WorldWideScience

Sample records for weapons information group

  1. Atomic Energy Authority (Weapons Group) Act 1973

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    This Act, which came into force on 6th March 1973 and modified Section 2 of the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 in respect of the Authority's power to do work on explosive nuclear devices, made provision for the transfer to the Secretary of State for Defence of the Weapons Group of the Atomic Energy Authority. (NEA) [fr

  2. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luke, S.J.

    2011-01-01

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

  3. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Luke, S J

    2011-12-20

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

  4. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  5. The Role of Adolescent Friendship Group Integration and Cohesion in Weapon-Related Violent Crime as a Young Adult.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mundt, Marlon P; Antonaccio, Olena P; French, Michael T; Zakletskaia, Larissa I

    2017-08-01

    Weapon-related violent crime is a serious, complex, and multifaceted public health problem. The present study uses data from Waves I and III of Add Health (n = 10,482, 54% female) to examine how friendship group integration and cohesion in adolescence (ages 12-19) is associated with weapon-related criminal activity as a young adult (ages 18-26). Results indicate that greater cohesion in friendship groups is associated with significantly lower weapon-related criminal activity in young adulthood. In addition, for adolescent girls, a greater number of close friendship ties-an indicator of friendship group integration-is associated with less weapon-related criminal activity in young adulthood. These findings suggest that school-based initiatives to facilitate inclusive and cohesive adolescent peer communities may be an effective strategy to curb weapon-related criminal activity in young adulthood.

  6. Combating the terrorist use of mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barakat, M.

    2008-01-01

    The risks of mass destruction weapons vary and also forms of damages resulting therefrom. While the effects of nuclear weapons are focused, sudden and comprehensive, the chemical weapons have limited impacts relatively unless used intensively severe prejudice to the element of surprise, and thus impaired the efficacy of their influences,especially that they affect exceptionally the individuals in the area of injury and biological weapons do not announce themselves except through their effect that appears later than the time of use as they affect exceptionally the organisms in the area of injury.The mass destruction weapons have turned from being a purely military means in the early twentieth century and have now become the means of violence against governments and countries that they should prepare themselves for and respond in ways of successful and effective countermeasures. Despite the fact that the acquisition of mass destruction weapons can be considered as a priority objective, which terrorist groups and organizations steadily seek but their accessibility is flanked by a lot of difficulties. Addressing the risk of further spread of nuclear weapons, and especially after doubling the power of those high-risk weapons, the international community has an approach to take a number of arrangements that complement each other to control and resist nuclear proliferation, either for the states or for terrorist groups.

  7. Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-01

    Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands , Mongolia, Panama, and St. Vin- cent and the Grenadines, according to a State Department summary available...1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. As such, NBC weapons represent a group of weapons that the...Development, Produc- tion and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains two references to WMD

  8. 75 FR 27854 - 30-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: DS-4048, Projected Sales of Major Weapons in...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-18

    ... Information Collection: DS-4048, Projected Sales of Major Weapons in Support of Section 25(a)(1) of the Arms... Reduction Act of 1995. Title of Information Collection: Projected Sales of Major Weapons in Support of... automated collection techniques or other forms of technology. Abstract of proposed collection: Section 25(a...

  9. Security with nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karp, R.C.

    1991-01-01

    Recent improvements in East-West relations and the process of dramatic political change in Europe may result in unprecedented opportunities to reduce the global arsenal of nuclear weapons. Despite these welcome developments, the prospects for effectively controlling the spread of nuclear capability in the Third World have remained much less encouraging. The possibility of large reductions in nuclear weapons poses fundamental questions about their purpose. Why have some states chosen to acquire nuclear weapons? How and why have these decisions been maintained over time? Why have some states elected to approach, but not cross, the nuclear threshold? This book examines the commonalities and differences in political approaches to nuclear weapons both within and between three groups of states: nuclear, non-nuclear and threshold. The chapters explore the evolution of thinking about nuclear weapons and the role these weapons play in national security planning, and question the official security rationales offered by the nuclear weapon states for the maintenance of nuclear capabilities. For the non-nuclear weapon states, the book presents an analysis of alternative ways of assuring security and foreign policy effectiveness. For the threshold states, it examines the regional contexts within which these states maintain their threshold status. This book transcends traditional East-West approaches to analysis of nuclear issues by giving equal prominence to the issues of nuclear proliferation and non-nuclearism. The book also provides a comprehensive analysis of how current approaches to nuclear weapons have evolved both within and among the groups of countries under study

  10. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

  11. Does Britain need nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, C.R.; Pease, R.S.; Peierls, R.E.; Rotblat, J.

    1995-01-01

    This report from the British Pugwash Group follows up a detailed international study of the desirability and feasibility of a world free from nuclear weapons with an analysis of issues particular to British nuclear weapons and the associated defense policies. United Kingdom nuclear weapons are reviewed historically, as are the nuclear weapons policies of other countries. A critique of present government policy is presented, with alternative uses for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold war world. The document concludes with a summary of the text and suggests how a British government could move towards global nuclear disarmament. (UK)

  12. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  13. Wounds and weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vogel, H. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)], E-mail: Hermann.vogel@ak-stgeorg.lbk-hh.de; Dootz, B. [Asklepios Klinik St. Georg, Roentgenabteilung, Lohmuehlenstrasse 5, 20099 Hamburg (Germany)

    2007-08-15

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

  14. Wounds and weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.; Dootz, B.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. Material and method: The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Results: Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Conclusion: Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports

  15. A nuclear-weapon-free world. Report on working group 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The stages of nuclear material management are reviewed in respect to dismantlement of nuclear weapons, disposal of weapon-grade fissile materials and cut-off of their production as well as START I and II reduction which are underway. Separate chapters are dealing with the comprehensive test ban treaty, verification, control and regulation in this matter, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Canberra Commission, the ABM USA-Soviet Treaty

  16. 77 FR 59891 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-01

    ... Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and Report Handbook and Forms AGENCY: Bureau of Industry.... Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. II. Method of Collection Submitted...

  17. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1964-02-01

    This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

  18. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  19. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-01-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  20. Neutron weapons. War prevention by credible deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-11-01

    The neutron bomb has prompted fierce and controversial public discussions which are more emotional than based on facts. Unaware of the factual repercussions this weapon has, it has been described as the most inhumane weapon ever. By saying so, the public is wrongly informed and is made feel insecure. The following contributions made by competent authorities may be used for getting to the point, pointing out that the neutron bomb is primarily a defensive weapon. (orig.) [de

  1. 77 FR 22559 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-04-16

    ... Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the Export Administration Regulations AGENCY: Bureau of.... Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a multilateral arms control treaty that seeks to achieve an international ban on chemical weapons (CW). The CWC prohibits the use, development, production...

  2. ON THE OFFENSE: USING CYBER WEAPONS TO INFLUENCE COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mary Fendley

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available There is an increasing recognition that cyber warfare is an important area of development for targeting and weaponeering, with far-reaching effects in national defense and economic security. The ability to conduct effective operations in cyberspace relies on a robust situational awareness of events occurring in both the physical and information domains, with an understanding of how they affect the cognitive domain of friendly, neutral, and adversary population sets. The dynamic nature of the battlefield complicates efforts to understand shifting adversary motivations and intentions. There are very few approaches, to date, that systematically evaluate the effects of the repertoire of cyber weapons on the cognitive, perceptual, and behavioral characteristics of the adversary. In this paper, we describe a software environment called Cognitive Cyber Weapon Selection Tool (CCWST that simulates a scenario involving cyber weaponry.This tool provides the capabilities to test weapons which may induce behavioral state changes in the adversaries. CCWST provides the required situational awareness to the Cyber Information Operations (IO planner to conduct intelligent weapon selection during weapon activation in order to induce the desired behavioral change in the perception of the adversary. Weapons designed to induce the cognitive state changes of deception, distraction, distrust and confusion were then tested empirically to evaluate the capabilities and expected cognitive state changes induced by these weapons. The results demonstrated that CCWST is a powerful environment within which to test and evaluate the impact of cyber weapons on influencing cognitive behavioral states during information processing.

  3. Victim’s posture and protective clothing changes the approach in an edged-weapon attack

    OpenAIRE

    Carr, D; Mahoney, P; Godhania, K; Cowper, E; Malbon, C

    2017-01-01

    Diverse groups of people use edged-weapons (i.e. knives, spears, swords) professionally. The training received affects how the edged-weapon is used and the area of the body targeted. There is a growing body of information available on the internet which is aimed at the training individuals in offensive knife attacks. This poster aims to raise awareness of this issue and highlight how a trained individual modifies an attack sequence depending on their victim’s posture and the protective clothi...

  4. Oil and influence: the oil weapon examined

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maull, H

    1975-01-01

    The term ''oil weapon'' as used here signifies any manipulation of the price and/or supply of oil by exporting nations with the intention of changing the political behavior of the consumer nations. The political potential of the oil price is fairly restricted so, in effect, the supply interruptions are of prime concern. Manipulating price does, in principle, offer the possibilities of both conferring rewards and inflicting sanctions. Oil could be sold on preferential prices and terms. A precondition for using the oil weapon successfully would be the ability to cause real and serious damage to the consumer countries. Four damaging potentials for using the oil weapon could include its application by: (1) one producer against one consumer; (2) one producer against all consumers; (3) a group of producers against one consumer; and (4) by a group of producers against all consumers. It is concluded that the oil weapon will continue to be a force in the international system. (MCW)

  5. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juzaitis, R.J.

    1995-01-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a 'short-sleeve' workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE's contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects

  6. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.

    2010-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  7. The weapons effect.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J

    2018-02-01

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  8. Psychological markers underlying murder weapon profile: a quantitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kamaluddin, M R; Othman, A; Ismail, K H; Mat Saat, G A

    2017-12-01

    The horrific nature of murder using different types of weapons has been an important focal point of many criminological studies. Weapons that are used in murders seem to play dominant roles in murder investigations as they may provide information leading to arrest. The established factors for weapon usage include environmental context, demography and availability of weapons. However, there is insufficient research attention on the psychological functioning of murderers for particular weapon usage. In light of this, the current study seeks to narrow this gap of information by identifying the influences of psychological traits on weapon usage among a sample of male murderers. The present cross-sectional study was conducted among 71 male murderers incarcerated in 11 prisons within Peninsular Malaysia. The selection of the sample was based on predetermined selection criteria using a purposive sampling method. A guided self-administered questionnaire comprising sociodemography variables and four Malay validated psychometric instruments: Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire-40-Cross-Culture, Self-control Scale, "How I Think" Questionnaire and Aggression Questionnaire; was used. Independent sample t-test was performed to establish the mean score differences of psychological traits between the murderers who used single and multiple weapons while Kruskal-Wallis tests were carried out to ascertain the differences between the specific types of weapons used among the murderers. Following this, one-way ANOVA was carried out to ascertain the psychological trait differences among the murderers according to the different sources of weapon. Results indicated specific psychological traits influenced the number(s), source(s) and type(s) of weapon used in committing murder. The findings have implications for the psychological profiling of unknown murderers within the Malaysian context.

  9. Precursor of other nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roman-Morey, E.

    1997-01-01

    Based on the analysis of the long process of negotiations for implementing the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its history during the last three decades, especially its influence on other regions of the world for stimulating the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the following conclusions were drawn: nuclear danger still persists; the end of Cold War implies the end of a nuclear threat; the nuclear fear should not become nuclear complacency and be accepted by international community; common security as the goal of international community should be recognised and definitive abolition of nuclear weapons should be sought; the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents the cornerstone for creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones; Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should be examples to be followed by other regions and groups of countries for creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones which should be recognised as very important phase in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and means for attaining an international regime of non-proliferation of weapons for mass destruction

  10. Characterising the online weapons trafficking on cryptomarkets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rhumorbarbe, Damien; Werner, Denis; Gilliéron, Quentin; Staehli, Ludovic; Broséus, Julian; Rossy, Quentin

    2018-02-01

    Weapons related webpages from nine cryptomarkets were manually duplicated in February 2016. Information about the listings (i.e. sales proposals) and vendors' profiles were extracted to draw an overview of the actual online trafficking of weapons. Relationships between vendors were also inferred through the analysis of online digital traces and content similarities. Weapons trafficking is mainly concentrated on two major cryptomarkets. Besides, it accounts for a very small proportion of the illicit trafficking on cryptomarkets compared to the illicit drugs trafficking. Among all weapon related listings (n=386), firearms only account for approximately 25% of sales proposal since the proportion of non-lethal and melee weapons is important (around 46%). Based on the recorded pseudonyms, a total of 96 vendor profiles were highlighted. Some pseudonyms were encountered on several cryptomarkets, suggesting that some vendors may manage accounts on different markets. This hypothesis was strengthened by comparing pseudonyms to online traces such as PGP keys, images and profiles descriptions. Such a method allowed to estimate more accurately the number of vendors offering weapons across cryptomarkets. Finally, according to the gathered data, the extent of the weapons trafficking on the cryptomarkets appear to be limited compared to other illicit goods. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  11. Flexible weapons architecture design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pyant, William C., III

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.

  12. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  13. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, Samuel

    1957-06-01

    This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

  14. Flexible weapons architecture design

    OpenAIRE

    Pyant, William C.

    2015-01-01

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilia...

  15. Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-06-04

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  16. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimír Pitschmann

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  17. Instruments of war weapons and technologies that have changed history

    CERN Document Server

    Tucker, Spencer C

    2015-01-01

    In war, the weapons and technologies employed have direct effects on how battles are waged. When new weapons are introduced, they can dramatically alter the outcomes of warfare-and consequently change the course of history itself. This reference work provides a fascinating overview of the major weapon systems and military technologies that have had a major impact on world history. Addressing weapons as crude as the club used by primitive man to the high-tech weapons of today such as unmanned drones, Instruments of War: Weapons and Technologies That Have Changed History offers nearly 270 profusely illustrated entries that examine the key roles played by specific weapons and identify their success and failures. The book begins with an introductory essay that frames the subject matter of the work and discusses the history of weapons as a whole. The text is concise and accessible to general readers without extensive backgrounds in military history yet provides the detailed information necessary to convey the comp...

  18. Aum Shinrikyo's Chemical and Biological Weapons: More Than Sarin.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tu, A T

    2014-07-01

    The radical religious group Aum Shinrikyo was founded in Japan in the 1980s and grew rapidly in the 1990s. Aum members perpetrated a mass murder in Matsumoto City in 1994, where they used sarin as a chemical weapon to poison approximately 500 civilians. On March 20, 1995, Aum deployed sarin in an even larger terrorist attack on the Tokyo Subway System, which poisoned some 6,000 people. After the Tokyo Subway attack, the Japanese Police arrested the sect's senior members. From 2005 through 2011, 13 of these senior members were sentenced to death. In this article, aspects of Aum's chemical and biological terrorism are reviewed. Sarin production efforts by the sect are described, including how the degradation product of sarin in soil, methylphosphonic acid, enabled the detection of sarin production sites. Also, Aum's chemical-warfare agents other than sarin are described, as are its biological weapons. The author was permitted by the Japanese government to interview Dr. Tomomasa Nakagawa, one of the senior members of Aum Shinrikyo. From Dr. Nakagawa the author obtained valuable inside information about Aum's chemical and biological weapons programs. Copyright © 2014 Central Police University.

  19. Can abolition of nuclear weapons be adequately verified?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotblat, J.

    1993-01-01

    Speaking on the problems of preventing proliferations of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament the author suggests the following measures to reach these goals: signing a treaty that binds all the nuclear weapon states to the no-first-use principle as a basic policy; the United Nations should put the elimination of nuclear weapons on its agenda; having the treaty safeguarded two-pronged verification regime, one would be technological verification, the second one - so called societal verification which means that not just a group of experts but everybody would be asked to take part in ensuring that the treaty would not be violated

  20. Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Eccleston, G.W.; Yates, M.A.

    1998-01-01

    The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information

  1. The weapons effect

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J.

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain

  2. US Army Weapon Systems Human-Computer Interface (WSHCI) style guide, Version 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Avery, L.W.; O`Mara, P.A.; Shepard, A.P.

    1996-09-30

    A stated goal of the U.S. Army has been the standardization of the human computer interfaces (HCIS) of its system. Some of the tools being used to accomplish this standardization are HCI design guidelines and style guides. Currently, the Army is employing a number of style guides. While these style guides provide good guidance for the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) domain, they do not necessarily represent the more unique requirements of the Army`s real time and near-real time (RT/NRT) weapon systems. The Office of the Director of Information for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4), in conjunction with the Weapon Systems Technical Architecture Working Group (WSTAWG), recognized this need as part of their activities to revise the Army Technical Architecture (ATA). To address this need, DISC4 tasked the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop an Army weapon systems unique HCI style guide. This document, the U.S. Army Weapon Systems Human-Computer Interface (WSHCI) Style Guide, represents the first version of that style guide. The purpose of this document is to provide HCI design guidance for RT/NRT Army systems across the weapon systems domains of ground, aviation, missile, and soldier systems. Each domain should customize and extend this guidance by developing their domain-specific style guides, which will be used to guide the development of future systems within their domains.

  3. Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-09-01

    The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera

  4. The threat of nuclear terrorism: Nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maerli, Morten Bremer

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Conventional weaponry and tactics are likely to remain the primary terrorist means for a definitive majority of sub-national groups. No non-state actors have ever deployed or used a nuclear device. However, recent developments in international terrorism may point in the direction of future terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices. Some terrorist groups with a high international profile have showed disturbing interests in acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. As the 'terrorist nuclear weapon standards' are likely to be lower than the strict requirements for traditional state nuclear weapons, technical barriers should not be considered sufficient to avoid future nuclear terrorist violence. Preventing any extremist group from achieving their goals of large-scale nuclear killing is likely best done by preventing the access to fissile materials through state compliances to rigorous standards of Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC and A). (author)

  5. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nissen, Thomas Elkjer

    In today’s conflict environment, transformed by information technology and of who can communicate and how, states, non-state actors, ad hoc activist networks and individuals create effect(s) in and through social network media in support of their objectives. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia develops...... a framework for understanding how social network media shapes global politics and contemporary conflicts by examining their role as a platform for conduction intelligence collection, targeting, cyber-operations, psychological warfare and command and control activities. Through these, the weaponization...... of social media shows both the possibilities and the limitations of social network media in contemporary conflicts and makes a contribution to theorizing and studying contemporary conflicts....

  6. Prions: the danger of biochemical weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Eric Almeida Xavier

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available The knowledge of biotechnology increases the risk of using biochemical weapons for mass destruction. Prions are unprecedented infectious pathogens that cause a group of fatal neurodegenerative diseases by a novel mechanism. They are transmissible particles that are devoid of nucleic acid. Due to their singular characteristics, Prions emerge as potential danger since they can be used in the development of such weapons. Prions cause fatal infectious diseases, and to date there is no therapeutic or prophylactic approach against these diseases. Furthermore, Prions are resistant to food-preparation treatments such as high heat and can find their way from the digestive system into the nervous system; recombinant Prions are infectious either bound to soil particles or in aerosols. Therefore, lethal Prions can be developed by malicious researchers who could use it to attack political enemies since such weapons cause diseases that could be above suspicion.

  7. Weapons of mass destruction - current security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durdiak, J.; Gafrik, A.; Pulis, P.; Susko, M.

    2005-01-01

    This publication brings a complex and comprehensive view of the weapons of mass destruction phenomenon in the context of present military and political situation. It emphasizes the threat posed by proliferation of these destructive devices and their carriers as well as the threat present in their possession by unpredictable totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups. The publication is structured into four basic parts: Introduction Into The Topic, Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons. The Introduction reflects the latest developments on the field of military technologies, which lead to the development of new destructive devices with characteristics comparable to basic types of WMDs - nuclear, chemical and biological. Based on the definition of WMD as 'weapon systems with enormous impact causing mass destruction, population, equipment and material losses', the modern mass destruction devices are assorted here, such as ecological, radiological and beam weapons, aerosol and container intelligent ammunition, the outburst of dangerous chemical substances from infrastructure, non-conventional weapons and military devices. The Nuclear Weapons part depicts the most destructive device of mass destruction mankind ever invented in close detail. It maps the history of most significant discoveries in nuclear physics, development and construction of the first nuclear weapons, accumulation of nuclear warheads and their carriers in the Cold war era, attempts of nuclear disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in possession of superpowers and their proliferation in the world's crisis regions including North Korea and Iran. The chapters devoted to theoretical grounds and physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons' functioning, the main categories and types, as well as destructive effects and consequences of use contain an adequate mathematical apparatus. This chapter's conclusion brings the overview of nuclear armament of states that

  8. 15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.6 Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations, the International...

  9. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  10. South America and the proliferation of biological weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tatiana Coutto

    2013-04-01

    Full Text Available This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC. Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting the exchange of information among different groups of states, most notably during the 2006 BTWC review conference. This paper also sheds light on the identification of specific features that allow for increasing visibility and actorness of regional powers in promoting universality of multilateral security regimes (MSR, as well as the limitations faced by these players.

  11. Perceived popularity of adolescents who use weapons in violence and adolescents who only carry weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wallace, Lacey N

    2017-01-01

    Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed.

  12. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-21

    of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminate many of them. These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in July 1991...of these weapons. The abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over nuclear weapons...assure other allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, but these assurances do not necessarily include legally binding commitments to retaliate

  13. Virtual nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  14. Information Discovery from Complementary Literatures: Categorizing Viruses as Potential Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swanson, Don R.; Smalheiser, Neil R.; Bookstein, A.

    2001-01-01

    This project demonstrates how techniques of analyzing complementary literatures might be applied to problems of defense against biological weapons. The article is based solely on the open-source scientific literature, and is oriented on informatics techniques. Findings are intended as a guide to the virus literature to support further studies that…

  15. Experimental manipulation reveals a trade-off between weapons and testes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Somjee, U; Miller, C W; Tatarnic, N J; Simmons, L W

    2018-01-01

    Theory predicts a trade-off between sexually selected weapons used to secure mates and post-copulatory traits used to maximize fertilization success. However, individuals that have a greater capacity to acquire resources from the environment may invest more in both pre- and post-copulatory traits, and trade-offs may not be readily apparent. Here, we manipulate the phenotype of developing individuals to examine allocation trade-offs between weapons and testes in Mictis profana (Hemiptera: Coreidae), a species where the hind legs are sexually selected weapons used in contests over access to females. We experimentally prevented males from developing weapons by inducing them to autotomize their hind legs before the final moult to adulthood. We compared trait expression in this group to males where autotomy was induced in the mid-legs, which are presumably not under sexual selection to the same extent. We found males without weapons invested proportionally more in testes mass than those with their mid-legs removed. Males that developed to adulthood without weapons did not differ from the mid-leg removal group in other traits potentially under precopulatory sexual selection, other post-copulatory traits or naturally selected traits. In addition, a sample of adult males from the same population in the wild revealed a positive correlation between investment in testes and weapons. Our study presents a critical contribution to a growing body of literature suggesting the allocation of resources to pre- and post-copulatory sexual traits is influenced by a resource allocation trade-off and that this trade-off may only be revealed with experimental manipulation. © 2017 European Society For Evolutionary Biology. Journal of Evolutionary Biology © 2017 European Society For Evolutionary Biology.

  16. Identification of nuclear weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  17. A Conceptual Model to Identify Intent to Use Chemical-Biological Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mary Zalesny

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available This paper describes a conceptual model to identify and interrelate indicators of intent of non-state actors to use chemical or biological weapons. The model expands on earlier efforts to understand intent to use weapons of mass destruction by building upon well-researched theories of intent and behavior and focusing on a sub-set of weapons of mass destruction (WMD to account for the distinct challenges of employing different types of WMD in violent acts. The conceptual model is presented as a first, critical step in developing a computational model for assessing the potential for groups to use chemical or biological weapons.

  18. Nuclear weapons free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stahl, K.

    1990-01-01

    The article analyses the concept and problems of the two nuclear weapons free zones in Latin America and in the South Pacific established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. So far the nuclear weapons states except China have refused to sign the additional protocols of the Treaties or have signed them only with considerable provisos. Therefore they don't fully recognize the nuclear weapons free status of those zones, or they don't recognize it at all. Both Treaties contain no provisions to regulate the transit of nuclear weapons through the zones. This allows de facto the stationing of nuclear weapons in the military bases of the US which are located within the nuclear weapons free zone of Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains also the right of the states, party to the Treaty, to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Since peaceful and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished technically, this right could also undermine the nuclear weapons free status of the region. Important nuclear threshold countries like Argentina and Brazil have furthermore refrained from putting the Treaty into force. (orig.) [de

  19. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This report briefly reviews previous WHO work on the health consequences of nuclear war and concentrates on current information about the effects of nuclear weapons on health, and related environmental problems. 15 refs

  20. Chemical Weapons Convention

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1997-01-01

    On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  1. Antisatellite weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garwin, R.L.; Gottfried, K.; Hafner, D.L.

    1984-01-01

    The authors take issue with the assessment that the advent of antisatellite weapons implies that the beneficial role of satellites in arms control, confidence building, and conflict resolution has been judged less important than their ability to support actual military operations. They argue that there is still an opportunity to negotiate a militarily significant and verifiable constraint on the growth of antisatellite technology that would be in the security interest of the US and the world as a whole. They base their opinion on an assessment of the roles of the existing military satellites and their vulnerability to antisatellite weapons and the probable impact of antisatellite weapons on various kinds of crisis and conflict. 10 figures, 1 table

  2. Is the nuclear weapon taboo? The nuclear weapon is useless and expensive. Let us not leave the nuclear weapon as an inheritance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauchet, Nathalie; Norlain, Bernard; Beach, Hugh; Beckett, Margaret; Quiles, Paul; Rocard, Michel; Ramsbotham, David

    2012-03-01

    Starting with the definition of the word taboo as stated in a dictionary (a topic it would be unbecoming to evoke, under social and moral proprieties), the author of the first article discusses the status of the nuclear weapon, outlining that it is expensive, useless and monstrous. She notices that conventions on chemical weapons seem to be more efficient than the NPT, that, even if the reasons for abolition are known as well as ways to reach it, it seems difficult to actually address this issue. She evokes different voices coming from different countries or international bodies calling for this abolition. She also states that the nuclear weapon is not a deterrent weapon but a weapon of domination, and calls for the mobilisation of the civil society throughout the world. A second article states that the nuclear weapon is useless and expensive, and that we have to get rid of this hazard for the sake of the planet. Former ministers, Prime ministers, and generals consider that we can and must give up nuclear weapons, notably because the strategic context has completely changed since the fall of the Berlin wall, and support the action of Global Zero

  3. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-08-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

  4. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

  5. 75 FR 47631 - Swets Information Services, Operations Department, Information Technology Group, Marketing Group...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-06

    ... DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Employment and Training Administration [TA-W-73,668] Swets Information Services, Operations Department, Information Technology Group, Marketing Group, Finance Group, Runnemede..., Information Technology (IT) Group, Marketing Group and the Finance Group into one entity instead of...

  6. You've asked us about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robins, S.

    1987-11-01

    Judging from its name alone, the Atomic Energy Control Board would seem a logical place to get information on nuclear weapons. If we are involved in the control of atomic energy, we must know something about its military uses. In actual fact, however, our regulatory activities are restricted to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and our safeguards - an international audit system to discourage the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment from peaceful applications to the production of explosive devices. Not being the best source of information on the subject of weapons, we have prepared this fact sheet to assist your research. Simply look for the topic heading that interests you, to find out where to go for more information. The publications listed under the various headings are available to the public free of charge, upon request. A bibliography of books and periodicals is also attached for your reference

  7. The transportation of British nuclear weapons by road. Hiroshima is waiting to happen in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, E.J.

    1993-01-01

    This leaflet describes the transportation of nuclear weapons on United Kingdom roads. The author seeks to question the safety and desirability of such activities, and points out the potential hazards to humans and the environment should convoy accidents occur. Correspondence is included between the author and various Government sources to illustrate the difficulty of obtaining full, accurate information on the design and safety of weapons transportation vehicles and the reasons and frequency of weapons convoys. The author contrasts these difficulties with the free available government information in the United States of America because of the Freedom of Information Act. Readers are urged to contribute to monitoring the routes and occurrence of UK weapons convoys to assist in data collection. (UK)

  8. U.S. Army weapon systems human-computer interface style guide. Version 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Avery, L.W.; O`Mara, P.A.; Shepard, A.P.; Donohoo, D.T.

    1997-12-31

    A stated goal of the US Army has been the standardization of the human computer interfaces (HCIs) of its system. Some of the tools being used to accomplish this standardization are HCI design guidelines and style guides. Currently, the Army is employing a number of HCI design guidance documents. While these style guides provide good guidance for the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) domain, they do not necessarily represent the more unique requirements of the Army`s real time and near-real time (RT/NRT) weapon systems. The Office of the Director of Information for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4), in conjunction with the Weapon Systems Technical Architecture Working Group (WSTAWG), recognized this need as part of their activities to revise the Army Technical Architecture (ATA), now termed the Joint Technical Architecture-Army (JTA-A). To address this need, DISC4 tasked the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop an Army weapon systems unique HCI style guide, which resulted in the US Army Weapon Systems Human-Computer Interface (WSHCI) Style Guide Version 1. Based on feedback from the user community, DISC4 further tasked PNNL to revise Version 1 and publish Version 2. The intent was to update some of the research and incorporate some enhancements. This document provides that revision. The purpose of this document is to provide HCI design guidance for the RT/NRT Army system domain across the weapon systems subdomains of ground, aviation, missile, and soldier systems. Each subdomain should customize and extend this guidance by developing their domain-specific style guides, which will be used to guide the development of future systems within their subdomains.

