Implementation of the United States/Russian HEU Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rutkowski, E

2003-01-01

During Calendar Year (CY) 2002, the Russian Federation (R.F.) delivered low enriched uranium (LEU) from the conversion and processing of 30 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade (90% 235 U assay) uranium. Through July 2003, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) will have monitored the conversion of over 190 MT HEU into LEU. This total represents about 38 percent of the projected 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the destruction of 7,600 nuclear devices. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) HEU-TIP monitors the processing of this HEU at four Russian uranium-processing plants. During CY 2002, United States (U.S.) personnel monitored this process for a total of 194 monitor-weeks by staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) located in Novouralsk, and through a series of five-day Special Monitoring Visits (SMV) to the four plants. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in-process containers, the observation of operations and non-destructive assay measurements (NDA) to determine 235 U enrichment, as well as the examination and validation of Russian Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) documents. In addition, the U.S. designed Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) installed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) in January 1999 monitored all HEU blended at that facility, which is about 50 percent of the HEU blended into LEU during CY 2002. Recently we installed a BDMS at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in Zelenogorsk and plans are underway to install a BDMS at the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) in Seversk in late 2004. On a very positive note, interpersonal interactions between U.S. and Russian technical experts continues to expand and have proven to be an important element of the transparency regime. On the tenth anniversary of the HEU Purchase Agreement, the Ministry of the R.F. for Atomic Energy (Minatom) also saluted the

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage and disposition program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arms, W.M.; Everitt, D.A.; O'Dell, C.L.

1995-01-01

Recent changes in international relations and other changes in national priorities have profoundly affected the management of weapons-usable fissile materials within the United States (US). The nuclear weapon stockpile reductions agreed to by the US and Russia have reduced the national security requirements for these fissile materials. National policies outlined by the US President seek to prevent the accumulation of nuclear weapon stockpiles of plutonium (Pu) and HEU, and to ensure that these materials are subjected to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. The purpose of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage and Disposition Program Plan is to define and establish a planned approach for storage of all HEU and disposition of surplus HEU in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Material Disposition Program. Elements Of this Plan, which are specific to HEU storage and disposition, include program requirements, roles and responsibilities, program activities (action plans), milestone schedules, and deliverables

Converting targets and processes for fission-product molybdenum-99 from high- to low-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Aase, S.

1999-01-01

Most of the world's supply of 99 Mo is produced by the fissioning of 235 U in high-enriched uranium targets (HEU, generally 93% 235 U). To reduce nuclear-proliferation concerns, the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor Program is working to convert the current HEU targets to low-enriched uranium (LEU, 235 U). Switching to LEU targets also requires modifying the separation processes. Current HEU processes can be classified into two main groups based on whether the irradiated target is dissolved in acid or base. Our program has been working on both fronts, with development of targets for acid-side processes being the furthest along. However, using an LEU metal foil target may allow the facile replacement of HEU for both acid and basic dissolution processes. Demonstration of the irradiation and 99 Mo separation processes for the LEU metal-foil targets is being done in cooperation with researchers at the Indonesian PUSPIPTEK facility. We are also developing LEU UO 2 /Al dispersion plates as substitutes for HEU UA1 x /A1 dispersion plates for base-side processes. Results show that conversion to LEU is technically feasible; working with producers is essential to lowering any economic penalty associated with conversion. (author)

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Oxide blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for commercial use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-09-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the oxide blending HEU disposition option. This option provides for a yearly HEU throughput of 1 0 metric tons (MT) of uranium metal with an average U235 assay of 50% blended with 165 MT of natural assay triuranium octoxide (U 3 O 8 ) per year to produce 177 MT of 4% U235 assay U 3 O 8 , for LWR fuel. Since HEU exists in a variety of forms and not necessarily in the form to be blended, worst case scenarios for preprocessing prior to blending will be assumed for HEU feed streams

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Oxide blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for commercial use

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the oxide blending HEU disposition option. This option provides for a yearly HEU throughput of 1 0 metric tons (MT) of uranium metal with an average U235 assay of 50% blended with 165 MT of natural assay triuranium octoxide (U{sub 3} O{sub 8}) per year to produce 177 MT of 4% U235 assay U{sub 3} O{sub 8}, for LWR fuel. Since HEU exists in a variety of forms and not necessarily in the form to be blended, worst case scenarios for preprocessing prior to blending will be assumed for HEU feed streams.

Overview of Russian HEU transparency issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kempf, C.R.; Bieniawski, A.

1993-01-01

The U.S. has signed an agreement with the Russian Federation for the purchase of 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled nuclear weapons. The HEU will be blended down to low-enriched uranium and will be transported to the U.S. to be used by fuel fabricators to make fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Both the U.S. and Russia have been preparing to institute transparency measures to provide assurance that nonproliferation and arms control objectives specified in the agreement are met. This paper provides background information on the original agreement and on subsequent negotiations with the Russians, as well as discussion of technical aspects of developing transparency measures suited to the facilities and processes which are expected to be involved. Transparency has been defined as those agreed-upon measures which build confidence that arms control and non-proliferation objectives shared by the parties are met. Transparency is a departure from exhaustive, detailed arms control verification regimes of past agreements, which were based on a presumption of detecting transgressions as opposed to confirming compliance

An update on the LEU target development and conversion program for the MAPLE reactors and new processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malkoske, G.R.; Eng, B.Sc; Eng, P.

2002-01-01

Historically, the production of molybdenum-99 in the NRU research reactors at Chalk River, Canada, has been extracted from reactor targets employing highly enriched uranium (HEU). A reliable supply of HEU metal from the United States used in the manufacture of targets for the NRU research reactor has been a key factor to enable MDS Nordion to develop a secure supply of medical isotopes for the international nuclear medicine community. The molybdenum extraction process from HEU targets provides predictable, consistent yields for our high-volume molybdenum production process. Each link of the isotope supply chain, from isotope production to ultimate use by the physician, has been established using this proven and established method of HEU target irradiation and processing to extract molybdenum-99. To ensure a continued reliable and timely supply of medical isotopes, MDS Nordion is completing the construction of two MAPLE reactors and a New Processing Facility. The design of the MAPLE facilities was based on an established process developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL)-extraction of isotopes from HEU target material. However, in concert with the global trend to utilize low enriched uranium (LEU) in research reactors, MDS Nordion has launched a three phase LEU Target Development and Conversion Program for the MAPLE facilities. Phase 1, the Initial Feasibility Study, which identified the technical issues to convert the MAPLE reactor targets from HEU to LEU for large scale commercial production was reported on at the RERTR-2000 conference. The second phase of the LEU Target Development and Conversion Program was developed with extensive consultation and involvement of experts knowledgeable in target development, process system design, enriched uranium conversion chemistry and commercial scale reactor operations and molybdenum production. This paper will provide an overview of the Phase 2 Conversion Development Program, report on progress to date, and further

The LEU target development and conversion program for the MAPLE reactors and new processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malkoske, G.R.

2002-01-01

Historically, the production of molybdenum-99 in the NRU research reactors at Chalk River, Canada has been extracted from reactor targets employing highly enriched uranium (HEU). A reliable supply of HEU metal from the United States used in the manufacture of targets for the NRU research reactor has been a key factor to enable MDS Nordion to develop a secure supply of medical isotopes for the international nuclear medicine community. The molybdenum extraction process from HEU targets provides predictable, consistent yields for our high-volume molybdenum production process. Each link of the isotope supply chain, from isotope production to ultimate use by the physician, has been established using this proven and established method of HEU target irradiation and processing to extract molybdenum-99. To ensure a continued reliable and timely supply of medical isotopes, MDS Nordion is completing the construction of two MAPLE reactors and a New Processing Facility. The design of the MAPLE facilities was based on an established process developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) - extraction of isotopes from HEU target material. However, in concert with the global trend to utilize low enriched uranium (LEU) in research reactors, MDS Nordion has launched a three phase LEU Target Development and Conversion Program for the MAPLE facilities. Phase 1, the Initial Feasibility Study, which identified the technical issues to convert the MAPLE reactor targets from HEU to LEU for large scale commercial production was reported on at the RERTR- 2000 conference. The second phase of the LEU Target Development and Conversion Program was developed with extensive consultation and involvement of experts knowledgeable in target development, process system design, enriched uranium conversion chemistry and commercial scale reactor operations and molybdenum production. This paper will provide an overview of the Phase 2 Conversion Development Program, report on progress to date, and further

The LEU target development and conversion program for the MAPLE reactors and new processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malkoske, G.R.

2003-01-01

The availability of isotope grade, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), from the United States for use in the manufacture of targets for molybdenum-99 production in AECL's NRU research reactor has been a key factor to enable MDS Nordion to develop a reliable, secure supply of medical isotopes for the international nuclear medicine community. The molybdenum extraction process from HEU targets is a proven and established method that has reliably produced medical isotopes for several decades. The HEU process provides predictable, consistent yields for our high-volume, molybdenum-99 production. Other medical isotopes such as I-131 and Xe-133, which play an important role in nuclear medicine applications, are also produced from irradiated HEU targets as a by-product of the molybdenum-99 process. To ensure a continued reliable and timely supply of medical isotopes, MDS Nordion is completing the commissioning of two MAPLE reactors and an associated isotope processing facility (the New Processing Facility). The new MAPLE facilities, which will be dedicated exclusively to medical isotope production, will provide an essential contribution to a secure, robust global healthcare system. Design and construction of these facilities has been based on a life cycle management philosophy for the isotope production process. This includes target irradiation, isotope extraction and waste management. The MAPLE reactors will operate with Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel, a significant contribution to the objectives of the RERTR program. The design of the isotope production process in the MAPLE facilities is based on an established process - extraction of isotopes from HEU target material. This is a proven technology that has been demonstrated over more than three decades of operation. However, in support of the RERTR program and in compliance with U.S. legislation, MDS Nordion has undertaken a LEU Target Development and Conversion Program for the MAPLE facilities. This paper will provide an

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU UNH for commercial use

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form that is more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UNH blending HEU disposition option. Process requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste/emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.

Certification of U.S. instrumentation in Russian nuclear processing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Powell, D.H.; Sumner, J.N.

2000-01-01

Agreements between the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) require the down-blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian Federation nuclear weapons. The Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) was jointly developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to continuously monitor the enrichments and flow rates in the HEU blending operations at the R.F. facilities. A significant requirement of the implementation of the BDMS equipment in R.F. facilities concerned the certification of the BDMS equipment for use in a Russian nuclear facility. This paper discusses the certification of the BDMS for installation in R.F. facilities, and summarizes the lessons learned from the process that can be applied to the installation of other U.S. equipment in Russian nuclear facilities

Detection of illicit HEU production in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants using neutron counting techniques on product cylinders

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Freeman, Corey R.; Geist, William H.

2010-01-01

Innovative and novel safeguards approaches are needed for nuclear energy to meet global energy needs without the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. Part of these efforts will include creating verification techniques that can monitor uranium enrichment facilities for illicit production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Passive nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques will be critical in preventing illicit HEU production because NDA offers the possibility of continuous and unattended monitoring capabilities with limited impact on facility operations. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) are commonly used to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactor fuel. In a GCEP, gaseous UF 6 spins at high velocities in centrifuges to separate the molecules containing 238 U from those containing the lighter 235 U. Unfortunately, the process for creating LEU is inherently the same as HEU, creating a proliferation concern. Insuring that GCEPs are producing declared enrichments poses many difficult challenges. In a GCEP, large cascade halls operating thousands of centrifuges work together to enrich the uranium which makes effective monitoring of the cascade hall economically prohibitive and invasive to plant operations. However, the enriched uranium exiting the cascade hall fills product cylinders where the UF 6 gas sublimes and condenses for easier storage and transportation. These product cylinders hold large quantities of enriched uranium, offering a strong signal for NDA measurement. Neutrons have a large penetrability through materials making their use advantageous compared to gamma techniques where the signal is easily attenuated. One proposed technique for detecting HEU production in a GCEP is using neutron coincidence counting at the product cylinder take off stations. This paper discusses findings from Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) code simulations that examine the feasibility of such a detector.

Sealing of process valves for the HEU downblending verification experiment at Portsmouth

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baldwin, G.T.; Bartberger, J.C.; Jenkins, C.D.; Perlinski, A.W.; Schoeneman, J.L.; Gordon, D.M.; Whiting, N.E.; Bonner, T.N.; Castle, J.M.

1998-01-01

At the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio, USA, excess inventory of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from US defense programs is being diluted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial use. The conversion is subject to a Verification Experiment overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Verification Experiment is making use of monitoring technologies developed and installed by several DOE laboratories. One of the measures is a system for sealing valves in the process piping, which secures the path followed by uranium hexafluoride gas (UF 6 ) from cylinders at the feed stations to the blend point, where the HEU is diluted with LEU. The Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS) was the alternative proposed by Sandia National Laboratories that was selected by the IAEA. Approximately 30 valves were sealed by the IAEA using AIMS fiber-optic seals (AFOS). The seals employ single-core plastic fiber rated to 125 C to withstand the high-temperature conditions of the heated piping enclosures at Portsmouth. Each AFOS broadcasts authenticated seal status and state-of-health messages via a tamper-protected radio-frequency transmitter mounted outside of the heated enclosure. The messages are received by two collection stations, operated redundantly

Development of dissolution process for metal foil target containing low enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Srinivasan, B.; Hutter, J.C.; Johnson, G.K.; Vandegrift, G.F.

1994-01-01

About six times more low enriched uranium (LEU) metal is needed to produce the same quantity of 99 Mo as from a high enriched uranium (HEU) oxide target, under similar conditions of neutron irradiation. In view of this, the post-irradiation processing procedures of the LEU target are likely to be different from the Cintichem process procedures now in use for the HEU target. The authors have begun a systematic study to develop modified procedures for LEU target dissolution and 99 Mo separation. The dissolution studies include determination of the dissolution rate, chemical state of uranium in the solution, and the heat evolved in the dissolution reaction. From these results the authors conclude that a mixture of nitric and sulfuric acid is a suitable dissolver solution, albeit at higher concentration of nitric acid than in use for the HEU targets. Also, the dissolver vessel now in use for HEU targets is inadequate for the LEU target, since higher temperature and higher pressure will be encountered in the dissolution of LEU targets. The desire is to keep the modifications to the Cintichem process to a minimum, so that the switch from HEU to LEU can be achieved easily

Uranium management activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jackson, D.; Marshall, E.; Sideris, T.; Vasa-Sideris, S.

2001-01-01

One of the missions of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Office (ORO) has been the management of the Department's uranium materials. This mission has been accomplished through successful integration of ORO's uranium activities with the rest of the DOE complex. Beginning in the 1980's, several of the facilities in that complex have been shut down and are in the decommissioning process. With the end of the Cold War, the shutdown of many other facilities is planned. As a result, inventories of uranium need to be removed from the Department facilities. These inventories include highly enriched uranium (HEU), low enriched uranium (LEU), normal uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). The uranium materials exist in different chemical forms, including metals, oxides, solutions, and gases. Much of the uranium in these inventories is not needed to support national priorities and programs. (author)

2009 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU Transparency Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Radev, R.

2010-01-01

During the 2009 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program for external and internal radiation protection. LLNL also provided technical expertise related to BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance. For the calendar year 2009, there were 159 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors. Of the 159 person-trips, 149 person-trips were SMVs and 10 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips. There were 4 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 10 to UEIE itself. LLNL's Hazard Control Department laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency monitors. In 2009, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE. The HEU Transparency Program now has over fifteen years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives.

Fluxes at experiment facilities in HEU and LEU designs for the FRM-II

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hanan, N. A.

1998-01-01

An Alternative LEU Design for the FRM-II proposed by the RERTR Program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has a compact core consisting of a single fuel element that uses LEU silicide fuel with a uranium density of 4.5 g/cm 3 and has a power level of 32 MW. Both the HEU design by the Technical University of Munich (TUM) and the alternative LEU design by ANL have the same fuel lifetime(50 days) and the same neutron flux performance (8 x 10 14 n/cm 2 -s in the reflector). LEU silicide fuel with 4.5 g/cm 3 has been thoroughly tested and is fully-qualified, licensable, and available now for use in a high flux reactor such as the FRM-II. Several issues that were raised by TUM have been addressed in Refs. 1-3. The conclusions of these analyses are summarized below. This paper addresses four additional issues that have been raised in several forums, including Ref 4: heat generation in the cold neutron source (CNS), the gamma and fast neutron fluxes which are components of the reactor noise in neutron scattering experiments in the experiment hall of the reactor, a fuel cycle length difference, and the reactivity worth of the beam tubes and other experiment facilities. The results show that: (a) for the same thermal neutron flux, the neutron and gamma heating in the CNS is smaller in the LEU design than in the HEU design, and cold neutron fluxes as good or better than those of the HEU design can be obtained with the LEU design; (b) the gamma and fast neutron components of the reactor noise in the experiment hall are about the same in both designs; (c) the fuel cycle length is 50 days for both designs; and (d) the absolute value of the reactivity worth of the beam tubes and other experiment facilities is smaller in the LEU design, allowing its fuel cycle length to be increased to 53 or 54 days. Based on the excellent results for the Alternative LEU Design that were obtained in all analyses, the RERTR Program reiterates its conclusion that there are no major technical

HEU to LEU conversion experience at the UMass-Lowell research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

White, John R.; Bobek, Leo M.

2005-01-01

The UMass-Lowell Research Reactor (UMLRR) operated safely with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for over 25 years. Having reached the end of core lifetime and due to proliferation concerns, the reactor was recently converted to low-enriched uranium silicide (LEU) fuel. The actual process for converting the UMLRR from HEU to LEU fuel covered a period of over 15 years. The conversion effort - from the initial conceptual design studies in the late 1980s to the final offsite shipment of the spent HEU fuel in August 2004 - was a unique experience for the faculty and staff of a small university research reactor. This paper gives a historical view of the process and it highlights several key milestones along the road to successful completion of this project. (author)

Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Pu from nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neff, T.L.

1992-01-01

Last year, as the Soviet Union began to crumble and the Bush-Gorbachev talks had advanced to consider the dismantling of actual warheads instead of mere delivery systems, Dr. Thomas L. Neff, a senior member of MIT's Center for International Studies, tinkered with the notion that one day soon the US could be buying Russian uranium from scrapped nuclear arms. He also considered the costly business of dismantlement and set to work on an ingenious proposal. The basic idea was simply to purchase the HEU from Russia using funds derived from savings in the US Department of Energy's enrichment enterprise. The proposal, now part of an umbrella agreement between the US and Russia announced in early September, promises large strategic benefits for the US in terms of both financing dismantlement (to the tune of $100 million annually), as well as political oversight for the operation itself. In the words of Dr. Neff, who made briefings to both governments on the proposal, open-quotes It's a budget-neutral, win-win solution.close quotes What follows is an illustrated, step-by-step analysis of the proposal, as well as a reprint of Dr. Neff's paper, Disposition of HEU and Pu from Nuclear Weapons, as presented to the Uranium Institute's annual symposium last month

HEU Holdup Measurements on 321-M A-Lathe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dewberry, R.A.

2002-01-01

The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division (FDD) of the Savannah River Site to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. The 321-M facility was used to fabricate enriched uranium fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the production reactors. The results of the holdup assays are essential for determining compliance with the solid waste Waste Acceptance Criteria, Material Control and Accountability, and to meet criticality safety controls. Three measurement systems were used to determine highly enriched uranium (HEU) holdup. This report covers holdup measurements on the A-Lathe that was used to machine uranium-aluminum-alloy (U-Al). Our results indicated that the lathe contained more than the limits stated in the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for the solid waste E-Area Vaults. Thus the lathe was decontaminated three times and assayed four times in order to bring the amounts of uranium to an acceptable content. This report will discuss the methodology, Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) measurements, and results of the U-235 holdup on the lathe

A conversion development program to LEU targets for medical isotope production in the MAPLE Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malkoske, G.R.

2000-01-01

Historically, the production of molybdenum-99 in the NRU research reactors at Chalk River, Canada has been extracted from reactor targets employing highly enriched uranium (HEU). The molybdenum extraction process from the HEU targets provided predictable, consistent yields for our high-volume molybdenum production process. A reliable supply of HEU for the NRU research reactor targets has enabled MDS Nordion to develop a secure chain of medical isotope supply for the international nuclear medicine community. Each link of the isotope supply chain, from isotope production to patient application, has been established on a proven method of HEU target irradiation and processing. To ensure a continued reliable and timely supply of medical isotopes, the design of the MAPLE facilities was based on our established process - extraction of isotopes from HEU target material. However, in concert with the global trend to utilize low enriched uranium (LEU) in research reactors, MDS Nordion has launched a program to convert the MAPLE facilities to LEU targets. An initial feasibility study was initiated to identify the technical issues to convert the MAPLE targets from HEU to LEU. This paper will present the results of the feasibility study. It will also describe future challenges and opportunities in converting the MAPLE facilities to LEU targets for large scale, commercial medical isotope production. (author)

2011 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU transparency Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Radev, R.

2012-01-01

During the 2008 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program for external and internal radiation protection. They also provided technical expertise related to BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance. For the calendar year 2008, there were 158 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors. Of the 158 person-trips, 148 person-trips were SMVs and 10 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips. There were 6 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 8 to UEIE itself. There were three monitoring visits (source changes) that were back-to-back with a total of 24 monitors. LLNL's Hazard Control Department laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency monitors. In 2008, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE. The HEU Transparency now has thirteen years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives.

HEU Measurements of Holdup and Recovered Residue in the Deactivation and Decommissioning Activities of the 321-M Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DEWBERRY, RAYMOND; SALAYMEH, SALEEM R.; CASELLA, VITO R.; MOORE, FRANK S.

2005-03-11

This paper contains a summary of the holdup and material control and accountability (MC&A) assays conducted for the determination of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of Building 321-M at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The 321-M facility was the Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility at SRS and was used to fabricate HEU fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the SRS production reactors. The facility operated for more than 35 years. During this time thousands of uranium-aluminum-alloy (U-Al) production reactor fuel tubes were produced. After the facility ceased operations in 1995, all of the easily accessible U-Al was removed from the building, and only residual amounts remained. The bulk of this residue was located in the equipment that generated and handled small U-Al particles and in the exhaust systems for this equipment (e.g., Chip compactor, casting furnaces, log saw, lathes A & B, cyclone separator, Freon{trademark} cart, riser crusher, ...etc). The D&D project is likely to represent an important example for D&D activities across SRS and across the Department of Energy weapons complex. The Savannah River National Laboratory was tasked to conduct holdup assays to quantify the amount of HEU on all components removed from the facility prior to placing in solid waste containers. The U-235 holdup in any single component of process equipment must not exceed 50 g in order to meet the container limit. This limit was imposed to meet criticality requirements of the low level solid waste storage vaults. Thus the holdup measurements were used as guidance to determine if further decontamination of equipment was needed to ensure that the quantity of U-235 did not exceed the 50 g limit and to ensure that the waste met the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) of the solid waste storage vaults. Since HEU is an accountable nuclear material, the holdup assays and assays of recovered

Technology for down-blending weapons grade uranium into commercial reactor-usable uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arbital, J.G.; Snider, J.D.

1996-01-01

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used in nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching the uranium isotope 235 U from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by permanently diluting the concentration of the 235 U isotope, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope re-enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended, low-enriched uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel. The DOE has evaluated three candidate processes for down blending surplus HEU. These candidate processes are: (1) uranium hexafluoride blending; (2) molten uranium metal blending; and (3) uranyl nitrate solution blending. This paper describes each of these candidate processes. It also compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each process with respect to: (1) the various forms and compounds of HEU comprising the surplus inventory, (2) the use of down-blended product as commercial reactor fuel, or (3) its disposal as waste

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BLEND DOWN PROGRAM AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE PRESENT AND FUTURE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Magoulas, V; Charles Goergen, C; Ronald Oprea, R

2008-01-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) entered into an Interagency Agreement to transfer approximately 40 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to TVA for conversion to fuel for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. Savannah River Site (SRS) inventories included a significant amount of this material, which resulted from processing spent fuel and surplus materials. The HEU is blended with natural uranium (NU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) with a 4.95% 235U isotopic content and shipped as solution to the TVA vendor. The HEU Blend Down Project provided the upgrades needed to achieve the product throughput and purity required and provided loading facilities. The first blending to low enriched uranium (LEU) took place in March 2003 with the initial shipment to the TVA vendor in July 2003. The SRS Shipments have continued on a regular schedule without any major issues for the past 5 years and are due to complete in September 2008. The HEU Blend program is now looking to continue its success by dispositioning an additional approximately 21 MTU of HEU material as part of the SRS Enriched Uranium Disposition Project

Coordination Between the HEU Transparency Program and the Material Protection, Control and Accountability Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glaser, J.; Hernandez, J.; Dougherty, D.; Bieniawski, A.; Cahalane, P.; Mastal, E.

2000-01-01

DOE sponsored programs such as Material Protection Control and Accountability (MPC and A) and implementation of the Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program send US personnel into Russian nuclear facilities and receive Russian representatives from these programs. While there is overlap in the Russian nuclear facilities visited by these two programs, there had not been any formal mechanism to share information between them. Recently, an MPC and A/HEU Working Group was developed to facilitate the sharing of appropriate information and to address concerns expressed by Minatom and Russian facility personnel such as US visit scheduling conflicts. This paper discusses the goals of the Working Group and ways it has helped to allow the programs to work more efficiently with the Russian facilities

CONCEPTUAL PROCESS DESCRIPTION FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM-MOLYBDENUM FUEL

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Daniel M. Wachs; Curtis R. Clark; Randall J. Dunavant

2008-02-01

The National Nuclear Security Agency Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is tasked with minimizing the use of high-enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide. A key component of that effort is the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program, previously known as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program was initiated in 1978 by the United States Department of Energy to develop the nuclear fuels necessary to enable these conversions. The program cooperates with the research reactors’ operators to achieve this goal of HEU to LEU conversion without reduction in reactor performance. The programmatic mandate is to complete the conversion of all civilian domestic research reactors by 2014. These reactors include the five domestic high-performance research reactors (HPRR), namely: the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory, the National Bureau of Standards Reactor at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Missouri University Research Reactor at the University of Missouri–Columbia, and the MIT Reactor-II at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Characteristics for each of the HPRRs are given in Appendix A. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program is currently engaged in the development of a novel nuclear fuel that will enable these conversions. The fuel design is based on a monolithic fuel meat (made from a uranium-molybdenum alloy) clad in Al-6061 that has shown excellent performance in irradiation testing. The unique aspects of the fuel design, however, necessitate the development and implementation of new fabrication techniques and, thus, establishment of the infrastructure to ensure adequate fuel fabrication capability. A conceptual fabrication process description and rough estimates of the total facility throughput are described in this document as a basis for

Candidate processes for diluting the 235U isotope in weapons-capable highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Snider, J.D.

1996-02-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile 235 U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile 235 U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel

Assessment of the effectiveness of personal visual observation as a safeguards measure in a uranium enrichment facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohno, Fubito; Okamoto, Tsuyoshi; Yokochi, Akira; Nidaira, Kazuo

2003-01-01

In a centrifuge enrichment facility, a cascade that produces low enriched uranium is composed of a large number of UF 6 gas centrifuges interconnected with pipes. It is possible to divert the cascade to the illegal production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by changing the piping arrangement within the cascade. If integrated type centrifuges that contain a few tens of advanced centrifuges are introduced into the facility, the number of pipes will greatly decrease. The smaller the number of pipes, the less the labor required to change the piping arrangement. Because personal visual observation by an inspector is considered as one of measures against changing the piping arrangement, its effectiveness is assessed in this study. First, a model centrifuge enrichment facility that has a capacity of 2,400 ton-SWU/y is designed. In this model facility, integrated type centrifuges that contain advanced centrifuges are installed. Second, the diversion path analysis is carried out for the model facility under the assumption that a facility operator's goal is to produce 75 kg of HEU with 20% enrichment in a month. The analysis shows that, in our assumed diversion path, changes of the piping arrangement can be certainly detected by personal visual observation of a part of pipes connected with integrated type centrifuges that compose the cascade diverted to the HEU production. Finally, inspections in a cascade area are modeled as two-person noncooperative games between the inspector and the facility operator. As a result, it is found that all the cascades in the model facility will be investigated if the inspector can devote the inspection effort of 0.83 man-day per month to personal visual observation in the cascade area. Therefore, it is suggested that personal visual observation of the piping arrangement is worth carrying out in a uranium enrichment facility where integrated type centrifuges that contain advanced centrifuges are installed. (author)

Foreign research reactor uranium supply program: The Y-12 national security complex process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nelson, T.; Eddy, B.G.

2010-01-01

The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the HEU Disposition Program, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, and the United States FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program. The Y-12 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign governments for the supply of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. This program supports the important U.S. government and nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to LEU fuel under the guidance of the NNSA RERTR Program. In conjunction with the FRR SNF Acceptance Program which supports the global nonproliferation efforts to disposition U.S.-origin HEU, the Y-12 FRR Uranium Supply Program can provide the LEU for the replacement fuel fabrication. In addition to feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 supplies LEU for target fabrication for medical isotope production. The Y-12 process uses supply forecasting tools, production improvements and efficient delivery preparations to successfully support the global research reactor community

The Impact of Climatological Conditions on Low Enriched Uranium Loading Station Operations for the HEU Blend Down Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chang, R.C.

2002-01-01

A computer model was developed using COREsim to perform a time motion study for the Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Loading Station operations. The project is to blend Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) with Natural Uranium (NU) to produce LEU to be shipped to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for further processing. To cope with a project cost reduction, the LEU Loading Station concept has changed from an enclosed building with air-conditioning to a partially enclosed building without air conditioning. The LEU Loading Station is within a radiological contaminated area; two pairs of coveralls and negative pressure respirator are required. As a result, inclement weather conditions, especially heat stress, will affect and impact the LEU loading operations. The purposes of the study are to determine the climatological impacts on LEU Loading operations, resources required for committed throughputs, and to find out the optimum process pathways for multi crews working simultaneously in the space-lim ited LEU Loading Station

RERTR end-game: A win-win framework. Phasing out remaining global HEU commerce by conditionally and temporarily renewing U.S. exports of HEU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

1997-01-01

The RERTR program stands on the brink of fulfilling its historic mission. However, a series of missteps and misunderstandings have recently raised the risk that defeat will be snatched from the jaws of victory. Perhaps the most serious threat to the RERTR regime is posed by France's pending import of 625 kilograms of bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia, intended primarily to fuel its high-flux research reactor at the Institute Laue-Langevin in Grenoble, as well as its Orphee research reactor. As the first export of HEU from Russia to a facility outside the former Soviet bloc, this precedential transaction would establish Russia as a new global supplier of bomb-grade uranium, potentially setting the stage for a rise in international HEU commerce, rather than its phase-out as envisioned under the RERTR program. Apparently, France turned to Russia for supply of the fuel because the United States was perceived as unable or unwilling to continue supplying such fuel in the wake of the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 1992, which, pursuant to its so-called Schumer Amendment, places sharp restrictions on HEU exports. Unexplained delays in Russia's shipment of this material to France provide a fortuitous window of opportunity in which efforts can and should be made by France and the United States to resolve present differences in a manner beneficial to each, as well as in the interest of global security. This paper proposes an arrangement under which the United States would renew exports of HEU to France, in exchange for pledges from France enabling the export to comply with the principles and objectives of the RERTR program as embodied in U.S. law. In so doing, the arrangement would obviate the need for Russian HEU export, thereby avoiding its dangerous precedent. By enabling high quality scientific research to continue, while simultaneously helping to fulfill the RERTR program's original goal, such an arrangement would truly be a 'win-win' solution. (author)

The Mailbox Computer System for the IAEA verification experiment on HEU downblending at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aronson, A.L.; Gordon, D.M.

2000-01-01

IN APRIL 1996, THE UNITED STATES (US) ADDED THE PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT TO THE LIST OF FACILITIES ELIGIBLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS. AT THAT TIME, THE US PROPOSED THAT THE IAEA CARRY OUT A ''VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT'' AT THE PLANT WITH RESPECT TO DOOWNBLENDING OF ABOUT 13 METRIC TONS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE FORM OF URANIUM HEXAFLUROIDE (UF6). DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1997 THROUGH JULY 1998, THE IAEA CARRIED OUT THE REQUESTED VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT. THE VERIFICATION APPROACH USED FOR THIS EXPERIMENT INCLUDED, AMONG OTHER MEASURES, THE ENTRY OF PROCESS-OPERATIONAL DATA BY THE FACILITY OPERATOR ON A NEAR-REAL-TIME BASIS INTO A ''MAILBOX'' COMPUTER LOCATED WITHIN A TAMPER-INDICATING ENCLOSURE SEALED BY THE IAEA

A level-playing field for medical isotope production - How to phase-out reliance on HEU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuperman, A.J.

1999-01-01

Two decades ago, civilian commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use as targets in the production of medical isotopes was considered a relatively minor security concern for three reasons. First, the number of producers was small. Second, the amount of HEU involved was small. Third, the amount of HEU was dwarfed by the quantities of HEU in civilian commerce as fuel for nuclear research and test reactors. Now, however, all three variables have changed. First, as the use of medical isotopes has expanded rapidly, production programs are proliferating. Second, as the result of such new producers and the expansion of existing production facilities, the amounts of HEU involved are growing. Third, as the RERTR program has facilitated the phase-out of HEU as fuel in most research and test reactors, the quantities of HEU for isotope production have come to represent a significant percentage of global commerce in this weapons-usable material. Medical isotope producers in several states are cooperating with the RERTR program to convert to low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets within the next few years, and one already relies on LEU for isotope production. However, the three biggest isotope producers - in Canada and the European Union - continue to rely on HEU, creating a double-standard that endangers the goal of the RERTR program. Each of these three producers has expressed economic concerns about being put at a competitive disadvantage if it alone converts. This paper proposes forging a firmer international consensus that all present and future isotope producers should convert to LEU, and calls for codifying such a commitment in a statement of intent to be prepared by producers over the next year. With such a level playing field, no producer would need fear being put at a competitive disadvantage by conversion, or being stigmatized by pressure groups for continued reliance on HEU. The phase-out of all HEU commerce for isotope production could be achieved within about

Production, inventories and HEU in the world uranium market: Production's vital role

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Underhill, D.H.

1997-01-01

This paper analyses recent uranium supply and demand relationship and projects supply through 2010. The extremely depressed record low market prices have led to the ongoing annual inventory drawdown of over 25,000 t U resulting from the current 45% world production shortfall. The policy of the European Union and anti-dumping related activities in the USA are restricting imports of uranium from CIS producers to a majority of the world's nuclear utilities. These factors are reducing low priced uranium supply and forcing buyers to again obtain more of their requirements from producers. It discusses how the sale of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) produced from of 550 t High Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Russia and Ukraine could potentially supply about 15% of world requirements through 2010. However, legislation currently being developed by the US Congress may ration the sale of this material, extending the LEU supply well into the next century. Nuclear generation capacity and its uranium requirements are projected to grow at about 1.5% through 2010. Demand for new uranium purchases is however, increasing at the much higher rate of 25-30% over the next 10-15 years. This increasing demand in the face of decreasing supply is resulting in a market recovery in which the spot price for non-CIS produced uranium has risen over 25% since October 1994. Prices will continue to increase as the market equilibrium shifts from a balance with alternative excess low priced supply to an equilibrium between production and demand. 19 refs, 14 figs, 2 tabs

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UF6 blending alternative to produce LEU UF6 for commercial use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials; the nuclear material will be converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed; blending as UF 6 to produce a UF 6 product for commercial use is one of them. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UF 6 blending HEU disposition option. Resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed

Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mo, S.C.; Hanan, N.A.; Matos, J.E.

2004-01-01

The FRM-II reactor design of the Technical University of Munich has a compact core that utilizes fuel plates containing highly-enriched uranium (HEU, 93%). This paper presents an alternative core design utilizing low-enriched uranium (LEU, 3 that provides nearly the same neutron flux for experiments as the HEU design, but has a less favourable fuel cycle economy. If an LEU fuel with a uranium density of 6.0 - 6.5 g/cm 3 . were developed, the alternative design would provide the same neutron flux and use the same number of cores per year as the HEU design. The results of this study show that there are attractive possibilities for using LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in the FRM-II. Further optimization of the LEU design and near-term availability of LEU fuel with a uranium density greater than 4.8 g/cm 3 would enhance the performance of the LEU core. The REKIR Program is ready to exchange information with the Technical University of Munich to resolve any differences that may exist and to identify design modifications that would optimize reactor performance utilizing LEU fuel. (author)

Department of Energy HEU ES and H vulnerability assessment, Savannah River Site, Site Assessment Team report. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geddes, R.L.; Barone, A.; Shook, H.E. Varner, C.E.; Rollins, R.

1996-01-01

This report fulfills the directive issued by the Secretary of Energy on February 22, 1996 to complete a comprehensive assessment of potential vulnerabilities associated with the management of highly enriched uranium (HEU) throughout the DOE complex. In a subsequent letter instruction, the DOE-SR Field Office formally directed WSRC to conduct an assessment of the HEU materials at SRS. The term ''ES and H vulnerabilities'' is defined for the purpose of this assessment to mean conditions or weaknesses that could lead to unnecessary or increased exposure of workers or the public to radiation or to HEU-associated chemical hazards, or to the release of radioactive materials to the environment. The assessment will identify and prioritize ES and H vulnerabilities, and will serve as an information base for identifying corrective actions for the safe management of HEU. Primary facilities that hold HEU at SRS are H-Canyon, K-Reactor assembly area, K, L, and P-Reactor disassembly basins, and the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF)

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UF{sub 6} blending alternative to produce LEU UF{sub 6} for commercial use

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials; the nuclear material will be converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed; blending as UF{sub 6} to produce a UF{sub 6} product for commercial use is one of them. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UF{sub 6} blending HEU disposition option. Resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.

Passive Time Coincidence Measurements with HEU and DU Metal Castings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McConchie, Seth M.; Hausladen, Paul; Mihalczo, John T.; Wright, Michael C.; Archer, Daniel E.

2008-01-01

A Department of Energy sponsored Oak Ridge National Laboratory/Y-12 National Security Complex program of passive time coincidence measurements has been initiated at Y-12 to evaluate the ability to determine the presence of high enriched uranium (HEU) and distinguish it from depleted uranium (DU). This program uses the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) without an active interrogation source. Previous passive NMIS measurements with Pu metal and Pu oxide have been successful in determining the Pu mass, assuming a known 240Pu content. The spontaneous fission of uranium metal is considerably lower than Pu and measurements of this type have been performed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This work presents results of measurements of HEU and DU metal castings using moderated 3He detectors.

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) politics: An enigma wrapped up in a warhead and boxed in political chaos

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1993-01-01

It could be fairly said that while the Cold War arose in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and hostility, it is ending with an equal amount of confusion and uncertainty. More than a year has passed since the US and Russia signed a tentative HEU agreement in August 1992. Many of the details have been worked out, but major questions remain. And they're not just on the Russian side. The fine points of President Clinton's overall nuclear policy are only now beginning to emerge. In his first major foreign policy address, before the United Nations in late September, Clinton called for a worldwide ban on the production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. open-quotes Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations,close quotes said Clinton before the UN. open-quotes We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever.close quotes As the veil lifts from Clinton's nuclear policy, it appears the Administration realizes that Russia may have more HEU than originally thought. That possibility has been confirmed by Minatom Minister Mikhailov's disclosures to the NUKEM Market Report, which brought a greater degree of certainty to estimates that had been floating around for some time. When the Bush Administration signed the HEU pact, it apparently thought the 500 metric tons comprised most of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Now that the number appears higher, Clinton may propose to accelerate and enlarge the HEU deal. He is due to summit with Yeltsin, if Yeltsin survives, next spring. The 500-metric-ton deal may only be the first step

Neutronic performance of a 14 MW TRIGA reactor: LEU vs HEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Cornella, R.J.

