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Sample records for wenra

  1. Harmonisation in WENRA and the CSN action plan; La armonizacion en WENRA y el plan de accion del CSN

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Recarte Garcia-Andrade, I.

    2008-07-01

    The Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) is undertaking a process of harmonisation of the regulations of its different member countries, the aim being to homogenise criteria and achieve a high degree of nuclear safety throughout the European Union. The CSN implemented a plan, updated in November last, to at least incorporate the WENRA reference levels in the Spanish system of standards through the issuing of instructions published in the Official State Gazette. (Author)

  2. Harmonizing nuclear safety practices in Europe: WENRA activities in the area of waste management; Harmonisation des pratiques en matiere de surete nucleaire en Europe. Les activites de l'Association des responsables des Autorites de surete nucleaire des pays d'Europe de l'Ouest (WENRA) dans le domaine de la gestion des dechets

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Theis, St. [ENSI, groupe de travail de WENRA sur les dechets et le demantelement (Switzerland); Dandrieux, G.; Feron, F. [Autorite de Surete Nucleaire, representante francaise au sein du groupe de travail de WENRA sur les dechets et le demantelement, 75 - Paris (France)

    2011-02-15

    The Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) was created in 1999. It originally consisted of the heads of the nuclear safety authorities of the member countries of the European Union (E.U.), plus Switzerland. The original objectives of the Association were: to develop a common approach to nuclear safety and regulation, in particular within the E.U.; to provide the E.U. with an independent capability to examine nuclear safety and regulation in candidate countries; to evaluate and achieve a common approach to nuclear safety and regulatory issues which arise. For the detailed work WENRA set up two working groups, for reactor safety (RHWG: reactor harmonization working group) and a little later for waste and decommissioning (WGWD: working group on waste and decommissioning). The basis for all WENRA work is the WENRA policy statement which as a major promoter of developments contains a self commitment of all WENRA member states to implement without undue delay harmonized requirements produced by the working groups after approval of the WENRA plenary. First WENRA publications receiving much public interest were mainly dedicated to the safety of power reactor, and more recently on new reactors and on long term operation of currently operating reactors. (authors)

  3. WENRA. European harmonization of regulations concerning decommissioning and dismantling in the view of safety. What is the state-of-the-art in Germany?; WENRA. Europaweite Harmonisierung des Regelwerkes im Bereich der Stilllegung aus sicherheitstechnischer Sicht. Wo stehen wir in Deutschland?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adler, Jens [E.ON Kernkraft (Germany); Braun, Miriam [EnBW Kernkraft (Germany); Langer, Hermann [Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy (Germany); Storch, Bernd [Energiewerke Nord GmbH (Germany); Versemann, Ralf [RWE Power AG (Germany)

    2008-07-01

    WENRA (Western European nuclear regulators' association) has developed a bottom-up safety approach based on own experiences and IAEA safety standards in terms of reference levels and recommendations. In 2002 the working group on waste and decommissioning (WGWD) was formed with the task of harmonization in the fields waste, spent fuel storage and decommissioning. By the end of 2005 the ''waste and spent fuel storage safety reference level report'' and ''decommissioning safety reference levels report'' was published. The European NPP operators launched in 2006 under the European nuclear installation safety standards (ENISS) of FORATOM the ENISS waste/deco safety group (WDSG). The WENRA benchmark process includes the evaluation of the reference level implementation into the national standards. In 2007 a pilot benchmark was performed for the NPP site Greifswald.

  4. Pilot Study on Harmonisation of Reactor Safety in WENRA Countries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-03-01

    Most of the objectives, set for the Pilot Study, were met. It can be concluded that the methodology was adequate for its purpose. National requirements on selected safety issues have been systematically compared and the major gaps and differences have been identified. Convenient overviews have been provided of differences and similarities between the countries. Furthermore, the conclusions are based on a safety justification and are detailed enough to provide input to a further more detailed analysis on the national level. It was not possible, however, to provide fully verified conclusions about the implementation of the reference levels in the different countries. This has to do with the following constraints on the study: In line with the Terms of Reference, the comparison of formal requirements did not address the more detailed use of criteria and methods to verify compliance. The same requirement could be enforced differently in different regulatory systems, and hence lead to different implementation. The Pilot Study also assessed the implementation, but it was not possible to do this in sufficient detail to identify such differences. The implementation was assessed on the basis of current knowledge of the respective regulatory body, but it was not possible to provide the panels with evidence of the implementation. For these reasons, conclusions about implemented safety provisions in the different countries should be drawn with precaution. The introduction of the panel assessments greatly improved the quality and consistency of the comparison assessments. Uncertainties in the assessments are mainly connected with lack of time to make a detailed analysis in some cases. The reliability of the assessments seems to be sufficient for the objectives of the Pilot Study. The introduction of the IAEA safety standards in the study proved to be helpful and provided confidence in the scope and strictness of the reference levels. This Pilot Study has contributed to understand how to approach harmonisation and has provided a basis for further progress on this important safety and policy issue. The study has further provided a systematic opportunity to learning from best national and international practices in order to promote safety and has already contributed to improvements.