  9. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    CERN Document Server

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1992-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  10. Disposition of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons: Fission options and comparisons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omberg, R.P.; Walter, C.E.

    1993-01-01

    Over the next decade, the United States expects to recover about 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium and the Republic of Russia expects to recover a similar amount. Ensuring that these large quantities of high-grade material are not reused in nuclear weapons has drawn considerable attention. In response to this problem, the US Department of Energy (DOE) chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force (PDTF), in the summer of 1992, to assess a range of practical means for disposition of excess US plutonium. This report summarizes and compares the ''Fission Options'' provided to the Fission Working Group Review Committee (the committee) of the PDTF. The review by the committee was based on preliminary information received as of December 4, 1992, and as such the results summarized in this report should also be considered preliminary. The committee concluded that irradiation of excess weapon plutonium in fission reactors in conjunction with the generation of electricity and storing the spent fuel is a fast, cost-effective, and environmentally acceptable method of addressing the safeguards (diversion) issue. When applied appropriately, this method is consistent with current nonproliferation policy. The principal effect of implementing the fission options is at most a moderate addition of plutonium to that existing in commercial spent fuel. The amount of plutonium in commercial spent fuel by the year 2000 is estimated to be 300 Mg. The addition of 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium, in this context, is not a determining factor, moreover, several of the fission options achieve substantial annihilation of plutonium

  11. Weapon Simulator Test Methodology Investigation: Comparison of Live Fire and Weapon Simulator Test Methodologies and the Effects of Clothing and Individual Equipment on Marksmanship

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-15

    variables analyzed included shot group tightness, radial error from the center of the target, and multiple time variables. The weapon simulator and...performance could be analyzed to determine if the weapon simulator data aligns with live fire data (i.e., if similar performance decrements appear in the...Analysis and Reporting The Noptel NOS4 software records shot performance data real-time and presents multiple statistical calculations as well as

  12. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-01-01

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers

  13. Chemical and biological weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, E.D.

    1991-01-01

    This paper discusses the prospects of the multilateral negotiations aimed at achieving a complete and total ban on chemical weapons the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC). The control of the proliferation of chemical weapons is no longer just on East-West issue; it is also an issue of concern in Third World Countries, and in some of the wealthier middle eastern nations, such as Kuwait

  14. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  15. Nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezendes, V.S.

    1992-04-01

    In addition to long-standing safety and environmental problems plaguing the nuclear weapons complex, this paper reports that the Department of Energy (DOE) faces a major new challenge-how to reconfigure the weapons complex to meet the nation's defense needs in the 21st century. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex; where, if necessary, to relocate various operations; what technologies to use for new tritium production; and what to do with excess weapons-grade material. The choices confronting DOE and Congress are difficult given the conflicting demands for limited resources

  16. Chemical and biological weapons: new questions, new answers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hood, E

    1999-01-01

    The words "chemical and biological weapons" (CBW) send a shiver down most spines these days. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a massive nuclear confrontation appears remote, so today many popular doomsday scenarios center on the aggressive use of chemical or biological warfare by rogue nations or terrorist groups. As exaggerated as some of the accounts are, with CBW cast as the latest unseen, unstoppable enemy, the threat posed by these weapons is all too real, and growing. Images p931-a PMID:10585899

  17. Kinematics of Laying an Automated Weapon System

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-07-19

    UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED AD-E403 899 Technical Report ARWSE-TR-16024 KINEMATICS OF LAYING AN AUTOMATED WEAPON SYSTEM...information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and...maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of

  18. Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    We performed the audit in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning conflicts of interest among members of the Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program...

  19. Weapon of the Weak?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Amber, Van der Graaf; Otjes, Simon; Rasmussen, Anne

    2016-01-01

    able to reinvigorate democratic processes by changing inequalities in the landscape of political representation among interest groups. The level of resources held by the interest groups acts as the single most consistent predictor of both the range and volume of their social media use. Interest groups......Social media have the potential to offset existing inequalities in representation among interest groups and act as a ‘weapon of the weak’ by providing a technological infrastructure that allows even groups with limited resources to create content and interact across the globe. We expand...... on the sparse existing literature on interest groups and social media in a quantitative, structural analysis of both the range and volume of social media use examining a data set of groups active in European Union lobbying. Despite the positive expectations, we find limited evidence that social media have been...

  20. Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

    1998-05-01

    The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

  1. Does nuclear power lead to nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prawitz, J.

    1977-01-01

    It is pointed out that 'reactor grade' plutonium usually contains about 30 % Pu240 and is unsuitable for weapons. While it is possible to obtain an explosion, it is more difficult to initiate one and its effect, which will be considerably less than with bomb grade plutonium, is difficult to predict. The critical mass will be larger and more cooling required. The proliferation problem is then discussed and the four aspects, vertical, horizontal, sub-national and revolutionary, mentioned. In connection with nuclear power it is the second and third aspects which are of interest. In discussing the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining plutonium, a study by the Swedish Defence Research Institute is quoted as estimating that 10-20 qualified specialists and several years secret preparation would be necessary to make a nuclear weapon. Other authors, e.g. Ted Taylor, have maintained that it would be much easier, but examples of 'student designs' are primitive and unlikely to detonate. Even so, it is emphasised that safeguards and physical security are necessary. Horizontal proliferation is a more real problem and the NPT and IAEA safeguards are discussed in this connection. In conclusion the question of whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons via nuclear power can be prevented cannot be answered with a clear yes or no. Certain states may use nuclear weapon potential as a bargaining factor. However the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is political and while a nuclear power industry would be of help, it would not be decisively so. (JIW)

  2. Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newman, D.F.

    1993-06-01

    As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO 2 fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle

  3. The morality of weapons research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forge, John

    2004-07-01

    I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as 'defensive' weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.

  4. The chemical and biological weapon terrorism by the Aum Shnirikyo

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furukawa, K.

    2009-01-01

    The Aum Shinrikyo, an obscure cult religious group, attacked the Tokyo subways employing sarin gas in March 1995, which was viewed as a mark of a new era in terrorism. The Aum Shinrikyo remains the one empirical example of a religiously motivated cult with an affluent amount of financial and human resources and motivations to use unconventional weapons. The Aum Shinrikyo's leaders included the scientific elite of a young generation as well as former Yakuza members who had close ties with organized crime networks. Aum succeeded in establishing an extensive network to procure weapons, material, and drug, primarily in Russia but also other countries including the United States and even North Korea. Despite the fact that the law enforcement authority had already obtained various pieces of information that reasonably indicated that Aum was producing sarin by late 1994, the law enforcement authority became too cautious to advance its investigation to arrest Aum members until it was too late. Japan's experience with the Aum Shinrikyo's threats provides valuable insights for democratic governments seeking to thwart the deadly plans of religiously motivated non-state actors. It reveals the tremendous difficulties for a democratic society to confront the terrorists who were willing to pursue their deadly 'divine' objectives, especially when the society had no experience to encounter such a threat. This presentation will explain the chemical and biological weapon programs of the Aum Shinrikyo, especially focusing on the following elements: Intention and capability of the Aum Shinrikyo; Weapon systems and mode of attacks, including their target selections; The lessons learned from this case for the prevention and crisis/consequence management n the event of CBW terrorism. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the Research Institute for Science and Technology for Society or its research sponsors.(author)

  5. Making weapons, talking peace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, H.F.

    1987-01-01

    The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961, the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle

  6. Non-State actors’ pursuit of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Meulenbelt, S.E.; Nieuwenhuizen, M.S.

    2016-01-01

    This paper discusses non-State actors’ motivation and capacity to develop and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) improvised weapons in attacks, as well as the possible consequences of such use. Six types of groups have been identified as potential CBRN weapons users that may

  7. Do Weapons Facilitate Adolescent Delinquency? An Examination of Weapon Carrying and Delinquency Among Adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Emmert, Amanda D; Hall, Gina Penly; Lizotte, Alan J

    2018-03-01

    This article examines whether weapon carrying influences the frequency and variety of violent, property, and drug delinquency adolescents commit through fixed-effects analyses of data from the Rochester Youth Development Study (RYDS). We conclude that weapon carrying contributes to violent, substance, and property delinquency, and delinquent behaviors learned during weapon carrying continue to affect substance and property delinquency long after carrying has ceased.

  8. Oscilacije nagibnog sklopa oruđa pri opaljenju / Oscillation of elevating group on artillery weapon during firing test

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zoran Ristić

    2005-03-01

    Full Text Available U radu su opisane oscilacije nagibnog sklopa artiljerijskog oruđa koje nastaju pri opaljenju. Nagibni sklop prikazanje kao kruto telo sa jednim stepenom slobode kretanja (rotacija u vertikalnoj ravni. Model oscilovanja upoređenje sa eksperimentalnim rezultatima realnog modela oscilovanja oruđa (oscilacije nagibnog sklopa sa više stepeni slobode kretanja. Date su razlike između proračunskog i realnog modela oscilovanja i analiza njihovih parametara. / The oscillation of elevating group on artillery weapon during firing test are described in this paper. The elevation group is represented a rigid body of DOF (rotation in vertical plane. The model oscillation is compared -with the experimental results of real model oscillation (oscillations of elevating group with more degrees of freedom. A difference sizes among simplify and real model oscillation are given, and some of their parameters are analyzed.

  9. Prerequisites for a nuclear weapons convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    1999-01-01

    A Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) would prohibit the research, development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and would serve their total elimination.' In this fashion it follows the model laid out by the biological and chemical weapons conventions. The NWC would encompass a few other treaties and while replacing them should learn from their experiences. The Nuclear Weapons Convention should at some given point in the future replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and so resolve its contradictions and shortcomings. The main objectives of an NWC Would be: reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the 'five' nuclear weapons powers down to zero within a set of fixed periods of time; elimination of stockpiles of weapons-usable materials and, where existent, nuclear warheads in de-facto nuclear weapon and threshold states; providing assurance that all states will retain their non-nuclear status forever

  10. Weapons and hope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyson, F.

    1984-01-01

    The British-born physicist presents a full-blown critique of US weapons policy. His careful evaluation of opposing views leads him to endorse a live-and-let-live concept of arms control, which would reject both assured destruction and first use of nuclear weapons in favor of abolishing them. Dyson's faith in the humane progress of military technology and his tolerance of dangerous conventional weapons will not please dovish readers, while his denunciation of military idolatry and his support of a nuclear freeze will disappoint some hawks. Along with moving personal memories of war and pacifism, the most original sections of the book are the author's insightful comments about the Soviet Union and the issue of verification

  11. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  12. Maintaining non-nuclear weapon status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muller, H.

    1991-01-01

    Among the some 170 sovereign states in the world, five are legally recognized as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the terms of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Six countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa) are counted as threshold states: they possess sizeable unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or have passed the brink of a nuclear test or of clandestine weapon production. Six other countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Taiwan, and North and South Korea) have been suspected periodically of either considering the nuclear weapon option or of working secretly on the development of weapons. Thus, about 150 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain which neither possess nuclear weapons nor strive to acquire them. These states are distributed throughout the globe and encompass highly industrialized as well as underdeveloped countries, liberal democracies, socialist states, sheikdoms and dictatorships. Some NNWS face acute military threats; other are far removed from the quarrels of the world, as in the case of some remote fortunate islands. Furthermore, NNWS may be members of nuclear-umbrella alliances or may have opted for a policy of neutrality or non-alignment

  13. The return of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calvez, Jean-Yves

    2005-01-01

    Written after the 2005 NPT review conference, this article first recalls the early stages of nuclear proliferation: acquisition of nuclear weapons by Great-Britain, USSR, France and China, and creation of the NPT in 1970. The author briefly evokes some weaknesses and violations of this treaty: emergence of new nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel) and of nuclear weapon programmes (Iran, North Korea). He outlines the lack of true rules to impede countries to develop nuclear weapons, and then states that the only solution seems to be a simple abolition of these weapons. This option is notably supported by the Catholic Church as outlined and recalled here. The author discusses the situation of this abolition option, and notices that, even though NPT members committed themselves on this way, some also decided to develop new and smaller weapons. Then, it becomes always more difficult to persuade countries not to possess these weapons. The author finally discusses the issues of terrorism threat in relationship to the miniaturisation process, and regrets the lack of commitment in an abolition process

  14. Nuclear weapons industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertsch, K.A.; Shaw, L.S.

    1984-01-01

    This unique study was written specifically as a reference source for institutional investors concerned about the threat posed to their stock portfolios by the debate over nuclear arms production. The authors focus their analysis on the 26 leading companies in the field. The perspective is neutral and refreshing. Background information on strategic policy, arms control and disarmament, and the influence of the industry on defense policy and the economy is presented rationally. The study also discusses the economic significance of both the conversion from military to civilian production and nuclear freeze initiatives. An appendix contains a fact-filled guide to nuclear weapon systems

  15. Weapon carrying and psychopathic-like features in a population-based sample of Finnish adolescents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saukkonen, Suvi; Laajasalo, Taina; Jokela, Markus; Kivivuori, Janne; Salmi, Venla; Aronen, Eeva T

    2016-02-01

    We investigated the prevalence of juvenile weapon carrying and psychosocial and personality-related risk factors for carrying different types of weapons in a nationally representative, population-based sample of Finnish adolescents. Specifically, we aimed to investigate psychopathic-like personality features as a risk factor for weapon carrying. The participants were 15-16-year-old adolescents from the Finnish self-report delinquency study (n = 4855). Four different groups were formed based on self-reported weapon carrying: no weapon carrying, carrying knife, gun or other weapon. The associations between psychosocial factors, psychopathic-like features and weapon carrying were examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis. 9% of the participants had carried a weapon in the past 12 months. Adolescents with a history of delinquency, victimization and antisocial friends were more likely to carry weapons in general; however, delinquency and victimization were most strongly related to gun carrying, while perceived peer delinquency (antisocial friends) was most strongly related to carrying a knife. Better academic performance was associated with a reduced likelihood of carrying a gun and knife, while feeling secure correlated with a reduced likelihood of gun carrying only. Psychopathic-like features were related to a higher likelihood of weapon carrying, even after adjusting for other risk factors. The findings of the study suggest that adolescents carrying a weapon have a large cluster of problems in their lives, which may vary based on the type of weapon carried. Furthermore, psychopathic-like features strongly relate to a higher risk of carrying a weapon.

  16. The immediate need for US universities to promote research related to a nuclear-weapon-free world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ionno, S.

    1999-01-01

    If disarmament is a goal, then the requisite skills must be fostered in academic research. Too many students today view nuclear weapons as a non-issue. It is crucial that those people in positions of influence encourage more young people to explore in-depth the political, scientific, and social changes that a nuclear-weapon-free world will require. The data presented are based on a search of nuclear-weapons-related keywords in the UMI Dissertation Abstracts Database which includes work from over 1000 North American graduate schools and European Universities. The search was focused on US Phd dissertations between 1987 and 1996. There was no PhDs focused on issues such as: zero-level nuclear-weapons-free world; nuclear-weapons-free zones; decreasing nuclear alert status; a nuclear weapons convention; no-first-use or-no use against non-nuclear-weapons-states; START; French nuclear weapons; a possible 'Eurobomb'; peace groups outside the USA, UK, and Germany; nuclear-weapons secrecy; funding disarmament; the role od UN in a nuclear-weapons-free world; an so on

  17. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  18. Political accountability and autonomous weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    James Igoe Walsh

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Autonomous weapons would have the capacity to select and attack targets without direct human input. One important objection to the introduction of such weapons is that they will make it more difficult to identify and hold accountable those responsible for undesirable outcomes such as mission failures and civilian casualties. I hypothesize that individuals can modify their attribution of responsibility in predicable ways to accommodate this new technology. The results of a survey experiment are consistent with this; subjects continue to find responsible and hold accountable political and military leaders when autonomous weapons are used, but also attribute responsibility to the designers and programmers of such weapons.

  19. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities

  20. Warhead politics: Livermore and the competitive system of nuclear weapon design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Francis, Sybil [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1995-06-01

    From the 1950s onward, US evolved a two-laboratory system to design, develop, and test nuclear weapons. LANL (New Mexico) dates from World War II. The founding in 1952 of LLNL in California effectively established the two-laboratory system. Despite essentially identical missions, LANL and LLNL adopted different strategies and approaches to the development of nuclear weapons. This thesis looks to their joint history for an explanation of this and consequent questions (how did the two-laboratory system originate and evolve? how did it function? what impact did it have on nuclear weapons development?) The incentives and constraints that shaped laboratory strategies and outputs was determined by military demand for nuclear weapons, an informal mandate against laboratory duplication, congressional support for competition, and Livermore`s role as the ``second lab.`` This thesis discusses the laboratories` role in the arms race, organizational strategies for coping with changing political environments, dynamics of technological innovation, and the leverage of policymakers over large organizations.

  1. Stability of transition to a world without nuclear weapons: Technical problems of verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhigalov, V.

    1998-01-01

    A serious psychological barrier to acceptance of the concept for achieving the nuclear-weapon-free world is fear of facing the prospect that one or more nations or extremist political groups might develop their own nuclear weapons. Actually this is a question of stability of the nuclear-weapon-free world. From this point of view the most effective system of verification is an absolute necessity. This system must ensure detection of so called undeclared nuclear activity at early stage. Scientists of Russian nuclear centers are working today on solving this problem. This paper is considered to be a comprehensive attempt to analyze the technical and organizational aspects of the problems of transition to a nuclear-weapons-free world, setting aside the difficulties of resolving purely political problems

  2. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department's first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department's legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle

  3. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  4. Pisanello’s hat. The costume and weapons depicted in Pisanello’s medal for John VIII Palaeologus. A discussion of the saber and related weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexander, David

    2004-12-01

    Full Text Available A group of six drawings by the Veronese artist Antonio Pisano depicted the Bizantine Emperor John VIII Paleologus wearing costumes and weapons according to islamic types. This paper studies these objects in relation to other contemporary islamic weapons.

    Un grupo de seis dibujos del artista veronés Antonio Pisano representa al emperador bizantino Juan VIII Paleólogo vestido y armado según modelos islámicos. Este trabajo estudia dichos objetos en relación a otras armas islámicas contemporáneas.

  5. Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. Summary of a United Nations study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    In December 1988, by resolution 43/75N, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out a comprehensive update of a 1980 study on nuclear weapons. The study was to take into account recent relevant studies, and consider the political, legal and security aspects of: (a) nuclear arsenals and pertinent technological developments; (b) doctrines concerning nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; (d) physical, environmental, medical and other effects of the use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear testing; (e) efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; (f) efforts to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and their horizontal and vertical proliferation; and (g) the question of verification of compliance with nuclear-arms limitation agreements. The Group's report is presented in nine chapters, eight of which are summarized here; chapter 9, entitled ''Conclusions'', is included in its entirety. In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General observes that the study represents the most comprehensive review of the relevant developments in the field over the last decade and was carried out during a period of ''far-reaching changes in international relations'' and an ''unprecedented evolution in the relationship between East and West''. This period experienced for the first time the initiation of an effective process of reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles

  6. Unmaking the bomb: Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Glaser, Alexander

    2017-11-01

    Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons may require the ability for international in-spectors to account for individual warheads, even when non-deployed, and to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads prior to dismantlement. These are fundamentally new challenges for nuclear verification, and they have been known for some time; unfortunately, due to a lack of sense of urgency, research in this area has not made substantial progress over the past 20 years. This chapter explores the central outstanding issues and offers a number of possible paths forward. In the case of confirming numerical limits, these in-clude innovative tagging techniques and approaches solely based on declarations using modern crypto-graphic escrow schemes; with regard to warhead confirmation, there has recently been increasing interest in developing fundamentally new measurement approaches where, in one form or another, sensitive infor-mation is not acquired in the first place. Overall, new international R&D efforts could more usefully focus on non-intrusive technologies and approaches, which may show more promise for early demonstration and adoption. In the meantime, while warhead dismantlements remain unverified, nuclear weapon states ought to begin to document warhead assembly, refurbishment, and dismantlement activities and movements of warheads and warhead components through the weapons complex in ways that international inspectors will find credible at a later time. Again, such a process could be enabled by modern cryptographic techniques such as blockchaining. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to recognize that the main reason for the complexity of technologies and approaches needed for nuclear disarmament verification is the requirement to protect information that nuclear weapon states consider sensitive. Ultimately, if information security concerns cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, an alternative would be to "reveal the

  7. Global strike hypersonic weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, Mark J.

    2017-11-01

    Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.

  8. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-03-01

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  9. Nuclear power and weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwood, T.; Rathjens, C.W.; Ruina, J.

    1977-01-01

    The relationship between nuclear weapons development and nuclear electric power is examined. A brief description of nuclear weapons design is first given. This is then followed by a discussion of various aspects of nuclear power technology and of how they affect a nuclear weapon programme. These include fuel cycles, chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment, and the control of dissemination of nuclear technology. In conclusion there is a discussion of possible political and institutional controls for limiting nuclear proliferation. (U.K.)

  10. Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Peterson, P.F. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu waste forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups.

  11. Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peterson, P.F.

    1996-01-01

    If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu waste forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups

  12. Detection and identification of concealed weapons using matrix pencil

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adve, Raviraj S.; Thayaparan, Thayananthan

    2011-06-01

    The detection and identification of concealed weapons is an extremely hard problem due to the weak signature of the target buried within the much stronger signal from the human body. This paper furthers the automatic detection and identification of concealed weapons by proposing the use of an effective approach to obtain the resonant frequencies in a measurement. The technique, based on Matrix Pencil, a scheme for model based parameter estimation also provides amplitude information, hence providing a level of confidence in the results. Of specific interest is the fact that Matrix Pencil is based on a singular value decomposition, making the scheme robust against noise.

  13. International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Grimmett, Richard F

    2006-01-01

    ...) to less-developed nations undergoing civil conflicts. Views expressed by these groups have raised the interest of governments in examining the implications of the international trade in such weapons, particularly, illicit trading...

  14. Effects of the use of ABC weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karl-Rueckert, E.

    1980-01-01

    The effects of ABC-weapons are presented. The various classes of chemical weapons and their effects are discussed. It is pointed out that there is hardly a means of protection against these weapons. (MG) [de

  15. Special Weapons

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Supporting Navy special weapons, the division provides an array of engineering services, technical publication support services, logistics support services, safety...

  16. Public involvement in environmental, safety and health issues at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, Laura L.; Morgan, Robert P.

    1992-01-01

    The state of public involvement in environmental, safety, and health issues at the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex is assessed through identification of existing opportunities for public involvement and through interviews with representatives of ten local citizen groups active in these issues at weapons facilities in their communities. A framework for analyzing existing means of public involvement is developed. On the whole, opportunities for public involvement are inadequate. Provisions for public involvement are lacking in several key stages of the decision-making process. Consequently, adversarial means of public involvement have generally been more effective than cooperative means in motivating change in the Weapons Complex. Citizen advisory boards, both on the local and national level, may provide a means of improving public involvement in Weapons Complex issues. (author)

  17. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaughen, V.C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  18. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    Since 1981 WHO has been studying and reporting on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services. This report provides information on the subject and refers to earlier related work of WHO. It forms the basis for a request from WHO to the International Court of Justice regarding the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. 15 refs

  19. Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons; Armes de terreur. Debarrasser le monde des armes nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques - Commission sur les armes de destruction massive

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H.; Journe, V.

    2010-07-01

    This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

  20. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-01-01

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing

  1. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing

  2. Western Option - Disarmament of Russian Weapon Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tveiten, B.; Petroll, M.R.

    2002-01-01

    The Western Option concept describes an approach to the conversion of weapon-grade plutonium from Russian nuclear warheads under the special aspects of meeting the criteria of irreversible utilization. Putting this concept of plutonium conversion into non-weapon-grade material into effect would make a major contribution to improving security worldwide. This study is based on an agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America concluded in September 2000. It provides for the conversion of 34 t of weapon-grade plutonium in each of the two states. This goal is also supported by other G8 countries. While the United States performs its part of the agreement under its sole national responsibility, the Russian program needs financial support by Western states. Expert groups have pointed out several options as a so-called basic scenario. The funds of approx. US Dollar 2 billion required to put them into effect have not so far been raised. The Western Option approach described in this contribution combines results of the basic scenario with other existing experience and with technical solutions available for plutonium conversion. One of the attractions of the Western Option lies in its financial advantages, which are estimated to amount to approx. US Dollar 1 billion. (orig.) [de

  3. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do.

  4. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do

  5. Integration of low level and ontology derived features for automatic weapon recognition and identification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sirakov, Nikolay M.; Suh, Sang; Attardo, Salvatore

    2011-06-01

    This paper presents a further step of a research toward the development of a quick and accurate weapons identification methodology and system. A basic stage of this methodology is the automatic acquisition and updating of weapons ontology as a source of deriving high level weapons information. The present paper outlines the main ideas used to approach the goal. In the next stage, a clustering approach is suggested on the base of hierarchy of concepts. An inherent slot of every node of the proposed ontology is a low level features vector (LLFV), which facilitates the search through the ontology. Part of the LLFV is the information about the object's parts. To partition an object a new approach is presented capable of defining the objects concavities used to mark the end points of weapon parts, considered as convexities. Further an existing matching approach is optimized to determine whether an ontological object matches the objects from an input image. Objects from derived ontological clusters will be considered for the matching process. Image resizing is studied and applied to decrease the runtime of the matching approach and investigate its rotational and scaling invariance. Set of experiments are preformed to validate the theoretical concepts.

  6. [New approaches to early diagnosis of chronic organophosphorus chemicals intoxication in workers at chemical weapons extermination objects].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Babakov, V N; Goncharov, N V; Radilov, A S; Glashkina, E P; Podol'skaia, E P; Ermolaeva, E E; Shilov, V V; Prokof'eva, D S; Voĭtenko, N G; Egorov, N A

    2009-01-01

    Mass spectrum analysis revealed differences in general contents of low-molecular peptides spectrums in chemical weapons extermination object staffers, in comparison with the reference group. Findings are that serum paraoxonase activity in chemical weapons extermination object staffers in significantly increased.

  7. Bugs and gas: Agreements banning chemical and biological weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mikulak, Robert P.

    2017-11-01

    The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.

  8. Nuclear experts and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1979-01-01

    In Germany the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation has attracted scant attention. Most potential nuclear weapon states are important trade partners of the FRG and, since further proliferation of nuclear weapons could worsen conflicts involving these, it should be in the FRG's interest to limit proliferation. The security of the FRG is also dependent on the common interest of the great powers to avoid nuclear war. The contradictory positions of Usa and the USSR on nuclear weapons policy regarding themselves and non-nuclear weapon states encourages less developed countries to see nuclear weaponry as useful. The NPT and IAEA safeguards have only limited inhibiting effect. The nuclear export policy of the FRG has been dominated by short term economic advantage, neglecting the negative long term effects of decreased political stability. The FRG should formulate a policy based on self-restraint, positive stimuli and extension of controls, using its economic strength to deter proliferation. (JIW)

  9. Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyson, Rhianna

    2005-01-01

    'Some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral, and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation. The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon States continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately, the reverse is true.' - United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 'Something is wrong with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Although seemingly well-equipped with an arsenal of legal and political mechanisms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), decades' worth of General Assembly (GA) resolutions and even a recent slew of ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the regime created to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war remains inadequate. This insufficiency is even starker when viewed in relation to the regimes controlling other weapons of mass destruction. Despite its own challenges, the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons remains relatively well-funded and well-situated to facilitate the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), while still lacking the necessary verification mechanisms, has managed to effectively criminalize not just the use and threat of use of biological weapons, but also their production, development and stockpiling. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear regime seems to be faltering. Progress made in

  10. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

  11. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glasstone, S; Dolan, P J

    1977-01-01

    Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

  12. Weapons material and the commercial fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steyn, J.J.

    1993-01-01

    In 1991, the United States and the former USSR had arsenals of ∼18,000 and 27,200 nuclear weapons, respectively. Approximately 10,000 of the US and 13,000 of the former USSR weapons were in the strategic category, and the remainder were tactical weapons. The dramatic changes in the political climate between the United States and the republics of the former USSR have resulted in the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II), agreements to substantially reduce nuclear weapons arsenals. Tactical weapons have already been collected in Russia, and strategic weapons are to be collected by the end of 1994. The major issues in accomplishing the treaty reductions appear to be funding, transport safety, storage capacity, and political issues between Russia and Ukraine because the latter seems to be using its weapons for political leverage on other matters. Collectively, the US and former USSR warhead stockpiles contain tremendous inventories of high-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium which if converted to light water reactor fuel would equate to an enormous economic supply of natural uranium, conversion services, and enrichment separative work. The potential for this material entering the light water reactor fuel marketplace was enhanced in July 1992, when the two US industrial companies, Nuclear Fuel Services and Allied-Signal, announced that they had reached a preliminary agreement with the Russian ministry, Minatom, and the Russian Academay of Sciences to convert Russian high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium

  13. Imprecise Probability Methods for Weapons UQ

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Picard, Richard Roy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Vander Wiel, Scott Alan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-05-13

    Building on recent work in uncertainty quanti cation, we examine the use of imprecise probability methods to better characterize expert knowledge and to improve on misleading aspects of Bayesian analysis with informative prior distributions. Quantitative approaches to incorporate uncertainties in weapons certi cation are subject to rigorous external peer review, and in this regard, certain imprecise probability methods are well established in the literature and attractive. These methods are illustrated using experimental data from LANL detonator impact testing.