1983-01-01

A primary objective of the US Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program is to develop means for replacing, wherever possible, currently used highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel ( 235 U enrichment > 90%) with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel ( 235 U enrichment < 20%) without significantly degrading the performance of research and test reactors. The General Atomic Company has developed a low-enriched but high uranium content Er-U-ZrH/sub 1.6/ fuel to enable the conversion of TRIGA reactors (and others) from HEU to LEU. One possible application is to the water-moderated 14 MW TRIGA Steady State Reactor (SSR) at the Romanian Institute for Nuclear Power Reactors. The work reported here was undertaken for the purpose of comparing the neutronic performance of the SSR for HEU fuel with that for LEU fuel. In order to make these relative comparisons as valid as possible, identical methods and models were used for the neutronic calculations

Continuing investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched uranium] targets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

1987-01-01

Currently much of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is produced from 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or zircaloy. Included is a cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminium alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent 99 Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to 1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and 2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved. (Author)

ORSPHERE: CRITICAL, BARE, HEU(93.2)-METAL SPHERE

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Margaret A. Marshall

2013-09-01

In the early 1970’s Dr. John T. Mihalczo (team leader), J.J. Lynn, and J.R. Taylor performed experiments at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (called Oak Ridge Alloy or ORALLOY) in an attempt to recreate GODIVA I results with greater accuracy than those performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1950’s (HEU-MET-FAST-001). The purpose of the Oak Ridge ORALLOY Sphere (ORSphere) experiments was to estimate the unreflected and unmoderated critical mass of an idealized sphere of uranium metal corrected to a density, purity, and enrichment such that it could be compared with the GODIVA I experiments. “The very accurate description of this sphere, as assembled, establishes it as an ideal benchmark for calculational methods and cross-section data files.” (Reference 1) While performing the ORSphere experiments care was taken to accurately document component dimensions (±0. 0001 in. for non-spherical parts), masses (±0.01 g), and material data The experiment was also set up to minimize the amount of structural material in the sphere proximity. A three part sphere was initially assembled with an average radius of 3.4665 in. and was then machined down to an average radius of 3.4420 in. (3.4425 in. nominal). These two spherical configurations were evaluated and judged to be acceptable benchmark experiments; however, the two experiments are highly correlated.

Conversion of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute nuclear reactor to low enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newton, T.H. Jr.

1991-01-01

The Training Reactor was converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) aluminide fuel in 1988 and 1989. Tests on the Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) core and LEU cores were performed and comparisons made. The testing consisted of critical loading, thermal neutron flux distribution, excess reactivity, regulating blade reactivity worth, and temperature coefficient of reactivity measurement. Comparisons between the LEU and HEU showed that the critical loading configurations were somewhat different with the HEU core consisting of 24 elements and the LEU core consisting of 21 1/3 elements with excess reactivities of 0.24% ΔK/K for the HEU and 0.16% for the LEU. Thermal neutron flux distributions showed similar trends in both the LEU and HEU cores. The regulating blade worth showed a larger LEU value due to thermal peaking in the blade region and temperature coefficients showed a more negative LEU value due to Doppler broadening. Low induced activity of the HEU fuel permitted shipment to the Westinghouse Savannah River Facility using DOT-6M type B containers on 8 August, 1989. (orig.)

DESIGN STUDY FOR A LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM CORE FOR THE HIGH FLUX ISOTOPE REACTOR, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL; Renfro, David G [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Pinkston, Daniel [ORNL

2011-02-01

This report documents progress made during FY 2010 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current level. Studies are reported of support to a thermal hydraulic test loop design, the implementation of finite element, thermal hydraulic analysis capability, and infrastructure tasks at HFIR to upgrade the facility for operation at 100 MW. A discussion of difficulties with preparing a fuel specification for the uranium-molybdenum alloy is provided. Continuing development in the definition of the fuel fabrication process is described.

Orsphere: Physics Measurments For Bare, HEU(93.2)-Metal Sphere

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Marshall, Margaret A. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Bess, John D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Briggs, J. Blair [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); White, Christine E. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Dyrda, James P. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Tancock, Nigel P. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Mihalczo, John [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2015-03-01

In the early 1970s Dr. John T. Mihalczo (team leader), J.J. Lynn, and J.R. Taylor performed experiments at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (called Oak Ridge Alloy or ORALLOY) in an attempt to recreate GODIVA I results with greater accuracy than those performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1950s (HEU-MET-FAST-001). The purpose of the Oak Ridge ORALLOY Sphere (ORSphere) experiments was to estimate the unreflected and unmoderated critical mass of an idealized sphere of uranium metal corrected to a density, purity, and enrichment such that it could be compared with the GODIVA I experiments. “The very accurate description of this sphere, as assembled, establishes it as an ideal benchmark for calculational methods and cross-section data files” (Reference 1). While performing the ORSphere experiments care was taken to accurately document component dimensions (±0.0001 inches), masses (±0.01 g), and material data. The experiment was also set up to minimize the amount of structural material in the sphere proximity. Two, correlated spheres were evaluated and judged to be acceptable as criticality benchmark experiments. This evaluation is given in HEU-MET-FAST-100. The second, smaller sphere was used for additional reactor physics measurements. Worth measurements (Reference 1, 2, 3 and 4), the delayed neutron fraction (Reference 3, 4 and 5) and surface material worth coefficient (Reference 1 and 2) are all measured and judged to be acceptable as benchmark data. The prompt neutron decay (Reference 6), relative fission density (Reference 7) and relative neutron importance (Reference 7) were measured, but are not evaluated. Information for the evaluation was compiled from References 1 through 7, the experimental logbooks 8 and 9 ; additional drawings and notes provided by the experimenter; and communication with the lead experimenter, John T. Mihalczo.

Development of uranium metal targets for 99Mo production

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wiencek, T.C.; Hofman, G.L.

1993-10-01

A substantial amount of high enriched uranium (HEU) is used for the production of medical-grade 99 Mo. Promising methods of producing irradiation targets are being developed and may lead to the reduction or elimination of this HEU use. To substitute low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in the production of 99 Mo, the target material may be changed to uranium metal foil. Methods of fabrication are being developed to simplify assembly and disassembly of the targets. Removal of the uranium foil after irradiation without dissolution of the cladding is a primary goal in order to reduce the amount of liquid radioactive waste material produced in the process. Proof-of-concept targets have been fabricated. Destructive testing indicates that acceptable contact between the uranium foil and the cladding can be achieved. Thermal annealing tests, which simulate the cladding/uranium diffusion conditions during irradiation, are underway. Plans are being made to irradiate test targets

Safeguards considerations for uranium enrichment facilities, as applied to gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-03-01

The goals and objectives of IAEA safeguards as they are understood by the authors based on published documents are reviewed. These goals are then used to derive safeguards concerns, diversion strategies, and potential safeguards measures for four base cases, the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a diffusion plant, the diversion of low enriched uranium (LEU) at a diffusion plant, the diversion of HEU at a gas centrifuge plant, and the diversion of LEU at a gas centrifuge plant. Tables of estimated capabilities are given for each case, under the assumption that the inspector would have access: to the cascade perimeter at or after the start of operations, to the cascade perimeter throughout construction and operation, to the cascade perimeter during operation plus a one-time access to the cascade itself, to the cascade during construction but only its perimeter during operation, or to the cascade itself during construction and operation

Continuing investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched Uranium] targets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandergrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

1987-01-01

Currently much of the world's supply of /sup 99m/Tc for medical purposes is produced from 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). The need for /sup 99m/Tc is continuing to grow, especially in developing countries, where needs and national priorities call for internal production of 99 Mo. This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched Uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal are reported. These improvements continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or hastaloy. A cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets is reported. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminum alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in other current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent 99 Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to (1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and (2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that both concerns can be handled and that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved

The preparation of reports of a significant event at a uranium processing or uranium handling facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-08-01

Licenses to operate uranium processing or uranium handling facilities require that certain events be reported to the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and to other regulatory authorities. Reports of a significant event describe unusual events which had or could have had a significant impact on the safety of facility operations, the worker, the public or on the environment. The purpose of this guide is to suggest an acceptable method of reporting a significant event to the AECB and to describe the information that should be included. The reports of a significant event are made available to the public in accordance with the provisions of the Access to Information Act and the AECB's policy on public access to licensing information

Environmental monitoring data review of a uranium ore processing facility in Argentina

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bonetto, J.

2014-01-01

An uranium ore processing facility in the province of Mendoza (Argentina) that has produced uranium concentrate from 1954 to 1986 is currently undergoing the last steps of environmental restoration. The operator has been performing post-closure environmental monitoring since 1986, while the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) has been carrying out its own independent radiological environmental monitoring for verification purposes since its creation, in 1995. A detailed revision of ARN´s monitoring plan for uranium mining and milling facilities has been undergoing since 2013, starting with this particular site. Results obtained from long-time sampling locations (some of them currently unused) have been analyzed and potentially new sampling points have been studied and proposed. In this paper, some statistical analysis and comparison of sampling-points’ datasets are presented (specifically uranium and radium concentration in groundwater, surface water and sediments) with conclusions pertaining to their keeping or discarding as sampling points in future monitoring plans. (author)

Measurements of the HEU and LEU in-core spectra at the Ford Nuclear Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wehe, D K [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); King, J S; Lee, J C; Martin, W R [Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

1985-07-01

The Ford Nuclear Reactor (FNR) at the University of Michigan has been serving as the test site for a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel whole-core demonstration. As part of the experimental program, the differential neutron spectrum has been measured in a high-enriched uranium (HEU) core and an LEU core. The HEU and LEU spectra were determined by unfolding the measured activities of foils that were irradiated in the reactor. When the HEU and LEU spectra are compared from meV to 10 MeV, significant differences between the two spectra are apparent below 10 eV. These are probably caused by the additional {sup 238}U resonance absorption in the LEU fuel. No measurable difference occurs in the shape of the spectra above MeV. (author)

Decommissioning of U.S. uranium production facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1995-02-01

From 1980 to 1993, the domestic production of uranium declined from almost 44 million pounds U{sub 3}O{sub 8} to about 3 million pounds. This retrenchment of the U.S. uranium industry resulted in the permanent closing of many uranium-producing facilities. Current low uranium prices, excess world supply, and low expectations for future uranium demand indicate that it is unlikely existing plants will be reopened. Because of this situation, these facilities eventually will have to be decommissioned. The Uranium Mill Tailings and Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) vests the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with overall responsibility for establishing environmental standards for decommissioning of uranium production facilities. UMTRCA also gave the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the responsibility for licensing and regulating uranium production and related activities, including decommissioning. Because there are many issues associated with decommissioning-environmental, political, and financial-this report will concentrate on the answers to three questions: (1) What is required? (2) How is the process implemented? (3) What are the costs? Regulatory control is exercised principally through the NRC licensing process. Before receiving a license to construct and operate an uranium producing facility, the applicant is required to present a decommissioning plan to the NRC. Once the plan is approved, the licensee must post a surety to guarantee that funds will be available to execute the plan and reclaim the site. This report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) represents the most comprehensive study on this topic by analyzing data on 33 (out of 43) uranium production facilities located in Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington.

Decommissioning of U.S. uranium production facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-02-01

From 1980 to 1993, the domestic production of uranium declined from almost 44 million pounds U 3 O 8 to about 3 million pounds. This retrenchment of the U.S. uranium industry resulted in the permanent closing of many uranium-producing facilities. Current low uranium prices, excess world supply, and low expectations for future uranium demand indicate that it is unlikely existing plants will be reopened. Because of this situation, these facilities eventually will have to be decommissioned. The Uranium Mill Tailings and Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) vests the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with overall responsibility for establishing environmental standards for decommissioning of uranium production facilities. UMTRCA also gave the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the responsibility for licensing and regulating uranium production and related activities, including decommissioning. Because there are many issues associated with decommissioning-environmental, political, and financial-this report will concentrate on the answers to three questions: (1) What is required? (2) How is the process implemented? (3) What are the costs? Regulatory control is exercised principally through the NRC licensing process. Before receiving a license to construct and operate an uranium producing facility, the applicant is required to present a decommissioning plan to the NRC. Once the plan is approved, the licensee must post a surety to guarantee that funds will be available to execute the plan and reclaim the site. This report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) represents the most comprehensive study on this topic by analyzing data on 33 (out of 43) uranium production facilities located in Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington

Development of the Mo-99 process at CRNL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burrill, K.A.; Harrison, R.J.

1987-11-01

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used for Mo-99 production at CRNL. Dissolution of the targets and loading of the solution onto AI 2 0 3 columns is discussed. Development work continues to reduce processing time and overall product cost. A process for treating the fission product waste has been selected and a facility for processing is being designed. Low enriched uranium (LEU) is planned for targets eventually. Our experience with Si-based fuel for targets is poor, and alternatives are being sought

Neutronic analysis of the conversion of HEU to LEU fuel for a 5-MW MTR core

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pazirandeh, A.; Bartsch, G.

1987-01-01

In recent years, due to cessation of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel supply, practical steps have been taken to substitute HEU fuel in almost all research reactors by medium-enriched uranium or low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. In this study, a neutronic calculation of a 5-MW research reactor core fueled with HEU (93% 235 U) is presented. In order to assess the performance of the core with the LEU ( 235 U loadings were examined. The core consists of 22 standard fuel elements (SFEs) and 6 control fuel elements (CFEs). Each fuel elements has 18 curved plates of which two end plates are dummies. Initial 235 U content is 195 g 235 U/SFE and 9.7 g 235 U/CFE or /PFE. In all calculations the permitted changes to the fuel elements are (a) 18 active plates per SFE, (b) fuel plates assumed to be flat, and (c) 8 or 9 active plates per CFE

Analysis of civilian processing programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

2004-01-01

Since the RERTR-Meeting in Newport/USA in 1990 recommended in several papers to the research reactor community to agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for acceptance and for fabrication of fresh fuel elements. This target for unified and simplified specification has only been partially reached due to different interests of the fabricators because they want to receive the uranium as pure as possible. As a result of various investigations, however, it became clear that both LEU and HEU received from the United States since the late fifties had different qualities which we have to deal with today due to the availability of stocks. We are now one step forward to know more precisely the properties of LEU and HEU we have received in the past. This uranium was never virgin and we have to cope with this situation. Therefore in my present paper I have concentrated on the documentation of analytical work performed on samples of LEU and HEU received in the past. I propose furthermore a frame of unified specifications for so-called virgin LEU and HEU including uranium from a Zero-experiment. In addition I am giving a recommendation for specifications of LEU obtained by blending of reprocessed HEU. Finally I am touching the question of secure supplies of fresh LEU. (author)

Disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium: Draft environmental impact statement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-10-01

This document assesses the environmental impacts at four potential sites that may result from alternatives for the disposition of United States-origin weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) that has been or may be declared surplus to national defense or defense-related program needs. In addition to the no action alternative, it assesses four alternatives that would eliminate the weapons-usability of HEU by blending it with depleted uranium, natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU) to create low-enriched uranium, either as commercial reactor fuel feedstock or as low-level radioactive waste. The potential blending sites are DOE's Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock ampersand Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and the Nuclear Fuel Services Fuel Fabrication Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. Evaluations of impacts on site infrastructure, water resources, air quality and noise, socioeconomic resources, waste management, public and occupational health, and environmental justice for the potential blending sites are included in the assessment. The intersite transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials is also assessed. The preferred alternative is to blend down surplus HEU to LEU for maximum commercial use as reactor fuel feed which would likely be done at a combination of DOE and commercial sites

Management of high enriched uranium for peaceful purposes: Status and trends

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-06-01

Arms control agreements between some Nuclear Weapon States have led to the dismantling of many of the nuclear weapons in their military stockpiles, which in turn have produced stockpiles of excess weapons-grade high enriched uranium (HEU) from the dismantled weapons. Considering the proliferation potential of HEU, the management, control and disposition of this fissile material has become a primary focus of nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. To lessen the proliferation threat of excess HEU stockpiles, the USA agreed to purchase several tonnes of excess Russian HEU down-blended to low enriched uranium (LEU). Proliferation concerns about HEU have also resulted in a global effort to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel and to minimize civilian use of HEU. This publication addresses HEU management declared excesses, non-proliferation programmes and options for the use of HEU stockpiles, including disposition programmes. Also addressed are the influence of LEU derived from surplus HEU on the global market for uranium, technical issues associated with utilization and the disposition of HEU

Multilateral nonproliferation cooperation: US - Led effort to remove HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuels from the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shelton, Thomas A.; Viebrock, James M.; Riedy, Alexander W.; Moses, Stanley D.; Bird, Helen M.

1998-01-01

This paper presents the efforts led by United States for removing HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuel from dhe Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. These efforts are resulted from a plan approved by the United States Government, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Georgia Governments to rapidly retrieve and transport circa 4.3 kilograms of enriched uranium. This material consisted largely of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and a small amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) fresh fuel, as well as about 800 grams of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel from a shutdown IR T-M research reactor on the outskirts of Table's, Georgia. The technical team lead by DOE consisted of HEU handling, packaging and transportation experts from the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, managed and operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, and fuel handling and transportation experts from Nac International in Norcross, Georgia, United States

31 CFR 540.317 - Uranium feed; natural uranium feed.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium feed; natural uranium feed... (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.317 Uranium feed; natural uranium feed. The...

Uranium Processing Facility

Data.gov (United States)

Federal Laboratory Consortium — An integral part of Y‑12's transformation efforts and a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Uranium Center of Excellence, the Uranium...

Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

1996-01-01

Most of the world's supply of 99 mTc for medical purposes is currently produced from the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers. (author)

Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

1996-01-01

Most of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is currently produced form the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers

Radioactive Waste Issues related to Production of Fission-based Mo-99 by using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hassan, Muhmood ul; Ryu, Ho Jin [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

In order to produce fission-based Mo-99 from research reactors, two types of targets are being used and they are highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets with {sup 235}U enrichment more than 90wt% of {sup 235}U and low enriched uranium (LEU) targets with {sup 235}U enrichment less than 20wt% of {sup 235}U. It is worth noting that medium enriched uranium i.e. 36wt% of {sup 235}U as being used in South Africa is also regarded as non-LEU from a nuclear security point of view. In order to cope with the proliferation issues, international nuclear security policy is promoting the use of LEU targets in order to minimize the civilian use of HEU. It is noteworthy that Mo-99 yield of the LEU target is less than 20% of the HEU target, which requires approximately five times more LEU targets to be irradiated and consequently results in increased volume of waste. The waste generated from fission Mo-99 production can be mainly due to: target fabrication, assembling of target, irradiation in reactor and processing of irradiated targets. During the fission of U-235 in a reactor, a large number of radionuclides with different chemical and physical properties are formed. The waste produced from these practices may be a combination of low level waste (LLW) and intermediate level waste (ILW) comprised of all three types, i.e., solid, liquid and gas. Handling and treatment of the generated waste are dependent on its form and activity. In case of the large production facility, waste storage facility should be constructed in order to limit the radiation exposures of the workers and the environment. In this study, we discuss and compare mainly the radioactive waste generated by alkaline digestion of both HEU and LEU targets to assist in planning and deciding the choice of the technology with better arrangements for proper handling and disposal of generated waste. With the use of the LEU targets in Mo-99 production facility, significant increase in liquid and solid waste has been expected.

Several issues of uranium geology exploration facilities decommissioning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Lu; Lu Caixia; Sheng Qing; Zhuang Jingqi; Xie Shujun; Liao Yunxuan

2013-01-01

The environmental protection completion acceptance review work of uranium geology exploration facilities 'llth five-year plan' decommissioned and remediation projects is introduced. Some questions related to norms and standards for uranium geology exploration facilities decommissioning and remediation, scheme of decommissioning and remediation, process inspection and acceptance of project and so on are discussed, and corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, Some references can be provided for the later development of uranium geological exploration facility '12th five-year plan' decommissioning and remediation projects. (authors)

ADS with HEU in the Vinca Institute

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M.; Sobolevsky, N.

2000-01-01

The 'Conceptual design of ADS' is a new project proposed in the Vin.a Institute for the next three years. In this paper, an option in the project - an idea of high-enriched uranium (HEU) - H 2 O low-flux ADS is shown. Preliminary results of design study and calculations of the beam-target interaction and neutronics of proposed sub-critical system are given. (author)

Research reactor preparations for the air shipment of highly enriched uranium from Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bolshinsky, I.; Allen, K.J.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.; Paunoiu, C.; Ciocanescu, M.

2010-01-01

In June 2009 two air shipments transported both unirradiated (fresh) and irradiated (spent) Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel from two research reactors in Romania to the Russian Federation (RF) for conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU). The Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti (SCN Pitesti) shipped 30.1 kg of HEU fresh fuel pellets to Dimitrovgrad, Russia and the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH) shipped 23.7 kilograms of HEU spent fuel assemblies from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to Ozersk, Russia. Both HEU shipments were coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), were managed in Romania by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), and were conducted in cooperation with the Russian Federation State Corporation for Atomic Energy Rosatom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both shipments were transported by truck to and from respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at secure nuclear facilities in Russia until the material is converted into low enriched uranium. These shipments resulted in Romania becoming the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the research reactor preparations and license approvals that were necessary to safely and securely complete these air shipments of nuclear fuel. (author)

Conversion and standardization of university reactor fuels using low-enrichment uranium - options and costs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harris, D.R.; Matos, J.E.; Young, H.H.

1985-01-01

The highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel used in twenty United States university reactors can be viewed as contributing to the risk of theft or diversion of weapons-useable material. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a policy statement expressing its concern and has published a proposed rule on limiting the use of HEU in NRC-licensed non-power reactors. The fuel options, functional impacts, licensing, and scheduling of conversion and standardization of these reactor fuels to use of low-enrichment uranium (LEU) have been assessed. The university reactors span a wide range in form and function, from medium-power intense neutron sources where HEU fuel may be required, to low-power training and research facilities where HEU fuel is unnecessary. Conversion provides an opportunity to standardize university reactor fuels and improve reactor utilization in some cases. The entire program is estimated to cost about $10 million and to last about five years. Planning for conversion and standardization is facilitated by the US Department of Energy. 20 refs., 1 tab

Conversion and standardization of university reactor fuels using low-enrichment uranium - Options and costs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harris, D.R.; Matos, J.E.; Young, H.H.

1985-01-01

The highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel used in twenty United States university reactors can be viewed as contributing to the risk of theft or diversion of weapons-useable material. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a policy statement expressing its concern and has published a proposed rule on limiting the use of HEU in NRC-licensed non-power reactors. The fuel options, functional impacts, licensing, and scheduling of conversion and standardization of these reactor fuels to use of low-enrichment uranium (LEU) have been assessed. The university reactors span a wide range in form and function, from medium-power intense neutron sources where HEU fuel may be required, to low-power training and research facilities where HEU fuel is unnecessary. Conversion provides an opportunity to standardize university reactor fuels and improve reactor utilization in some cases. The entire program is estimated to cost about $10 million and to last about five years. Planning for conversion and standardization is facilitated by the U.S. Department of Energy. (author)

Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design. Attachment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hanan, N.A.; Mo, S.C.; Smith, R.S.; Matos, J.E.

2004-01-01

After presentation of the foregoing paper by Dr. Nelson Hanan of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) proposing an alternative LEU core with one fuel ring and a power level of 33 MW, a presentation was made by Dr. Klaus Boning of the Technical University of Munich comparing the FRM-II HEU design with an LEU design by Tlm that had two fuel rings and a power level of 40 MW. Dr. Boning raised the following issues concerning the use of LEU fuel in FRM-H reactor designs: (1) qualification of HEU and LEU silicide fuels, (2) gamma heating in the heavy water reflector, (3) the radiological consequences of hypothetical accidents, and (4) cost and schedule. These issues are addressed in this Attachment. In his presentation, Dr. Hanan mentioned that ANL was also investigating other LEU designs. This work led to a second alternative LEU design that has the same neutron flux performance (8 x 10 14 n/cm 2 /s peak neutron flux in the reflector) and the same fuel lifetime (50 full power days) as the HEU design, but uses LEU silicide fuel with a uranium density of only 4.5 g/cm 3 . This design was achieved by using a fuel plate that has a fuel meat thickness of 0.76 mm, a cladding thickness of 0.38 mm, and a water channel gap of 2.2 mm. A comparison is shown of the main characteristics of this second alternative LEU design with those of the FRM-II HEU design. The ANL core again has one fuel ring with the same dimensions. With this LEU design, a two stage process is no longer necessary because LEU silicide fuel with a uranium density of 4.5 g/cm 3 is fully qualified, licensable, and available now for use in a high flux reactor such as the FRM-II

Automated instruments for in-line accounting of highly enriched uranium at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Stephens, M.M.; Brumfield, T.L.; Smith, S.E.; McCullough, E.E.; Jeter, I.W.; Bowers, G.L.

1985-02-01

Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Oak Ridge Y-12 facility for recovery of highly enriched uranium (HEU). One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments was a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos personnel. This evaluation included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurements performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system and comparison of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function and design of the instruments and detailed results of the operational evaluation are reported

Uranium isotopic signatures measured in samples of dirt collected at two former uranium facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meyers, L.A.; Stalcup, A.M.; LaMont, S.P.; Spitz, H.B.

2014-01-01

Nuclear forensics is a multidisciplinary science that uses a variety of analytical methods and tools to explore the physical, chemical, and isotopic characteristics of nuclear and radiological materials. These characteristics, when evaluated alone or in combination, become signatures that may reveal how and when the material was fabricated. The signatures contained in samples of dirt collected at two different uranium metal processing facilities in the United States were evaluated to determine uranium isotopic composition and compare results with processes that were conducted at these sites. One site refined uranium and fabricated uranium metal ingots for fuel and targets and the other site rolled hot forged uranium and other metals into dimensional rods. Unique signatures were found that are consistent with the activities and processes conducted at each facility and establish confidence in using these characteristics to reveal the provenance of other materials that exhibit similar signatures. (author)

Operation of automated NDA instruments for in-line HEU accounting at Y-12

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Jeter, I.W.; McCullough, E.; Bowers, G.L.

1983-01-01

Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Y-12 Plant for recovery of highly enriched uranium. One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments has been a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos. This has included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurement performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system, as well as comparisons of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function, design, and preliminary results of the operational evaluation are reported

The NNSA global threat reduction initiative's efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Staples, Parrish

2010-01-01

The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU); Demonstrating the viability of medical isotope production technologies that do not use HEU; Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide; and Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview on the recent developments and priorities for GTRI program activities in 2010, with a particular focus on GTRI's efforts to demonstrate the viability of non-HEU based medical isotope production technologies. (author)

Hypertension and hematologic parameters in a community near a uranium processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wagner, Sara E.; Burch, James B.; Bottai, Matteo; Pinney, Susan M.; Puett, Robin; Porter, Dwayne; Vena, John E.; Hebert, James R.

2010-01-01

Background: Environmental uranium exposure originating as a byproduct of uranium processing can impact human health. The Fernald Feed Materials Production Center functioned as a uranium processing facility from 1951 to 1989, and potential health effects among residents living near this plant were investigated via the Fernald Medical Monitoring Program (FMMP). Methods: Data from 8216 adult FMMP participants were used to test the hypothesis that elevated uranium exposure was associated with indicators of hypertension or changes in hematologic parameters at entry into the program. A cumulative uranium exposure estimate, developed by FMMP investigators, was used to classify exposure. Systolic and diastolic blood pressure and physician diagnoses were used to assess hypertension; and red blood cells, platelets, and white blood cell differential counts were used to characterize hematology. The relationship between uranium exposure and hypertension or hematologic parameters was evaluated using generalized linear models and quantile regression for continuous outcomes, and logistic regression or ordinal logistic regression for categorical outcomes, after adjustment for potential confounding factors. Results: Of 8216 adult FMMP participants 4187 (51%) had low cumulative uranium exposure, 1273 (15%) had moderate exposure, and 2756 (34%) were in the high (>0.50 Sievert) cumulative lifetime uranium exposure category. Participants with elevated uranium exposure had decreased white blood cell and lymphocyte counts and increased eosinophil counts. Female participants with higher uranium exposures had elevated systolic blood pressure compared to women with lower exposures. However, no exposure-related changes were observed in diastolic blood pressure or hypertension diagnoses among female or male participants. Conclusions: Results from this investigation suggest that residents in the vicinity of the Fernald plant with elevated exposure to uranium primarily via inhalation exhibited

Hypertension and hematologic parameters in a community near a uranium processing facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wagner, Sara E., E-mail: swagner@uga.edu [College of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Paul D. Coverdell Center for Biomedical and Health Sciences, University of Georgia, 500 D.W. Brooks Drive, Athens, GA 30602-7396 (United States); Burch, James B. [Arnold School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States); South Carolina Statewide Cancer Prevention and Control Program, Columbia, SC (United States); WJB Dorn Veteran' s Affairs Medical Center, Columbia, SC (United States); Bottai, Matteo [Arnold School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States); Pinney, Susan M. [College of Medicine, Department of Environmental Health, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH (United States); Puett, Robin [Arnold School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States); South Carolina Statewide Cancer Prevention and Control Program, Columbia, SC (United States); Arnold School of Public Health, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States); Porter, Dwayne [Arnold School of Public Health, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States); Vena, John E. [College of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Paul D. Coverdell Center for Biomedical and Health Sciences, University of Georgia, 500 D.W. Brooks Drive, Athens, GA 30602-7396 (United States); Hebert, James R. [Arnold School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC (United States); South Carolina Statewide Cancer Prevention and Control Program, Columbia, SC (United States)

2010-11-15

Background: Environmental uranium exposure originating as a byproduct of uranium processing can impact human health. The Fernald Feed Materials Production Center functioned as a uranium processing facility from 1951 to 1989, and potential health effects among residents living near this plant were investigated via the Fernald Medical Monitoring Program (FMMP). Methods: Data from 8216 adult FMMP participants were used to test the hypothesis that elevated uranium exposure was associated with indicators of hypertension or changes in hematologic parameters at entry into the program. A cumulative uranium exposure estimate, developed by FMMP investigators, was used to classify exposure. Systolic and diastolic blood pressure and physician diagnoses were used to assess hypertension; and red blood cells, platelets, and white blood cell differential counts were used to characterize hematology. The relationship between uranium exposure and hypertension or hematologic parameters was evaluated using generalized linear models and quantile regression for continuous outcomes, and logistic regression or ordinal logistic regression for categorical outcomes, after adjustment for potential confounding factors. Results: Of 8216 adult FMMP participants 4187 (51%) had low cumulative uranium exposure, 1273 (15%) had moderate exposure, and 2756 (34%) were in the high (>0.50 Sievert) cumulative lifetime uranium exposure category. Participants with elevated uranium exposure had decreased white blood cell and lymphocyte counts and increased eosinophil counts. Female participants with higher uranium exposures had elevated systolic blood pressure compared to women with lower exposures. However, no exposure-related changes were observed in diastolic blood pressure or hypertension diagnoses among female or male participants. Conclusions: Results from this investigation suggest that residents in the vicinity of the Fernald plant with elevated exposure to uranium primarily via inhalation exhibited

Experiments with HEU (93.14 wt.%) metal annuli with internal graphite cylinder

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liu, Xiaobo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Bess, John D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Wehmann, Udo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Mihalczo, John T. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2015-04-01

A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal (oralloy ) during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, only three experimental configurations are described here. They are internal graphite reflected metal uranium assemblies with three different diameter HEU annuli (15-9 inches, 15-7 inches and 13-7 inches). These experiments can be found in Reference 1 and in their associated logbook

Depleted uranium processing and fluorine extraction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laflin, S.T.

2010-01-01

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, there has never been a commercial solution for the large quantities of depleted uranium hexafluoride generated from uranium enrichment. In the United States alone, there is already in excess of 1.6 billion pounds (730 million kilograms) of DUF_6 currently stored. INIS is constructing a commercial uranium processing and fluorine extraction facility. The INIS facility will convert depleted uranium hexafluoride and use it as feed material for the patented Fluorine Extraction Process to produce high purity fluoride gases and anhydrous hydrofluoric acid. The project will provide an environmentally friendly and commercially viable solution for DUF_6 tails management. (author)

Heat-transfer analysis of the existing HEU and proposed LEU cores of Pakistan research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khan, L.A.; Nabbi, R.

1987-02-01

In connection with conversion of Pakistan Research Reactor (PARR) from the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel, steady-state thermal hydraulic analysis of both existing HEU and proposed LEU cores has been carried out. Keeping in mind the possibility of power upgrading, the performance of proposed LEU core, under 10 MW operating conditions, has also been evaluated. Computer code HEATHYD has been used for this purpose. In order to verify the reliability of the code, IAEA benchmark 2 MW reactor was analyzed. The cooling parameters evaluated include: coolant velocity, critical velocity, pressure drop, temperature distribution in the core, heat fluxes at onset of nucleate boiling, flow instability and burnout and corresponding safety margins. From the results of the study it can be concluded that the conversion of the core to LEU fuel will result in higher safety margins, as compared to existing HEU core, mainly because the increased number of fuel plates in the proposed design will reduce the average heat flux significantly. Anyhow upgrading of the reactor power to 10 MW will need the flow rate to be adjusted between 850 to 900 m 3 /hr, to achieve reasonable safety margins, at least, comparable with the existing HEU core. (orig.)

How the radiologic and nuclear medical communities can improve nuclear security.

Science.gov (United States)

Kahn, Laura H; von Hippel, Frank

2007-04-01

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used to manufacture technetium-99m, the most widely used medical radioisotope in the world. Highly enriched uranium is also used to make nuclear bombs; 50 kg of HEU is enough to make a Hiroshima-type bomb. It is generally agreed that this technology is within the reach of a terrorist group; the main obstacle is acquiring HEU. Currently, as a legacy of the US and Soviet Atoms for Peace Program, there are civilian users of HEU in 40 countries, and about 1,000 kg are still being shipped each year. Unfortunately, the major international manufacturers of technetium-99m have been refusing to convert their production facilities to use low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb. Only 1% to 2% of the HEU is consumed in the process of producing technetium-99m. The remainder is accumulating in radioactive waste storage facilities. The radiologic and nuclear medical communities could make a tremendous contribution to a safer world by supporting the replacement of HEU with LEU in the production of technetium-99m. Low-enriched uranium is just as cost effective as HEU for the manufacture of technetium-99m and does not contribute to the risk for nuclear terrorism.

Shipment of VINCA Institute's HEU fresh fuel to Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, Milan; Sotic, Obrad

2002-01-01

This paper shows, for the first time, the basic data related to the recent shipment of the fresh HEU fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to Russia for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gives its contribution to the RERTR program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist action against nuclear material potentially usable for production of nuclear weapons. (author)

78 FR 72123 - Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2013-12-02

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU targets in Belgium. National Nuclear Security Uranium (HEU) uranium France for irradiation in... 5.8 kg of U- 235 contained in 6.2 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 12.615 kg of U-235...

Estimation methods for process holdup of special nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.; Marshall, R.S.

1984-06-01

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission sponsored a research study at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to explore the possibilities of developing statistical estimation methods for materials holdup at highly enriched uranium (HEU)-processing facilities. Attempts at using historical holdup data from processing facilities and selected holdup measurements at two operating facilities confirmed the need for high-quality data and reasonable control over process parameters in developing statistical models for holdup estimations. A major effort was therefore directed at conducting large-scale experiments to demonstrate the value of statistical estimation models from experimentally measured data of good quality. Using data from these experiments, we developed statistical models to estimate residual inventories of uranium in large process equipment and facilities. Some of the important findings of this investigation are the following: prediction models for the residual holdup of special nuclear material (SNM) can be developed from good-quality historical data on holdup; holdup data from several of the equipment used at HEU-processing facilities, such as air filters, ductwork, calciners, dissolvers, pumps, pipes, and pipe fittings, readily lend themselves to statistical modeling of holdup; holdup profiles of process equipment such as glove boxes, precipitators, and rotary drum filters can change with time; therefore, good estimation of residual inventories in these types of equipment requires several measurements at the time of inventory; although measurement of residual holdup of SNM in large facilities is a challenging task, reasonable estimates of the hidden inventories of holdup to meet the regulatory requirements can be accomplished through a combination of good measurements and the use of statistical models. 44 references, 62 figures, 43 tables

Process for decontamination of surfaces in an facility of natural uranium hexafluoride production (UF6)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Almeida, Claudio C. de; Silva, Teresinha M.; Rodrigues, Demerval L.; Carneiro, Janete C.G.G.

2017-01-01

The experience acquired in the actions taken during the decontamination process of an IPEN-CNEN / SP Nuclear and Energy Research Institute facility, for the purpose of making the site unrestricted, is reported. The steps of this operation involved: planning, training of facility operators, workplace analysis and radiometric measurements. The facility had several types of equipment from the natural uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) production tower and other facility materials. Rules for the transportation of radioactive materials were established, both inside and outside the facility and release of materials and installation

Remotely operated facility for in situ solidification of fissile uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McGinnis, C.P.; Collins, E.D.; Patton, B.D.

1986-01-01

A heavily shielded, remotely operated facility, located within the Radiochemical processing Plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), has been designed and is being operated to convert approx.1000 kg of fissile uranium (containing approx.75% 235 U, approx.10% 233 U, and approx.140 ppM 232 U) from a nitrate solution (130 g of uranium per L) to a solid oxide form. This project, the Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Program (CEUSP), is being carried out in order to prepare a stable uranium form for longterm storage. This paper describes the solidification process selected, the equipment and facilities required, the experimental work performed to ensure successful operation, some problems that were solved, and the initial operations

Processing of LEU targets for 99Mo production--testing and modification of the Cintichem process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wu, D.; Landsberger, S.; Buchholz, B.

1995-09-01

Recent experimental results on testing and modification of the Cintichem process to allow substitution of low enriched uranium (LEU) for high enriched uranium (HEU) targets are presented in this report. The main focus is on 99 Mo recovery and purification by its precipitation with α-benzoin oxime. Parameters that were studied include concentrations of nitric and sulfuric acids, partial neutralization of the acids, molybdenum and uranium concentrations, and the ratio of α-benzoin oxime to molybdenum. Decontamination factors for uranium, neptunium, and various fission products were measured. Experiments with tracer levels of irradiated LEU were conducted for testing the 99 Mo recovery and purification during each step of the Cintichem process. Improving the process with additional processing steps was also attempted. The results indicate that the conversion of molybdenum chemical processing from HEU to LEU targets is possible

COGEMA's UMF [Uranium Management Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lamorlette, G.; Bertrand, J.P.

1988-01-01

The French government-owned corporation, COGEMA, is responsible for the nuclear fuel cycle. This paper describes the activities at COGEMA's Pierrelatte facility, especially its Uranium Management Facility. UF6 handling and storage is described for natural, enriched, depleted, and reprocessed uranium. UF6 quality control specifications, sampling, and analysis (halocarbon and volatile fluorides, isotopic analysis, uranium assay, and impurities) are described. In addition, the paper discusses the filling and cleaning of containers and security at UMF

Development of LEU targets for 99Mo production and their chemical processing status 1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Chamberlain, D.B.; Hoh, J.C.; Streets, E.W.; Vogler, S.; Thresh, H.R.; Domagala, R.F.; Wiencek, T.C.; Matos, J.E.

1991-01-01

Most of the world's supply of Tc-99m for medical purposes is currently produced from Mo-99 derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low enriched uranium (LEU) silicide fuel for the HEU alloy and aluminide fuels used in current target designs will allow equivalent Mo-99 yields with no change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal will also allow the substitution of LEU for HEU. Efforts performed in 1989 focused on (1) fabrication of a uranium metal target by Hot Isostatic Pressing uranium metal foil to zirconium, (2) experimental investigation of the dissolution step for U 3 Si 2 targets, allowing us to present a conceptual design for the dissolution process and equipment, and (3) investigation of the procedures used to reclaim irradiated uranium from Mo-production targets, allowing us to further analyze the waste and by-product problems associated with the substitution of LEU for HEU. (orig.)