  5. Nuclear safety in EU candidate countries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-01

    Nuclear safety in the candidate countries to the European Union is a major issue that needs to be addressed in the framework of the enlargement process. Therefore WENRA members considered it was their duty to offer their technical assistance to their Governments and the European Union Institutions. They decided to express their collective opinion on nuclear safety in those candidate countries having at least one nuclear power plant: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The report is structured as follows: A foreword including background information, structure of the report and the methodology used, General conclusions of WENRA members reflecting their collective opinion, For each candidate country, an executive summary, a chapter on the status of the regulatory regime and regulatory body, and a chapter on the nuclear power plant safety status. Two annexes are added to address the generic safety characteristics and safety issues for RBMK and VVER plants. The report does not cover radiation protection and decommissioning issues, while safety aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are only covered as regards on-site provisions. In order to produce this report, WENRA used different means: For the chapters on the regulatory regimes and regulatory bodies, experts from WENRA did the work. For the chapters on nuclear power plant safety status, experts from WENRA and from French and German technical support organisations did the work. Taking into account the contents of these chapters, WENRA has formulated its general conclusions in this report.

  6. Instruction of the CSN on the requirements of the system of management of the nuclear power plants; Instruccion del CSN sobre los requisitos del sistema de gestion de las instalaciones nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cid, R.; Santo, A. de; Gil Montes, B.; Toca, A.

    2008-07-01

    The Western European Nations Regulatory Authorities (WENRA) performed a nuclear safety requirements harmonization task, as a result of this work and its implementation, the Spanish Nuclear Safety Counsel (CSN) has the commitment to issue its own Regulation Safety Instructions) to identify the WENRA to level nuclear safety requirements, and to incorporate it in the Spanish regulatory pyramid. However, the Spain nuclear installations meet these requirements through the original criteria to fulfill the regulation of the country that supply the NSSS design, these requirements are not incorporated in our regulation. One of the issues, identified by WENRA, is the implementation of the management system requirements in accord with the IAEA GS-R-3 The Management System for Facilities and Activities. As these regards, the CSN has developed a Safety Instruction, basically endorsing the IAEA GS-R-3. The Safety Instruction is actually in a phase of external comments and should be issued by june 2008. This paper describes the bases for the Safety Instruction, summarises the requirements that would meet the management system for nuclear installations and the activities to perform for its implementations. (Author)

  7. ASN reviews the safety options of the new reactor ATMEA-1; L'ASN engage la revue des options de surete du nouveau reacteur ATMEA-1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anon.

    2010-07-15

    The French authorities of nuclear safety (ASN) have announced that they were asked by the ATMEA company to review the safety options of a new power reactor called ATMEA-1. ATMEA is a common sub-company between Areva and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. ATMEA-1 belongs to the intermediate power range with a power output of 1100 MWe, this reactor is designed to be exported. ASN will make public the conclusions of this review in autumn 2011. ASN backs the WENRA initiative that states that the safety levels of new reactors must be higher than those of today's operating reactors. (A.C.)

  8. Normative development and new regulatory practices CSN; Desarrollo normativo y nuevas practicas reguladoras del CSN

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mellado, I.