  14. Pole-weapons in the Sagas of Icelanders: a comparison of literary and archaeological sources

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Orkisz Jan H.

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available The Icelandic sagas are a major source of information on the Vikings and their fighting prowess. In these stories, several mysterious pole-weapons appear, which are often called “halberds”, for lack of a better word. In order to better identify what these weapons could have been, and to provide a better understanding of how the sagas relate to the Viking-age events they describe, we confront textual and archaeological evidence for several of these weapons (the höggspjót, the atgeirr, the kesja, the krókspjót, the bryntroll and the fleinn, keeping in mind the contextualisation of their appearances in sagas. The description of the use of each weapon allows to pick several candidates likely to correspond to the studied word. Without a perfect knowledge of what context the authors of the sagas wanted to describe, it appears to be impossible to give a final answer. However, we show that some specific types of spears are good candidates for some of the studied weapons.

  15. Weapon Use in Korean Homicide: Differences Between Homicides Involving Sharp and Blunt Instruments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Jisun; Son, Hyeonseo

    2017-10-23

    On the basis of information regarding 276 homicides committed in South Korea between 1987 and 2008, we compared offenders' and victims' characteristics, injury locations, weapon-related behavior, and offending behavior between homicides involving sharp and blunt instruments. The victims of sharp-force homicide were much younger relative to those of blunt-force homicide. In addition, homicides involving blunt instruments were more likely to be committed by offenders who lived with the victims. Most sharp-force homicides involved injuries to the torso, while blunt-force homicides involved mainly head injuries. Furthermore, perpetrators of sharp-force homicides tended to preselect their weapons, while those of blunt-force homicides were likely to use weapons of opportunity. Logistic regression analysis identified a number of factors, including injury location and body transportation, which significantly predicted weapon type. As this was the first South Korean study to compare sharp- and blunt-force homicides, the results have practical implications for homicide investigations. © 2017 American Academy of Forensic Sciences.

  16. Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Thoughts, Angry Feelings, Hostile Appraisals, and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapons Effect Literature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benjamin, Arlin J; Kepes, Sven; Bushman, Brad J

    2017-09-01

    Guns are associated with aggression. A landmark 1967 study showed that simply seeing a gun can increase aggression-called the "weapons effect." This meta-analysis integrates the findings of weapons effect studies conducted from 1967 to 2017. It includes 162 effect-size estimates from 78 independent studies involving 7,668 participants. The theoretical framework used to explain the weapons effect was the General Aggression Model (GAM), which proposes three routes to aggression-cognitive, affective, and arousal. The GAM also proposes that hostile appraisals can facilitate aggression. As predicted by the GAM, the mere presence of weapons increased aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals, and aggression, suggesting a cognitive route from weapons to aggression. Weapons did not significantly increase angry feelings. Only one study tested the effects of weapons on arousal. These findings also contribute to the debate about social priming by showing that incidental exposure to a stimulus (weapon) can affect subsequent related behavior (aggression).

  17. War and Medicine in a Culture of Peace. 2. Synopsis of Biological Weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Pierard, Gérald

    2001-01-01

    Biological warfare has a long history. Despite the 1972 international convention and several attempts at biological weapon eradication, some countries and non governmental groups still retain some of these agents. According to their potential use, they belong to bioterrorism or to massive destruction weapons. Any biological warfare put the civilian medical and paramedical assets at the frontline and at high risk for being rapidly contaminated. The prompt recognition of a bioterrorist attack a...

  18. Medical experimentation concerning chemical and biological weapons for mass destruction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deutsch, Erwin

    2003-04-01

    This article is the text of a speech originally presented at the Second World Conference on Medical Ethics at Gijon, Spain, on 2 October 2002 under the title "Medical Experimentation Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons for Mass Destruction: Clinical Design for New Smallpox Vaccines: Ethical and Legal Aspects." Experimentation on vaccines such as smallpox is subject to the usual ethical rules such as the need for informed consent. However, the participants will not often be at risk of catching the disease but expose themselves by taking part in the experimentation. Professor Deutsch explores the implications of this, including the position of vulnerable groups such as children, those with mental handicaps, and those acting under orders such as the miliary, the policy and fire officers.

  19. International conference 'Addressing the issues of potential terrorism and guarding against weapons of mass destruction in Central Asia' Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction (W D M) arouse serious concern in world community. Geneva's protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the W D M proliferation becomes the subject of high concern. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show their interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution

  20. Collection and use of individual behavioral and consumption rate data to improve reconstruction of thyroid doses from nuclear weapons tests in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drozdovitch, Vladimir; Schonfeld, Sara; Bouville, Andre; Land, Charles; Luckyanov, Nick; Simon, Steven L.; Schwerin, Michael

    2008-01-01

    Full text: Historical behavioral and consumption rate data were collected from residents of Kazakhstan exposed to nuclear weapons testing fallout using a focus group data collection strategy. These data will enable improved thyroid dose estimation in a radiation epidemiological study being carried out the U.S. National Cancer Institute. The study on the relationship of radiation exposure from weapons testing fallout and thyroid disease in a cohort of 2,994 subjects is now in a stage of improving earlier dose estimates based on individual information collected from a basic questionnaire administered to the study population in 1998. The study subjects of both Kazakh and Russian origin were exposed during childhood to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site between 1949 and 1962. Due to the long time since exposure, a well developed strategy is necessary to encourage accurate memory recall. Limitations of the data collected in 1998 suggested the need to obtain reliable information that is tailored specific to the requirements of the dose reconstruction algorithm and to the evaluation of individual dose uncertainties. Focus group data collection in Kazakhstan in 2007 involved four 8-person focus groups (three of women and one of men) in each of four exposed settlements where thyroid disease screening was conducted in 1998. Age-specific data on relevant childhood behaviour, including time spent indoors and consumption of milk and other dairy products from cows, goats, horses, and sheep, were collected from women's groups. Men's focus groups were interviewed about construction materials of houses and schools as well as animal grazing patterns and supplemental feed to animals. Information obtained from the focus groups are being used to derive the settlement-, ethnicity-, age-, and gender-specific (where appropriate) probability density distributions on individual consumption rates of milk and dairy products

  1. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fieldhouse, R.

    1991-01-01

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

  2. Small Arms - Hand and Shoulder Weapons and Machine Guns

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-06-24

    weapon barrels between firing trials is permitted. A locally fabricated rack can be used for barrels that are detached from the weapon; the air should...Lubricating oil, weapons MIL-L-14107 (LAW) 19. Hydraulic fluid, petroleum base MIL-H-5606 20. Hydraulic fluid, fire - resistant MIL-H-46170...weapon from the test environment to perform maintenance. 4.20.8 Smoke . a. Background. The smoke cloud accumulated during weapon firing can

  3. Deconstructing the 'energy weapon': Russia's threat to Europe as case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith Stegen, Karen

    2011-01-01

    As the likelihood increases that Russia will dominate the European Union's (EU) energy supply, questions have emerged as to whether Russia would use the energy weapon to influence EU member policies and extract political concessions. Countervailing voices argue that Russia would be restricted by interdependence and market forces. As of yet, no one has analyzed the assumptions underlying the energy weapon thesis. Moreover, many scholars examining EU-Russian energy relations rely on non-Russian data. This article seeks to fill several informational and theoretical gaps by including Russian sources and first-hand data and by systematically analyzing the conditions that must obtain before an energy supplier can successfully convert its energy resources into political power. The resulting model can be utilized to analyze the capacity of a supplier to use the energy weapon-whether it be Russia, Iran, Venezuela or any other energy heavyweight-and to assess whether the deployment was successful. Five purported cases of Russian manipulation are analyzed in this article and the findings indicate that, more often than not, Russia failed to achieve political concessions. Looking to the future, the plausibility of Russia using the energy weapon to exploit Europe's dependence, particularly on gas, is also examined. - Highlights: → Energy producers may manipulate supply and prices to coerce political concessions. → Energy weapon model: four conditions must obtain for successful deployment. → Western policy-makers worry about EU dependence on and vulnerability to Russia. → Analysis of five Russian cases reveals tenuous link between weapon use and success. → In medium term, EU can likely avoid yielding political autonomy for supply security.

  4. The Regulation of the Possession of Weapons at Gatherings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pieter du Toit

    2013-12-01

    Full Text Available The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 provides for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the possession of a dangerous weapon and it repeals the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 as well as the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the erstwhile TBVC States. The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. The Dangerous Weapons Act provides for a uniform system of law governing the use of dangerous weapons for the whole of South Africa and it furthermore no longer places the onus on the individual charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon to show that he or she did not have any intention of using the firearm for an unlawful purpose. The Act also defines the meaning of a dangerous weapon. According to our court’s interpretation of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 a dangerous weapon was regarded as an object used or intended to be used as a weapon even if it had not been designed for use as a weapon. The Act, however, requires the object to be capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose. The possession of a dangerous weapon, in circumstances which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use it for an unlawful purpose, attracts criminal liability. The Act also provides a useful set of guidelines to assist courts to determine if a person charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon had indeed intended to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose. It seems, however, that the Act prohibits the possession of a dangerous weapon at gatherings, even if the person carrying the weapon does not intend to use it for an unlawful purpose. The state will, however, have to prove that the accused had the necessary control over the object and the intention to exercise such control, as well as that the object is capable of

  5. New Weapons and the Arms Race

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tsipis, Kosta

    1983-10-01

    In speaking about technologies that could further animate the weapons competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., it would be useful to distinguish between technologies that have already been incorporated into specific weapons systems, and new technologies that are of a generic nature, can be used in a variety of applications, adn can best be described by the tasks that they can perform rather than any specific weapons application. Let me begin with the latter class.

  6. Research on Inferring ELECTRE-III’s Parameters with Fuzzy information and A Case on Naval Gun Weapon System Integration

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sun Shi Yan

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Multiple attributes decision making (MADM method is an important measure for system integration. Robustness analysis on MADM is a hotspot in these years which wins academe’s great attention, and is supposed to be an effective way when countering imperfect information. Setting parameters in ELECTRE-III’s is a vital and difficult step. In this paper, a method of inferring ELECTRE-III’s parameters with fuzzy information based on robustness analysis is presented. First, ELECTRE-III is transformed into a continuous smooth function of each parameter vector. Then, robustness analysis structure and a parameters inferring algorithm are provided by maximizing robustness margin based on mathematics programming. Moreover, how to resolve the programming problem is also discussed. At last, a illustrative example of Naval Gun Weapon System Integration is put forward.

  7. The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carasales, J.

    1998-01-01

    The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  11. Nuclear weapons: new threats, new challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durand, D.

    2005-01-01

    After a brief history of the Iranian nuclear crisis since 2003, the author discusses the four aspects of this crisis which make it a textbook case: a country which wants to control the whole nuclear process and therefore may reach the capacity to produce military-grade uranium (this raises the question of the relationship between nuclear energy and disarmament), the validity and efficiency of international controls is at stake, divergence may appear on the ways to have international treaties respected (different approaches between Europe and the USA), a country which is looking for nuclear weapon for matters of regional security and power (this raises the issue of a new approach to security). Then, the author describes the new nuclear threats: proliferating states, terrorist groups, and states with nuclear weapons (attitude of the USA, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, perspective of a nuclear disarmament of Europe). He gives an overview of the current status of disarmament and of treaties (START, NPT), and discusses the opportunities to save the non proliferation treaty from collapsing in 2005

  12. Effects of a youth substance use prevention program on stealing, fighting, and weapon use.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nieri, Tanya; Apkarian, Jacob; Kulis, Stephen; Marsiglia, Flavio Francisco

    2015-02-01

    Using a sample of sixth graders in 11 public schools in a large Southwestern city, this longitudinal study examined how a model substance use prevention program, keepin' it REAL, that was implemented in 7th grade, influenced three other problem behaviors (fighting, weapon use, stealing), measured in 8th grade. Using a non-equivalent control group design, we compared 259 students in the intervention to 322 students in a treatment-as-usual condition. At baseline, 37% of the sample reported fighting in the last 30 days; 31% reported stealing in the last 30 days, and 16% reported using a weapon in the last 30 days. Regression analyses adjusted for students nested in schools through multi-level modeling and for missing data through multiple imputation. We found that at posttest the rates of all three behaviors were lower in the intervention group than the control group at posttest: 35 versus 37% got into a fight in the last 30 days; 24 versus 31% stole something in the last 30 days; and 16 versus 25% used a weapon in the last 30 days. The program impact for fighting and stealing was not statistically significant and involved minimal effect sizes. The program impact for weapon use was not statistically significant but had an effect size comparable to that for other problem behavior interventions. Promoting positive development via life skills may be a key to broadening program impact.

  13. Nuclear Weapons in Russia's approach to conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Dave

    2016-11-01

    President Putin has moved nuclear weapons to the foreground of the European security landscape. New risks and dangers arise from the apparent coupling of nuclear weapons capabilities with Moscow's revanchist and irredentist foreign and defence policies toward its neighbours. Nuclear weapons are the central feature and capstone capability in Russia's evolving concept of strategic deterrence and are important tools for achieving Russia's geopolitical aims. Russian thinking on the role and place of nuclear weapons in upholding national security and in achieving strategic aims is reflected in military policy, force structure and posture, and exercises and operations. Russia's political and military leaders are not only re-conceptualising the role of nuclear weapons. They are also building the military capabilities that can credibly threaten the calibrated employment of nuclear weapons for deterrence, de-escalation and war-fighting from the regional to large-scale and global levels of conflict. New and still developing concepts for the employment of conventional long-range precision weapons in tandem with nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and containment of local and regional conflicts add volatility to the regional tensions and uncertainties created by recent Russian aggression. Russia's reliance upon integrated conventional and nuclear capabilities in reasserting its influence in its perceived sphere of special interest, intended to contain conflicts at a manageable level, could actually increase the risk of the potential employment of nuclear weapons. NATO nations collectively, and the three NATO nuclear powers (Great Britain, France, and the United States) individually, have recognized this new reality and have begun to adapt to it. In that context, the aim of this paper is to elaborate a clearer understanding of the place and role of nuclear weapons in Russia's approach to conflict, based on nuclear-related policy statements and military-theoretical writing

  14. Development of halthane adhesives for phase 3 weapons: status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammon, H.G.; Althouse, L.P.

    1975-01-01

    Three new adhesives of the polyurethane type have been developed to meet the requirements for the current phase 3 nuclear weapons. They are designated Halthanes to avoid confusion with Adiprenes. Two of these adhesives are made from LLL-developed MDI-terminated prepolymers cured with a blend of polyols. The third is made from an LLL-developed prepolymer terminated with Hylene W and cured with aromatic diamines. All of the adhesives have low moduli over a wide temperature range, bond rapidly and well to most substrates, and are compatible with weapons components. This report updates information reported in Chemistry Department Technical Notes Nos. 75-23 and 75-24. Characterization and compatibility studied are continuing

  15. Financial Management: Financial Reporting of Deferred Maintenance Information on Navy Weapon Systems for FY 2002

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Granetto, Paul

    2003-01-01

    .... The Navy reported an estimated $ 1.3 billion of deterred maintenance at the beginning of FY 2002 on its aircraft, ships, missiles, combat vehicles, and other weapon systems national defense property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) commodities...

  16. Bibliography, subject index, and author index of the literature examined by the Radiation Shielding Information Center (Reactor and Weapons Radiation Shielding)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    An indexed bibliography is presented of literature selected by the Radiation Shielding Information Center since the previous volume was published in 1974 in the area of radiation transport and shielding against radiation from nuclear reactors, x-ray machines, radioisotopes, nuclear weapons (including fallout), and low-energy accelerators (e.g., neutron generators). In addition to lists of literature titles by subject categories (accessions 3501-4950), author and keyword indexes are given. Most of the literature selected for Vol. V was published in the years 1973 to 1976

  17. Small arms proliferation. Report on working group 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The working group reported on the proliferation of small arms, light weapons non-lethal weapons, which have traditionally been given little attention in international talks on peace on the contrary to nuclear weapons which have been tested during the Second World War but never used in war later

  18. Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, Alan; Dalyell, Tam; Haynes, Frank

    1990-01-01

    The Bill debated concerns the government's proposal for the future organisations of the atomic weapons establishment in the United Kingdom. The proposals arise from a full review carried out in 1989 and include points raised by the Select Committee on the Trident programme. Studies of productivity, pay and conditions, information systems and long term manufacturing strategy have been started to enable recommendations of the reorganisation of the establishments to be made. The details of the Bill were debated for just over two hours. The debate is reported verbatim. The main issues were over the principle of contractorisation, possible staff redundancies, conditions of employment, safety and security. The proposal that the Bill be read a second time was carried. (UK)

  19. Consequences of the Use of Neutron Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilijas, B.

    1998-01-01

    In modern conceptions of the use of nuclear weapons there is a significant role of so called enhanced radiation weapons, also known as neutron weapons. Its most important feature is that all other effects (blast, thermal) are minimized in favour of neutron radiation. Because of the great penetrative capability and biological efficiency, neutron beam is ideal weapon against people in shelters and armoured vehicles. Material goods stay saved and also there is no significant long- term radioactive contamination. After the use of this weapons, which is possible even for tactical tasks on limited area, one must count with great number of people irradiated with doses in wide range - from those enough for instantaneous incapacitation to those which cause only long-term effects. For the purpose of maximal efficiency in this situation, it is necessary to work out plans for dosimetric control, first aid, transport and medical treatment of irradiated people (soldiers and civilians) in war conditions. (author)

  20. Why are sexually selected weapons almost absent in females?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anders BERGLUND

    2013-08-01

    Full Text Available In sex role reversed species, predominantly females evolve sexually selected traits, such as ornaments and/or weapons. Female ornaments are common and their function well documented in many species, whether sex role reversed or not. However, sexually selected female weapons seem totally absent except for small wing spurs in three jacana species, present in both males and females. This poor female weaponry is in sharp contrast to the situation in species with conventional sex roles: males commonly have evolved sexually selected weapons as well as ornaments. At the same time, females in many taxa have naturally selected weapons, used in competition over resources or in predator defence. Why are sexually selected weapons then so rare, almost absent, in females? Here I briefly review weaponry in females and the function of these weapons, conclude that the near absence of sexually selected weapons begs an explanation, and suggest that costs of sexually selected weapons may exceed costs of ornaments. Females are more constrained when evolving sexually selected traits compared to males, at least compared to those males that do not provide direct benefits, as trait costs reduce a female’s fecundity. I suggest that this constraining trade-off between trait and fecundity restricts females to evolve ornaments but rarely weapons. The same may apply to paternally investing males. Whether sexually selected weapons actually are more costly than sexually selected ornaments remains to be investigated [Current Zoology 59 (4: 564–568, 2013].

  1. Peaceful uses of nuclear weapon plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burtak, F.

    1996-01-01

    In 1993, the U.S.A. and the CIS signed Start 2 (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in which they committed themselves the reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals to a fraction of that of 1991. For forty-five years the antagonism between the superpowers had been a dominating factor in world history, determining large areas of social life. When Start 2 will have been completed in 2003, some 200 t of weapon grade plutonium and some 2000 t of highly enriched uranium (Heu) will arise from dismantling nuclear weapons. In the absence of the ideological ballast of the debate about Communism versus Capitalism of the past few decades there is a chance of the grave worldwide problem of safe disposal and utilization of this former nuclear weapon material being solved. Under the heading of 'swords turned into plowshares', plutonium and uranium could be used for peaceful electricity generation. (orig.) [de

  2. Weapons dismantlement issues in independent Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.

    1995-01-01

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a seminar during September 1993 in Kiev, Ukraine, titled, ''Toward a Nuclear-Free Future--Barriers and Problems.'' It brought together Ukrainians, Belarusians and Americans to discuss the legal, political, economic, technical, and safeguards and security dimensions of nuclear weapons dismantlement and destruction. US representatives initiated discussions on legal and treaty requirements and constraints, safeguards and security issues surrounding dismantlement, storage and disposition of nuclear materials, warhead transportation, and economic considerations. Ukrainians gave presentations on arguments for and against the Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian Parliament's nonapproval of START 1, alternative strategies for dismantling silos and launchers, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons removal from the Ukraine. Participants from Belarus discussed proliferation and control regime issues. This paper will highlight and detail the issues, concerns and possible impacts of the Ukraine's dismantlement of its nuclear weapons

  3. Emerging nuclear energy systems and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gsponer, A.; Sahin, S.; Jasani, B.

    1983-01-01

    Generally when considering problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussions are focused on horizontal proliferation. However, the emerging nuclear energy systems currently have an impact mainly on vertical proliferation. The paper indicates that technologies connected with emerging nuclear energy systems, such as fusion reactors and accelerators, enhance the knowledge of thermonuclear weapon physics and will enable production of military useful nuclear materials (including some rare elements). At present such technologies are enhancing the arsenal of the nuclear weapon states. But one should not forget the future implications for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as some of the techniques will in the near future be within the technological and economic capabilities of non-nuclear weapon states. Some of these systems are not under any international control. (orig.) [de

  4. Beyond the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinlan, M.

    2001-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

  5. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kerr, Paul; Nikitin, Mary B

    2007-01-01

    Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles...

  6. Science seeks [nuclear] weapons clean-up role

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Macilwain, Colin.

    1996-01-01

    US scientists argue for funding to support basic research which would make the decommissioning of one of the world's nuclear stockpiles cheaper and more effective. This runs contrary to current popular and political thought, from citizens' groups and state governments, that the stockpile should be dismantled immediately and publicly due to their suspicion of scientists and fear that stockpiled weapons could still be used. This article examines the debate between the two opposing views. (UK)

  7. Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

  8. Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russett, B.

    1989-01-01

    To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

  9. A nuclear-weapon-free world and true disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salvini, G.

    1999-01-01

    This preliminary note about is important to consider when discussing hopes of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Without a serious effort to establish intelligent, powerful bodies to control and judge the behavior of the nations on Earth, whatever they future weapons may be, the objective to reach a nuclear-weapon-free world may even succeed, but it is not enough to stop wars and death. Even more than that: if taken alone, as the 'Great Way', it could prove negative, for it could slow down the general effort to achieve peace on out planet. A nuclear-weapon-free world is of course a very good idea but two points must be discussed: how to achieve the nuclear-weapon-free world; and what will happen afterwards. Some considerations on the second point are made

  10. A group theoretic approach to quantum information

    CERN Document Server

    Hayashi, Masahito

    2017-01-01

    This textbook is the first one addressing quantum information from the viewpoint of group symmetry. Quantum systems have a group symmetrical structure. This structure enables to handle systematically quantum information processing. However, there is no other textbook focusing on group symmetry for quantum information although there exist many textbooks for group representation. After the mathematical preparation of quantum information, this book discusses quantum entanglement and its quantification by using group symmetry. Group symmetry drastically simplifies the calculation of several entanglement measures although their calculations are usually very difficult to handle. This book treats optimal information processes including quantum state estimation, quantum state cloning, estimation of group action and quantum channel etc. Usually it is very difficult to derive the optimal quantum information processes without asymptotic setting of these topics. However, group symmetry allows to derive these optimal solu...

  11. Automated Navigation System based on Weapon-Target Assignment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mohammad Khairudin

    2011-12-01

    Full Text Available Operating of weapon on the tank is mostly by manually. It is not desired performance for a critical operation. An automatic control system is required to operate the weapon with the target while maintaining the accuracy. In this paper has designed an automatic weapon control system using object image proccessing. Various an image processing methods used to improve the weapon accuracy to obtain the intended target. The method used in digital image processing is the Camshift motion tracking method. This method is compared with the Lucas Canade motion tracking method. This comparison is conducted to found more precise results between the two methods. Results of object image processing are used to control the direction of the weapon that towards the desired goal. The results show that the implementation of the Lucas Canade motion tracking method using fire simulation tools have been successful. The performance of the Lucas Canade motion tracking methods is better than the CamShift method. Using Lucas Canade method for weapon controller is accordance with the purposes.

  12. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  13. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  14. Review of nuclear fuel cycle alternatives including certain features pertaining to weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, D.C.; Rosenstroch, B.

    1978-01-01

    Largely as a result of concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. program to develop and commercialize the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor has been slowed down; interest in alternative fuel cycles has increased. The report offers an informal review of the various nuclear fuel cycle options including some aspects relevant to weapon proliferation, although no complete review of the latter subject is attempted. Basic principles governing breeding, reactor safety, and efficient utilization of fission energy resources (thorium and uranium) are discussed. The controversial problems of weapon proliferation and its relation to fuel reprocessing (which is essential for efficient fuel cycles) are reviewed and a number of proposed approaches to reducing proliferation risks are noted. Some representative specific reactor concepts are described, with emphasis on their development status, their potentials for resource utilization, and their implications for proliferation

  15. The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larsen, J.A.; Garrity, P.J.

    1991-12-01

    A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

  16. Iraqi nuclear weapons development program. Final report, October 1, 1992--September 30, 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This is an abstract of the final report focusing on the collection, collation, analysis, and recording of information pertaining to Iraqi nuclear weapons development and on the long term monitoring of Iraq

  17. South America and the proliferation of biological weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Tatiana Coutto

    2013-01-01

    This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting t...

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  20. Nuclear weapons proliferation as a world order problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Falk, R.

    1977-01-01

    World-order concerns have intensified recently in light of mounting evidence that a weapons capability will soon be within easy reach of more and more governments and of certain nongovernmental groupings as well. One reliable source estimates that by 1985 as many as fifty countries could ''produce enough plutonium each year for at least several dozen nuclear explosives.'' In an even more immediate sense, ''economic competition among nuclear suppliers today could soon lead to a world in which twenty or more nations are but a few months from a nuclear weapons force.'' Three developments have created this ''world order'' sense of concern: (1) increased pace of civilian nuclear power deployment globally as a consequence of rising oil prices, unreliability of oil supplies, and reality of dwindling oil reserves in any case; (2) actuality of India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 which demonstrated vividly how any state that pursues a ''civilian'' program can also develop its own weapons capability; and (3) the intensification of competition for international nuclear sales which makes it increasingly evident that nonproliferation goals are no longer compatible with the pursuit of national commercial advantage; essentially, this reality has emerged from a break in the American monopoly over civilian nuclear technology and the willingness of French and German suppliers to provide all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing facilities,to any nation that feels it can afford to buy them; the German-Brazilian deal (worth at least $4 billion) has proven to be the equivalent in the commercial realm of India's ''peaceful'' nuclear explosion. Such developments disclose the alarming prospect that easier access to nuclear technology will make it relatively simple and thus more likely for a beleaguered government or a desperate political actor of any sort to acquire and possibly use nuclear weapons

  1. 15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or... REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY-CCL BASED CONTROLS § 742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention). States... Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  2. Escalation of terrorism? On the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nass, Jens

    2010-01-01

    The report on the risk of attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons or materials covers the following topics: the variety of terrorism: ethnic-nationalistic, politically motivated, social revolutionary, political extremism, religious fanaticism, governmental terrorism; CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) weapons and materials: their availability and effectiveness in case of use; potential actor groups; prevention and counter measures, emergency and mitigating measures.

  3. Dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schulte, N.T.

    1997-01-01

    The safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons is of fundamental importance to the security of all countries represented in this volume. Expertise in the field is not confined to one country or organisation: all can benefit from each other. There is an ever present danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: approximately two dozen countries have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire such weapons, and many are also gaining the capability to build air-surface delivery systems. But much can be done to prevent proliferation by reducing leakage of materials and know-how and by solving the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, which has now come to be a key issue. In 13 sessions of the workshop attention was paid to (1) Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons; (2) Status of Implementation of Arms Control Treaties and Voluntary Commitments; (3) National Perspectives on Cooperation in Disarmament; (4) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Chemical Weapons; (5) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Nuclear Weapons; (6) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Conventional Weapons. Session; (7) Experience with Currently Employed Chemical Destruction Technologies; (8) Alternative Chemical Destruction Technologies; (9) Deactivation, Dismantlement and Destruction of Delivery Systems and Infrastructure for Nuclear Weapons; (10) Storage, Safeguarding and Disposition of Fissile Materials; (11) Technologies for Conversion and Civil Use of Demilitarized Materials; (12) International Organizations; and (13) Environmental Challenges Posed by Chemical and Nuclear Disarmament

  4. Nuclear weapons in Europe: Why zero is better

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daalder, I.H.

