by three representatives of IAEA worked, the conclusions were that 90% of recommendations made to A.S.N. in 2006 were treated in a satisfying way; the evaluation gives three new recommendations, 7 new suggestions and 11 new correct practices. A meeting of the commission on safety standards (C.S.S.) stood in april 2009. Some others meeting are to be noticed: nuclear safety and security group (N.S.S.G.), expert group on nuclear and radiation safety (E.G.N.R.S.) instituted by the council of the Baltic sea states (C.B.S.S.) treats data exchange on the national networks of dose rates and surveillance of radioactivity in air. International nuclear regulator association (I.N.R.A.) held its first meeting in april 2009 at Seoul (Korea). Bilateral relations with Poland, Italy, Ukraine and Germany planed cooperation or information exchange in the field of nuclear safety. Participation to conference in Usa, meetings with United

Information report made on the behalf of the European Affairs Commission on European policy for nuclear safety; Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires europeennes (1) sur la politique europeenne de surete nucleaire

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bizet, J.; Sutour, S.

2011-05-15

This report aims at defining some perspectives for the evolution of the European general legal framework for nuclear safety. The authors first outline the difficulty for a European policy to emerge. They explain this statement by the importance of the current policy of national states, of their operators and of their national regulation authorities. They evoke the few elements of this legal framework (EURATOM Treaty, jurisprudence) but outline the strong cooperation between national authorities. Then, they discuss some progresses which have been noticed during the past two years (the 'safety' directive, a proposition for a directive on the management of used fuel and radioactive wastes, and the recent works by WENRA), and discuss the consequences of the accident in Fukushima. Propositions are made, notably concerning the support to the 'waste' directive, the perpetuation of strength tests, the rewriting of the 'safety' directive of June 2009

Information report made on the behalf of the European Affairs Commission on European policy for nuclear safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bizet, J.; Sutour, S.

2011-05-01

This report aims at defining some perspectives for the evolution of the European general legal framework for nuclear safety. The authors first outline the difficulty for a European policy to emerge. They explain this statement by the importance of the current policy of national states, of their operators and of their national regulation authorities. They evoke the few elements of this legal framework (EURATOM Treaty, jurisprudence) but outline the strong cooperation between national authorities. Then, they discuss some progresses which have been noticed during the past two years (the 'safety' directive, a proposition for a directive on the management of used fuel and radioactive wastes, and the recent works by WENRA), and discuss the consequences of the accident in Fukushima. Propositions are made, notably concerning the support to the 'waste' directive, the perpetuation of strength tests, the rewriting of the 'safety' directive of June 2009

Contribution of IAEA, FNRBA and ANNuR as Networking in Developing and Maintaining Capacity Building for a nuclear power programme: Comparative study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osman, Omer E.

2014-01-01

It is increasingly recognised that the mobilization and exchange of knowledge between different sectors (such as academia, policymakers, Regulators and practitioners) and regions or global can be of paramount importance in the field of Capacity Building for a nuclear power programme. As a result, the number of knowledge networks in this field has risen dramatically in recent years. Some of these networks bring together actors within a specific region, such as European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), The Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators (ANNuR). Still others cover entire continents such as Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN), Asia Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) and Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA). Or even operate worldwide and globally, like IAEA Special Support Services, Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network (GNSSN), World Organization of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA)

Nuclear safety in France in 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2002-01-01

This article presents the milestones of 2001 concerning nuclear safety in France: 1) the new organization of nuclear safety in France, IPSN (institute of protection and nuclear safety) and OPRI (office for protection against ionizing radiation) have merged into an independent organization: IRSN (institute of radiation protection and nuclear safety); 2) a draft bill has been proposed by the government to impose to nuclear operators new obligations concerning the transfer of information to the public; 3) nuclear safety authorities have drafted a new procedure in order to cope with the demand concerning modification of nuclear fuel management particularly the increase of the burn-up; 4) new evolutions concerning the management of a major nuclear crisis as a consequence of the terrorist attack on New-york and the accident at the AZF plant in Toulouse; 5) a point is made concerning the work of the WENRA association about the harmonization of the nuclear safety policies of its different members. (A.C.)

Defence-in-depth concept for the EU-ABWR

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yamazaki, Hiroshi; Fuchs, Steffen; Takada, Toshiaki; Kataoka, Kazuyoshi [Toshiba International Limited (Japan)

2013-07-01

The current defence-in-depth (DiD) concept has been established by the Reactor Harmonization Working Group (RHWG) of Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). Principally the DiD concept was already part of the very early power reactor designs. However, additional considerations have been done in order to take plant conditions into account which are beyond the original design basis. The most recent advancements have been done based on major lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident. Especially for new nuclear reactors it has to be demonstrated that DiD aspects have been considered in their design. Currently Toshiba is adapting its Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) for the European market, at first in Finland. This presentation aims to describe how the new DiD concept has been applied to achieve the safety goals for a modern reactor type and to ensure a design that can be licensed in Western Europe. (orig.)

Europe's progress towards joint regulation of nuclear safety; Le cheminement de l'Europe vers une reglementation commune sur la surete nucleaire

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hennenhofer, G. [surete des installations nucleaires et la radioprotection, Ministere de l' Environnement, de la Protection de la nature et de la securite nucleaire (BMU) (Germany)

2010-11-15

Following the end of the Second World War, there was great hope for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful applications. In the beginning, the different approaches adopted by East and West led to the design of different types of reactors, with priority being given to rapid development of the reactor fleet. Cooperation between safety regulators only came about very gradually. The Chernobyl disaster was in this respect the trigger event, as it clearly showed that the effects of nuclear events do not stop at borders and that collaboration by the safety regulators in this field was essential. Texts such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, requiring the creation of a regulatory body independent of economic interests, the other work done by IAEA on the issue of nuclear safety and, within the European context, the creation of WENRA, are all milestones along the path to close cooperation. The recently adopted European directive on the safety of nuclear installations is the natural successor to these achievements. The road to a common European vision of nuclear safety is now mapped out. Germany will be joining this movement and making its own contribution. (author)

Electrical Systems at Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant (LVNPP) after the Fukushima accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopez Jimenez, Jose Francisco

2015-01-01

During the accident occurred in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan, the onsite and offsite electrical systems were affected and lost for a long time with irreversible consequences, therefore, the Mexican Regulatory Body known as the National Commission for Nuclear Safety and Safeguards (CNSNS: for its acronym in Spanish) has taken several actions to review the current capacity of the electrical systems installed at Laguna Verde NPP to cope with an event beyond of the design basis. The first action was to require to Laguna Verde NPP the compliance with Information Notice 2011-05 'Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants' and with 10 CFR 50.54 'Conditions of licenses' section 'hh', both documents were issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Additionally, CNSNS has taken into account the response actions emitted by other countries after the Fukushima accident. This involved the review of documents generated by Germany, Canada, United Arab Emirates, Finland, France, the United Kingdom and the Western European Nuclear Regulator's Association (WENRA). CNSNS made special inspections to verify the current capacity of the electrical systems of AC and DC. As a result of these inspections, CNSNS issued requirements that must be addressed by Laguna Verde NPP to demonstrate that it has the capacity to cope with events beyond the design basis. Parallel to the above, Mexico has participated in the Ibero-american Forum to address matters related to the 'Resistance Tests', the evaluations of the Forum have reached similar conclusions to those required by European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), under the format proposed by WENRA. The actions carried out here are closely linked to the requirements established by the USNRC. It is also important to mention that: 1) the Extended Power Up-rate project was implemented in both Units of the Laguna Verde NPP before

PSA approach for the evaluation of external hazards as part of CNSC Fukushima action items

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xu, Michael; Yalaoui, Smain

2014-01-01

This paper introduces the PSA approach that Canadian licensees adopted to address the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Fukushima Action Items (FAIs) [1] with respect to external hazards evaluation. This paper focus on the FAIs specifically associated with the external hazard evaluation. It also briefly discusses the similarity and differences between the requirements of CNSC FAIs, the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) Stress Test [2], and the USNRC 'Request for Information'[3]. This paper provides a status update on the completion of the FAIs by the Canadian licensees' and discusses the lessons learned from the implementation of these actions items. It also identifies the importance of a closer interaction between the CNSC and other government agencies for the characterization of as well as for the protection against the external natural hazards. It also highlights some other areas that include research projects on external hazards, combined methodologies from the licensees, etc. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of CNSC, or any part thereof. All Canadian licensees are currently preparing their plant specific reports to address the relevant FAIs. Some preliminary hazards screening reports, as well as the reports for probabilistic seismic hazards analysis, external flood hazard and high wind hazard have been submitted to CNSC. CNSC, in conjunction other Canadian government agencies, are currently reviewing these reports to determine their acceptability. The licensees are expected to submit all required reports by the end of this year. In the meantime, other Fukushima actions requiring facility enhancements are underway for some licensees. These include: - acquiring additional emergency mitigating portable equipment, such as power generators and pumps, which can be stored onsite and offsite and used to bring reactors to a safe shutdown state, in the unlikely event of a

Defence in depth perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Veneau, Tania; Ferrier, Agnes; Barbaud, Jean

2017-01-01

The Defence in Depth (DiD) concept was introduced to the field of nuclear safety in the sixties and early seventies. Even though it was not well developed at the beginning, the principles rapidly became close to those currently used. The concept was then composed of 3 levels, and was already associated with operating conditions. These principles have progressed over time and now there are five levels, including progressively situations issued from design extension conditions, to cope with severe accidents and dealing with accident management off-site. Indeed, human and organizational features are considered as a part of the safety provisions at all levels in an integrated approach that is not just related to reactor design. That's the current vision from IAEA, addressed first in INSAG 3 then in INSAG 10, and in the IAEA standards requirements currently addressed by SSR-2/1 superseding NS-R-1). These five levels of DiD are also referred to in other texts including WENRA documents in Europe, but also in the national requirements from different countries. Thus, the application of DiD principle has become a recognized international practice. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accidents, even if they raised many questions on nuclear safety issues, confirmed the merits of the DiD concept. Indeed, lessons learned from the accidents have reinforced the use of the DiD concept to ensure adequate safety. The discussions focused more on the implementation of the concept (how it has been or can be used in practice) than the concept itself, and in particular on the following subjects: the notion of level robustness, generally addressed separately from the levels definition, but playing an important role for the efficiency of the concept; the notion of levels independence and the need for strengthening them; the role of diversity to achieve levels independence. However, a prescription of additional diversity and independence across all safety levels could result in inappropriately

European Union response to Fukushima. European stress tests and peer review

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jamet, Philippe [Autorite de Surete Nucleaire (ASN), Paris (France)

2012-07-01

Following the severe accidents which started in the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP on 11 March 2011, the European Council requested that a comprehensive safety and risk assessment, in light of preliminary lessons learned, be performed on all EU nuclear plants. Therefore, stress tests and peer review assessing natural initiating events, the loss of safety systems and severe accident management have been performed in the 15 European Union countries with nuclear power plants as well as Switzerland and Ukraine. The final peer review report of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) highlights four main areas for improvement to be explored across Europe: 1. Development by the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA), with the contribution of the best available EU expertise, of a European guidance on assessment of natural hazards and margins; 2. Importance of Periodic Safety Review to be underlined by ENSREG; 3. Expeditious implementation of the recognised measures to protect containment integrity; 4. Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limitation of their consequences. The peer review of the European stress tests was completed in April 2012. In their conclusive statement issued 26 April 2012, the national European regulators and the European Commission as European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) required that follow-up would occur by way of an ENSREG action plan. Country specific action plans will be developed and peer review workshop will be organised to share lessons learned on the implementation of post-Fukushima safety improvements.