    2009-07-01

    The CSN is carrying out an extensive program of standard development in order to harmonize the Spanish regulatory requirements to the reference levels agreed by the Western European Nuclear Regulator Association (WENRA). The capability of publishing Safety Instruction, recognized by the modification of CSN LAW 15/1980, approved in 1999 and developed in 2007, is being used to establish the new standards. In addition, new regulatory practices derived from a collaborative work carried out with UNESA under a program called Improvement of the Regulatory Process Effectivess have being implemented. The conditioned applied standards and the long term operation of NPP are some of the most remarkable. (Author)

  9. Updated action plan for the implementation of measures as a consequence of the Fukushima reactor accident; Fortgeschriebener Aktionsplan zur Umsetzung von Massnahmen nach dem Reaktorunfall in Fukushima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2016-03-15

    The updated German action plan for the implementation of measures as a consequence of the Fukushima reactor accident covers the following issues: decision on the future utilization of nuclear energy in Germany; national frame for security checks, inspections and measures for nuclear power plants; international frame for inspections; action plan and WENRA reference level; action plan for the implementation of measures form robustness enhancement in German nuclear power plants (SNC topics 1-3), action plan for implementation of further measures (CNS topics 4-6).

  10. Hazards and hazard combinations relevant for the safety of nuclear power plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    Decker, Kurt; Brinkman, Hans; Raimond, Emmanuel

    2017-04-01

    The potential of the contemporaneous impact of different, yet causally related, hazardous events and event cascades on nuclear power plants is a major contributor to the overall risk of nuclear installations. In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, which was caused by a combination of severe ground shaking by an earthquake, an earthquake-triggered tsunami and the disruption of the plants from the electrical grid by a seismically induced landslide, hazard combinations and hazard cascades moved into the focus of nuclear safety research. We therefore developed an exhaustive list of external hazards and hazard combinations which pose potential threats to nuclear installations in the framework of the European project ASAMPSAE (Advanced Safety Assessment: Extended PSA). The project gathers 31 partners from Europe, North Amerika and Japan. The list comprises of exhaustive lists of natural hazards, external man-made hazards, and a cross-correlation matrix of these hazards. The hazard list is regarded comprehensive by including all types of hazards that were previously cited in documents by IAEA, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), and others. 73 natural hazards and 24 man-made external hazards are included. Natural hazards are grouped into seismotectonic hazards, flooding and hydrological hazards, extreme values of meteorological phenomena, rare meteorological phenomena, biological hazards / infestation, geological hazards, and forest fire / wild fire. The list of external man-made hazards includes industry accidents, military accidents, transportation accidents, pipeline accidents and other man-made external events. The large number of different hazards results in the extremely large number of 5.151 theoretically possible hazard combinations (not considering hazard cascades). In principle all of these combinations are possible to occur by random coincidence except for 82 hazard combinations that - depending on the time scale - are mutually

  11. Report on nuclear safety in EU applicant countries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-03-01

    Nuclear safety in the candidate countries to the European Union is a major issue which needs to be addressed in the frame of the enlargement process. The Heads of the nuclear safety Regulatory Bodies of the European Union member states having nuclear power plants, i.e. Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom thought it was their duty to offer their assistance to the European Union institutions at a moment when the expansion of the Union is being considered. As a consequence, they decided to issue a report giving their collective opinion on nuclear safety in those applicant countries having at least one nuclear power reactor (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) and covering: the status of the regulatory regime and regulatory body and the nuclear power plant safety status. This report is based on the knowledge they gained through multilateral assistance programmes, in particular the Phare programmes, and also through bilateral contacts. It must be stressed that in some cases, they recognised that their current knowledge was not sufficient to express a clear and exhaustive opinion. Also, it should be pointed out that the judgements are based on widely applied Western European design standards for the defence-in-depth and associated barriers. Quantitative comparisons of Probabilistic Safety Assessments have not been used as the available results are of widely different depth and quality. They also recognised that such a report could only present the situation at a given moment and they intend to periodically update it so as to reflect the changes which may occur in these countries. At this stage, the report does not cover radioactive waste or radiation protection issues in any detail. After they had taken the decision to issue this report, they decided to create an association, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) in order to increase the co

  12. International relations; Relations internationales

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anon

    2009-02-15

    Concerning the european community, two meetings occurred during october 2008, the group on the nuclear safety and the waste management at Brussels and the meeting of W.E.N.R.A. (Western european nuclear regulator association). At the international level, the commission on safety standards took place in september 2008 at Vienna, a general conference of IAEA and the senor regulator meeting in september at Vienna. The worldwide conference of radiation protection (International radiation protection association -I.R.P.A.) took place under IAEA aegis at Buenos Aires in october 2008. Bilateral relations between France and South Africa, Germany, China, United States and Japan took place in october 2008 and were about information exchanges. (N.C.)