    1993-01-01

    Given the fundamental changes in the political context and NATO's perception of nuclear weapons, what role remains for US nuclear weapons in preserving security in Europe? Are US nuclear deployments on the continent still necessary? Is there a requirement for extended deterrence and, if so, does its credibility depend on the continued basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe? And what is the role of arms control in effecting any desirable restructuring in nuclear force postures? In addressing these questions, it becomes clear that US nuclear weapons can now be removed from Europe - they no longer serve the political and military functions they once did

  5. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons

  6. Bibliography, subject index, and author index of the literature examined by the radiation shielding information center. Volume 6. Reactor and weapons radiation shielding

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-05-01

    An indexed bibliography is presented of literature selected by the Radiation Shielding Information Center since the previous volume was published in 1978 in the area of radiation transport and shielding against radiation from nuclear reactors, x-ray machines, radioisotopes, nuclear weapons (including fallout), and low energy accelerators (e.g., neutron generators). The bibliography was typeset from data processed by computer from magnetic tape files. In addition to lists of literature titles by subject categories (accessions 4951-6200), an author index is given

  7. Strengthening global physical protection practices; gaining better information on national practices for protection of weapons-usable material. Keynote address/session 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, G.; Rinne, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty requirement that non-nuclear-weapon parties provide 'safeguards' information to the IAEA on their nuclear materials and their state systems for accounting and control, there is no related requirement to provide information on state systems of physical protection. A review of 1997 IAEA and Stanford physical protection conference proceedings showed both the absence of information on important practices from many states and the great variation in practices from state to state. Besides the lack of internationally required standards for domestic protection, reasons for the variations described in Stanford-Sandia National Laboratories research include: differences in states' perceptions of the threats to their materials; differences in their abilities to pay the cost of stronger physical protection; differences in their laws and regulatory practices in general; and differences in their cultural attitudes - for example, attitudes toward whether to arm personnel guarding weapon-usable material or to require clearances for personnel with access to such material. The information presented to the 1997 IAEA and Stanford conferences was supplied voluntarily. The two global documents which provide norms for physical protection do not require submission of such information. These are the 1980 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 1999 IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. This means that, without bilateral cooperation, no state can find out how other states are protecting their nuclear material. Yet, as IAEA Director General El Baradei has said, '[I]t is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent [physical protection] responsibility is fulfilled. ...The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations - where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter and defeat hostile actions against nuclear

  8. Chinese strategic weapons and the plutonium option (U)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lewis, John W.; Xui Litai

    1988-04-01

    In their article "Chinese Strategic Weapons and the Plutonium Option," John W. Lewis and Xue Litai of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University's International Strategic Institute present an unclassified look at plutonium processing in the PRC. The article draws heavily on unclassified PRC sources for its short look at this important subject. Interested readers will find more detailed information in the recently available works referenced in the article.

  9. Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

  10. Non-proliferation issues with weapons-usable plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper author deals with the plutonium produced in power reactors and with their using. Excess plutonium, mineralized in a ceramic matrix and incised in HLW glass, is a less attractive target for terrorist groups than either aged, irradiated weapons grade MOX fuel, or aged, U oxide spent fuel. This is especially true after the Russian and United States' Pu Disposition Programs have been completed, until the material (spent MOX fuel or the immobilized form) is stored in a sealed, repository. (authors)

  11. Models as Weapons: Review of Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy by Cathy O’Neil (2016

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Samuel Tunstall

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Cathy O�Neil. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (New York, NY: Crown 272 pp. ISBN 978-0553418811. Accessible to a wide readership, Cathy O�Neil�s Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy provides a lucid yet alarming account of the extensive reach of mathematical models in influencing all of our lives. With a particular eye towards social justice, O�Neil not only warns modelers to be cognizant of the effects of their work on real people�especially vulnerable groups who have less power to fight back�but also encourages laypersons to take initiative in learning about the myriad ways in which big data influences their lived experiences. In this review, I highlight O�Neil�s core argument and provide beginning thoughts on how the Numeracy community might take up the book moving forward.

  12. Physical security technologies for weapons complex reconfiguration facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-01-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a member of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S ampersand S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration. The physical security systems in the new and upgraded facilities being considered for the WCR had to meet DOE orders and other requirements set forth in the WCR Programmatic Design Criteria (PDC), incorporate the latest physical security technologies using proven state-of-the-art systems and meet fundamental security principles. The outcome was to avoid costly retrofits and provide effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, costs and schedule. Physical security requirements for WCR facilities include: (1) reducing S ampersand S life-cycle costs, (2) where feasible automating S ampersand S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, (3) increasing the amount of delay to outsider adversary attack, (4) compartmentalizing the facility to minimize the number of personnel requiring access to critical areas and (5) having reliable and maintainable systems. To be most effective against threats physical security must be integrated with facility operations, safety and other S ampersand S activities, such as material control and accountability, nuclear measurements and computer and information security. This paper will discuss the S ampersand S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical security technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed

  13. Islamic State and Chemical Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Rafay

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The article deals with topic of Islamic State and chemical weapons. The issue is analysed in three dimensions: origin of used chemical weapons and possibility of independent production; known chemical attacks and tactical regularities in their execution; and traits of future chemical terrorist attacks. By providing a thorough examination of the problem, the article aims at predicting the future development of the group’s chemical program as well as describing any prospective chemical terrorist attacks in Europe

  14. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierre, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    In this introduction to ''Nuclear Weapons in Europe'', the author summarized the views of two Americans and two Europeans, whose articles make up the volume. The introduction explains the different assumptions of the four authors before discussing their views on the military and political rationales for a nuclear force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the debate over battlefield nuclear weapons, conventional defense, and arms control proposals and talks. The four contributors whose views are analyzed are William G. Hyland, Lawrence D. Freeman, Paul C. Warnke, and Karstan D. Voight. The introduction notes that the agreements and differences do not fall strictly on American versus European dividing lines

  15. The medical consequences of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Humphrey, J.; Hartog, M.; Middleton, H.

    1982-01-01

    A pamphlet has been produced by the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) and by the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW) to bring the catastrophic effects that the use of nuclear weapons would entail to the attention of the general public, politicians and members of the medical profession. It describes the medical consequences of the effects of blast, heat and ionizing radiation from nuclear weapons, including details from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. The medical consequences of a nuclear attack including consideration of the casualties, care of the injured, psychological effects and the outcome are also discussed. It is concluded that if for none other than purely medical reasons, nuclear warfare must never be allowed to happen. (UK)

  16. Space weapon technology and policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hitchens, Theresa

    2017-11-01

    The military use of space, including in support of nuclear weapons infrastructure, has greatly increased over the past 30 years. In the current era, rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia and China have led to assumptions in all three major space powers that warfighting in space now is inevitable, and possible because of rapid technological advancements. New capabilities for disrupting and destroying satellites include radio-frequency jamming, the use of lasers, maneuverable space objects and more capable direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons. This situation, however, threatens international security and stability among nuclear powers. There is a continuing and necessary role for diplomacy, especially the establishment of normative rules of behavior, to reduce risks of misperceptions and crisis escalation, including up to the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy and strategy should seek a balance between traditional military approaches to protecting its space assets and diplomatic tools to create a more secure space environment.

  17. Bibliography, subject index, and author index of the literature examined by the Radiation Shielding Information Center (Reactor and Weapons Radiation Shielding). [1973--1976

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    An indexed bibliography is presented of literature selected by the Radiation Shielding Information Center since the previous volume was published in 1974 in the area of radiation transport and shielding against radiation from nuclear reactors, x-ray machines, radioisotopes, nuclear weapons (including fallout), and low-energy accelerators (e.g., neutron generators). In addition to lists of literature titles by subject categories (accessions 3501-4950), author and keyword indexes are given. Most of the literature selected for Vol. V was published in the years 1973 to 1976.

  18. The nuclear weapon; L'arme nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2008-07-01

    The author presents the technology, the concept of deterrence, the today means and the international control, concerning the nuclear weapon. The conclusion is pessimistic. The author sees only two issues: the substitution of a new weapon more powerful, or its use. (A.L.B.)

  19. Towards the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xie Zhiqiong

    1998-01-01

    For 40 years, the Pugwash Conference on Science and world affairs has been making unremitting efforts to achieve it main objectives the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, the elimination of wars and maintenance of world peace. The end of the Cold War vigorously encouraged world efforts in arms control and disarmament. On the day of exploding her first nuclear bomb in October 1964, China declared solemnly that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time under any circumstances. China has also committed unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. China is the sole nuclear weapon state that has made this commitment, and she has kept her word. China is in favour of comprehensive nuclear test ban in the move towards complete nuclear disarmament, taking an active part in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva and contributing to the conclusion of a fair, reasonable, verifiable treaty of universal adherence and unlimited duration within this year

  20. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Toet, A.

    2003-01-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the

  1. AWRE: Atomic Weapons Research Establishment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    This reviews the work of AWRE at Aldermaston and Foulness. The main programme is nuclear and is concerned with the design and development of warheads for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the British nuclear deterrent, including those for the Royal Navy's missile carrying submarine fleet. The work is described grouped as design physics, development and materials. Services to these groups and to the whole establishment are provided by Engineering, Safety and Administration. The work ranges from long-term fundamental research, the development of technology, design, prototype development to the environmental testing of engineered products. In materials research the emphasis is on plutonium, uranium and beryllium, on high explosives and a wide range of inorganic and organic materials. The physics of the earth's crust is studied to aid detection of underground nuclear explosions. Reactor research facilities include the two reactors, Herald and Viper. (U.K.)

  2. Foreign trade legislation, war weapons control legislation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hucko, E.M.

    1993-01-01

    The volume contains, in addition to an introduction into the matter, the texts of the Foreign Trade Act (FTA), the War Weapons Control Act and all relevant ordinances. Foreign trade transactions of the Federal Republic of Germany are essentially, but not exclusively, governed by the FTA. They are strongly influenced by the legislation of the European Communities which in the form of directives are immediately effective here, and in the form of guidelines oblige the German lawgiver or ordinance giver to translate them into practice, mostly by appropriate modifications of the foreign trade ordinance, the import and export lists. It is not the war weapons which are the problem, but the so-called dual-use goods, namely articles, technologies and knowledge which, as a rule, serve civil purposes, which, however, may be used also to produce weapons, in particular ABC weapons or rockets. Nowadays we are concerned about several third-world states which are obsessed by the wish to build their own atomic bomb. (orig./HSCH) [de

  3. Structural adaptations to diverse fighting styles in sexually selected weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCullough, Erin L; Tobalske, Bret W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2014-10-07

    The shapes of sexually selected weapons differ widely among species, but the drivers of this diversity remain poorly understood. Existing explanations suggest weapon shapes reflect structural adaptations to different fighting styles, yet explicit tests of this hypothesis are lacking. We constructed finite element models of the horns of different rhinoceros beetle species to test whether functional specializations for increased performance under species-specific fighting styles could have contributed to the diversification of weapon form. We find that horns are both stronger and stiffer in response to species-typical fighting loads and that they perform more poorly under atypical fighting loads, which suggests weapons are structurally adapted to meet the functional demands of fighting. Our research establishes a critical link between weapon form and function, revealing one way male-male competition can drive the diversification of animal weapons.

  4. Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security: A Need for Weapons Programs?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Woolf, Amy F

    2003-01-01

    .... nuclear weapons that goes beyond the concept of deterrence from the Cold War. It also identified a new targeting strategy that would seek to threaten specific capabilities in adversary nations...

  5. Enabling Lead Free Interconnects in DoD Weapon Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-09-28

    STATEMENT Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT An enhanced multi-pronged technology transfer approach will be designed to communicate...the needs of the weapon system program managers. Examples of risk will be given and information will be provided on where to access more detailed...Paul Zutter, Janelle Fowler, Holley Wingard, Jon Ahlbin, Charles Peltier, – Air Force • Paul Steiner, Tim Kalt, Gary Dowdy – NAVSEA • Mick Miller

  6. Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, Thomas

    2002-05-01

    The Swedish nuclear weapons research began as early as 1945, shortly after the first atomic bombs fell over Japan. The assignment to look into the new weapon of mass destruction went to the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). Admittedly, the main aim of the research initiated at that time was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset FOA was interested in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing what was then called an atomic bomb. A co-operation between FOA and AB Atomenergi (AE), which was created in 1947 in order to be responsible for the industrial development of civilian nuclear energy, was initiated. AE made several technical investigations within this co-operation regarding choice of reactors and preconditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. The first purpose of this report is therefore to investigate how this co-operation emerged and what consequences it had for the project to produce basic information for the Swedish manufacture of nuclear weapons. In general terms, the finding of this report is that FOA was responsible for the overall nuclear weapons research. For this reason, FOA was in charge of the construction of the nuclear device and the studies of its effects. Additionally, AE should deliver basic information of a possible production of weapons-grade plutonium and investigate the possibilities of a production or a procurement of inspection-free heavy water (i.e. without inspections by the supplying country). AE should also build a reprocessing plant and manufacture fuel elements to be used in the reactors for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that both FOA and AE conducted plutonium research. The reason why FOA conducted this research was that the plutonium had to be in metallic form in order to be used in a nuclear weapons device. Therefore, FOA carried out research with the purpose of producing

  7. High-Energy Laser Weapon Integration with Ground Vehicles

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hafften, Michael; Stratton, Robert

    2004-01-01

    .... The architecture of an electric, solid-state HEL weapon system would likely be based upon a hybrid electric vehicle that provides a common electrical power source for the propulsion and weapon subsystems...

  8. From weapons to waste: The future of the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wasserman Goodman, Sherri

    1992-01-01

    This paper examines how decision-making power has shifted within the nuclear weapons complex, from the federal government operating agency, in which power was originally vested by the Atomic Energy Act, to the states and to regulatory authorities. Additionally, when the original operating agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was abolished in the 1970s, substantial decision-making power shifted from Washington to the field sites. This paper identifies the needs for future materials and weapons production, and recommends that restart of old plants be abandoned as no longer militarily necessary. Instead, the U. S. should take advantage of what may be a unique opportunity to 'leapfrog' to new, smaller, technologically-advanced plants that will meet the needs of the nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War world. This paper then looks at the current state of DOE's environmental restoration/waste management program, and the technological, legal and political problems it faces in trying to accomplish its mission of cleaning up all nuclear weapons sites. This paper argues that the U. S. government no longer has the exclusive authority to make and carry out critical decisions affecting a cleanup program that will cost the U. S. over $200 billion over the next 20-40 years. Moreover, there are competing theories about the principles that should guide the cleanup program. Finally, the author examines alternative futures for the DOE'S environmental restoration/waste management program. (author)

  9. Open-area concealed-weapon detection system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pati, P.; Mather, P.

    2011-06-01

    Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) has become a significant challenge to present day security needs; individuals carrying weapons into airplanes, schools, and secured establishments are threat to public security. Although controlled screening, of people for concealed weapons, has been employed in many establishments, procedures and equipment are designed to work in restricted environments like airport passport control, military checkpoints, hospitals, school and university entrance. Furthermore, screening systems do not effectively decipher between threat and non-threat metal objects, thus leading to high rate of false alarms which can become a liability to daily operational needs of establishments. Therefore, the design and development of a new CWD system to operate in a large open area environment with large numbers of people reduced incidences of false alarms and increased location accuracy is essential.

  10. Worldwide governmental efforts to locate and destroy chemical weapons and weapons materials: minimizing risk in transport and destruction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trapp, Ralf

    2006-09-01

    The article gives an overview on worldwide efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the context of the implementation of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It highlights the objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency set up in The Hague to implement the CWC, and provides an overview of the present status of implementation of the CWC requirements with respect to chemical weapons (CW) destruction under strict international verification. It addresses new requirements that result from an increased threat that terrorists might attempt to acquire or manufacture CW or related materials. The article provides an overview of risks associated with CW and their elimination, from storage or recovery to destruction. It differentiates between CW in stockpile and old/abandoned CW, and gives an overview on the factors and key processes that risk assessment, management, and communication need to address. This discussion is set in the overall context of the CWC that requires the completion of the destruction of all declared CW stockpiles by 2012 at the latest.

  11. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  12. [Biological weapons--an old menace in new circumstances].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bartůnĕk, P

    2001-12-06

    Biological weapons were conceived for years by the world community only as a potential evil. A fundamental change of opinions regarding their real menace occurred only after the premeditated criminal attack on the USA on September 11, 2001. It was logical that publicists for mall types of media demanded from representatives of the state administration of the Czech Republic information how out country is prepared for this type of danger. Their reactions were hesitant and in a way reflect a certain chaos associated with the reorganization of the army and at the same time unpreparedness of civil defence. To a certain extent all this can be conceived as the consequence of the fundamental transformation of our society and thus it may be excused to a certain extent. Nevertheless it is obvious that not even the most advanced countries are quite clear as regards defence against the horror of biological weapons. Evidence to this effect is the following document, devoted to the problem in the USA, major parts of which we reproduce from the prestigious periodical The England Journal of Medicine.

  13. Asynchronous data-driven classification of weapon systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jin, Xin; Mukherjee, Kushal; Gupta, Shalabh; Ray, Asok; Phoha, Shashi; Damarla, Thyagaraju

    2009-01-01

    This communication addresses real-time weapon classification by analysis of asynchronous acoustic data, collected from microphones on a sensor network. The weapon classification algorithm consists of two parts: (i) feature extraction from time-series data using symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), and (ii) pattern classification based on the extracted features using the language measure (LM) and support vector machine (SVM). The proposed algorithm has been tested on field data, generated by firing of two types of rifles. The results of analysis demonstrate high accuracy and fast execution of the pattern classification algorithm with low memory requirements. Potential applications include simultaneous shooter localization and weapon classification with soldier-wearable networked sensors. (rapid communication)

  14. Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 1 August 1979.

  15. Proposals for chemical weapons during the American Civil War.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hasegawa, Guy R

    2008-05-01

    Proposals for chemical weapons that arose during the American Civil War are described. Most incendiary and all biological agents are excluded. The described proposals appeared primarily in periodicals or letters to government officials on both sides. The weapons were usually meant to temporarily disable enemy combatants, but some might have been lethal, and Civil War caregivers were ill-prepared to deal with the weapons' effects. Evidently, none of the proposed weapons were used. In only one instance was use against civilians mentioned. Among the agents most commonly proposed were cayenne pepper or other plant-based irritants such as black pepper, snuff, mustard, and veratria. Other suggested agents included chloroform, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic compounds, sulfur, and acids. Proponents usually suggested that the chemicals be included in explosive artillery projectiles. Less commonly proposed vehicles of delivery included fire engines, kites, and manned balloons. Some of the proposed weapons have modern counterparts.

  16. Nuclear weapons headed for the trash

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arkin, W.M.; Durrant, D.; Kristensen, H.

    1991-01-01

    Whether he intended it or not, Bush has taken steps that mean the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons. His proposals significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the burdens associated with deploying and controlling them. And although he retains many of the options for continuing and regenerating the nuclear arsenal, he has exposed the fact that there are no longer any grand justifications or doctrinal needs for nuclear weapons - and that the nuclear machine is choking on its economic, political, environmental, and human contradictions. The initiatives fundamentally altered the nuclear stance of both nations. Yet, as momentous as the changes were, they were set in motion in an almost businesslike manner. Neither leader truly framed the moves as an end to the nuclear age. But they didn't need to. The steps they have taken practically guarantee it

  17. Responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Jun

    1994-01-01

    The responsibilities of Nuclear Weapon States are presented by a straightforward analysis together with the ways in which they could fulfill them. The complete undertaking of all the commitments by the Nuclear Weapon States may take a long time. However they do not have a single excuse to neglect such a historic opportunity to do their best to provide a genuinely secure world environment for the international community, of which they too are members

  18. Chemical and biological weapons in the 'new wars'.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ilchmann, Kai; Revill, James

    2014-09-01

    The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

  19. Remote Sensing Information Sciences Research Group: Santa Barbara Information Sciences Research Group, year 4

    Science.gov (United States)

    Estes, John E.; Smith, Terence; Star, Jeffrey L.

    1987-01-01

    Information Sciences Research Group (ISRG) research continues to focus on improving the type, quantity, and quality of information which can be derived from remotely sensed data. Particular focus in on the needs of the remote sensing research and application science community which will be served by the Earth Observing System (EOS) and Space Station, including associated polar and co-orbiting platforms. The areas of georeferenced information systems, machine assisted information extraction from image data, artificial intelligence and both natural and cultural vegetation analysis and modeling research will be expanded.

  20. Application of a Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Weapon Target Assignment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-01

    evaluation and weapon assignment in maritime combat scenarios. Lloyd also acts as a liaison for the Weapons and Combat Systems Division with the ANZAC...positively identified a number of targets as threats, whether they are an enemy ship (i.e., specifically, its weapon launcher systems) or a directed

  1. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang Yenchiang

    2009-01-01

    This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

  2. Conflict Without Casualties: Non-Lethal Weapons in Irregular Warfare

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-09-01

    the body,” and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, bans the use of chemical and biological weapons .11 On 8 April 1975, President Ford issued Executive...E Funding – PE 63851M) (accessed 15 December 2006). The American Journal of Bioethics . “Medical Ethics and Non-Lethal Weapons .” Bioethics.net...CASUALTIES: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE by Richard L. Scott September 2007 Thesis Advisor: Robert McNab Second Reader

  3. Crowd Confrontation and Non-Lethal Weapons: A Literature Review and Conceptual Model

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-03-01

    counterterrorist situations, when there is a need to incapacitate one or several terrorists operating from within a larger group of harmless individuals. In such...weapons include some microbes capable of degrading fuel, an herbicide (“Agent Orange”), as well as non-lethal anti-personnel mines. It is concluded

  4. Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2002-05-01

    The Swedish nuclear weapons research began as early as 1945, shortly after the first atomic bombs fell over Japan. The assignment to look into the new weapon of mass destruction went to the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). Admittedly, the main aim of the research initiated at that time was to find out how Sweden could best protect itself against a nuclear weapon attack. However, from the outset FOA was interested in investigating the possibilities of manufacturing what was then called an atomic bomb. A co-operation between FOA and AB Atomenergi (AE), which was created in 1947 in order to be responsible for the industrial development of civilian nuclear energy, was initiated. AE made several technical investigations within this co-operation regarding choice of reactors and preconditions for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. The first purpose of this report is therefore to investigate how this co-operation emerged and what consequences it had for the project to produce basic information for the Swedish manufacture of nuclear weapons. In general terms, the finding of this report is that FOA was responsible for the overall nuclear weapons research. For this reason, FOA was in charge of the construction of the nuclear device and the studies of its effects. Additionally, AE should deliver basic information of a possible production of weapons-grade plutonium and investigate the possibilities of a production or a procurement of inspection-free heavy water (i.e. without inspections by the supplying country). AE should also build a reprocessing plant and manufacture fuel elements to be used in the reactors for a production of weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that both FOA and AE conducted plutonium research. The reason why FOA conducted this research was that the plutonium had to be in metallic form in order to be used in a nuclear weapons device. Therefore, FOA carried out research with the purpose of producing

  5. Nuclear weapons policy at the crossroads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howlett, D.; Ogilvie-White, T.; Simpson, J.; Taylor, E.

    2000-01-01

    This study on nuclear futures is a product of work undertaken by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) of the University of Southampton. The study has pursued three goals: to attempt to understand the dynamics of the nuclear present; to elucidate a range of possible nuclear futures that may emerge; and to assess different strategies that could be pursued in response to these futures, including proposals for promoting nuclear disarmament. The aim was to draw on research, meetings and outreach to achieve these goals, and to use the knowledge gained to help inform the international policy-making community. The work underlying this study was divided into two stages. During the first stage, the apparent threat perceptions of the five acknowledged NWS (China, France, Russia, the UK and the United States) and the three de facto NWS (India, Israel and Pakistan) were explored . The purpose of this research was to identify the main factors (or shapers) that seem to have influenced nuclear weapons policy in all these states, and to assess their relative importance. The second stage of the work drew on the conclusions reached on the eight countries. The shapers were divided into categories on the basis of their apparent impact on nuclear weapons policy. This study summarizes the main conclusions reached in the course of this work

  6. Hamburgian weapon delivery technology: a quantitative comparative approach

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Riede, Felix

    2010-01-01

    cran). Numerous studies have addressed the question of whether these points tipped arrows fired from bows, darts launched with the help of spear-throwers, or some other projectile delivery weapon. This paper approaches the question of Hamburgian weapon delivery technology from a quantitative...

  7. Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) Case Study

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bexfield, James

    2001-01-01

    .... This report describes the process used to conduct the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) in 1995-1997. This case study focuses on the weapons being procured by the Services and whether a joint viewpoint would result in a more effective mix...

  8. Application of inertial confinement fusion to weapon technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toepfer, A.J.; Posey, L.D.

    1978-12-01

    This report reviews aspects of the military applications of the inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program at Sandia Laboratories. These applications exist in the areas of: (1) weapon physics research, and (2) weapon effects simulation. In the area of weapon physics research, ICF source technology can be used to study: (1) equations-of-state at high energy densities, (2) implosion dynamics, and (3) laboratory simulation of exoatmospheric burst phenomena. In the area of weapon effects simulation, ICF technology and facilities have direct near, intermediate, and far term applications. In the near term, short pulse x-ray simulation capabilities exist for electronic component effects testing. In the intermediate term, capabilities can be developed for high energy neutron exposures and bremsstrahlung x-ray exposures of components. In the far term, system level exposures of full reentry vehicles will be possible if sufficiently high pellet gains are achieved

  9. The tale of the shrinking weapon: seasonal changes in nutrition affect weapon size and sexual dimorphism, but not contemporary evolution.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, C W; McDonald, G C; Moore, A J

    2016-11-01

    Sexually selected traits are often highly variable in size within populations due to their close link with the physical condition of individuals. Nutrition has a large impact on physical condition, and thus, any seasonal changes in nutritional quality are predicted to alter the average size of sexually selected traits as well as the degree of sexual dimorphism in populations. However, although traits affected by mate choice are well studied, we have a surprising lack of knowledge of how natural variation in nutrition affects the expression of sexually selected weapons and sexual dimorphism. Further, few studies explicitly test for differences in the heritability and mean-scaled evolvability of sexually selected traits across conditions. We studied Narnia femorata (Hemiptera: Coreidae), an insect where males use their hind legs as weapons and the femurs are enlarged, to understand the extent to which weapon expression, sexual dimorphism and evolvability change across the actual range of nutrition available in the wild. We found that insects raised on a poor diet (cactus without fruit) are nearly monomorphic, whereas those raised on a high-quality diet (cactus with ripe fruit) are distinctly sexually dimorphic via the expression of large hind leg weapons in males. Contrary to our expectations, we found little evidence of a potential for evolutionary change for any trait measured. Thus, although we show weapons are highly condition dependent, and changes in weapon expression and dimorphism could alter evolutionary dynamics, our populations are unlikely to experience further evolutionary changes under current conditions. © 2016 European Society For Evolutionary Biology. Journal of Evolutionary Biology © 2016 European Society For Evolutionary Biology.

  10. UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hastings, Robert L.

    2015-01-01

    Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

  11. Biological and Chemical Weapons: Criminal Sanctions and Federal Regulations

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Garcia, Michael J

    2004-01-01

    The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, both of which have been signed and ratified by the United States, obligate signatory parties to enact legislation or otherwise...

  12. Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Weilacher, Lester A

    2003-01-01

    Little more than a month after terrorists took control of four passenger aircraft in the United States and unleashed the horror of 9/11, 50 Chechen terrorists armed with automatic weapons and carrying...

  13. Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm For A World Without Nuclear Weapons?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marc Finaud

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available If there is a loose consensus on aiming at a world free of nuclear weapons in the future, there are clear oppositions as to the timeframe as well as the means for achieving this goal. The approach to nuclear disarmament followed to date has only yielded limited success because it has been conceived in isolation from global and regional security environments and threat perceptions. A new paradigm should thus be sought in order to reconcile nuclear powers’ security doctrines with global aspirations for a safer world, and ensure that nuclear powers derive their security less from others’ insecurity but from mutually beneficial cooperative security. This should not become a pretext for preserving nuclear weapons for ever. It will on the contrary require parallel tracks addressing the initial motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD, in particular in the context of regional conflicts, as well as dealing with the current issues necessarily related to nuclear disarmament (missile defence, weaponization of space, conventional imbalances and future weapon systems. Ultimately, in a globalised nuclear-weapon free world, state security will not require nuclear weapons because it will be inserted into a broader network encompass­ing all aspects of security addressed in cooperative and multilateral approaches.

  14. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-03-01

    Figure 17: Examples of Knowledge Scorecards 61 Page vi GAO-17-333SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs...programs. Page 61 GAO-17-333SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Figure 17: Examples of Knowledge Scorecards Pursuant to a...had direct access to the USD AT&L and other senior acquisition officials, and some approval authorities were delegated to lower levels. For example

  15. Radiation, chemical and biological protection. Mass destruction weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janasek, D.; Svetlik, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this text-book mass destruction weapons and radiation, chemical and biological protection are reviewed. The text-book contains the following chapter: (1) Mass destruction weapons; (2) Matter and material; (3) Radioactive materials; (4) Toxic materials; (5) Biological resources; (6) Nuclear energetic equipment; Appendices; References.