European Union response to Fukushima. European stress tests and peer review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jamet, Philippe

2012-01-01

Following the severe accidents which started in the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP on 11 March 2011, the European Council requested that a comprehensive safety and risk assessment, in light of preliminary lessons learned, be performed on all EU nuclear plants. Therefore, stress tests and peer review assessing natural initiating events, the loss of safety systems and severe accident management have been performed in the 15 European Union countries with nuclear power plants as well as Switzerland and Ukraine. The final peer review report of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) highlights four main areas for improvement to be explored across Europe: 1. Development by the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA), with the contribution of the best available EU expertise, of a European guidance on assessment of natural hazards and margins; 2. Importance of Periodic Safety Review to be underlined by ENSREG; 3. Expeditious implementation of the recognised measures to protect containment integrity; 4. Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limitation of their consequences. The peer review of the European stress tests was completed in April 2012. In their conclusive statement issued 26 April 2012, the national European regulators and the European Commission as European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) required that follow-up would occur by way of an ENSREG action plan. Country specific action plans will be developed and peer review workshop will be organised to share lessons learned on the implementation of post-Fukushima safety improvements.

Design of pressurized water reactors - Guide Nr 22, Release of the 18/07/2017

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

Jointly developed by the ASN and IRSN, this guide takes safety requirements for reactor design as defined by the IAEA, and reference levels, safety objectives and recommendations made by the WENRA into account. It addresses aspects related to installation design based on an appropriate application of the in-depth defence principle, as well as aspects related to the nuclear safety demonstration of a design. After an introduction which notably contains specific definitions, this guide presents general design objectives and principles: normal operation, possible incidents and accidents, in-depth defence, barriers, functions aiming at preventing incidents or accidents, general approach to nuclear safety demonstration. It addresses the issue of nuclear safety demonstration: identification and taking into account of events which may affect nuclear safety, reference operating conditions, reference internal and external aggressions excluding malevolent acts, the case of malevolent acts, use of probabilistic safety studies, principles of development of study methods. It presents general recommendations related to design: architecture of safety functions, EIP design, organisational and human dimensions, radiation protection. It also presents, specific recommendations related to barrier design (reactor core and associated devices, primary and secondary circuits, barrier), and to some safety functions (control of chain reactions, confinement of radioactive substances). It finally addresses other specific recommendations related to design: heat evacuation, electricity supply, volumetric and chemical control of the primary coolant, handling and warehousing of nuclear fuel, control and command, crisis management, and management of effluents and of radioactive wastes

Bohunice NPPs - Part of the Slovak's economy (sustainable) development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dobak, Dobroslav

2001-01-01

Of the total consumption of electricity in Slovakia, 42% was generated in nuclear power plant units in 1999. Slovakia operates 6 units with a WWER 440 nuclear reactors, 4 of them are at Bohunice site and 2 at Mochovce. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of SR is not the only regulatory body controlling nuclear activity. Both - the system of nuclear activities regulation in Slovakia as well as the approach to Nuclear Safety enhancement of the operator were positively judged by IAEA and WENRA. In 1993 -Slovakia has accepted the commitments of the UN Convention on Climate Changes, including a reduction of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Moreover, as an internal target Slovakia has set the reaching of the ,'Toronto Objective', i.e. 20% reduction in CO x emissions through the year 2005 as compared to 1988. Taking into account the actual situation as well as natural conditions for some renewable sources utilisation, the target won't be reached without nuclear energy. The nuclear energy is free of emissions, does not burn oxygen, and with the share of production in Slovakia will remain significant contributor. To the environment protection it contributes also by replacing fossil heat plants with heat delivery for the region. In case of radiological wastes the environment protection is ensured by very strict system of control, evidence, treatment and repository. To conclude, Bohunice NPPs were, are and will remain very important part of the Slovak's economy, creating conditions for its (sustainable) development

Evaluating the results of a site-specific PSHA from the perspective of a risk analyst

Science.gov (United States)

Klügel, Jens-Uwe

2016-04-01

From 1998 till 2015 Swiss Nuclear Power Plants sponsored a set of comprehensive site-specific PSHA-studies (PEGASOS, PEGASOS Refinement Project) to obtain the requested input for their plant specific probabilistic risk assessments following the US SSHAC procedures at their most elaborated level 4. The studies were performed by well-known earth scientists working completely independent from sponsors under participatory review of the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. Risk analysts of Swiss Nuclear Power Plants recently have been mandated to implement the final results of the studies in their risk assessment studies. This triggered an in depth assessment of the results focussed on their practical applicability for risk studies. This assessment resulted in some important insights that are of interest for future PSHA studies performed for new nuclear power plants. The assessment included a review of the completeness of results with respect to risk applications as well as plausibility checks of hazard results based on Black Swan Theory and known historical events. The key lessons and recommendations for more detailed project output specifications for future projects are presented in the paper. It was established that future PSHA projects shall provide the joint probability distribution of ground motion hazard and the associated strong motion duration as the output to allow for a technically meaningful risk assessment. The recommendation of WENRA (West European Nuclear Regulators) published in their reference levels to perform natural hazard assessment preferably based on physical grounds (deterministic method) is also rationalized by recommending an holistic approach to hazard analysis comparing PSHA insights with the results of modelling deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis.

Changes to Regulatory Systems for more Efficient Nuclear Energy Deployment: An Industry Viewpoint

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pelin, H.

2016-01-01

Nuclear energy is required to play a much larger role in the energy mix in most credible energy scenarios that address climate change (680 GW additional capacity by 2050 according to IEA, 1000 GW according to World Nuclear Association). To reach these ambitious targets, a concerted effort will be required involving industry, governments and regulators. Changes to regulatory systems and processes – including licensing (design, site, operation), export control, security and waste - is one important area that can stimulate faster and more cost effective development of nuclear capacity. In the past, regulators were mainly concerned with authorizing a limited number of reactors from a limited number of designs under a national standard. Today regulators need resources to assess a wider range of designs, while each licensee needs to complete a thorough safety assessment even if the design has been assessed and approved elsewhere. These developments are the inevitable consequence of globalization and competition within the industry. This paper examines the current state of nuclear regulation in relation to the main attributes of good regulation as defined by the OECD. It further looks at ongoing efforts among regulators to share experience or harmonize requirements, such as within MDEP, or to agree common safety levels, such as in WENRA, in order to reach common positions and improve their regulatory approaches. Finally, it will assess the work of industry to demonstrate the benefits – both in terms of efficiency as well as safety – of harmonised regulations notably through the activities of the World Nuclear Association/CORDEL Working Group. (author)

An innovative program to increase safety culture for workers on a nuclear power plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schryvers, Vincent

2007-01-01

Full text: To implement the WENRA harmonized guidelines and the IAEA reference guides, Electrabel has recently introduced a major training program for both its own staff and the contractors working on the sites of its Nuclear Power Plants. This training program stresses the importance of safety culture on both theoretical and practical level and is mostly focused on the behavioural aspects during activities performed at the site of a Nuclear Power Plant. Further emphasis is put on radiation protection, industrial safety, environmental protection and explosion prevention. The training scheme for both the staff of Electrabel and contractors typically contains a theoretical part introducing the basic concepts of nuclear safety and safety culture and a practical exercise in a simulated environment. A novel element in the training cycle is the use of a simulated environment, where the actual working conditions in the nuclear part of the installation are simulated. This mock-up installation enables the workers to train the nuclear safety constraints linked to the actual installation and to enhance safety culture by responding on simulated problems and changing conditions possibly being encountered during an intervention at the real working site. To analyze the behaviour of the future workers, the activities are videotaped and commented for further improvement. A refresh of the training courses is implemented after 3 years.Although this training program has only been in operation for just 6 months, the response of the contractors and the staff to this training has been enthusiastic. At this moment, more than 1.000 workers have successfully completed the training course. (author)

The European Utility Requirements (EUR). Status and near term activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berbey, Pierre; Hedin, Francois

2010-01-01

In 1991 5 major European Utilities participating in the US ALWR program decided to develop together a common specification that would contribute to keep the nuclear option open. The European Utility Requirements (EUR) are addressed to the designers and suppliers of LWR plants in order to allow the development of standards designs that can be build and licensed in several European countries with only minor variations. The EUR organization has kept enlarging; today 16 utilities are members of the EUR organization. Seven compliance analyses dedicated respectively to the BWR90, EPR, EPP, ABWR, SWR1000, AP1000 and to the AES92 projects have been already published. The revised version of the EPR subset of the EUR volume 3 was finalized in mid 2009. New LWR projects of potential interest for the EUR utilities are being contemplated. For instance a preliminary assessment of compliance of MHI's APWR project has been worked out in the first months of 2008. Recently EUR organization has decided to launch coordinated actions with other industry groups and other stakeholders. In particular EUR and ENISS organizations have decided to join their efforts in their relations with the IAEA and WENRA organizations with respect to the LWR Gen3 designs. In addition EUR and CORDEL (Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing), which is a WNA (World Nuclear Association) working group decided also to coordinate their efforts for the industry benefit, in relation with the MDEP (Multinational Design Evaluation Program) initiative of safety nuclear regulators. Contacts have been also initiated with ENEN and the WNU in order to develop new courses for young professionals. (orig.)

Requalification of the steam supply systems of Units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy NPP to a new model WWER-440/B-209M

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iordanov, I.; Ourutchev, V.; Stoev, M.; Sabinov, S.

2001-01-01

In order to achieve significant advances in operational safety level, the project characteristics, the possibility of safety systems upgrading and operational conditions of Units 1 to 4 of the Kozloduy NPP were an object of very serious and in-depth analysis in the years 1990-2000. This systematic evaluation was initiated under the broad international concern resulted from the conclusions of IAEA missions held during 1990-1991 to assess the safety of the units. As a result of the efforts of the plant staff and many international experts the operational conditions, design safety and plant management were dramatically improved which resulted in bringing the plant to a new safety level. This review also developed such that the design safety features of Units 3 and 4 are significantly different from those units of the so-called V-230 group. The principle difference and advantages of Units 3 and 4 design were clarified and confirmed. A review process of the changed status of Units 3 and 4 safety was conducted in 1999-2000 with the help of IAEA experts and the experts of RISKAUDIT and WENRA. The process led to the conclusion that the significance of advantages of the safety level need to be encapsulated within a new safety case and the corresponding set of steps was combined as a 'Project for upgrading the Nuclear Steam Supply System of Units 3 and 4 of Kozloduy NPP to model WWER-440/B-209M'. The completion of the activities under this project is expected in 2002 following the major implementation phase during 2001/2002 units' outages. (author)

ASN report on nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2006, excerpts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lacoste, A.C.