  13. Information report made on the behalf of the European Affairs Commission on European policy for nuclear safety; Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires europeennes (1) sur la politique europeenne de surete nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bizet, J.; Sutour, S.

    2011-05-15

    This report aims at defining some perspectives for the evolution of the European general legal framework for nuclear safety. The authors first outline the difficulty for a European policy to emerge. They explain this statement by the importance of the current policy of national states, of their operators and of their national regulation authorities. They evoke the few elements of this legal framework (EURATOM Treaty, jurisprudence) but outline the strong cooperation between national authorities. Then, they discuss some progresses which have been noticed during the past two years (the 'safety' directive, a proposition for a directive on the management of used fuel and radioactive wastes, and the recent works by WENRA), and discuss the consequences of the accident in Fukushima. Propositions are made, notably concerning the support to the 'waste' directive, the perpetuation of strength tests, the rewriting of the 'safety' directive of June 2009

  14. International relations; Relations internationales

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anon

    2009-07-15

    The French nuclear safety authority (A.S.N.) has participated at different meeting in European Union as nuclear decommissioning assistance programme(N.D.A.P.), Regulatory assistance management group (R.A.M.G.) and Instrument for nuclear safety cooperation (I.N.S.C.). The members of Western European nuclear regulator association (W.E.N.R.A.) met and discussed about the future of W.E.N.R.A. and its representativeness and its cooperation with European nuclear safety regulator group (E.N.S.R.E.G.) and head of European radiation control authorities (H.E.R.C.A.). About International relations it is to noticed a meeting at the invitation of IAEA to discuss about the possibility to resort to the Ines scale for medical events. An audit mission under the IAEA aegis stood at Fessenheim, O.S.A.R.T. for operational safety review team. Two years and a half passed by between the audit mission Integrated regulatory review service (I.R.S.S.) welcome by A.S.N. in november 2006 and the audit mission follow up in 2009, 12 experts from 11 different countries and coordinated by three representatives of IAEA worked, the conclusions were that 90% of recommendations made to A.S.N. in 2006 were treated in a satisfying way; the evaluation gives three new recommendations, 7 new suggestions and 11 new correct practices. A meeting of the commission on safety standards (C.S.S.) stood in april 2009. Some others meeting are to be noticed: nuclear safety and security group (N.S.S.G.), expert group on nuclear and radiation safety (E.G.N.R.S.) instituted by the council of the Baltic sea states (C.B.S.S.) treats data exchange on the national networks of dose rates and surveillance of radioactivity in air. International nuclear regulator association (I.N.R.A.) held its first meeting in april 2009 at Seoul (Korea). Bilateral relations with Poland, Italy, Ukraine and Germany planed cooperation or information exchange in the field of nuclear safety. Participation to conference in Usa, meetings with United

  15. Development of Extended Station Blackout Recovery Guideline for OPR1000 and APR1400

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chang Gyun; Cho, Dong Hyun; Park, Ki Moon; Huh, Jae Young; Lee, Gyu Cheon [KEPCO, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Many regulatory requirements and recommendations following the Fukushima accident have been issued to cope with the extended station blackout (SBO) by the NRC, INPO, IAEA, ENSREG, WENRA, etc., and the nuclear safety improvement design features of each country have been enhanced to incorporate the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. There have been many evaluations to cope with the extended loss of alternating current (AC) power (ELAP) event after the Fukushima accident. PWROG has developed the FLEX support guideline (FSG) that provides the guidance to mitigate the consequences of ELAP event based on the FLEX. The FSG is interfaced with emergency operating guidelines (EOGs) and severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs). However, the FSG developed by PWROG is not compatible with EOGs for both OPR1000 and APR1400 NPPs. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an extended station blackout recovery guideline (ESRG) to cope with an extended SBO event utilizing the newly adopted safety improvement design features against Fukushima accident for OPR1000 and APR1400 NPPs. The ESRG is also performed to satisfy all safety functions and to prevent from entering SAMGs during an extended SBO event. Therefore, this ESRG is entirely appropriate to cope with an extended SBO event by utilizing the newly adopted safety improvement design features following Fukushima accident for OPR1000 and APR1400 NPPs. This guideline will be considered in the establishment of accident management planning in near future.