  16. Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) as asymmetric weapons: the design basis threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skinner, L.

    2009-01-01

    Asymmetric warfare concepts relate well to the use of improvised chemical weapons against urban targets. Sources of information on toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and lists of high threat chemicals are available that point to likely choices for an attack. Accident investigations can be used as a template for attacks, and to judge the possible effectiveness of an attack using TICs. The results of a chlorine rail car accident in South Carolina, USA and the Russian military assault on a Moscow theater provide many illustrative points for similar incidents that mighty be carried out deliberately. Computer modeling of outdoor releases shows how an attack might take into consideration issues of stand-off distance and dilution. Finally, the preceding may be used to estimate with some accuracy the design basis threat posed by the used of TICs as weapons.(author)

  17. Deconstructing the 'energy weapon': Russia's threat to Europe as case study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith Stegen, Karen, E-mail: k.smithstegen@jacobs-university.de [Jacobs University Bremen (Germany); Bremer Energie Institut (Germany)

    2011-10-15

    As the likelihood increases that Russia will dominate the European Union's (EU) energy supply, questions have emerged as to whether Russia would use the energy weapon to influence EU member policies and extract political concessions. Countervailing voices argue that Russia would be restricted by interdependence and market forces. As of yet, no one has analyzed the assumptions underlying the energy weapon thesis. Moreover, many scholars examining EU-Russian energy relations rely on non-Russian data. This article seeks to fill several informational and theoretical gaps by including Russian sources and first-hand data and by systematically analyzing the conditions that must obtain before an energy supplier can successfully convert its energy resources into political power. The resulting model can be utilized to analyze the capacity of a supplier to use the energy weapon-whether it be Russia, Iran, Venezuela or any other energy heavyweight-and to assess whether the deployment was successful. Five purported cases of Russian manipulation are analyzed in this article and the findings indicate that, more often than not, Russia failed to achieve political concessions. Looking to the future, the plausibility of Russia using the energy weapon to exploit Europe's dependence, particularly on gas, is also examined. - Highlights: > Energy producers may manipulate supply and prices to coerce political concessions. > Energy weapon model: four conditions must obtain for successful deployment. > Western policy-makers worry about EU dependence on and vulnerability to Russia. > Analysis of five Russian cases reveals tenuous link between weapon use and success. > In medium term, EU can likely avoid yielding political autonomy for supply security.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Suriname and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 February 1979 and of the Protocol thereto between Suriname and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 February 1979. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  19. A nuclear-weapon-free Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jortner, Joshua

    1986-01-01

    The paper examines the issue of nuclear-weapon States involvement in regional conflicts, and whether such a conflict in the Middle East could trigger a nuclear war between the Super-Powers. Comments on the Middle Eastern situation are given, along with a discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Middle East, Israel and the NPT, and the nuclear potential in Arab countries. The proposal, by Israel, of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East is outlined. (UK)

  20. 76 FR 66327 - Iron Mountain Information Management, Inc., Corporate Service Group, Information Technology (IT...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-26

    ... Management, Inc., Corporate Service Group, Information Technology (IT) Division, Including On-Site Leased... Information Management, Inc., Corporate Service Group, Information Technology (IT) Division, including on-site... location of Iron Mountain Information Management, Inc., Corporate Service Group, Information Technology (IT...

  1. 236U and 239,240Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tims, S.G.; Froehlich, M.B.; Fifield, L.K.; Wallner, A.; De Cesare, M.

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes 236 U, 239 Pu and 240 Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that 236 U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of 236 U as a new fallout tracer. - Highlights: • Measured 236 U inventories around the Maralinga Test Nuclear weapons test site. • Comparison of 236 U and 239 Pu soil depth profiles at Maralinga. • Differences in 236 U and 239 Pu inventories indicate most Pu fallout is from the safety trials, rather than the weapons tests.

  2. The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2014-12-01

    The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

  3. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK.

  4. Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung

    2015-01-01

    This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK

  5. Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jasjit Singh

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

  6. The spread of nuclear weapons among nations: militarization or development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, A.Q.

    1986-01-01

    The paper reviews nuclear proliferation among nations. Nuclear weapons promotion and proliferation are discussed, including both motivation and lack of motivation to manufacture nuclear weapons. The failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is examined with respect to vertical and horizontal proliferation, and the containment of horizontal proliferation. Risks of nuclear war by accident are outlined, as well as nuclear weapon development. (UK)

  7. Weapon plutonium in accelerator driven power system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shvedov, O.V.; Murin, B.P.; Kochurov, B.P.; Shubin, Yu.M.; Volk, V.I.; Bogdanov, P.V.

    1997-01-01

    Accelerator Driven Systems are planned to be developed for the use (or destruction) of dozens of tons of weapon-grade Plutonium (W-Pu) resulted from the reducing of nuclear weapons. In the paper are compared the parameters of various types of accelerators, the physical properties of various types of targets and blankets, and the results of fuel cycle simulation. Some economical aspects are also discussed

  8. The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-04-15

    this genre is the venerable, and classified, official “bible” of nuclear weapons effects, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. Widely referred to by...weekly comic Shukan Shonen Jampu and was later made into several film versions, a television drama series, and ten books, which follow Gen’s...civilized behavior. The film , distributed internationally and shown on Soviet television, was widely discussed in the United States and both depressed

  9. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  10. The prevention of geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons: Nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in the Southern hemisphere

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, E.

    1989-01-01

    It is understandable that many Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) worry about the dangers of further geographical or spatial proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the extension to their regions of rivalries that are foreign to them. In this regard, there has been since the 1950's a number of proposals and initiatives to turn specific regions into nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace in order to prevent or reduce the above mentioned threats. Although differences exits between the concepts of nuclear-weapon-free-zones and zones of peace as well as among the various NWFZ and ZP, inter se, they do share a common feature insofar as they represent a regional approach to the question of curbing the arms race, especially the nuclear one. This study will address some of these initiatives, examine their specific characteristics and assess their role in the prevention of the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Among the relevant existing initiatives, those situated in the Southern Hemisphere offer an interesting focus of attention, in view of the fact that, together, they form a sort of a contiguous geographical area encompassing virtually half of the globe. The regions covered are the Antarctic, Latin American, South Pacific, South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The first three have been established as nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the last two are in the process of being turned into zones of peace. The aim of this study is to compare similarities and differences among them and to identify the factors that condition their efficiency. By understanding their usefulness and their weaknesses, one many eventually construct useful paradigms for further regional initiatives to curb the arms race, specially the nuclear one

  11. Nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan context

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

    2002-01-01

    This thesis deals with the possible employment of nuclear weapons in the ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan. After reviewing the nuclear capabilities of both Indian and Pakistan and assessing their possible delivery systems, this dissertation explores the emerging picture regarding the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines. It is argued that, after exploring the current structure of the armed forces in both countries and after analyzing the theatres of operations, it is highly unlikely that either country seeks to employ nuclear weapons in a tactical, battlefield role. It is also argued that neither India or Pakistan is making an effort to evolve a nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Moreover, it is shown that nuclear weapons have simply led to a re-thinking of military tactics on the part of India so as to minimize the chance of a nuclear strike by limiting the aims and objectives of any Indian military action. In stark contrast, it is shown that South Asian cities present far more lucrative targets for nuclear strikes. As a result of this and the geographic and tactical limitations of South Asian battlefields, it is argued that both India and Pakistan have based their fledgling nuclear strategies around a 'city-busting' concept. The existing command and control systems in both countries are examined and found to be adequate if both countries adopt a strict 'second-strike' approach to the employment of nuclear weapons. It is further argued that nuclear weapons, while limiting the scale of any future India-Pakistan war, will not play a major role in preventing a conflict between the two countries. Rather, the basic operational parity that exists between the two countries in terms of their conventional forces is responsible for preventing the outbreak of war. The thesis also briefly explores the rationale behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both countries and on their basic security perceptions. The issue of confidence building measures and the

  12. The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-02-21

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  13. The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  14. 50 kW laser weapon demonstrator of Rheinmetall Waffe munition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

    2013-10-01

    We will present the setup of a 50 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator (LWD) and results achieved with this system. The LWD is a ground based Air Defence system consisting of a Skyguard sensor unit for target acquisition and two laser equipped weapon turrets. The weapon turrets used are standard air defence turrets of Rheinmetall Air Defence which were equipped with several 10 kW Laser Weapon Modules (LWM). Each LWM consists of one 10 kW fiber laser and a beam forming unit (BFU). Commercial of the shelf fiber laser were modified for our defence applications. The BFU providing diffraction limited beam focusing, target imaging and fine tracking of the target was developed. The LWD was tested in a firing campaign at Rheinmetall test ground in Switzerland. All laser beams of both weapon turrets were superimposed on stationary and dynamic targets. Test results of the LWD for the scenarios Air Defence and C-RAMM (counter rockets, artillery, mortar and missiles) will be presented. An outlook for the next development stage towards a 100 kW class laser weapon on RWM will be given.

  15. Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is w here it all began . The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

  16. Males that drop a sexually selected weapon grow larger testes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Joseph, Paul N; Emberts, Zachary; Sasson, Daniel A; Miller, Christine W

    2018-01-01

    Costly sexually selected weapons are predicted to trade off with postcopulatory traits, such as testes. Although weapons can be important for achieving access to females, individuals of some species can permanently drop (i.e. autotomize) their weapons, without regeneration, to escape danger. We capitalized on this natural behavior to experimentally address whether the loss of a sexually selected weapon leads to increased testes investment in the leaf-footed cactus bug, Narnia femorata Stål (Hemiptera: Coreidae). In a second experiment, we measured offspring production for males that lost a weapon during development. As predicted, males that dropped a hind limb during development grew significantly larger testes than the control treatments. Hind-limb autotomy did not result in the enlargement of other nearby traits. Our results are the first to experimentally demonstrate that males compensate for natural weapon loss by investing more in testes. In a second experiment we found that females paired with males that lost a hind limb had 40% lower egg hatching success than females paired with intact males, perhaps because of lower mating receptivity to males with a lost limb. Importantly, in those cases where viable offspring were produced, males missing a hind limb produced 42% more offspring than males with intact limbs. These results suggest that the loss of a hind-limb weapon can, in some cases, lead to greater fertilization success. © 2017 The Author(s). Evolution © 2017 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

  17. The MARS simulation of the nuclear weapons preparedness LOTTA scenario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tovedal, H.

    2001-03-01

    The simulation method MARS, Mathematical Radiac Simulation, is primarily intended for preparedness exercises in nuclear fallout areas and simulates the ionizing radiation dose rates from fission products deposited on the ground, i.e. fallout from a nuclear weapons explosion or from a release of radioactive material from a nuclear reactor. MARS gives at any time after the fictitious explosion or reactor release the dose rates at any position in the fallout area. MARS has been used for simulation of an exercise scenario called LOTTA, designed for training and test of a radiac preparedness group in the Dept. of Nuclear Protection at FOI. The group is a member of a national preparedness organisation under the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, SSI. This MARS application was a simulation of the entire course of events following a fictitious nuclear weapons explosion, including the fission product deposition process and the ultimate activity and dose rate distribution in the fallout area. The simulation was based on deposition and fallout prognoses worked out by FOI, using the prognosis model PELLO. This report presents a short description of the simulation of the LOTTA scenario. A more detailed presentation of the general MARS method can be found in the report 'Mathematical Radiac Simulation, MARS'

  18. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oelgaard, P.L.

    1994-01-01

    During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235 U or 239 Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235 U and 239 Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

  19. The proliferation of massive destruction weapons and ballistic missiles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, M.

    1996-01-01

    The author studies the actual situation of nuclear deterrence policies, the possibilities of use chemical weapons as massive destructions weapons for non nuclear governments. The situation of non proliferation of nuclear weapons took a new interest with the disintegration of the communism block, but it seems that only few nuclear matter disappeared towards proliferating countries. The denuclearization of Bielorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan makes progress with the START I treaty; China has signed the Non proliferation treaty in 1992, it conducts an export policy in matter of equipment and know-how, towards Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Syria. In a future of ten years, countries such, Iran, North Korea could catch up with Israel, India and Pakistan among non declared nuclear countries. For chemical weapon, Libya, Iran and Syria could catch up with Iraq. (N.C.)

  20. The Spear: An Effective Weapon Since Antiquity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert E. Dohrenwend

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available The spear is perhaps man’s oldest weapon, and may even be his oldest tool. Over the hundreds of thousands of years of the weapon’s existence, it evolved from a pointed stick into an efficient hunting missile, and then became the most effective hand-held bladed weapon humans ever devised. The spear and its use is the only martial art originally devised for use against species other than our own, and more than any other weapon, the spear emphasizes the relationship between hunting and warfare. Virtually without exception, the spear is present wherever there are humans. The spear may claim to be the senior martial art, and the weapon is still in use today. Early techniques are preserved by the small number of Japanese sojutsu schools, and modern Chinese martial artists have developed elegant and impressive gymnastic routines for the spear. The javelin throw is a modern Olympic track and field event, and there are people who have resurrected the Aztec atlatl for sporting competition. Today, the spear is still used in Europe for hunting wild boar, and the continued issue of the obsolete bayonet to modern soldiers testifies to a deep, almost instinctive respect still possessed by the military for the spear.

  1. Non-Lethal Weapons Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sheets Frequently Asked Questions Non-Lethal Weapons FAQs Active Denial System FAQs Human Electro -Muscular Incapacitation FAQs Related Links Business Opportunities Contact JNLWD Congressional Engagement , Wednesday, Sept 20, 2017. The Active Denial System, blunt-impact munitions, dazzling lasers, LRAD 100X

  2. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  3. Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsch, Rainer

    2007-01-01

    In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

  4. Responding to chemical weapons violations in Syria: legal, health, and humanitarian recommendations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brooks, Julia; Erickson, Timothy B; Kayden, Stephanie; Ruiz, Raul; Wilkinson, Stephen; Burkle, Frederick M

    2018-01-01

    The repeated use of prohibited chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict poses serious health, humanitarian, and security threats to civilians, healthcare personnel, and first responders. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons constitutes a clear and egregious violation of international law-likely amounting to a war crime-for which continued impunity is setting a dangerous precedent in relation to current and future conflicts. This debate article calls upon concerned states, organizations, and individuals to respond urgently and unequivocally to this serious breach of international legal and humanitarian norms. Based on health, humanitarian, and legal findings, this article calls for concrete action to: 1) reduce the risk of chemical weapons being used in current and future conflicts; 2) review and support the preparedness equipment and antidote supplies of first responders, humanitarian organizations, and military forces operating in Syria; 3) support international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the prohibition on chemical weapons, including through criminal accountability; 4) support civilian victims of chemical weapons attacks, including refugees; and 5) re-commit to the complete elimination of chemical weapons in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), a comprehensive treaty that bans chemical weapons and requires their complete destruction. All involved states and organizations should take urgent steps to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable victims of conflict, including victims of chemical weapons attacks in Syria, and to reinforce international law in the face of such serious violations.

  5. Rethinking the Development of Weapons and Their Impact

    Science.gov (United States)

    Katsioloudis, Petros J.; Jones, Mildred V.

    2011-01-01

    As one reads about the history of humans, he/she sees very early on that humans are naturally "tool users." More specifically, humans used tools as a means of subsistence and survival. Even today humans use tools to extend their capabilities beyond imagination. These tools are even used as weapons. However primitive, these early weapons would soon…

  6. Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

    1993-01-01

    Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

  7. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-01-01

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  8. U.S. assistance in the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Mostoller, Eric Charles

    2000-01-01

    The thesis examines the present status of Russia's chemical weapons destruction program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, which is located at seven sites in western Russia. It also evaluates the environmental and international security concerns posed by the conditions at these sites and the disastrous implications of a failure of this che...

  9. Health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons; Helse- og miljoevirkninger av atomvaapen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    Since 1981 WHO has been studying and reporting on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services. This report provides information on the subject and refers to earlier related work of WHO. It forms the basis for a request from WHO to the International Court of Justice regarding the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. 15 refs.

  10. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  11. The treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    In a letter of 28 January 1994, the Director General was informed that on 18 January 1994, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean entered into force for the Argentine Republic

  12. Australia - a nuclear weapons testing ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobbs, Michael.

    1993-01-01

    Between 1952 and 1958 Britain conducted five separate nuclear weapons trials in Australia. Australia had the uninhabited wide open spaces and the facilities which such tests need and Britain was able to use its special relationship with Australia to get agreement to conduct atomic tests in Australia and establish a permanent test site at Maralinga. Other non-nuclear tests were conducted between 1953-1963. The story of Britain's involvement in atomic weapons testing in Australia is told through its postal history. Both official and private covers are used to show how the postal communications were established and maintained throughout the test years. (UK)

  13. Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.

    1998-01-01

    Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

  14. BLDC technology and its application in weapon system launching ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    In this paper Brushless DC (BLDC) Technology and its Application in Articulation of Weapon System Launching Platform using Electromechanical Servo Drive is presented. ... Due to inherent properties of BLDC Technology BLDC Motors and Drives are profoundly used in military and strategic weapon system applications.

  15. BLDC technology and its application in weapon system launching ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Due to inherent properties of BLDC Technology BLDC Motors and Drives are profoundly used in military and strategic weapon system applications. In this paper, BLDC Motor and Electromechanical Servo Drive System, operating principle, modeling, characteristics and its application in various weapon system programs are ...

  16. Hidden profiles and concealed information: strategic information sharing and use in group decision making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toma, Claudia; Butera, Fabrizio

    2009-06-01

    Two experiments investigated the differential impact of cooperation and competition on strategic information sharing and use in a three-person group decision-making task. Information was distributed in order to create a hidden profile so that disconfirmation of group members' initial preferences was required to solve the task. Experiment 1 revealed that competition, compared to cooperation, led group members to withhold unshared information, a difference that was not significant for shared information. In competition, compared to cooperation, group members were also more reluctant to disconfirm their initial preferences. Decision quality was lower in competition than in cooperation, this effect being mediated by disconfirmation use and not by information sharing. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and revealed the role of mistrust in predicting strategic information sharing and use in competition. These results support a motivated information processing approach of group decision making.

  17. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [es

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [fr

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

  1. Agent-based Modeling Methodology for Analyzing Weapons Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-03-26

    technique involve model structure, system representation and the degree of validity, coupled with the simplicity, of the overall model. ABM is best suited... system representation of the air combat system . We feel that a simulation model that combines ABM with equation-based representation of weapons and...AGENT-BASED MODELING METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS THESIS Casey D. Connors, Major, USA

  2. Statement to Conference for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World, 12 October 2011, Astana, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and underscores the principles of the NPT. By constraining further development of nuclear weapons, these measures to bring nuclear tests to a halt and to bring the test sites to closure are important steps towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Recently, Kazakhstan has offered to provide a location for an IAEA low enriched uranium bank. I am grateful to the Government of Kazakhstan for its offer. Ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used exclusively for peaceful purposes is the basic pillar upon which the IAEA was established more than five decades ago. A central Agency function is to verify that States are fully complying with their non-proliferation obligations and to confirm that nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. This is our main contribution to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Non-Nuclear-Weapon States party to the NPT are required to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, under which we conduct regular inspections of their nuclear material and activities. The additional protocol to these safeguards agreements, greatly enhances the IAEA's verification capability by giving us expanded access to information and to relevant locations. It enables us to provide credible assurance not only about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material - that is, material about which a country has notified us - but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Such credible assurances are highly effective tools of international and regional confidence building. They can contribute decisively to forestalling the spread of threat perceptions and thus to reducing the risk of the further spread of nuclear weapons. So far, 110 countries have brought additional protocols into force. Last year, at the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony marking the 65 anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, I made my own Nagasaki Commitment to work for a world free of

  3. Young children seek out biased information about social groups.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Over, Harriet; Eggleston, Adam; Bell, Jenny; Dunham, Yarrow

    2018-05-01

    Understanding the origins of prejudice necessitates exploring the ways in which children participate in the construction of biased representations of social groups. We investigate whether young children actively seek out information that supports and extends their initial intergroup biases. In Studies 1 and 2, we show that children choose to hear a story that contains positive information about their own group and negative information about another group rather than a story that contains negative information about their own group and positive information about the other group. In a third study, we show that children choose to present biased information to others, thus demonstrating that the effects of information selection can start to propagate through social networks. In Studies 4 and 5, we further investigate the nature of children's selective information seeking and show that children prefer ingroup-favouring information to other types of biased information and even to balanced, unbiased information. Together, this work shows that children are not merely passively recipients of social information; they play an active role in the creation and transmission of intergroup attitudes. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  4. Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction: Some reflections. Essay, published in Le Monde

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2003-01-01

    With all the changes in international relations since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have continued to have a position of prominence as the currency of ultimate power. And although a number of countries such as South Africa have given up their nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons ambitions, the nuclear umbrellas of NATO and other alliances continue to expand. More importantly, the objectives embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), developed in the early 1970s to control the spread of nuclear weapons and to move us towards nuclear disarmament, are under growing stress. Several thousands of nuclear weapons continue to exist in the five nuclear weapon States party to the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). And of the three countries that remain outside the NPT, two India and Pakistan have in the last few years demonstrated their nuclear weapons capability, while the third Israel is generally presumed to have such weapons. Most recently North Korea, a party to the NPT, has decided to walk away from the Treaty and, not unlike some other parties to the Treaty, is suspected of working to acquire nuclear weapons. Other States, on the other hand, have opted for the 'poor man's alternative' by pursuing the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons. And in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, the threat of Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation gained a new dimension: the prospect of sub-national groups seeking to acquire and use these weapons. Faced with this reality, one must conclude that it is futile to try to combat the spread of WMD through a collective, rule-based system of international security and that people have to acquiesce to living in a world plagued with the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust or other disasters? But reliance on a system of collective security to curb the proliferation of WMD will require bold thinking, a willingness to work together

  5. USAF Weapon System Evaluation Program

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1999-01-01

    During this task period, Schafer Corporation provided engineering services and analysis to the USAF at Eglin AFB, Florida in direct support of the USAF Air-to-Surface Weapon System Evaluation Program (WSEP...

  6. What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drell, Sidney

    2011-04-01

    Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

  7. The abolition of nuclear weapons: realistic or not? For physicians, a world without nuclear weapons is possible and above all necessary. To abolish, did you say abolish? Is the elimination of the nuclear weapon realistic?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Behar, Abraham; Gere, Francois; Lalanne, Dominique

    2010-06-01

    In a first article, a physician explains that eliminating nuclear weapons would be a way to get rid of the temptation for some persons to use this arm of massive destruction, and that it would be better for mankind to live without this threat. The author of the second article discusses the effect abolition could have, and, with a reference to President Obama's position about zero nuclear weapons, outlines that it could be at the benefit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He also discusses the perspectives of this 'global zero logics' with a new approach to arms control, and comments the relationships between abolition and non proliferation. He finally discusses the reserved attitude of France on these issues. In the next contribution, a nuclear physicist wanders whether the elimination of nuclear weapons is realistic: whereas it has always been a political objective, nuclear states refused to commit themselves in this direction in 2010 and keep on developing military-oriented tools to design new weapons

  8. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk

  9. The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-07-13

    The text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Nicaragua and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 29 December 1976. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article III thereof.

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1976-01-13

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ecuador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 March 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  11. The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Nicaragua and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 29 December 1976. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article III thereof.

  12. The Text of the Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 6 November 1978 and of the Protocol thereto between Jamaica and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 November 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 18 April 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Honduras and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 April 1975. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  14. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ecuador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 March 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  15. Motivated information processing in group judgement and decision making

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    de Dreu, C.K.W.; Nijstad, B.A.; van Knippenberg, D.

    2008-01-01

    This article expands the view of groups as information processors into a motivated information processing in groups (MIP-G) model by emphasizing, first, the mixedmotive structure of many group tasks and, second, the idea that individuals engage in more or less deliberate information search and

  16. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power stations: what is the connection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spencer, K.

    1985-01-01

    From the start of the nuclear age with the dropping of two atom bombs on Japan in 1945 it has been known that this new source of primary energy could be exploited for weapons or for replacing coal or oil in electricity-generating stations. Nuclear energy is made from two elements: naturally occurring uranium and man-made plutonium. Their processing differs according to the intended end-use. Great efforts have been and still are made to disguise the close connection between nuclear energy for war and for power stations. Two reasons are suggested for this: political conveniences in avoiding additional informed protests against nuclear weapon production and industrial convenience in carrying on without public protest what has become a very profitable industry. It is argued that medical doctors, because of their professional prestige, can speak and be listened to on the risks of continuing to exploit this newly discovered form of energy. Furthermore, this industry is uniquely hazardous to the health of its workers, to the public generally and possibly to the procreation and genetic health of future generations. (author)

  17. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  18. The opportunity to limit and reduce inventories of fissionable weapon materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hebel, L.C.

    1991-01-01

    As the United States and the Soviet government agree on major reductions in nuclear weapon delivery systems, they need to address the disposal of the nuclear warheads and bombs for those systems. Such measures could be strongly reinforced if the two nations also institute restraints and reductions in the total amount of fissionable materials available for weapons. Many metric tonnes of such materials would be made surplus by the reductions in strategic nuclear weapons due to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I). Equally large reductions in short-range (theater) nuclear weapons are expected in the wake of the recent Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

  19. Motivated information processing in group judgment and decision making

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    De Dreu, Carsten K. W.; Nijstad, Bernard A.; van Knippenberg, Daan

    This article expands the view of groups as information processors into a motivated information processing in groups (MIP-G) model by emphasizing, first, the mixed-motive structure of many group tasks and, second, the idea that individuals engage in more or less deliberate information search and

  20. National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goodwin, B T; Juzaitis, R J

    2006-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories have developed a common framework and key elements of a national certification methodology called Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU). A spectrum from senior managers to weapons designers has been engaged in this activity at the two laboratories for on the order of a year to codify this methodology in an overarching and integrated paper. Following is the certification paper that has evolved. In the process of writing this paper, an important outcome has been the realization that a joint Livermore/Los Alamos workshop on QMU, focusing on clearly identifying and quantifying differences between approaches between the two labs plus developing an even stronger technical foundation on methodology, will be valuable. Later in FY03, such a joint laboratory workshop will be held. One of the outcomes of this workshop will be a new version of this certification paper. A comprehensive approach to certification must include specification of problem scope, development of system baseline models, formulation of standards of performance assessment, and effective procedures for peer review and documentation. This document concentrates on the assessment and peer review aspects of the problem. In addressing these points, a central role is played by a 'watch list' for weapons derived from credible failure modes and performance gate analyses. The watch list must reflect our best assessment of factors that are critical to weapons performance. High fidelity experiments and calculations as well as full exploitation of archival test data are essential to this process. Peer review, advisory groups and red teams play an important role in confirming the validity of the watch list. The framework for certification developed by the Laboratories has many basic features in common, but some significant differences in the detailed technical implementation of the overall methodology remain. Joint certification workshops held in June

  1. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  2. The Military Cooperation Group

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Renzi, Jr, Alfred E

    2006-01-01

    .... This thesis will describe a structure to assist with both those needs. The premise is that an expanded and improved network of US Military Groups is the weapon of choice for the war on terror, and beyond...

  3. Delayed effects of nuclear and chemical weapons in man

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dienstbier, Z.

    1984-01-01

    Delayed radiation effects are discussed of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons (defoliants and herbicides). Attention is drawn to the development of delayed malignities in exposed subjects and their pathophysiologic causes are explained. The only prevention of these effects is to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction. (author)

  4. Nuclear weapons and NATO operations: Doctrine, studies, and exercises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karber, P.A.

    1994-01-01

    A listing of papers is presented on the doctrine, studies, and exercises dealing with nuclear weapons and NATO operations for the period 1950-1983. The papers deal with studies on massive retaliation, sword and shield, and flexible response. Some of the enduring issues of nuclear weapons in NATO are listed

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007 [es

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  8. Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Milne, T.; Wilson, H.

    1999-01-01

    The process of verifying the complete elimination of nuclear warheads in national stockpiles can be divided, conceptually, into four stages: first, comprehensive declarations of warhead and material inventories, as a base-line from which verified disarmament can proceed; second, the transfer of all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material into bonded store; third, demilitarisation measures, such as to render warheads unusable without disassembly and refabrication; fourth, dismantlement of warheads and disposition of fissile material. Many of the technologies and technologies and techniques needed for verifying the elimination of nuclear warheads have been worked out at a general level, largely in US studies. While it is essential that these techniques are refined and improved, what is most important now, if disarmament is to proceed expeditiously, is for each of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) themselves to study the central verification problems and requirements in order to identify particular techniques and approaches that meet their needs. As yet there is no system of integrated data exchange and verification that any of the NWS is willing to endorse. Each of the NWS should give detailed consideration to the logistics of dismantling the warheads in their respective stockpiles, including, for example, the practicalities of accommodating international verification at their potential dismantlement facilities. Each of the NWS might usefully review exactly which details of warhead design and construction have to remain secret in the course of the disarmament process, in the first place from one another, and second from the IAEA or any other international body that might be involved in international disarmament arrangements. Introducing transparency and verification into national nuclear weapons programmes might have a significant financial cost. Research and ingenuity might reduce this cost, however, and early investments in these fields, with sharing of

  9. From the lab to the battlefield? Nanotechnology and fourth generation nuclear weapons

    OpenAIRE

    Gsponer, Andre

    2005-01-01

    The paper addresses some major implications of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) engineering and nanotechnology for the improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons, and the development of more robust versions of these weapons, as well as for the development of fourth generations nuclear weapons in which nanotechnology will play an essential role.