2007-01-01

The main topics for the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in 2006 were the following ones. 1) the 2006-686 bill on transparency and security in the nuclear field. This law constitutes an overhaul of the legislative framework applicable to nuclear activities. It creates the Nuclear Safety Authority as an independent administrative authority and defines its tasks. It contains significant advances in terms of transparency. 2) The 2006-739 bill concerning sustainable management of radioactive materials and waste. This law clearly states that the disposal in deep geological formations is the reference solution for high-level, long-lived radioactive wastes. 3) The EPR reactor project safety in which ASN completed technical examination of the preliminary safety case. In November 2006, ASN produced to French Authorities a draft decree concerning the EPR project on the Flamanville site. 4) An international audit of ASN was performed in 2006 by IAEA in order to assess the extent to which the standards IAEA recommends are taken into account and implemented. 5) ASN has contributed to the harmonization of nuclear safety in Europe and at world scale through its contribution to the work of the WENRA association. 6) In 2005 and 2006 4 serious radiotherapy accidents were reported in France. Cancer radiotherapy is a fully justified practice that demands a vigilant supervision of ASN. 7) ASN has amplified its means for informing the public about nuclear safety and radiation protection. And 8) ASN considers that people and organizations are fundamental factors in safety and radiation protection and that significant progress is still to be made in taking into account these factors in nuclear activities. (A.C.)

Synthesis of the IRSN report related to severe accidents and to the probabilistic level-2 safety study for the Flamanville EPR reactor. Referral of the Permanent Group of Experts for nuclear reactors (GPR), examination of probabilistic level-2 safety studies (EPS 2) and severe accidents (AG) of the Flamanville reactor nr 3. Opinion related to severe accidents and to the probabilistic level-2 safety study for the Flamanville EPR reactor (FA3). Electronuclear reactors - EDF - Flamanville 3 EPR reactor. Severe accidents and probabilistic level 2 studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This document gathers several documents. The first one recalls the main arrangements implemented on the FA3 EPR reactor regarding accidents with core fusion, reports the analysis made by the IRSN about the sizing of these arrangements to reach a controlled status of the installation after a severe accident, regarding the probabilistic level-2 safety assessment, regarding the radiological impact of a severe accident on the population and on the environment, regarding those aimed at facing a total and long duration loss of electric power sources and cold sources, and about the situation of the reactor with respect to WENRA positions on severe accidents for new reactors. The second document is a letter sent by the ASN to the Permanent Group of Experts for nuclear reactors (GPR) to address probabilistic level-2 safety studies (EPS2) and severe accidents for the Flamanville 3 reactor. The third one reports the opinion of the GPR on these both issues and proposes a set of recommendations. The next document is a letter sent by the ASN to the Flamanville 3 project manager at EDF which recalls the related objectives, the ASN opinion on the implemented arrangements for severe accidents (de-pressurization of the primary circuit, management of hydrogen-related risks, corium recovery and cooling outside the vessel, limitation of vapour explosion risks outside the vessel, heat evacuation system, containment enclosure, management of the risk of a return to criticality), to face a total and long duration loss of electricity sources and cold sources, and other aspects addressed in the IRSN analysis. Requests and remarks formulated by the ASN are provided in an appendix to this last document

Current regulatory developments concerning the implementation of probabilistic safety analyses for external hazards in Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krauss, Matias; Berg, Heinz-Peter

2014-01-01

The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) initiated in September 2003 a comprehensive program for the revision of the national nuclear safety regulations which has been successfully completed in November 2012. These nuclear regulations take into account the current recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). In this context, the recommendations and guidelines of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission (KTA) and the technical documents elaborated by the respective expert group on Probabilistic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants (FAK PSA) are being updated or in the final process of completion. A main topic of the revision was the issue external hazards. As part of this process and in the light of the accident at Fukushima and the findings of the related actions resulting in safety reviews of nuclear power plants at national level in Germany and on European level, a revision of all relevant standards and documents has been made, especially the recommendations of KTA and FAK PSA. In that context, not only design issues with respect to events such as earthquakes and floods have been discussed, but also methodological issues regarding the implementation of improved probabilistic safety analyses on this topic. As a result of the revision of the KTA 2201 series 'Design of Nuclear Power Plants against Seismic Events' with their parts 1 to 6, part 1 'Principles' was published as the first standard in November 2011, followed by the revised versions of KTA 2201.2 (soil) and 2201.4 (systems and components) in 2012. The modified the standard KTA 2201.3 (structures) is expected to be issued before the end of 2013. In case of part 5 (seismic instrumentation) and part 6 (post>seismic actions) draft amendments are expected in 2013. The expert group 'Probabilistic Safety Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants' (FAK PSA) is an advisory body of the Federal

International Context Regarding Application of Single Failure Criterion For New Reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Basic, I.; Vrbanic, I.

2016-01-01

The Single Failure Criterion (SFC) ensures reliable performance of safety systems in nuclear power plants in response to design basis initiating events. The SFC, basically, requires that the system must be capable of performing its task in the presence of any single failure. The capability of a system to perform its design function in the presence of a single failure could be threatened by a common cause failure such as a fire, flood, or human intervention or by any other cause with potential to induce multiple failures. When applied to plant's response to a postulated design-basis initiating event, the SFC usually represents a requirement that particular safety system performs its safety functions as designed under the conditions which can include: All failures caused by a single failure; All identifiable but non-detectable failures, including those in the non-tested components; All failures and spurious system actions that cause (or are caused by) the postulated event. The paper provides an overview of the regulatory design requirements for new reactors addressing Single Failure Criterion (SFC) in accordance to international best-practices, particularly considering the SCF relation to in-service testing, maintenance, repair, inspection and monitoring of systems, structures and components important to safety. The paper discusses the comparison of the current SFC requirements and guidelines published by the IAEA, WENRA, EUR and nuclear regulators in the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Korea, Japan, China and Finland. Also, paper addresses the application of SFC requirements in design; considerations for testing, maintenance, repair, inspection and monitoring; allowable equipment outage times; exemptions to SFC requirements; and analysis for SFC application to two-, three- and four-train systems and applications for small and modular reactors. (author).

Certification of the decommissioning project for the PROTEUS research reactor at the Paul Scherrer Institute; Gutachten zum Stilllegungsprojekt der Kernanlage PROTEUS am Paul Scherrer Institut

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2015-12-15

The Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) revised the documents concerning the decommissioning of the PROTEUS research reactor. This report presents the results of the evaluation by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI). PSI considered all relevant stipulations of nuclear energy legislation, the law on radiation protection, as well as ENSI directives. Moreover, ENSI made sure that the PROTEUS decommissioning project corresponds to the IAEA, WENRA and OECD/NEA international requirements, and corresponds to current state of science and technology. ENSI ascertained some facts that have to be looked at more deeply. Before beginning with the decommissioning work, all the fuel must be taken out of the PROTEUS facility. For each step an authorization has to be requested from ENSI with a detailed description of the work foreseen. Personal dosimetry has to be performed with calibrated dosimeters. By the use of mechanical, thermal or chemical methods to partition radioactive components, the air on the working place has to be continuously checked for radioactive aerosols. The dose limit of 0.3 mSv per year must be respected. The surveillance of the release of radioactive materials has to be done according to the PSI release regulations. By large material quantities like barite concrete blocks, graphite reflector and steel components, PSI has to describe the process used to declare the materials as inactive. For the radioactive materials expected, the containers specified have to be approved by ENSI. Before the first dismantling phase, the organization plan for all participating persons and their responsibilities have to be presented to ENSI. In its request for the decommissioning of the PROTEUS research reactor, PSI consistently demonstrates that the protection of persons and environment against radioactive radiation can be guaranteed during the dismantling of the facility and that the wastes produced can be safely managed. In consequence, all required conditions for

Proposal of an ISO Standard: Classification of Transients and Accidents for Pressurized Water Reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jo, Jong Chull [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Chung, Bub Dong; Lee, Doo-Jeong; Kim, Jong In; Yoon, Ju Hyun [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Jae Jun [Pusan National Univ., Busan (Korea, Republic of); Kim, An Sup; Lee, Sang Yoon [Korea Electric Association, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

Classification of the events for a nuclear power plant is a fundamental basis for defining nuclear safety functions, safety systems performing those functions, and specific acceptance criteria for safety analyses. Presently, the approaches for the event classification adopted by the nuclear suppliers are different, which makes a nuclear technology trade barrier. The IAEA and WENRA are making efforts to establish general requirements or guidelines on the classification of either plant states or defence-in-depth levels for the design of nuclear power plants. However, the requirements and guidelines do not provide the details for practical application to various types of commercial PWRs. Recently, Korea proposed a new ISO standardisation project to develop a harmonized or consolidated international standard for classifying the events in PWRs and for defining (or imposing) the acceptance criteria for reactor design and/or radiation protection corresponding to each event class. This paper briefs the method with strategies for developing the standard, the current various practices of the PWR event classification and acceptance criteria developed or adopted by several organizations in USA and Europe, and a draft of the proposed standard. The proposed standard will affect all the relevant stakeholders such as reactor designers, vendors, suppliers, utilities, regulatory bodies, and publics of the leading countries in the area of nuclear industry as well as utilities, regulatory bodies, and publics of the newly entering (starting) countries. It is expected that all of the stakeholders will benefit from the proposed deliverable which provides an internationally harmonized standard for classifying the PWR events as follows: The reactor design bases for assuring safety and related technical information can be effectively communicated and shared among them resulting in enhancement of the global nuclear safety and fosterage of the global nuclear trade. The countries starting

Market conditions in Hungary, central europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nagy, S.