Description of an engineering-scale facility for uranium fluorination studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yagi, Eiji; Saito, Shinichi; Horiuchi, Masato

1976-03-01

In the research program of power reactor fuel reprocessing by fluoride volatility process, the engineering facility was constructed to establish the techniques of handling kilogram quantities of fluorine and uranium hexafluoride and to obtain engineering data on the uranium fluidized-bed oxidation and fluorination. This facility is designed for a capacity of 5 kg per batch. Descriptions on the facility and equipment are given, including design philosophy, safety and its analysis. (auth.)

Determination of Dancoff correction thermal utilization and thermal disadvantage factors of HEU and LEU cores of an MNSR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ofori, Y. T.

2013-07-01

Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1), an MNSR (Miniature Neutron Source Reactor) is to be converted from HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) to LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) fuel, along with all current MNSRs in various other countries. The purpose of the conversion is to minimize the use of HEU for non-proliferation of high-grade nuclear fuel. In this research work, a comparative study has been performed for the determination of the Dancoff, thermal utilization and thermal disadvantage factors of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and potential low enriched uranium (LEU) cores of GHARR-1. A one group transport theory and collision probability based methodologies was used to develop mathematical formulations for thermal utilization factor and thermal disadvantage factor assuming isotropic scattering. This methodology was implemented in a FORTRAN 95 based computer program THERMCALC, which uses Bessell and BesselK as subroutines developed to calculate the modified Bessel functions I n and K n respectively using the polynomial approximation method. Furthermore, a Dancoff correction factor of 0.1519 thermal utilization factor of 0.9767 and a thermal disadvantage factor of 1.894 were obtained for the 90.2% highly enriched Uranium core of GHARR-1. The results compare favorably with literature. Thus THERMCALC can be used as a reliable tool for the calculation of Dancoff, thermal utilization and disadvantage factors of MNSR cores. Other potential LEU cores; UO 2 (with different fuel meat densities and enrichments) and U 3 Si 2 have also been analysed. UO 2 with 12.6% of Uranium-235 was chosen as the most potential LEU core for the GHARR-1. (au)

31 CFR 540.309 - Natural uranium.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Natural uranium. 540.309 Section 540... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.309 Natural uranium. The term natural uranium means uranium found in...

Neutronic calculations for the conversion of the University of Florida Training Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, E.T.; Diaz, N.J.; Kniedler, G.S.

1983-01-01

The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is located on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville, Florida. The reactor is the Argonaut type, heterogeneous in design and currently fueled with 93% enriched, uranium-aluminum alloy MTR plate-type fuel. Investigations are being performed to examine te feasibility of replacing the highly-enriched fuel of the current UFTR with 4.8% enriched, cylindrical pin SPERT fuel. The SPERT fuel is stainless steel clad and contains uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) pellets. On a broad spectrum, training reactor conversion from high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fueled facilities has been a continuing concern in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and significant work has been done in this area by the Argonne RERTR Program. The International Atomic Energy Agency cites three reasons for reactor conversion to low-enriched uranium. The main reason is the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of research reactor fuels. The second is to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly-enriched uranium. The third reason is the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during fabrication, transportation, storage and use. This same IAEA report points out that the three reasons stated for the conversion of the fuel of research reactors are interrelated and cannot be considered individually. The concerns of the Nuclear Engineering Sciences Department at the University of Florida relating to the HEU fuel of the UFTR coincide with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The primary reason for going to low-enriched pin-type fuel is the concern with proliferation provoked by the highly-enriched plate fuel which has led to tighter security of nuclear facilities such as the UFTR. A second reason for changing to the pin-type fuel is because of difficulties that are being encountered in the supply of the

Neutronic calculations for the conversion of the University of Florida Training Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dugan, E T; Diaz, N J [Department of Nuclear Engineering Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL (United States); Kniedler, G S [Reactor Analysis Group, TVA, Chattanooga, TN (United States)

1983-09-01

The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is located on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville, Florida. The reactor is the Argonaut type, heterogeneous in design and currently fueled with 93% enriched, uranium-aluminum alloy MTR plate-type fuel. Investigations are being performed to examine te feasibility of replacing the highly-enriched fuel of the current UFTR with 4.8% enriched, cylindrical pin SPERT fuel. The SPERT fuel is stainless steel clad and contains uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2}) pellets. On a broad spectrum, training reactor conversion from high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fueled facilities has been a continuing concern in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and significant work has been done in this area by the Argonne RERTR Program. The International Atomic Energy Agency cites three reasons for reactor conversion to low-enriched uranium. The main reason is the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of research reactor fuels. The second is to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly-enriched uranium. The third reason is the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during fabrication, transportation, storage and use. This same IAEA report points out that the three reasons stated for the conversion of the fuel of research reactors are interrelated and cannot be considered individually. The concerns of the Nuclear Engineering Sciences Department at the University of Florida relating to the HEU fuel of the UFTR coincide with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The primary reason for going to low-enriched pin-type fuel is the concern with proliferation provoked by the highly-enriched plate fuel which has led to tighter security of nuclear facilities such as the UFTR. A second reason for changing to the pin-type fuel is because of difficulties that are being encountered in the supply of

Department of Energy, highly enriched uranium ES ampersand H vulnerability assessment, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

In accordance with the February 22, 1996 directive issued by Secretary of Energy O'Leary on the Vulnerability Assessment of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory conducted an assessment of the site's HEU holdings and any associated vulnerabilities. The assessment was conducted between April 25 and May 24, 1996. The scope of this assessment, as defined in the Assessment Plan, included all HEU, and any spent fuel not evaluated in the Spent Fuel Vulnerability Assessment. Addressed in this assessment were all of the holdings at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) except any located at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) and the Naval Reactors Facility. Excluded from the assessment were those HEU holdings previously assessed in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory and Vulnerability Site Assessment Report and any HEU holdings evaluated in the Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment Report

Challenges of ICRP 60 for uranium refining and conversion facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takala, J.M.

1998-01-01

Cameco Corporation operates high-grade uranium mines in northern Saskatchewan and uranium refining and conversion facilities in Ontario. The dose limits for these and all other nuclear facilities in Canada are 50 mSv per year and 4 WLM per year, which are applied separately. However, the upcoming incorporation of the recommendations in ICRP 60 into the Canadian regulations will result in several important changes. In addition to a more restrictive dose limit, the new regulations will require that all radiation exposures be combined into a single index of exposure. Meeting the new lower dose limits of 50 mSv per year and 100 mSv per 5 years will not be a major problem at Cameco facilities. However, the incorporation of long-lived radioactive dust exposures into the dose calculation will be a major challenge. This will cause the most difficulty at the uranium refining and conversion facilities where much of the process involves handling a variety of uranium compounds in the form of a dry powder. At the uranium conversion facilities the control of exposure to airborne uranium is achieved through a combination of lung counting, urinalysis, and fixed area monitors. To progress from a system of exposure control to dose estimation to individual workers will require some major changes. (author)

The regulation of uranium refineries and conversion facilities in Canada

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Didyk, J.P.

1986-04-01

The nuclear regulatory process as it applies to uranium refineries and conversion facilities in Canada is reviewed. In the early 1980s, Eldorado Resources Limited proposed to construct and operate new facilities for refining yellowcake and for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ). These projects were subject to regulation by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). A description of the AECB's comprehensive licensing process covering all stages of siting, construction, operation and eventual decommissioning of nuclear facilities is traced as it was applied to the Eldorado projects. The AECB's concern with occupational health and safety, with public health and safety and with the protection of the environment in so far as it affects public health and safety is emphasized. Some regulatory difficulties encountered during the project's development which led to opening up the licensing process to public input and closer coordination of regulatory activities with other provincial and federal regulatory agencies are described. The Board's regulatory operational compliance program for uranium refineries and conversion facilities is summarized

Ion-induced gammas for photofission interrogation of HEU.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Doyle, Barney Lee (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); Antolak, Arlyn J.; Morse, Daniel H.; Provencio, Paula Polyak (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM)

2006-03-01

High-energy photons and neutrons can be used to actively interrogate for heavily shielded special nuclear material (SNM), such as HEU (highly enriched uranium), by detecting prompt and/or delayed induced fission signatures. In this work, we explore the underlying physics for a new type of photon source that generates high fluxes of mono-energetic gamma-rays from low-energy (<500 keV) proton-induced nuclear reactions. The characteristic energies (4- to 18-MeV) of the gamma-rays coincide with the peak of the photonuclear cross section. The source could be designed to produce gamma-rays of certain selected energies, thereby improving the probability of detecting shielded HEU or providing a capability to determine enrichment inside sealed containers. The fundamental physics of such an interrogation source were studied in this LDRD through scaled ion accelerator experiments and radiation transport modeling. The data were used to assess gamma and neutron yields, background, and photofission-induced signal levels from several (p,{gamma}) target materials under consideration.

Repository emplacement costs for Al-clad high enriched uranium spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McDonell, W.R.; Parks, P.B.

1994-01-01

A range of strategies for treatment and packaging of Al-clad high-enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels to prevent or delay the onset of criticality in a geologic repository was evaluated in terms of the number of canisters produced and associated repository costs incurred. The results indicated that strategies in which neutron poisons were added to consolidated forms of the U-Al alloy fuel generally produced the lowest number of canisters and associated repository costs. Chemical processing whereby the HEU was removed from the waste form was also a low cost option. The repository costs generally increased for isotopic dilution strategies, because of the substantial depleted uranium added. Chemical dissolution strategies without HEU removal were also penalized because of the inert constituents in the final waste glass form. Avoiding repository criticality by limiting the fissile mass content of each canister incurred the highest repository costs

Design Study for a Low-enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2007

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Primm, Trent [ORNL; Ellis, Ronald James [ORNL; Gehin, Jess C [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL

2007-11-01

This report documents progress made during fiscal year 2007 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium fuel (LEU). Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. A high volume fraction U/Mo-in-Al fuel could attain the same neutron flux performance as with the current, HEU fuel but materials considerations appear to preclude production and irradiation of such a fuel. A diffusion barrier would be required if Al is to be retained as the interstitial medium and the additional volume required for this barrier would degrade performance. Attaining the high volume fraction (55 wt. %) of U/Mo assumed in the computational study while maintaining the current fuel plate acceptance level at the fuel manufacturer is unlikely, i.e. no increase in the percentage of plates rejected for non-compliance with the fuel specification. Substitution of a zirconium alloy for Al would significantly increase the weight of the fuel element, the cost of the fuel element, and introduce an as-yet untried manufacturing process. A monolithic U-10Mo foil is the choice of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preliminary calculations indicate that with a modest increase in reactor power, the flux performance of the reactor can be maintained at the current level. A linearly-graded, radial fuel thickness profile is preferred to the arched profile currently used in HEU fuel because the LEU fuel media is a metal alloy foil rather than a powder. Developments in analysis capability and nuclear data processing techniques are underway with the goal of verifying the preliminary calculations of LEU flux performance. A conceptual study of the operational cost of an LEU fuel fabrication facility yielded the conclusion that the annual fuel cost to the HFIR would increase significantly from the current, HEU fuel cycle. Though manufacturing can be accomplished with existing technology

Correlation function measurement of uranium casting driven by tagged DT neutrons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Jiansheng; Ye Cenming; Xie Wenxiong; Huang Po; Zeng Liheng; Jin Yu; Xie Qilin; Zhang Yi

2013-01-01

Background: In the nuclear disarmament process, the measurement and verification of uranium casting in sealed container are important to process control and treaty implementation. It is a difficult and hot problem to verify uranium casting in a sealed metal container, due to the weak intensity of neutron and gamma rays of uranium. Purpose: We want to measure the correlation functions of different casting in uranium casting verifications. Methods: Two BC501 scintillation detectors are placed outside the tagged neutron cone and in opposite position. The α detector forms the first channel pulse signal, while the two BC501 scintillation detectors form the second and third channel pulse signals. Those three pulsed time series are recorded by high speed acquisition system. The correlation functions between these signals are calculated by the time series. Results: Putting the two BC501 detectors into the tagged neutron cone, the time of flight for the 14 MeV neutron is measured. The FWHM in TOF spectrum is 2.0 ns. Putting the two BC501 detectors outside the tagged neutron cone, the correlation functions measured by high speed acquisition system and MCA are consistent. The spontaneous neutron decay constants of the castings are measured by γ rays. The decay constant of 6.5 kg Pb component is 184 μs -1 . The decay constants of 4 kg and 15 kg HEU casting are 210 μs -1 and 128 μs -1 , respectively. The correlation functions C 12 (τ), C 13 (τ) and C 23 (τ) are acquired. In C 12 (C), the γ ray peak coming from the inelastic reaction of 14-MeV neutrons with the casting is 5.0 ns before the neutron peak of fission chain. This time difference can estimate the casting position in container. The integrations of the C 12 (τ), C 13 (τ) and C 23 (τ) increase with the casting mass. The C 23 (τ) values of Pb component and DU casting are far less than the values of HEU casting. The C 23 (τ) integration of Pb component is 3.0% comparing with 15-kg HEU casting, while the

Conversion of the University of Missouri-Rolla Reactor from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bolon, A.E.; Straka, M.; Freeman, D.W.

1997-01-01

The objectives of this project were to convert the UMR Reactor fuel from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and to ship the HEU fuel back to the Department of Energy Savannah River Site. The actual core conversion was completed in the summer of 1992. The HEU fuel was offloaded to an onsite storage pit where it remained until July, 1996. In July, 1996, the HEU fuel was shipped to the DOE Savannah River Site. The objectives of the project have been achieved. DOE provided the following funding for the project. Several papers were published regarding the conversion project and are listed in the Attachment. In retrospect, the conversion project required much more time and effort than originally thought. Several difficulties were encountered including the unavailability of a shipping cask for several years. The authors are grateful for the generous funding provided by DOE for this project but wish to point out that much of their efforts on the conversion project went unfunded

Unattended Monitoring of HEU Production in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants using Automated Aerosol Collection and Laser-based Enrichment Assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

2010-01-01

Nuclear power is enjoying rapid growth as government energy policies and public demand shift toward low carbon energy production. Pivotal to the global nuclear power renaissance is the development and deployment of robust safeguards instrumentation that allows the limited resources of the IAEA to keep pace with the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle. Undeclared production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) remains a primary proliferation concern for modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), due to their massive separative work unit (SWU) processing power and comparably short cascade equilibrium timescale. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing an unattended safeguards instrument, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely detection of HEU production within a GCEP. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulates, followed by laser spectroscopy to characterize the uranium enrichment level. Our prior investigation demonstrated single-shot detection sensitivity approaching the femtogram range and relative isotope ratio uncertainty better than 10% using gadolinium as a surrogate for uranium. In this paper we present measurement results on standard samples containing traces of depleted, natural, and low enriched uranium, as well as measurements on aerodynamic size uranium particles mixed in background materials (e.g., dust, minerals, soils). Improvements and optimizations in the detection electronics, signal timing, calibration, and laser alignment have lead to significant improvements in detection sensitivity and enrichment accuracy, contributing to an overall reduction in the false alarm probability. The sample substrate media was also found to play a significant role in facilitating laser-induced vaporization and the production of energetic plasma conditions, resulting in ablation optimization and further improvements in the isotope abundance sensitivity.

Development of Fission Mo-99 Process for LEU Dispersion Target

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Seung Kon; Lee, Su Seung; Hong, Soon Bog; Jang, Kyung Duk; Park, Ul Jae; Lee, Jun Sig [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) is developing LEU-based fission {sup 99}Mo production process which is connected to the new research reactor (Kijang New Research Reactor, KJRR), which is being constructed in Gijang, Busan, Korea. Historically, the most fission {sup 99}Mo producers have been used highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets so far. However, to reduce the use of HEU in private sector for non-proliferation, {sup 99}Mo producers are forced to convert their HEU-based process to use low enriched uranium (LEU) targets. Economic impact of a target conversion from HEU to LEU is significant. Overall cost for the production of the fission {sup 99}Mo increases significantly with the conversion of fission {sup 99}Mo targets from HEU to LEU. It is not only because the yield of LEU is only 50% of HEU, but also because radioactive waste production increases 200%. On the basis, worldwide efforts on the development of {sup 99}Mo production process that is optimized for the LEU target become an important issue. In this study, fission {sup 99}Mo process with non-irradiated LEU targets was presented except separation and purification steps. Pre- and post-irradiation tests of the fission {sup 99}Mo target will be done in 4th quarter of 2016.

Development of Fission Mo-99 Process for LEU Dispersion Target

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Seung Kon; Lee, Su Seung; Hong, Soon Bog; Jang, Kyung Duk; Park, Ul Jae; Lee, Jun Sig

2016-01-01

KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) is developing LEU-based fission 99 Mo production process which is connected to the new research reactor (Kijang New Research Reactor, KJRR), which is being constructed in Gijang, Busan, Korea. Historically, the most fission 99 Mo producers have been used highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets so far. However, to reduce the use of HEU in private sector for non-proliferation, 99 Mo producers are forced to convert their HEU-based process to use low enriched uranium (LEU) targets. Economic impact of a target conversion from HEU to LEU is significant. Overall cost for the production of the fission 99 Mo increases significantly with the conversion of fission 99 Mo targets from HEU to LEU. It is not only because the yield of LEU is only 50% of HEU, but also because radioactive waste production increases 200%. On the basis, worldwide efforts on the development of 99 Mo production process that is optimized for the LEU target become an important issue. In this study, fission 99 Mo process with non-irradiated LEU targets was presented except separation and purification steps. Pre- and post-irradiation tests of the fission 99 Mo target will be done in 4th quarter of 2016

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the uranium trioxide facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thompson, R.J.; Sontag, S.

1991-11-01

A facility effluent monitoring plant is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years. The UO 3 Plant is located in the south-central portion of the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. The plant consists of two primary processing buildings and several ancillary facilities. The purpose of the UO 3 Plant is to receive uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) from the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant, concentrate it, convert the UNH to uranium trioxide (UO 3 ) powder by calcination and package it for offsite shipment. The UO 3 Plant has been placed in a standby mode. There are two liquid discharges, and three gaseous exhaust stacks, and seven building exhausters that are active during standby conditions

HEU age determination by the activity ratio {sup 227}Th/{sup 235}U

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Li, Junjie; Zeng, Lina; Wu, Jian; Zheng, Chun; Li, Jiansheng, E-mail: lastljj@hotmail.com

2014-02-15

It is important to measure the age of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) assembly for authentication of the material in the frame of arms control inspections. A new non-destructive gamma spectrometric method for HEU age-dating is reported. This method relies on measuring the daughter/parent activity ratio {sup 227}Th/{sup 235}U by high-resolution gamma spectrometry. Only a narrow gamma range of energy of uranium from 230 keV to 242 keV will be used for analysis. The relative efficiency of every characteristic gamma ray changes in a small range because it has a near energy, which makes the results more accurate in theory. It provides a quick and reliable method for HEU age determination. Several gamma spectra of the same HEU assembly have been measured with different conditions (gain settings, distance and measurement time). When a branching ratio of 12.6% was chosen for the 235.96 keV line of {sup 227}Th, we obtained the activity ratios of (5.61 ± 0.40) × 10{sup −4}, (5.17 ± 0.39) × 10{sup −4}, (5.26 ± 0.39) × 10{sup −4}, (5.10 ± 0.35) × 10{sup −4}, (5.50 ± 0.44) × 10{sup −4} and (5.47 ± 0.42) × 10{sup −4}, respectively. These ratios correspond to ages of 52.2 ± 2.4 years, 49.7 ± 2.3 years, 50.1 ± 2.3 years, 49.3 ± 2.2 years, 51.6 ± 2.5 years and 51.5 ± 2.4 years, respectively, which are consistent with the known age of this material and the results of the U–Bi method.

On the importance of ending the use of HEU in the nuclear fuel cycle: An updated assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glaser, Alexander; Hippel, Frank von

2002-01-01

The events of September 2001 have created a renewed urgency with regard to the disposition and future use and management of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has received particular attention because it is relatively easy to use in a nuclear weapon and therefore an obvious candidate for diversion or theft by state or nonstate actors. The role of the RERTR program in this context and its contribution to global security can hardly be overemphasized. This article reviews existing or proposed activities to reduce the threat posed by HEU, how these activities are linked to the RERTR program, and outlines the most urgent steps to be taken to approach the ultimate objective of eliminating non-weapons HEU inventories in the world. (author)

Leaching study of heavy and radioactive elements present in wastes discarded by a uranium extraction and processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pihlak, A.; Lippmaa, E.; Maremaee, E.; Sirk, A; Uustalu, E.

1995-08-01

The present report provides a systematic leaching study of the waste depository at the Sillamaee metallurgical plant 'Silmet' (former uranium extraction and processing facility), its construction and environmental impact. The following data are presented: γ-activity data of the depository and two drill cores, chemical composition and physical properties of depository material and leaching waters, results of γ- and α-spectrometric studies, leaching (with demineralized and sea water) intensities of loparite and uranium ore processing waste components. Environmental danger presented by the Sillamaee waste dump to the Gulf of Finland and the surrounding environment in Estonia is mainly due to uranium leaching and the presence of a large array of chemically poisonous substances

Long Range Active Detection of HEU Based on Thermal Neutron Multiplication

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forman L.; Dioszegi I.; Salwen, C.; and Vanier, P.E.

2010-05-24

We report on the results of measurements of proton irradiation on a series of targets at Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL) Alternate Gradient Synchrotron Facility (AGS), in collaboration with LANL and SNL. We examined the prompt radiation environment in the tunnel for the DTRA-sponsored series (E 972), which investigated the penetration of air and subsequent target interaction of 4 GeV proton pulses. Measurements were made by means of an organic scintillator with a 500 MHz bandwidth system. We found that irradiation of a depleted uranium (DU) target resulted in a large gamma-ray signal in the 100-500 µsec time region after the proton flash when the DU was surrounded by polyethylene, but little signal was generated if it was surrounded by boron-loaded polyethylene. Subsequent Monte Carlo (MCNPX) calculations indicated that the source of the signal was consistent with thermal neutron capture in DU. The MCNPX calculations also indicated that if one were to perform the same experiment with a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target there would be a distinctive fast neutron yield in this 100-500 µsec time region from thermal neutron-induced fission. The fast neutrons can be recorded by the same direct current system and differentiated from gamma ray pulses in organic scintillator by pulse shape discrimination.

Research reactor core conversion from the use of highly enriched uranium to the use of low enriched uranium fuels guidebook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-08-01

In view of the proliferation concerns caused by the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and in anticipation that the supply of HEU to research and test reactors will be more restricted in the future, this document has been prepared to assist reactor operators in determining whether conversion to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel designs is technically feasible for their specific reactor, and to assist in making a smooth transition to the use of LEU fuel designs where appropriate

Performance of an active well coincidence counter for HEU samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferrari, Francesca; Peerani, Paolo

2010-01-01

Neutron coincidence counting is the reference NDA technique used in nuclear safeguards to measure the mass of nuclear material in samples. For high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples active neutron interrogation is generally performed and the most common device used by nuclear inspectors is the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC). Within her master thesis at the Polytechnic of Milan, the first author performed an intensive study on the characteristics and performances of the AWCC in order to assess the 235 U mass in HEU oxide samples at the PERLA laboratory of JRC. The work has been summarised in this paper that starts with the optimisation of the use of AWCC for nuclear safeguards, describing the calibration procedure, reporting results of a series of verification measurements, summarising the performances that can be obtained with this instruments during inspections at fuel production plants and concluding with the discussion of uncertainties related to these measurements.

Conversion of research and test reactors to low enriched uranium fuel: technical overview and program status

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roglans-Ribas, J.

2008-01-01

Many of the nuclear research and test reactors worldwide operate with high enriched uranium fuel. In response to worries over the potential use of HEU from research reactors in nuclear weapons, the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program - the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) - in 1978 to develop the technology necessary to reduce the use of HEU fuel by converting research reactors to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The Reactor Conversion program is currently under the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). 55 of the 129 reactors included in the scope have been already converted to LEU fuel or have shutdown prior to conversion. The major technical activities of the Conversion Program include: (1) the development of advanced LEU fuels; (2) conversion analysis and conversion support; and (3) technology development for the production of Molybdenum-99 (Mo 99 ) with LEU targets. The paper provides an overview of the status of the program, the technical challenges and accomplishments, and the role of international collaborations in the accomplishment of the Conversion Program objectives. Nuclear research and test reactors worldwide have been in operation for over 60 years. Many of these facilities operate with high enriched uranium fuel. In response to increased worries over the potential use of HEU from research reactors in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program - the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) - in 1978 to develop the technology necessary to reduce the use of HEU fuel in research reactors by converting them to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor conversion program was initially focused on U.S.-supplied reactors, but in the early 1990s it expanded and began to collaborate with Russian institutes with the objective of converting Russian supplied reactors to the use of LEU fuel.

Expert's statement on the research reactor Munich II (FRM-II); Gutachterliche Stellungnahme zum Forschungsreaktor Muenchen II (FRM-II)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liebert, Wolfgang; Friess, Friederike; Gufler, Klaus; Arnold, Nikolaus [Univ. fuer Bodenkultur (BOKU), Wien (Austria). Inst. fuer Sicherheits- und Risikowissenschaften (ISR)

2017-12-15

The Expert's statement on the research reactor FRM-II covers the following issues: The situation in Germany with respect to HEU (highly enriched uranium) fuel elements, the proliferation problems related to HEU fuel and the generated high-level radioactive wastes, possible safety hazards of an interim storage of HEU containing wastes, for instance in the interim storage facility Ahaus, possible safety hazards of final disposal of HEU containing radioactive wastes, possibilities to avoid the use of HEU fuel in order to prevent further production of these wastes, requirement of processing spent HEU containing fuel elements for final disposal.

Uranium Metal to Oxide Conversion by Air Oxidation –Process Development

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duncan, A

2001-12-31

Published technical information for the process of metal-to-oxide conversion of uranium components has been reviewed and summarized for the purpose of supporting critical decisions for new processes and facilities for the Y-12 National Security Complex. The science of uranium oxidation under low, intermediate, and high temperature conditions is reviewed. A process and system concept is outlined and process parameters identified for uranium oxide production rates. Recommendations for additional investigations to support a conceptual design of a new facility are outlined.

NUCLEAR ISOTOPIC DILUTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BY DRY BLENDING VIA THE RM-2 MILL TECHNOLOGY

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajamani, Raj K.; Latchireddi, Sanjeeva; Devrani, Vikas; Sethi, Harappan; Henry, Roger; Chipman, Nate

2003-01-01

DOE has initiated numerous activities to focus on identifying material management strategies to disposition various excess fissile materials. In particular the INEEL has stored 1,700 Kg of offspec HEU at INTEC in CPP-651 vault facility. Currently, the proposed strategies for dispositioning are (a) aqueous dissolution and down blending to LEU via facilities at SRS followed by shipment of the liquid LEU to NFS for fabrication into LWR fuel for the TVA reactors and (b) dilution of the HEU to 0.9% for discard as a waste stream that would no longer have a criticality or proliferation risk without being processed through some type of enrichment system. Dispositioning this inventory as a waste stream via aqueous processing at SRS has been determined to be too costly. Thus, dry blending is the only proposed disposal process for the uranium oxide materials in the CPP-651 vault. Isotopic dilution of HEU to typically less than 20% by dry blending is the key to solving the dispositioning issue (i.e., proliferation) posed by HEU stored at INEEL. RM-2 mill is a technology developed and successfully tested for producing ultra-fine particles by dry grinding. Grinding action in RM-2 mill produces a two million-fold increase in the number of particles being blended in a centrifugal field. In a previous study, the concept of achieving complete and adequate blending and mixing (i.e., no methods were identified to easily separate and concentrate one titanium compound from the other) in remarkably short processing times was successfully tested with surrogate materials (titanium dioxide and titanium mono-oxide) with different particle sizes, hardness and densities. In the current project, the RM-2 milling technology was thoroughly tested with mixtures of natural uranium oxide (NU) and depleted uranium oxide (DU) stock to prove its performance. The effects of mill operating and design variables on the blending of NU/DU oxides were evaluated. First, NU and DU both made of the same oxide

Isotope Enrichment Detection by Laser Ablation - Laser Absorption Spectrometry: Automated Environmental Sampling and Laser-Based Analysis for HEU Detection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

2010-01-01

The global expansion of nuclear power, and consequently the uranium enrichment industry, requires the development of new safeguards technology to mitigate proliferation risks. Current enrichment monitoring instruments exist that provide only yes/no detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) production. More accurate accountancy measurements are typically restricted to gamma-ray and weight measurements taken in cylinder storage yards. Analysis of environmental and cylinder content samples have much higher effectiveness, but this approach requires onsite sampling, shipping, and time-consuming laboratory analysis and reporting. Given that large modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) can quickly produce a significant quantity (SQ ) of HEU, these limitations in verification suggest the need for more timely detection of potential facility misuse. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended safeguards instrument concept, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely analysis of enrichment levels within low enriched uranium facilities. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulate samples, followed by wavelength tuned laser diode spectroscopy to characterize the uranium isotopic ratio through subtle differences in atomic absorption wavelengths. Environmental sampling (ES) media from an integrated aerosol collector is introduced into a small, reduced pressure chamber, where a focused pulsed laser vaporizes material from a 10 to 20-(micro)m diameter spot of the surface of the sampling media. The plume of ejected material begins as high-temperature plasma that yields ions and atoms, as well as molecules and molecular ions. We concentrate on the plume of atomic vapor that remains after the plasma has expanded and then cooled by the surrounding cover gas. Tunable diode lasers are directed through this plume and each isotope is detected by monitoring absorbance

Using low-enriched uranium in research reactors: The RERTR program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.

1994-01-01

The goal of the RERTR program is to minimize and eventually eliminate use of highway enriched uranium (HEU) in research and test reactors. The program has been very successful, and has developed low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel materials and designs which can be used effectively in approximately 90 percent of the research and test reactors which used HEU when the program began. This progress would not have been possible without active international cooperation among fuel developers, commercial vendors, and reactor operators. The new tasks which the RERTR program is undertaking at this time include development of new and better fuels that will allow use of LEU fuels in all research and test reactors; cooperation with Russian laboratories, which will make it possible to minimize and eventually eliminate use of HEU in research reactors throughout the world, irrespective of its origin; and development of an LEU-based process for the production of 99 Mo. Continuation and intensification of international cooperation are essential to the achievement of the ultimate goals of the RERTR program

RUSSIAN-ORIGIN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM BULGARIA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kelly Cummins; Igor Bolshinsky; Ken Allen; Tihomir Apostolov; Ivaylo Dimitrov

2009-07-01

In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

Russian-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment From Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor; Allen, Ken; Apostolov, Tihomir; Dimitrov, Ivaylo

2009-01-01

In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

The Y-12 National Security Complex Foreign Research Reactor Uranium Supply Production

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nelson, T. [Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States); Keller, A.P. [Disposition and Supply Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

2011-07-01

The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) HEU Disposition, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), and the United States (U.S.) FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Programs. The FRR Supply Program supports the important U.S. government nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel under the RERTR Program. The NNSA Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign government agencies for the supply of LEU for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. In addition to uranium metal feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 can produce LEU in different forms to support new fuel development or target fabrication for medical isotope production. With production improvements and efficient delivery preparations, Y-12 continues to successfully support the global research reactor community. (author)

Critical analysis of the management of waste system originated at the uranium mining and processing. A case study of the Concentrated Unit of Uranium - INB

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Araujo, Valeska Peres de

2005-01-01

The uranium world market faced a depreciation of this commodity during the last decades. Recently, decreases in the secondary supply (represented by highly enriched uranium - HEU - stocks detained by the former Soviet Union) turned out the market dependent upon primary supply again. In order to cope with this changing demands and market conditions, new uranium mining/milling projects must start operation, or at least, former uranium production plants must be improved. Environmental questions have been and certainly will continue to be a determinant factor concerning the operational feasibility of these facilities. Mining/milling activities have the potential to cause risks to the human health and to the environment. In case of uranium projects, radiological impacts shall also be taken into consideration. Amongst the most relevant environmental aspects associated with the operation of a uranium project, generated wastes are usually of major concern and deserve appropriate management strategies. As a result the objective of the present work was to examine the waste management system of the Brazilian uranium production unity located at the municipality of Caetite, northeast region of the country. An open pit mine and a milling facility compose this unit. The extraction method employed is acid heap leach (using H 2 SO 4 ). It could be assessed that the overall conceptual management strategy is in agreement with the practices adopted worldwide. Atmospheric impacts, caused by the emissions of radon and aerosols must be investigated in more details. Mathematical simulation revealed that no significant impact in groundwater is expected due to mobilization and transport of radionuclides from the milling wastes. However, the impacts of drainage water, accumulated in the open pit, into groundwater cannot be discarded yet. Screening techniques were applied to assess the potential contribution of the leached ore piles as a 226 Ra source of pollution. Our results did not allow

A Very High Uranium Density Fission Mo Target Suitable for LEU Using atomization Technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, C. K.; Kim, K. H.; Lee, Y. S.; Ryu, H. J.; Woo, Y. M.; Jang, S. J.; Park, J. M.; Choi, S. J. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2011-05-15

Currently HEU minimization efforts in fission Mo production are underway in connection with the global threat reduction policy. In order to convert HEU to LEU for the fission Mo target, higher uranium density material could be applied. The uranium aluminide targets used world widely for commercial {sup 99}Mo production are limited to 3.0 g-U/cc in uranium density of the target meat. A consideration of high uranium density using the uranium metal particles dispersion plate target is taken into account. The irradiation burnup of the fission Mo target are as low as 8 at.% and the irradiation period is shorter than 7 days. Pure uranium material has higher thermal conductivity than uranium compounds or alloys. It is considered that the degradation by irradiation would be almost negligible. In this study, using the computer code of the PLATE developed by ANL the irradiation behavior was estimated. Some considerations were taken into account to improve the irradiation performance further. It has been known that some alloying elements of Si, Cr, Fe, and Mo are beneficial for reducing the swelling by grain refinement. In the RERTR program recently the interaction problem could be solved by adding a small amount of Si to the aluminum matrix phase. The fabrication process and the separation process for the proposed atomized uranium particles dispersion target were reviewed

Occupational exposures to uranium: processes, hazards, and regulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stoetzel, G.A.; Fisher, D.R.; McCormack, W.D.; Hoenes, G.R.; Marks, S.; Moore, R.H.; Quilici, D.G.; Breitenstein, B.D.

1981-04-01

The United States Uranium Registry (USUR) was formed in 1978 to investigate potential hazards from occupational exposure to uranium and to assess the need for special health-related studies of uranium workers. This report provides a summary of Registry work done to date. The history of the uranium industry is outlined first, and the current commercial uranium industry (mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) is described. This description includes information on basic processes and areas of greatest potential radiological exposure. In addition, inactive commercial facilities and other uranium operations are discussed. Regulation of the commercial production industry for uranium fuel is reported, including the historic development of regulations and the current regulatory agencies and procedures for each phase of the industry. A review of radiological health practices in the industry - facility monitoring, exposure control, exposure evaluation, and record-keeping - is presented. A discussion of the nonradiological hazards of the industry is provided, and the final section describes the tissue program developed as part of the Registry

31 CFR 540.315 - Uranium-235 (U235).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium-235 (U235). 540.315 Section... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.315 Uranium-235 (U235). The term uranium-235 or U235 means the fissile...

Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-09-01

The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium

Science.gov (United States)

Fairrow, Nannette Lea

Safeguarding special nuclear material (SNM) in the Department of Energy Complex is vital to the national security of the United States. Active and passive nondestructive assays are used to confirm the presence of SNM in various configurations ranging from waste to nuclear weapons. Confirmation measurements for nuclear weapons are more challenging because the design complicates the detection of a distinct signal for highly enriched uranium. The emphasis of this dissertation was to investigate a new nondestructive assay technique that provides an independent and distinct signal to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Once completed and tested this assay method could be applied to confirmation measurements of nuclear weapons. The new system uses a 14-MeV neutron source for interrogation and records the arrival time of neutrons between the pulses with a high efficiency detection system. The data is then analyzed by the Feynman reduced variance method. The analysis determined the amount of correlation in the data and provided a unique signature of correlated fission neutrons. Measurements of HEU spheres were conducted at Los Alamos with the new system. Then, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to verify hypothesis made about the behavior of the neutrons in the experiment. Comparisons of calculated counting rates by the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) were made with the experimental data to confirm that the measured response reflected the desired behavior of neutron interactions in the highly enriched uranium. In addition, MCNP calculations of the delayed neutron build-up were compared with the measured data. Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, this measurement method has the potential to be expanded to include mass determinations of highly enriched uranium. Although many safeguards techniques exist for measuring special nuclear material, the number of assays that can be used to confirm HEU in shielded systems is

31 CFR 540.308 - Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). 540.308... OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.308 Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). The term low enriched...

Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Cowherd, W. M. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program; Rickman, B. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program

2014-12-01

This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. In the framework of non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MURR. This report presents the results of a study of core behavior under a set of accident conditions for MURR cores fueled with HEU U-Alx dispersion fuel or LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo

Calibration Tools for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxide and Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide with a Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mount, M; O'Connell, W; Cochran, C; Rinard, P

2003-01-01

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has completed an extensive effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. Earlier papers described the PAN shuffler calibration over a range of item properties by standards measurements and an extensive series of detailed simulation calculations. With a single normalization factor, the simulations agree with the HEU oxide standards measurements to within ±1.2% at one standard deviation. Measurement errors on mixed U-Pu oxide samples are in the ±2% to ±10% range, or ±20 g for the smaller items. The purpose of this paper is to facilitate transfer of the LLNL procedure and calibration algorithms to external users who possess an identical, or equivalent, PAN shuffler. Steps include (1) measurement of HEU standards or working reference materials (WRMs); (2) MCNP simulation calculations for the standards or WRMs and a range of possible masses in the same containers; (3) a normalization of the calibration algorithms using the standard or WRM measurements to account for differences in the 252 Cf source strength, the delayed-neutron nuclear data, effects of the irradiation protocol, and detector efficiency; and (4) a verification of the simulation series trends against like LLNL results. Tools include EXCEL/Visual Basic programs which pre- and post-process the simulations, control the normalization, and embody the calibration algorithms

Reprocessing flowsheet and material balance for MEU spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abraham, L.

1978-10-01

In response to nonproliferation concerns, the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) Fuel Recycle Development Program is investigating the processing requirements for a denatured medium-enriched uranium--thorium (MEU/Th) fuel cycle. Prior work emphasized the processing requirements for a high-enriched uranium--thorium (HEU/Th) fuel cycle. This report presents reprocessing flowsheets for an HTGR/MEU fuel recycle base case. Material balance data have been calculated for reprocessing of spent MEU and recycle fuels in the HTGR Recycle Reference Facility (HRRF). Flowsheet and mass flow effects in MEU-cycle reprocessing are discussed in comparison with prior HEU-cycle flowsheets

Ore-processing technology and the uranium supply outlook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

James, H.E.; Simonsen, H.A.

1978-01-01

The subject is covered in sections, as follows: the resource base (uranium content of rocks, regional distribution of Western World uranium); ore types (distribution of Western World uranium, by ore types, response to ore-processing); constraints on expansion in traditional uranium areas (defined for this paper as the sandstone deposits of the U.S.A. and the quartz-pebble conglomerates of the Witwatersrand and Elliot Bay areas, all other deposits being referred to as new uranium areas). Sections then follow dealing in detail with the processing of deposits in U.S.A., South Africa, Canada, Niger, Australia, South West Africa, Greenland. More general sections follow on: shale, lignite and coal deposits, calcrete deposits. Finally, there are sections on: uranium as a by-product; uranium from very low-grade resources; constraints on expansion rate for production facilities. (U.K.)