  10. Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill [Money

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, A.F.; Cryer, Bob; Carlisle, Kenneth; Dean, Paul.

    1990-01-01

    The debate concerns the authorisation of payment of the money required to reorganise the atomic weapons establishment in the United Kingdom provided for in the Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill in progress through Parliament. In the Bill the contractorisation of the establishment is recommended and some sort of Government owned company operated scheme set up. The debate lasted about half an hour and is reported verbatim. The issues raised concerned the actual sums likely to be incurred in the formation of a Company to carry out the designated activities of the Bill. These are connected with the research, development, production or maintenance of nuclear devices and the premises needed. The government spokesman suggested the sums required to support the Bill would not be large and the resolution was agreed to without a vote. (UK)

  11. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. Crown Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  12. Final report of the tritium issues working group. Vol. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spratt, Peter; Hardy, David; Peirce, Denny; Smith, Ron; Wyatt, Alan.

    1985-09-01

    Early in 1985 the proposed sale of the isotope 'tritium' by Ontario Hydro became a public issue. A number of community groups claimed in public forum that tritium recovered from Ontario Hydro's nuclear reactors would be sold or diverted to American thermonuclear (fusion) weapons. Their position was based on the following presumptions: that tritium was a major component in American nuclear weapons, that the United States has a supply problem with or shortage of this material, and that Ontario Hydro would directly or indirectly support the American nuclear weapons program: a) by providing tritium directly to the U.S. Department of Energy for use in nuclear weapons, or b) by supplying tritium to certain buyers - either traditional commercial facilities or the developing fusion research agencies associated with the Department of Energy, thus allowing or making possible the diversion of this isotope to nuclear weapons purposes, or c) by answering the needs of the commercial market, at present supplied from production reactors dedicated to supplying U.S. military requirements, indirectly allowing the U.S. government to concentrate its efforts on the production of tritium for nuclear weapons. When members of what has become known as the 'Tritium Issues Working Group' were first approached by Dr. T.S. Drolet in mid-April 1985, we were asked if we would agree to participate in a study to assess whether Canadian tritium, which is to be produced only for commercial and research purposes, could be inadvertantly utilized, either directly or indirectly, in the American nuclear weapons program. Our discussion of these issues is covered in Volume 1 of this report and is supplemented by appropriate Appendices in Volume 2. We could find absolutely nothing of a factual nature to justify the hypothesis that Canadian tritium would find its way into the American weapons program

  13. One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weaver, Jason [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-08-25

    Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there has not been a single instance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation, but there have been numerous accidents and “close calls.” As the understanding of these environments has increased, the need for a robust nuclear weapon safety philosophy has grown. This paper describes some of the methods used by the Nuclear Weapon Complex today to assure nuclear weapon safety, including testing, modeling, analysis, and design features. Lastly, it also reviews safety’s continued role in the future and examines how nuclear safety’s present maturity can play a role in strengthening security and other areas and how increased coordination can improve safety and reduce long-term cost.

  14. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugie, Ei-Ichi

    1997-01-01

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  15. IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Russian Federation Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev, United States Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei met in Vienna on 16 September 2002 to review the status of the Trilateral Initiative and agree on its future direction. The parties concluded that the task entrusted to the Trilateral Initiative Working Group in 1996 has been fulfilled. The work completed has demonstrated practical approaches for IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as released from defence programmes in classified forms or at certain sensitive facilities. The work included the examination of technical, legal and financial issues associated with such verification. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament steps undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification of the materials declared excess to nuclear weapons programmes and made subject to this Initiative would build international confidence that this material will never again be used in nuclear weapons. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei recognized the value of the groundbreaking work completed over the last six years. Building on the work completed, they directed the technical experts to begin without delay discussions on future possible cooperation within the trilateral format. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei agreed that the Principals would meet again in September 2003 to review progress within the trilateral format. (IAEA)

  16. The research on magnetic exploring abandoned chemical weapons by Japanese

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Luoguo; Li Jingyue; Wang Zezhong

    2007-01-01

    During Word war II, a lot of chemical weapons were left by Japanese on our land. It is very difficult to explore because its complicated states underground. There is no document about the details of this. Few of the research work have been done. In order to destroy completely abandoned chemical weapons by Japanese, the paper has given a serious study on the means to explore the chemical weapons for the purpose to protect our environment and benefit our people. After plenty of research and test, we get good results. (authors)

  17. From Russian weapons grade plutonium to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braehler, G.; Kudriavtsev, E.G.; Seyve, C.

    1997-01-01

    The April 1996, G7 Moscow Summit on nuclear matters provided a political framework for one of the most current significant challenges: ensuring a consistent answer to the weapons grade fissile material disposition issue resulting from the disarmament effort engaged by both the USA and Russia. International technical assessments have showed that the transformation of Weapons grade Plutonium in MOX fuel is a very efficient, safe, non proliferant and economically effective solution. In this regard, COGEMA and SIEMENS, have set up a consistent technical program properly addressing incineration of weapons grade plutonium in MOX fuels. The leading point of this program would be the construction of a Weapons grade Plutonium dedicated MOX fabrication plant in Russia. Such a plant would be based on the COGEMA-SIEMENS industrial capabilities and experience. This facility would be operated by MINATOM which is the partner for COGEMA-SIEMENS. MINATOM is in charge of coordination of the activity of the Russian research and construction institutes. The project take in account international standards for non-proliferation, safety and waste management. France and Germany officials reasserted this position during their last bilateral summits held in Fribourg in February and in Dijon in June 1996. MINATOM and the whole Russian nuclear community have already expressed their interest to cooperate with COGEMA-SIEMENS in the MOX field. This follows governmental-level agreements signed in 1992 by French, German and Russian officials. For years, Russia has been dealing with research and development on MOX fabrication and utilization. So, the COGEMA-SIEMENS MOX proposal gives a realistic answer to the management of weapons grade plutonium with regard to the technical, industrial, cost and schedule factors. (author)

  18. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  19. Internationalization to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The recent International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) has concluded that, in a world in which an increasing number of countries are using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, no technical ways exist to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation is a political problem and must, therefore, be solved by political means. The reasons why countries want nuclear weapons - whether to meet their real or perceived security requirements or for political prestige - must be removed. Resolution of regional conflicts would diminish the stimulus for proliferation, while significant nuclear disarmament measures would de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. Meanwhile, institutional arrangements could minimize the risks of nuclear weapon proliferation. One such arrangement could be the internationalization of the sensitive, that is, the most proliferation-prone, elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This book analyses some of the political, economic, technical and legal issues involved in internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle. It consists of two parts. Part I is SIPRI's (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) evaluation of the advantages, as well as the weaknesses, of the existing proposals for internationalization. Part II contains the papers contributed to the SIPRI symposium on 'internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle', which was held in October/ November 1979. (author)

  20. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alsaed, A.A.; Adams, M.

    1998-03-01

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the open-quotes spent fuel standard.close quotes One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

  2. The Text of the Agreement of 22 April 1975 between El Salvador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 22 April 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between El Salvador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 April 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 December 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 22 March 2000

  4. Motivated information processing and group decision refusal

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Nijstad, Bernard A.; Oltmanns, Jan

    Group decision making has attracted much scientific interest, but few studies have investigated group decisions that do not get made. Based on the Motivated Information Processing in Groups model, this study analysed the effect of epistemic motivation (low vs. high) and social motivation (proself

  5. Plus c'est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO's New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future

  6. Bill related to the struggle against proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This bill indicates the modifications brought to different French laws and codes (penal code, defence code, custom code) and defines provisions and penalties within the frame of struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear weapons, biological weapons and toxin-based weapons, chemical weapons), and against the proliferation of their vectors. These modifications, provisions and penalties also concern double-use products. The bill also defines the modifications brought to the French penal procedure code. It finally addresses offenses related to these proliferations which can be considered as an act of terrorism

  7. Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such ''linkage''. It does not deal with the linkages that exist between nuclear weapons and other industries and activities - for example, those involved in weapons delivery systems -since these are not within the Uranium Institute's area of competence. Linkage concerns regarding civil nuclear programmes arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. The technologies which can give rise directly to these materials are therefore ''sensitive'' in proliferation terms. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First, important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (author)

  8. Critical Success Factors and Their Application to DOD Weapon System Acquisition

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Harris, Chad M

    2006-01-01

    Department of Defense weapon systems are growing more complex and expensive and the services are under increasing pressure from Congress to improve the cost schedule and performance of their weapons programs...

  9. Some think of all rises on efficiency and performance for antisubmarine weapon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wan Qian

    2003-01-01

    The integrated antisubmarine weapon system is new antisubmarine weapon system studied by our country. The efficiency and performance of the system was not put into fullplay in the trying on. The reason for thus is much, such as: personnel, training, management, use, arm system and son on. The author presented some think of all rises on efficiency and performance for integrated antisubmarine weapon

  10. The German Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Olivier

    2008-01-01

    This report analyses the debate in Germany about tactical nuclear weapons deployments in Europe. It is mainly based on interviews conducted with senior officials from the German Federal Foreign Ministry, the Federal Ministry of Defence, senior members of Parliament as well as experts from research institutes and think-tanks. The interviews focused on the more recent past in the German debate as well as the future of tactical nuclear weapon deployments in Germany and Europe. The report concludes that while a change of Germany's position on tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to change in the short-term, several developments will make it unlikely that the continued involvement of Germany in NATO nuclear sharing will have to be debated in the medium term. Should the next Parliamentary elections, which will take place in 2009 at the latest, result in a Social Democrat-led government, a push for a reduction of Germany's involvement in NATO nuclear sharing appears possible. A conservative-led government is likely to maintain the nuclear status quo within NATO

  11. The Combat with Short Edged Weapons in Persian SwordsmanshiP

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Manouchehr Moshtagh Khorasani

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available The combat with short-edged weapons has a long tradition in Iran. There are several traditional types of Persian knives and daggers. They can generally be classified into three main categories that were used by Persian warriors in close cambat: kārd (knife, xanjar (dagger, and pišqabz (a type of knife/dagger with an S-shaped blade. The pišqabz was also called dešne. The following article presents these different weapons, analyzing their basic features and variations, the way of carrying and unsheathing them, and the corresponding techniques of use of each weapon.

  12. 10 CFR 1045.16 - Criteria for evaluation of restricted data and formerly restricted data information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... U.S. weapon or weapon system; (3) Whether the information would hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts... information to public discussion and education and potential contribution to economic growth; and, 6) Whether...

  13. World hazards and nuclear weapons: right and wrong answers. To reach a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons is possible

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durand, Daniel; Nivet, Roland

    2017-01-01

    A first article notices that modernisation of nuclear weapons are resumed with the emergence of new nuclear temptations: ambitious modernisation programme in the USA, catching-up race by Russia to be able to pierce antimissile defences, Chinese modernisation, renewal of the British Trident programme, doubling of nuclear military budgets in France, developments in India and Pakistan. However, the author discusses the possible emergence of new opportunities for a nuclear disarmament: humanitarian ICAN campaign for a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons. He highlights the need of a debate in France on these issues even though no politician dares to take a strong position in favour of nuclear disarmament. In a third article, a member of an activist association shows that, after the adoption of a U N resolution on favour of the elaboration of a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons, reaching such a treaty is possible. The action of civil society seems necessary

  14. Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1999-01-01

    An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

  15. Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by Chemical Weapons Convention inspections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanzman, E.A. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States). Economics and Law Section

    1994-10-21

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the United States system of constitutional law. This discussion is about the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by the CWC and about how federal implementing legislation can allow verification inspections to take place in the United States under the Chemical Weapons Convention while remaining in compliance with the Constitution. By implementing legislation, the author means a federal statute that would be enacted separately from Senate approval of the Convention itself. Although implementing legislation is a relatively unusual accompaniment to a treaty, it will be necessary to the CWC, and the Administration has submitted a bill that was under consideration in the last Congress and presumably will be reintroduced early next year. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment problems posed by the CWC arise from the verification inspection scheme embodied in the treaty. The CWC depends heavily on on-site inspections to verify compliance with its key requirements. These include destroying all chemicals weapons stockpiles and bringing potential chemical weapons precursors under international control. The Convention contains four distinct kinds of inspections: systematic inspections of chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities, routine inspections of various declared facilities, challenge inspections, and a variant on challenge inspections in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. All inspections are supposed to be only as intrusive as necessary to carry out the Convention. These inspections will be carried out by inspectors employed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, which is responsible for enforcing the Convention. Generally, the inspected State Party is permitted to assign observers to accompany the inspectors.

  16. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL's Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents

  17. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  18. Someone at School Has a Weapon. What Should I Do?

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... animals talking about weapons and violence fascination with violent video games, TV shows, and movies threatening or bullying others isolation from family and friends Of course, these signs don't necessarily mean that a person will become violent or bring a weapon to school. Still, you ...

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  1. Just war and nuclear weapons : just war theory and its application to the Korean nuclear weapons issue in Korean Christianity

    OpenAIRE

    Son, Changwan

    2009-01-01

    This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the North. The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s 'Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of th...

  2. Nuclear weapon testing and the monkey business

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murthy, M.S.S.

    1978-01-01

    Reasons for India's total ban on the export of rhesus monkeys to U.S. have been explained. The major reason is that some of the animals were used in nuclear weapon related radiation experiments. This was a clear violation of a stricture in the agreement about supply of monkeys. The stricture prohibited the use of animals for research concerning military operations, including nuclear weapon testing. It is pleaded that a strict enforcement of strictures rather than a total ban on the export of monkeys would be better in the interest of advancement of knowledge in human medicine and disease control. (M.G.B.)

  3. 36 CFR 327.13 - Explosives, firearms, other weapons and fireworks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... weapons and fireworks. 327.13 Section 327.13 Parks, Forests, and Public Property CORPS OF ENGINEERS... ADMINISTERED BY THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS § 327.13 Explosives, firearms, other weapons and fireworks. (a) The... explosives or explosive devices of any kind, including fireworks or other pyrotechnics, is prohibited unless...

  4. Between Allies and Rivals: Turkey, Nuclear Weapons, and BMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kibaroglu, Mustafa

    2014-01-01

    This paper discusses Turkey's attitudes vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense in the light of recent developments in the Iranian nuclear program and NATO's evolving concept of extended deterrence. On the one hand, the long-standing forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey and the country's role in the US Phased Adaptive Approach BMD architecture are still considered to be key elements of national security. On the other, security guarantees offered to Turkey by NATO and the US appear less and less credible in the face of rising regional threats. As this paper shows, there is a growing gap between official policy and public perceptions inside Turkey vis-a-vis the US, Iran, and nuclear weapons, as well as a growing Turkish aspiration to autonomy in its security and defense policy. While one should not expect Turkey to develop nuclear weapons anytime soon, an unchecked Iranian regional power could bring Ankara to hedge its bets in the long term. Turkey's controversial recent decision to buy a Chinese system for its national air and missile defense rather than European or US equipment should be seen in the light of this search for autonomy. (author)

  5. International agreements on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dombey, N.

    1982-01-01

    The satellite detection of a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic and Israel's destruction of a research reactor in Iraq make it essential to strengthen existing monitoring and enforcement programs to prevent proliferation. While there was no reliable evidence that either South Africa or Iraq was violating non-proliferation agreements, worst case scenarios can demonstrate to unfriendly countries that South Africa had diverted fuel to test a nuclear weapon and that Iraq is intending to produce weapons-grade plutonium 239. The situation can be improved by formulating better terms and conditions for internationalizing access to materials. Nuclear suppliers need to agree on terms that will assure their customers that contracts for civil programs will be honored. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which includes both nuclear suppliers and customers, could achieve stronger agreements that take into account recent technological advances that will expand enrichment and reprocessing activities. 23 references, 1 figure

  6. North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pollack, J.D.

    2010-01-01

    This essay assesses North Korea's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons; alternative strategies for inhibiting Pyongyang's weapons development; and the potential implications for regional security and nonproliferation should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) retain and enhance its weapons programs. North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has long provoked heated debate among policy makers and research analysts about the purposes of engagement with the North, reflecting the repeated frustrations in efforts to negotiate Korean denuclearization. These debates reflect widely divergent views of the North Korean regime; its sustainability as an autonomous political, economic, and military system; and the potential consequences of continued nuclear development in this isolated, highly idiosyncratic state. These questions assume additional salience as North Korea approaches a leadership succession for only the second time in its six-decade history. The effort to inhibit North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is among the longest running and least successful sagas in international security and non-proliferation policy of the past quarter century. In early 2010, Pyongyang claims a rudimentary nuclear capability by possession of weaponized plutonium, the conduct of two nuclear tests, and advances in the production of enriched uranium as an alternative means of fissile material production, though the latter step is nominally justified as a source for reactor fuel. North Korea defends its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent to counter what Pyongyang deems existential threats posed by the United States.Despite the resumption of high-level diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang in late 2009, realization of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula remains a very remote prospect. The DPRK insists that a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea and hence the cessation of 'hostile DPRK-U.S. relations' are necessary before any consideration of

  7. Action group for nuclear power information

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    Following the nuclear power controversy in the Swedish general election of 1976, a group of technical employees of ASEA-Atom formed an action group for nuclear power information. This was a spontaneous move in which management was not involved. The object was to provide a balance to uninformed campaigns by 'environmental' action groups. The level of political activity among technical personnel is low, but once the threshold has been crossed the desire for information by the public has been shown to be great. It has however been difficult to obtain a hearing in radio, TV or the national press. The local press has on the other hand proved open. While no significant effect among the public can be demonstrated, there seems to have been some influence on politicians. There has been contact with corresponding organisations in Denmark, Finland and the UK, and in the Federal Republic of Germany in July 1978 a European Energy Association was formed to balance such organisations as European Environmental Bureau. (JIW)

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001 [es

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-07-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

  11. Nuclear weapons Latin American Proscription Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    Military descentralization of Latin America will constitute a measure that will keep its peoples from squandering in nuclear weapons out of their limited resources and will protect them from eventually being attacked in such fashion within their territories. This constitutes a considerable contribution award avoiding proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as a giant step towards general and complete disarmament. It will also constitute evidence that Latin America, faithful to its universalist tradition, not only must make a greater effort towards proscribing from its territories the treat of a nuclear war, but also must use all its resources to persevere in its struggle for welfare and progress of its peoples, cooperating along with the rest of the world to achieve the ideals of mankind as a whole

  12. Proliferation of massive destruction weapons: fantasy or reality?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duval, M.

    2001-01-01

    This article evaluates the threat of massive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological) for Europe and recalls the existing safeguards against the different forms of nuclear proliferation: legal (non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) etc..), technical (fabrication of fissile materials, delays). However, all these safeguards can be overcome as proven by the activities of some countries. The situation of proliferation for the other type of massive destruction weapons is presented too. (J.S.)

  13. Can we stop the spread of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1990-02-01

    In his address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the world's non-proliferation regime and the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the first and fundamental barrier to proliferation is the political will and determination of individual States not to acquire nuclear weapons, other barriers being legal obligations under treaties or agreements and the acceptance of safeguards inspections to verify peaceful uses of nuclear facilities

  14. Personality traits and group-based information behaviour

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hyldegård, Jette

    2009-01-01

    followed during a project assignment. The long version of the commonly-used NEO-PI-R test instrument was employed to describe and compare each group member's personality traits at a more detailed level. Data were also collected through a process survey, a diary and an interview. Analysis. The calculation....... Information behaviour associated with personality traits was identified, but the presence of personality effects tended to vary with the perceived presence of the social context. Conclusions. Some matches were identified between group members' personality traits and their actual information behaviour...... but there were also deviations, which were found that seemed to be related to the group-work context. The importance of studying personality traits in context has further been confirmed....

  15. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eaton, M.A.

    2007-01-01

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  16. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eaton, M.A

    2007-07-01

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians

  17. The Meteorological Monitoring program at a former nuclear weapons plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maxwell, D.R.; Bowen, B.M.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of the Meteorological Monitoring program at Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) is to provide meteorological information for use in assessing the transport, and diffusion, and deposition of effluent actually or potentially released into the atmosphere by plant operations. Achievement of this objective aids in protecting health and safety of the public, employees, and environment, and directly supports Emergency Response programs at RFP. Meteorological information supports the design of environmental monitoring networks for impact assessments, environmental surveillance activities, remediation activities, and emergency responses. As the mission of the plant changes from production of nuclear weapons parts to environmental cleanup and economic development, smaller releases resulting from remediation activities become more likely. These possible releases could result from airborne fugitive dust, evaporation from collection ponds, or grass fires

  18. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the IFR closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1994-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the IFR closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode all at a constant heat rating of 840 MWt. For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode, and recycle corns using weapons material only as required for a make-up feed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium feed does not have an adverse impact on IFR core performance characteristics

  19. A open-quotes Newclose quotes regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-01-01

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The open-quote newclose quotes in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be open-quotes new,close quotes when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification

  20. Trends in weapon-related injuries from violence in Odense Municipality, Denmark 1991-2009

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Møller Luef, Stefan; Lauritsen, Jens Martin; Faergemann, Christian

    2016-01-01

    rate was 4.8 per 1,000 victims in males and 29.1 per 1,000 victims in females. More than half (57%) of the homicides were caused by lesions due to sharp weapons. CONCLUSION: Weapon-related injuries are rare in the Odense Municipality. The incidence rate of weapon-related violence did not increase...

  1. Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE's Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories

  2. Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mariella Jr., Raymond P.

    2004-09-07

    A system for detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens uses a detector system, an electrostatic precipitator or scrubber, a circulation system, and a control. The precipitator or scrubber is activated in response to a signal from the detector upon the detection of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens.

  3. 15 CFR 745.2 - End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 745.2 Section 745.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations... EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS § 745.2 End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Note: The End-Use Certificate requirement of...

  4. Nuclear weapons and the World Court ruling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, J.

    1998-01-01

    based on the initiatives by non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion in 1993 whether, considering the environmental and health consequences, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law. The World Court decided that it was not able to give an advisory opinion as requested, because of the fact that questions of use of force and such like were beyond the scope of specialized agencies like the WHO. The Court has ruled that the international community, especially the five nuclear weapon states have not only an obligation to negotiate a treaty for total nuclear disarmament, but also have an obligation to conclude such treaty. We may expect that the nuclear weapon states will cynically disregard the ruling of the World Court as they have been doing to the basic obligation itself in pursuit of nuclear hegemony. But the remaining 150 countries or so also bear a responsibility to keep nudging the recalcitrant states into implementing their commitments to disarm

  5. Directed-Energy Weapons: Invisible and Invincible?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Deveci, Bayram M

    2007-01-01

    ... capacity, low operational cost, reduced logistic support, a nearly unlimited magazine, and wide area coverage for offensive and defensive purposes, seem to be at the forefront of the next revolution in military weapons...

  6. Low yield nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodionov, S.

    1999-01-01

    It is unlikely that anybody would imagine the route to a nuclear-weapon-free world as a straight and unimpeded one. At the moment, there is a fading interest in the possibility of the concerted bilateral reduction of the US and Russian nuclear weapon stockpiles. The reason is evident: these powers demonstrate quite different approaches to two large political campaigns initiated in American political circles, namely NATO expansion to the East, and the attack on Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia considers these initiatives as provocative in content and high-handed in the form. The West argues that Russian response is unjustified and insists on the peaceful nature of its plans?

  7. Are groups working in the Information Technology class? | Mentz ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    We discuss teache rs' perce ption of the use of group work in the Information Technology (IT) classroom. We describe the current situation regarding the implementation of group work in IT classrooms in South Africa as well as the challenges that IT teachers face when implementing group work. This information will be used ...

  8. The Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    In a note verbale of 10 June 1994, the Agency was informed that, on 30 May 1994, the instruments necessary to bring the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean into force for the Federative Republic of Brazil had been deposited. As requested by the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the International Organizations in Vienna, the text of the note is attached hereto for the information of Member States

  9. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    Every year since 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject ''Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East''. By that resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region, and to submit this study to the General Assembly. The study was carried out between July 1989 and August 1990. The study discusses a number of steps and measures that could ease the process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Those measures could be undertaken independently or in conjunction with each other, as well as by individual States or jointly by several, and also on a reciprocal basis; each of them would move the States concerned closer to their ultimate objective - the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons

  10. Selection on an extreme weapon in the frog-legged leaf beetle (Sagra femorata).

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Brien, Devin M; Katsuki, Masako; Emlen, Douglas J

    2017-11-01

    Biologists have been fascinated with the extreme products of sexual selection for decades. However, relatively few studies have characterized patterns of selection acting on ornaments and weapons in the wild. Here, we measure selection on a wild population of weapon-bearing beetles (frog-legged leaf beetles: Sagra femorata) for two consecutive breeding seasons. We consider variation in both weapon size (hind leg length) and in relative weapon size (deviations from the population average scaling relationship between hind leg length and body size), and provide evidence for directional selection on weapon size per se and stabilizing selection on a particular scaling relationship in this population. We suggest that whenever growth in body size is sensitive to external circumstance such as nutrition, then considering deviations from population-level scaling relationships will better reflect patterns of selection relevant to evolution of the ornament or weapon than will variation in trait size per se. This is because trait-size versus body-size scaling relationships approximate underlying developmental reaction norms relating trait growth with body condition in these species. Heightened condition-sensitive expression is a hallmark of the exaggerated ornaments and weapons favored by sexual selection, yet this plasticity is rarely reflected in the way we think about-and measure-selection acting on these structures in the wild. © 2017 The Author(s). Evolution © 2017 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

  11. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Nikitin, Mary B

    2007-01-01

    .... The Six-Party Talks include the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea, and were begun in August 2003 to attempt to resolve the current crisis over North Korean nuclear weapons...

  12. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, T [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

    2001-09-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

  13. Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, T

    2001-09-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  14. The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, Thomas

    2001-03-01

    This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

  15. Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  16. Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  17. Study on combat effectiveness of air defense missile weapon system based on queuing theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhao, Z. Q.; Hao, J. X.; Li, L. J.

    2017-01-01

    Queuing Theory is a method to analyze the combat effectiveness of air defense missile weapon system. The model of service probability based on the queuing theory was constructed, and applied to analyzing the combat effectiveness of "Sidewinder" and "Tor-M1" air defense missile weapon system. Finally aimed at different targets densities, the combat effectiveness of different combat units of two types' defense missile weapon system is calculated. This method can be used to analyze the usefulness of air defense missile weapon system.

  18. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fitzpatrick, Anne C. [Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ. (Virginia Tech), Blacksburg, VA (United States)

    1999-07-01

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to

  19. Emergency management of chemical weapons injuries.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-02-01

    The potential for chemical weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Classes of chemical weapons include nerve agents, vesicants (blister agents), choking agents, incapacitating agents, riot control agents, blood agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. The nerve agents work by blocking the actions of acetylcholinesterase leading to a cholinergic syndrome. Nerve agents include sarin, tabun, VX, cyclosarin, and soman. The vesicants include sulfur mustard and lewisite. The vesicants produce blisters and also damage the upper airways. Choking agents include phosgene and chlorine gas. Choking agents cause pulmonary edema. Incapacitating agents include fentanyl and its derivatives and adamsite. Riot control agents include Mace and pepper spray. Blood agents include cyanide. The mechanism of toxicity for cyanide is blocking oxidative phosphorylation. Toxic industrial chemicals include agents such as formaldehyde, hydrofluoric acid, and ammonia.

  20. Nuclear power and nuclear weapon proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apold, A.

    1978-01-01

    The theme of Dr. Marshall's lecture was that it is, from the viewpoint of prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons,preferable to use plutonium as a fuel in FBR reactors rather than store it in what, in effect, would be plutonium mines. The true threat of proliferation lies in uranium enrichment. The FBR reactor is misunderstood and the US policy is not against breeders as such. Safeguards against the misuse of plutonium by leaving a residue of radioactivity after reprocessing is quite feasible, despite certain practical problems and extra costs. Weapon proliferation is subject to political objectives and intentions. Definite proposals are, (a) a limited number of reprocessing centres, (b) an accelerated development of FBR reactors, (c) a new FBR fuel cycle, (d) stop storage of spent thermal reactor fuel, (e) reinforced safeguards. (JIW)

  1. Voice Biometrics for Information Assurance Applications

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kang, George

    2002-01-01

    In 2002, the President of the United States established an organization within the DOD to develop and promulgate biometrics technologies to achieve security in information, information systems, weapons, and facilities...

  2. Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such 'linkage'. Linkage concerns arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Even enrichment and reprocessing, as normally used in electricity programmes, do not give rise to the materials used in weapons. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (Author)

  3. Biological effects of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frischauf, H.

    1983-01-01

    Prompt and delayed biological effects of nuclear weapons are discussed. The response to excess pressure on man is estimated, the acute radiation syndrome caused by different radiation doses and cancerogenous and genetic effects are described. Medical care after a nuclear explosion would be difficult and imperfect. (M.J.)