  16. Europe's progress towards joint regulation of nuclear safety; Le cheminement de l'Europe vers une reglementation commune sur la surete nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hennenhofer, G. [surete des installations nucleaires et la radioprotection, Ministere de l' Environnement, de la Protection de la nature et de la securite nucleaire (BMU) (Germany)

    2010-11-15

    Following the end of the Second World War, there was great hope for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful applications. In the beginning, the different approaches adopted by East and West led to the design of different types of reactors, with priority being given to rapid development of the reactor fleet. Cooperation between safety regulators only came about very gradually. The Chernobyl disaster was in this respect the trigger event, as it clearly showed that the effects of nuclear events do not stop at borders and that collaboration by the safety regulators in this field was essential. Texts such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, requiring the creation of a regulatory body independent of economic interests, the other work done by IAEA on the issue of nuclear safety and, within the European context, the creation of WENRA, are all milestones along the path to close cooperation. The recently adopted European directive on the safety of nuclear installations is the natural successor to these achievements. The road to a common European vision of nuclear safety is now mapped out. Germany will be joining this movement and making its own contribution. (author)

  17. Evaluating the results of a site-specific PSHA from the perspective of a risk analyst

    Science.gov (United States)

    Klügel, Jens-Uwe

    2016-04-01

    From 1998 till 2015 Swiss Nuclear Power Plants sponsored a set of comprehensive site-specific PSHA-studies (PEGASOS, PEGASOS Refinement Project) to obtain the requested input for their plant specific probabilistic risk assessments following the US SSHAC procedures at their most elaborated level 4. The studies were performed by well-known earth scientists working completely independent from sponsors under participatory review of the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. Risk analysts of Swiss Nuclear Power Plants recently have been mandated to implement the final results of the studies in their risk assessment studies. This triggered an in depth assessment of the results focussed on their practical applicability for risk studies. This assessment resulted in some important insights that are of interest for future PSHA studies performed for new nuclear power plants. The assessment included a review of the completeness of results with respect to risk applications as well as plausibility checks of hazard results based on Black Swan Theory and known historical events. The key lessons and recommendations for more detailed project output specifications for future projects are presented in the paper. It was established that future PSHA projects shall provide the joint probability distribution of ground motion hazard and the associated strong motion duration as the output to allow for a technically meaningful risk assessment. The recommendation of WENRA (West European Nuclear Regulators) published in their reference levels to perform natural hazard assessment preferably based on physical grounds (deterministic method) is also rationalized by recommending an holistic approach to hazard analysis comparing PSHA insights with the results of modelling deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis.

  18. Analysis of flammability in the attached buildings to containment under severe accident conditions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosa, J.C. de la, E-mail: juan-carlos.de-la-rosa-blul@ec.europa.eu [European Commission Joint Research Centre (Netherlands); Fornós, Joan, E-mail: jfornosh@anacnv.com [Asociación Nuclear Ascó-Vandellós (Spain)

    2016-11-15

    Highlights: • Analysis of flammability conditions in buildings outside containment. • Stepwise approach easily applicable for any kind of containment and attached buildings layout. • Detailed application for real plant conditions has been included. - Abstract: Right after the events unfolded in Fukushima Daiichi, the European Union countries agreed in subjecting Nuclear Power Plants to Stress Tests as developed by WENRA and ENSREG organizations. One of the results as implemented in many European countries derived from such tests consisted of mandatory technical instructions issued by nuclear regulatory bodies on the analysis of potential risk of flammable gases in attached buildings to containment. The current study addresses the key aspects of the analysis of flammable gases leaking to auxiliary buildings attached to Westinghouse large-dry PWR containment for the specific situation where mitigating systems to prevent flammable gases to grow up inside containment are available, and containment integrity is preserved – hence avoiding isolation system failure. It also provides a full practical exercise where lessons learned derived from the current study – hence limited to the imposed boundary conditions – are applied. The leakage of gas from the containment to the support buildings is based on separate calculations using the EPRI-owned Modular Accident Analysis Program, MAAP4.07. The FATE™ code (facility Flow, Aerosol, Thermal, and Explosion) was used to model the transport and distribution of leaked flammable gas (H{sub 2} and CO) in the penetration buildings. FATE models the significant mixing (dilution) which occurs as the released buoyant gas rises and entrains air. Also, FATE accounts for the condensation of steam on room surfaces, an effect which acts to concentrate flammable gas. The results of the analysis show that during a severe accident, flammable conditions are unlikely to occur in compartmentalized buildings such as the one used in the

  19. An approach for estimating the radiological significance of a hypothetical major nuclear accident over long distance transboundary scales

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mitrakos, D., E-mail: dimitris.mitrakos@eeae.gr; Potiriadis, C.; Housiadas, C.