Report of the Working Party on the conversion of HIFAR to low enrichment uranium fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-06-01

This report states the effect on research reactor operations and applications of international and national political decisions relating to fuel enrichment. Technical work done in Australia and overseas to establish parameters for conversion of research reactors from High Enrichment Uranium (HEU) to Low Enrichment Uranium (LEU) have been considered in developing a strategy for HIFAR. The requirements of the research groups, isotope production group and reactor operating staff have been considered. For HIFAR to continue to provide the required facilities in support of the national need, it is concluded these should be no reduction of neutron flux

76 FR 60941 - Policy Regarding Submittal of Amendments for Processing of Equivalent Feed at Licensed Uranium...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-09-30

... Processing of Equivalent Feed at Licensed Uranium Recovery Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission... State-licensed uranium recovery site, either conventional, heap leach, or in situ recovery. DATES... Regarding Submittal of Amendments for Processing of Equivalent Feed at Licensed Uranium Recovery Facilities...

A comparative and predictive study of the annual fuel cycle costs for HEU and LEU fuels in the High Flux Reactor, Petten, 1985-1993

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Moss, R L; May, P

1985-07-01

The internationally agreed constraint on availability of supply of HEU fuels to Research and Test Reactors has necessitated that a cost analysis be carried out to determine the financial effect of converting the core of the HFR from HEU to LEU fuels. A computer program, written at Petten and based on information extracted from studies in Europe and the USA, identifies the major cost variables to be manufacturing, uranium, reprocessing and transport costs. Comparison between HEU and LEU cores have been carried out and includes the effects of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. Conversion of the HFR core to LEU fuels is shown to be financially disadvantageous. (author)

A comparative and predictive study of the annual fuel cycle costs for HEU and LEU fuels in the High Flux Reactor, Petten, 1985-1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moss, R.L.; May, P.

1985-01-01

The internationally agreed constraint on availability of supply of HEU fuels to Research and Test Reactors has necessitated that a cost analysis be carried out to determine the financial effect of converting the core of the HFR from HEU to LEU fuels. A computer program, written at Petten and based on information extracted from studies in Europe and the USA, identifies the major cost variables to be manufacturing, uranium, reprocessing and transport costs. Comparison between HEU and LEU cores have been carried out and includes the effects of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. Conversion of the HFR core to LEU fuels is shown to be financially disadvantageous. (author)

77 FR 33782 - License Amendment To Construct and Operate New In Situ Leach Uranium Recovery Facility; Uranium...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-06-07

... and Operate New In Situ Leach Uranium Recovery Facility; Uranium One Americas; Ludeman AGENCY: Nuclear... provided the first time that a document is referenced. The Ludeman facility In Situ Leach Uranium Recovery... request to amend Source Material License SUA-1341 to construct and operate a new in situ leach uranium...

Implementation of the United States-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

R.rutkowski, E; Armantrout, G; Mastal, E; Glaser, J; Benton, J

2004-01-01

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) monitors and provides assurance that Russian weapons-grade HEU is processed into low enriched uranium (LEU) under the transparency provisions of the 1993 United States (U.S.)-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. Meeting the Agreement's transparency provisions is not just a program requirement; it is a legal requirement. The HEU Purchase Agreement requires transparency measures to be established to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are met. The Transparency concept has evolved into a viable program that consists of complimentary elements that provide necessary assurances. The key elements include: (1) monitoring by technical experts; (2) independent measurements of enrichment and flow; (3) nuclear material accountability documents from Russian plants; and (4) comparison of transparency data with declared processing data. In the interest of protecting sensitive information, the monitoring is neither full time nor invasive. Thus, an element of trust is required regarding declared operations that are not observed. U.S. transparency monitoring data and independent instrument measurements are compared with plant accountability records and other declared processing data to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the 1993 Agreement are being met. Similarly, Russian monitoring of U. S. storage and fuel fabrication operations provides assurance to the Russians that the derived LEU is being used in accordance with the Agreement. The successful implementation of the Transparency program enables the receipt of Russian origin LEU into the United States. Implementation of the 1993 Agreement is proceeding on schedule, with the permanent elimination of over 8,700 warhead equivalents of HEU. The successful implementation of the Transparency program has taken place over the last 10 years and has provided the

Development of ISA procedure for uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamate, Kazuki; Arakawa, Tomoyuki; Yamashita, Masahiro; Sasaki, Noriaki; Hirano, Mitsumasa

2011-01-01

The integrated safety analysis (ISA) procedure has been developed to apply risk-informed regulation to uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities. The major development efforts are as follows: (a) preparing the risk level matrix as an index for items-relied-on-for-safety (IROFS) identification, (b) defining requirements of IROFS, and (c) determining methods of IROFS importance based on the results of risk- and scenario-based analyses. For the risk level matrix, the consequence and likelihood categories have been defined by taking into account the Japanese regulatory laws, rules, and safety standards. The trial analyses using the developed procedure have been performed for several representative processes of the reference uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities. This paper presents the results of the ISA for the sintering process of the reference fabrication facility. The results of the trial analyses have demonstrated the applicability of the procedure to the risk-informed regulation of these facilities. (author)

Uranium conversion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina

2006-03-01

FOI, has performed a study on uranium conversion processes that are of importance in the production of different uranium compounds in the nuclear industry. The same conversion processes are of interest both when production of nuclear fuel and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are considered. Countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions, with the intention to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, need some degree of uranium conversion capability depending on the uranium feed material available. This report describes the processes that are needed from uranium mining and milling to the different conversion processes for converting uranium ore concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the uranium compound used in most enrichment facilities. The processes needed to produce uranium dioxide for use in nuclear fuel and the processes needed to convert different uranium compounds to uranium metal - the form of uranium that is used in a nuclear weapon - are also presented. The production of uranium ore concentrate from uranium ore is included since uranium ore concentrate is the feed material required for a uranium conversion facility. Both the chemistry and principles or the different uranium conversion processes and the equipment needed in the processes are described. Since most of the equipment that is used in a uranium conversion facility is similar to that used in conventional chemical industry, it is difficult to determine if certain equipment is considered for uranium conversion or not. However, the chemical conversion processes where UF 6 and UF 4 are present require equipment that is made of corrosion resistant material

10 CFR 70.23a - Hearing required for uranium enrichment facility.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Hearing required for uranium enrichment facility. 70.23a... MATERIAL License Applications § 70.23a Hearing required for uranium enrichment facility. The Commission... license for construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility. The Commission will publish...

Solubility of airborne uranium samples from uranium processing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kravchik, T.; Oved, S.; Sarah, R.; Gonen, R.; Paz-Tal, O.; Pelled, O.; German, U.; Tshuva, A.

2005-01-01

Full text: During the production and machining processes of uranium metal, aerosols might be released to the air. Inhalation of these aerosols is the main route of internal exposure of workers. To assess the radiation dose from the intake of these uranium compounds it is necessary to know their absorption type, based on their dissolution rate in extracellular aqueous environment of lung fluid. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has assigned UF4 and U03 to absorption type M (blood absorption which contains a 10 % fraction with an absorption rate of 10 minutes and 90 % fraction with an absorption rate of 140 fays) and UO2 and U3O8 to absorption type S (blood absorption rate with a half-time of 7000 days) in the ICRP-66 model.The solubility classification of uranium compounds defined by the ICRP can serve as a general guidance. At specific workplaces, differences can be encountered, because of differences in compounds production process and the presence of additional compounds, with different solubility characteristics. According to ICRP recommendations, material-specific rates of absorption should be preferred to default parameters whenever specific experimental data exists. Solubility profiles of uranium aerosols were determined by performing in vitro chemical solubility tests on air samples taken from uranium production and machining facilities. The dissolution rate was determined over 100 days in a simultant solution of the extracellular airway lining fluid. The filter sample was immersed in a test vial holding 60 ml of simultant fluid, which was maintained at a 37 o C inside a thermostatic bath and at a physiological pH of 7.2-7.6. The test vials with the solution were shaken to simulate the conditions inside the extracellular aqueous environment of the lung as much as possible. The tests indicated that the uranium aerosols samples taken from the metal production and machining facilities at the Nuclear Research Center Negev (NRCN

The status of HEU and LEU core conversion activities at the Jamaica SLOWPOKE

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Preston, J.; Grant, C., E-mail: john.preston@uwimona.edu.jm [Univ. of the West Indies, Mona Campus, International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, Kingston (Jamaica)

2013-07-01

The SLOWPOKE reactor in Jamaica has been operated by the International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, University of the West Indies since 1984, mainly for the purpose of Neutron Activation Analysis. The HEU core with current utilization has another 14 years of operation, before the addition of a large beryllium annulus would be required to further extend the life-time by 15 years. However, in keeping with the spirit of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, the decision was taken in 2003 to convert the core from HEU to LEU, inline with those at the Ecole Polytechnic and RMC SLOWPOKE facilities. This paper reports on the current status of the conversion activities, including key fuel manufacture and regulatory issues, which have seen substantial progress during the last year. A timetable for the complete process is given, and provided that the fuel fabrication can be completed in the estimated 18 months, the core conversion should be accomplished by the end of 2014. (author)

Uranium ore processing in Spain

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Josa, J.M.

1976-01-01

The paper presents a review of the Spanish needs of uranium concentrates and uranium ore processing technology and trends in Spain. Spain produces approximately 200t U 3 O 8 /a at two facilities. One plant in the south (Andujar, Jaen) can obtain 70t U 3 O 8 /a and uses a conventional acid leaching process with countercurrent solvent extraction. A second plant, situated in the west (Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca) has started in 1975 and has a capacity of 120-130t U 3 O 8 /a, using acid heap leaching and solvent extraction. There is another experimental facility (Don Benito, Badajoz) scheduled to start in 1976 and expected to produce about 25-35t U 3 O 8 /a as a by-product of the research work. For the near future (1978) it is hoped to increase the production with: (a) A new conventional acid leaching/solvent extraction plant in Ciudad Rodrigo; its tentative capacity is fixed at 550t U 3 O 8 /a. (b) A facility in the south, to recover about 130t U 3 O 8 /a from phosphoric acid. (c) Several small mobile plants (30t U 3 O 8 /a per plant); these will be placed near small and isolated mines. The next production increase (1979-1980) will come with the treatment of sandstones (Guadalajara and Cataluna) and lignites(Cataluna); this is being studied. There are also research programmes to study the recovery of uranium from low-grade ores (heap, in-situ and bacterial leaching) and from other industries. (author)

Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schaper, Annette

2013-07-01

Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaper, Annette

2013-01-01

Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

Minimizing civilian use of highly enriched uranium - FRM II and global developments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Englert, Matthias [Oeko-Institut e.V., Darmstadt (Germany)

2016-07-01

The need to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear applications is shrinking due to international efforts worldwide in the last three decades. Today low enriched uranium (LEU) that is not suitable for nuclear weapon purposes can be used instead in almost all civil applications. An overview of the current HEU use worldwide will be presented before focusing more on the use of HEU in research reactors and the conversion of existing reactors to LEU. Specifically interesting is the case of the German research reactor in Munich, the FRM-II. The reactor operates since ten years after intense national and international discussions over the use of weapon usable HEU to fuel the reactor. Since its construction the reactor is therefore obliged to convert to lower enrichment levels as soon as a suitable fuel becomes available. Despite huge international efforts to develop new fuels it is still not clear if and when the reactor can be converted.

Comparison of thermohydraulic and nuclear aspects in a standard HEU core and a typical LEU core for the HFR Petten. A case study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pruimboom, H.; Tas, A.

1985-01-01

Within the framework of the RERTR program various HEU-LEU core calculations have been performed by ANL in a cooperative effort with ECN and JRC Petten. The main purpose of this work has been to gain competence in analysing HEU-LEU core conversion for high power Materials Testing Reactors and to assist in a possible HEU-LEU conversion of the HFR Petten. For reference purposes the present HFR standard core (HEU) in the 'old' vessel geometry was calculated at first. As a next step the new vessel geometry and the increased fuel weights were taken into account. Subsequently various LEU HFR core options have been analysed. Main parameters in the LEU study were the uranium loading in the meat, the fuel type, the thickness of the meat, the number of fuel plates per element and the type of burnable poison applied. Though the study has not yet been completed, one of its striking preliminary results concerns the increased power peaking in the LEU fuel elements as compared with the HEU situation. A preliminary analysis of the thermal characteristics of a typical LEU core as compared with a standard HEU core has been made and is presented in the paper. A short survey of the various HEU and LEU calculations is given. The thermal safety analysis procedure for the HFR, as based on the flow instability criterion, is clarified. Finally, the thermal comparison HEU versus LEU and the resulting conclusions are presented. (author)

Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Hans; Laucht, Juergen

1996-01-01

Since the RERTR meeting in 1990 at Newport/USA, NUKEM recommended that the research reactor community agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) since there existed numerous specifications both from suppliers/fabricators and research reactors. The target recommended by NUKEM is to arrive at a worldwide unified standard specification in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for fabrication of research reactor fuel elements. In our paper presented at the RERTR meeting at Paris in September 1995, we pointed out that LEU and HEU supplied by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in the past was never 'virgin' material, i.e., it was mixed with reprocessed uranium. Our recommendation was to include this fact in the proposed unified specification. Since the RERTR meeting in 1995 progress on a unified standard specification has been made and we would like to provide more specific information about that in this paper. Furthermore, we will deal with the question whether there is a secure supply of LEU for converted research reactors. We list current and potential suppliers of LEU, noting however, that the DOE has for a number of years been unable to supply any LEU due to production problems. The future availability of LEU of U.S. origin is, of course, essential for those research reactor operators which have converted their reactors from HEU to LEU and which are intending to return spent fuel of U.S. origin to the U.S.A. (author)

Treatment of uranium-containing effluent in the process of metallic uranium parts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yuan Guoqi

1993-01-01

The anion exchange method used in treatment of uranium-containing effluent in the process of metallic parts is the subject of the paper. The results of the experiments shows that the uranium concentration in created water remains is less than 10 μg/l when the waste water flowed through 10000 column volume. A small facility with column volume 150 litre was installed and 1500 m 3 of waste water can be cleaned per year. (1 tab.)

Assessment of surface contamination level in an operating uranium ore processing facility of Jaduguda, India

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meena, J.S.; Patnaik, R.L.; Jha, V.N.; Sahoo, S.K.; Ravi, P.M.; Tripathi, R.M.

2014-01-01

Radiological concern of the occupational workers and the area is given priority over other safety issue in confirmation with the stipulated guideline of national regulatory agency (AERB/FEFCF/SG-2, 2007). The key concern from the radiological hazard evaluation point of view is air activity, external gamma level and surface contamination. Present investigations was carried out to ascertain the surface contamination level of uranium ore processing facility at Jaduguda, Jharkhand. For a low grade uranium ore processing industry surface contamination is a major concern in product precipitation and recovery section. In view of this, the ore processing plant can broadly be classified into three areas i.e. ion exchange area, precipitation and product recovery section and other areas. The monitoring results incorporate the level of surface contamination of the plant during the last five years. The geometric mean activity of surface contamination level was 31.1, 34.5 and 9.8 Bq dm -2 in ion exchange, product precipitation and recovery and other areas with GSD of 2, 2.5 and 1.9. In most of the cases the surface contamination level was well within the recommended limit of 100 Bq dm -2 for M class uranium compound. Occasional cases of surface contamination levels exceeding the recommended limit were addressed and areas were decontaminated. Based on the study, modification in the design feature of the surface of the finished product section was also suggested so that the decontamination procedure can be more effectively implemented

Operational experience in the production of 131Molybdenum and 99Iodine with high and low uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bravo, C.; Cristini, Pablo R..; Novello, A.; Bronca, M.; Cestau, Daniel; Centurion, R.; Bavaro, R.; Cestau, J.; Gualda, E.; Bronca, P.; Carranza, Eduardo C.

2009-01-01

In 1992, in an effort to curtail use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), hoping to alleviate nuclear security concerns, United States passed the Schumer amendment to the Energy Policy Act. This legislation conditioned U.S. export of HEU to foreign companies, understanding that these companies would switch as soon as possible to Lowly Enriched Uranium (LEU). This paper describes 99 Mo production flow chart, characteristics of process cells, shielding, systems of manipulation at distance, cell ventilation system and the method for personal dose monitoring. Production evolution for the span of years 1998 to 2007 is given by indicators, keeping in mind enrichment proportion change. Evolution shown on the indicators is directly related to the application of Safety Culture concepts adopted by personnel. (author)

Technical basis in support of the conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) core from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium - core neutron physics

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stillman, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Foyto, L [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; McKibben, J C [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Peters, N. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Stevens, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

2012-09-01

This report contains the results of reactor design and performance for conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support of the U. S. government.

Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

Progress in the neutronic core conversion (HEU-LEU) analysis of Ghana research reactor-1.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Anim-Sampong, S.; Maakuu, B. T.; Akaho, E. H. K.; Andam, A.; Liaw, J. J. R.; Matos, J. E.; Nuclear Engineering Division; Ghana Atomic Energy Commission; Kwame Nkrumah Univ. of Science and Technology

2006-01-01

The Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) and has operated at different power levels since its commissioning in March 1995. As required for all nuclear reactors, neutronic and thermal hydraulic analysis are being performed for the HEU-LEU core conversion studies of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) facility, which is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). Stochastic Monte Carlo particle transport methods and tools (MCNP4c/MCNP5) were used to fine-tune a previously developed 3-D MCNP model of the GHARR-1 facility and perform neutronic analysis of the 90.2% HEU reference and candidate LEU (UO{sub 2}, U{sub 3}Si{sub 2}, U-9Mo) fresh cores with varying enrichments from 12.6%-19.75%. In this paper, the results of the progress made in the Monte Carlo neutronic analysis of the HEU reference and candidate LEU fuels are presented. In particular, a comparative performance assessment of the LEU with respect to neutron flux variations in the fission chamber and experimental irradiation channels are highlighted.

Nondestructive assay of special nuclear material for uranium fuel-fabrication facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, H.A. Jr.; Schillebeeckx, P.

1997-01-01

A high-quality materials accounting system and effective international inspections in uranium fuel-fabrication facilities depend heavily upon accurate nondestructive assay measurements of the facility's nuclear materials. While item accounting can monitor a large portion of the facility inventory (fuel rods, assemblies, storage items), the contents of all such items and mass values for all bulk materials must be based on quantitative measurements. Weight measurements, combined with destructive analysis of process samples, can provide highly accurate quantitative information on well-characterized and uniform product materials. However, to cover the full range of process materials and to provide timely accountancy data on hard-to-measure items and rapid verification of previous measurements, radiation-based nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques play an important role. NDA for uranium fuel fabrication facilities relies on passive gamma spectroscopy for enrichment and U isotope mass values of medium-to-low-density samples and holdup deposits; it relies on active neutron techniques for U-235 mass values of high-density and heterogeneous samples. This paper will describe the basic radiation-based nondestructive assay techniques used to perform these measurements. The authors will also discuss the NDA measurement applications for international inspections of European fuel-fabrication facilities

SRTC criticality technical review: Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 93-18 Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rathbun, R.

1993-01-01

Separate review of NMP-NCS-930058, open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 93-18 Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility (U), August 17, 1993,close quotes was requested of SRTC Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment to determine waste container uranium limits in the Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility. The NCSE under review concludes that the NDA room remains in a critically safe configuration for all normal and single credible abnormal conditions. The ability to make this conclusion is highly dependent on array limitation and inclusion of physical barriers between 2x2x1 arrays of boxes containing materials contaminated with uranium. After a thorough review of the NCSE and independent calculations, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion

Fuel depletion analyses for the HEU core of GHARR-1: Part II: Fission product inventory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anim-Sampong, S.; Akaho, E.H.K.; Boadu, H.O.; Intsiful, J.D.K.; Osae, S.

1999-01-01

The fission product isotopic inventories have been estimated for a 90.2% highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lattice cell of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) using the WIMSD/4 transport lattice code. The results indicate a gradual decrease in the Xe 135 inventory, and saturation trend for Sm 149 , Cs 134 and Cs 135 inventories as the fuel is depleted to 10,000 MWd/tU. (author)

HEU core conversion of Russian production reactors: a major threat to the international RERTR regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

1998-01-01

This paper calls the attention for the major threat to the International Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, represented by the HEU core conversion of russian production reactors. This program aims to reduce and eventually eliminate international civilian commerce in nuclear weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium , and thereby significantly lower risks of the material being stolen or diverted by terrorist or states for producing nuclear weapons

Uranium conversion; Urankonvertering

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina [Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm (Sweden)

2006-03-15

FOI, has performed a study on uranium conversion processes that are of importance in the production of different uranium compounds in the nuclear industry. The same conversion processes are of interest both when production of nuclear fuel and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are considered. Countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions, with the intention to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, need some degree of uranium conversion capability depending on the uranium feed material available. This report describes the processes that are needed from uranium mining and milling to the different conversion processes for converting uranium ore concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the uranium compound used in most enrichment facilities. The processes needed to produce uranium dioxide for use in nuclear fuel and the processes needed to convert different uranium compounds to uranium metal - the form of uranium that is used in a nuclear weapon - are also presented. The production of uranium ore concentrate from uranium ore is included since uranium ore concentrate is the feed material required for a uranium conversion facility. Both the chemistry and principles or the different uranium conversion processes and the equipment needed in the processes are described. Since most of the equipment that is used in a uranium conversion facility is similar to that used in conventional chemical industry, it is difficult to determine if certain equipment is considered for uranium conversion or not. However, the chemical conversion processes where UF{sub 6} and UF{sub 4} are present require equipment that is made of corrosion resistant material.

Alternative dispositioning methods for HEU spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krupa, J.F.; McKibben, J.M.; Parks, P.B.; DuPont, M.E.

1995-01-01

The United States has a strong policy on prevention of the international spread of nuclear weapons. This policy was announced in Presidential Directive PDD-13 and summarized in a White House press release September 27, 1993. Two cornerstones of this policy are: seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly- enriched uranium or plutonium; propose hor-ellipsis prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside international safeguards. The Department of Energy is currently struggling to devise techniques that safely and efficiently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) while satisfying national non-proliferation policies. SRS plans and proposals for disposing of their SNF are safe and cost effective, and fully satisfy non-proliferation objectives

Audit of the Uranium Solidification Facility at the Savannah River Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

In the late 1980s, DOE decided to construct a Uranium Solidification Facility at the Savannah River Site to process liquid uranyl nitrate into powder. Since the need for weapons materials has been reduced, an audit was conducted to assess the need for this facility. The audit disclosed that DOE continued to construct the facility, because DOE's procedures did not ensure that projects of this type were periodically reassessed when significant program changes occurred. The audit identified more economical alternatives for processing existing quantities of liquid uranyl nitrate at the Savannah River Site

Engineering and technology in the deconstruction of nuclear materials production facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kingsley, R.S.; Reynolds, W.E.; Heffner, D.C.

1996-01-01

Technology and equipment exist to support nuclear facility deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning. In reality, this statement is not surprising because the nuclear industry has been decontaminating and decommissioning production plants for decades as new generations of production technology were introduced. Since the 1950s, the Babcock and Wilcox Company (B ampersand W) has operated a number of nuclear materials processing facilities to manufacture nuclear fuel for the commercial power industry and the U.S. Navy. These manufacturing facilities included a mixed oxide (PuO 2 -UO 2 ) nuclear fuel manufacturing plant, low- and high-enriched uranium (HEU/LEU) chemical and fuel plants, and fuel assembly plants. In addition, B ampersand W designed and build a major nuclear research center in Lynchburg, Virginia, to support these nuclear fuel manufacturing activities and to conduct nuclear power research. These nuclear research facilities included two research reactors, a hot-cell complex for nuclear materials research, four critical experiment facilities, and a plutonium fuels research and development facility. This article describes the B ampersand W deactivation, decomtanimation, and decommisioning program

Several issues on the decommissioning of uranium mining/milling facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xu Lechang; Xu Jianxin; Gao Shangxiong

2007-01-01

Several issues on the decommissioning of uranium mining/milling facilities are discussed at the national and international level of decommissioning, including radiation, monitoring, dose evaluation, covering, water treatment and stabilization of uranium tailings impoundment, etc. Some suggestions are made: drawing international lessons on decommissioning of uranium mining/milling facilities; enhancing monitoring and database construction in decommissioning management; stressing utilization of measured dose data; using the experience of other countries for reference on covering designs for uranium tailings impoundment and water treatment; strengthening decommissioning management, etc. (authors)

Quality assurance in the enriched uranium operations NDA facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

May, P.K.; Ceo, R.N. [Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, TN (United States)

1997-11-01

The Nondestructive Analysis (NDA) Facility at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant has characterized process wastes for Enriched Uranium Operations since 1978. Since that time, over 50,000 items have been analyzed. Analysis results are used to determine whether or not recovery of uranium from process wastes is economically feasible. Our instrument complement includes one large segmented gamma scanner (SGS), two smaller SGS, two solution assay systems (SAS), and Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC). The large SGS is used for analyzing High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters ant 208-L drums filled with combustible contaminated waste. The smaller SGS are used to analyze 4-L containers of ash and leached residues. The SAS are used to analyze 125 ml bottles of aqueous or organic waste solutions that may contain uranium. The gamma-based NDA techniques are used to identify which process wastes can be discarded, and which must be recycled. The AWCC is used to analyze high-density materials which are not amenable to gamma-ray analysis. 1 ref., 4 figs.

Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

K. J. Allen; I. Bolshinsky; L. L. Biro; M. E. Budu; N. V. Zamfir; M. Dragusin

2010-07-01

Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world’s first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment.

Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Allen, K.J.; Bolshinsky, I.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.

2010-01-01

Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world's first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3. country under the RRRFR program and the 14. country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment. (authors)

The potential for criticality following disposal of uranium at low-level waste facilities: Uranium blended with soil

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Toran, L.E.; Hopper, C.M.; Naney, M.T. [and others

1997-06-01

The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether or not fissile uranium in low-level-waste (LLW) facilities can be concentrated by hydrogeochemical processes to permit nuclear criticality. A team of experts in hydrology, geology, geochemistry, soil chemistry, and criticality safety was formed to develop achievable scenarios for hydrogeochemical increases in concentration of special nuclear material (SNM), and to use these scenarios to aid in evaluating the potential for nuclear criticality. The team`s approach was to perform simultaneous hydrogeochemical and nuclear criticality studies to (1) identify some achievable scenarios for uranium migration and concentration increase at LLW disposal facilities, (2) model groundwater transport and subsequent concentration increase via sorption or precipitation of uranium, and (3) evaluate the potential for nuclear criticality resulting from potential increases in uranium concentration over disposal limits. The analysis of SNM was restricted to {sup 235}U in the present scope of work. The outcome of the work indicates that criticality is possible given established regulatory limits on SNM disposal. However, a review based on actual disposal records of an existing site operation indicates that the potential for criticality is not a concern under current burial practices.

The potential for criticality following disposal of uranium at low-level waste facilities: Uranium blended with soil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toran, L.E.; Hopper, C.M.; Naney, M.T.

1997-06-01

The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether or not fissile uranium in low-level-waste (LLW) facilities can be concentrated by hydrogeochemical processes to permit nuclear criticality. A team of experts in hydrology, geology, geochemistry, soil chemistry, and criticality safety was formed to develop achievable scenarios for hydrogeochemical increases in concentration of special nuclear material (SNM), and to use these scenarios to aid in evaluating the potential for nuclear criticality. The team's approach was to perform simultaneous hydrogeochemical and nuclear criticality studies to (1) identify some achievable scenarios for uranium migration and concentration increase at LLW disposal facilities, (2) model groundwater transport and subsequent concentration increase via sorption or precipitation of uranium, and (3) evaluate the potential for nuclear criticality resulting from potential increases in uranium concentration over disposal limits. The analysis of SNM was restricted to 235 U in the present scope of work. The outcome of the work indicates that criticality is possible given established regulatory limits on SNM disposal. However, a review based on actual disposal records of an existing site operation indicates that the potential for criticality is not a concern under current burial practices

Uranium silicide activities at Babcock and Wilcox

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Noel, W.W.; Freim, J.B.

1983-01-01

Babcock and Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD) in conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is actively involved in the Reduced Enrichment Research Test Reactor (RERTR) Program to produce low enriched fuel elements for research reactors. B and W and ANL have undertaken a joint effort in which NNFD will fabricate two low enriched uranium (LEU), Oak Ridge Reactor (ORR) elements with uranium silicide fuel furnished by ANL. These elements are being fabricated for irradiation testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Concurrently with this program, NNFD is developing and implementing the uranium silicide and uranium aluminide fuel fabrication technology. NNFD is fabricating the uranium silicide ORR elements in a two-phase program, Development and Production. To summarize: 1. Full size fuel plates can be made with U 3 SiAl but the fabricator must prevent oxidation of the compact prior to hot roll bonding; 2. Providing the ANL U 3 Si x irradiation results are successful, NNFD plans to provide two ORR elements during February 1983; 3. NNFD is developing and implementing U 3 Si x and UAI x fuel fabrication technology to be operational in 1983; 4. NNFD can supply U 3 O 8 high enriched uranium (HEU) or low enriched uranium (LEU) research reactor elements; 5. NNFD is capable of providing high quality, cost competitive LEU or HEU research reactor elements to meet the needs of the customer

Transition from HEU to LEU fuel in Romania's 14-MW TRIGA reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, J.L.

1995-01-01

The 14-MW TRIGA steady state reactor (SSR) located in Pitesti, Romania, first went critical in the fall of 1979. Initially, the core configuration for full power operation used 29 fuel clusters each containing a 5 x 5 square array of HEU U (10 wt% - ZrH - Er 2.8 wt%) fuel-moderator rods (1.295 cm o.d.) clad in Incoloy. With a total inventory of 35 HEU fuel clusters, burnup, considerations required a gradual expansion of the core from 29 to 32 and finally to 35 clusters before the reactor was shut down because of insufficient excess reactivity. At this time each of the original 29 fuel clusters had an average 235 U burnup in the range from 50 to 62%. Because of the U.S. policy regarding the export of highly enriched uranium, fresh HEU TRIGA replacement fuel is not available. After a number of safety-related measurements, the SSR is expected to resume full power operation in the near future using a mixed core containing five LEU TRIGA clusters of the same geometry as the original fuel but with fuel-moderator rods containing 45 wt% U (19.7% 235 U enrichment) and 1.1 wt% Er. Rods for 14 additional LEU fuel clusters will be fabricated by General Atomics. In support of the SSR mixed core operation numerous neutronic calculations have been performed. This paper presents some of the results of those calculations. (author)

Subcritical Neutron Multiplication Measurements of HEU Using Delayed Neutrons as the Driving Source

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hollas, C.L.; Goulding, C.A.; Myers, W.L.

1999-01-01

A new method for the determination of the multiplication of highly enriched uranium systems is presented. The method uses delayed neutrons to drive the HEU system. These delayed neutrons are from fission events induced by a pulsed 14-MeV neutron source. Between pulses, neutrons are detected within a medium efficiency neutron detector using 3 He ionization tubes within polyethylene enclosures. The neutron detection times are recorded relative to the initiation of the 14-MeV neutron pulse, and subsequently analyzed with the Feynman reduced variance method to extract singles, doubles and triples neutron counting rates. Measurements have been made on a set of nested hollow spheres of 93% enriched uranium, with mass values from 3.86 kg to 21.48 kg. The singles, doubles and triples counting rates for each uranium system are compared to calculations from point kinetics models of neutron multiplicity to assign multiplication values. These multiplication values are compared to those from MC NP K-Code calculations

78 FR 60928 - Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2013-10-02

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU The Netherlands. National Nuclear Security Uranium uranium (17.1 targets in France... export from 9.4 kg of U-235 contained in 10.1 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 17.1 kg of U-235...

The status of HEU to LEU core conversion activities at the Jamaica SLOWPOKE

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Preston, J.; Grant, C., E-mail: john.preston@uwimona.edu.jm [Univ. of the West Indies, Mona Campus, International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, Mona (Jamaica)

2012-12-15

The SLOWPOKE reactor in Jamaica has been operated by the International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, University of the West Indies since 1984, mainly for the purpose of Neutron Activation Analysis. The HEU core with current utilization has another 14 years of operation, before the addition of a large beryllium annulus would be required to further extend the life-time by 15 years. However, in keeping with the spirit of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, the decision was taken in 2003 to convert the core from HEU to LEU, in line with those at the Ecole Polytechnic and RMC SLOWPOKE facilities. This paper reports on the current status of the conversion activities, including key fuel manufacture and regulatory issues, which have seen substantial progress during the last year. A timetable for the complete process is given, and provided that the fuel fabrication can be completed in the estimated 18 months, the core conversion should be accomplished by the end of 2014. (author)

A modern depleted uranium manufacturing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zagula, T.A.

1995-07-01

The Specific Manufacturing Capabilities (SMC) Project located at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and operated by Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co. (LMIT) for the Department of Energy (DOE) manufactures depleted uranium for use in the U.S. Army MIA2 Abrams Heavy Tank Armor Program. Since 1986, SMC has fabricated more than 12 million pounds of depleted uranium (DU) products in a multitude of shapes and sizes with varying metallurgical properties while maintaining security, environmental, health and safety requirements. During initial facility design in the early 1980's, emphasis on employee safety, radiation control and environmental consciousness was gaining momentum throughout the DOE complex. This fact coupled with security and production requirements forced design efforts to focus on incorporating automation, local containment and computerized material accountability at all work stations. The result was a fully automated production facility engineered to manufacture DU armor packages with virtually no human contact while maintaining security, traceability and quality requirements. This hands off approach to handling depleted uranium resulted in minimal radiation exposures and employee injuries. Construction of the manufacturing facility was complete in early 1986 with the first armor package certified in October 1986. Rolling facility construction was completed in 1987 with the first certified plate produced in the fall of 1988. Since 1988 the rolling and manufacturing facilities have delivered more than 2600 armor packages on schedule with 100% final product quality acceptance. During this period there was an annual average of only 2.2 lost time incidents and a single individual maximum radiation exposure of 150 mrem. SMC is an example of designing and operating a facility that meets regulatory requirements with respect to national security, radiation control and personnel safety while achieving production schedules and product quality

Getting the plutonium disposition job done: the concept of a joint-venture disposition enterprise financed by additional sales of highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, M.

1996-01-01

The paper gives an outline of a concept which has the potential to provide both substantial financing needed for disposition of plutonium from excess nuclear weapons and the long-term management structure required to implement this effort. The three most important issues were underlined. First, it is urgent to modernize security and accounting systems for all weapon-usable nuclear materials, particularly from former Soviet Union. Second, excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) must be brought under international monitoring to ensure irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. Third, quick move should be done towards actual disposition of excess plutonium and HEU. Technology already exists, but the key issues are how to get finance and manage this operation, particularly given its immense scope and controversial nature. An international joint venture 'Enterprise for nuclear Security' that would build and operate plutonium disposition facilities under stringent non-proliferation controls, financed through additional sales of HEU is a potentially promising approach to addressing the most difficult issues facing the disposition problem

Forensic analysis of a smuggled HEU sample interdicted in Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niemeyer, S.; Hutcheon, I.

2002-01-01

a light-water reactor with a very thermal spectrum. We calculate that a burn-up exposure of more than 300,000 MWD/MT are required to match the U isotopics. We found it quite difficult, though, to simultaneously match the U and Pu isotopics using these codes and the assumed geometry. We will discuss the potential types of reactors that could have produced this HEU sample, but our preferred interpretation is that it is a research reactor. Although we are not able to pinpoint the type of reactor, we emphasize that we have identified a number of distinguishing characteristics of this HEU sample that would enable one to link it with other samples from the same reactor or reprocessing environment. The very low abundances of the minor U isotopes, U-232 and U-233, coupled with the high abundance of U-236 are one such feature. Coupling the Pu isotopics to the U composition makes for an especially distinctive signature. The particle size distribution is also highly unusual for a reactor fuel. The accuracy with which we have determined the time the material was last chemically processed also offers a potential pathway to attribution. If nuclear regulatory agencies maintain chronological records of activities at known reprocessing facilities, the physical and chemical characteristics discussed here may be sufficient either to identify a specific facility or at least to eliminate a large number of potential reprocessing facilities. (author)

The University of Missouri Research Reactor HEU to LEU conversion project status

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McKibben, James C; Kutikkad, Kiratadas; Foyto, Leslie P; Peters, Nickie J; Solbrekken, Gary L; Kennedy, John [University of Missouri Research Reactor, Missouri (United States); Stillman, John A; Feldman, Earl E; Tzanos, Constantine P; Stevens, John G [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois (United States)

2012-03-15

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is one of five U.S. high performance research and test reactors that are actively collaborating with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement for the currently required highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. A conversion feasibility study based on U-10Mo monolithic LEU fuel was completed in 2009. It was concluded that the proposed LEU fuel assembly design, in conjunction with an increase in power level from 10 to 12 MWth, will (1) maintain safety margins during operation, (2) allow operating fuel cycle lengths to be maintained for efficient and effective use of the facility, and (3) preserve an acceptable level and spectrum of key neutron fluxes to meet the scientific mission of the facility. The MURR and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) team is continuing to work toward realization of the conversion. The 'Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Methodologies and Scenarios for LEU Conversion of MURR' was completed in June 2011. This report documents design parameter values critical to the Fuel Development (FD), Fuel Fabrication Capability (FFC) and Hydromechanical Fuel Test Facility (HMFTF) projects. The report also provides a preliminary evaluation of safety analysis techniques and data that will be needed to complete the fuel conversion Safety Analysis Report (SAR), especially those related to the U-10Mo monolithic LEU fuel. Specific studies are underway to validate the proposed path to an LEU fuel conversion. Coupled fluid-structure simulations and experiments are being conducted to understand the hydrodynamic plate deformation risk for 0.965 mm (38 mil) thick fuel plates. Methodologies that were recently developed to answer the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Request for Additional Information (RAI) regarding the MURR 2006 relicensing submittal will be used in the LEU conversion effort. Transition LEU fuel elements that will have a minimal impact on

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Renfro, David G [ORNL; Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Griffin, Frederick P [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL

2012-03-01

This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Renfro, David G.; Cook, David Howard; Freels, James D.; Griffin, Frederick P.; Ilas, Germina; Sease, John D.; Chandler, David

2012-01-01

This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

10 CFR 40.33 - Issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility... License Applications § 40.33 Issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility. (a) The Commission... the licensing of the construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility. The Commission will...

Guide to the bioassay of uranium at uranium mine-mill facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

As a result of occupational exposure, uranium may be taken into the body by inhalation, ingestion or absorption through skin wounds. The organs at risk are the lung, kidney, and bones. Analysis of urine samples for uranium is recommended on a regular monthly basis, before and after a rest period, and it is suggested that a worker be removed from a working area if a level above 300 μg/l is found before a rest period, or 150 μg/l after a rest period. Background information on the development of a bioassay program is given, and a recommended program for uranium mine and mill facilities is included. (L.L.)

Uses for Uranium-233: What Should Be Kept for Future Needs?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsberg, C.W.; Lewis, L.C.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been evaluating what fissile materials to keep for potential uses and what fissile materials to declare excess. There are three major fissile materials: high-enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and uranium-233 ( 233 U). Both HEU and plutonium were produced in large quantities for use in nuclear weapons and for reactor fuel. Uranium-233 was investigated for use in nuclear weapons and as a reactor fuel; however, it was never deployed in nuclear weapons or used commercially as a nuclear fuel. Uranium-233 has limited current uses, but it could have several future uses. Because of (1) the cost of storing 233 U and (2) arms control considerations, the U.S. government must decide how much of the existing 233 U inventory should be kept for future use and how much should be disposed of as waste. The objective of this report is to provide technical and economic input to make a use-or-dispose decision

Material control and accounting requirements for uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ting, P.