2000-01-01

Paks Nuclear Power Plant is the only nuclear power plant in Hungary covering 38% of electricity consumption in the country. The nuclear electricity production of the four VVER440/213 type units in the year of 1999 was 14096 GWh, the second best result in the history of the company. After very detailed safety analyses Paks NPP started a safety upgrading program in 1996, and today the CDF values of the reactor units reached an internationally accepted value. The operational and safety culture and the level of safety was evaluated and reviewed by different international organizations like the IAEA, WENRA, WANO. Based on the conclusions of these international organizations the Paks plant w111 be ready for EU accession after the completion of the ongoing safety upgrading program. Capacity enhancement as a part of the preparation for the market conditions resulted a power upgrade around 20 MW for all four units. This way a relatively small investment in comparison with new installations resulted more efficient to market nuclear capacity. Last year the cost of a generated 1 kWh electricity was 5.98 Ft, which is still to be decreased in 2000. To upgrade the competitiveness of nuclear generation lots of efforts were done in the areas of plant management cost reduction, man-power efficiency upgrade. Un-bundling of activities not directly related to electricity generation in one hand, and more efficient cooperation with other VVER operators and the Hungarian Power Companies Ltd. in certain areas on the other hand are good examples for efficient steps in economic improvement. The company as one of the electricity producers also should follow the capabilities of producers in the neighboring countries like Slovakia and Ukraine, where electricity production is with government subsidiary. To find the right balance between the necessary investments and the market induced cost reduction is one of the most important task in Hungary in Eastern-Europe especially when the nuclear energy

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities; Le demantelement des installations nucleaires de base

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Niel, J.Ch.; Rieu, J.; Lareynie, O.; Delrive, L.; Vallet, J.; Girard, A.; Duthe, M.; Lecomte, C.; Rozain, J.P.; Nokhamzon, J.G.; Davoust, M.; Eyraud, J.L.; Bernet, Ph.; Velon, M.; Gay, A.; Charles, Th.; Leschaeva, M.; Dutzer, M.; Maocec, Ch.; Gillet, G.; Brut, F.; Dieulot, M.; Thuillier, D.; Tournebize, F.; Fontaine, V.; Goursaud, V.; Birot, M.; Le Bourdonnec, Th.; Batandjieva, B.; Theis, St.; Walker, St.; Rosett, M.; Cameron, C.; Boyd, A.; Aguilar, M.; Brownell, H.; Manson, P.; Walthery, R.; Wan Laer, W.; Lewandowski, P.; Dorms, B.; Reusen, N.; Bardelay, J.; Damette, G.; Francois, P.; Eimer, M.; Tadjeddine, A.; Sene, M.; Sene, R

2008-11-15

This file includes five parts: the first part is devoted to the strategies of the different operators and includes the following files: the decommissioning of nuclear facilities Asn point of view, decommissioning of secret nuclear facilities, decommissioning at the civil Cea strategy and programs, EDF de-construction strategy, Areva strategy for decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the second one concerns the stakes of dismantling and includes the articles as follow: complete cleanup of buildings structures in nuclear facilities, decommissioning of nuclear facilities and safety assessment, decommissioning wastes management issues, securing the financing of long-term decommissioning and waste management costs, organizational and human factors in decommissioning projects, training for the decommissioning professions: the example of the Grenoble University master degree; the third part is devoted to the management of dismantling work sites and includes the different articles as follow: decommissioning progress at S.I.C.N. plant, example of decommissioning work site in Cea Grenoble: Siloette reactor decommissioning, matters related to decommissioning sites, decommissioning of french nuclear installations: the viewpoint of a specialist company, specificities of inspections during decommissioning: the Asn inspector point of view; the fourth part is in relation with the international approach and includes as follow: IAEA role in establishing a global safety regime on decommissioning, towards harmonization of nuclear safety practices in Europe: W.E.N.R.A. and the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, EPA superfund program policy for decontamination and decommissioning, progress with remediation at Sellafield, progress and experiences from the decommissioning of the Eurochemic reprocessing plant in Belgium, activities of I.R.S.N. and its daughter company Risk-audit I.r.s.n./G.r.s. international in the field of decommissioning of nuclear facilities in eastern countries

Near-term objectives of the works on the EUR document, comparison with the EPRI-URD

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berbey, P.; Lopez, P. T. L.

2010-01-01

18 years after its foundation, the EUR organization is still quite active. During the last 3 years, the EUR products have mainly been evaluations of the Gen 3 LWR designs. The evaluations of the AP1000 and of the AES92 designs have been concluded in 2007 and a revised version of the evaluation of the EPR completed in 2009. Other LWR projects of potential interest for the EUR utilities, such as MHI's APWR are being reviewed before starting a full-scope assessment. Last, a revision C of the EUR volume 4 has been published in 2007. Coordinated actions with the other industry groups and the other stakeholders have been a centerpiece of the recent EUR strategy. In particular, the EUR and ENISS organizations have joined their efforts to coordinate their actions in nuclear safety, in particular vs. IAEA and WENRA. Also EUR and WNA/CORDEL have coordinated their efforts, in relation with the MDEP initiative of the safety regulators. Meanwhile, the EUR organization has kept enlarging: CEZ and MVM now are associated members and Gen-Energija from Slovenia has been invited to participate. Education and training has been dealt with actively. The EUR organization strongly supported WNU in setting up their successful 2009 'forum on harmonization'. A more technical course about the EUR requirements is being organized under the aegis of ENEN. Finally, preparatory material for a revision D of the EUR volumes 1 and 2 has been gathered. Out of this material, the update of the comparison between the EUR document and the EPRI-URD is of specific importance. In 1995-1997 a first analysis of the differences between the two documents had been carried out by the EUR organization and a synthesis report focused on 35 'macro issues' had been produced. Ten years later, this work was felt deserving a thorough update. Thus a specific organization has been set out between EUR and EPRI to update the old synthesis report. The 'macro issues' have been re-analyzed by a specific EUR working group leaded

Analysis of flammability in the attached buildings to containment under severe accident conditions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rosa, J.C. de la, E-mail: juan-carlos.de-la-rosa-blul@ec.europa.eu [European Commission Joint Research Centre (Netherlands); Fornós, Joan, E-mail: jfornosh@anacnv.com [Asociación Nuclear Ascó-Vandellós (Spain)

2016-11-15

Highlights: • Analysis of flammability conditions in buildings outside containment. • Stepwise approach easily applicable for any kind of containment and attached buildings layout. • Detailed application for real plant conditions has been included. - Abstract: Right after the events unfolded in Fukushima Daiichi, the European Union countries agreed in subjecting Nuclear Power Plants to Stress Tests as developed by WENRA and ENSREG organizations. One of the results as implemented in many European countries derived from such tests consisted of mandatory technical instructions issued by nuclear regulatory bodies on the analysis of potential risk of flammable gases in attached buildings to containment. The current study addresses the key aspects of the analysis of flammable gases leaking to auxiliary buildings attached to Westinghouse large-dry PWR containment for the specific situation where mitigating systems to prevent flammable gases to grow up inside containment are available, and containment integrity is preserved – hence avoiding isolation system failure. It also provides a full practical exercise where lessons learned derived from the current study – hence limited to the imposed boundary conditions – are applied. The leakage of gas from the containment to the support buildings is based on separate calculations using the EPRI-owned Modular Accident Analysis Program, MAAP4.07. The FATE™ code (facility Flow, Aerosol, Thermal, and Explosion) was used to model the transport and distribution of leaked flammable gas (H{sub 2} and CO) in the penetration buildings. FATE models the significant mixing (dilution) which occurs as the released buoyant gas rises and entrains air. Also, FATE accounts for the condensation of steam on room surfaces, an effect which acts to concentrate flammable gas. The results of the analysis show that during a severe accident, flammable conditions are unlikely to occur in compartmentalized buildings such as the one used in the

Safety management in nuclear technology. Proceedings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

At the symposium of TueV Sued AG (Munich, Federal Republic of Germany) held in Munich on 28 and 29 October 2008, the following lectures were held: (1) Fundamental requirements of the management system in nuclear technology - Experiences from the international developments at IAEA and WENRA (M. Herttrich); (2) Information from a comparison of requirements of safety management systems (B. Kallenbach-Herbert); (3) Requirements of a modern management system in German nuclear power plants from the view of nuclear safety (D. Majer); (4) Requirements on safety management in module 8 of the regulations project (M. Maqua); (5) Requirements on the management system in nuclear power plants according to GRS-229 and developments at the KTA 1402 ''Integrated management system for safe operation of nuclear power plants (in progress)'' (C. Verstegen); (6) Experiences from the development and implementation of safety management systems in connection with the works management of a nuclear power plant (K. Ramler); (7) Design of a safety management system of a nuclear power plant in consideration of existing management systems (U. Naumann); (8) Experiences in the utilization and evaluation of a safety management system (J. Ritter); (9) Aspects of leadership of safety management systems (S. Seitz); (10) Management of safety or safety management system? Prevailing or administration? (A. Frischknecht); (11) Change management - strategies for successful transfer of new projects: How can I motivate co-workers for a further development of the safety management system? (U. Schnabel); (12) Requirements concerning indicators in integrated management systems and safety management systems (J. Stiller); (13) Integration of proactive and reactive indicators in the safety management system (B. Fahlbruch); (14) What do indicators show? About the use of indicators by regulatory authorities (A. Kern); (15) Safety management and radiation protection in nuclear technology (K. Grantner); (16) Any more

Analysis of flammability in the attached buildings to containment under severe accident conditions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rosa, J.C. de la; Fornós, Joan

2016-01-01

Highlights: • Analysis of flammability conditions in buildings outside containment. • Stepwise approach easily applicable for any kind of containment and attached buildings layout. • Detailed application for real plant conditions has been included. - Abstract: Right after the events unfolded in Fukushima Daiichi, the European Union countries agreed in subjecting Nuclear Power Plants to Stress Tests as developed by WENRA and ENSREG organizations. One of the results as implemented in many European countries derived from such tests consisted of mandatory technical instructions issued by nuclear regulatory bodies on the analysis of potential risk of flammable gases in attached buildings to containment. The current study addresses the key aspects of the analysis of flammable gases leaking to auxiliary buildings attached to Westinghouse large-dry PWR containment for the specific situation where mitigating systems to prevent flammable gases to grow up inside containment are available, and containment integrity is preserved – hence avoiding isolation system failure. It also provides a full practical exercise where lessons learned derived from the current study – hence limited to the imposed boundary conditions – are applied. The leakage of gas from the containment to the support buildings is based on separate calculations using the EPRI-owned Modular Accident Analysis Program, MAAP4.07. The FATE™ code (facility Flow, Aerosol, Thermal, and Explosion) was used to model the transport and distribution of leaked flammable gas (H_2 and CO) in the penetration buildings. FATE models the significant mixing (dilution) which occurs as the released buoyant gas rises and entrains air. Also, FATE accounts for the condensation of steam on room surfaces, an effect which acts to concentrate flammable gas. The results of the analysis show that during a severe accident, flammable conditions are unlikely to occur in compartmentalized buildings such as the one used in the

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niel, J.Ch.; Rieu, J.; Lareynie, O.; Delrive, L.; Vallet, J.; Girard, A.; Duthe, M.; Lecomte, C.; Rozain, J.P.; Nokhamzon, J.G.; Davoust, M.; Eyraud, J.L.; Bernet, Ph.; Velon, M.; Gay, A.; Charles, Th.; Leschaeva, M.; Dutzer, M.; Maocec, Ch.; Gillet, G.; Brut, F.; Dieulot, M.; Thuillier, D.; Tournebize, F.; Fontaine, V.; Goursaud, V.; Birot, M.; Le Bourdonnec, Th.; Batandjieva, B.; Theis, St.; Walker, St.; Rosett, M.; Cameron, C.; Boyd, A.; Aguilar, M.; Brownell, H.; Manson, P.; Walthery, R.; Wan Laer, W.; Lewandowski, P.; Dorms, B.; Reusen, N.; Bardelay, J.; Damette, G.; Francois, P.; Eimer, M.; Tadjeddine, A.; Sene, M.; Sene, R.