    2016-04-15

    Highlights: • Actions may be warranted after a major nuclear accident even at long distances. • Distance may not be the decisive parameter for longer term radiological impact. • Remote impact may vary orders of magnitude depending on the meteorological conditions. • The potential impact can be assessed using computationally inexpensive calculations. - Abstract: After the Fukushima accident important initiatives were taken in European level to enhance the nuclear safety level of the existing and planned nuclear reactors, such as the so-called nuclear “stress-tests” and the amendment of the Nuclear Safety Directive. A recent work of HERCA and WENRA focused on the need for a more consistent and harmonized response in a transboundary context in case of a hypothetical major nuclear accident in Europe. Such an accident, although very improbable, cannot be totally excluded and so, should be considered in emergency preparedness arrangements among the various European countries. In case of a hypothetical severe Fukushima-like accident in Europe, the role of the neighboring countries may be important, since the authorities should be able to provide information and advice to the government and the public, but also can contribute to the overall assessment of the situation be their own means. In this work we assess the radiological significance of a hypothetical major nuclear accident for distances longer than 300 km that are not typically covered by the internationally accepted emergency planning zones. The approach is simple and computationally inexpensive, since it is based on the calculation of only a few release scenarios at dates selected within a whole year on the basis of bounding the deposition levels at long distances in relation to the occurrence of precipitation. From the calculated results it is evident that distance is not the only decisive parameter in estimating the potential radiological significance of a severe nuclear accident. The hypothetical

  20. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-15

    Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). In accordance with Article 5 of CNS, Switzerland has submitted 4 country reports for Review Meetings of Contracting Parties. This 5{sup th} report by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. The report attempts to give appropriate consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 4{sup th} Review Meeting. It starts with general political information on Switzerland, a brief history of nuclear power and an overview of Swiss nuclear facilities. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the status of nuclear safety in Switzerland (as of July 2010) which indicates how Switzerland complies with the key obligations of the Convention. ENSI updated a substantial proportion of its guidelines which are harmonised with the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) based on IAEA Safety Standards. On 1{sup st} January 2009, ENSI became formally independent of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. It is now a stand-alone organisation controlled by its own management board. Switzerland recently started a process to select a site for the disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Energy Act and its ordinance came into force

  1. EU-stress test: Swiss national action plan. Follow-up of peer review 2012 year-end status report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-12-15

    of the events at Fukushima, are being processed according to their importance and urgency in a Swiss action plan. There was a lack of consistency identified with respect to natural hazards assessments where significant differences exist in national approaches and where difficulties were encountered with beyond design margins and cliff-edge effects assessments. The peer review Board recommends that the Western European Nuclear Safety Regulators Association (WENRA) develop guidance on natural hazards assessments, including earthquake, flooding and extreme weather conditions, as well as on the assessment of margins beyond the design basis and cliff-edge effects. In Switzerland, the periodic safety review is mandatory every 10 years; the risk from external hazards is re-evaluated. ENSI required a re-evaluation of severe weather conditions. A comprehensive research project on external flooding was initiated. The Fukushima disaster highlighted the importance of the containment function as the last barrier to protect the people and the environment against radioactive releases resulting from a nuclear accident. All Swiss NPPs are equipped with special bunkered safety systems designed against extreme external events. ENSI requested a new safety case to demonstrate that the Swiss NPPs have adequate protection against the 10,000-year earthquake and the combination of this earthquake and a 10,000-year flooding. The necessary analyses were submitted by the licence holders. A flood-proof and earthquake-resistant external storage facility is in place at Reitnau since June 2011, in order to strengthen the provision for accident mitigation. It contains various operational resources, in particular mobile motor-driven pumps, mobile emergency power generators, hoses and cables, radiation protection suits, tools, diesel fuel and boration agents. This storage facility is located on top of a hill and is accessible by road or by helicopter. The three independent storage buildings are