1991-01-01

This paper reports that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has defined material control and accounting (MC and A) requirement for low-enriched uranium enrichment plants licensed under 10 CFR parts 40 and 70. Following detailed assessment of potential safeguards issues relevant to these facilities, a new MC and A rule was developed. The primary safeguards considerations are detection of the loss of special nuclear material, detection of clandestine production of special nuclear material of low strategic significance for unauthorized use or distribution, and detection of unauthorized production of uranium enriched to ≥10 wt % U-235. The primary safeguards concerns identified were the large absolute limit of error associated with the material balance closing, the inability to shutdown some uranium enrichment technologies to perform a cleanout inventory of the process system, and the flexibility of some of these technologies to produce higher enrichments. Unauthorized production scenarios were identified for some technologies that could circumvent the detection of the production and removal of 5 kilograms of U-235 as high-enriched uranium through conventional material control and accounting programs. Safeguards techniques, including the use of production and process control information, measurements, and technical surveillance, were identified to compensate for these concerns

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.

2007-01-01

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique

Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of fuel cycle programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. Reference annual mass flows and inventories for a representative 1,400 Mwe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycle have been investigated for three cases: the 100 percent uranium oxide UO 2 fuel loading once through cycle, and the 33 percent mixed oxide MOX loading configuration for a first and second plutonium recycle. The analysis addresses fuel cycle developments; plutonium and uranium inventory and flow balances; nuclear fuel processing operations; UO 2 once-through and MOX first and second recycles; and the economic incentives to draw-down the excess separated plutonium stores. The preliminary analysis explores several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium arisings and HEU, and the consequences of the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments

Design Study for a Low-Enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2008

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Primm, Trent [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL

2009-03-01

This report documents progress made during FY 2008 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in reactor performance from the current level. Results of selected benchmark studies imply that calculations of LEU performance are accurate. Scoping experiments with various manufacturing methods for forming the LEU alloy profile are presented.

Conceptual Process for the Manufacture of Low-Enriched Uranium/Molybdenum Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sease, J.D.; Primm, R.T. III; Miller, J.H.

2007-01-01

The U.S. nonproliferation policy 'to minimize, and to the extent possible, eliminate the use of HEU in civil nuclear programs throughout the world' has resulted in the conversion (or scheduled conversion) of many of the U.S. research reactors from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). A foil fuel appears to offer the best option for using a LEU fuel in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) without degrading the performance of the reactor. The purpose of this document is to outline a proposed conceptual fabrication process flow sheet for a new, foil-type, 19.75%-enriched fuel for HFIR. The preparation of the flow sheet allows a better understanding of the costs of infrastructure modifications, operating costs, and implementation schedule issues associated with the fabrication of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preparation of a reference flow sheet is one of the first planning steps needed in the development of a new manufacturing capacity for low enriched fuels for U.S. research and test reactors. The flow sheet can be used to develop a work breakdown structure (WBS), a critical path schedule, and identify development needs. The reference flow sheet presented in this report is specifically for production of LEU foil fuel for the HFIR. The need for an overall reference flow sheet for production of fuel for all High Performance Research Reactors (HPRR) has been identified by the national program office. This report could provide a starting point for the development of such a reference flow sheet for a foil-based fuel for all HPRRs. The reference flow sheet presented is based on processes currently being developed by the national program for the LEU foil fuel when available, processes used historically in the manufacture of other nuclear fuels and materials, and processes used in other manufacturing industries producing a product configuration similar to the form required in manufacturing a foil fuel. The processes in the reference flow sheet are within the

Conceptual Process for the Manufacture of Low-Enriched Uranium/Molybdenum Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sease, J.D.; Primm, R.T. III; Miller, J.H.

2007-09-30

The U.S. nonproliferation policy 'to minimize, and to the extent possible, eliminate the use of HEU in civil nuclear programs throughout the world' has resulted in the conversion (or scheduled conversion) of many of the U.S. research reactors from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). A foil fuel appears to offer the best option for using a LEU fuel in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) without degrading the performance of the reactor. The purpose of this document is to outline a proposed conceptual fabrication process flow sheet for a new, foil-type, 19.75%-enriched fuel for HFIR. The preparation of the flow sheet allows a better understanding of the costs of infrastructure modifications, operating costs, and implementation schedule issues associated with the fabrication of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preparation of a reference flow sheet is one of the first planning steps needed in the development of a new manufacturing capacity for low enriched fuels for U.S. research and test reactors. The flow sheet can be used to develop a work breakdown structure (WBS), a critical path schedule, and identify development needs. The reference flow sheet presented in this report is specifically for production of LEU foil fuel for the HFIR. The need for an overall reference flow sheet for production of fuel for all High Performance Research Reactors (HPRR) has been identified by the national program office. This report could provide a starting point for the development of such a reference flow sheet for a foil-based fuel for all HPRRs. The reference flow sheet presented is based on processes currently being developed by the national program for the LEU foil fuel when available, processes used historically in the manufacture of other nuclear fuels and materials, and processes used in other manufacturing industries producing a product configuration similar to the form required in manufacturing a foil fuel. The processes in the reference flow sheet are

HEU/LEU-conversion of BER II successfully finished

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, K.; Fischer, C.-O.; Krohn, H.

2000-01-01

The BER II (Berliner Experimental Reactor) research reactor is a swimming pool type reactor located in Berlin, Germany. The reactor operates with a thermal power of 10 MW and is primarily used to produce neutrons for neutron scattering experiments. The conversion from HEU- to LEU-fuel elements began in August, 1997. At the last RERTR Meeting 1999 in Budapest, Hungary, Hahn-Meitner-Institut (HMI) presented a 'Status Report' on the conversion of 10 HEU/LEU mixed cores. In February 2000, HMI finished the HEU/LEU-conversion. Hereby, the first pure LEU-standard-core went into operation. Our second LEU-core just ends its operation at the end of July. The third LEU-core will be built up in the beginning of August. The average burn-up rate was improved from 50 - 55% (HEU) to 60 - 65% (LEU). Therefore, only 14 elements/year are now used instead of 28/year. The following report describes our first steps in building pure LEU-cores from mixed HEU/LEU-cores, as well as our initial experience using the pure LEU-cores. (author)

Unallocated Off-Specification Highly Enriched Uranium: Recommendations for Disposition

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bridges, D. N.; Boeke, S. G.; Tousley, D. R.; Bickford, W.; Goergen, C.; Williams, W.; Hassler, M.; Nelson, T.; Keck, R.; Arbital, J.

2002-02-27

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made significant progress with regard to disposition planning for 174 metric tons (MTU) of surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Approximately 55 MTU of this 174 MTU are ''offspec'' HEU. (''Off-spec'' signifies that the isotopic or chemical content of the material does not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials standards for commercial nuclear reactor fuel.) Approximately 33 of the 55 MTU have been allocated to off-spec commercial reactor fuel per an Interagency Agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (1). To determine disposition plans for the remaining {approx}22 MTU, the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) co-sponsored this technical study. This paper represents a synopsis of the formal technical report (NNSA/NN-0014). The {approx} 22 MTU of off-spec HEU inventory in this study were divided into two main groupings: one grouping with plutonium (Pu) contamination and one grouping without plutonium. This study identified and evaluated 26 potential paths for the disposition of this HEU using proven decision analysis tools. This selection process resulted in recommended and alternative disposition paths for each group of HEU. The evaluation and selection of these paths considered criteria such as technical maturity, programmatic issues, cost, schedule, and environment, safety and health compliance. The primary recommendations from the analysis are comprised of 7 different disposition paths. The study recommendations will serve as a technical basis for subsequent programmatic decisions as disposition of this HEU moves into the implementation phase.

Radiation protection of workers from uranium mines and of the public living nearby uranium mining and milling facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kiselev, Mikhail; Romanov, Vladimir; Shandala, Nataliya; Gneusheva, Galina; Titov, Alex; Novikova, Natalia; Smith, Graham

2008-01-01

As part of the program of nuclear power development, the Russia Federation plans to increase uranium production and to improve supply from existing uranium mining and milling facilities. Moreover, development of new uranium ore deposits is also envisaged. A corollary of these developments is the placing of a high priority on environmental and human health protection Special attention should be paid to assurance of health protection both of workers and of the public living nearby such facilities. This paper reviews the status and development of understanding of facilities in the Russian Federation from a regulatory perspective. (author)

Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team. UPSAT. An international peer review service for uranium production facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

The IAEA Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team (UPSAT) programme is designed to assist Member States to improve the safe operation of uranium production facilities. This programme facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience between team members and industry personnel. An UPSAT mission is an international expert review, conducted outside of any regulatory framework. The programme is implemented in the spirit of voluntary co-operation to contribute to the enhancement of operational safety and practices where it is most effective, at the facility itself. An UPSAT review supplements other facility and regulatory efforts which may have the same objective

Use of highly enriched uranium at the FRM-II

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boening, K. [Forschungs-Neutronenquelle FRM-II, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, D-85747 Garching bei Muenchen (Germany)

2002-07-01

The new FRM-II research reactor in Munich, Germany, provides a high flux of thermal neutrons outside of the core at only 20 MW power. This is achieved by using a single compact, cylindrical fuel element with highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is cooled by light water and placed in the center of a large heavy water tank. The paper outlines the arguments which have led to this core concept and summarizes its performance. It also reports on alternative studies which have been performed for the case of low enriched uranium (LEU) and compares the data of the two concepts, with the conclusion that the FRM-II cannot be converted to LEU. A concept using medium enriched uranium (MEU) is described as well as plans to develop such a fuel element in the future. Finally, it is argued that the use of HEU fuel elements at the FRM-II does not - realistically -involve any risk of proliferation. (author)

Performance and economic penalties of some LEU [low enriched uranium] conversion options for the Australian Reactor HIFAR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCulloch, D.B.; Robinson, G.S.

1987-01-01

Performance calculations for the conversion of HIFAR to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel have been extended to a wide range of 235 U loadings per fuel element. Using a simple approximate algorithm for the likely costs of LEU compared with highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements, the increases in annual fuelling costs for LEU compared with HEU fuel are examined for a range of conversion options involving different performance penalties. No significant operational/safety problems were found for any of the options canvassed. (Author)

The conversion of NRU from HEU to LEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sears, D.F.; Atfield, M.D.; Kennedy, I.C.

1990-01-01

The program at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories (CRNL) to develop and test low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU, 3 Si, USiAl, USi Al and U 3 Si 2 (U-3.96 wt% Si; U-3.5 wt% Si-1.5 wt% AL; U-3.2 wt%; Si-3 wt% Al; U-7.3 wt% Si, respectively). Fuel elements were fabricated with uranium loadings suitable for NRU, 3.15 gU/cm 3 , and for NRX, 4.5 gU/cm 3 , and were irradiated under normal fuel-operating conditions. Eight experimental irradiations involving 100 mini-elements and 84 full-length elements (7X12-element rods) were completed to qualify the LEU fuel and the fabrication technology. Post irradiation examinations confirmed that the performance of the LEU fuel, and that of a medium enrichment uranium (MEU, 45% U-235) alloy fuel tested as a back-up, was comparable to the HEU fuel. The uranium silicide dispersion fuel swelling was approximately linear up to burnups exceeding NRU's design terminal burnup (80 at%). NRU was partially converted to LEU fuel when the first 31 prototype fuel rods manufactured with industrial scale production equipment were installed in the reactor. The rods were loaded in NRU at a fuelling rate of about two rods per week over the period 1988 September to December. This partial LEU core (one third of a full NRU core) has allowed the reactor engineers and physicists to evaluate the bulk effects of the LEU conversion on NRU operations. As expected, the irradiation is proceeding without incident

The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Means to an End for the Operational Commander

Science.gov (United States)

2009-05-04

The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors ( RERTR ) Program develops technology necessary to enable the conversion of civilian...facilities using high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and targets. The RERTR Program was initiated by the U.S. Department of...processes have been developed for producing radioisotopes with LEU targets. The RERTR Program is managed by the Office of Nuclear Material Threat

Restoration activities in uranium mining and milling facilities in Spain

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garcia Quiros, J.M.

1997-01-01

From the end of the 80's up to now, several tasks have been carried out in Spain on restoration in the field of uranium mining and milling, significant among them being Andujar Uranium Mill (FUA) closure and La Haba closure. Also, a study has been carried out on restoration of inoperative and abandoned uranium mine sites. At present, detailed plans are being worked out for the project on the closure of the Elefante plant. All activities have been developed in the common framework of national standards and regulations which are generally in compliance with the standards, regulations and recommendations of international organizations. This paper describes briefly the standards and the criteria applied to the restoration tasks at various sites of the uranium mining and milling facilities in Spain. The restoration activities have different characteristics La Haba facility is an isolated and conventional facility to produce uranium concentrate; in the case of old and abandoned uranium mines the intervention criteria is more relevant than the activities to be carried out; the closure (the first phase of licensing) and restoration activities of Elefante plant have to be developed taking into account that it is sited within the area of Quercus plant which is currently in operation. (author)

Progress in chemical processing of LEU targets for 99Mo production - 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Conner, C.; Sedlet, J.; Wygmans, D.G.; Wu, D.; Iskander, F.; Landsberger, S.

1997-01-01

Presented here are recent experimental results of our continuing development activities associated with converting current processes for producing fission-product 99 Mo from targets using high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Studies were focused in four areas: (1) measuring the chemical behavior of iodine, rhodium, and silver in the LEU-modified Cintichem process, (2) performing experiments and calculations to assess the suitability of zinc fission barriers for LEU metal foil targets, (3) developing an actinide separations method for measuring alpha contamination of the purified 99 Mo product, and (4) developing a cooperation with Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory that will lead to approval by the U.S. Federal Drug Administration for production of 99 Mo from LEU targets. Experimental results continue to show the technical feasibility of converting current HEU processes to LEU. (author)

Control and prevention of seepage from uranium mill waste disposal facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, R.E.

1978-01-01

This paper constitutes an analysis of the technologies which are available for the prevention of movement of waste waters out of uranium mill waste disposal facilities via sub-surface routes. Hydrogeologic criteria for potential uranium mill waste disposal sites and mathematical modeling of contaminant migration in ground water are presented. Methods for prevention of seepage from uranium mill waste disposal facilities are investigated: liners, clay seals, synthetic polymeric membranes (PVC, polyethylene, chlorinated polyethylene, hypalon, butyl rubber, neoprene, elasticized polyolefin)

Loading and initial start-up testing of the low-enrichment uranium core for the Ohio State University research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talnagi, J.W.

1989-01-01

Conversion of the Ohio State University Research Reactor (OSURR) from high-enrichment uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enrichment uranium (LEU) fuel elements was begun in August 1985, with funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the university. Conversion of the OSURR from HEU to LEU fuel was successfully completed. The reactor is operational at 10-kW steady-state thermal power. Measurements of selected core parameters have been made and compared with predicted values and previous values for the HEU core. In general, measured results agree well with predicted performance, and minor changes have been detected in certain core parameters as a result of the change to LEU fuel. Future plans include additional core testing and a possible increase in operating power

Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Jaluvka, D. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States)

2017-02-01

This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members in the Research and Test Reactor Department at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. MURR LEU conversion is part of an overall effort to develop and qualify high-density fuel within the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor Conversion (USHPRR) program conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Material Management and Minimization (M³).

Uranium processing and properties

CERN Document Server

2013-01-01

Covers a broad spectrum of topics and applications that deal with uranium processing and the properties of uranium Offers extensive coverage of both new and established practices for dealing with uranium supplies in nuclear engineering Promotes the documentation of the state-of-the-art processing techniques utilized for uranium and other specialty metals

2011 Progress Report on HEU Minimization Activities in Argentina

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bonini, A.; Cristini, P.; Lio, L. De; Dell' Occhio, L.; Gil, D.; Gonzalez, A.G.; Gonzalez, R.; Varela, C. Komar; Lopez, M.; Novara, O.; Taboada, H. [Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica, Av. Del Libertador 8250 (1429) Buenos Aires (Argentina)

2011-07-01

After the core conversion of the RA-6 reactor finished in March 2008, an extension of the original CNEA-NNSA DoE contract was signed to enhance the final national HEU inventories minimization. Before this process, CNEA reserved a small inventory of HEU for R and D uses in fission chambers, neutronic probes and standards. This minimization comprises that all fresh and irradiated HEU remnant inventories coming from fuels and Mo99 irradiation targets fabrication and irradiated HEU-oxides retained in production filters and solutions will be recovered, down-blended into LEU and purified or dispose as waste whenever its recovery would not be advisable due to cost-benefit consideration. CNEA has a R and D program to develop the fabrication technology of both dispersed U-Mo (Al-Si matrix and Al cladding) and monolithic (Zry-4 cladding) miniplates to support the qualification activities of the RERTR program. Some monolithic 58% enrichment and LEU 8%Mo and U10%Mo miniplates and plates were and are being delivered to INL-DoE to be irradiated in the ATR reactor core. CNEA, a worldwide leader on LEU technology for fission radioisotope production is providing Brazil with 1/3 of the national requirements on Mo99 by weekly deliveries. Australia has started the fission radioisotope production through several batches by week, based on CNEA's LEU technology provided by INVAP SE. CNEA is also committed to improve the diffusion of LEU target and radiochemical technology for radioisotope production and target and process optimization. Future plans include: 1. Plans to recover and purify the LEU based inventories in Mo99 production filters, once the HEU to LEU campaign is over. 2. Fabrication and delivering to INL to be irradiated in the ATR core of U-8%Mo and U-10%Mo monolithic miniplates and development and fabrication of LEU very high density monolithic and dispersed U-Mo fuel plates with Zr cladding for the FUTURE-MONO experiment in the frame of the RERTR program. 3

An Effort to Improve Uranium Foil Target Fabrication Technology by Single Roll Method

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sim, Moon Soo; Lee, Jong Hyeon [Chungnam National University, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Chang Kyu [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2012-05-15

Technetium-99({sup 99m}Tc) is the most commonly used radioisotope in nuclear medicine for diagnostic procedures. It is produced from the decay of its parent Mo-99, which is sent to the hospital or clinic in the form of a generator. Recently, all of the major providers of Mo-99 have used high-enrichment uranium (HEU) as a target material in a research and test reactor. As a part of a nonproliferation effort, the RERTR program has investigated the production of the fission isotope Mo-99 using low-enrichment uranium(LEU) instead of HEU since 1993, a parent nuclide of {sup 99m}Tc , which is a major isotope for a medical diagnosis. As uranium foils have been produced by the conventional method on a laboratory scale by a repetitive hot-rolling method with significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the planar flow casting(PFC) method. In KAERI, many experiments are performed using depleted uranium(DU).

Energy–angle correlation of neutrons and gamma-rays emitted from an HEU source

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Miloshevsky, G., E-mail: gennady@purdue.edu; Hassanein, A.

2014-06-01

Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) yield very unique fission signatures, namely correlated neutrons and gamma-rays. A major challenge is not only to detect, but also to rapidly identify and recognize SNM with certainty. Accounting for particle multiplicity and correlations is one of standard ways to detect SNM. However, many parameter data such as joint distributions of energy, angle, lifetime, and multiplicity of neutrons and gamma-rays can lead to better recognition of SNM signatures in the background radiation noise. These joint distributions are not well understood. The Monte Carlo simulations of the transport of neutrons and gamma-rays produced from spontaneous and interrogation-induced fission of SNM are carried out using the developed MONSOL computer code. The energy spectra of neutrons and gamma-rays from a bare Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) source are investigated. The energy spectrum of gamma-rays shows spectral lines by which HEU isotopes can be identified, while those of neutrons do not show any characteristic lines. The joint probability density function (JPDF) of the energy–angle association of neutrons and gamma-rays is constructed. Marginal probability density functions (MPDFs) of energy and angle are derived from JPDF. A probabilistic model is developed for the analysis of JPDF and MPDFs. This probabilistic model is used to evaluate mean values, standard deviations, covariance and correlation between the energy and angle of neutrons and gamma-rays emitted from the HEU source. For both neutrons and gamma-rays, it is found that the energy–angle variables are only weakly correlated.

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission regulatory process for decommissioning a uranium mining facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scissons, K.; Schryer, D.M.; Goulden, W.; Natomagan, C.

2002-01-01

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) regulates uranium mining in Canada. The CNSC regulatory process requires that a licence applicant plan for and commit to future decommissioning before irrevocable decisions are made, and throughout the life of a uranium mine. These requirements include conceptual decommissioning plans and the provision of financial assurances to ensure the availability of funds for decommissioning activities. When an application for decommissioning is submitted to the CNSC, an environmental assessment is required prior to initiating the licensing process. A case study is presented for COGEMA Resources Inc. (COGEMA), who is entering the decommissioning phase with the CNSC for the Cluff Lake uranium mine. As part of the licensing process, CNSC multidisciplinary staff assesses the decommissioning plan, associated costs, and the environmental assessment. When the CNSC is satisfied that all of its requirements are met, a decommissioning licence may be issued. (author)

77 FR 60482 - Regulatory Guide 5.67, Material Control and Accounting for Uranium Enrichment Facilities...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-03

... Accounting for Uranium Enrichment Facilities Authorized To Produce Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic... Accounting for Uranium Enrichment Facilities Authorized to Produce Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic... and is applicable to the Paducah GDP and other uranium enrichment facilities that have been licensed...

Decommissioning of nuclear facilities involving operations with uranium and thorium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shum, E.Y.; Neuder, S.M.

1990-01-01

When a licensed nuclear facility ceases operation, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ensures that the facility and its site are decontaminated to acceptable levels so they may safely be released for unrestricted public use. Because specific environmental standards or broad federal guidelines governing release of residual radioactive contamination have not been issued, NRC has developed ad hoc cleanup criteria for decommissioning nuclear facilities that involved uranium and thorium. Cleanup criteria include decontamination of buildings, equipment, and land. We will address cleanup criteria and their rationale; procedures for decommissioning uranium/thorium facilities; radiological survey designs and procedures; radiological monitoring and measurement; and cost-effectiveness to demonstrate compliance

Neutronic analysis for conversion of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 facility using Monte Carlo methods and UO{sub 2} LEU fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Anim-Sampong, S.; Akaho, E.H.K.; Maakuu, B.T.; Gbadago, J.K. [Ghana Research Reactor-1 Centre, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering and Materials Science, National Nuclear Research Institute, Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, Legon, Accra (Ghana); Andam, A. [Kwame Nkrumah Univ. of Science and Technology, Dept. of Physics (Ghana); Liaw, J.J.R.; Matos, J.E. [Argonne National Lab., RERTR Programme, Div. of Nuclear Engineering (United States)

2007-07-01

Monte Carlo particle transport methods and software (MCNP) have been applied to the modelling, simulation and neutronic analysis for the conversion of the HEU-fuelled (high enrichment uranium) core of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) facility. The results show that the MCNP model of the GHARR-1 facility, which is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) is good as the simulated neutronic and other reactor physics parameters agree with very well with experimental and zero power results. Three UO{sub 2} LEU (low enrichment uranium) fuels with different enrichments (12.6% and 19.75%), core configurations, core loadings were utilized in the conversion studies. The nuclear criticality and kinetic parameters obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation and neutronic analysis using three UO{sub 2} LEU fuels are in close agreement with results obtained for the reference 90.2% U-Al HEU core. The neutron flux variation in the core, fission chamber and irradiation channels for the LEU UO{sub 2} fuels show the same trend as the HEU core as presented in the paper. The Monte Carlo model confirms a reduction (8% max) in the peak neutron fluxes simulated in the irradiation channels which are utilized for experimental and commercial activities. However, the reductions or 'losses' in the flux levels neither affects the criticality safety, reactor operations and safety nor utilization of the reactor. Employing careful core loading optimization techniques and fuel loadings and enrichment, it is possible to eliminate the apparent reductions or 'losses' in the neutron fluxes as suggested in this paper. Concerning neutronics, it can be concluded that all the 3 LEU fuels qualify as LEU candidates for core conversion of the GHARR-1 facility.

Criticality safety evaluation for the Advanced Test Reactor enhanced low enriched uranium fuel elements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Montierth, Leland M. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2016-07-19

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) convert program is developing a high uranium density fuel based on a low enriched uranium (LEU) uranium-molybdenum alloy. Testing of prototypic GTRI fuel elements is necessary to demonstrate integrated fuel performance behavior and scale-up of fabrication techniques. GTRI Enhanced LEU Fuel (ELF) elements based on the ATR-Standard Size elements (all plates fueled) are to be fabricated for testing in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). While a specific ELF element design will eventually be provided for detailed analyses and in-core testing, this criticality safety evaluation (CSE) is intended to evaluate a hypothetical ELF element design for criticality safety purposes. Existing criticality analyses have analyzed Standard (HEU) ATR elements from which controls have been derived. This CSE documents analysis that determines the reactivity of the hypothetical ELF fuel elements relative to HEU ATR elements and whether the existing HEU ATR element controls bound the ELF element. The initial calculations presented in this CSE analyzed the original ELF design, now referred to as Mod 0.1. In addition, as part of a fuel meat thickness optimization effort for reactor performance, other designs have been evaluated. As of early 2014 the most current conceptual designs are Mk1A and Mk1B, that were previously referred to as conceptual designs Mod 0.10 and Mod 0.11, respectively. Revision 1 evaluates the reactivity of the ATR HEU Mark IV elements for a comparison with the Mark VII elements.

Criticality safety evaluation for the Advanced Test Reactor enhanced low enriched uranium fuel elements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Montierth, Leland M.

2016-01-01

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) convert program is developing a high uranium density fuel based on a low enriched uranium (LEU) uranium-molybdenum alloy. Testing of prototypic GTRI fuel elements is necessary to demonstrate integrated fuel performance behavior and scale-up of fabrication techniques. GTRI Enhanced LEU Fuel (ELF) elements based on the ATR-Standard Size elements (all plates fueled) are to be fabricated for testing in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). While a specific ELF element design will eventually be provided for detailed analyses and in-core testing, this criticality safety evaluation (CSE) is intended to evaluate a hypothetical ELF element design for criticality safety purposes. Existing criticality analyses have analyzed Standard (HEU) ATR elements from which controls have been derived. This CSE documents analysis that determines the reactivity of the hypothetical ELF fuel elements relative to HEU ATR elements and whether the existing HEU ATR element controls bound the ELF element. The initial calculations presented in this CSE analyzed the original ELF design, now referred to as Mod 0.1. In addition, as part of a fuel meat thickness optimization effort for reactor performance, other designs have been evaluated. As of early 2014 the most current conceptual designs are Mk1A and Mk1B, that were previously referred to as conceptual designs Mod 0.10 and Mod 0.11, respectively. Revision 1 evaluates the reactivity of the ATR HEU Mark IV elements for a comparison with the Mark VII elements.

Finding of no significant impact: Interim storage of enriched uranium above the maximum historical level at the Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge, Tennessee

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929, September, 1994). The EA evaluates the environmental effects of transportation, prestorage processing, and interim storage of bounding quantities of enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant over a ten-year period. The State of Tennessee and the public participated in public meetings and workshops which were held after a predecisional draft EA was released in February 1994, and after the revised pre-approval EA was issued in September 1994. Comments provided by the State and public have been carefully considered by the Department. As a result of this public process, the Department has determined that the Y-12 Plant-would store no more than 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and no more than 6 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU). The bounding storage quantities analyzed in the pre-approval EA are 500 metric tons of HEU and 7,105.9 metric tons of LEU. Based on-the analyses in the EA, as revised by the attachment to the Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), DOE has determined that interim storage of 500 metric tons of HEU and 6 metric tons of LEU at the Y-12 Plant does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. Therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is not required and the Department is issuing this FONSI

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF 6 ) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ''transparency),'' and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1994-01-01

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

Decommissioning and disposal of foreign uranium mine and mill facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pan Yingjie; Xue Jianxin; Yuan Baixiang; Xu Lechang

2012-01-01

Disposal techniques in decommissioning of foreign uranium mine and mill facilities are systematically discussed, including covering of uranium tailing impoundment, drainaging and consolidation of uranium tailing, and treatment of mining waste water and polluted groundwater, and the costs associated with disposal are analyzed. The necessity of strengthening the decommissioning disposal technology research and international exchanges and cooperation is emphasized. (authors)

Test operation of the uranium ore processing pilot plant and uranium conversion plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suh, I.S.; Lee, K.I.; Whang, S.T.; Kang, Y.H.; Lee, C.W.; Chu, J.O.; Lee, I.H.; Park, S.C.

1983-01-01

For the guarantee of acid leaching process of the Uranium Ore Processing Pilot Plnat, the KAERI team performed the test operation in coorperation with the COGEMA engineers. The result of the operation was successful achieving the uranium leaching efficiency of 95%. Completing the guarentee test, a continuous test operation was shifted to reconform the reproducibility of the result and check the functions of every units of the pilot plant feeding the low-grade domestic ore, the consistency of the facility was conformed that the uranium can easily be dissolved out form the ore between the temperature range of 60degC-70degC for two hours of leaching with sulfuric acid and could be obtained the leaching efficiency of 92% to 95%. The uranium recovery efficiencies for the processes of extraction and stripping were reached to 99% and 99.6% respectively. As an alternative process for the separation of solid from the ore pulp, four of the Counter Current Decanters were shifted replacing the Belt Filter and those were connected in a series, which were not been tested during the guarantee operation. It was found out that the washing efficiencies of the ore pulp in each tests for the decanters were proportionally increased according to the quantities of the washing water. As a result of the test, it was obtained that washing efficiencies were 95%, 85%, 83% for the water to ore ratio of 3:1, 2:1, 1.5:1 respectively. (Author)

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.

2009-01-01

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be

Impact of the use of low or medium enriched uranium on the masses of space nuclear reactor power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-12-01

The design process for determining the mass increase for the substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for high-enriched uranium (HEU) in space nuclear reactor systems is an optimization process which must simultaneously consider several variables. This process becomes more complex whenever the reactor core operates on an in-core thermionic power conversion, in which the fissioning of the nuclear fuel is used to directly heat thermionic emitters, with the subsequent elimination of external power conversion equipment. The increased complexity of the optimization process for this type of system is reflected in the work reported herein, where considerably more information has been developed for the moderated in-core thermionic reactors

Uranium 2000 : International symposium on the process metallurgy of uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ozberk, E.; Oliver, A.J.

2000-01-01

The International Symposium on the Process Metallurgy of Uranium has been organized as the thirtieth annual meeting of the Hydrometallurgy Section of the Metallurgical Society of the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum (CIM). This meeting is jointly organized with the Canadian Mineral Processors Division of CIM. The proceedings are a collection of papers from fifteen countries covering the latest research, development, industrial practices and regulatory issues in uranium processing, providing a concise description of the state of this industry. Topics include: uranium industry overview; current milling operations; in-situ uranium mines and processing plants; uranium recovery and further processing; uranium leaching; uranium operations effluent water treatment; tailings disposal, water treatment and decommissioning; mine decommissioning; and international regulations and decommissioning. (author)

Development of ISA procedure for uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities: overview of ISA procedure and its application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamate, Kazuki; Yamada, Takashi; Takanashi, Mitsuhiro; Sasaki, Noriaki

2013-01-01

Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) procedure for uranium fuel fabrication and enrichment facilities has been developed for aiming at applying risk-informed regulation to these uranium facilities. The development has carried out referring to the ISA (NUREG-1520) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The paper presents purpose, principles and activities for the development of the ISA procedure, including Risk Level (RL) matrix and grading evaluation method of IROFS (Items Relied on for Safety), as well as general description and features of the procedure. Also described in the paper is current status in application of risk information from the ISA. Japanese four licensees of the uranium facilities have been conducting ISA for their representative processes using the developed procedure as their voluntary safety activities. They have been accumulating experiences and knowledge on the ISA procedure and risk information through the field activities. NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) and JNES (Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization) are studying how to use such risk information for the safety regulation of the uranium facilities, taking into account the licensees' experiences and knowledge. (authors)

Uranium ore mining in Spain with a focus on the closure and remediation measures in former production facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koch, H.; Blunck, S.; Lopez Romero, A.R.

2004-01-01

In early 2000, the uranium ore mining activities in Spain ceased. Since the middle of the last century, Spain had pushed ahead its own production of uranium concentrate with the formation of several companies (ENUSA, J.E.N.). In that period, Spain produced around 6000 t of uranium. With the completion of the operations at Andujar, La Haba and Elephante as well as Quercus at Saelices el Chico, the corporate tasks have shifted from building-up of a strategic uranium reserve to remediation and subsequent use of the locations. The operations have reached different remediation phases. While at Saelices el Chico remediation is still proceeding, the Andujar and La Haba locations are undergoing a monitoring phase as agreed for all former operating facilities. The estimated closure and remediation costs for the three operating facilities described amount to approx. 85 mio. Euro. In all three cases dealt with, however, these limited financial resources have been sufficient to successfully implement a closure and remediation concept that minimizes the risks from the facilities of uranium ore mining and processing with regard to the environment. (orig.)

76 FR 63330 - Policy Regarding Submittal of Amendments for Processing of Equivalent Feed at Licensed Uranium...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-10-12

... Processing of Equivalent Feed at Licensed Uranium Recovery Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission... NRC and Agreement State-licensed uranium recovery site. This action is necessary to correct several... read ``(see Page A2 of SECY-99-011, ``Draft Rulemaking Plan: Domestic Licensing of Uranium and Thorium...

ANL progress in developing an LEU target and process for Mo-99 production: Cooperation with CNEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gelis, A.V.; Vandegrift, G.F.; Aase, S.B.; Bakel, A.J.; Falkenberg, J.R.; Regalbuto, M.C.; Quigley, K.J.

2003-01-01

The primary mission of the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program is to facilitate the conversion of research and test-reactor fuel and targets from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). One of the current goals at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is to assist the Argentine Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) in developing an LEU foil target and a process for 99 Mo production. Specifically addressed in this paper is ANL R and D related to this conversion: (1) designing a prototype production vessel for digesting irradiated LEU foils in alkaline solutions and (2) developing a new digestion method to address all issues related to HEU to LEU conversion. (author)

Technical problems in case of utilizing uranium of medium enrichment for a research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kanda, Keiji; Shibata, Shun-ichi

1979-01-01

Usually, highly enriched uranium of 90 - 93% is used for research reactors, but the US government proposed the strong policy to use low enriched uranium of the uranium of medium enrichment in unavoidable case from the viewpoint of the resistance to nuclear proliferation in November, 1977. This policy is naturally applied to Japan also. The export of highly enriched uranium will be permitted only when the President approves it after the technical and economical evaluations by the government. The Kyoto University high flux reactor has the features which are not seen in other research reactors, such as medical irradiation, and it is hard to attain the objectives of researches unless HEU is used. The application for the export of HEU was accepted in February, 1978. The nuclear characteristics of the KUHFR when medium or low enriched uranium is used, the criticality experiment in the KUCA using the uranium of medium enrichment, and the burning test on the uranium fuel plates of medium enrichment are described. The research project to lower the degree of enrichment in the fuel for research and test reactors is expected to be continued down to less than 20%. The MEU of 45% enrichment will be actually used in 1983. (Kako, I.)

Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

Science.gov (United States)

Satkowiak, Lawrence

2014-05-01

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Satkowiak, Lawrence [Director, Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security Programs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

2014-05-09

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

10 CFR 140.13b - Amount of liability insurance required for uranium enrichment facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... enrichment facilities. 140.13b Section 140.13b Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) FINANCIAL... required for uranium enrichment facilities. Each holder of a license issued under Parts 40 or 70 of this chapter for a uranium enrichment facility that involves the use of source material or special nuclear...

Secondary limits of exposure in facilities handling uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Raghavayya, M.

1999-08-01

Annual limits of exposure and intake for radiation workers in nuclear installations have been recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the same have been adopted by the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board for all the radionuclides of interest. The prescribed limits cannot be directly used for day to day radiation protection work. Hence secondary limits have to be derived for routine applications. The modeling steps may be simple in some situations and more complicated in some others. The limits recommended are for individual radionuclides. But in facilities handling natural or enriched uranium the radionuclides (isotopes of uranium and its decay products) generally occur together in specific ratios. Derivation of secondary limits has to take this into consideration. The present document is an attempt at deriving the secondary limits required for routine application in facilities handling uranium (Mine, mill, refineries and fuel fabrication etc.). Secondary limits of exposure have been derived in this document for air borne activity, activity in water, surface contamination and internal exposures. (author)

PROCESS OF RECOVERING URANIUM

Science.gov (United States)

Carter, J.M.; Larson, C.E.

1958-10-01

A process is presented for recovering uranium values from calutron deposits. The process consists in treating such deposits to produce an oxidlzed acidic solution containing uranium together with the following imparities: Cu, Fe, Cr, Ni, Mn, Zn. The uranium is recovered from such an impurity-bearing solution by adjusting the pH of the solution to the range 1.5 to 3.0 and then treating the solution with hydrogen peroxide. This results in the precipitation of uranium peroxide which is substantially free of the metal impurities in the solution. The peroxide precipitate is then separated from the solution, washed, and calcined to produce uranium trioxide.

Surveying and assessing the hazards associated with the processing of uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kruger, J.

1980-01-01

The control of uranium during the milling process has not received extensive attention. The results of several surveys of surface contamination, airborne contamination and external radiation made at South African processing facilities are presented and compared with derived norms for permissible exposure to uranium dust. The routine urine sampling results are used as an indicator of personnel exposures. Results of sampling identify the main sources of airborne activity and indicate the contribution of general surface contamination levels to airborne levels. The use of surface contamination levels together with frequent air sampling for assessing the environmental conditions is illustrated. It is concluded that infrequent grab air sampling alone is not adequate for assessing the hazards during uranium processing. Detailed surveys are required and proper area and personnel access control are indicated. (H.K.)

Critical review of uranium resources and production capability to 2020

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-08-01

This report was prepared to assess the changing uranium supply and demand situation as well as the adequacy of uranium resources and the production capability to supply uranium concentrate to meet reactor demand through 2020. Uranium production has been meeting only 50 to 60 percent of the world requirements with the balance met from sale of excess inventory offered on the market at low prices. It is generally agreed by most specialists that the end of the excess inventory is approaching. With inventory no longer able to meet the production shortfall it is necessary to significantly expand uranium production to fill an increasing share of demand. Non-production supplies of uranium, such as the blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) warheads to produce low enriched reactor fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel, are also expected to grow in importance as a fuel source. This analysis addresses three major concerns as follows: adequacy of resources to meet projected demand; adequacy of production capability to produce the uranium; and market prices to sustain production to fill demand. This analysis indicates uranium mine production to be the primary supply providing about 76 to 78 percent of cumulative needs through 2020. Alternative sources supplying the balance, in order of relative importance are: (1) low enriched uranium (LEU) blended from 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Russian weapons, plus initial US Department of Energy (US DOE) stockpile sales (11 to 13%); (2) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (6%) and; (3) utility and Russian stockpiles. Further this report gives uranium production profiles by countries: CIS producers (Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and other producers (Australia, Canada, China, Gabon, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, United States of America)

Dry uranium tetrafluoride process preparation using the uranium hexafluoride reconversion process effluents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Silva Neto, Joao Batista da

2008-01-01

It is a well known fact that the use of uranium tetrafluoride allows flexibility in the production of uranium suicide and uranium oxide fuel. To its obtention there are two conventional routes, the one which reduces uranium from the UF 6 hydrolysis solution with stannous chloride, and the hydro fluorination of a solid uranium dioxide. In this work we are introducing a third and a dry way route, mainly utilized to the recovery of uranium from the liquid effluents generated in the uranium hexafluoride reconversion process, at IPEN/CNEN-SP. Working in the liquid phase, this route comprises the recuperation of ammonium fluoride by NH 4 HF 2 precipitation. Working with the solid residues, the crystallized bifluoride is added to the solid UO 2 , which comes from the U mini plates recovery, also to its conversion in a solid state reaction, to obtain UF 4 . That returns to the process of metallic uranium production unity to the U 3 Si 2 obtention. This fuel is considered in IPEN CNEN/SP as the high density fuel phase for IEA-R1m reactor, which will replace the former low density U 3 Si 2 -Al fuel. (author)

PHWR fuel fabrication with imported uranium - procedures and processes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rao, R.V.R.L.V.; Rameswara Rao, A.; Hemantha Rao, G.V.S.; Jayaraj, R.N.