2008-01-01

This file includes five parts: the first part is devoted to the strategies of the different operators and includes the following files: the decommissioning of nuclear facilities Asn point of view, decommissioning of secret nuclear facilities, decommissioning at the civil Cea strategy and programs, EDF de-construction strategy, Areva strategy for decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the second one concerns the stakes of dismantling and includes the articles as follow: complete cleanup of buildings structures in nuclear facilities, decommissioning of nuclear facilities and safety assessment, decommissioning wastes management issues, securing the financing of long-term decommissioning and waste management costs, organizational and human factors in decommissioning projects, training for the decommissioning professions: the example of the Grenoble University master degree; the third part is devoted to the management of dismantling work sites and includes the different articles as follow: decommissioning progress at S.I.C.N. plant, example of decommissioning work site in Cea Grenoble: Siloette reactor decommissioning, matters related to decommissioning sites, decommissioning of french nuclear installations: the viewpoint of a specialist company, specificities of inspections during decommissioning: the Asn inspector point of view; the fourth part is in relation with the international approach and includes as follow: IAEA role in establishing a global safety regime on decommissioning, towards harmonization of nuclear safety practices in Europe: W.E.N.R.A. and the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, EPA superfund program policy for decontamination and decommissioning, progress with remediation at Sellafield, progress and experiences from the decommissioning of the Eurochemic reprocessing plant in Belgium, activities of I.R.S.N. and its daughter company Risk-audit I.r.s.n./G.r.s. international in the field of decommissioning of nuclear facilities in eastern countries

European Utility Requirements: leveling the European electricity producers' playing ground for new NPPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bernard Roche

2006-01-01

Full text of publication follows: Since 1992, the European Utility Requirement (EUR) document has been developed by the major European electricity producers. The main driver to this work has been the construction of a unified European market. The electricity producers have set out design requirements adapted to this new European environment, while keeping in mind experience feedback from operating NPPs worldwide. The EUR document is now fully operational and its set of generic requirements have been recently used as bid specification in Finland and in China. The EUR document keeps developing in two directions: 1- completing the assessment of the projects that could be proposed by the vendors for the European market. Five projects have been assessed between 1999 and 2002: BWR90, EPR, EP1000, ABWR and SWR1000. Two new projects are being assessed, the Westinghouse AP1000 and the Russian VVER AES92. It is currently planned to publish these two new assessments in the first half of 2006. Others may be undertaken meanwhile. 2- revision of the generic requirements. A revision C of the volume 4 dedicated to power generation plant is being completed. It includes responses to vendors comments and feedback from the TVO call for bid for Finland 5. A revision D of the volumes 1 and 2 dedicated to nuclear islands is foreseen. The main contributions to this revision are the harmonization actions going on in Europe about nuclear safety (WENRA study on reactor safety harmonization, EC works, evolution of the IAEA guides and requirements), the harmonization works on the conditions of connection to the European HV grid as well as harmonization works on other matters, like codes and standards. This has given a unified frame in which the future nuclear plants can be designed and built. In this frame development of standards designs usable throughout Europe without major design change is possible, thus helping to increase competition, and ultimately to save investment and operating costs

An approach for estimating the radiological significance of a hypothetical major nuclear accident over long distance transboundary scales

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mitrakos, D., E-mail: dimitris.mitrakos@eeae.gr; Potiriadis, C.; Housiadas, C.

2016-04-15

Highlights: • Actions may be warranted after a major nuclear accident even at long distances. • Distance may not be the decisive parameter for longer term radiological impact. • Remote impact may vary orders of magnitude depending on the meteorological conditions. • The potential impact can be assessed using computationally inexpensive calculations. - Abstract: After the Fukushima accident important initiatives were taken in European level to enhance the nuclear safety level of the existing and planned nuclear reactors, such as the so-called nuclear “stress-tests” and the amendment of the Nuclear Safety Directive. A recent work of HERCA and WENRA focused on the need for a more consistent and harmonized response in a transboundary context in case of a hypothetical major nuclear accident in Europe. Such an accident, although very improbable, cannot be totally excluded and so, should be considered in emergency preparedness arrangements among the various European countries. In case of a hypothetical severe Fukushima-like accident in Europe, the role of the neighboring countries may be important, since the authorities should be able to provide information and advice to the government and the public, but also can contribute to the overall assessment of the situation be their own means. In this work we assess the radiological significance of a hypothetical major nuclear accident for distances longer than 300 km that are not typically covered by the internationally accepted emergency planning zones. The approach is simple and computationally inexpensive, since it is based on the calculation of only a few release scenarios at dates selected within a whole year on the basis of bounding the deposition levels at long distances in relation to the occurrence of precipitation. From the calculated results it is evident that distance is not the only decisive parameter in estimating the potential radiological significance of a severe nuclear accident. The hypothetical

Radiation protection in Bohunice NPP. Description of present status

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dobis, L.

2001-01-01

Radiation protection (RP) at Bohunice NPP has reached the high international standard. The fact was approved by several independent international missions (OSART , WANO, WENRA, ...). A lot of modifications have been done in order to improve the standard of radiation protection. All the BSS requirements have been implemented into the plant regulations before the State Law No 290/1996 and 470/2000 came into the force. Internal audits are regularly performed at NPP in order to reveal potential deficiencies. In 2001 there were 4 such audits focused on quality assurance, software operation, LBB concept and limits and condition of safe operation. State Health Institute, the regulatory body in the radiation protection, performs the inspection at least ones a month. Good relationship with the inspectors of State Health Institute also contributes to the safe operation of the NPP. There were not any radiation accident. All anomalies or radiation events are investigated at a plant level. The results of root cause analysis and proposal of corrective actions are provided to IAEA and WANO databases for the distribution. The Radiation protection department of Bohunice NPP cooperates with the other Czech and Slovak NPPs. Regular meetings on radiation protection and lately also on emergency preparedness are organized. The cooperation is excellent. Occupational exposure is reviewed also with respect of ISOE data. Bohunice NPP (even with high dose burden caused by reconstruction of V1 NPP) can be found in the first half of world PWR speaking about the collective exposure per reactor. V2 NPP itself reaches the lowest collective exposure in the world. All doses are below the limits and kept ALARA. ALARA system has been established already in 1997 at Bohunice NPP and its results are obvious for example looking at dose results during the reconstruction works at V1 NPP. The operation of Bohunice NPP has negligible influence to its surroundings. The values of gas and liquid effluents move

Recent achievements of the EUR organisation (European utility requirements for advanced light water reactors) - 15365

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jacquart, G.; Guelfi, A.; Vanhoenacker, L.; Pouget-Abadie, X.; Engstroem, J.

2015-01-01

's EU-APR1400 and AEP's VVER TOI). The paper briefly recalls the EUR design assessment objectives and process and the progress of the different assessment projects. The third topic to be covered by this paper is the interaction between the EUR and the other stakeholders, in particular the other international organisations (ENISS, WNA/CORDEL, WENRA, IAEA, EPRI). The paper describes how the EUR organisation is connected to these stakeholders and the corresponding cooperation results and future projects. (authors)

Stress test of the nuclear power plants performed in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu, C.H.; Teng, W.C.; Chang, S.; Chen, Y.B.

2014-01-01

In the wake of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants event, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has asked Taiwan's Nuclear Power Plant operator (TPC) to re-examine and re-evaluate the vulnerabilities of its nuclear units, and furthermore, take possible countermeasures against extreme natural disasters, including earthquake, tsunami and rock-and-mud slide. The evaluation process should be based on both within and beyond Design Basis Accidents, by reference to the actions recommended by the world nuclear authorities and groups, namely, IAEA, USNRC, NEI, ENSREG and WANO. Taiwan is a very densely populated region of the world. Furthermore, like Japan, due to its geophysical position, Taiwan is prone to large scale earthquakes, and although historically rare, Taiwan also faces the potential risk of tsunamis. AEC also asked TPC to perform the stress test following the specification given by WENRA (later ENSREG) and conducted in all the EU's nuclear reactors. After completion of the stress test for all the nuclear power plants, AEC was trying to have the reports peer reviewed by international organizations, as EU did. The OECD/NEA accepted AEC's request and formed a review team specific to the review of Taiwan's National Report for the Stress Test. There were 18 follow-up items after the NEA's review. Based on these items, AEC developed five orders to require TPC further enhancing their capabilities to cope with extreme natural hazards. The ENSREG also formed a nine-expert review team for Taiwan's Stress Test in response to AEC's request almost at the same time as the OECD/NEA. The ENSREG review team began their works in June 2013 by desktop review, and ended in early October 2013 by country visit to Taiwan. While the assessment of post-Fukushima evaluation reveals neither immediate nuclear safety concerns nor threats to the public health and safety, AEC requested that TPC focus on strengthening its re-evaluation on design

Stress test of the nuclear power plants performed in Taiwan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wu, C.H.; Teng, W.C.; Chang, S.; Chen, Y.B. [Atomic Energy Council, Taipei, Taiwan (China)

2014-07-01

In the wake of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants event, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has asked Taiwan's Nuclear Power Plant operator (TPC) to re-examine and re-evaluate the vulnerabilities of its nuclear units, and furthermore, take possible countermeasures against extreme natural disasters, including earthquake, tsunami and rock-and-mud slide. The evaluation process should be based on both within and beyond Design Basis Accidents, by reference to the actions recommended by the world nuclear authorities and groups, namely, IAEA, USNRC, NEI, ENSREG and WANO. Taiwan is a very densely populated region of the world. Furthermore, like Japan, due to its geophysical position, Taiwan is prone to large scale earthquakes, and although historically rare, Taiwan also faces the potential risk of tsunamis. AEC also asked TPC to perform the stress test following the specification given by WENRA (later ENSREG) and conducted in all the EU's nuclear reactors. After completion of the stress test for all the nuclear power plants, AEC was trying to have the reports peer reviewed by international organizations, as EU did. The OECD/NEA accepted AEC's request and formed a review team specific to the review of Taiwan's National Report for the Stress Test. There were 18 follow-up items after the NEA's review. Based on these items, AEC developed five orders to require TPC further enhancing their capabilities to cope with extreme natural hazards. The ENSREG also formed a nine-expert review team for Taiwan's Stress Test in response to AEC's request almost at the same time as the OECD/NEA. The ENSREG review team began their works in June 2013 by desktop review, and ended in early October 2013 by country visit to Taiwan. While the assessment of post-Fukushima evaluation reveals neither immediate nuclear safety concerns nor threats to the public health and safety, AEC requested that TPC focus on strengthening its re-evaluation on design