  4. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

  5. Weapons grade plutonium disposition in PWR, CANDU and FR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deplech, M.; Tommasi, J.; Zaetta, A.

    2000-01-01

    In the frame work of the AIDA/MOX phase I/I/ program (1994-1997) between France and Russia, the disposition of plutonium in reactors was studied. The LWR (Light Water Reactor), FR (Fast reactors), CANDU (Heavy Water Reactors), HTR (High Temperature Reactors) options for using excess dismantled weapons plutonium for peaceful commercial nuclear power generating purposes offer some advantages over the remaining options (storage). The AIDA/MOX phase 1 program covers different topics, among which are the neutronic aspects of loading reactors with weapons-grade plutonium. The conclusions are that the weapon plutonium consumption is similar in the different type of reactors. However, the use of inert matrices allows to increase the mass balance for a same denaturing level. The use of Thorium as a matrix or special isotopes to increase the proliferation resistance prove to be insufficient. (author)

  6. Historical fencing and scientific research medieval weapons: common ground

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    B. V. Hrynchyshyn

    2015-07-01

    We considered various approaches to the reconstruction of the historical fencing. It is proved that the activities of such societies has a positive effect on the process research of features of medieval weapons, fighting tactics of different periods The various approaches to the reconstruction of the historical fencing. Proved that the activities of such societies has a positive effect on the process research of features of medieval weapons, fighting tactics of different periods.

  7. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Program of the DPRK

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    - Park Sang Hoon

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

  8. TSUNAMI analysis of the applicability of proposed experiments to reactor-grade and weapons-grade mixed-oxide systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rearden, Bradley T.; Hopper, Calvin M.; Elam, Karla R.

    2005-01-01

    The applicability of proposed critical experiments for the criticality code validation of a series of prototypic reactor-grade and weapons-grade mixed-oxide systems has been assessed with the TSUNAMI methodology from SCALE 5. The application systems were proposed by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety MOX Experimental Needs Working Group. Forty-eight application systems were conceived to envelope the range of conditions in processing and fabrication of reactor-grade and weapons-grade MOX fuel. The applicability of 303 existing critical benchmarks to each of the 48 applications was assessed, and validation coverage was found to be lacking for certain applications. Two series of proposed critical experiments were also considered in this analysis. The TSUNAMI analysis has revealed that both series of proposed experiments are applicable to numerous configurations of the reactor-grade and weapons-grade systems. A detailed assessment of which experiments were revealed by TSUNAMI to be most applicable to specific prototypic fuel processing systems has been performed. (author)

  9. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Matoušek, J

    2010-02-01

    Full Text Available Chemical weapons, like all military technology, are associated with activities of scientists and engineers. However, chemical weapons differ from any other military technology because they were invented, and their first mass use directly developed by famous chemists. The active contribution of engineers and scientists and their organisations in the negotiations on chemical disarmament, including drafting the Chemical Weapons Convention, is described. Their present and future role in implementing the Convention is analysed, taking into consideration the threats and benefits of advances in science and technology, and stressing the independent expertise of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board.

  10. Elimination of ballistic missiles: An important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheffran, J.

    1997-01-01

    Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty preamble emphasises 'the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems. Delivery systems are an important and costly part of nuclear weapons which should be sophisticated, therefore the control of nuclear-capable delivery systems would be an important step to make nuclear weapons useless and reduce the threat od their use. This is especially true for ballistic missiles, which represent effective and powerful means to deploy nuclear weapons

  11. Why we must abolish nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohnishi, Hitoshi

    1997-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has offered a great opportunity to reduce or even abolish nuclear weapons, but the international community seemed to lose interest in nuclear weapons issues. Today, however, there are a lot of other major menaces to the survival of the mankind: pollution, hunger, poverty, ethnic conflicts. So the nuclear weapons issue is merely one of the most pressing threats to survival

  12. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  13. The Neuropeptide Oxytocin Enhances Information Sharing and Group Decision Making Quality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Wilde, Tim R W; Ten Velden, Femke S; De Dreu, Carsten K W

    2017-01-11

    Groups can make better decisions than individuals when members cooperatively exchange and integrate their uniquely held information and insights. However, under conformity pressures group members are biased towards exchanging commonly known information, and away from exchanging unique information, thus undermining group decision-making quality. At the neurobiological level, conformity associates with the neuropeptide oxytocin. A double-blind placebo controlled study found no evidence for oxytocin induced conformity. Compared to placebo groups, three-person groups whose members received intranasal oxytocin, focused more on unique information (i) and repeated this information more often (ii). These findings reveal oxytocin as a neurobiological driver of group decision-making processes.

  14. Safety and injury profile of conducted electrical weapons used by law enforcement officers against criminal suspects.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bozeman, William P; Hauda, William E; Heck, Joseph J; Graham, Derrel D; Martin, Brian P; Winslow, James E

    2009-04-01

    Conducted electrical weapons such as the Taser are commonly used by law enforcement agencies. The safety of these weapons has been the subject of scrutiny and controversy; previous controlled studies in animals and healthy humans may not accurately reflect the risks of conducted electrical weapons used in actual conditions. We seek to determine the safety and injury profile of conducted electrical weapons used against criminal suspects in a field setting. This prospective, multicenter, observational trial tracked a consecutive case series of all conducted electrical weapon uses against criminal suspects at 6 US law enforcement agencies. Mandatory review of each conducted electrical weapon use incorporated physician review of police and medical records. Injuries were classified as mild, moderate, or severe according to a priori definitions. The primary outcome was a composite of moderate and severe injuries, termed significant injuries. Conducted electrical weapons were used against 1,201 subjects during 36 months. One thousand one hundred twenty-five subjects (94%) were men; the median age was 30 years (range 13 to 80 years). Mild or no injuries were observed after conducted electrical weapon use in 1,198 subjects (99.75%; 95% confidence interval 99.3% to 99.9%). Of mild injuries, 83% were superficial puncture wounds from conducted electrical weapon probes. Significant injuries occurred in 3 subjects (0.25%; 95% confidence interval 0.07% to 0.7%), including 2 intracranial injuries from falls and 1 case of rhabdomyolysis. Two subjects died in police custody; medical examiners did not find conducted electrical weapon use to be causal or contributory in either case. To our knowledge, these findings represent the first large, independent, multicenter study of conducted electrical weapon injury epidemiology and suggest that more than 99% of subjects do not experience significant injuries after conducted electrical weapon use.

  15. Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adams, Marvin

    2011-04-01

    As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

  16. Multidepot UAV Routing Problem with Weapon Configuration and Time Window

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tianren Zhou

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available In recent wars, there is an increasing trend that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs are utilized to conduct military attacking missions. In this paper, we investigate a novel multidepot UAV routing problem with consideration of weapon configuration in the UAV and the attacking time window of the target. A mixed-integer linear programming model is developed to jointly optimize three kinds of decisions: the weapon configuration strategy in the UAV, the routing strategy of target, and the allocation strategy of weapons to targets. An adaptive large neighborhood search (ALNS algorithm is proposed for solving the problem, which is tested by randomly generated instances covering the small, medium, and large sizes. Experimental results confirm the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed ALNS algorithm.

  17. Social Information on Fear and Food Drives Animal Grouping and Fitness.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gil, Michael A; Emberts, Zachary; Jones, Harrison; St Mary, Colette M

    2017-03-01

    Empirical studies in select systems suggest that social information-the incidental or deliberate information produced by animals and available to other animals-can fundamentally shape animal grouping behavior. However, to understand the role of social information in animal behavior and fitness, we must establish general theory that quantifies effects of social information across ecological contexts and generates expectations that can be applied across systems. Here we used dynamic state variable modeling to isolate effects of social information about food and predators on grouping behavior and fitness. We characterized optimal behavior from a set of strategies that included grouping with different numbers of conspecifics or heterospecifics and the option to forage or be vigilant over the course of a day. We show that the use of social information alone increases grouping behavior but constrains group size to limit competition, ultimately increasing individual fitness substantially across various ecological contexts. We also found that across various contexts, foraging in mixed-species groups is generally better than foraging in conspecific groups, supporting recent theory on competition-information quality trade-offs. Our findings suggest that multiple forms of social information shape animal grouping and fitness, which are sensitive to resource availability and predation pressure that determine information usefulness.

  18. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  19. Scientific and technical development and the chemical weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqui, P.H.

    2008-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was drafted with the recognition that it is impossible to envision every way in which toxic chemicals might be used for aggressive purposes. As terrorist organizations and rogue states replace the major powers as the most likely candidates to employ chemical weapons, the agents of choice may differ from those developed for battlefield use. Twenty- first century chemical warfare may target civilians or agricultural production, and clandestine production-facilities may manufacture toxic agents from chemical precursors, not monitored under the CWC control regime. The effects (on CWC implementation) of changing industrial technologies, including ongoing developments in chemical process technology, dual-use industrial chemicals, and rapid methods for discovering biologically active chemicals, are considerable Also considered is how commercial technologies could be misused for the development of novel chemical weapons, and how such abuses might be detected and monitored. (author)

  20. US and Russia face urgent decisions on weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hileman, B.

    1994-01-01

    Surplus plutonium poses a ''clear and present danger to national and international security,'' warns a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study released in January, titled ''The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.'' Over the past few years, many different methods of disposing of plutonium have been proposed. They range from shooting it into the Sun with missiles, to deep-seabed disposal, to fissioning it within a new generation of nuclear reactors. The NAS report rejects most of the methods suggested so far, but does recommend pursuing two of the options. One is to incorporate the plutonium in mixed-oxide fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, and use it to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. The other is to mix the plutonium with high-level waste and molten glass and mold the resulting material into large glass logs for eventual geologic disposal. Both are discussed here. The panel that wrote the NAS study is a standing committee called the Committee on International Security ampersand Arms Control. It suggests steps that should be taken now to guard supplies of plutonium removed from weapons. One step is bilateral US-Russian monitoring of warhead dismantlement. Others include setting up secure interim storage for the fissile materials and establishing an international monitoring system to verify the stockpiles and ensure that materials are not withdrawn for use in new weapons. The panel also urges Russia to stop producing fissile weapons materials and both countries to commit a very large fraction of their plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled weapons to nonaggressive uses. The US and Russia have already made initial moves to accomplish these goals but have not fully implemented any of them

  1. Ionitriding of Weapon Components

    Science.gov (United States)

    1974-01-01

    and documented tho production sequences required for the case- hardening of AISI 4140 and Nitralloy 13514 steels. Determination of processina...depths were established experimentally for Nitralloy 135M and for AISI 4140 steels. These steels are commonly used for the manufacture of nitrlded...weapons components. A temperature of 050F, upper limit for lonitrlding, was selected for the Nitralloy 135M to keep treatment times short. Since AISI 4140

  2. Weapons-grade nuclear material - open questions of a safe disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Closs, K.D.; Giraud, J.P.; Grill, K.D.; Hensing, I.; Hippel, F. von; Holik, J.; Pellaud, B.

    1995-01-01

    There are suitable technologies available for destruction of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Weapons-grade uranium, consisting to 90% of the isotope U-235, can be diluted with the uranium isotope U-238 to make it non-weapons-grade, but it will then still be a material that can be used as a fuel in civil nuclear reactors. For safe plutonium disposal, several options are under debate. There is for instance a process called ''reverse reprocessing'', with the plutonium being blended with high-level radioactive fission products and then being put into a waste form accepted for direct ultimate disposal. The other option is to convert weapons-grade plutonium into MOX nuclear fuel elements and then ''burn'' them in civil nuclear power reactors. This is an option favoured by many experts. Such fuel elements should stay for a long time in the reactor core in order to achieve high burnups, and should then be ready for ultimate disposal. This disposal pathway offers essential advantages: the plutonium is used up or depleted as a component of reactor fuel, and thus is no longer available for illegal activities, and it serves as an energy source for power generation. (orig./HP) [de

  3. Building Foundations for Nuclear Security Enterprise Analysis Utilizing Nuclear Weapon Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Josserand, Terry Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Nuclear Security Enterprise and Cost Analysis; Young, Leone [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Nuclear Security Enterprise and Cost Analysis; Chamberlin, Edwin Phillip [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Nuclear Security Enterprise and Cost Analysis

    2017-09-01

    The Nuclear Security Enterprise, managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration - a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy - has been associated with numerous assessments with respect to the estimating, management capabilities, and practices pertaining to nuclear weapon modernization efforts. This report identifies challenges in estimating and analyzing the Nuclear Security Enterprise through an analysis of analogous timeframe conditions utilizing two types of nuclear weapon data - (1) a measure of effort and (2) a function of time. The analysis of analogous timeframe conditions that utilizes only two types of nuclear weapon data yields four summary observations that estimators and analysts of the Nuclear Security Enterprise will find useful.

  4. IFR starts to burn up weapons-grade material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    With funding from different parts of the federal government, the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) project has survived into fiscal year 1994 and is now embarking on a demonstration of how this type of liquid-metal-cooled reactor (LMR) can be used to burn fuel derived from weapons-grade plutonium. This month, an assembly made from weapons-grade material is to be loaded into Experimental Breeder Reactor-II in Idaho, which is serving as the prototype for the IFR concept. Although FY 1994 work is being funded by the DOE, this particular examination of plutonium burnup is backed by the Department of Defense

  5. The Regulation of the Possession of Weapons at Gatherings | du Toit

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. ... (b) possession of dangerous weapons during the participation in any religious or cultural activities or lawful sport, recreation or entertainment or (c) legitimate collection, ...

  6. Enhancing Group Decision Making: An Exercise to Reduce Shared Information Bias

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baker, Diane F.

    2010-01-01

    Research on shared information bias has shown that group members involved in a decision-making task tend to undervalue information that a single member shares with the group, especially when that information conflicts with their prior conclusions. The group activity in this article is intended to heighten awareness of this shared information bias…

  7. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination; Pour une convention d'elimination des armes nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-03-15

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  8. Homicide-suicide cases in Switzerland and their impact on the Swiss Weapon Law.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grabherr, Silke; Johner, Stephan; Dilitz, Carine; Buck, Ursula; Killias, Martin; Mangin, Patrice; Plattner, Thomas

    2010-12-01

    Homicide followed by the suicide of the offender is a well-known phenomenon. In most cases, it takes place in the context of the so-called "family tragedies." A recent series of such family tragedies in Switzerland prompted an intensive debate in the media and the Swiss government concerning the Swiss Weapon Law, in particular the requirement to keep personal army weapons at home. The present study of Homicide-Suicide cases in Switzerland, thus focuses on the role played by guns, especially military weapons, in such crimes. We investigated retrospectively 75 cases of Homicide-Suicide, comprising 172 individuals and spanning a period of 23 years in western and central Switzerland. Our results show that if guns were used in 76% of the cases, army weapons were the cause of death in 25% of the total. In 28% of the deaths caused by a gunshot, the exact type of the gun and its origin could not be determined. Thus, the majority of Homicide-Suicide cases in Switzerland involve the use of guns. The exact percentage of cases were military weapons were involved could not be defined. In our opinion, a stricter weapons law, restricting access to firearms, would be a factor of prevention of Homicide- Suicide cases in Switzerland.

  9. The Future of Killing: Ethical and Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martin Lark

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Warfare is moving towards full weapon autonomy. Already, there are weapons in service that replace a human at the point of engagement. The remote pilot must adhere to the law and consider the moral and ethical implications of using lethal force. Future fully autonomous weapons will be able to search for, identify and engage targets without human intervention, raising the question of who is responsible for the moral and ethical considerations of using such weapons. In the chaos of war, people are fallible, but they can apply judgement and discretion and identify subtle signals. For example, humans can identify when an enemy wants to surrender, are burying their dead, or are assisting non-combatants. An autonomous weapon may not be so discerning and may not be capable of being programmed to apply discretion, compassion, or mercy, nor can it adapt commanders’ intent or apply initiative. Before fully autonomous weapons use lethal force, it is argued that there needs to be assurances that the ethical implications are understood and that control mechanisms are in place to ensure that oversight of the system is able to prevent incidents that could amount to breaches of the laws of armed conflict.

  10. Physical and emotional health problems experienced by youth engaged in physical fighting and weapon carrying.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sophie D Walsh

    Full Text Available Then aims of the current study were 1 to provide cross-national estimates of the prevalence of physical fighting and weapon carrying among adolescents aged 11-15 years; (2 To examine the possible effects of physical fighting and weapon carrying on the occurrence of physical (medically treated injuries and emotional health outcomes (multiple health complaints among adolescents within the theoretical framework of Problem Behaviour Theory. 20,125 adolescents aged 11-15 in five countries (Belgium, Israel, USA, Canada, FYR Macedonia were surveyed via the 2006 Health Behaviour in School Aged Children survey. Prevalence was calculated for physical fighting and weapon carrying along with physical and emotional measures that potentially result from violence. Regression analyses were used to quantify associations between violence/weapon carrying and the potential health consequences within each country. Large variations in fighting and weapon carrying were observed across countries. Boys reported more frequent episodes of fighting/weapon carrying and medically attended injuries in every country, while girls reported more emotional symptoms. Although there were some notable variations in findings between different participating countries, increased weapon carrying and physical fighting were both independently and consistently associated with more frequent reports of the potential health outcomes. Adolescents engaging in fighting and weapon carrying are also at risk for physical and emotional health outcomes. Involvement in fighting and weapon carrying can be seen as part of a constellation of risk behaviours with obvious health implications. Our findings also highlight the importance of the cultural context when examining the nature of violent behaviour for adolescents.

  11. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of

  12. Defense and Regional Integration: Brazil’s Weapons Industry Case

    OpenAIRE

    Suzeley Kalil Mathias; Eduardo Lucas de Vasconcelos Cruz

    2009-01-01

    This paper works with the relation between technological development and weapons industry in Brazil, pointing out the dependence of this to that one. One reveals as the changes in the commerce of armaments that currently privileges the production of small weapons for exportation. The conclusion is that to keep projects of this nature, is using to advantage the industrial park for the dual production, that is, that one takes care the civil and the military demands. At last, it defends the poss...

  13. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1969-01-01

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  14. Nuclear weapons and conflict transformation: the case of India-Pakistan. - Pbk ed.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Khan, S.

    2010-01-01

    Introduction Part 1: Theory 1. Studies on Conflict Transformation 2. Scholarship on Ramifications of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition 3. Elucidating Conflict Transformation with Nuclear Weapons Part 2: The India-Pakistan Protracted Conflict 4. Life of the Protracted Conflict 5. Introduction of Nuclear

  15. Simulated ICJ Judgment : Revisiting the Lawfulness of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Winston P. Nagan

    2012-04-01

    Full Text Available The author prepared this simulated judgment at the request of Cadmus editors to demonstrate that there is ample ground for revisiting and revising the landmark 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons. The ICJ failed to anticipate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which expands the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, the potential cataclysmic impact of nuclear war on climate change, the multiplication of nuclear-weapon-free zones as evidence of a widespread rejection, mounting evidence regarding the physical and psychological harm, and unwillingness of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under the NPT. This article challenges the notion that a few sovereign states should be the sole arbiters of international law and affirms the legitimate claim of the global community of protection from the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. The use or threat of use undermines foundational values of the international legal system and the specific rules of self-defense and humanitarian law. The contribution seeks to give an accentuated role for the explicit use of the fundamental values of international legal order, in crafting an innovative methodology for the formulation of the judgment. The very existence of these weapons undermines the rights of all of humanity. The ICJ should be moved to categorically declare the use and possession of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity.

  16. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

  17. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  18. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  19. Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  20. Hazards of chemical weapons release during war: new perspectives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reutter, S

    1999-01-01

    The two major threat classes of chemical weapons are mustard gas and the nerve agents, and this has not changed in over 50 years. Both types are commonly called gases, but they are actually liquids that are not remarkably volatile. These agents were designed specifically to harm people by any route of exposure and to be effective at low doses. Mustard gas was used in World War I, and the nerve agents were developed shortly before, during, and after World War II. Our perception of the potency of chemical weapons has changed, as well as our concern over potential effects of prolonged exposures to low doses and potential target populations that include women and children. Many of the toxicologic studies and human toxicity estimates for both mustard and nerve agents were designed for the purpose of quickly developing maximal casualties in the least sensitive male soldier. The "toxicity" of the chemical weapons has not changed, but our perception of "toxicity" has. PMID:10585902

  1. Tool, weapon, or white elephant? A realist analysis of the five phases of a twenty-year programme of occupational health information system implementation in the health sector.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spiegel, Jerry M; Lockhart, Karen; Dyck, Carmen; Wilson, Andrea; O'Hara, Lyndsay; Yassi, Annalee

    2012-08-06

    Although information systems (IS) have been extensively applied in the health sector worldwide, few initiatives have addressed the health and safety of health workers, a group acknowledged to be at high risk of injury and illness, as well as in great shortage globally, particularly in low and middle-income countries. Adapting a context-mechanism-outcome case study design, we analyze our team's own experience over two decades to address this gap: in two different Canadian provinces; and two distinct South African settings. Applying a realist analysis within an adapted structuration theory framing sensitive to power relations, we explore contextual (socio-political and technological) characteristics and mechanisms affecting outcomes at micro, meso and macro levels. Technological limitations hindered IS usefulness in the initial Canadian locale, while staffing inadequacies amid pronounced power imbalances affecting governance restricted IS usefulness in the subsequent Canadian application. Implementation in South Africa highlighted the special care needed to address power dynamics regarding both worker-employer relations (relevant to all occupational health settings) and North-south imbalances (common to all international interactions). Researchers, managers and front-line workers all view IS implementation differently; relationships amongst the workplace parties and between community and academic partners have been pivotal in determining outcome in all circumstances. Capacity building and applying creative commons and open source solutions are showing promise, as is international collaboration. There is worldwide consensus on the need for IS use to protect the health workforce. However, IS implementation is a resource-intensive undertaking; regardless of how carefully designed the software, contextual factors and the mechanisms adopted to address these are critical to mitigate threats and achieve outcomes of interest to all parties. Issues specific to IS development

  2. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

    1982-06-01

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

  3. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

    1982-06-01

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given

  4. Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  5. Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  6. Future of clip-on weapon sights: pros and cons from an applications perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knight, C. Reed; Greenslade, Ken; Francisco, Glen

    2015-05-01

    US Domestic, International, allied Foreign National Warfighters and Para-Military First Responders (Police, SWAT, Special Operations, Law Enforcement, Government, Security and more) are put in harm's way all the time. To successfully complete their missions and return home safely are the primary goals of these professionals. Tactical product improvements that affect mission effectiveness and solider survivability are pivotal to understanding the past, present and future of Clip-On in-line weapon sights. Clip-On Weapon Sight (WS) technology was deemed an interim solution by the US Government for use until integrated and fused (day/night multi-sensor) Weapon Sights (WSs) were developed/fielded. Clip-On has now become the solution of choice by Users, Warriors, Soldiers and the US Government. SWaP-C (size, weight and power -cost) has been improved through progressive advances in Clip-On Image Intensified (I2), passive thermal, LL-CMOS and fused technology. Clip-On Weapon Sights are now no longer mounting position sensitive. Now they maintain aim point boresight, so they can be used for longer ranges with increased capabilities while utilizing the existing zeroed weapon and daysight optic. Active illuminated low-light level (both analog I2 and digital LL-CMOS) imaging is rightfully a real-world technology, proven to deliver daytime and low-light level identification confidence. Passive thermal imaging is also a real-world technology, proven to deliver daytime, nighttime and all-weather (including dirty battlefield) target detection confidence. Image processing detection algorithms with intelligent analytics provide documented promise to improve confidence by reducing Users, Warriors and Soldiers' work-loads and improving overall system engagement solution outcomes. In order to understand the future of Clip-On in-line weapon sights, addressing pros and cons, this paper starts with an overview of historical weapon sight applications, technologies and stakeholder decisions

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-03-28

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003.

  9. Scope for nuclear weapon-free zone in central and eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pande, Savita

    1998-01-01

    The idea of a Central Europe free of nuclear weapons has its roots, of course, in the end of the cold war and the break-up of the former Union. These historical developments created the necessary conditions for the Lisbon Protocol, the successful withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as well as these countries' accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is admitted that even before these steps had been achieved, Belarus had put forward the nuclear-free zone initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in 1991. Like all the other nuclear weapon-free zones, existing or potential, a proposal for such a zone entails that it be analysed in the context of its political environment, regional specificity as well as the role, and implications of the relevant outside powers. These include Warsaw Pact dissolution and its impact on control of tactical nuclear weapons as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO's) expansion eastwards. It is equally important to look at the issue in the context of its history, or, in other words, the past attempts

  10. WEAPONS COMPLEX OF RUSSIAN SERVING TATARS IN XV-XVII TH CENTURIES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Б А Илюшин

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available The article considers the issue of the offensive and defensive armament of the serving Tatars of the Moscow state in the XV-XVIIth centuries, its research degree in the national historiography, the opportunities and prospects of its enhanced studying. The serving Tatars were one of the categories of the Moscow state nobility, which is reflected, first of all, in written sources. The weapons complex of Russian serving Tatars included minimal armour. European sources do not mention armour and helms or shield. But noble Tatars could have costly armour of many types that were used in that epoch by peoples of Eastern Europe and Middle East - Russians, Persians, Turks. The basic weapons of the serving Tatars were bows and arrows. In the close combat they were using sabres, and (rarely spears. The fire weapon was not used by the serving Tatars (or they used it very rarely and it was not characteristic for their weapons complex, because it was ineffective in their tactics. The serving Tatars were light mobile horse archers that preferred battles of long-distance.

  11. Nuclear Forensics: Report of the AAAS/APS Working Group

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tannenbaum, Benn

    2008-04-01

    This report was produced by a Working Group of the American Physical Society's Program on Public Affairs in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement of the state of the art of nuclear forensics; an assessment of its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential. In the course of its work, the Working Group observed that nuclear forensics was an essential part of the overall nuclear attribution process, which aims at identifying the origin of unidentified nuclear weapon material and, in the event, an unidentified nuclear explosion. A credible nuclear attribution capability and in particular nuclear forensics capability could deter essential participants in the chain of actors needed to smuggle nuclear weapon material or carry out a nuclear terrorist act and could also encourage states to better secure such materials and weapons. The Working Group also noted that nuclear forensics result would take some time to obtain and that neither internal coordination, nor international arrangements, nor the state of qualified personnel and needed equipment were currently enough to minimize the time needed to reach reliable results in an emergency such as would be caused by a nuclear detonation or the intercept of a weapon-size quantity of material. The Working Group assesses international cooperation to be crucial for forensics to work, since the material would likely come from inadequately documented foreign sources. In addition, international participation, if properly managed, could enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect of attribution. Finally the Working Group notes that the U.S. forensics

  12. Turkey's response to threats of weapons of mass destruction

    OpenAIRE

    Al, Guray.

    2001-01-01

    Unlike most of its NATO allies, Turkey did not emerge from the Cold War with enhanced security. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles by its neighbors in the Middle Eastâ Iran, Iraq and Syriaâ creates a serious security concern for Turkey. This thesis analyzes the numerous threats posed to Turkey by its neighborsα nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and their ballistic missiles. It evaluates Turkeyαs defense options to counter these thre...

  13. Multi-task learning with group information for human action recognition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Qian, Li; Wu, Song; Pu, Nan; Xu, Shulin; Xiao, Guoqiang

    2018-04-01

    Human action recognition is an important and challenging task in computer vision research, due to the variations in human motion performance, interpersonal differences and recording settings. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-task learning framework with group information (MTL-GI) for accurate and efficient human action recognition. Specifically, we firstly obtain group information through calculating the mutual information according to the latent relationship between Gaussian components and action categories, and clustering similar action categories into the same group by affinity propagation clustering. Additionally, in order to explore the relationships of related tasks, we incorporate group information into multi-task learning. Experimental results evaluated on two popular benchmarks (UCF50 and HMDB51 datasets) demonstrate the superiority of our proposed MTL-GI framework.

  14. Monitoring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Can regional CBMs play a role?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sood, R.

    1994-01-01

    The experience of regional Confidence Building Measures (CBM), has only limited applicability for tackling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where the international norm has developed as in the case of biological and chemical weapons, through international disarmament treaties, regional initiatives can strengthen this norm. Where a norm is less well-founded, regional initiatives are not likely to succeed. Specifically, with regard to nuclear weapons, consensus on negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a convention for prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and explosive devices is a positive development. Successful conclusion of these universal and verifiable treaties will go a long way to strengthening the international norm against proliferation. Two other measures are critical - a development of a non-use assurance and commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear weapon States. If the international community witnesses improvement in these areas, regional negotiations will be stimulated. Therefore, the primary focus should be on developing an international norm to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Regional efforts will take their cue from these international norms and would result in CBMs that are consistent with the international norm

  15. A compilation of nuclear weapons test detonation data for U.S. Pacific ocean tests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simon, S L; Robison, W L

    1997-07-01

    Prior to December 1993, the explosive yields of 44 of 66 nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands were still classified. Following a request from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the U.S. Department of Energy to release this information, the Secretary of Energy declassified and released to the public the explosive yields of the Pacific nuclear tests. This paper presents a synopsis of information on nuclear test detonations in the Marshall Islands and other locations in the mid-Pacific including dates, explosive yields, locations, weapon placement, and summary statistics.