2010-01-01

Following the 123 agreement and subsequent agreements with IAEA & NSG, Government of India has entered into bilateral agreements with different countries for nuclear trade. Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Government of India, has entered into contract with few countries for supply of uranium material for use in the safeguarded PHWRs. Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC), an industrial unit of DAE, established in the early seventies, is engaged in the production of Nuclear Fuel and Zircaloy items required for Nuclear Power Reactors operating in the country. NFC has placed one of its fuel fabrication facilities (NFC, Block-A, INE-) under safeguards. DAE has opted to procure uranium material in the form of ore concentrate and fuel pellets. Uranium ore concentrate was procured as per the ASTM specifications. Since no international standards are available for PHWR fuel pellets, Specifications have to be finalized based on the present fabrication and operating experience. The process steps have to be modified and fine tuned for handling the imported uranium material especially for ore concentrate. Different transportation methods are to be employed for transportation of uranium material to the facility. Cost of the uranium material imported and the recoveries at various stages of fuel fabrication have impact on the fuel pricing and in turn the unit energy costs. Similarly the operating procedures have to be modified for safeguards inspections by IAEA. NFC has successfully manufactured and supplied fuel bundles for the three 220 MWe safeguarded PHWRs. The paper describes various issues encountered while manufacturing fuel bundles with different types of nuclear material. (author)

Disposition Options for Uranium-233

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beahm, E.C.; Dole, L.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Icenhour, A.S.; Storch, S.N.

1999-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD), in support of the U.S. arms-control and nonproliferation policies, has initiated a program to disposition surplus weapons-usable fissile material by making it inaccessible and unattractive for use in nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable fissile materials include plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233 (sup 233)U. In support of this program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory led DOE's contractor efforts to identify and characterize options for the long-term storage and disposal of excess (sup 233)U. Five storage and 17 disposal options were identified and are described herein

Technical investigation of a pyrophoric event involving corrosion products from HEU ZPPR fuel plates

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Totemeier, T. C.

2000-01-01

A pyrophoric event recently occurred which involved corrosion products collected from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel plates used in the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR). This paper summarizes the event and its background, and presents the results of an investigation into its source and mechanism. The investigation focused on characterization of corrosion product samples similar to those involved in the event using thermo-gravimetric analysis (TGA). Burning curve TGA tests were performed to measure the ignition temperature and hydride fractions of corrosion products in several different conditions to assess the effects of passivation treatment and long-term storage on chemical reactivity. The hydride fraction and ignition temperature of the corrosion products were found to be strongly dependent on the corrosion extent of the source metal. The results indicate that the energy source for the event was a considerable quantity of uranium hydride present in the corrosion products, but the specific ignition mechanism could not be identified

Nuclear and radiological safety in the substitution process of the fuel HEU to LEU 30/20 in the Reactor TRIGA Mark III of the ININ

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hernandez G, J.

2012-10-01

Inside the safety initiative in the international ambit, with the purpose of reducing the risks associated with the use of high enrichment nuclear fuels (HEU) for different proposes to the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy, Mexico contributes by means of the substitution of the high enrichment fuel HEU for low enrichment fuel LEU 30/20 in the TRIGA Mark III Reactor, belonging to Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares (ININ). The conversion process was carried out by means of the following activities: analysis of the proposed core, reception and inspection of the fuel LEU 30/20, the discharge of the fuels of the mixed reactor core, shipment of the fuels HEU fresh and irradiated to the origin country, reload activities with the fuels LEU 30/20 and parameters measurement of the core operation. In order to maintaining the personnel's integrity and infrastructure associated to the Reactor, during the whole process the measurements of nuclear and radiological safety were controlled to detail, in execution with the license requirements of the installation. This work describes the covering activities and radiological inspections more relevant, as well as the measurements of radiological control implemented with base in the estimate of the equivalent dose of the substitution process. (Author)

Why does the need of HEU for high flux research reactors remain?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glaeser, W.

1991-01-01

It has shown that high performance high flux reactors need an ongoing supply of highly enriched uranium. The new fuel materials in their highly enriched version offer prospective for advanced and better neutron sources vital for the future of neutron research. This is another very attractive result of the RERTR programme. One-sided restriction would only provide marginal or no values for research. If we adopt the sometimes expressed views that high enriched RERTR developed fuel should only be made available when unique benefits to mankind could be obtained, then certainly basic research at the forefront belongs to this category. HEU would only pose theoretical difficulties, if it would remain under proper safeguards and obviously this is the way to be pursued. (orig.)

Criticality safety of storage barrels for enriched uranium fresh fuel at the RB research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M. P.

1997-01-01

Study on criticality safety of fresh low and high enriched uranium (LEU and HEU) fuel elements in the storage/transport barrels at the RB research reactor is carried out by using the well-known MCNP computer code. It is shown that studied arrays of tightly closed fuel barrels, each entirely loaded with 100 fresh (HEU or LEU) fuel slugs, are far away from criticality, even in cases of an unexpected flooding by light water.(author)

Past and present supply of enriched uranium for research reactors in the European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

2002-01-01

In the last decade research reactor operators have focused mainly on the issues of disposal of spent research reactor fuel and the development of high density fuels. The safe supply of fresh uranium did not receive as much attention. This is surprising since the United States - who was the main supplier for LEU and HEU since the late 1950's - stopped supplying non-US research reactors with enriched uranium a decade ago. The reason for this stop of supply is described in this paper. This paper explains how research reactors in the E U continued to operate during the last decade, in spite of the fact that their primary supply source had not provided LEU and HEU over the same period. (author)

How is uranium supply affecting enrichment?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Steve Kidd

2007-01-01

As a result of the enlivened uranium market, momentum has in turn picked up in the enrichment sector. What are the consequences of higher uranium prices? There is, of course, a link between uranium and enrichment supply to the extent that they are at least partial substitutes. On the enrichment supply side, the most obvious feature is the gradual replacement of the old gas diffusion facilities of Usec in the USA and EURODIF in France with more modern and economical centrifuge plants. Assuming Usec can overcome the financing and technical issues surrounding its plans, the last gas diffusion capacity should disappear around 2015 and the entire enrichment market should then be using centrifuges. On the commercial side, the key anticipated developments are mostly in Russia. Although there should still continue to be substantial quantities of surplus Russian HEU available for down blending in the period beyond 2013, it is now reasonable to expect that it will be mostly consumed by internal needs, to fuel Russian-origin reactors both at home and in export markets such as China and India. Finally, as a key sensitive area for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the enrichment sector is likely to be a central point of the new international arrangements which must be developed to support a buoyant nuclear sector throughout this century.

Validation of gamma-ray detection techniques for safeguards monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dewji, S.A., E-mail: dewjisa@ornl.gov [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States); Lee, D.L.; Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States); Hertel, N.E. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States); Nuclear and Radiological Engineering Program, Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State Street, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States); Chapman, J.A.; McElroy, R.D.; Cleveland, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1 Bethel Valley Road, MS-6335, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6335 (United States)

2016-07-01

Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exists. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18, the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted, suggesting that purified uranium compounds should be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion process. In response to this technical need, a combination of simulation models and experimental measurements were employed to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate (UO{sub 2}(NO{sub 3}){sub 2}) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point (KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool. The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. Nondestructive assay techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy were evaluated to determine their viability as a technical means for drawing safeguards conclusions at NUCPs, and if the IAEA detection requirements of 1 significant quantity (SQ) can be met in a timely way. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector sensitivities to uranyl nitrate. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the uranyl nitrate gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and high-purity germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10–90 g U/L of natural uranyl nitrate are presented. A range of

Methods for nondestructive assay holdup measurements in shutdown uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hagenauer, R.C.; Mayer, R.L. II.

1991-09-01

Measurement surveys of uranium holdup using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are being conducted for shutdown gaseous diffusion facilities at the Oak Ridge K-25 Site (formerly the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant). When in operation, these facilities processed UF 6 with enrichments ranging from 0.2 to 93 wt % 235 U. Following final shutdown of all process facilities, NDA surveys were initiated to provide process holdup data for the planning and implementation of decontamination and decommissioning activities. A three-step process is used to locate and quantify deposits: (1) high-resolution gamma-ray measurements are performed to generally define the relative abundances of radioisotopes present, (2) sizable deposits are identified using gamma-ray scanning methods, and (3) the deposits are quantified using neutron measurement methods. Following initial quantitative measurements, deposit sizes are calculated; high-resolution gamma-ray measurements are then performed on the items containing large deposits. The quantitative estimates for the large deposits are refined on the basis of these measurements. Facility management is using the results of the survey to support a variety of activities including isolation and removal of large deposits; performing health, safety, and environmental analyses; and improving facility nuclear material control and accountability records. 3 refs., 1 tab

A disposition strategy for highly enriched, aluminum-based fuel from research and test reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McKibben, J.M.; Gould, T.H.; McDonell, W.R.; Bickford, W.E.

1994-01-01

The strategy proposed in this paper offers the Department of Energy an approach for disposing of aluminum-based, highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels from foreign and domestic research reactors. The proposal is technically, socially, and economically sound. If implemented, it would advance US non-proliferation goals while also disposing of the spent fuel's waste by timely and proven methods using existing technologies and facilities at SRS without prolonged and controversial storage of the spent fuel. The fuel would be processed through 221-H. The radioactive fission products (waste) would be treated along with existing SRS high level waste by vitrifying it as borosilicate glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for disposal in the national geological repository. The HEU would be isotopically diluted, during processing, to low-enriched uranium (LEU) which can not be used to make weapons, thus eliminating proliferation concerns. The LEU can be sold to fabricators of either research reactor fuel or commercial power fuel. This proposed processing-LEU recycle approach has several important advantages over other alternatives, including: Lowest capital investment; lowest net total cost; quickest route to acceptable waste form and final geologic disposal; and likely lowest safety, health, and environmental impacts

The role of secondary uranium supplies through 2013 and beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lohrey, Klaus; Aul, Friedel; Kwasny, Rolf

2010-01-01

This article examines 4 dimensions of secondary supply: - The Western World's past reliance on secondary supply as a supplement to primary production,- The availability of secondary supplies from now until 2013 and - above all - continued availability of secondary supplies after the HEU deal's expiration in 2013,- Russia's requirements for secondary supply beyond 2013; and - The global requirement for secondary supplies post-2013. Historically, uranium production has seen 3 major phases. Industrial-scale uranium mining started long before the material was needed to fuel commercial nuclear power plants. The first phase, called ''Procurement of Weapons Uranium,'' extended from the 1950s into the early-1960s. Between 1975 and 1980 there was a second huge wave of primary uranium production. The mines' annual output doubled, driven by very ambitious plans for the construction of additional NPPs, further fuelled by the oil crisis of 1973. Throughout the third phase, which started in the mid 1980s, the Western World's natural uranium production remained significantly below the actual reactor demand. This was - and still is - a unique situation within the world's commodities markets. Secondary supplies have recently covered between 30 and 40% of the worldwide nuclear fuel demand. Since the bulk of the secondary supplies can be made available and fabricated into reactor fuel at costs which are below the current prices of fresh uranium, secondary supplies are widely given preference over fresh uranium. But what about the worldwide secondary supplies' role in the years to come, particularly after the expiration of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Agreement in 2013? (orig.)

Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium. Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation. Report submitted to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arbman, Gunnar; Calogero, Francesco; Martellini, Maurizio; Bremer Maerli, Morten; Nikitin, Alexander; Prawitz, Jan

2004-04-01

This study is of an exploratory nature. It provides preliminary assessments of issues of relevance for HEU elimination in Russia including: (a) technical issues concerning the HEU down-blending; uranium transparency and verification requirements; description of current Russian HEU locations; the HEU down-blending capacities, and the HEU logistics, and (b) various political and financial requirements and considerations. For future, practical project measures to be put in place, further investigations that deal with HEU logistics and handling are needed. Such studies - that obviously should include and engage key Russian actors - are possible, if they take legitimate Russian security and sensitivity concerns into consideration. Interestingly, there is a growing perception in Russia that large stocks of HEU are not required and that they could, in fact, constitute a source of danger

HEU and Leu FueL Shielding Comparative Study Applied for Spent Fuel Transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Margeanu, C.A.; Margeanu, S.; Barbos, D.

2009-01-01

INR Pitesti owns and operates a TRIGA dual-core Research Reactor for material testing, power reactor fuel and nuclear safety studies. The dual core concept involves the operation of a 14 MW TRIGA steady-state, high flux research and material testing reactor at one end of a large pool, and the independent operation of an annular-core pulsing reactor (TRIGA-ACPR) at the other end of the pool. The steady-state reactor is mostly used for long term testing of power reactor fuel components (pellets, pins, subassemblies and fuel assemblies) followed by post-irradiation examination. Following the general trend to replace the He fuel type (High Enriched Uranium) by Leu fuel type (Low Enriched Uranium), in the light of international agreements between IAEA and the states using He fuel in their nuclear reactors, Inr Past's have been accomplished the TRIGA research reactor core full conversion on May 2006. The He fuel repatriation in US in the frame of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return Programme effectively started in 1999, the final stage being achieved in summer of 2008. Taking into account for the possible impact on the human and environment, in all activities associated to nuclear fuel cycle, the spent fuel or radioactive waste characteristics must be well known. Shielding calculations basic tasks consist in radiation doses calculation, in order to prevent any risks both for personnel protection and impact on the environment during the spent fuel manipulation, transport and storage. The paper is a comparative study of Leu and He fuel utilization effects for the shielding analysis during spent fuel transport. A comparison against the measured data for He spent fuel, available from the last stage of the spent fuel repatriation, is presented. All the geometrical and material data related on the spent fuel shipping cask were considered according to the Nac-Lt Cask approved model. The shielding analysis estimates radiation doses to shipping cask wall surface

Comment on the contribution of S.C. Mo, N.A. Hanan and J.E. Matos: 'Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boening, K.

2004-01-01

The results of the reference paper, which came to our attention for the first time during this RERTR Meeting, are more or less consistent with neutronic data we have obtained earlier within the FRM-II project (i.e. with own calculations and extrapolations). However, a realistic comparison of the HEU design of the FR.M-II (HEU = highly enriched uranium, 93 % U-235) with an alternative LEU design (LEU = low enriched uranium, 20 % U-235) is only possible on the basis of identical assumptions on the input parameters and has to consider more than neutronic data only. Serious scientists and experts should not confuse the politicians with academic studies touching some aspects of the full story only. The comparison has shown that the performance and reliability of the FRM-II design, which uses HEU fuel, is so advantageous that it can not - not even approximately - be met by an alternative design using LEU fuel. A change of the FRM-II design from HEU to LEU fuel with the results as shown above - i.e. less performance, higher costs, more nuclear waste and higher risk potential, and all of this with a delay of at least 5 years this could never be justified. If a future development of more advanced fuels should allow us to achieve our scientific goals at the conditions as identified above also with uranium of reduced enrichment - there would be no objection to a corresponding later conversion. Activities to realize a new neutron source in Germany go back to the late 70's with the project of a new middle flux beam reactor (MSR), which was abandoned shortly later in favour of an ambitious new spallation neutron source (SNQ). After this project also having been terminated around 1985 because of too high costs and technological risks, the hopes of the German community of neutron scientists focussed on the FRM-II. If non-technical pressure would damage this project this would equally provide irreversible damage to the large and still prospering field of neutron research in Germany

Direct dating of fossils by the helium-uranium method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaeffer, O.A.

1967-01-01

The He-U method has been found to be applicable to the dating of fossil carbonates. This method furnishes a new dating technique particularly applicable to the Pleistocene and the Tertiary periods, especially the Late Tertiary, for which other methods of age dating either fail or are difficult to correlate with the fossil record. The method has been checked for possible losses of helium and uranium from or to the surroundings. It has been found that, while a calcite lattice does not appear to retain helium, if the lattice is aragonite there is good evidence that helium leakage is not a problem. This is true at least for times up to 20 m. y. For corals where the uranium is apparently uniformly distributed within the lattice as a trace element, the uranium does not exchange or undergo concentration changes. As a result aragonite corals yield reliable He-U ages. On the other hand, the uranium in mollusc fossils is apparently mainly in the grain boundaries and is not always a tight system as far as uranium exchange or concentration changes are concerned. To obtain a reliable age for a mollusc one needs additional evidence to ensure lack of changes in uranium concentration. If the measurement of U and He is combined with 238 U, 234 U and 230 Th determinations, it appears that many mollusc shells will also be datable by the method. The resulting evidence for secular equilibrium in the 238 U chain is good evidence for a closed system as far as U concentration changes are concerned. (author)

The Potential for Criticality Following Disposal of Uranium at Low-Level-Waste Facilities. Containerized Disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Colten-Bradley, V.A.; Hopper, C.M.; Parks, C.V.; Toran, L.E.

1999-01-01

The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether or not fissile uranium in low-level-waste (LLW) facilities can be concentrated by hydrogeochemical processes to permit nuclear criticality. A team of experts in hydrology, geology, geochemistry, soil chemistry, and criticality safety was formed to develop and test some reasonable scenarios for hydrogeochemical increases in concentration of special nuclear material (SNM) and to use these scenarios to aid in evaluating the potential for nuclear criticality. The team's approach was to perform simultaneous hydrogeochemical and nuclear criticality studies to (1) identify some possible scenarios for uranium migration and concentration increase at LLW disposal facilities, (2) model groundwater transport and subsequent concentration increase via precipitation of uranium, and (3) evaluate the potential for nuclear criticality resulting from potential increase in uranium concentration over disposal limits. The analysis of SNM was restricted to 235 U in the present scope of work. The work documented in this report indicates that the potential for a criticality safety concern to arise in an LLW facility is extremely remote, but not impossible. Theoretically, conditions that lead to a potential criticality safety concern might arise. However, study of the hydrogeochemical mechanisms, the associated time frames, and the factors required for an actual criticality event indicate that proper emplacement of the SNM at the site can eliminate practical concerns relative to the occurrence and possible consequences of a criticality event

Hazard analysis in uranium hexafluoride production facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marin, Maristhela Passoni de Araujo

1999-01-01

The present work provides a method for preliminary hazard analysis of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The proposed method identify both chemical and radiological hazards, as well as the consequences associated with accident scenarios. To illustrate the application of the method, a uranium hexafluoride production facility was selected. The main hazards are identified and the potential consequences are quantified. It was found that, although the facility handles radioactive material, the main hazards as associated with releases of toxic chemical substances such as hydrogen fluoride, anhydrous ammonia and nitric acid. It was shown that a contention bung can effectively reduce the consequences of atmospheric release of toxic materials. (author)

Development laser light facility for uranium isotope separation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickinson, G.J.

1992-01-01

A laser light facility has been built and successfully commissioned as part of a programme to explore the economic potential of Laser Isotope Separation of Uranium. The laser systems are comprised of tunable dye lasers pumped by copper vapour lasers. The requirements for optical beam stability, alignment of lasers in chains, and protection of optical coatings have made challenging demands on the engineering design and operation of the facility. (Author)

Disposition of highly enriched uranium obtained from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Environmental assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-05-01

This EA assesses the potential environmental impacts associated with DOE's proposal to transport 600 kg of Kazakhstand-origin HEU from Y-12 to a blending site (B ampersand W Lynchburg or NFS Erwin), transport low-enriched UF6 blending stock from a gaseous diffusion plant to GE Wilmington and U oxide blending stock to the blending site, blending the HEU and uranium oxide blending stock to produce LEU in the form of uranyl nitrate, and transport the uranyl nitrate from the blending site to USEC Portsmouth

Treatment of wastewater for removal of soluble uranium species at Cameco's Port Hope Conversion Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dumont, H.; Tairova, G.; Kwong, A.K.; Smith, B.D.

2000-01-01

Ion exchange (IX) resin processes have been used for many years in the uranium mining industry for the recovery of uranium from both acid and alkaline leach solutions. More recently, IX processes have been shown to be an effective approach to control the uranium levels in non-process waters, such as mine water, public drinking water supply and well water. Bench scale and mini-pilot plant tests were conducted at the Cameco's Port Hope Conversion Facility to demonstrate the economic and technical viability of an IX process as an uranium remediation treatment for trace amounts of uranium in non-process laundry water. In the mini-pilot plant study, waste laundry water containing between 10 mg U/L and 200 mg U/L was treated at a rate ranging from 120 L/h to 240 L/h, using a typical 'merry-go-round' fixed-bed ion exchange system with three ion exchange columns. Each column contained 14 L of strongly basic Purolite A300 resin type II. The results indicated that the breakthrough limit, set at 0.1 mg U/L was obtained after a minimum of 1,200 equivalent bed volumes, while saturation was obtained at 3,300 equivalent bed volumes. Recovery parameters are discussed along with feed and effluent stream quality and modifications to the upstream operation. (author)

The strategy on rehabilitation of the former uranium facilities at the 'Pridneprovsky chemical plant' in Ukraine

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Voitsekhovich, O.; Lavrova, T.; Skalskiy, A.S.; Ryazantsev, V.F.

2007-01-01

This paper describes current status of the former Uranium Facilities at the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant in Ukraine, which are currently under development of action plan for its territory rehabilitation. The monitoring data carried out during recent several years show its impact to the Environment and gives a basis for justification of the number of measures aiming to reduce radiological and ecological risks of the Uranium tailings situated at the territory of PChP. The monitoring data and strategy for its remediation are considered in the presentation. Uranium mining has been intensively conducted in Ukraine since the end of the 40-s. Most of the uranium deposits have been explored in the Dnieper river basin, while some smaller deposits can be found within the basins of the Southern Bug and Severskiy Donets rivers. There also several large Uranium Milling facilities were in operation since the end of the 40-s till 1991, when due to disintegration of the former Soviet Union system the own uranium production has been significantly declined. The Milling Plant and Uranium extraction Facilities in ZhevtiVody is still in operation with UkrAtomprom Industrial Consortium. Therefore rehabilitation programme for all Uranium facilities in this site are in duty of the East Mining Combine and the Consortium. The most difficult case is to provide rehabilitation Action Plan for Uranium tailings and number of other facilities situated in Dnieprodzerzhinsk town and which were in operation by the former State Industrial Enterprise Pridneprovskiy Chemical Plant (PChP). In past PChP was one of the largest Uranium Milling facilities of the Former Soviet Union and has been in operation since 1948 till 1991. During Soviet time the Uranium extraction at this legacy site has been carried out using the ore raw products delivered also from Central Asia, Germany and Checz Republic. After extraction the uranium residue has been putting to the nearest landscape depressions at the vicinity of

Remediation of uranium impacted sediments in a watercourse

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shephard, Eugene; Walter, Nelson; Downey, Heath [AMEC, Inc., Portland, Maine (United States); Collopy, Peter [AMEC, Inc., San Diego, California (United States); Conant, John [ABB, Inc., Windsor, Connecticut (United States)

2013-07-01

In 2009, remediation was initiated for a non-operational fuel cycle facility previously used for government contract work located in Windsor, Connecticut, USA. Radiological contaminants consisted primarily of high enriched uranium (HEU). Other radionuclides encountered in relatively minor amounts in certain areas of the clean-up included Co-60, Cs- 137, Ra-226, Th-232 and low enriched uranium (LEU).Between 2009 and the spring of 2011, remediation efforts were focused on demolition of contaminated buildings and removal of contaminated soil. In the late spring of 2011, the last phase of remediation commenced involving the removal of contaminated sediments from portions of a 1,200 meter long gaining stream. Planning and preparation for remediation of the stream began in 2009 with submittal of permit applications to undertake construction activities in a wetland area. The permitting process was lengthy and involved securing permits from multiple agencies. However, early and frequent communication with stakeholders played an integral role in efficiently obtaining the permit approvals. Frequent communication with stakeholders throughout the planning and remediation process also proved to be a key factor in timely completion of the project. The remediation of the stream involved the use of temporary bladder berms to divert surface water flow, water diversion piping, a sediment vacuum removal system, excavation of sediments using small front-end loaders, sediment dewatering, and waste packaging, transportation and disposal. Many safeguards were employed to protect several species of concern in the work area, water management during project activities, challenges encountered during the project, methods of Final Status Survey, and stream restoration. (authors)

Health and safety considerations for U.S. monitors in the Russian transparency program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boggs, C. J.

1998-01-01

In 1993 the US and the Russian Federation signed an agreement allowing the US to purchase highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia over a 20-year period. This Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement permits the purchase of 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons in the form of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use as power reactor fuel in the US. Under the HEU Agreement, the US and Russia are cooperating in a ''Transparency Program'' to ensure that arms control and nonproliferation objectives are being met. The Transparency Program measures, which are a departure from traditional, intrusive measures of verification, include sending individuals from the US to Russia to monitor the processing of the HEU

The regulatory process for uranium mines in Canada -general overview and radiation health and safety in uranium mine-mill facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dory, A.B.

1982-01-01

This presentation is divided into two main sections. In the first, the author explores the issues of radiation and tailings disposal, and then examines the Canadian nuclear regulatory process from the point of view of jurisdiction, objectives, philosophy and mechanics. The compliance inspection program is outlined, and the author discussed the relationships between the AECB and other regulatory agencies, the public and uranium mine-mill workers. The section concludes with an examination of the stance of the medical profession on nuclear issues. In part two, the radiological hazards for uranium miners are examined: radon daughters, gamma radiation, thoron daughters and uranium dust. The author touches on new regulations being drafted, the assessment of past exposures in mine atmospheres, and the regulatory approach at the surface exploration stage. The presentation concludes with the author's brief observations on the findings of other uranium mining inquiries and on future requirements in the industry's interests

New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brim, Cornelia P.

2013-04-01

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

Nuclear criticality safety assessment of the Consolidated Edison Uranium-Solidification Program Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, J.T.

1984-01-01

A nuclear criticality assessment of the Consolidated Edison Uranium-Solidification Program facility confirms that all operations involved in the process may be conducted with an acceptable margin of subcriticality. Normal operation presents no concern since subcriticality is maintained by design. Several recommendations are presented to prevent, or mitigate the consequences of, any abnormal events that might occur in the various portions of the process. These measures would also serve to reduce to a minimum the administrative controls required to prevent criticality

Project C-018H, 242-A Evaporator/PUREX Plant Process Condensate Treatment Facility, functional design criteria. Revision 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, N.

1995-01-01

This document provides the Functional Design Criteria (FDC) for Project C-018H, the 242-A Evaporator and Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant Condensate Treatment Facility (Also referred to as the 200 Area Effluent Treatment Facility [ETF]). The project will provide the facilities to treat and dispose of the 242-A Evaporator process condensate (PC), the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant process condensate (PDD), and the PUREX Plant ammonia scrubber distillate (ASD)

Critical analysis of the management of waste system originated at the uranium mining and processing. A case study of the Concentrated Unit of Uranium - INB; Analise critica do sistema de gerenciamento de rejeitos provenientes de mineracao e beneficiamento de uranio. Um estudo de caso da Unidade de Concentrado de Uranio/INB

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Araujo, Valeska Peres de

2005-07-01

The uranium world market faced a depreciation of this commodity during the last decades. Recently, decreases in the secondary supply (represented by highly enriched uranium - HEU - stocks detained by the former Soviet Union) turned out the market dependent upon primary supply again. In order to cope with this changing demands and market conditions, new uranium mining/milling projects must start operation, or at least, former uranium production plants must be improved. Environmental questions have been and certainly will continue to be a determinant factor concerning the operational feasibility of these facilities. Mining/milling activities have the potential to cause risks to the human health and to the environment. In case of uranium projects, radiological impacts shall also be taken into consideration. Amongst the most relevant environmental aspects associated with the operation of a uranium project, generated wastes are usually of major concern and deserve appropriate management strategies. As a result the objective of the present work was to examine the waste management system of the Brazilian uranium production unity located at the municipality of Caetite, northeast region of the country. An open pit mine and a milling facility compose this unit. The extraction method employed is acid heap leach (using H{sub 2}SO{sub 4}). It could be assessed that the overall conceptual management strategy is in agreement with the practices adopted worldwide. Atmospheric impacts, caused by the emissions of radon and aerosols must be investigated in more details. Mathematical simulation revealed that no significant impact in groundwater is expected due to mobilization and transport of radionuclides from the milling wastes. However, the impacts of drainage water, accumulated in the open pit, into groundwater cannot be discarded yet. Screening techniques were applied to assess the potential contribution of the leached ore piles as a {sup 226}Ra source of pollution. Our results

Impact of uranium-233/thorium cycle on advanced accountability concepts and fabrication facilities. Addendum 2 to application of advanced accountability concepts in mixed oxide fabrication

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bastin, J.J.; Jump, M.J.; Lange, R.A.; Crandall, C.C.

1977-11-01

The Phase I study of the application of advanced accountability methods (DYMAC) in a uranium/plutonium mixed oxide facility was extended to cover the possible fabrication of uranium-233/thorium fuels. Revisions to Phase II of the DYMAC plan which would be necessitated by such a process are specified. These revisions include shielding requirements, measurement systems, licensing conditions, and safeguards considerations. The impact of the uranium/thorium cycle on a large-scale fuel fabrication facility was also reviewed; it was concluded that the essentially higher radioactivity of uranium/thorium feeds would lead to increased difficulties which tend to preclude early commercial application of the process. An amended schedule for Phase II is included

Decommissioning plan depleted uranium manufacturing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bernhardt, D.E.; Pittman, J.D.; Prewett, S.V.

1987-01-01

Aerojet Ordnance Tennessee, Inc. (Aerojet) is decommissioning its California depleted uranium (DU) manufacturing facility. Aerojet has conducted manufacturing and research and development activities at the facility since 1977 under a State of California Source Materials License. The decontamination is being performed by a contractor selector for technical competence through competitive bid. Since the facility will be released for uncontrolled use it will be decontaminated to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). In order to fully apply the principles of ALARA, and ensure the decontamination is in full compliance with appropriate guides, Aerojet has retained Rogers and Associaties Engineering Corporation (RAE) to assist in the decommissioning. RAE has assisted in characterizing the facility and preparing contract bid documents and technical specifications to obtain a qualified decontamination contractor. RAE will monitor the decontamination work effort to assure the contractor's performance complies with the contract specifications and the decontamination plan. The specifications require a thorough cleaning and decontamination of the facility, not just sufficient cleaning to meet the numeric cleanup criteria

Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Mixed Oxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

2002-01-01

As a follow-on to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide, a method has been developed to extend the use of the PAN shuffler to the measurement of HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. This method uses the current LLNL HEU oxide calibration algorithms, appropriately corrected for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, and recently developed PuO 2 calibration algorithms to yield the mass of 235 U present via differences between the expected count rate for the PuO 2 and the measured count rate of the mixed U-Pu oxide. This paper describes the LLNL effort to use PAN shuffler measurements of units of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) and CRM 146 (uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) and a selected set of LLNL PuO 2 -bearing containers in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to each to (1) establish and validate a correction to the HEU calibration algorithm for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, (2) develop a PuO 2 calibration algorithm that includes the effect of PuO 2 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (8.57 cm to 9.88 cm inside diameter and 9.60 cm to 13.29 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop and validate the method for establishing the mass of 235 U present in an unknown of mixed U-Pu oxide.

IAEA Mission Sees High Commitment to Safety at Ghana's Research Reactor After HEU to LEU Fuel Conversion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2018-01-01

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said the operator of Ghana’s research reactor has demonstrated a high commitment to safety following the conversion of the reactor core to use low enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel instead of high enriched uranium (HEU). The team also made recommendations for further safety enhancements. The Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) team concluded a five-day mission today to assess the safety of the GHARR-1 research reactor, originally commissioned in 1994. The 30 kW reactor, operated by the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) at the National Nuclear Research Institute in the capital Accra, is used primarily for trace element analysis for industrial or agricultural purposes, research, education and training. In 2017, the reactor core was converted in a joint effort by Ghana, the United States and China, with assistance from the IAEA. The IAEA supported the operation to eliminate proliferation risks associated with HEU, while maintaining important scientific research. The team made recommendations for improvements to the GAEC, including: • Completing the revision of reactor safety and operating documents to reflect the results of the commissioning of the reactor after the core fuel conversion. • Enhancing the training and qualification programme for operating personnel. • Improving the capability for monitoring operational safety parameters under all conditions. • Strengthening radiation protection by establishing an effective radiation monitoring of workplace. The GAEC said it will request a follow-up INSARR mission by 2020.

Pursuit of improvement in uranium bulk analysis at the clear facility for safeguards environmental samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sakurai, S.; Takahashi, M.; Sakakibara, T.; Magara, M.; Kurosawa, S.; Esaka, F.; Takai, K.; Watanabe, K.; Usuda, S.; Adachi, T.

2002-01-01

Full text: In order to contribute to the IAEA strengthened safeguards system, a project started in Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) in 1998. Consequently, a clean room facility called as CLEAR, the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research, was constructed in June 2001 at JAERI Tokai and the analytical techniques of ultra-trace nuclear materials in environmental samples are being developed. As for the bulk analysis, performance of inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) was mainly examined because sample preparation for ICP-MS is simpler than that for thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS). Interference of polyatomic ion (such as PtAr + ) and coexisting element (such as Na) on the uranium ions, as well as mass bias caused by ICP-MS operating conditions, has been investigated for precise measurement on uranium isotope ratio. The authors have also studied on the uranium blanks during sample treatment process. The blank value below 10 pg uranium per sample treatment was obtained: dominant origins were elution from Teflon vessel surface in acid heating process of the sample to dry up. The work is in progress to minimize the blank. Compared with the process blank and the minimum uranium amount for isotope ratio measurement by ICP-MS (ca. 10 pg for natural uranium), the swipe cotton (Texwipe-304) which is currently used for IAEA Environmental Sampling includes much more amount of natural uranium in several nano-grams. If the amount of uranium collected on Texwipe-304 is small, sensitive and reliable measurement on isotope ratio will be impossible by bulk analysis. The authors are seeking alternative swipe materials with less amount of uranium. Recently, one of the authors devised an effective technique for recovery of uranium-containing particles from Texwipe-304. The technique, named as Vacuum Suction Method, uses a combination of polycarbonate membrane filters and a macro-pipette tip, which is connected to a vacuum pump

The calculation of the MEU-HEU coupled core in the KUCA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hayashi, M.; Shiroya, S.; Kanda, K.; Shibata, T.

1984-01-01

The KUCA has a plan for critical experiments of the MEU-HEU coupled core in 1984. The neutronics calculation has been performed for the MEU-HEU coupled core in the KUCA. The GGC-4 and THERMOS were used to generate the four-group constants and the 2D-FEM-KUR, based on the finite-element method, was used for the diffusion calculation. The calculations with four-group constants agreed with experiments within 1.8% for the both single-cores with the MEU and the HEU. (author)

URANIUM LEACHING AND RECOVERY PROCESS

Science.gov (United States)

McClaine, L.A.

1959-08-18

A process is described for recovering uranium from carbonate leach solutions by precipitating uranium as a mixed oxidation state compound. Uranium is recovered by adding a quadrivalent uranium carbon;te solution to the carbonate solution, adjusting the pH to 13 or greater, and precipitating the uranium as a filterable mixed oxidation state compound. In the event vanadium occurs with the uranium, the vanadium is unaffected by the uranium precipitation step and remains in the carbonate solution. The uranium-free solution is electrolyzed in the cathode compartment of a mercury cathode diaphragm cell to reduce and precipitate the vanadium.

The structural innovative design of DN400 experimental facility with inversed U-shaped twin tower for uranium ion exchange

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Geng; Lei Ze'nan; Liu Qing

2012-01-01

A DN400 experimental facility with inversed U-shaped twin towers for uranium ion exchange is designed and developed to solve the existing problems in ion exchange equipment, such as easy agglomeration on the upper layer of resin bed, much resin abrasion, high sensitiveness for mud and sand, and difficulty in producing ideal plug flow in back-wash process. The facility combined with the valve control principle, cross flow type sieve plate and the unique inlet and outlet structures can solve the above problems, and the efficiency of uranium extraction can be improved significantly. (authors)

Control of uranium hazards - Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wagner, E.R.

1985-01-01

This report summarizes the Environmental, Safety and Health programs to control uranium hazards at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. A description of the physical plant, the facility processes and the attendant uranium flows and effluents are provided. The hazards of uranium are discussed and the control systems are outlined. Finally, the monitoring programs are described and summaries of recent data are provided. 11 figs., 20 tabs

ANL progress in developing a target and process for converting CNEA Mo-99 production to LEU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Gelis, A.; Aase, S.; Bakel, A.; Freiberg, E.; Conner, C.

2002-01-01

The primary mission of the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program is to facilitate the conversion of research and test reactor fuel and targets from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). One of the current goals at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is to convert 99 Mo production at Argentine Commission Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) from HEU to LEU targets. Specifically addressed in this paper is ANL R and D related to this conversion: (1) designing a prototype production vessel for digesting irradiated LEU foils in alkaline solutions, (2) developing means to improve digestion efficiency, and (3) modifying ion-exchange processes used in the CNEA recovery and purification of 99 Mo to deal with the lower volumes generated from LEU-foil digestion. (author)

Development of a stable uranium recovery regulatory framework for uranium recovery activities in the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Layton, M.C.; Abrams, C.E.

2000-01-01

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has historically regulated operations at all uranium and thorium recovery facilities under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Uranium recovery facilities are those plants, or portions of facilities that process uranium- or thorium-bearing material primarily for its source material content. The uranium recovery industry expressed some concerns over several aspects of the NRC's practices, as described in the NRC's guidance documents. In April 1998, the National Mining Association submitted a report to the Commission, that identified specific concerns with NRC's current position and guidance regarding concurrent jurisdiction at uranium mills; dual regulatory authority at in situ leach facilities; the use of mill tailings impoundments for disposal of radioactive material other than 11e.(2) byproduct material; and the ability to process alternate feed material at uranium mills. The NRC staff addressed most of these concerns in two SECY (staff recommendations) papers that were concurrently provided to the Commission, along with a SECY paper on a draft rulemaking plan relating to these and other issues. The issues addressed in these papers included a new rulemaking, disposal of materials other than 11 e.(2) byproduct material, processing of materials other than natural ores, and improved efficiency for regulating in situ leach uranium facilities. The Commission issued final policy decisions on these issues and directions for NRC staff to implement those decisions in July 2000. (author)

Fuel cycle cost study with HEU and LEU fuels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matos, J.E.; Freese, K.E.

1984-01-01

Fuel cycle costs are compared for a range of 235 U loadings with HEU and LEU fuels using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. If LEU silicide fuels are successfully demonstrated and licensed, the results indicate that total fuel cycle costs can be about the same or lower than those with the HEU fuels that are currently used in most research reactors

Scrap uranium recycling via electron beam melting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McKoon, R.

1993-11-01

A program is underway at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to recycle scrap uranium metal. Currently, much of the material from forging and machining processes is considered radioactive waste and is disposed of by oxidation and encapsulation at significant cost. In the recycling process, uranium and uranium alloys in various forms will be processed by electron beam melting and continuously cast into ingots meeting applicable specifications for virgin material. Existing vacuum processing facilities at LLNL are in compliance with all current federal and state environmental, safety and health regulations for the electron beam melting and vaporization of uranium metal. One of these facilities has been retrofitted with an auxiliary electron beam gun system, water-cooled hearth, crucible and ingot puller to create an electron beam melt furnace. In this furnace, basic process R ampersand D on uranium recycling will be performed with the goal of eventual transfer of this technology to a production facility

Evaluation of environmental control technologies for commercial uranium nuclear fuel fabrication facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perkins, B.L.