Periodic Safety Review in Interim Storage Facilities - Current Regulation and Experiences in Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neles, Julia Mareike; Schmidt, Gerhard

2014-01-01

Periodic safety reviews in nuclear power plants in Germany have been performed since the end of the 1980's as an indirect follow-up of the accident in Chernobyl and, in the meantime, are formally required by law. During this process the guidelines governing this review were developed in stages and reached their final form in 1996. Interim storage facilities and other nuclear facilities at that time were not included, so the guidelines were solely focused on the specific safety issues of nuclear power plants. Following IAEA's recommendations, the Western European Nuclear Regulator Association (WENRA) introduced PSRs in its safety reference levels for storage facilities (current version in WGWD report 2.1 as of Feb 2011: SRLs 59 - 61). Based on these formulations, Germany improved its regulation in 2010 with a recommendation of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (Entsorgungskommission, ESK), an expert advisory commission for the federal regulatory body BMU. The ESK formulated these detailed requirements in the 'ESK recommendation for guides to the performance of periodic safety reviews for interim storage facilities for irradiated fuel elements and heat-generating radioactive waste'. Before finalization of the guideline a test phase was introduced, aimed to test the new regulation in practice and to later include the lessons learned in the final formulation of the guideline. The two-year test phase started in October 2011 in which the performance of a PSR will be tested at two selected interim storage facilities. Currently these recommendations are discussed with interested/concerned institutions. The results of the test phase shall be considered for improvements of the draft and during the final preparation of guidelines. Currently the PSR for the first ISF is in an advanced stage, the second facility just started the process. Preliminary conclusions from the test phase show that the implementation of the draft guideline requires interpretation. The aim of a

ABWR1. A Generation III.7 reactor after the Fukushima Daiichi accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sato, Takashi; Matsumoto, Keiji; Kurosaki, Toshikazu; Taguchi, Keisuke

2015-01-01

iB1350 stands for an innovative, intelligent and inexpensive BWR 1350. It is the first Generation III.7 reactor after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It has incorporated lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and WENRA safety objectives. It has innovative safety to cope with devastating natural disasters including a giant earthquake, a large tsunami and a monster hurricane. The iB1350 can survive passively such devastation and a very prolonged SBO without any support from the outside of a site up to 7 days even preventing core melt. It, however, is based on the well-established proven ABWR design. The NSSS is exactly the same as that of the current ABWR. As for safety design it has a double cylinder RCCV (Mark W containment) and an in-depth hybrid safety system (IDHS). The Mark W containment has double FP confinement barriers and the in-containment filtered venting system (IFVS) that enable passively no emergency evacuation outside the immediate vicinity of the plant for a SA. It has a large volume to hold hydrogen, a core catcher, a passive flooding system and an innovative passive containment cooling system (iPCCS) establishing passively practical elimination of containment failure even in a long term. The IDHS consists of 4 division active safety systems for a DBA, 2 division active safety systems for a SA and built-in passive safety systems (BiPSS) consisting of an isolation condenser (IC) and the iPCCS for a SA. The IC/PCCS pools have enough capacity for 7 day grace period. The IC/PCCS heat exchangers, core and spent fuel pool are enclosed inside the CV building and protected against a large airplane crash. The iB1350 can survive a large airplane crash only by the CV building and the built-in passive safety systems therein. The dome of the CV building consists of a single wall made of steel and concrete composite. This single dome structure facilitates a short-term construction period and cost saving. The CV diameter is smaller than that of most

Experience of Bohunice V-1 NPP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dobik, Dobroslav

2000-01-01

. Since 'European nuclear safety criteria' don't exist, all international recommendations are used in Bohunice, and our results were highly quoted at the following events: IAEA April - Meeting of contracting parties to Convention on Nuclear Safety; IAEA Final Report of the Programme on the safety of WWER and RBMK NPPs in May; IAEA Conference on Nuclear Safety in the Middle and East European Countries in June. There are two activities, both on a voluntary basis - WENRA's assessment of some applicants countries NPPs/Bohunice, Kozloduy, Ignalina and another activity trying to define safety criteria for NPPs large producers and operating utilities are involved in. As far as there is not a unique legislation in this area existing in EU, it cannot be an official item of the accession negotiation

Safety Consideration for a Wet Interim Spent Fuel Store at Conceptual Design Stage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Astoux, Marion

2014-01-01

EDF Energy plans to build and operate two UK EPRs at the Hinkley Point C (HPC) site in Somerset, England. Spent fuel from the UK EPRs will need to be managed from the time it is discharged from the reactor until it is ultimately disposed of and this will involve storing the spent fuel for a period in the fuel building and thereafter in a dedicated interim facility until it can be emplaced within the UK Geological Disposal Facility. EDF Energy has proposed that this interim store should be located on the Hinkley Point site which is consistent with UK policy. This Interim Spent Fuel Store (ISFS) will have the capability to store for at least one hundred years the spent fuel arising from the operation of the two EPR units (sixty years operation). Therefore, specificities regarding the lifetime of the facility have to be accounted for its design. The choice of interim storage technology was considered in some depth for the HPC project and wet storage (pool) was selected. The facility is currently at conceptual design stage, although its construction will be part of main site construction phase. Safety functions and safety requirements for this storage facility have been defined, in compliance with WENRA 'Waste and Spent Fuel Storage - Safety Reference Level Report' and IAEA Specific Safety Guide no. 15 'Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel'. EDF technical know-how, operational feedback on existing storage pools, UK regulatory context and Fukushima experience feedback have also been accounted for. Achievement of the safety functions as passively as reasonably practicable is a key issue for the design, especially in accident situations. Regarding lifetime aspects, ageing management of equipments, optimisation of the refurbishment, climate change, passivity of the facility, and long-term achievement of the safety functions are among the subjects to consider. Adequate Operational Limits and Conditions will also have to be defined, to enable the long-term achievement of the safety

Review of national and international demands on fire protection in nuclear power plants and their application in the Swedish nuclear industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fredholm, Lotta

2010-02-01

regarding fire safety at nuclear power plants that have been studied are regulation from USA, Finland, Great Britain, Canada, Germany and the international organisations IAEA and WENRA. The conclusion of this study is that the differences between the regulations mostly are differences in detailed fire safety design. Some differences can not easily be explained by national. Differences and the resulting effect on the overall fire safety is very difficult to evaluate. Regarding how to improve the Swedish regulations regarding fire safety at nuclear power plants there are different possibilities. One is to complement the regulations with acceptable solutions on how to design the fire protection. If this shall be done IAEAs Safety Guides seem to be the easiest of the more detailed fire requirements to adopt to Swedish conditions. Another way of improving the regulation is to give more guidance on how to proof that the rules are fulfilled. In this case the Canadian guidelines may be a good source of ideas and information

Review of national and international demands on fire protection in nuclear power plants and their application in the Swedish nuclear industry; Oeversikt av nationell och internationell kravbild avseende brandskydd paa kaernkraftverk och hur dessa tillaempas i svensk kaernkraftindustri

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fredholm, Lotta (Tyrens AB, Malmoe (Sweden))

2010-02-15

regarding fire safety at nuclear power plants that have been studied are regulation from USA, Finland, Great Britain, Canada, Germany and the international organisations IAEA and WENRA. The conclusion of this study is that the differences between the regulations mostly are differences in detailed fire safety design. Some differences can not easily be explained by national. Differences and the resulting effect on the overall fire safety is very difficult to evaluate. Regarding how to improve the Swedish regulations regarding fire safety at nuclear power plants there are different possibilities. One is to complement the regulations with acceptable solutions on how to design the fire protection. If this shall be done IAEAs Safety Guides seem to be the easiest of the more detailed fire requirements to adopt to Swedish conditions. Another way of improving the regulation is to give more guidance on how to proof that the rules are fulfilled. In this case the Canadian guidelines may be a good source of ideas and information

Multinational design evaluation programme - 2009 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-06-01

The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) was established in 2006 as a multinational initiative to develop innovative approaches to leverage the resources and knowledge of the national regulatory authorities who are currently or will be tasked with the review of new reactor power plant designs. MDEP comprises 13 countries' nuclear regulatory authorities and is structured under 3 design-specific working groups and 3 issue-specific working groups which meet several times a year. The OECD/NEA facilitates MDEP's activities by acting as technical secretariat for the programme. The MDEP Policy Group (PG) and the Steering Technical Committee (STC) oversee the programme. MDEP's main objectives can be defined as follows: - to enhance multilateral co-operation within existing regulatory frameworks; - to encourage multinational convergence of codes, standards and safety goals; - to implement the MDEP products in order to facilitate the licensing of new reactors, including those being developed by the Generation IV International Forum. To carry out the work, two main lines of activity have been implemented: - the exploration of opportunities for harmonisation of regulatory practices; - the cooperation on the safety reviews of specific reactor designs. MDEP engages with key stakeholders involved in ensuring the safety of new reactor designs, manufacturing, construction and operation. At this time, these stakeholders include other national regulatory authorities and international organisations involved in ensuring nuclear safety including the IAEA, Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA), NEA Committees on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) and Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), the various reactor vendors, nuclear component manufacturers, mechanical and electrical standards development organisations, reactor operators and licensees and key industry representatives such as World Nuclear Association (WNA). To this end, the MDEP has organised a

Probabilistic analysis of external events with focus on the Fukushima event

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kollasko, Heiko; Jockenhoevel-Barttfeld, Mariana; Klapp, Ulrich

2014-01-01

by the SKI guidance 2:27 and have been performed as part of the PSA for new plant designs and for installed based projects. Following the Fukushima event from March 2011, the methodology for screening external events has been reviewed at AREVA with respect to its applicability, limitations and to the identification of enhancement areas. This paper presents the screening analysis methodology to identify relevant external events and external event combinations. In line with the WENRA Position paper, this approach provides valuable input information for the identification of single external events and their combinations to create Fukushima-like rare and severe external hazards which may need to be addressed additionally to the general design basis as design extension hazards by realistic analyses rather than conservative. The analysis is based on a systematic identification of relevant external event combinations which includes earthquake-induced external events and takes into account a deterministic justification of the design basis for external events including beyond design external events. Lessons learnt from the Fukushima accident have been identified and evaluated in order to be considered for reinforcement in the identification, screening and in the detailed probabilistic analysis of external events. (authors)