  16. Communication dated 11 September 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan regarding the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia signed on 8 September 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale, dated 11 September 2006, from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the IAEA regarding the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia signed on 8 September 2006 in Semipalatinsk by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Note Verbale and, as requested therein, the enclosed information regarding the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, is reproduced herewith for the information of Member States

  17. Cargo/Weapons Elevator Land Based Engineering Site

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Cargo and Weapons Facility consists of a suite of full scale and component test facilities contiguously located in building 77H. The site was constructed in 1987...

  18. Correcting environmental problems facing the nuclear weapons complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezendes, V.S.

    1990-06-01

    This report discusses DOE's efforts to correct the environmental problems facing the nuclear weapons complex. It focuses on three main points. First, the weapons complex faces a variety of serious and costly environmental problems. Second, during the past year, DOE has made some important changes to its organization that should help change its management focus from one that emphasizes materials production to one that more clearly focuses on environmental concerns. Third, because resolution of DOE's environmental problems will require considerable resources during a period of budgetary constraints, it is imperative that DOE have internal controls in place to ensure that resources are spent efficiently

  19. The singular weapon. What remains from the atomic age?; Die Singulaere Waffe. Was bleibt vom Atomzeitalter?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eisenbart, Constanze (ed.) [Forschungsstaette der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (FEST), Heidelberg (Germany)

    2012-07-01

    The book contains the following contributions: Why do we talk about the atomic age? The language of the atomic myth - comments to a protestant debate. Nuclear singularity between fiction and reality. Only one can get through: military singularity of nuclear weapons. Physical singularity of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons test and fall-out. Quantitative disarmament and qualitative rearmament. Do mini nukes neutralize the singularity? The vulnerability of the industrial society by the nuclear electromagnetic momentum. Nuclear weapons as national status symbol - the example of India. The general regulations of international laws and the singularity of nuclear weapons. The construction of normative singularity - development and change of the nuclear taboo.

  20. Application of NEPA to nuclear weapons production, storage, and testing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sauber, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirement of environmental impact statements for the testing of military equipment, specifically nuclear weapons, conflicts with national security objectives. The author examines NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in terms of the environmental effects of weapons testing and the relevant case law. The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project sought to resolve the conflict by distinguishing between a project which is contemplated and one which is proposed. The classification scheme embodied in the FOIA exemption for national security may cause unwarranted frustration of NEPA's goals. The author outlines a new classification system and review mechanism that could curb military abuse in this area

  1. Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Stanbro, W.D.

    1994-01-01

    Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ''transparency'' is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared

  2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-04-22

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

  5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  6. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  9. The predictive influence of family and neighborhood assets on fighting and weapon carrying from mid- to late adolescence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haegerich, Tamara M; Oman, Roy F; Vesely, Sara K; Aspy, Cheryl B; Tolma, Eleni L

    2014-08-01

    Using a developmental, social-ecological approach to understand the etiology of health-risk behavior and inform primary prevention efforts, we assess the predictive effects of family and neighborhood social processes on youth physical fighting and weapon carrying. Specifically, we focus on relationships among youth and their parents, family communication, parental monitoring, as well as sense of community and neighborhood informal social control, support, concerns, and disorder. This study advances knowledge through its investigation of family and neighborhood structural factors and social processes together, employment of longitudinal models that estimate effects over adolescent development, and use of self-report and observational measures. Data from 1,093 youth/parent pairs were analyzed from the Youth Assets Study using a Generalized Estimating Equation approach; family and neighborhood assets and risks were analyzed as time varying and lagged. Similar family assets affected physical fighting and weapon carrying, whereas different neighborhood social processes influenced the two forms of youth violence. Study findings have implications for the primary prevention of youth violence, including the use of family-based approaches that build relationships and parental monitoring skills and community-level change approaches that promote informal social control and reduce neighborhood concerns about safety.

  10. Animal Rights Groups Target High School Dissection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trotter, Andrew

    1992-01-01

    Two groups leading the charge against dissection are People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and the Student Action Corps for Animals (SACA). Protests by student and community members remain the movement's strongest weapon. (MLF)

  11. Research on group enterprise multimedia information publishing system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zhimin Dong

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available A electric power group enterprises to actively explore the innovation of enterprise culture management, making full use of modern information and communication technologies, construction of trans-regional multimedia information publishing platform. Construction of a municipal pilot units in Group region, for example, through consolidation, Office LANs, corporate networks in electric power communication network, cable TV network, realized with pictures, video, PPT, FLASH animations, WORD documents, WEB pages, video conference streams, radio, television, and other media as the carrier’s digital communications.

  12. Rays as weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vogel, H.

    2007-01-01

    Purpose: Ionizing radiation is being regarded as life threatening. Therefore, accidents in nuclear power plants are considered equal threatening as nuclear bomb explosions, and attacks with dirty bombs are thought as dangerous as nuclear weapon explosions. However, there are differences between a nuclear bomb explosion, the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and an attack with a dirty bomb. It is intended to point them out. Method: The processes are described, which damage in a nuclear bomb explosion, in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, and in an attack with a dirty bomb. Their effects are compared with each other, i.e. explosion, heat, shock wave (blast), ionizing radiation, and fallout. Results: In the center of the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the temperature rises to 100 Mio deg.C, this induces damaging heat radiation and shock wave. In the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant and in the conventional explosion of a dirty bomb, the temperature may rise up to 3000 deg. C, heat radiation and blast are limited to a short distance. In nuclear power plants, explosions due to oxyhydrogen gas or steam may occur. In nuclear explosions the dispersed radioactive material (fall out) consists mainly of isotopes with short half-life, in nuclear power plants and in dirty bomb attacks with longer half-life. The amount of fall out is comparable in nuclear bomb explosions with that in the largest imaginable accident in a nuclear power plant, it is smaller in attacks with dirty bombs. An explosion in a nuclear power plant even in the largest imaginable accident is not a nuclear explosion. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 200,000 victims nearly all by heat and blast, some 300 died by ionizing radiation. In Chernobyl, there have been less than 100 victims due to ionizing radiation up till now. A dirty bomb kills possibly with the explosion of conventional explosive, the dispersed radioactive material may damage

  13. Synergies across verification regimes: Nuclear safeguards and chemical weapons convention compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kadner, Steven P.; Turpen, Elizabeth

    2001-01-01

    In the implementation of all arms control agreements, accurate verification is essential. In setting a course for verifying compliance with a given treaty - whether the NPT or the CWC, one must make a technical comparison of existing information-gathering capabilities against the constraints in an agreement. Then it must be decided whether this level of verifiability is good enough. Generally, the policy standard of 'effective verification' includes the ability to detect significant violations, with high confidence, in sufficient time to respond effectively with policy adjustments or other responses, as needed. It is at this juncture where verification approaches have traditionally diverged. Nuclear safeguards requirements have taken one path while chemical verification methods have pursued another. However, recent technological advances have brought a number of changes affecting verification, and lately their pace has been accelerating. First, all verification regimes have more and better information as a result of new kinds of sensors, imagery, and other technologies. Second, the verification provisions in agreements have also advanced, to include on-site inspections, portal monitoring, data exchanges, and a variety of transparency, confidence-building, and other cooperative measures, Together these developments translate into a technological overlap of certain institutional verification measures such as the NPT's safeguards requirements and the IAEA and the CWC's verification visions and the OPCW. Hence, a priority of international treaty-implementing organizations is exploring the development of a synergistic and coordinated approach to WMD policy making that takes into account existing inter-linkages between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons issues. Specific areas of coordination include harmonizing information systems and information exchanges and the shared application of scientific mechanisms, as well as collaboration on technological developments

  14. Defense and Regional Integration: Brazil’s Weapons Industry Case

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Suzeley Kalil Mathias

    2009-06-01

    Full Text Available This paper works with the relation between technological development and weapons industry in Brazil, pointing out the dependence of this to that one. One reveals as the changes in the commerce of armaments that currently privileges the production of small weapons for exportation. The conclusion is that to keep projects of this nature, is using to advantage the industrial park for the dual production, that is, that one takes care the civil and the military demands. At last, it defends the possibility of the defense industry works as mechanism of regional integration.

  15. Nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Asia Pacific region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamada, Eiji

    1997-01-01

    The Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty decided on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and adopted two documents 'principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty'. In the former document, the Conference encourages the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the conviction that such zones will enhance global and regional peace and security. Besides the Rarotonga Treaty, ASEAN countries plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South-East Asia

  16. Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Honduras to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between the Republic of Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  17. Making Weapons for the Terracotta Army

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marcos Martinón-Torres

    2011-10-01

    Full Text Available The Terracotta Army of the First Emperor of China is one of the most emblematic archaeological sites in the world. Many questions remain about the logistics of technology, standardisation and labour organisation behind the creation of such a colossal construction in just a few decades over 2,000 years ago. An ongoing research project co-ordinated between the UCL Institute of Archaeology and the Emperor Qin Shihang's Terracotta Army Museum is beginning to address some of these questions. This paper outlines some results of the typological, metric, microscopic, chemical and spatial analyses of the 40,000 bronze weapons recovered with the Terracotta Warriors. Thanks to a holistic approach developed specifically for this project, it is possible to reveal remarkable aspects of the organisation of the Qin workforce in production cells, of the standardisation, efficiency and quality-control procedures employed, and of the sophisticated technical knowledge of the weapon-makers.

  18. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    An appropriate non-proliferation treaty should not discriminate among the non-weapon states, but should seek a cooperative approach with all countries seeking nuclear power and willing to accept international safeguards. Near-term proliferation problems, represented by nations already on the threshold of weapon capability, should not be confused with the long-term problem of world-wide nuclear development. The first can be handled with incentives and disincentives imposed on specific countries, while the latter involves the distribution of plutonium on the basis of alternative fuel cycles. To retain world leadership, U.S. efforts along these lines should be to encourage a dialogue between suppliers and recipients and to coordinate the economic and security issues of its own non-proliferation and foreign policies. One option is a U.S. commitment to a multinational fuel storage and reprocessing facility. Technical evaluation and demonstration of alternative fuel cycles to reach an international consensus would be a parallel activity

  19. Iran's nuclear program - for power generation or nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kippe, Halvor

    2008-11-01

    This report addresses the development of a nuclear infrastructure in Iran, and assessments are made on the near-term potential this infrastructure might yield of either nuclear power or nuclear arms production. The most significant facilities are treated in a more elaborate fashion, as these are assumed to have key roles in either a true civilian programme, or in the prospect of weapons-grade fissile material production. The future potential capacity for the latter is calculated under certain presumptions, both in the case that Iran focuses its efforts on uranium-based nuclear weapons, and in the case that it should choose the plutonium path to nuclear weapons. All the conclusions and findings in this report are based on technological considerations. This means that social or political assessments have not prevailed, rather the picture of Iran's nuclear programme is drawn through descriptions and assessments of facilities and systems, and their role in the bigger context. Definite conclusions have not been made as to whether Iran's nuclear programme currently is aimed towards nuclear arms or nuclear power. The secrecy surrounding some of the most prominent nuclear sites together with more or less credible allegations of purely weapons-related activities in the past, make it hard not to conclude that Iran until the disclosures in 2002 made as great an effort as it could on its way on developing nuclear weapons covertly. The scope of today's nuclear programme seems, on the other hand, most likely to be in part to help relieve the ever-increasing need for energy, although considerable deficits to this strategy are identified, at the same time as the Iranian people are united in a giant, high-prestige project in defiance of massive international pressure. Adding to this is a much-feared ability to rapidly being able to redirect their nuclear efforts, and develop nuclear arms in perhaps as little as one year. This so-called break-out scenario, where Iran presumably

  20. Environmental Information Document: L-reactor reactivation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackey, H.E. Jr.

    1982-04-01

    Purpose of this Environmental Information Document is to provide background for assessing environmental impacts associated with the renovation, restartup, and operation of L Reactor at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). SRP is a major US Department of Energy installation for the production of nuclear materials for national defense. The purpose of the restart of L Reactor is to increase the production of nuclear weapons materials, such as plutonium and tritium, to meet projected needs in the nuclear weapons program

  1. Environmental Information Document: L-reactor reactivation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mackey, H.E. Jr. (comp.)

    1982-04-01

    Purpose of this Environmental Information Document is to provide background for assessing environmental impacts associated with the renovation, restartup, and operation of L Reactor at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). SRP is a major US Department of Energy installation for the production of nuclear materials for national defense. The purpose of the restart of L Reactor is to increase the production of nuclear weapons materials, such as plutonium and tritium, to meet projected needs in the nuclear weapons program.

  2. A nuclear-weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia : problems and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alagappa, M.

    1987-01-01

    Although the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone was already recognised in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 and has been on the Asean agenda since the late 1970s as a component of the package to realise a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, the formal initiative to make the region a nuclear-weapons-free zone is of relatively recent origin. The security benefits that are likely to accrue from declaring Southeast Asia nuclear-weapons-free are rather marginal. Benefits, as there are, are in the political and diplomatic realm where the proposed agreement can be used to influence the conduct of international relations which in turn may have the potential to modify the strategic environment of Southeast Asia

  3. Military Munitions Waste Working Group report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This report presents the findings of the Military Munitions Waste Working Group in its effort to achieve the goals directed under the Federal Advisory Committee to Develop On-Site Innovative Technologies (DOIT Committee) for environmental restoration and waste management. The Military Munitions Waste Working Group identified the following seven areas of concern associated with the ordnance (energetics) waste stream: unexploded ordnance; stockpiled; disposed -- at known locations, i.e., disposal pits; discharged -- impact areas, unknown disposal sites; contaminated media; chemical sureties/weapons; biological weapons; munitions production; depleted uranium; and rocket motor and fuel disposal (open burn/open detonation). Because of time constraints, the Military Munitions Waste Working Group has focused on unexploded ordnance and contaminated media with the understanding that remaining waste streams will be considered as time permits. Contents of this report are as follows: executive summary; introduction; Military Munitions Waste Working Group charter; description of priority waste stream problems; shortcomings of existing approaches, processes and technologies; innovative approaches, processes and technologies, work force planning, training, and education issues relative to technology development and cleanup; criteria used to identify and screen potential demonstration projects; list of potential candidate demonstration projects for the DOIT committee decision/recommendation and appendices

  4. Military Munitions Waste Working Group report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-11-30

    This report presents the findings of the Military Munitions Waste Working Group in its effort to achieve the goals directed under the Federal Advisory Committee to Develop On-Site Innovative Technologies (DOIT Committee) for environmental restoration and waste management. The Military Munitions Waste Working Group identified the following seven areas of concern associated with the ordnance (energetics) waste stream: unexploded ordnance; stockpiled; disposed -- at known locations, i.e., disposal pits; discharged -- impact areas, unknown disposal sites; contaminated media; chemical sureties/weapons; biological weapons; munitions production; depleted uranium; and rocket motor and fuel disposal (open burn/open detonation). Because of time constraints, the Military Munitions Waste Working Group has focused on unexploded ordnance and contaminated media with the understanding that remaining waste streams will be considered as time permits. Contents of this report are as follows: executive summary; introduction; Military Munitions Waste Working Group charter; description of priority waste stream problems; shortcomings of existing approaches, processes and technologies; innovative approaches, processes and technologies, work force planning, training, and education issues relative to technology development and cleanup; criteria used to identify and screen potential demonstration projects; list of potential candidate demonstration projects for the DOIT committee decision/recommendation and appendices.

  5. Medical and industrial radiation sources as radiological weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bielefeld, T.; Fischer, H.W.

    2006-01-01

    The execution of attacks with radiological weapons are well within the capabilities of both local terrorist groups and transnational terrorist networks. In a research project, plausible attack scenarios have been developed, based on medical and industrial radioactive sources widely used in Germany. Special emphasis was put on how such sources could be obtained applying criminal tactics. To this end, working procedures in hospitals and companies have been analyzed. Furthermore, by means of simulations, the consequences of a terrorist attack using such sources were estimated. None of the scenarios we investigated led to doses at the site of the explosion which might cause acute radiation effects. However, in some scenarios, an attack would result in the necessity of a potentially very costly clean-up of large urban areas. Therefore, improvements in sources security are recommended. (orig.)

  6. Shipborne Laser Beam Weapon System for Defence against Cruise Missiles

    OpenAIRE

    J.P. Dudeja; G.S. Kalsey

    2000-01-01

    Sea-skim~ing cruise missiles pose the greatest threat to a surface ship in the present-day war scenario. The convenitional close-in-weapon-systems (CIWSs) are becoming less reliable against these new challenges requiring extremely fast reaction time. Naval Forces see a high energy laser as a feasible andjeffective directed energy weapon against sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles becauseof its .ability to deliver destructive energy at the speed of light on to a distant target. The paper com...

  7. Dangerous deterrent: nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paul Kapur, S.

    2008-01-01

    This book discusses the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and its effect on security of the South Asian region. The author uses quantitative analysis to establish the relationship between nuclearization and conventional stability in the region between 1971 and 2002. He shows a positive correlation between nuclear proliferation and conventional instability during these three decades. Thus, this study affirms that nuclear weapons have failed to prevent conflict in South Asia. In fact, they have escalated tensions

  8. Options for the destruction of chemical weapons and management of the associated risks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Manley, Ron G

    2006-09-01

    The destruction of chemical weapons is a hazardous operation. The degree of hazard posed, however, is not uniform and is dependent on the specific chemical agent and the configuration of the weapon or bulk storage vessel in which it is contained. For example, a highly volatile nerve agent in an explosively configured munition, such as a rocket, poses a very different hazard from that of a bulk storage container of viscous mustard gas. Equally the handling of recovered, often highly corroded, World War (WW)I or WWII chemical munitions will pose a very different hazard from that associated with dealing with modern chemical weapons stored under the appropriate conditions. Over the years, a number of technologies have been developed for the destruction of chemical weapons. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. None of them provide a universal solution to the problem. When assessing options for the destruction of these weapons and the management of the associated risks, therefore, it is important to give due consideration and weight to these differences. To ensure that the destruction technology selected takes due account of them and that the resulting overall risk assessment accurately reflects the actual risks involved.

  9. Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glauser, H

    2011-03-03

    Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

  10. Violence and weapon carrying in music videos. A content analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DuRant, R H; Rich, M; Emans, S J; Rome, E S; Allred, E; Woods, E R

    1997-05-01

    The positive portrayal of violence and weapon carrying in televised music videos is thought to have a considerable influence on the normative expectations of adolescents about these behaviors. To perform a content analysis of the depictions of violence and weapon carrying in music videos, including 5 genres of music (rock, rap, adult contemporary, rhythm and blues, and country), from 4 television networks and to analyze the degree of sexuality or eroticism portrayed in each video and its association with violence and weapon carrying, as an indicator of the desirability of violent behaviors. Five hundred eighteen videos were recorded during randomly selected days and times of the day from the Music Television, Video Hits One, Black Entertainment Television, and Country Music Television networks. Four female and 4 male observers aged 17 to 24 years were trained to use a standardized content analysis instrument. Interobserver reliability testing resulted in a mean (+/- SD) percentage agreement of 89.25% +/- 7.10% and a mean (+/- SD) kappa of 0.73 +/- 0.20. All videos were observed by rotating 2-person, male-female teams that were required to reach agreement on each behavior that was scored. Music genre and network differences in behaviors were analyzed with chi 2 tests. A higher percentage (22.4%) of Music Television videos portrayed overt violence than Video Hits One (11.8%), Country Music Television (11.8%), and Black Entertainment Television (11.5%) videos (P = .02). Rap (20.4%) had the highest portrayal of violence, followed by rock (19.8%), country (10.8%), adult contemporary (9.7%), and rhythm and blues (5.9%) (P = .006). Weapon carrying was higher on Music Television (25.0%) than on Black Entertainment Television (11.5%), Video Hits One (8.4%), and Country Music Television (6.9%) (P violence (P violence and weapon carrying, which is glamorized by music artists, actors, and actresses.

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

  14. Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  15. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-03-11

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  16. Sea-dumped chemical weapons: environmental risk, occupational hazard.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Greenberg, M I; Sexton, K J; Vearrier, D

    2016-01-01

    Chemical weapons dumped into the ocean for disposal in the twentieth century pose a continuing environmental and human health risk. In this review we discuss locations, quantity, and types of sea-dumped chemical weapons, related environmental concerns, and human encounters with sea-dumped chemical weapons. We utilized the Ovid (http://ovidsp.tx.ovid.com) and PubMed (http://www.pubmed.org) search engines to perform MEDLINE searches for the terms 'sea-dumped chemical weapons', 'chemical warfare agents', and 'chemical munitions'. The searches returned 5863 articles. Irrelevant and non-English articles were excluded. A review of the references for these articles yielded additional relevant sources, with a total of 64 peer-reviewed articles cited in this paper. History and geography of chemical weapons dumping at sea: Hundreds of thousands of tons of chemical munitions were disposed off at sea following World War II. European, Russian, Japanese, and United States coasts are the areas most affected worldwide. Several areas in the Baltic and North Seas suffered concentrated large levels of dumping, and these appear to be the world's most studied chemical warfare agent marine dumping areas. Chemical warfare agents: Sulfur mustard, Lewisite, and the nerve agents appear to be the chemical warfare agents most frequently disposed off at sea. Multiple other type of agents including organoarsenicals, blood agents, choking agents, and lacrimators were dumped at sea, although in lesser volumes. Environmental concerns: Numerous geohydrologic variables contribute to the rate of release of chemical agents from their original casings, leading to difficult and inexact modeling of risk of release into seawater. Sulfur mustard and the organoarsenicals are the most environmentally persistent dumped chemical agents. Sulfur mustard in particular has a propensity to form a solid or semi-solid lump with a polymer coating of breakdown products, and can persist in this state on the ocean floor

  17. Team confidence, motivated information processing, and dynamic group decision making

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    de Dreu, C.K.W.; Beersma, B.

    2010-01-01

    According to the Motivated Information Processing in Groups (MIP-G) model, groups should perform ambiguous (non-ambiguous) tasks better when they have high (low) epistemic motivation and concomitant tendencies to engage in systematic (heuristic) information processing and exchange. The authors

  18. 78 FR 55326 - Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-10

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8460] Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 AGENCY: Bureau of... Government has determined on August 2, pursuant to Section 306(a) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons...

  19. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with special reference to East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prawitz, J.

    1997-01-01

    The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone, as it has developed from political deliberation since mid-1950s, today covers a spectrum of arrangements, geographically ranging from whole continent like Latin America to a corridor in central Europe, and functionally serving the purposes of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and avoiding nuclear war. Among the nuclear-weapon-free zones proposed but not established, one is now being negotiated and two are subject to investigations published in official reports. These are the proposed zones in ASEAN area, The Middle East and Nordic Europe

  20. First fusion neutrons from a thermonuclear weapon device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    An account of the first observation of thermonuclear neutrons from a hydrogen weapon, the George shot, is presented. A personal narrative by the researchers J. Allred and L. Rosen includes such topics as the formation of the experimental team, description of the experimental technique, testing the experimental apparatus, testing the effects of a blast, a description of the test area, and the observation of neutrons from fusion. Excerpts are presented from several chapters of the Scientific Director's report on the atomic weapons tests of 1951. Also included is a brief description of the basic design of the hydrogen bomb, a recounting of subsequent developments, and short scientific biographies of the researchers. 21 figures, 2 tables

  1. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  2. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jing-dong, Yuan

    2010-07-01

    The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent

  3. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jing-dong, Yuan

    2010-01-01

    The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent deployment of the long

  4. The Neuropeptide Oxytocin Enhances Information Sharing and Group Decision Making Quality

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    De Wilde, T.R.W.; Ten Velden, F.S.; De Dreu, C.K.W.

    2017-01-01

    Groups can make better decisions than individuals when members cooperatively exchange and integrate their uniquely held information and insights. However, under conformity pressures group members are biased towards exchanging commonly known information, and away from exchanging unique information,

  5. The bioscience revolution & the biological weapons threat: levers & interventions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martin Greg

    2009-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract In December 2008, the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, released a report, World At Risk. The Report points to the fact that, not only is the use of a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist attack before the end of 2013, more likely than not, but also to the fact that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use biological weapons than nuclear. This paper examines the recommendations of the report in the context of the historic and geopolitical changes, in particular globalization. The authors highlight the "dual-use" dilemma, as described in the report, as the paradoxical use of technology developed for the benefit of mankind being used for sinister purposes. The mitigation of such a threat lies in broad stakeholder involvement and cooperation, including non-state actors, governments and the bio-tech industry itself. The importance of vigilance measures within the life science community is emphasized and, the authors propose, could include a web-based didactic course in bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction identification. The site could outline safety protocols, have detailed disaster management tutorials, and could be specifically tailored for different subsets of industry and health professionals. The paper concludes with an endorsement of a multi-pronged approach including strong international guidelines and intelligence cooperation and preparatory measures such as the wide-spread use of detection systems as well as diagnostic decision support systems for bioterrorism detection at the local level.

  6. Morality of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    34 Paul C. Szasz , “The International Law Concerning Weapons of Mass...downloaded 18 October 2009. Szasz , Paul C., “The International Law Concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction

  7. Group creativity and innovation: a motivated information processing perspective

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    de Dreu, C.K.W.; Nijstad, B.A.; Bechtoldt, M.N.; Baas, M.

    2011-01-01

    The authors review the Motivated Information Processing in Groups Model (De Dreu, Nijstad, & Van Knippenberg, 2008) to understand group creativity and innovation. Although distinct phenomena, group creativity and innovation are both considered a function of epistemic motivation (EM; the degree to

  8. Changing the Army’s Weapon Training Strategies to Meet Operational Requirements More Efficiently and Effectively

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-01-01

    psycho -motor skills. Other major weapon systems are more supported by technology and require crews or units collectively applying procedures rapidly and...Army can take to improve its train- ing and leader development management processes and architectures . The directions for improvement outlined in this...activity; (4) enhance ATLD and Army-wide information technology architectures to improve data collection and analysis; and (5) evolve emerging ATLD

  9. Interim storage of dismantled nuclear weapon components at the U.S. Department of Energy Pantex Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guidice, S.J.; Inlow, R.O.

    1995-01-01

    Following the events of 1989 and the subsequent cessation of production of new nuclear weapons by the US, the mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Weapons Complex has shifted from production to dismantlement of retired weapons. The sole site in the US for accomplishing the dismantlement mission is the DOE Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. Pending a national decision on the ultimate storage and disposition of nuclear components form the dismantled weapons, the storage magazines within the Pantex Plant are serving as the interim storage site for pits--the weapon plutonium-bearing component. The DOE has stipulated that Pantex will provide storage for up to 12,000 pits pending a Record of Decision on a comprehensive site-wide Environmental Impact Statement in November 1996

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  11. The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  12. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  14. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  15. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arsenault, J.E

    2008-09-15

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  16. Manhattan Project redux: Canada and the first atomic weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arsenault, J.E.

    2008-01-01

    Only three nuclear weapons produced by the Manhattan Project (MP) were used during World War II: Trinity Test, New Mexico on 16 July 1945, Hiroshima, Japan, on 6 August 1945, and Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945. Several sources and authors, including EM and RL (1967), Stacey (1970), Sanger (1981), and Buckley (2000), have written that it is unlikely that any Canadian uranium was used in the atomic weapons that ended WW II. These sources offer no detailed justification for their conclusion, nevertheless, after analysis of data contained in numerous sources, this article reaches a similar conclusion. (author)

  17. The neuropeptide oxytocin enhances information sharing and group decision making quality

    OpenAIRE

    De, Wilde T.R.W.; Ten, Velden F.S.; De, Dreu C.K.W.

    2017-01-01

    Groups can make better decisions than individuals when members cooperatively exchange and integrate their uniquely held information and insights. However, under conformity pressures group members are biased towards exchanging commonly known information, and away from exchanging unique information, thus undermining group decision-making quality. At the neurobiological level, conformity associates with the neuropeptide oxytocin. A double-blind placebo controlled study found no evidence for oxyt...

  18. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pitre, J; Chan, P; Dastur, A [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Mississauga, ON (Canada)

    1996-12-31

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs.

  19. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitre, J.; Chan, P.; Dastur, A.

    1995-01-01

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs

  20. Is there any future for nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heisbourg, F.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear weapons occupy a paradoxal place both in the collective imagination and in the historical reality: on the one hand everybody dreads the apocalypse horror, and on the other hand, dissuasion appears as an unchanging and quite comfortable situation. However, the world has become multipolar in this domain as well. The geopolitical map is reconstructing. Doctrinal revisions, initiatives against nuclear weapons proliferation, and nuclear disarmament measures are now on the agenda. The best foreign and French experts examine for the first time the consequences of these evolutions. They analyse in particular the split up risks and the potential consequences of a nuclear conflict in regions where atomic arms have become a key-component of the strategic landscape: Middle-Est, Far-East, Southern Asia. The choices France and its allies will have to face are examined as well. (J.S.)