1983-01-01

At present in the United States, there are seven commercial light-water reactor uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Effluent wastes from these facilities include uranium, nitrogen, fluorine, and organic-containing compounds. These effluents may be either discharged to the ambient environment, treated and recycled internally, stored or disposed of on-site, sent off-site for treatment and/or recovery, or sent off-site for disposal (including disposal in low-level waste burial sites). Quantities of waste generated and treatment techniques vary greatly depending on the facility and circuits used internally at the facility, though in general all the fluorine entering the facility as UF 6 is discharged as waste. Further studies to determine techniques and procedures that might minimize dose (ALARA) and to give data on possible long-term effects of effluent discharge and waste disposal are needed

Process for electrolytically preparing uranium metal

Science.gov (United States)

Haas, Paul A.

1989-01-01

A process for making uranium metal from uranium oxide by first fluorinating uranium oxide to form uranium tetrafluoride and next electrolytically reducing the uranium tetrafluoride with a carbon anode to form uranium metal and CF.sub.4. The CF.sub.4 is reused in the fluorination reaction rather than being disposed of as a hazardous waste.

White Paper – Use of LEU for a Space Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Poston, David Irvin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Mcclure, Patrick Ray [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-08-11

Historically space reactors flown or designed for the U.S. and Russia used Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for fuel. HEU almost always produces a small and lighter reactor. Since mass increases launch costs or decreases science payloads, HEU was the natural choice. However in today’s environment, the proliferation of HEU has become a major concern for the U.S. government and hence a policy issue. In addition, launch costs are being reduced as the space community moves toward commercial launch vehicles. HEU also carries a heavy security cost to process, test, transport and launch. Together these issues have called for a re-investigation into space reactors the use Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel.

Uranium Task Force final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-03-01

Site-specific data on the management of uranium of 17 facilities have been assembled and analyzed to develop a comprehensive report on uranium processes, treatment, storage, and disposal on a Department of Energy-wide basis. By integrating a variety of waste generation sources, treatment processes, storage facilities, and disposal options, this waste management system study aims to effectively characterize and evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the total Department of Energy system for the management of uranium, as well as the individual sites. 7 refs., 7 figs., 2 tabs

Analysis of characteristics and radiation safety situation of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in north area of China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu Ruilan; Li Jianhui; Wang Xiaoqing; Huang Mingquan

2014-01-01

According to the radiation safety management of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in north area of China, features and radiation safety conditions of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in north area of China were analyzed based on summarizing the inspection data for 2011-2013. So the main problems of radiation environment security on uranium mine were studied. The relevant management measures and recommendations were put forward, and the basis for environmental radiation safety management decision making of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in future was provided. (authors)

The SAPPHIRE and 50 MT projects at BWXT, Lynchburg, VA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thiele, R.; Horn, B.; Coates, C.W.; Stainback, J.R.

2001-01-01

Full text: When the SAPPHIRE project for the down-blending of HEU material of Khazak origin was initiated in 1996 at BWX Technologies (BWXT) formally Babcock and Wilcox in Lynchburg, VA and the Agency was requested to apply its specially designed safeguards measures to the process with a view to provide assurance to the international community that down-blending had actually taken place as stipulated in the USA-Khazak agreement a learning process was initiated from this effort culminating in the current 50 MT downblending process at the same facility with BWXT, the USA Authorities, and the Agency as partners in this technologically advanced enterprise aimed at the downgrading of a substantial quantity of weapons grade material. In the present paper an overview is provided of the road leading to an effective, and mutually agreeable safeguards approach for carrying out verifications in the sensitive environment of a facility devoted to HEU uranium processing. (author)

An assessment of the effectiveness of personal visual observation for a uranium enrichment facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohno, Fubito; Okamoto, Tsuyoshi; Yokochi, Akira; Nidaira, Kazuo

2002-01-01

In a centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, a cascade producing low enriched uranium is composed of a large number of UF 6 gas centrifuges interconnected with pipes. If new advanced centrifuges are developed and they are installed in the facility, the number of centrifuges in the unit cascade will decrease. This means that the number of pipes connecting centrifuges will decrease also. In addition, if integrated type centrifuges containing a few tens of centrifuges are adopted for economical reasons, the number of pipes will further decrease. The smaller the number of pipes, the less the labor required to reconstruct the cascade by changing the piping arrangement so that it can produce highly enriched uranium. Because personal visual observation by inspectors is considered as one of safeguards measures against changing the piping arrangement, its effectiveness is assessed in this study. An inspection in a cascade area is modeled as a two-person non-cooperative game between an inspector and a facility operator. As a result, it is suggested that personal visual observation of the piping arrangement is worth carrying out in an advanced centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. (author)

Radiological characterization of two Spanish uranium mine facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quindos Poncela, L.S.; Fernandez, P.I.; Gomez Arozamena, J.; Bordonoba, M.L.

2000-01-01

During the last decade our Department of Applied and Medical Physics has been involved in the development of a Radiation Protection Programme to monitor and control the environmental radiation conditions existing in the only two Spanish uranium mill facilities located at La Haba (Badajoz) and Salacious (Salamanca). Both mines are located in the west of the country, geographical area with high natural radiation levels. In the framework of this Programme, measurements of radon, radon progeny and external gamma radiation indoors and outdoors, as well as of radon exhalation rate and natural radionuclide concentrations in tailings and soils, have been systematically carried out. In particular, two ore body areas in these uranium mill sites have been specially studied to determine the natural radiation background to be used as a reference value to design reliable criteria for the closure of both facilities, which is planned for the next year. This paper summarizes the main results obtained from the measurements of external gamma radiation, radon concentrations, radon exhalation rate and natural radionuclide activity concentrations made in the above mentioned facilities with special emphasis on the results achieved from the ore body areas. Correlations between experimental results and a short description of the devices and methods used in the measurements are also shown. (author)

Stabilization of uranium hexafluoride by hydrolysis method for decommissioning of safeguard laboratory facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Inagawa, Jun; Hotoku, Shinobu; Oda, Tetsuzo; Aoyagi, Noboru; Magara, Masaaki [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Science and Engineering Directorate, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

2014-03-15

In safeguard laboratory (SGL) facility of Nuclear Science Research Institute of JAEA , uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) of enriched uranium of various enrichment was used for research and development of a spectrometric method for the determination of the enrichment of uranium in April 1983 through March 1993. After completion of this R and D, the UF{sub 6} has been stored in SGL facility. It was decided that the UF{sub 6} is carried to out of the facility, because the SGL facility will be decommissioning until March 2015. To transport and store in safety after transportation, it is necessary that the UF{sub 6} should be converted to stable chemical form. Hydrolysis of UF{sub 6} to uranyl fluoride (UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}) and evaporation to solid state were selected for the stabilization method. The equipment for hydrolysis and evaporation was installed in the SGL facility. Stabilization was operated in this equipment, and all of the UF{sub 6} in the SGL facility was converted to UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} solid state in October 2012 through August 2013. In this report, results of examination and operation for stabilization of UF{sub 6} were reported. (author)

Uranium Processing Research in Australia [Processing of Low-Grade Uranium Ores

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stewart, J R [Australian Atomic Energy Commission, Coogee, N.S.W. (Australia)

1967-06-15

Uranium processing research in Australia has included studies of flotation, magnetic separation, gravity separation, heavy medium separation, atmospheric leaching, multi-stage leaching, alkali leaching, solar heating of leach pulps, jigged-bed resin-in-pulp and solvent-in-pulp extraction. Brief details of the results obtained are given. In general, it can be said that gravity, magnetic and flotation methods are of limited usefulness in the treatment of Australian uranium ores. Alkali leaching seldom gives satisfactory recoveries and multi-stage leaching is expensive. Jigged-bed resin-in-pulp and packed tower solvent-in-pulp extraction systems both show promise, but plant-scale development work is required. Bacterial leaching may be useful in the case of certain low-grade ores. The main difficulties to be overcome, either singly or in combination, in the case of Australian uranium ores not currently considered economically exploitable, are the extremely finely divided state of the uranium mineral, the refractory nature of the uranium mineral and adverse effects due to the gangue minerals present. With respect to known low-grade ores, it would be possible in only a few cases to achieve satisfactory recovery of uranium at reasonable cost by standard treatment methods. (author)

Development of Practical Remediation Process for Uranium-Contaminated Concrete

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, S. S.; Kim, W. S.; Kim, G. N.; Moon, J. K. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2013-10-15

A volume reduction of the concrete waste by the appropriate treatment technologies will decrease the amount of waste to be disposed of and result in a reduction of the disposal cost and an enhancement of the efficiency of the disposal site. Our group has developed a 100 drums/year decontamination process and facilities for the decontamination of radioactive concrete. This practical scale process is little known. A practical decontamination process was developed to remove uranium from concrete pieces generated from the decommissioning of a uranium conversion plant. The concrete pieces are divided into two groups: concrete coated with and without epoxy. For the removal of epoxy from the concrete, direct burning by an oil flame is preferable to an electric heating method. The concrete blocks are crushed to below 30 mm and sifted to 1 mm. When the concrete pieces larger than 1 mm are sequentially washed with a clear washing solution and 1.0 M of nitric acid, most of their radioactivity reaches below the limit value of uranium for self-disposal. The concrete pieces smaller than 1 mm are decontaminated in a rotary washing machine by nitric acid, and an electrokinetic equipment is also used if their radioactivity is high.

Development of Practical Remediation Process for Uranium-Contaminated Concrete

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, S. S.; Kim, W. S.; Kim, G. N.; Moon, J. K.

2013-01-01

A volume reduction of the concrete waste by the appropriate treatment technologies will decrease the amount of waste to be disposed of and result in a reduction of the disposal cost and an enhancement of the efficiency of the disposal site. Our group has developed a 100 drums/year decontamination process and facilities for the decontamination of radioactive concrete. This practical scale process is little known. A practical decontamination process was developed to remove uranium from concrete pieces generated from the decommissioning of a uranium conversion plant. The concrete pieces are divided into two groups: concrete coated with and without epoxy. For the removal of epoxy from the concrete, direct burning by an oil flame is preferable to an electric heating method. The concrete blocks are crushed to below 30 mm and sifted to 1 mm. When the concrete pieces larger than 1 mm are sequentially washed with a clear washing solution and 1.0 M of nitric acid, most of their radioactivity reaches below the limit value of uranium for self-disposal. The concrete pieces smaller than 1 mm are decontaminated in a rotary washing machine by nitric acid, and an electrokinetic equipment is also used if their radioactivity is high

Uranium ore deposits: geology and processing implications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Belyk, C.L.

2010-01-01

There are fifteen accepted types of uranium ore deposits and at least forty subtypes readily identified around the world. Each deposit type has a unique set of geological characteristics which may also result in unique processing implications. Primary uranium production in the past decade has predominantly come from only a few of these deposit types including: unconformity, sandstone, calcrete, intrusive, breccia complex and volcanic ones. Processing implications can vary widely between and within the different geological models. Some key characteristics of uranium deposits that may have processing implications include: ore grade, uranium and gangue mineralogy, ore hardness, porosity, uranium mineral morphology and carbon content. Processing difficulties may occur as a result of one or more of these characteristics. In order to meet future uranium demand, it is imperative that innovative processing approaches and new technological advances be developed in order that many of the marginally economic traditional and uneconomic non-traditional uranium ore deposits can be exploited. (author)

Design of facilities for processing pyrophoric radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bristow, H.A.S.; Hunter, S.D.

1976-01-01

The safe processing of large quantities of plutonium-bearing material poses difficult problems the solution of which sometimes involves conflicting requirements. The difficulties are increased when plutonium of a high burnup is used and the position becomes considerably more complicated when the chemical nature of the material being handled is such that it is pyrophoric. This paper describes the design principles and methods used to establish a facility capable of manufacturing large quantities of mixed plutonium/uranium carbide. The facility which included process stages such as milling, granulation, pellet pressing, furnacing and pin filling, was largely a conversion of an existing processing line. The paper treats the major plant hazards individually and indicates the methods used to counter them, outlining the main design principles employed and describing their application to selected items of equipment. Examples of the problems encountered with typical items of equipment are discussed. Some guide-lines are listed which should be of general value to designers and developers working on equipment for processing plutonium-bearing solids. The methods described have been successfully employed to provide a plant for the manufacture of mixed plutonium/uranium carbide on a scale of many hundreds of kilograms with no serious incident.(author)

Fast critical assembly safeguards: NDA methods for highly enriched uranium. Summary report, October 1978-September 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bellinger, F.O.; Winslow, G.H.

1980-12-01

Nondestructive assay (NDA) methods, principally passive gamma measurements and active neutron interrogation, have been studied for their safeguards effectiveness and programmatic impact as tools for making inventories of highly enriched uranium fast critical assembly fuel plates. It was concluded that no NDA method is the sole answer to the safeguards problem, that each of those emphasized here has its place in an integrated safeguards system, and that each has minimum facility impact. It was found that the 185-keV area, as determined with a NaI detector, was independent of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) plate irradiation history, though the random neutron driver methods used here did not permit accurate assay of irradiated plates. Containment procedures most effective for accurate assaying were considered, and a particular geometry is recommended for active interrogation by a random driver. A model, pertinent to that geometry, which relates the effects of multiplication and self-absorption, is described. Probabilities of failing to detect that plates are missing are examined

Active neutron and gamma-ray imaging of highly enriched uranium for treaty verification.

Science.gov (United States)

Hamel, Michael C; Polack, J Kyle; Ruch, Marc L; Marcath, Matthew J; Clarke, Shaun D; Pozzi, Sara A

2017-08-11

The detection and characterization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) presents a large challenge in the non-proliferation field. HEU has a low neutron emission rate and most gamma rays are low energy and easily shielded. To address this challenge, an instrument known as the dual-particle imager (DPI) was used with a portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator to detect neutrons and gamma rays from induced fission in HEU. We evaluated system response using a 13.7-kg HEU sphere in several configurations with no moderation, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) moderation, and tungsten moderation. A hollow tungsten sphere was interrogated to evaluate the response to a possible hoax item. First, localization capabilities were demonstrated by reconstructing neutron and gamma-ray images. Once localized, additional properties such as fast neutron energy spectra and time-dependent neutron count rates were attributed to the items. For the interrogated configurations containing HEU, the reconstructed neutron spectra resembled Watt spectra, which gave confidence that the interrogated items were undergoing induced fission. The time-dependent neutron count rate was also compared for each configuration and shown to be dependent on the neutron multiplication of the item. This result showed that the DPI is a viable tool for localizing and confirming fissile mass and multiplication.

Contaminant distributions at typical U.S. uranium milling facilities and their effect on remedial action decisions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamp, S.; Dotson, P.W.

1995-01-01

Past operations at uranium processing sites throughout the US have resulted in local contamination of soils and ground water by radionuclides, toxic metals, or both. Understanding the origin of contamination and how the constituents are distributed is a basic element for planning remedial action decisions. This report describes the radiological and nonradiological species found in ground water at a typical US uranium milling facility. The report will provide the audience with an understanding of the vast spectrum of contaminants that must be controlled in planning solutions to the long-term management of these waste materials

A fuel cycle cost study with HEU and LEU fuels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matos, J.E.; Freese, K.E.

1985-01-01

Fuel cycle costs are compared for a range of 235 U loadings with HEU and LEU fuels using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. If LEU silicide fuels are successfully demonstrated and licensed, the results indicate that total fuel cycle costs can be about the same or lower than those with the HEU fuels that are currently used in most research reactors. (author)

A fuel cycle cost study with HEU and LEU fuels

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matos, J E; Freese, K E [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL (United States)

1985-07-01

Fuel cycle costs are compared for a range of {sup 235}U loadings with HEU and LEU fuels using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. If LEU silicide fuels are successfully demonstrated and licensed, the results indicate that total fuel cycle costs can be about the same or lower than those with the HEU fuels that are currently used in most research reactors. (author)

Proposal for Monitoring Within the Centrifuge Cascades of Uranium Enrichment Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Farrar, David R.

2017-04-01

Safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to independently verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to weapons (IAEA, 2017a). Safeguards implemented at uranium enrichment facilities (facilities hereafter) include enrichment monitors (IAEA, 2011). Figure 1 shows a diagram of how a facility could be monitored. The use of a system for monitoring within centrifuge cascades is proposed.

Safety analysis report for packaging, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, model DC-1 package with HEU oxide contents. Change pages for Rev.1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-01-18

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant for the Model DC-1 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide contents has been prepared in accordance with governing regulations form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation and orders from the Department of energy. The fundamental safety requirements addressed by these regulations and orders pertain to the containment of radioactive material, radiation shielding, and nuclear subcriticality. This report demonstrates how these requirements are met.

Safety analysis report for packaging, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, model DC-1 package with HEU oxide contents. Change pages for Rev.1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant for the Model DC-1 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide contents has been prepared in accordance with governing regulations form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation and orders from the Department of energy. The fundamental safety requirements addressed by these regulations and orders pertain to the containment of radioactive material, radiation shielding, and nuclear subcriticality. This report demonstrates how these requirements are met

Preliminary study for treatment methodology establishment of liquid waste containing uranium in refining facility lagoon

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Jik; Lee, Kune Woo; Won, Hui Jun; Ahn, Byung Gil; Shim, Joon Bo

1999-12-01

The preliminary study which establishes the treatment methodology of the sludge waste containing uranium in the conversion facility lagoon was performed. The property of lagoon liquid waste such as the initial water content, the density including radiochemical analysis results were obtained using the samples taken from the lagoon. The objective of this study is to provide some basically needed materials for selection of the most proper lagoon waste treatment methodology by reviewing the effective processes and methods for minimizing the secondary waste resulting from the treatment and disposition of large amount of radioactive liquid waste according to the facility closing. The lagoon waste can be classified into two sorts, such as supernatant and precipitate. The supernatants contain uranium less than 5 ppm and their water content are about 35 percent. Therefore, supernatants are solutions composed of mainly salt components. However, the precipitates have lots of uranium compound contained in the coagulation matrix, and are formed as two kinds of crystalline structures. The most proper method minimizing the secondary waste would be direct drying and solidification of the supernatants and precipitates after separation of them by filtering. (author)

The Development of Treatment Process Technology for Uranium Soil washing Leachate

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shon, Dong Bin; Kim, Gye Nam; Park, Hye Min; Kim, Ki Hong; Lee, Ki Won; Moon, Jeik won [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2011-05-15

Electrokinetic treatment technology is a good method for removing radioactive substances such as U, Co, Cs: but it has a weakness. It takes a long time to get high removal efficiency. The Soil washing method compensates for this weak point with its short reaction time and with this method it is possible to remove a lot of uranium-contaminated soil. But a great deal of leachate is generated. That is, about more amounts of leachate are generated for the decontamination of the same volume of radioactive soil using the electrokinetic equipment. Therefore, the development of a treatment process for The Soil washing leachate is important so that there is a reduction of leachate waste volume and a choice of process. Previously, studies for liquid radioactive waste were in process at various nuclear facilities. Nuclear fuel plant survey appropriate cohesion quantity of liquid waste of radioactive. Nuclear power plants manage liquid radioactive waste with centrifugation equipment. In this study, the treatment technology for uranium Soil washing leachate generated on Soil washing decontamination for the soil contaminated with uranium was developed. A treatment process suitable to the contamination characteristics of Soil washing leachate was proposed

Uranium hexafluoride purification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Araujo, Eneas F. de

1986-01-01

Uranium hexafluoride might contain a large amount of impurities after manufacturing or handling. Three usual methods of purification of uranium hexafluoride were presented: selective sorption, sublimation, and distillation. Since uranium hexafluoride usually is contaminated with hydrogen fluoride, a theoretical study of the phase equilibrium properties was performed for the binary system UF 6 -HF. A large deviation from the ideal solution behaviour was observed. A purification unity based on a constant reflux batch distillation process was developed. A procedure was established in order to design the re boiler, condenser and packed columns for the UF 6 -HF mixture separation. A bench scale facility for fractional distillation of uranium hexafluoride was described. Basic operations for that facility and results extracted from several batches were discussed. (author)

Mixed U/Pu oxide fuel fabrication facility co-processed feed, pelletized fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-09-01

Two conceptual MOX fuel fabrication facilities are discussed in this study. The first facility in the main body of the report is for the fabrication of LWR uranium dioxide - plutonium dioxide (MOX) fuel using co-processed feed. The second facility in the addendum is for the fabrication of co-processed MOX fuel spiked with 60 Co. Both facilities produce pellet fuel. The spiked facility uses the same basic fabrication process as the conventional MOX plant but the fuel feed incorporates a high energy gamma emitter as a safeguard measure against diversion; additional shielding is added to protect personnel from radiation exposure, all operations are automated and remote, and normal maintenance is performed remotely. The report describes the fuel fabrication process and plant layout including scrap and waste processing; and maintenance, ventilation and safety measures

Production of MO-99 from LEU targets-base-side processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, George F.; Koma, Yoshikazu; Cols, Hector; Conner, Cliff; Aase, Scott; Peter, Magdalin; Walker, David; Leonard, Ralph A.; Snelgrove, James L.

2000-01-01

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is cooperating with the Argentine Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) to convert their 99 Mo production process, which uses high enriched uranium (HEU), to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Progress discussed in this year's paper includes optimization of (1) the digestion of LEU foil by sodium hydroxide solution and (2) the primary recovery of molybdenum by anion exchange. Also discussed are ANL/CNEA plans for demonstrating the irradiation and digestion of LEU-foil targets and recovering 99 Mo in Argentina later this year. Our results show that, up to this point in our study, conversion of the CNEA process to LEU appears viable. (author)

New processes for uranium isotope separation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vanstrum, P.R.; Levin, S.A.

1977-01-01

An overview of the status and prospects for processes other than gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and separation nozzle for uranium isotope separation is presented. The incentive for the development of these processes is the increasing requirements for enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear power plants and the potential for reducing the high costs of enrichment. The latest nuclear power projections are converted to uranium enrichment requirements. The size and timing of the market for new enrichment processes are then determined by subtracting the existing and planned uranium enrichment capacities. It is estimated that to supply this market would require the construction of a large new enrichment plant of 9,000,000 SWU per year capacity, costing about $3 billion each (in 1976 dollars) about every year till the year 2000. A very comprehensive review of uranium isotope separation processes was made in 1971 by the Uranium Isotope Separation Review Ad Hoc Committee of the USAEC. Many of the processes discussed in that review are of little current interest. However, because of new approaches or remaining uncertainties about potential, there is considerable effort or continuing interest in a number of alternative processes. The status and prospects for attaining the requirements for competitive economics are presented for these processes, which include laser, chemical exchange, aerodynamic other than separation nozzle, and plasma processes. A qualitative summary comparison of these processes is made with the gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and separation nozzle processes. In order to complete the overview of new processes for uranium isotope separation, a generic program schedule of typical steps beyond the basic process determination which are required, such as subsystem, module, pilot plant, and finally plant construction, before large-scale production can be attained is presented. Also the present value savings through the year 2000 is shown for various

Uranium extraction history using pressure leaching

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fraser, K.S.; Thomas, K.G.

2010-01-01

Over the past 60 years of uranium process development only a few commercial uranium plants have adopted a pressure leaching process in their flowsheet. The selection of acid versus alkaline pressure leaching is related to the uranium and gangue mineralogy. Tetravalent (U"+"4) uranium has to be oxidized to hexavalent (U"+"6) uranium to be soluble. Refractory tetravalent uranium requires higher temperature and pressure, as practised in pressure leaching, for conversation to soluble hexavalent uranium. This paper chronicles the history of these uranium pressure leaching facilities over the past 60 years, with specific details of each design and operation. (author)

Radiological consequence analysis with HEU and LEU fuels

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Woodruff, W.L.; Warinner, D.K.; Matos, J.E.

1984-01-01

A model for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical accident in HEU and LEU fueled research and test reactors is presented. Simple hand calculations based on fission product yield table inventories and non-site specific dispersion data may be adequate in many cases. However, more detailed inventories and site specific data on meteorological conditions and release rates and heights can result in substantial reductions in the dose estimates. LEU fuel gives essentially the same doses as HEU fuel. The plutonium buildup in the LEU fuel does not significantly increase the radiological consequences. The dose to the thyroid is the limiting dose. 10 references, 3 figures, 7 tables.

Radiological consequence analysis with HEU and LEU fuels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woodruff, W.L.; Warinner, D.K.; Matos, J.E.

1984-01-01

A model for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical accident in HEU and LEU fueled research and test reactors is presented. Simple hand calculations based on fission product yield table inventories and non-site specific dispersion data may be adequate in many cases. However, more detailed inventories and site specific data on meteorological conditions and release rates and heights can result in substantial reductions in the dose estimates. LEU fuel gives essentially the same doses as HEU fuel. The plutonium buildup in the LEU fuel does not significantly increase the radiological consequences. The dose to the thyroid is the limiting dose. 10 references, 3 figures, 7 tables

Process for recovery of uranium from wet process phosphoric acid

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wiewiorowski, T.K.; Thornsberry, W.L. Jr.

1978-01-01

Process is claimed for the recovery of uranium from wet process phosphoric acid solution in which an organic extractant, containing uranium values and dissolved iron impurities and comprising a dialkylphosphoric acid and a trialkylphosphine oxide dissolved in a water immiscible organic solvent, is contacted with a substantially iron-free dilute aqueous phosphoric acid to remove said iron impurities. The removed impurities are bled from the system by feeding the resulting iron-loaded phosphoric acid to a secondary countercurrent uranium extraction operation from which they leave as part of the uranium-depleted acid raffinate. Also, process for recovering uranium in which the extractant, after it has been stripped of uranium values by aqueous ammonium carbonate, is contacted with a dilute aqueous acid selected from the group consisting of H 2 SO 4 , HCl, HNO 3 and iron-free H 3 PO 4 to improve the extraction efficiency of the organic extractant

Social Licensing in uranium mining: Experiences from the IAEA review of planned Mukju River Uranium Project, Tanzania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schnell, Henry

2014-01-01

The IAEA Uranium Production Site Appraisal Team (UPSAT) programme is designed to assist Member States to enhance the operational performance and the occupational, public and environmental health and safety of uranium mining and processing facilities across all phases of the uranium production cycle. These include exploration, resource assessment, mining, processing, waste management, site management and remediation, and final closure.

Decontamination and demolition of a former plutonium processing facility's process exhaust system, firescreen, and filter plenum buildings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

LaFrate, P.J. Jr.; Stout, D.S.; Elliott, J.W.

1996-01-01

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Decommissioning Project has decontaminated, demolished, and decommissioned a process exhaust system, two filter plenum buildings, and a firescreen plenum structure at Technical Area 21 (TA-2 1). The project began in August 1995 and was completed in January 1996. These high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter plenums and associated ventilation ductwork provided process exhaust to fume hoods and glove boxes in TA-21 Buildings 2 through 5 when these buildings were active plutonium and uranium processing and research facilities. This paper summarizes the history of TA-21 plutonium and uranium processing and research activities and provides a detailed discussion of integrated work process controls, characterize-as-you-go methodology, unique engineering controls, decontamination techniques, demolition methodology, waste minimization, and volume reduction. Also presented in detail are the challenges facing the LANL Decommissioning Project to safely and economically decontaminate and demolish surplus facilities and the unique solutions to tough problems. This paper also shows the effectiveness of the integrated work package concept to control work through all phases

Decontamination and demolition of a former plutonium processing facility's process exhaust system, firescreen, and filter plenum buildings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

LaFrate, P.J. Jr.; Stout, D.S.; Elliott, J.W.

1996-01-01

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Decommissioning Project has decontaminated, demolished, and decommissioned a process exhaust system, two filter plenum buildings, and a firescreen plenum structure at Technical Area 21 (TA-21). The project began in August 1995 and was completed in January 1996. These high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter plenums and associated ventilation ductwork provided process exhaust to fume hoods and glove boxes in TA-21 Buildings 2 through 5 when these buildings were active plutonium and uranium processing and research facilities. This paper summarizes the history of TA-21 plutonium and uranium processing and research activities and provides a detailed discussion of integrated work process controls, characterize-as-you-go methodology, unique engineering controls, decontamination techniques, demolition methodology, waste minimization, and volume reduction. Also presented in detail are the challenges facing the LANL Decommissioning Project to safely and economically decontaminate and demolish surplus facilities and the unique solutions to tough problems. This paper also shows the effectiveness of the integrated work package concept to control work through all phases

Low-resolution gamma-ray measurements of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Christiansen, A.; Cole, R.; Collins, M.L.

1996-01-01

Facilities that process special nuclear material perform periodic inventories. In bulk facilities that process low-enriched uranium, these inventories and their audits are based primarily on weight and enrichment measurements. Enrichment measurements determine the 211 U weight fraction of the uranium compound from the passive gamma-ray emissions of the sample. Both international inspectors and facility operators rely on the capability to make in-field gamma-ray measurements of uranium enrichment. These users require rapid, portable measurement capability. Some in-field measurements have been biased, forcing the inspectors to resort to high-resolution measurements or mass spectrometry to accomplish their goals

Preliminary investigations on the use of uranium silicide targets for fission Mo-99 production

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cols, H.; Cristini, P.; Marques, R.

1997-08-01

The National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) of Argentine Republic owns and operates an installation for production of molybdenum-99 from fission products since 1985, and, since 1991, covers the whole national demand of this nuclide, carrying out a program of weekly productions, achieving an average activity of 13 terabecquerel per week. At present they are finishing an enlargement of the production plant that will allow an increase in the volume of production to about one hundred of terabecquerel. Irradiation targets are uranium/aluminium alloy with 90% enriched uranium with aluminium cladding. In view of international trends held at present for replacing high enrichment uranium (HEU) for enrichment values lower than 20 % (LEU), since 1990 the authors are in contact with the RERTR program, beginning with tests to adapt their separation process to new irradiation target conditions. Uranium silicide (U{sub 3}Si{sub 2}) was chosen as the testing material, because it has an uranium mass per volume unit, so that it allows to reduce enrichment to a value of 20%. CNEA has the technology for manufacturing miniplates of uranium silicide for their purposes. In this way, equivalent amounts of Molybdenum-99 could be obtained with no substantial changes in target parameters and irradiation conditions established for the current process with Al/U alloy. This paper shows results achieved on the use of this new target.

Aerodynamic isotope separation processes for uranium enrichment: process requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malling, G.F.; Von Halle, E.

1976-01-01

The pressing need for enriched uranium to fuel nuclear power reactors, requiring that as many as ten large uranium isotope separation plants be built during the next twenty years, has inspired an increase of interest in isotope separation processes for uranium enrichment. Aerodynamic isotope separation processes have been prominently mentioned along with the gas centrifuge process and the laser isotope separation methods as alternatives to the gaseous diffusion process, currently in use, for these future plants. Commonly included in the category of aerodynamic isotope separation processes are: (a) the separation nozzle process; (b) opposed gas jets; (c) the gas vortex; (d) the separation probes; (e) interacting molecular beams; (f) jet penetration processes; and (g) time of flight separation processes. A number of these aerodynamic isotope separation processes depend, as does the gas centrifuge process, on pressure diffusion associated with curved streamlines for the basic separation effect. Much can be deduced about the process characteristics and the economic potential of such processes from a simple and elementary process model. In particular, the benefit to be gained from a light carrier gas added to the uranium feed is clearly demonstrated. The model also illustrates the importance of transient effects in this class of processes

Uranium enrichment. Enrichment processes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alexandre, M.; Quaegebeur, J.P.

2009-01-01

Despite the remarkable progresses made in the diversity and the efficiency of the different uranium enrichment processes, only two industrial processes remain today which satisfy all of enriched uranium needs: the gaseous diffusion and the centrifugation. This article describes both processes and some others still at the demonstration or at the laboratory stage of development: 1 - general considerations; 2 - gaseous diffusion: physical principles, implementation, utilisation in the world; 3 - centrifugation: principles, elementary separation factor, flows inside a centrifuge, modeling of separation efficiencies, mechanical design, types of industrial centrifuges, realisation of cascades, main characteristics of the centrifugation process; 4 - aerodynamic processes: vortex process, nozzle process; 5 - chemical exchange separation processes: Japanese ASAHI process, French CHEMEX process; 6 - laser-based processes: SILVA process, SILMO process; 7 - electromagnetic and ionic processes: mass spectrometer and calutron, ion cyclotron resonance, rotating plasmas; 8 - thermal diffusion; 9 - conclusion. (J.S.)

The relationship of JNC and JCO in the uranium processing plant criticality accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kanamori, Masashi; Yanagibashi, Katsumi; Okamoto, Naritoshi

2002-12-01

On September 30th 1999, the criticality accident occurred at JCO's uranium conversion building in Tokai. The accident occurred during reconversion from U 3 O 8 to uranium nitrate solution (UNH) with uranium enriched 18.8% and about 60 kgU. JCO contacted with JNC to supply UNH that is fuel material for the experimental fast breeder reactor 'JOYO'. JNC has contracted with JCO that had started nuclear fuel material processing business following a definite policy of Japanese government and developed SUMITOMO ADU PROCESS'. JNC made the first contract with JCO in 1985 and has made a contact every year. There had never been a problem in their products. JNC inspected products based on contract. JNC discharge our duty as customer inspecting products based on contract. As for safety control, JCO had taken licensing safety review and had been permitted to be 'a processing facility'. Therefore JNC understood that JCO produced following this license. 'The Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation' showed that JCO had been taking a different method from the permit and violating the license. However JNC had never been explained about that and JCO's operation procedures had never described about that. Therefore the Criticality Accident couldn't be avoided. This report describes the relationship of JNC and JCO in the uranium reconversion contract for JOYO, atomic development policy of Japanese government, process to the order and the contents of contract. (author)

31 CFR 540.305 - HEU Agreements.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false HEU Agreements. 540.305 Section 540.305 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF... Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the Transfer of Source Material to the Russian Federation signed at...

Procedure of uranium mine and mill facilities decommissioning work

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Renjie

1995-01-01

The procedure of decommissioning work of uranium mine and mill facilities includes three stages: preparation, on-the-spot construction and acceptance after being completed. The first stage, preparation, is discussed in detail, and it is presented to take the measures of strengthening leadership and improving leading body to conduct the decommissioning work best

Case study: remediation of a former uranium mining/processing site in Hungary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Csovari, M. et al.

2004-01-01

The Hungarian uranium mining activities near Pecs lasted from 1958 to 1997. Approximately 46 Mt of rock were mined, from which 18.8 Mt of upgraded ore were processed. Some ore had been exported prior to the construction of the processing plant at the site. Remediation of the former uranium-related industrial sites is being carried out by the Mecsek Ore Environment Ltd. and started in the 1990s. Today the former mines and their surroundings are rehabilitated, former heap piles and a number of smaller waste rock piles have been relocated to a more protected area (waste rock pile N 3). Ongoing core remediation activities are directed to the remediation of the tailings ponds, and also water treatment issues are most important. Three water treatment facilities are currently in operation: a mine water treatment system with the objective to remove uranium and gain a marketable by-product; a pump-and-treat system to restore the groundwater quality in the vicinity of the tailing ponds; a pilot-scale, experimental passive in-situ groundwater treatment system to avoid migration of uranium contaminated groundwater. Refs. 5 (author)

A re-evaluation of physical protection standards for irradiated HEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lyman, Edwin; Kuperman, Alan

2002-01-01

In the post-September 11 era, it is essential to reconsider all the assumptions upon which the physical protection systems of the past were based and determine whether these assumptions are still appropriate in light of the current terrorist threat. For instance, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission definition of a 'formula quantity' of special nuclear material is derived from the belief that a terrorist plot to carry out multiple coordinated attacks on different facilities with the goal of acquiring enough SNM for a nuclear weapon is incredible. This assumption has clearly been proven wrong by the September 11 attacks. Another standard that needs to be revisited is the 'self-protection' threshold that determines whether or not an item containing SNM is considered to be 'irradiated' for physical protection purposes. The current value of this threshold, 1 Sv/hr unshielded at 1 meter, is of questionable value as a deterrent to determined terrorists who would be willing to sustain long-term injury as long as they could accomplish their near-term goals. A more credible threshold would be set at a level that would have a high likelihood of disabling the perpetrators before they could complete their mission. Most irradiated nonpower reactor fuels would be unable to meet such a standard. This raises serious questions about the adequacy of the level of physical protection applied today to the large inventories of irradiated HEU fuels now scattered in storage sites around the world. The absence of a coherent global policy for dealing with these materials has created a situation rife with vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit. The international community, now seized with concern about unused stockpiles of unirradiated HEU fuels around the world, also needs to appreciate the dangers posed by lightly irradiated spent fuels as well. A U.S. proposal to import Russian HEU for supplying U.S. nonpower reactors will only prolong this situation This paper will review policy

The SLOWPOKE-2 reactor with low enrichment uranium oxide fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Townes, B.M.; Hilborn, J.W.

1985-06-01

A SLOWPOKE-2 reactor core contains less than 1 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the proliferation risk is very low. However, to overcome proliferation concerns a new low enrichment uranium (LEU) fuelled reactor core has been designed. This core contains approximately 180 fuel elements based on the Zircaloy-4 clad UOsub(2) CANDU fuel element, but with a smaller outside diameter. The physics characteristics of this new reactor core ensure the inherent safety of the reactor under all conceivable conditions and thus the basic SLOWPOKE safety philosophy which permits unattended operation is not affected

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Design with Two-Dimensional Grading for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL

2011-05-01

An engineering design study of the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel is ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The computational models developed during fiscal year 2010 to search for an LEU fuel design that would meet the requirements for the conversion and the results obtained with these models are documented and discussed in this report. Estimates of relevant reactor performance parameters for the LEU fuel core are presented and compared with the corresponding data for the currently operating HEU fuel core. The results obtained indicate that the LEU fuel design would maintain the current performance of the HFIR with respect to the neutron flux to the central target region, reflector, and beam tube locations under the assumption that the operating power for the reactor fueled with LEU can be increased from the current value of 85 MW to 100 MW.

A radiological consequence analysis with HEU and LEU fuels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woodruff, W.L.; Warinner, D.K.; Matos, J.E.

1985-01-01

A model for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical accident in HEU and LEU fueled research and test reactors is presented. Simple hand calculations based on fission product yield table inventories and nonsite specific dispersion data may be adequate in many cases. However, more detailed inventories and site specific data on meteorological conditions and release rates and heights can result in substantial reductions in the dose estimates. LEU fuel gives essentially the same doses as HEU fuel. The plutonium buildup in the LEU fuel does not significantly increase the radiological consequences. The dose to the thyroid is the limiting dose. (author)

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Anderson, James [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Goins, Monty [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Paul, Pran [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wilkinson, Alan [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wilson, David [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2015-09-03

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of adioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

PROCESS FOR PREPARING URANIUM METAL

Science.gov (United States)

Prescott, C.H. Jr.; Reynolds, F.L.

1959-01-13

A process is presented for producing oxygen-free uranium metal comprising contacting iodine vapor with crude uranium in a reaction zone maintained at 400 to 800 C to produce a vaporous mixture of UI/sub 4/ and iodine. Also disposed within the maction zone is a tungsten filament which is heated to about 1600 C. The UI/sub 4/, upon contacting the hot filament, is decomposed to molten uranium substantially free of oxygen.

Uranium refining process using ion exchange membrane

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamaguchi, Akira

1977-01-01

As for the method of refining uranium ore being carried out in Europe and America at present, uranium ore is roughly refined at the mine sites to yellow cake, then this is transported to refineries and refined by dry method. This method has the following faults, namely the number of processes is large, it requires expensive corrosion-resistant materials because of high temperature treatment, and the impurities in uranium tend to increase. On the other hand, in case of EXCER method, treatment is carried out at low temperature, and high purity uranium can be obtained, but the efficiency of electrolytic reduction process is extremely low, and economically infeasible. In the wet refining method called PNC process, uranium tetrafluoride is produced from uranium ore without making yellow cake, therefore the process is rationalized largely, and highly economical. The electrolytic reduction process in this method was developed by Asahi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. by constructing the pilot plant in Ningyotoge Mine. The ion exchange membrane, the electrodes, and the problems concerning the process and the engineering for commercial plants were investigated. The electrolytic reduction process, the pilot plant, the development of the elements of electrolytic cells, the establishment of analytical process, the measurement of the electrolytic characteristics, the demonstration operation, and the life time of the electrolytic diaphragm are reported. (Kako, I.)