Implementation of Defence in Depth at Nuclear Power Plants. Lessons Learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lachaume, Jean-Luc; Miller, Douglass; Rzentkowski, Greg; Lahtinen, Nina; Valtonen, Keijo; Foucher, Laurent; Harikumar, Shri S.; Yamada, Tomoho; Sharafutdinov, Rashet; Kuznetsov, Mark; Carlsson, Lennart; Hanberg, Jan; Theiss, Klaus; Holahan, Gary; Williams, Donna; Nuenighoff, Kay; Wattelle, Emmanuel; Lazo, Edward; White, Andrew; Reig, Javier; Salgado, Nancy; Weightman, Mike

2016-01-01

Defence in depth (DiD) is a concept that has been used for many years alongside tools to optimise nuclear safety in reactor design, assessment and regulation. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident raised many questions and gave unique insight into nuclear safety issues, including DiD. In June 2013, the NEA held a Joint Workshop on Challenges and Enhancements to DiD in Light of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (NEA, 2014), organised by the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). It was noted at the time that further work would be beneficial to enhance nuclear safety worldwide, especially with regard to the implementation of DiD. Accordingly, a senior-level task group (STG) was set up to produce a regulatory guidance booklet that would assist member countries in the use of DiD, taking into account lessons learnt from the 2011 accident. This regulatory guidance booklet builds on the work of this NEA workshop, of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and of other members of the STG. It uses as its basis the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's Defence in Depth in Nuclear Safety study (INSAG-10) (IAEA, 1996). The booklet provides insights into the implementation of DiD by regulators and emergency management authorities after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, aiming to enhance global harmonisation by providing guidance on: - the background to the DiD concept; - the need for independent effectiveness among the safety provisions for the various DiD levels, to the extent practicable; - the need for greater attention to reinforce prevention and mitigation at the various levels; - the vital importance of ensuring that common cause and common mode failures, especially external events acting in combination, do not lead to breaches of safety provisions at several DiD levels, taking note of the

iB1350 no.1. A generation III.7 reactor after the Fukushima Daiichi accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sato, Takashi; Matsumoto, Keiji; Hosomi, Kenji; Kojima, Yoshihiro; Taguchi, Keisuke

2017-01-01

iB1350 stands for an innovative, intelligent and inexpensive BWR 1350. It is the first generation III.7 reactor after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It has incorporated lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and WENRA safety objectives. It has innovative safety to cope with devastating natural disasters including a giant earthquake, a large tsunami and a monster hurricane. The iB1350 can survive passively such devastation and a very prolonged SBO without any support from the outside of a site up to 7 days even preventing core melt. It, however, is based on the well-established proven ABWR design. The NSSS is exactly the same as that of the current ABWR. As for safety design, it has a double cylinder RCCV (Mark W containment) and in-depth hybrid safety systems (IDHS). The Mark W containment has double FP confinement barriers and the in-containment filtered venting system (IFVS) that enable passively no emergency evacuation outside the immediate vicinity of the plant for a SA. It has a large volume to hold hydrogen, an innovative core catcher (iCC), a passive flooding system and an innovative passive containment cooling system (iPCCS) establishing passively practical elimination of containment failure even in a long term. The IDHS consists of 4 division active safety systems for a DBA, 2 division active safety systems for a SA and built-in passive safety systems (BiPSS) consisting of an isolation condenser (IC) and the iPCCS for a SA. While the conventional PCCS can never cool the S/P, the iPCCS can automatically cool the S/P directly even in a DBA LOCA. That makes it possible for the iB1350 to optimize the active safety systems for a DBA. Sato came up with several optimized configurations of the IDHS that are expected to achieve further cost reduction and enhance its reliability resulting from passive feature of the iPCCS. The IC/iPCCS pool has enough capacity for 7 day grace period. The IC/iPCCS heat exchangers, the core and the spent fuel pool are

Nuclear power is really assisting Romania on its accession way to the European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bilegan, Iosif Constantin

2005-01-01

accurate information on the overall indices and new regional development trends. Public's perceptions is evolving into the right direction with respect to nuclear power. As a result of public debates, more and more people become aware, understand and place proper confidence in nuclear technology that is environmentally friendly while offering safe, reliable and cost effective industrial electricity. Once concluded the Agreement of Accession to the European Union on February 1st, 1995, Romania irreversibly committed itself onto the way of the European integration, assuming increased responsibilities regarding the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. The conclusion of the analysis carried out by the European Commission '2000 Agenda', confirmed by the Western Europe Nuclear Regulators' Association - WENRA, were in favor of Romania and Slovenia, presently the only countries in the Central and South-eastern Europe that hold nuclear units (Cernavoda and Krsko, respectively) based on western technology design. It is obviously that each country is monitored and evaluated for the purpose of harmonizing all the units' nuclear safety standards imposed on European level. The following conclusions come out of the aforesaid: - The electric power developed in Romania based on the CANDU Western Technology successfully complies with the nuclear safety requirements and standards. Thus, considering this pre-requisite, the process of our country's accession to the European structure is not jeopardized; - moreover by using the own resources of natural uranium and heavy water for the industrial generation of electricity, Romania is contributing to its own safe supply and EU's safe supply as well, after the accession; - the development strategies and policies in the electric power in Romania are harmonized with the present ones provided for the EU development, what is confirmed by the current support granted by EURATOM for the completion of the Cernavoda NPP Unit 2. (author)

EU-stress test: Swiss national action plan. Follow-up of peer review 2012 year-end status report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2012-12-15

of the events at Fukushima, are being processed according to their importance and urgency in a Swiss action plan. There was a lack of consistency identified with respect to natural hazards assessments where significant differences exist in national approaches and where difficulties were encountered with beyond design margins and cliff-edge effects assessments. The peer review Board recommends that the Western European Nuclear Safety Regulators Association (WENRA) develop guidance on natural hazards assessments, including earthquake, flooding and extreme weather conditions, as well as on the assessment of margins beyond the design basis and cliff-edge effects. In Switzerland, the periodic safety review is mandatory every 10 years; the risk from external hazards is re-evaluated. ENSI required a re-evaluation of severe weather conditions. A comprehensive research project on external flooding was initiated. The Fukushima disaster highlighted the importance of the containment function as the last barrier to protect the people and the environment against radioactive releases resulting from a nuclear accident. All Swiss NPPs are equipped with special bunkered safety systems designed against extreme external events. ENSI requested a new safety case to demonstrate that the Swiss NPPs have adequate protection against the 10,000-year earthquake and the combination of this earthquake and a 10,000-year flooding. The necessary analyses were submitted by the licence holders. A flood-proof and earthquake-resistant external storage facility is in place at Reitnau since June 2011, in order to strengthen the provision for accident mitigation. It contains various operational resources, in particular mobile motor-driven pumps, mobile emergency power generators, hoses and cables, radiation protection suits, tools, diesel fuel and boration agents. This storage facility is located on top of a hill and is accessible by road or by helicopter. The three independent storage buildings are

EU-stress test: Swiss national action plan. Follow-up of peer review 2012 year-end status report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-12-01

of the events at Fukushima, are being processed according to their importance and urgency in a Swiss action plan. There was a lack of consistency identified with respect to natural hazards assessments where significant differences exist in national approaches and where difficulties were encountered with beyond design margins and cliff-edge effects assessments. The peer review Board recommends that the Western European Nuclear Safety Regulators Association (WENRA) develop guidance on natural hazards assessments, including earthquake, flooding and extreme weather conditions, as well as on the assessment of margins beyond the design basis and cliff-edge effects. In Switzerland, the periodic safety review is mandatory every 10 years; the risk from external hazards is re-evaluated. ENSI required a re-evaluation of severe weather conditions. A comprehensive research project on external flooding was initiated. The Fukushima disaster highlighted the importance of the containment function as the last barrier to protect the people and the environment against radioactive releases resulting from a nuclear accident. All Swiss NPPs are equipped with special bunkered safety systems designed against extreme external events. ENSI requested a new safety case to demonstrate that the Swiss NPPs have adequate protection against the 10,000-year earthquake and the combination of this earthquake and a 10,000-year flooding. The necessary analyses were submitted by the licence holders. A flood-proof and earthquake-resistant external storage facility is in place at Reitnau since June 2011, in order to strengthen the provision for accident mitigation. It contains various operational resources, in particular mobile motor-driven pumps, mobile emergency power generators, hoses and cables, radiation protection suits, tools, diesel fuel and boration agents. This storage facility is located on top of a hill and is accessible by road or by helicopter. The three independent storage buildings are

Licensing of safety critical software for nuclear reactors. Common position of seven European nuclear regulators and authorised technical support organisations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

It is widely accepted that the assessment of software cannot be limited to verification and testing of the end product, i.e. the computer code. Other factors such as the quality of the processes and methods for specifying, designing and coding have an important impact on the implementation. Existing standards provide limited guidance on the regulatory and safety assessment of these factors. An undesirable consequence of this situation is that the licensing approaches taken by nuclear safety authorities and by technical support organisations are determined independently with only limited informal technical co-ordination and information exchange. It is notable that several software implementations of nuclear safety systems have been marred by costly delays caused by difficulties in co-ordinating the development and qualification process. It was thus felt necessary to compare the respective licensing approaches, to identify where a consensus already exists, and to see how greater consistency and more mutual acceptance could be introduced into current practices. This report is the result of the work of a group of regulator and safety authorities' experts. The 2007 version was completed at the invitation of the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA). The major result of the work is the identification of consensus and common technical positions on a set of important licensing issues raised by the design and operation of computer based systems used in nuclear power plants for the implementation of safety functions. The purpose is to introduce greater consistency and more mutual acceptance into current practices. To achieve these common positions, detailed consideration was paid to the licensing approaches followed in the different countries represented by the experts of the task force. The report is intended to be useful: - to coordinate regulators' and safety experts' technical viewpoints in the design of regulators' national policies and in revisions

Licensing of safety critical software for nuclear reactors. Common position of seven European nuclear regulators and authorised technical support organisations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-07-01

It is widely accepted that the assessment of software cannot be limited to verification and testing of the end product, i.e. the computer code. Other factors such as the quality of the processes and methods for specifying, designing and coding have an important impact on the implementation. Existing standards provide limited guidance on the regulatory and safety assessment of these factors. An undesirable consequence of this situation is that the licensing approaches taken by nuclear safety authorities and by technical support organisations are determined independently with only limited informal technical co-ordination and information exchange. It is notable that several software implementations of nuclear safety systems have been marred by costly delays caused by difficulties in co-ordinating the development and qualification process. It was thus felt necessary to compare the respective licensing approaches, to identify where a consensus already exists, and to see how greater consistency and more mutual acceptance could be introduced into current practices. This report is the result of the work of a group of regulator and safety authorities' experts. The 2007 version was completed at the invitation of the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA). The major result of the work is the identification of consensus and common technical positions on a set of important licensing issues raised by the design and operation of computer based systems used in nuclear power plants for the implementation of safety functions. The purpose is to introduce greater consistency and more mutual acceptance into current practices. To achieve these common positions, detailed consideration was paid to the licensing approaches followed in the different countries represented by the experts of the task force. The report is intended to be useful: - to coordinate regulators' and safety experts' technical viewpoints in the design of regulators' national

Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-07-15

Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). In accordance with Article 5 of CNS, Switzerland has submitted 4 country reports for Review Meetings of Contracting Parties. This 5{sup th} report by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. The report attempts to give appropriate consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 4{sup th} Review Meeting. It starts with general political information on Switzerland, a brief history of nuclear power and an overview of Swiss nuclear facilities. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the status of nuclear safety in Switzerland (as of July 2010) which indicates how Switzerland complies with the key obligations of the Convention. ENSI updated a substantial proportion of its guidelines which are harmonised with the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) based on IAEA Safety Standards. On 1{sup st} January 2009, ENSI became formally independent of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. It is now a stand-alone organisation controlled by its own management board. Switzerland recently started a process to select a site for the disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Energy Act and its ordinance came into force

Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-07-01

Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). In accordance with Article 5 of CNS, Switzerland has submitted 4 country reports for Review Meetings of Contracting Parties. This 5 th report by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. The report attempts to give appropriate consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 4 th Review Meeting. It starts with general political information on Switzerland, a brief history of nuclear power and an overview of Swiss nuclear facilities. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the status of nuclear safety in Switzerland (as of July 2010) which indicates how Switzerland complies with the key obligations of the Convention. ENSI updated a substantial proportion of its guidelines which are harmonised with the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) based on IAEA Safety Standards. On 1 st January 2009, ENSI became formally independent of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. It is now a stand-alone organisation controlled by its own management board. Switzerland recently started a process to select a site for the disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Energy Act and its ordinance came into force in 2005

Fukushima action plan 2015; Aktionsplan Fukushima 2015

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2015-02-15

assumptions. Therefore the legal base requirements with respect to the prevention goals (control of reactivity, cooling of the fuel assemblies and containment of radioactive materials) are guarantied. For a further improvement of safety, ENSI nevertheless defined a series of other requirements such as the requirement for various diverse heat removal systems which should be safe against flooding and earthquakes. ENSI monitors the implementation of its requirements through continued supervision, e.g. providing written comments, delivery of licences or through inspections and checks at the plant. ENSI required the plant operators to participate in the European Union (EU) stress tests. In the Swiss report on the EU stress tests ENSI provided written comments on the documents sent by the plant operators. Additional ordinances were published to clear 3 important open points from the analysis of the final reports of the Swiss NPPs on the EU stress tests. Then the Swiss data were submitted to a peer review process at European level which confirmed the conclusions of ENSI concerning the safety of the Swiss NPPs and further provided a survey of the status of the nuclear facilities in Europe. The 2 recommendations of the peer review for Switzerland concern design exceeding scenarios; they are presently being looked at by ENSI. Besides, ENSI takes part in the follow-up work on the EU stress tests in order to monitor the application of the recommended measures in Europe and actively collaborates in the optimisation of the WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels. ENSI published 4 reports concerning the events during the Fukushima accident with special emphasis on the human and organisational factors, the radiological consequences and the lessons which can be learned from them. The knowledge which can be gained from the analysis of the accident unfolding at Fukushima was tested for application in Switzerland and was compiled in a series of check points. After finishing the analyses of the EU

Proceedings (slides) of the OECD/NEA Workshop on Innovations in Water-cooled Reactor Technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Spiler, Joze; Kim, Sang-Baik; ); Feron, Fabien; Jaervinen, Marja-Leena; Husse, Julien; ); Ferraro, Giovanni; Bertels, Frank; Denk, Wolfgang; Tuomisto, Harri; Golay, Michael; Buongiorno, J.; Todreas, N.; Adams, E.; Briccetti, A.; Jurewicz, J.; Kindfuller, V.; Srinivasan, G.; Strother, M.; Minelli, P.; Fasil, E.; Zhang, J.; Genzman, G.; Epinois, Bertrand de l'; Kim, Shin Whan; Laaksonen, Jukka; Maltsev, Mikhail; Yu, CHongxing; Powell, David; Gorgemans, Julie; Hopwood, Jerry; Bylov, Igor; Bakhmetyev, Alexander M.; Lepekhin, Andrey N.; Fadeev, Yuriy P.; Bruna, Giovanni; Gulliford, Jim; ); Ham-Su, Rosaura; Thevenot, Caroline; GAUTIER, Guy-Marie; MARSAULT, Philippe; PIGNATEL, Jean-Francois; White, Andrew; )

2015-02-01

development or being considered for future water-cooled reactors; - Advantages that Gen III reactors have over previous designs in terms of economics, fuel utilisation, thermal efficiency, etc; - Operational issues of nuclear power plants in future low carbon energy systems with high shares of variable renewables, and issues posed by climate change (e.g. water scarcity, increased air and water temperatures and extreme weather events). - Standardisation, modularization and constructability issues and challenges; - A discussion of key differences between Gen II and Gen III designs, and possibilities of back-fitting Generation II reactors with new technologies, as part of a Long Term Operation strategy. This document brings together the available presentations (slides), dealing with: 1 - Utility safety and performance requirements in Europe (J. Spiler); 2 - EPRI Utility Requirement Document (S.B. Kim); 3 - WENRA activities on new and existing reactors (F. Feron); 4 - Evolution of the Finnish safety regulations and implementation ( M.L. Jaervinen); 5 - Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (J. Husse); 6 - EDF France modernization program for the existing NPPs (G. Ferraro); 7 - Innovations in GEN III designs and modernisation of existing NPP - An operator's point of view (F. Bertels); 8 - Modernisation of existing NPPs in Switzerland (W. Denk); 9 - Nuclear Technology Improvements in Modernization, Refurbishment and New Build Projects in Finland (H. Tuomisto); 10 - Round table discussion - Renewable and nuclear energy-based mitigation of climate change: substitution for fossil fuel usage (M. Golay); 11 - Innovation in water cooled reactor technologies (B. de l'Epinois); 12 - APR1400 - Safe, Reliable Technology (S. W. Kim); 13 - Advanced safety features of 3. generation VVER Plants (J. Laaksonen); 14 - Additional information on modern VVER GEN III Technology (M. Maltsev); 15 - Research and Development on Advanced PWR Design Improvement and Innovation in NPI (C. Yu); 16 - GE

Fukushima action plan 2014; Aktionsplan Fukushima 2014

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-02-15

valid risk assumptions. Therefore the legal base requirements with respect to the prevention goals (control of reactivity, cooling of the fuel assemblies and containment of radioactive materials) are guarantied. For a further improvement of safety, ENSI nevertheless defined a series of other requirements such as the requirement for various diverse heat removal systems which should be safe against flooding and earthquakes. ENSI monitors the implementation of its requirements through continued supervision, e.g. providing written comments, delivery of licences or through inspections and checks at the plant. ENSI required the plant operators to participate in the European Union (EU) stress tests. In the Swiss report on the EU stress tests ENSI provided written comments on the documents sent by the plant operators. Additional ordinances were published to clear 3 important open points from the analysis of the final reports of the Swiss NPPs on the EU stress tests. Then the Swiss data were submitted to a peer review process at European level which confirmed the conclusions of ENSI concerning the safety of the Swiss NPPs and further provided a survey of the status of the nuclear facilities in Europe. The 2 recommendations of the peer review for Switzerland concern design-exceeding scenarios; they are presently being looked at by ENSI. Besides, ENSI takes part in the follow-up work on the EU stress tests in order to monitor the application of the recommended measures in Europe and actively collaborates in the optimisation of the WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels. ENSI published 4 reports concerning the events during the Fukushima accident with special emphasis on the human and organisational factors, the radiological consequences and the lessons which can be learned from them. The knowledge which can be gained from the analysis of the accident unfolding at Fukushima was tested for application in Switzerland and was compiled in a series of check points. After finishing the

Research and experience report 2009. Developments in the technical and legal basis of nuclear oversight

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-04-01

intake points in the cooling water outlet. There have been defects and incidents in the construction of the new plants at Olkiluoto (Finland) and Flamanville (France) relating to concreting work and inadequate welding specifications. ENSI will develop a new surveillance concept for the construction of NPPs, so that Switzerland is prepared in time for any new builds. ENSI maintains active links with international organisations, particularly with IAEA, OECD/NEA and WENRA and also has a series of bilateral agreements with France, Germany, Austria and the USA. The ENSI contribution to current negotiations on greater global harmonisation is based on the stringent nuclear safety standards in Switzerland. At the 3 rd Review Conference of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Switzerland received a rating of good for its Country Report: other countries welcomed the transparency of the master plan procedure and the participation of the public and neighbouring countries. The research programme at the rock laboratories of Mont Terri and Grimsel also received a positive reception. According to the main requirements of IAEA and the Swiss Nuclear Energy Act, since 1 January 2009 ENSI has been an independent nuclear regulatory body reporting directly to the Federal Council (Swiss national government). The existing ordinances and guidelines are continuously amended to accord with the recent legislation on nuclear energy and also are harmonised with international standards. A new ordinance based on the Nuclear Energy Act took effect in 2009. In addition ENSI completed 8 guidelines, either new or revisions

Research and experience report 2009. Developments in the technical and legal basis of nuclear oversight; Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht 2009. Entwicklungen im Bereich der Grundlagen der nuklearen Aufsicht/Rapport sur la recherche et les experiences en 2009. Developpements dans les bases techniques et legales pour la surveillance nucleaire/Research and experience report 2009. Developments in the technical and legal basis of nuclear oversight

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-04-15

additional intake points in the cooling water outlet. There have been defects and incidents in the construction of the new plants at Olkiluoto (Finland) and Flamanville (France) relating to concreting work and inadequate welding specifications. ENSI will develop a new surveillance concept for the construction of NPPs, so that Switzerland is prepared in time for any new builds. ENSI maintains active links with international organisations, particularly with IAEA, OECD/NEA and WENRA and also has a series of bilateral agreements with France, Germany, Austria and the USA. The ENSI contribution to current negotiations on greater global harmonisation is based on the stringent nuclear safety standards in Switzerland. At the 3{sup rd} Review Conference of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Switzerland received a rating of good for its Country Report: other countries welcomed the transparency of the master plan procedure and the participation of the public and neighbouring countries. The research programme at the rock laboratories of Mont Terri and Grimsel also received a positive reception. According to the main requirements of IAEA and the Swiss Nuclear Energy Act, since 1 January 2009 ENSI has been an independent nuclear regulatory body reporting directly to the Federal Council (Swiss national government). The existing ordinances and guidelines are continuously amended to accord with the recent legislation on nuclear energy and also are harmonised with international standards. A new ordinance based on the Nuclear Energy Act took effect in 2009. In addition ENSI completed 8 guidelines, either new or revisions