  2. Action plan Fukushima 2013; Aktionsplan Fukushima 2013

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-02-15

    safety, however, ENSI requested a series of back-fittings as the requirement of a flooding and earthquake safe heat sink and various heat sinks. ENSI checks the realization of the requirements by the plant operators through inspections, and instructed the Swiss operators to take part in the European Union (EU) stress tests. The Swiss reports to the EU stress tests were submitted to a peer review process. The results of the peer review on European level have confirmed the safety of the Swiss NPPs; further it gives a glance on the status of the power plants in Europe. The two recommendations of the peer review team for Switzerland, which concern out-of-design basis scenarios, are worked out by ENSI. ENSI takes part in the follow-up works to the EU stress tests in order to check the implementation of the recommended measures in Europe and actively participates in the optimization of the Western European Nuclear Safety Regulators Association (WENRA) safety reference levels. ENSI carried out an analysis of the events at Fukushima and published the results in four reports which provide detailed descriptions of the causes, consequences and radiological impacts of the accident at Fukushima. They analyse the contributory human and organisational factors, and specify lessons that can be derived from this information together with specific issues for further investigation. The knowledge acquired from the analysis of the accident at Fukushima was examined concerning the possible application to Switzerland; it was summed up in the ENSI report called Lessons learned. The list of the recognized points will be continuously brought to date taking account of new acquirements. On the basis of Fukushima and in view of the long-term operation of the NPP Muehleberg a back-fitting was required.

  3. Implementation of the obligations of the convention on nuclear safety. Fifth Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-15

    Switzerland signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). In accordance with Article 5 of CNS, Switzerland has submitted 4 country reports for Review Meetings of Contracting Parties. This 5{sup th} report by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides an update on compliance with CNS obligations. The report attempts to give appropriate consideration to issues that aroused particular interest at the 4{sup th} Review Meeting. It starts with general political information on Switzerland, a brief history of nuclear power and an overview of Swiss nuclear facilities. This is followed by a comprehensive overview of the status of nuclear safety in Switzerland (as of July 2010) which indicates how Switzerland complies with the key obligations of the Convention. ENSI updated a substantial proportion of its guidelines which are harmonised with the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) based on IAEA Safety Standards. On 1{sup st} January 2009, ENSI became formally independent of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. It is now a stand-alone organisation controlled by its own management board. Switzerland recently started a process to select a site for the disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. The first generation of NPPs in Switzerland has been the subject of progressive back-fitting. The second generation of NPPs incorporated various safety and operating improvements in their initial design. All Swiss NPPs have undergone the safety review process required under the Convention and have incorporated the improvements identified in the respective safety review reports. The Swiss policy of continuous improvements to NPPs ensures a high level of safety. The legislation and regulatory framework for nuclear installations is well established. It provides the formal basis for the supervision and the continuous improvement of nuclear installations. The Nuclear Energy Act and its ordinance came into force

  4. Research and experience report 2009. Developments in the technical and legal basis of nuclear oversight; Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht 2009. Entwicklungen im Bereich der Grundlagen der nuklearen Aufsicht/Rapport sur la recherche et les experiences en 2009. Developpements dans les bases techniques et legales pour la surveillance nucleaire/Research and experience report 2009. Developments in the technical and legal basis of nuclear oversight

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-04-15

    additional intake points in the cooling water outlet. There have been defects and incidents in the construction of the new plants at Olkiluoto (Finland) and Flamanville (France) relating to concreting work and inadequate welding specifications. ENSI will develop a new surveillance concept for the construction of NPPs, so that Switzerland is prepared in time for any new builds. ENSI maintains active links with international organisations, particularly with IAEA, OECD/NEA and WENRA and also has a series of bilateral agreements with France, Germany, Austria and the USA. The ENSI contribution to current negotiations on greater global harmonisation is based on the stringent nuclear safety standards in Switzerland. At the 3{sup rd} Review Conference of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Switzerland received a rating of good for its Country Report: other countries welcomed the transparency of the master plan procedure and the participation of the public and neighbouring countries. The research programme at the rock laboratories of Mont Terri and Grimsel also received a positive reception. According to the main requirements of IAEA and the Swiss Nuclear Energy Act, since 1 January 2009 ENSI has been an independent nuclear regulatory body reporting directly to the Federal Council (Swiss national government). The existing ordinances and guidelines are continuously amended to accord with the recent legislation on nuclear energy and also are harmonised with international standards. A new ordinance based on the Nuclear Energy Act took effect in 2009. In addition ENSI completed 8 guidelines, either new or revisions