Radiological aspects of in situ uranium recovery

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BROWN, STEVEN H.

2007-01-01

In the last few years, there has been a significant increase in the demand for Uranium as historical inventories have been consumed and new reactor orders are being placed. Numerous mineralized properties around the world are being evaluated for Uranium recovery and new mining / milling projects are being evaluated and developed. Ore bodies which are considered uneconomical to mine by conventional methods such as tunneling or open pits, can be candidates for non-conventional recovery techniques, involving considerably less capital expenditure. Technologies such as Uranium in situ leaching in situ recovery (ISL / ISR), have enabled commercial scale mining and milling of relatively small ore pockets of lower grade, and may make a significant contribution to overall world wide uranium supplies over the next ten years. Commercial size solution mining production facilities have operated in the US since 1975. Solution mining involves the pumping of groundwater, fortified with oxidizing and complexing agents into an ore body, solubilizing the uranium in situ, and then pumping the solutions to the surface where they are fed to a processing plant. Processing involves ion exchange and may also include precipitation, drying or calcining and packaging operations depending on facility specifics. This paper presents an overview of the ISR process and the health physics monitoring programs developed at a number of commercial scale ISL / ISR Uranium recovery and production facilities as a result of the radiological character of these processes. Although many radiological aspects of the process are similar to that of conventional mills, conventional-type tailings as such are not generated. However, liquid and solid byproduct materials may be generated and impounded. The quantity and radiological character of these by products are related to facility specifics. Some special monitoring considerations are presented which are required due to the manner in which Radon gas is evolved in

The modelling of the uranium-leaching and ion-exchange processes of the Hartebeestfontein Gold Mine and its role in economic plant operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Broekman, B.R.; Ward, B.

1985-01-01

Computer facilities available in the Metallurgical Department at Hartebeestfontein Gold Mine have enabled the research staff to develope complex, practical mathematical models of their uranium hydrometallurgical processes. Empirical models of uranium leaching, uranium loading on resin and redox potential in leach liquors are discussed. These models, developed with non-linear regression techniques, form the basis of an over all mathematical model for a uranium plant. The most economic operating conditions can be predicted for specific prices of uranium and reagents. Substantial profit improvements have been achieved as a result of the changes in the process and equipment that have been made

Processing of uranium-containing coal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cordero Alvarez, M.

1987-01-01

A direct storage of uranium-bearing coal requires the processing of large amounts of raw materials while lacking guarantee of troublefree process cycles. With the example of an uranium-bearing bituminous coal from Stockheim, it was aimed at the production of an uranium ore concentrate by means of mechanical, thermal and chemical investigations. Above all, amorphous pitch blende was detected as a uranium mineralization which occurs homogeneously distributed in the grain size classes of the comminuted raw material with particle diameters of a few μm and, after the combustion, enriches in the field of finest grain of the axis. Heterogeneous and solid-state reactions in the thermal decarburization above 700deg C result in the development of hardly soluble uranium oxides and and calcium uranates as well as in enclosures in mineral glass. Thus, the pre-enrichment has to take place in a temperature range below 600deg C. By means of a sorting classification of the ash at ± 2.0 mm, it is possible to achieve an enrichment of up to factor 15 for a mineral of a mainly low carbonate content and, for a mineral of a rich carbonate content, up to the factor 4. The separation of the uranium from the concentrates produced is possible with a yield of 95% by means of leaching with sulphuric acid at a temperature of 20deg C. As far as their reproducibility was concerned, the laboratory tests were verified on a semi-industrial scale. A processing method is suggested on the basis of the data obtained. (orig.) [de

Uranium isotopes in tree bark as a spatial tracer of environmental contamination near former uranium processing facilities in southwest Ohio.

Science.gov (United States)

Conte, Elise; Widom, Elisabeth; Kuentz, David

2017-11-01

Inappropriate handling of radioactive waste at nuclear facilities can introduce non-natural uranium (U) into the environment via the air or groundwater, leading to anthropogenic increases in U concentrations. Uranium isotopic analyses of natural materials (e.g. soil, plants or water) provide a means to distinguish between natural and anthropogenic U in areas near sources of radionuclides to the environment. This study examines the utility of two different tree bark transects for resolving the areal extent of U atmospheric contamination using several locations in southwest Ohio that historically processed U. This study is the first to utilize tree bark sampling transects to assess environmental contamination emanating from a nuclear facility. The former Fernald Feed Materials Production Center (FFMPC; Ross, Ohio) produced U metal from natural U ores and recycled nuclear materials from 1951 to 1989. Alba Craft Laboratory (Oxford, Ohio) machined several hundred tons of natural U metal from the FFMPC between 1952 and 1957. The Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company (HHM; Hamilton, Ohio) intermittently fabricated slugs rolled from natural U metal stock for use in nuclear reactors from 1943 to 1951. We have measured U concentrations and isotope signatures in tree bark sampled along an ∼35 km SSE-NNW transect from the former FFMPC to the vicinity of the former Alba Craft laboratories (transect #1) and an ∼20 km SW- NE (prevailing local wind direction) transect from the FFMPC to the vicinity of the former HHM (transect #2), with a focus on old trees with thick, persistent bark that could potentially record a time-integrated signature of environmental releases of U related to anthropogenic activity. Our results demonstrate the presence of anthropogenic U contamination in tree bark from the entire study area in both transects, with U concentrations within 1 km of the FFMPC up to ∼400 times local background levels of 0.066 ppm. Tree bark samples from the Alba Craft and

A novel monolithic LEU foil target based on a PVD manufacturing process for 99Mo production via fission.

Science.gov (United States)

Hollmer, Tobias; Petry, Winfried

2016-12-01

99 Mo is the most widely used radioactive isotope in nuclear medicine. Its main production route is the fission of uranium. A major challenge for a reliable supply is the conversion from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). A promising candidate to realize this conversion is the cylindrical LEU irradiation target. The target consists of a uranium foil encapsulated between two coaxial aluminum cladding cylinders. This target allows a separate processing of the irradiated uranium foil and the cladding when recovering the 99 Mo. Thereby, both the costs and the volume of highly radioactive liquid waste are significantly reduced compared to conventional targets. The presented manufacturing process is based on the direct coating of the uranium on the inside of the outer cladding cylinder. This process was realized by a cylindrical magnetron enhanced physical vapor deposition (PVD) technique. The method features a highly automated process, a good quality of the resulting uranium foils and a high material utilization. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Lessons learned from recent safety related incidents at A Canadian uranium conversion facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaferi, Jafir

2013-01-01

This paper presents the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's (CNSC) regulatory requirements for nuclear fuel facility licensees to report any situation or incident that results or is likely to result in a hazard to the health or safety of any person or the environment and to submit its incident investigation report with cause(s) of the incident and corrective actions taken or planned. In addition, the paper presents two recent safety-related incidents that occurred at a uranium conversion facility in Canada along with their consequences, causes, corrective actions and any lessons learned. The first incident resulted in a release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) inside the UF6 cylinder filling station and the second one resulted in a spill of uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ) slurry inside the UF6 plant. Both incidents had no impact on the workers or the environment. (authors)

Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response

Science.gov (United States)

2009-01-01

milling facilities to crush the ore and extract the uranium concentrate, a process that yields what is often called yellowcake. The yellowcake would then...issued by the Baker-Cutler Task Force described the threat, “In a worst-case scenario, a nuclear engineer graduate with a grapefruit -sized lump of HEU...stealing spent power reactor fuel or fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel, both of which would need to have their plutonium chemically extracted . While separating

Uranium/plutonium and uranium/neptunium separation by the Purex process using hydroxyurea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhu Zhaowu; He Jianyu; Zhang Zefu; Zhang Yu; Zhu Jianmin; Zhen Weifang

2004-01-01

Hydroxyurea dissolved in nitric acid can strip plutonium and neptunium from tri-butyl phosphate efficiently and has little influence on the uranium distribution between the two phases. Simulating the 1B contactor of the Purex process by hydroxyurea with nitric acid solution as a stripping agent, the separation factors of uranium/plutonium and uranium/neptunium can reach values as high as 4.7 x 10 4 and 260, respectively. This indicates that hydroxyurea is a promising salt free agent for uranium/plutonium and uranium/neptunium separations. (author)

77 FR 18272 - Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services LLC...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-03-27

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 70-3103; NRC-2010-0264] Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services LLC, National Enrichment Facility, Eunice... Louisiana Energy Services (LES), LLC, National enrichment Facility in Eunice, New Mexico, and has verified...

77 FR 65729 - Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services LLC...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-30

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 70-3103; NRC-2010-0264] Uranium Enrichment Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Reports Regarding Louisiana Energy Services LLC, National Enrichment Facility, Eunice... Services (LES), LLC, National Enrichment Facility in Eunice, New Mexico, and has verified that cascades...

Uranium manufacturing process employing the electrolytic reduction method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oda, Yoshio; Kazuhare, Manabu; Morimoto, Takeshi.

1986-01-01

The present invention related to a uranium manufacturing process that employs the electrolytic reduction method, but particularly to a uranium manufacturing process that employs an electrolytic reduction method requiring low voltage. The process, in which uranium is obtained by means of the electrolytic method and with uranyl acid as the raw material, is prior art

Characterization of Uranium-Bearing Material by Passive Non-Destructive Gamma Spectrometry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lakosi, L.; Zsigrai, J.; Nguyen, C.T.

2009-01-01

Characterization of nuclear materials is equally important in nuclear safeguards (inventory verification) and in nuclear security (revealing illicit trafficking). Analysis of materials is a key issue in both fields. Natural (NU), depleted (DU), low-enriched (LEU), and high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples were analysed by high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS). Isotopic composition and total U-content of reactor fuel pellets and powder were determined. A unique HRGS method was developed for the first time for determining the production date of the material of unknown origin. Identifying reprocessed uranium proved to be possible by HRGS as well.

Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986 No. 194

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-01-01

The purpose of this Act is to protect the health and safety of the people of New South Wales and its environment. Accordingly it prohibits prospecting or mining for uranium and the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and other facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. (NEA) [fr

Uranium extraction from phosphates: Background, opportunities, process overview and way forward for commercialisation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haldar, T.K.; Hilton, J.; Tulsidas, H.

2014-01-01

Socio-economic up-gradation for major part of global population, particularly in developing countries will call for large growth of electricity demand. The fact that 2 billion of world’s 7 billion population do not have access to electricity justifies this growth projection. Environmental concern along with increasing demand for other essential ingredients for improved standard of living like affordable food, water, healthcare etc. will encourage large growth in nuclear technology utilisation. While conventional uranium resources will continue to be the major source for meeting the resultant surge in uranium demand, there is a need to look forward beyond this. Inherent advantage of uranium extraction from phosphate (UxP) is that it is the by-product of phosphate fertilizer industry. There is no need for separate mine development, ore processing or tailing disposal. Feed phosphoric acid is available from phosphate industry in ready to use condition. UxP thus enables recovery of energy resource otherwise lost for ever besides making the fertiliser cleaner. UxP has also potential to make phosphate industry economically more viable and socially more acceptable. Phosphate industry also benefits from cleaner return acid making operation of downstream plant simpler and cleaner besides possible value addition of the product basket Due to low uranium concentration in source material, normally in the range of 80 – 150 ppm, and several process and engineering issues inherent to this relatively difficult separation process, large scale commercial deployment will depend on development of commercially viable technology. Though the process has been utilised for production of uranium in the past, before setting up a new commercial facility, it is imperative that its techno-economic feasibility be established considering all related aspects of the proposed facility. This will address the difficulties encountered in earlier plants, problems related to wide variation in physical

A study of the material accountancy procedure at the uranium enrichment facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shirahashi, J.; Akiba, M.; Omae, M.

1984-01-01

This paper describes an evaluation of material accountancy based on total uranium (U element MUF) to detect diversions of significant quantity in the uranium enrichment facility operating at a stated maximum enrichment level of 5%. Verification that material production is within the declared enrichment can be achieved by the inspection activities associated with limited - frequency unannounced access (LFUA) to cascade areas as treated extensively in HSP. According to the experience of the material accountancy at our facility, the reduction of the material accountancy capability by changing from U-235 isotope MUF to U element MUF is only about half. However, still the U element MUF approach can meet the current IAEA detection goals for the up to about 1000 tswu/a plant

Studies on uranium ore processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, C.H.; Park, S.W.; Lim, J.K.; Chung, M.K.

1981-01-01

Chemical and chemical engineering techniques of the uranium ore processing established by France COGEMA (Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires) have been comprehensively reviewed in preparation for successful test operation of the pilot plant to be completed by the end of 1981. It was found that the amount of sulfuric acid (75 Kg/t, ore) and sodium chlorate (2.5 Kg/t, ore) recommended by COGEMA should be increased up to 100 Kg/t, ore and 10 Kg/t, ore respectively to obtain satisfactory leach of uranium for some ore samples produced at the different pits of Goesan uranium mine. Conditions of the other processes such as solvent extraction, stripping, and precipitation of yellow cake were generally agreed with the results of intensive studies done by this laboratory

Uranium resource processing. Secondary resources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gupta, C.K.; Singh, H.

2003-01-01

This book concentrates on the processing of secondary sources for recovering uranium, a field which has gained in importance in recent years as it is environmental-friendly and economically in tune with the philosophy of sustainable development. Special mention is made of rock phosphate, copper and gold tailings, uranium scrap materials (both natural and enriched) and sea water. This volume includes related area of ore mineralogy, resource classification, processing principles involved in solubilization followed by separation and safety aspects

Uranium bed oxidation vacuum process system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McLeland, H.L.

1977-01-01

Deuterium and tritium gases are occluded in uranium powder for release into neutron generator tubes. The uranium powder is contained in stainless steel bottles, termed ''beds.'' If these beds become damaged, the gases must be removed and the uranium oxidized in order not to be flammable before shipment to ERDA disposal grounds. This paper describes the system and methods designed for the controlled degassing and oxidation process. The system utilizes sputter-ion, cryo-sorption and bellows pumps for removing the gases from the heated source bed. Removing the tritium gas is complicated by the shielding effect of helium-3, a byproduct of tritium decay. This effect is minimized by incremental pressure changes, or ''batch'' processing. To prevent runaway exothermic reaction, oxidation of the uranium bed is also done incrementally, or by ''batch'' processing, rather than by continuous flow. The paper discusses in detail the helium-3 shielding effect, leak checks that must be made during processing, bed oxidation, degree of gas depletion, purity of gases sorbed from beds, radioactivity of beds, bed disposal and system renovation

Uranium recovery from wet process phosphoric acid

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

In the field of metallurgy, specifically processes for recovering uranium from wet process phosphoric acid solution derived from the acidulation of uraniferous phosphate ores, problems of imbalance of ion exchange agents, contamination of recycled phosphoric acid with process organics and oxidizing agents, and loss and contamination of uranium product, are solved by removing organics from the raffinate after ion exchange conversion of uranium to uranous form and recovery thereof by ion exchange, and returning organics to the circuit to balance mono and disubstituted ester ion exchange agents; then oxidatively stripping uranium from the agent using hydrogen peroxide; then after ion exchange recovery of uranyl and scrubbing, stripping with sodium carbonate and acidifying the strip solution and using some of it for the scrubbing; regenerating the sodium loaded agent and recycling it to the uranous recovery step. Economic recovery of uranium as a by-product of phosphate fertilizer production is effected. (author)

Filtration aids in uranium ore processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ford, H.L.; Levine, N.M.; Risdon, A.R.

1975-01-01

A process of improving the filtration efficiency and separation of uranium ore pulps obtained by carbonate leaching of uranium ore which comprises treating said ore pulps with an aqueous solution of hydroxyalkyl guar selected from the group consisting of hydroxyethyl and hydroxypropyl guar in the amount of 0.1 and 2.0 pounds of hydroxyalkyl guar per ton of uranium ore

Process for recovering a uranium containing concentrate and purified phosphoric acid from a wet process phosphoric acid containing uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weterings, C.A.M.; Janssen, J.A.

1985-01-01

A process is claimed for recovering from a wet process phosphoric acid which contains uranium, a uranium containing concentrate and a purified phosphoric acid. The wet process phosphoric acid is treated with a precipitant in the presence of a reducing agent and an aliphatic ketone

Process for recovering a uranium containing concentrate and purified phosphoric acid from a wet process phosphoric acid containing uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Weterings, C.A.M.; Janssen, J.A.

1985-04-30

A process is claimed for recovering from a wet process phosphoric acid which contains uranium, a uranium containing concentrate and a purified phosphoric acid. The wet process phosphoric acid is treated with a precipitant in the presence of a reducing agent and an aliphatic ketone.

Uranium ore processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ritcey, G.M.; Haque, K.E.; Lucas, B.H.; Skeaff, J.M.

1983-01-01

The authors have developed a complete method of recovering separately uranium, thorium and radium from impure solids such as ores, concentrates, calcines or tailings containing these metals. The technique involves leaching, in at least one stage. The impure solids in finely divided form with an aqueous leachant containing HCl and/or Cl 2 until acceptable amounts of uranium, thorium and radium are dissolved. Uranium is recovered from the solution by solvent extraction and precipitation. Thorium may also be recovered in the same manner. Radium may be recovered by at least one ion exchange, absorption and precipitation. This amount of iron in the solution must be controlled before the acid solution may be recycled for the leaching process. The calcine leached in the first step is prepared in a two stage roast in the presence of both Cl 2 and a metal sulfide. The first stage is at 350-450 0 and the second at 550-700 0

A process for uranium recovery in phosphoric acid

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duarte Neto, J.

1984-01-01

Results are presented about studies carried out envisaging the development of a process for uranium recovery from phosphoric acid, produced from the concentrate obtained from phosphorus-uraniferous mineral from Itataia mines (CE, Brazil). This process uses a mixture of DEPA-TOPO as extractant and the extraction cycle involves the following stages: acid pre-treatment; adjustment of the oxidation potential so to ensure that all uranium is hexavalent; extraction of uranium from the acid; screening of the solvent to remove undesirable impurities; uranium re-extraction and precipitation; solvent recovery. A micro-pilot plant for continuous processing was built up. Data collected showed that uranium can be recovered with an yield greater than 99%, thus proving the feasibility of the process and encouraging the construction of a bigger scale plant. (Author) [pt

Civilian inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Albright, D.

1987-01-01

In the future, commercial laser isotope enrichment technologies, currently under development, could make it easier for national to produce highly enriched uranium secretly. The head of a US firm that is developing a laser enrichment process predicts that in twenty years, major utilities and small countries will have relatively small, on-site, laser-based uranium enrichment facilities. Although these plants will be designed for the production of low enriched uranium, they could be modified to produce highly enriched uranium, an option that raises the possibility of countries producing highly enriched uranium in small, easily hidden facilities. Against this background, most of this report describes the current and future quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the world, their forms, the facilities in which they are produced, stored, and used, and the extent to which they are transported. 5 figures, 10 tables

Study of immobilization of waste from treatment of acid waters of a uranium mining facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goda, R.T.; Oliveira, A.P. de; Silva, N.C. da; Villegas, R.A.S.; Ferreira, A.M.

2017-01-01

This study aimed to produce scientific and technical knowledge aiming at the development of techniques to immobilize the waste generated in the treatment of acid waters in the UTM-INB Caldas uranium mining and processing facility using Portland cement. This residue (calcium diuranate - DUCA) contains uranium compounds and metal hydroxides in a matrix of calcium sulfate. It is observed that this material, in contact with the lake of acid waters of the mine's own pit, undergoes resolubilization and, therefore, changes the quality of the acidic water contained therein, changing the treatment parameters. For the study of immobilization of this residue, the mass of water contained in both the residue deposited in the pit of the mine and in the pulp resulting from the treatment of the acid waters was determined. In addition, different DUCA / CEMENT / WATER ratios were used for immobilization and subsequent mechanical strength and leaching tests. The results showed that in the immobilized samples with 50% cement mass condition, no uranium was detected in the leaching tests, and the mechanical strength at compression was 9.4 MPa, which indicates that more studies are needed, but indicate a good capacity to immobilize uranium in cement

Oxidation-extraction of uranium from wet-process phosphoric acid

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lawes, B.C.

1985-01-01

The invention involves an improvement to the reductive stripping process for recovering uranium values from wet-process phosphoric acid solution, where uranium in the solution is oxidized to uranium (VI) oxidation state and then extracted from the solution by contact with a water immiscible organic solvent, by adding sufficient oxidant, hydrogen peroxide, to obtain greater than 90 percent conversion of the uranium to the uranium (VI) oxidation state to the phosphoric acid solution and simultaneously extracting the uranium (VI)

Study contribution to the new international philosophy of the radiological safety system on chemical processing of the natural uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Silva, T.M. da.

1988-01-01

The objective of the work is to adapt the radiological Safety System in the facilities concerned to the chemical treatment of the uranium concentrated (yellow-cake) until conversion in uranium hexafluoride in the pilot plant of IPEN-CNEN/SP, to the new international philosophy adopted by the International Commission Radiological on Protection ICPR publication 22(1973), 26(1977), 30(1978) and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA publication 9(1982). The new philosophy changes fully the Radiological Protection concepts of preceding philosophy, changes, also, the concept of the work place and individual monitoring as well as the classification of the working areas. These new concepts are applied in each phase of the natural uranium treatment chemical process in conversion facility. (author)

Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Annuli and Cylinders with Polyethylene Reflectors and/or Internal Polyethylene Moderator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tyler Sumner; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Montierth

2007-01-01

A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, experiments of uranium metal annuli with and without polyethylene reflectors and with the central void region either empty or filled with polyethylene were evaluated under ICSBEP Identifier HEU-MET-FAST-076. The outer diameter of the uranium annuli varied from 9 to 15 inches in two-inch increments. In addition, there were uranium metal cylinders with diameters varying from 7 to 15 inches with complete reflection and reflection on one flat surface to simulate floor reflection. Most of the experiments were performed between February 1964 and April 1964. Five partially reflected (reflected on the top only) experiments were assembled in November 1967, but are judged by the evaluators not to be of benchmark quality. Twenty-four of the twenty-five experiments have been determined to have fast spectra. The only exception has a mixed spectrum. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with five different parameters associated with the uranium parts and three associated with the polyethylene parts was evaluated. Included were uranium mass, height, diameter, isotopic content, and impurity content and polyethylene mass, diameter, and impurity content. There were additional uncertainties associated with assembly alignment, support structure, and the value

Uranium in a recent phosphorite formation process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Baturin, G N; Dubinchuk, V I; Kochenov, A V

1986-01-01

Uranium behaviour in the process of nowadays phosphorite formation in the sediments of Namibia shelf is considered. The material collected during the 3-d trip of the research vessel ''Akademik Kurchatov'' and 26-th trip of the research vessel ''Mikhail Lomonosov'' is used. The samples from three geological stations 2046, 2047 and 2048 from the depths of 78-87 m have been investigated. Each sample (mass from 0.2 to 0.3 kg) is composed of several samples representing unified genetic series: holocene diatomic silts enclosing phosphorites - phosphatized silts - phosphorite concretions. Uranium has been determined by the X-ray spectral method; phosphorus, organic carbon and other components - by the chemical analysis. Uranium forms investigated by the combination of methods of electron microscopy, microdiffraction, microradioautography and microsounding. Uranium content in nowadays phosphorites at the shelf is 3-106 g/t. Uranium accumulation in phosphorites at the initial stages of their formation is controlled by its content in host sediments. In the course of litification of diagenetic phosphate concretions the uranium content in them varies from 40 to 80 g/t. The uranium concentration process in phosphorites is accompanied by formation of independent mineral phases of uranium oxide and ningyoite type.

Remediation of former uranium mining and milling facilities in Germany - the WISMUT experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gatzweiler, R.

2000-01-01

The former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) provided most of the natural uranium for the nuclear programmes of the former Soviet Union. Uranium mining and milling activities caused extensive devastation and resulted in large amounts of waste with serious impacts on the environment and unacceptable risks to human health. Production ceased in 1990-91 in the course of the reunification of Germany. At the same time a very large environmental remediation programme was initiated by the German Federal Government. WISMUT GmbH, the successor company of the former Soviet-German enterprise SDAG WISMUT, was designated to carry out this DM 13 billion programme. The programme is currently in its ninth year and will likely continue up to 2015. The initial assessment of the remediation and the cost estimates were based on closure plans for the mining and milling facilities, an extensive environmental database and basic concepts for site specific remediation in accordance with legal requirements and directives. The decision making process for individual remediation objects is based on risk analyses and the evaluation of remediation options. The methodologies used depend on the size and complexity of the individual object. For simple cases, an environmental assessment study is used. Remediation options for larger and more complex objects such as tailings facilities are evaluated by multi-attribute analysis with emphasis on sensitivity investigations. The general public is not formally involved in the decision making process but is informed on conceptual remediation plans for the individual sites. These plans are regularly updated. For several of the remediated facilities, future use cannot be unrestricted and therefore, some form of institutional control is needed. To date, criteria for close-out have not been clearly defined for all sites. Similarly, criteria concerning transfer of ownership and responsibilities for long term surveillance and maintenance have yet to be

Liquid membrane process for uranium recovery

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valint, P.L. Jr.

1982-01-01

An improved liquid membrane emulsion extraction process for recovering uranium from a WPPA feed solution containing uranyl cations wherein said feed is contacted with a water-in-oil emulsion which extracts and captures the uranium in the interior aqueous phase thereof, wherein the improvement comprises the presence of an alkane diphosphonic acid uranium complexing agent in the interior phase of the emulsion. This improvement results in greater extraction efficiency

Long-term criticality control in radioactive waste disposal facilities using depleted uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsberg, C.W.

1997-01-01

Plant photosynthesis has created a unique planetary-wide geochemistry - an oxidizing atmosphere with oxidizing surface waters on a planetary body with chemically reducing conditions near or at some distance below the surface. Uranium is four orders of magnitude more soluble under chemically oxidizing conditions than it is under chemically reducing conditions. Thus, uranium tends to leach from surface rock and disposal sites, move with groundwater, and concentrate where chemically reducing conditions appear. Earth's geochemistry concentrates uranium and can separate uranium from all other elements except oxygen, hydrogen (in water), and silicon (silicates, etc). Fissile isotopes include 235 U, 233 U, and many higher actinides that eventually decay to one of these two uranium isotopes. The potential for nuclear criticality exists if the precipitated uranium from disposal sites has a significant fissile enrichment, mass, and volume. The earth's geochemistry suggests that isotopic dilution of fissile materials in waste with 238 U is a preferred strategy to prevent long-term nuclear criticality in and beyond the boundaries of waste disposal facilities because the 238 U does not separate from the fissile uranium isotopes. Geological, laboratory, and theoretical data indicate that the potential for nuclear criticality can be minimized by diluting fissile materials with- 238 U to 1 wt % 235 U equivalent

Processing of stored uranium tetrafluoride for productive use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whinnery, W.N. III

1987-01-01

Waste uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) was created from converting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to UF4 for generation of hydrogen fluoride. This resulted in more tails cylinders being made available in the early days of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. A need arose for the UF4; however, a large portion of the material was stored outside in 55-gallon drums where the material became caked and very hard. Chemical operations crushed, ground, and screened a large portion of the waste UF4 from 1981-1987. Over 111,935,000 pounds of the material has been processed and put into productive use at Westinghouse Materials Company of Ohio or at Department of Defense facilities. This long-term effort saved the disposal cost of the material which is estimated at $9,327,900. In addition, the work was for an outside contract which lowered the operating cost of the Chemical Operations Department by $4,477,400. Disposal options for the material still present in the current inventory are outlined

Chattanooga shale: uranium recovery by in situ processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jackson, D.D.

1977-01-01

The increasing demand for uranium as reactor fuel requires the addition of sizable new domestic reserves. One of the largest potential sources of low-grade uranium ore is the Chattanooga shale--a formation in Tennessee and neighboring states that has not been mined conventionally because it is expensive and environmentally disadvantageous to do so. An in situ process, on the other hand, might be used to extract uranium from this formation without the attendant problems of conventional mining. We have suggested developing such a process, in which fracturing, retorting, and pressure leaching might be used to extract the uranium. The potential advantages of such a process are that capital investment would be reduced, handling and disposing of the ore would be avoided, and leaching reagents would be self-generated from air and water. If successful, the cost reductions from these factors could make the uranium produced competitive with that from other sources, and substantially increase domestic reserves. A technical program to evaluate the processing problems has been outlined and a conceptual model of the extraction process has been developed. Preliminary cost estimates have been made, although it is recognized that their validity depends on how successfully the various processing steps are carried out. In view of the preliminary nature of this survey (and our growing need for uranium), we have urged a more detailed study on the feasibility of in situ methods for extracting uranium from the Chattanooga shale

Process for recovering uranium

Science.gov (United States)

MacWood, G. E.; Wilder, C. D.; Altman, D.

1959-03-24

A process useful in recovering uranium from deposits on stainless steel liner surfaces of calutrons is presented. The deposit is removed from the stainless steel surface by washing with aqueous nitric acid. The solution obtained containing uranium, chromium, nickel, copper, and iron is treated with an excess of ammonium hydroxide to precipitnte the uranium, iron, and chromium and convert the nickel and copper to soluble ammonio complexions. The precipitated material is removed, dried and treated with carbon tetrachloride at an elevated temperature of about 500 to 600 deg C to form a vapor mixture of UCl/ sub 4/, UCl/sub 5/, FeCl/sub 3/, and CrCl/sub 4/. The UCl/sub 4/ is separated from this vapor mixture by selective fractional condensation at a temperature of about 500 to 400 deg C.

Detection of uranium enrichment activities using environmental monitoring techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Belew, W.L.; Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

1993-01-01

Uranium enrichment processes have the capability of producing weapons-grade material in the form of highly enriched uranium. Thus, detection of undeclared uranium enrichment activities is an international safeguards concern. The uranium separation technologies currently in use employ UF 6 gas as a separation medium, and trace quantities of enriched uranium are inevitably released to the environment from these facilities. The isotopic content of uranium in the vegetation, soil, and water near the plant site will be altered by these releases and can provide a signature for detecting the presence of enriched uranium activities. This paper discusses environmental sampling and analytical procedures that have been used for the detection of uranium enrichment facilities and possible safeguards applications of these techniques

Analysis on possible North Korea's uranium stock by using open source information

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Jung Hyun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2012-10-15

The gas centrifuge plant in Yongbyon is the only revealed uranium enrichment plant in North Korea. Yongbyon enrichment plant is believed producing only LEU below 5 percent uranium 235 for use as fuel in the LWR, as they said. But the plant could be easily converted to producing HEU for nuclear weapons. In this paper, we estimated the enrichment capability of the Yongbyon plant based on the known characteristics of its centrifuges and cascades. And then we developed the four possible uranium enrichment scenarios, to examine the future options that North Korea may use to enhance its enrichment capability. Finally, we suggested several key measures to stop North Korea from pursing its nuclear ambitions.

PROCESSES OF CHLORINATION OF URANIUM OXIDES

Science.gov (United States)

Rosenfeld, S.

1958-09-16

An improvement is described in the process fur making UCl/sub 4/ from uranium oxide and carbon tetrachloride. In that process, oxides of uranium are contacted with carbon tetrachloride vapor at an elevated temperature. It has been fuund that the reaction product and yield are improved if the uranlum oxide charge is disposed in flat trays in the reaction zone, to a depth of not more than 1/2 centimeter.

Conversion of highly enriched uranium in thorium-232 based oxide fuel for light water reactors: MOX-T fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vapirev, E I; Jordanov, T; Christoskov, I [Sofia Univ. (Bulgaria). Fizicheski Fakultet

1994-12-31

The idea of conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from warheads without mixing it with natural uranium as well as the utilization of plutonium as fuel component is discussed. A nuclear fuel which is a mixture of 4% {sup 235}U (HEU) as a fissile isotope and 96 % {sup 232}Th (ThO{sub 2}) as a non-fissile isotope in a mixed oxide with thorium fuel is proposed. It is assumed that plutonium can also be used in the proposed fuel in a mixture with {sup 235}U. The following advantages of the use of HEU in LWRs in mixed {sup 235}U - Th fuel are pointed out: (1) No generation of long-living plutonium and americium isotopes (in case of reprocessing the high level radioactive wastes will contain only fission fragments and uranium); (2) The high conversion ratio of Th extends the expected burnup by approximately 1/3 without higher initial enrichment (the same initial enrichment simplifies the problem for compensation of the excess reactivity in the beginning with burnable poison and boric acid); (3) The high conversion ratio of Th allows the fuel utilization with less initial enrichment (by approx. 1/3) for the same burnup; thus less excess reactivity has to be compensated after reloading; in case of fuel reprocessing all fissile materials ({sup 235}U + {sup 233}U) could be chemically extracted. Irrespectively to the optimistic expectations outlined, further work including data on optimal loading and reloading schemes, theoretical calculations of thermal properties of {sup 235}U + Th fuel rods, manufacturing of several test fuel assemblies and investigations of their operational behaviour in a reactor core is still needed. 1 fig., 7 refs.

Domestic round robin exercise on analysis of uranium for nuclear material handling facilities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kato, Yoshiyasu; Nagai, Kohta; Handa, Takamitsu; Inoue, Shin-ichi; Sato, Yoshihiro

2016-01-01

Interlaboratory comparison programme as well as internal quality control system is an effective tool for an analytical laboratory responsible to nuclear material accountancy of a nuclear facility to maintain and enhance its capability for analysis. However, it is a burden on nuclear material handling facilities in Japan to attend interlaboratory comparison programme run by overseas institutions because of high costs and complicated procedure for importing nuclear materials, and therefore facilities which can participate in such international programme would be limited. Nuclear Material Control Center has hence started and organised an annual domestic round robin exercise on analysis of uranium standard materials, funded by the Japan Safeguards Office of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, since 2008 to enhance analytical capability of Japanese Facilities. The outline of the round robin exercise will be given and the results of uranium isotopic and concentration analysis reported by participant facilities from 2008 to 2015 will be summarised in the presentation. (author)

Calculation of mixed HEU-LEU cores for the HOR research reactor with the scale code system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leege, P.F.A. de; Gibcus, H.P.M.; Hoogenboom, J.E.; Vries, J.W. de

1997-01-01

The HOR reactor of Interfaculty Reactor Institute (IRI), Delft, The Netherlands, will be converted to use low enriched fuel (LEU) assemblies. As there are still many usable high enriched (HEU) fuel assemblies present, there will be a considerable reactor operation time with mixed cores with both HEU and LEU fuel assemblies. At IRI a comprehensive reactor physics code system and evaluated nuclear data is implemented for detailed core calculations. One of the backbones of the IRI code system is the well-known SCALE code system package. Full core calculations are performed with the diffusion theory code BOLD VENTURE, the nodal code SILWER, and the Monte Carlo code KENO Va. Results are displayed of a strategy from a HEU core to a mixed HEU-LEU core and eventually a LEU core. (author)

Application of Taguchi method for separation of uranium from acetate bearing wastewater using hydroxamic acid based sorbent

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Satpati, S.K.; Hareendran, K.; Roy, S.B.; Vaidya, A.; Bankar, V.; Dasgupta, K.; Pal, S.

2016-01-01

Separation and recovery of uranium from effluent of nuclear facility has drawn immense attention in separation science research. The acetic acid based uranium solution effluent generated in uranium metal powder production facility was targeted for the study. Solid state separation technique has been employed using hydroxamic acid based chelating sorbent because of several advantages. In the study, the sorbent performances have been evaluated for its important parameters like isotherm, efficiency and kinetics. The equilibrium adsorption capacity (q e ) and distribution coefficient (K d ) of U(VI) have been evaluated as 3.24 mg/g sorbent and 805 ml/g sorbent respectively. Uranium has been recovered using HCl solution. Uranium removal from the feed was found to be more than 95% and the recovery of uranium was more than 99% from the adsorbed phase. Elution process is faster than sorption process. Taguchi optimization method has been applied for designing experimental study and also to identify the optimum operational conditions for uranium separation process.The developed process is useful for separation and recovery of uranium from acetate bearing wastewater generated in uranium processing facilities

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility: Coprecal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

1979-02-01

This report describes the conceptual design of an advanced materials-management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility based on the Coprecal process. Design concepts are presented for near real-time (dynamic) accountability by forming dynamic materials balances from information provided by chemical and nondestructive analyses and from process-control instrumentation. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to compare the sensitivities of proposed dynamic materials accounting strategies to both abrupt and protracted diversion. The safeguards implications of coconversion as well as some unique features of the reference process are discussed and design criteria are identified to improve the safeguardability of the Coprecal coconversion process

Fire hazards analysis for the uranium oxide (UO3) facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wyatt, D.M.

1994-01-01

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) documents the deactivation end-point status of the UO 3 complex fire hazards, fire protection and life safety systems. This FHA has been prepared for the Uranium Oxide Facility by Westinghouse Hanford Company in accordance with the criteria established in DOE 5480.7A, Fire Protection and RLID 5480.7, Fire Protection. The purpose of the Fire Hazards Analysis is to comprehensively and quantitatively assess the risk from a fire within individual fire areas in a Department of Energy facility so as to ascertain whether the objectives stated in DOE Order 5480.7, paragraph 4 are met. Particular attention has been paid to RLID 5480.7, Section 8.3, which specifies the criteria for deactivating fire protection in decommission and demolition facilities

Numerical simulation of radon migration from a uranium ore storage facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vasil'ev, I.A.; Politov, V.Yu.; Chernov, V.V.; Shestakov, A.A.

2007-01-01

Data on geologic structure and radiation environment in the vicinity of the tailings storage facility (TSF) of Kara-Balta uranium hydrometallurgical factory in Kyrgyzstan were used to design a mathematical model of radon migration from the surface of TSF. Numerical calculations have been performed to describe prevalence of radon contamination [ru

Processing of Sierra Albarrana uranium ores

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gutierrez Jodra, L.; Perez Luina, A.; Perarnau, M.

1960-01-01

Uranium recovery by hydrometallurgy from brannerite, found in Hornachuelos (Cordoba) is described. It has been studied the acid and alkaline leaching and salt roasting, proving as more satisfactory the acid leaching. Besides the uranium solubilization by acid leaching, is described the further process to obtain pure uranyl nitrate. (Author)

Cost study on waste management at three model Canadian uranium mines

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-03-01

A waste management cost study was initiated to determine the capital and operating costs of three different uranium waste management systems which incorporate current technologies being used in Canadian uranium mining operations. Cost estimates were to be done to a thirty percent level of accuracy and were to include all waste management related costs of a uranium ore processing facility. Each model is based on an annual uranium production of 1,923,000 kg U (5,000,000 lbs U 3 O 8 ) with a total operating life of 20 years for the facility. The three models, A, B, and C, are based on three different uranium ore grades, 0.10 percent U 3 O 8 , 0.475 percent U 3 O 8 and 1.5 percent U 3 O 8 respectively. Yellowcake production is assumed to start in January 1984. Model A is based on a conceptual 7,180 tonne per day uranium ore processing facility and waste management system typical of uranium operations in the Elliot Lake area of northern Ontario with an established infrastructure. Model B is a 1.512 tonne per day operation based on a remote uranium operation typical of the Athabasca Basin properties in northern Saskatchewan. Model C is a 466 tonne per day operation processing a high-grade uranium ore containing arsenic and heavy metal concentrations typical of some northern Saskatchewan deposits

Use of historical uranium air sampling data to estimate worker exposure potential to airborne radioactive particulate in a uranium processing facility.

Science.gov (United States)

Methner, M M; Feng, H A; Utterback, D F

2001-12-01